Risk assessment: VNSAs' ability to achieve CBRN capabilities

Abstract

Academics disagree on the risk of VNSAs being able to build or acquire CBRN weapons. Their analysis is based on motivation, geographical factors, potential targets, and VNSA group attributes. Missing is the detailed investigation of how and where a VNSA obtains the necessary precursor materials and the type of security surrounding common materials used for CBRN weapons. This paper will explore the possible routes an actor could take to acquire the knowledge, skills, and materials necessary to make an operable CBRN weapon. Case studies are used to show past routes that allowed VNSAs to achieve capability and the type of weapon and attack utilized. The implementation of regulations, both in response to CBRN attacks and their effectiveness in preventing VNSA CBRN weapon capability, are analyzed. Public online forums, weapons manuals and weapons research along with past prosecuted criminal CBRN attacks revealed the financial capacity needed to acquire materials as well as the technical capacity required to build a successful CBRN system. Existing databases logging insecurity in nuclear facilities, radioisotope thefts, chemical and biological incidents and more are used to establish trends among past and present pursuits and use of CBRN weapons. Viable routes to CBRN capability remain reenforcing the...