Securitising biology: Biological threats and state preparedness in the wake of a pandemic
Sekuritizace biologie: Biologické hrozby a připravenost státu v kontextu pandemie
diplomová práce (OBHÁJENO)
Zobrazit/ otevřít
Trvalý odkaz
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/150386Identifikátory
SIS: 236813
Kolekce
- Kvalifikační práce [17132]
Autor
Vedoucí práce
Oponent práce
Butler, Eamonn
Fakulta / součást
Fakulta sociálních věd
Obor
International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies (IMSISS)
Katedra / ústav / klinika
Katedra bezpečnostních studií
Datum obhajoby
15. 9. 2021
Nakladatel
Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědJazyk
Angličtina
Známka
Výborně
Klíčová slova (česky)
anti-sekuritizace, antrax, biologické zbraně, biologické hrozby, COVID-19, ebola, infekční choroby, připravenost na pandemii, ochrana veřejného zdraví, sekuritizace, USAKlíčová slova (anglicky)
anti-securitisation, anthrax, biological weapons, biothreats, COVID-19, Ebola, infectious diseases, pandemic preparedness, public health, securitisation, United States64053643 SECURITISING BIOLOGY: BIOLOGICAL THREATS AND STATE PREPAREDNESS IN THE WAKE OF A PANDEMIC ABSTRACT The management of infectious diseases in the realm of public health has shown increasingly overlapping areas with biological warfare preparedness. While the acknowledgement of these common elements is not only frequent but also codified in an international treaty and subject to distinct regulations, research into how these two fields connect is scarce. Potential deliberate use of biological weapons typically leads to intense political mobilisation and ensuing dedication of financial resources. Contrarily, the management of health crises over the last decades has been severely flawed, and no country in the world is considered fully prepared to a pandemic, according to the Global Health Security Index. The current COVID-19 pandemic has recently been further proof of the inadequacy of state-level prevention and preparedness capabilities. This dissertation aims at bridging the existing conceptual gap and policy divide between biological warfare and infectious disease preparedness, and to analyse elements that can be mutually applicable and potentially beneficial. It will do so by establishing analytical equivalence between the securitisation of an artificial biothreat and a nature-borne infectious disease...