Understanding Information Asymmetries through Mechanism Design
Chápanie informačných asymetrií pomocou dizajnu mechanizmov
diploma thesis (DEFENDED)

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Permanent link
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/72575Collections
- Kvalifikační práce [12447]
Author
Advisor
Referee
Adam, Tomáš
Faculty / Institute
Faculty of Social Sciences
Discipline
Economics
Department
Institute of Economic Studies
Date of defense
24. 9. 2014
Publisher
Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědLanguage
English
Grade
Excellent
Keywords (Czech)
mechanism design, information asymmetries, monotonicity, revelation principle, incentive compatibility
Keywords (English)
mechanism design, information asymmetries, monotonicity, revelation principle, incentive compatibility
Táto práca má za cieľ poskytnúť úvod a prehľad rozsiahlych a úzko súvisiacich oblastí dizajnu mechanizmov, teórie kontraktov a informačnej ekonómie. Každá kapitola prezentuje ucelenú teóriu z jednotlivých aplikovaných oblastí - napríklad negatívny výber, morálny hazard a aukcie. Práca má dva hlavné prínosy: jednak popisuje hlavné princípy teórie dizajnu mechanizmov a taktiež skúma konkrétne modely informačných asymetrií. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
This thesis serves as an introduction and overview of the broad and closely related fields of mechanism design, contract theory, and information economics. Each chapter is intended to provide a self-contained guide to the particular area of application -- examples include adverse selection, moral hazard, and auctions. The reader should benefit from the thesis in two ways: by understanding the general notions of the revelation principle, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality from the mechanism design theory as well as by examining the particular information asymmetry models in the individual areas. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)