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dc.contributorFabianková Klára, Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics, Prague, W. Churchill Sq. 4, 130 67, Praha, Czech Republic , klara.fabiankova@vse.cz
dc.creatorFabianková, Klára
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dc.date2015
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dc.date.accessioned2018-05-28T11:04:47Z
dc.date.available2018-05-28T11:04:47Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifierISSN 2336-7105
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/96836
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dc.descriptionThe aim of the essay is to analyse the most important circumstances which could affected the final Stalin’s decision leading to the ratification of Soviet-German political relations at the end of the thirties. Among others to verify the affirmation that it was a calculated deal with exact objectives in the case of Ribbentrop-Molotov‘s Pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23rd, 1939 was a calculated accord with precise objectives when in both systems common national interests, which consisted also in the partition of Poland, overshadowed their ideological differences. This paper outlines the circumstances of the negotiations, the main actors, and motives leading to the creation of the agreement. A part of the research is the analysis of importance and direct consequences of the German-Soviet Pact. The political alliance provided Germany both a feeling of relative security in the war against Poland and neutrality of the second party, including the guarantee of a series of commodities necessary for the war economy. The defensive alliance of Western powers became inefficient. The August and September pacts enabled the Soviet Union to restrict the scope and authority of the Nazi regime in the East European territory by which minimalized the war threat temporarily. They at the same time ensured that Stalin had an approach to strategical economical areas at the Western border, not unnecessary even for his defensive.
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dc.publisherUniverzita Karlova v Praze, Filozofická fakulta
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dc.rights
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dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/
dc.sourcePrague Papers on the History of International Relations 2015, 2, 102-126
dc.subjectHitler
dc.subjectGermany
dc.subjectSoviet Union
dc.subjectRibbentrop-Molotov Pact
dc.subjectPolitical Relations
dc.subjectAugust 1939
dc.titleSearch for Partnership: German-Soviet Political Relations on the Eve of the Second World War
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dc.typeČlánekcs_CZ
dc.typeArticleen_US
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dc.description.startPage102
dc.description.endPage126
dcterms.isPartOf.namePrague Papers on the History of International Relationscs_CZ
dcterms.isPartOf.journalYear2015
dcterms.isPartOf.journalVolume2015
dcterms.isPartOf.journalIssue2


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