Anti-Corruption Mechanism in Economic Models of Corruption
Anti-Corruption Mechanism in Economic Models of Corruption
dizertační práce (OBHÁJENO)
Zobrazit/ otevřít
Trvalý odkaz
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/21564Identifikátory
SIS: 84640
Kolekce
- Kvalifikační práce [17642]
Autor
Vedoucí práce
Oponent práce
Frank, Bjorn
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Fakulta / součást
Fakulta sociálních věd
Obor
Ekonomie
Katedra / ústav / klinika
CERGE
Datum obhajoby
17. 12. 2009
Nakladatel
Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědJazyk
Angličtina
Známka
Prospěl/a
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms in Economic Models of Corruption Jana Krajčová Abstract This dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I...
This dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I demonstrate, for the first time as far as I know, that real-world subjects...