Understanding Information Asymmetries through Mechanism Design

Abstract

Táto práca má za cieľ poskytnúť úvod a prehľad rozsiahlych a úzko súvisiacich oblastí dizajnu mechanizmov, teórie kontraktov a informačnej ekonómie. Každá kapitola prezentuje ucelenú teóriu z jednotlivých aplikovaných oblastí - napríklad negatívny výber, morálny hazard a aukcie. Práca má dva hlavné prínosy: jednak popisuje hlavné princípy teórie dizajnu mechanizmov a taktiež skúma konkrétne modely informačných asymetrií. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

This thesis serves as an introduction and overview of the broad and closely related fields of mechanism design, contract theory, and information economics. Each chapter is intended to provide a self-contained guide to the particular area of application -- examples include adverse selection, moral hazard, and auctions. The reader should benefit from the thesis in two ways: by understanding the general notions of the revelation principle, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality from the mechanism design theory as well as by examining the particular information asymmetry models in the individual areas. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)