Speaking the mind, minding the language

Abstract

Pr ace ukazuje, ze k probl emu vztahu t ela a mysli, a konkr etn e k ot azce vysv etlitelnosti v edom p r rodn mi v edami, je t reba p ristu- povat skrze zkoum an jazyka a v yznamu. Za j adro probl emu vz- tahu t ela a mysli je ozna cena kantovsk a transcendent aln jed- nota apercepce a je zd urazn en rozd l mezi empirick ym a tran- scendent aln m v edom m. P redpokl ad a se, ze empirick e v edom je uspokojiv e vysv etliteln e pomoc teorie my slenek vy s s ho r adu. N asleduje rozbor r uzn ych aspekt u v yznamu, intencionality a u zit jazyka, kter e podporuj z av er, ze podm nky mo znosti b yti mluv- c m jazyka s sebou nesou transcendent aln podm nky v edom . O jazyku lze tak r ci, ze konstituuje v edom nejen v tom smyslu, ze krit eria p rips an v edom n e cemu (n ekomu) jsou ve sv e podstat e jazykov a, ale t e z ve smyslu, ze v edom se objevuje se schopnost mluvit.

The thesis proposes to address the mind-body problem, and specif- ically the question of scienti c explanation of consciousness, in terms of language and meaning. First, the core of the mind- problem is identi ed with Kant's transcendental unity of apper- ception and the distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness is emphasized. Empirical consciousness, as con- sciousness of something, is assumed to be best approached by a higher-order theory of consciousness. Then various aspects of meaning, intentionality and language in use are discussed to pre- pare ground for the conclusion that transcendental conditions of consciousness are entailed by conditions of being a genuine speaker of language. Thus language can be said to be constitutive consciousness not only in the sense that the behavioural criteria for attributing consciousness are essentially linguistic, but also in the sense that consciousness comes with the ability to speak.