Germany's Post-2022 Deterrence and the Russian Nuclear Threat: A Credibility Assessment

Abstract

This thesis examines the extent to which Russian nuclear signaling deterred German military aid to Ukraine from January 1, 2022, to November 6, 2024, and what this suggests about the credibility of Germany's deterrence efforts after February 24, 2022. The analysis builds on three datasets, which record Russian nuclear signaling, German military aid, and German strategic decisions affecting its deterrence posture. It uses a longitudinal analysis and closely examines the concrete cases of the Panzerhaubitze 2000, Leopard tanks, and the Taurus cruise missile. The findings indicate that Germany was not deterred from providing and expanding military aid overall, but Russian nuclear signaling made an identifiable but uneven contribution to restraint. There appears to be a very limited or no deterrence effect on systems associated with lower escalation sensitivity, while the thesis finds substantial deterrence effects on higher escalation-sensitivity systems. Germany's examined deterrence efforts are predominantly in line with the pre-2022 overall posture, with its emphasis on conventional-denial capabilities intended for direct deterrence. But some strategic decisions introduce some nuances, especially a greater degree of providing extended deterrence and forward exposure as well as a possibly increased...