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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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**The change of normative perception and thinking about
the Nuclear Sharing within NATO**

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2018

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
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In Prague on 10th May 2018

David Kořínek

References

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Abstract

The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the development of the NATO's normative perception and thinking over the nuclear weapons and the nuclear sharing concept. While the nuclear sharing lays in the main area of the interest of this thesis, the approach towards the nuclear weapons itself is the inseparable component of this research. This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The chapter one explains the historical position of the nuclear weapons in the NATO thinking and the history of the nuclear sharing in relation to the NPT. It also introduces the basic theoretical debate and definition of the concept. The chapter two explains the chosen methodological framework, describes the set of analysed documents and sets rules for the coding of those documents. For the purposes of this analysis, I decided to use the methodological framework of the content analysis, which is created through the content analysis software NVivo 12. It is followed by the chapter three which is visualising and explaining the results of the content analysis created following the script already described in the chapter two.

Abstrakt

Primárním cílem této práce je analyzovat vývoj normativního vnímání a uvažování o jaderných zbraních a jejich sdílení v rámci NATO. V samotném centru zájmu této práce leží koncept sdílení jaderných zbraní Severoatlantické aliance, který však nemůže být zkoumán bez obdobné analýzy zaměřené na vnímání a uvažování o jaderných zbraních samotných. Tato práce je rozdělena do tří kapitol. První kapitola vysvětluje historickou pozici jaderných zbraní v rámci struktur NATO a minulost konceptu jejich sdílení ve vztahu ke Smlouvě o nešíření jaderných zbraní. Taktéž představuje základní teoretickou debatu a definici konceptu. Kapitola dvě pak vysvětluje metodologický rámec práce, popisuje set analyzovaných dokumentů a pravidla pro jejich kódování. Pro účely této práce jsem se rozhodl použít software pro obsahovou analýzu NVivo 12. Poté následuje kapitola tři, která vizualizuje a vysvětluje výsledky obsahové analýzy zpracované na základě schématu popsaného v kapitole dvě.

Keywords

Nuclear sharing, NATO, Nuclear weapons, Nuclear doctrine, Deterrence, Content analysis, normative perception

Klíčová slova

Sdílení jaderných zbraní, NATO, jaderné zbraně, nukleární doktrína, odstrašování, obsahová analýza, hodnotové vnímání

Název práce

Změna v normativním vnímání a uvažování o sdílení jaderných zbraní v rámci NATO

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List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF	Intermediate Range Force Treaty
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NW	Nuclear Weapons
NWS	Nuclear Weapon State
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

The nuclear sharing concept has been one of the key pillars of the nuclear policy and capabilities of the NATO. It was introduced as the consequence of the rising hostility among the East and West during the Cold War and as the guarantee of the security and deterrence capabilities of the European part of the Alliance. The relatively newly emerging international criticism of this concept, mainly represented by the concerns of the Russian Federation during the NPT review conferences, accompanied with the general international commitment to decrease the risk of the nuclear conflict and the reduction of the international stockpile of the NWs puts the future of this concept into question.

The main interest of this thesis lays in the understanding of the development of the NATO's normative perception and understanding of the nuclear sharing concept, its benefits and possible risks and also how were these approaches and perceptions constructed through the wording of the Alliance's strategic documents. Such an understanding would provide us with the better position for the possible future research of the sustainable development of the NATO's nuclear deterrent and shared arsenals. Without the proper understanding of the Alliance's perception and attitude toward such a concept, it would be rather complicated to understand, how could this phenomenon develop. According to the close relation of this concept to the perception of nuclear weapons as the weapon category and a tool in the international relations, it is important to also analyse the NATO's understanding, perception and approach toward the nuclear weapons itself.

For these purposes, I decided to use the methodological framework of the content analysis and utilize it to understand the development of the NATO's thinking and perception of nuclear sharing in the set of to the nuclear policy related strategic documents. I created a set of 108 documents from the whole period of the Alliance's existence. This set consists of the Nuclear Planning Group final communiques, the NATO's ministerial summit final communiques or declarations and the strategic concepts accompanied by its most important supplements. This set of documents is also extended by the documents mentioned by the NATO's official website as those of high influence to the Alliance's perception and thinking about the nuclear weapons and the nuclear sharing concept.

This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The chapter one will explain the historical position of the nuclear weapons in the NATO thinking and the history of the nuclear sharing. It will also introduce the definition of the nuclear sharing and the basic theoretical framework explaining why the actor could be willing to adopt it. The very important part of the chapter will cover the relation of the NATO's nuclear sharing and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the main international treaty limiting the proliferation of the NWs, institutionalising the current relations among the NWS and NNWS, and which is used as a legislative background for the international criticism of the nuclear sharing concept. The chapter two will explain the chosen methodological framework, describe the set of analysed documents and set rules for the coding of those documents. It will be followed by the chapter three which will visualise and explain the results of the content analysis created following the script already described in chapter two.

1 The concept of Nuclear Sharing and its theoretical understanding

1.1 Brief history of nuclear sharing and why is it important

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the main guarantor of the European security since its foundation in 1949. The most important feature of this guarantee for the whole period of the Cold War era was the willingness of the United States of America to protect its European Allies from the Soviet threat. This feature was even multiplied with the spread of the nuclear weapons possession to the Soviet Union, which led to the introduction of so-called Nuclear Sharing Concept, which provides the USA with an opportunity to provide its nuclear weapons, launchers and means under the joint command with its European allies.

These shared nuclear capabilities became the main instrument of the insurance against the potential Soviet attack. Even though there were more than 300 000 of the U.S. military personals and a significant amount of the conventional military vehicles and technique, the conventional defensive capabilities of the European part of the Alliance against the potential Soviet attack were not sufficient enough to face the Soviet numerical superiority in the conventional power.

The importance of the nuclear sharing concept was preserved even after the successful testing and introduction of the British and French nuclear capabilities. The reason for the maintenance of the nuclear sharing concept was, that the Americans were the only member nation willing to partly provide its nuclear capabilities under the shared command. *“NATO, per se, does not actually possess any nuclear weapons. Rather, the US, UK, and France possess national nuclear forces that they may or may not make available to NATO depending on the strategic circumstances.”*¹ writes Ian P. Rutherford in his article NATO ‘s new strategic concept, nuclear weapons, and global zero from 2011.

It means that the Alliance itself has never possessed nuclear weapons even though it proclaims itself to be nuclear alliance. American nuclear weapons were stationed in several countries all around the European part of the Alliance. Several hundreds of B61 atomic bombs could be found in Canada until 1972 (in fact the American nuclear weapons were stationed in Canada even after through North American Aerospace Defense

¹ RUTHERFORD, I. NATO's new strategic concept, nuclear weapons, and global zero. International Journal, 66(2), 463-482. 2011. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27976103>. Page 465.

Command), in the United Kingdom until 1992 and in Greece until 2001. And about two hundred of American nuclear weapons are still stationed in Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey.

The history of nuclear sharing is closely connected with the emergence of this weapon category on the shrink of the World War II. The principles of the sharing of nuclear know-how, technical capacities and scientific personals could be mapped even before the actual production of the first nuclear weapons by the U.S. led Manhattan Project, which was conducted in the close cooperation with the Canadian and the British scientist from 1942 to 1946.² And the cooperation in this field continued with greater or less intensity through the whole period of the Cold War among the so-called western allies, which was mainly represented by the hosting of the small amount of the American nuclear weapons on the soil of the NATO allies.³ Similar scheme could be observed on the other side of the Iron Curtain, where the USSR dislocated some components of its nuclear arsenal on the soil of allied countries from the Warsaw Pact, even though the command was exclusively in the hands of the Soviet intelligence and military officers deployed with those pieces of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which makes it rather the foreign deployment of the Soviet nuclear capabilities than the nuclear sharing.⁴ According to this fact, NATO was and still is the only alliance which introduced working nuclear sharing concept.

The public demand for the withdrawal of the shared nuclear weapons first appeared almost immediately after their deployment on the soil of the European states. But through the first decades of the Cold War era, these demands were relatively weak. The introduction and ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 should be seen as the first bigger success of the anti-nuclear movement. But the first peak of the anti-nuclear movement was just about to occur in the late seventies and eighties hand in hand with the formation of the green parties in Western Europe.

At the end of the Cold War era, the pressure on the withdrawal of the American nuclear weapons from Europe become even stronger which leads to the significant

2 CYNTHIA C. Kelly. Oppenheimer and the Manhattan project: insights into J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Father of the atomic bomb". Reprint. Singapore [u.a.]: World Scientific, 2006. ISBN 9812564187. Page 9-35.

3 KRISTENSEN, Hans M. a Robert S. NORRIS. The B61 family of nuclear bombs. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [online]. 2015, 70(3), 79-84. DOI: 10.1177/0096340214531546. ISSN 0096-3402. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1177/0096340214531546>. Page 80.

4 ZALOGA, Steve. Kremlin's nuclear sword: the rise and fall of Russia's strategic nuclear forces 1945-2000. S.I.: Smithsonian Books, 2014. ISBN 1588344843. Page 17-24.

reduction in the stockpiles of shared weapons and also to the withdrawal of some already mentioned countries from the programme.

The current debate about the future of nuclear weapons is very closely connected to the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to the Russian understanding of the treaty, the Nuclear Sharing Concept is the clear violation of the NPT. The demand of the anti-nuclear movement was even bolstered with the president Obama statements about the possibility of the World without nuclear weapons and his favour to the solution of the global zero.

In 2015 the Russian Federation publicly criticised the U.S. and its allies for the violation of the NPT: *“Article I of the Treaty (NPT) stipulates that nuclear-weapon States undertook not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly, or indirectly. Non-nuclear weapon States in their turn under Article II of the NPT undertook not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or of control over such weapons directly or indirectly. Both articles are violated during so-called ‘nuclear sharing’ when servicemen from NATO non-nuclear weapon States are trained to apply nuclear weapons and participate in the nuclear planning process.”*⁵ Which was a surprising step for the Alliance because of the fact, that the NPT was since its adoption perceived as compatible with the NATO’s nuclear sharing – this shift in the Russian understanding of the NPT could be seen as the illustrative example, how can the actor of the international system change its perception of specific concept during the time.

As one of the most influential advocates of the nuclear sharing and proliferation should be seen Kenneth Waltz. At the beginning of the 1980's, he claimed that more nuclear weapons in the hand of bigger amount of states will contribute to the higher stability of the international system and possibly even to the international peace. This idea was based on his assumption that there is no effective defence against the possible nuclear attack, which in the connection with the second-strike capabilities arsenals possessed by all the nuclear weapon states and very likely even by the internationally unrecognized holders of the nuclear weapons, makes the very idea of nuclear war unimaginable because of such high political costs related to the possible annihilation of the humankind.

⁵ Statement by M. Uliyanov, Acting Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Debate), Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York, NY, 27 April, 2015.

It means, that for Waltz the nuclear weapons, their proliferation and the sharing of nuclear know-how is the effective mean of control of the preservation of the international status quo. In his understanding, the deterrent based on the possession of the nuclear weapons by the state actor is sufficient to deterred possible war with other nuclear weapon owners.⁶ This understanding of the nuclear deterrence is typical for the representatives of the realist approach in the field of international relations, such as the American professor Robert Jervis⁷, or for geo-politicians, such as the French air force brigadier general Pierre Gallois.⁸

With such a perception of the nuclear weapons, the states already possessing the nuclear weapons, which are satisfied with the current status quo in the international order, are likely to share the nuclear know-how with their allies⁹ and possibly even with other states, which are not directly hostile.¹⁰ On the other hand, the states, that consider their position in the international political hierarchy to be weak or underestimated, are usually not willing of the sharing of the nuclear know-how or components of the nuclear arsenal with the other states, especially not with non-nuclear weapon states.¹¹ This thesis is primarily concerned with the first-mentioned group of states, which means that the cases of the nuclear sharing will be described in the following chapters and then the case of NATO nuclear sharing, which should be seen as the only case of the nuclear sharing successfully introduced in the human history will be analysed in the forthcoming chapters.

1.2 Definition of nuclear sharing and the European reality

At first, it is important to define what is counted as the nuclear sharing for the purposes of this thesis. There are several differently wide understandings of the nuclear sharing concept. Based on the analysis of the NATO development and with regards to the

6 WALTZ, Kenneth N. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better: Introduction*, 2008. *The Adelphi Papers*, 21:171, 1, DOI: 10.1080/05679328108457394

7 JERVIS, Robert. *The meaning of the nuclear revolution: statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. ISBN 0801495652.

8 GALLOIS, Pierre M. *The balance of terror: strategy for the nuclear age*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961. Page 187-194

9 MANDELBAUM, Michael. *The nuclear revolution: international politics before and after Hiroshima*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. ISBN 9780521282390. Page 57-58.

10 GARRITY, Patrick J. a Steven A. MAARANEN, ed. *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World* [online]. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1992. ISBN 978-1-4684-5744-5. Page 225-228.

11 Zanyvl Krieger, and Ariel Ilan Roth. "Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory." *International Studies Review*, vol. 9, no. 3, 2007, pp. 369–384. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4621831. Page 370-371.

focus of this thesis it is natural to use the NATO's understanding. The Alliance perceives the nuclear sharing as the joint control over the stockpile of the U.S. nuclear weapons dedicated to the sharing on the soil of specific European allies. Those weapons, while still in the formal possession of the U.S., could be loaded to the allied multi-purpose aircraft and activated by entering the Permissive Action Link code by U.S. soldiers guarding them on the command of the U.S. president. Such a step would transfer those nuclear weapons into the command of the allied NATO member state. It means, that the nuclear sharing within the NATO's thinking is about sharing the training and technologies needed for the successful launching of the specific nuclear weapons stationed on the soil of allied NATO member states in the case of danger, while the formal control over those weapons stays in the hands of the U.S. troops during the peacetime.¹²

As was mentioned above – there are several other understandings of nuclear sharing, some of them are significantly broader, as an example of such an approach we can take definition adopted by Julian Schofield: *“Sharing nuclear weapons entails considering not simply the nuclear warheads, but also the materials, fissile and otherwise, the technology, the manufacturing capability and the delivery means, including missiles, bombers and submarines, and in effect, anything that contributes to or enhances a nuclear military capability. A fission demonstration device without a means of delivery may be worse than useless, creating vulnerability, instability and incentives for preventive attack (...) Permissiveness may give the recipient state the capacity to manufacture or use nuclear weapons. The assumption here is that the nuclear donor has superior technical ability to the nuclear recipient, although the dynamics of nuclear sharing apply to partnerships as well. Nuclear sharing in this context consists of the creation of human capital, direct transfer of nuclear fuels and fissile explosives, associated command and control technology, or delivery vehicles.”*¹³

12 NASSAUER, Otfried. Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal? BITS – Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security. Published in April 2001. Accessed on 10/04/18. Available at: <https://www.bits.de/public/articles/sda-05-01.htm>

13 SCHOFIELD, Julian. *Strategic nuclear sharing*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. ISBN 9781137298447. Page 2.

According to several authors such as Garry Milhollin¹⁴, Christopher Chyba, Chaim Braun or George Bunn¹⁵, there cannot be the distinction between nuclear weapons and missile technology, because all the states developing ballistic missiles were and still are interested in the use of such technology for purposes of delivery of the nuclear weapons if not immediately, then possibly in the future. Which is on the other hand challenged by the fact, that the nuclear weapons could be delivered by the several means already in possession of the non-nuclear weapon states (multi-purpose aircraft) or even private companies (missiles).

Currently there are less than two hundred of American NWs deployed under the shared command in five European countries – Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Turkey and Belgium.¹⁶ All of those weapons are freefall gravity nuclear bombs with codename B-61 in the version 11, which are dedicated to usage with dual-capable aircrafts of the hosting states. *“The pilots for these aircraft are provided with training specific to use nuclear weapons. The air force units to which these pilots and aircraft belong have the capability to play a part in NATO nuclear planning, including assigning a target, selecting the yield of the warhead for the target, and planning a specific mission for the use of the bombs.”*¹⁷ explains the principle of nuclear sharing Otfried Nassauer in his article for Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security.

The Alliance used to share even other types of NWs, but since the end of the East-West conflict and the disillusion of the Soviet Union, only the bombs dedicated to be used with dual-capable aircraft remains. *“(...) bombs on aircraft were regarded as flexible to allow the Allies to participate in NATO’s nuclear missions by providing the means of delivery and could, unlike missiles, up to a point be called back in the case of a false alarm or a fundamental change in the situation. In the NATO jargon at that time, B-61*

14 MILHOLLIN, Gary. India's Missiles—With a Little Help from Our Friends. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [online]. 2015, 45(9), 31-35, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1989.11459747. ISSN 0096-3402. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.1989.11459747>

15 BRAUN, Chaim, and William J. PERRY. “New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime.” U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Threats, edited by Christopher F. Chyba and George Bunn, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2006, pp. 126–160.

16 KRISTENSEN, Hans M. a Robert S. NORRIS. Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [online]. 2017, 73(5), 289-297 [cit. 2018-04-16]. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995. ISSN 0096-3402. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995>

17 NASSAUER, Otfried. Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal? BITS – Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security. Published in April 2001. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: <https://www.bits.de/public/articles/sda-05-01.htm>

bombs delivered by fighter bombers combined in the best possible way the requirements of flexibility, reliability, and survivability,¹⁸ explains this decision the Nuclear Threat Initiative report from 2011.

1.3 Theories of nuclear non-sharing

The situation in which states are not willing to share their nuclear know-how, any part of the nuclear arsenal or differently accept the nuclear sharing concept is significantly more often than the opposite situation in which the sharing is introduced. Schofield described three models of nuclear non-sharing, which he calls: *the elusive deterrence*; *the intervention* and *the non-proliferation bargain* models.¹⁹

1.3.1 The elusive deterrence

This model is based on fear of the policymakers and decision-makers from the possible failure of the concept of the nuclear deterrence itself. The representatives of this approach do not trust the ability of the nuclear arsenals to have the decisive role in the negotiations of the major interstate conflicts. It means that the whole concept of the nuclear deterrence is questioned, partly because of the vulnerability of the second-strike capabilities and partly because of the reliability of the weapon category itself. In the sum up it means, that the states are not willing to share their nuclear know-how with anyone, even though they are not firmly convinced that the nuclear deterrence will work. The only exception is their closest allies.²⁰

Which is partly based on the fact, that the policymakers and decision-makers are still not sure whether should be the nuclear weapons category counted more as a defensive or offensive one.²¹ This notion is based on the fact, that this weapon category was originally developed exclusively for the offensive operations, such as the bombing of two Japanese cities in 1945, and the currently much significantly emphasised feature of the nuclear deterrence which made the role of nuclear arsenal more defensive than offensive,

18 KAMP, Karl-Heinz and Robertus C. N. REMKES. Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Published on 17/11/11. Available at: http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Framework_Chpt4.pdf?_=1322701823. Page 80-81.

19 SCHOFIELD, Julian. *Strategic nuclear sharing*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. ISBN 9781137298447. Page 7-14.

20 MANDELBAUM, Michael. *The nuclear revolution: international politics before and after Hiroshima*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. ISBN 9780521282390. Page 57-58.

21 MAKHIJANI, Arjun., Howard. HU a Katherine. YIH. *Nuclear wastelands: a global guide to nuclear weapons production and its health and environmental effects*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1995. ISBN 9780262133074. Page 31.

was adopted only during the Cold War.²² The vital use of the nuclear weapons as the second-strike option is limited by the size of the arsenal possessed. The small arsenals of new nuclear-armed states could just hardly cause enough deterrence against the huge arsenals of internationally recognized nuclear weapon states, which are in most cases possessing fully developed nuclear triads or at least its significant parts and which arsenals are much higher. In very similar situation are the countries only possessing shared components of the nuclear arsenal of another country. Such as nuclear weapons are reliable useful only against the counter-value targets and because of its limited amount they cannot be used for the effective implementation of the counter-force strategy, which is often seen as the only way how to decisively fight the nuclear war.²³

1.3.2 The intervention

This model is based on the perception of the nuclear weapons as something, that automatically guarantees the possessing state the much more significant role in the international system and motivates it not to diminish its position by sharing its know-how or even aspects of the nuclear arsenal. In the sum up it means, that by preserving its significant position in the international system, the state preserves its ability to influence its allies. The logic of the non-sharing even with the close allies is justified by the idea, that the allies simply can not demand something like nuclear weapons in return for their loyalty and cooperation, otherwise, they are not true allies. The exception to this is the situation in which both states share a common enemy, who is possessing better position in the international states system and the higher level of military power than the state providing its nuclear know-how or arsenal to share. The preferable outcome of such exception is the increase of the power capabilities of the sharing state compared with the already mentioned common enemy.²⁴ The motivation for such sharing could also be the try to demotivate state's ally to search nuclear patronage at different nuclear power.²⁵

22 BOBROW, Davis B. Realism About Nuclear Spread. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* [online]. 2015, 21(10), 20-22. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1965.11454871. ISSN 0096-3402. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.1965.11454871>.

23 MEYER, S.M. a FOREWARD BY J.S. NYE JR. *Dynamics of nuclear proliferation*. S.l.: Univ Of Chicago Press, 1986. ISBN 0226521494. Page 187-194.

24 *New threats: responding to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and delivery capabilities in the Third World*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990. ISBN 0819176702. Page 5-16.

25 JERVIS, Robert. *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*. *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan., 1978), pp. 167-214. Available at: <http://www.sfu.ca/~kawasaki/Jervis%20Cooperation.pdf>. Page 167-170.

Such a pattern could be observed in the early days of the adoption of the nuclear sharing principle by the NATO and is described in the article Nuclear Sharing: NATO and N+1 Country by Albert Wohlstetter: *"We have, of course, deployed nuclear weapons under our own control in many parts of the world. In several countries, we have put weapons under the dual control of ourselves and our host. While we have not transferred warheads to the independent control of other countries, we have, in the case of several allies, sold or given them significant parts of a total system-delivery vehicles, personnel training and the like."*²⁶

The intervention model is also much more concerned with the possible use of the nuclear arsenal for the elimination of the counter-value targets, which means, that the size and technical level of the arsenal play significantly smaller role than in the case of previously mentioned elusive deterrence model. The reason is, that for the successful elimination of the opponent's counter-value targets, there is no need for the sophisticated and fully developed nuclear triad. As a consequence, the state already possessing the nuclear weapons has to be reluctant to share its nuclear know-how with anyone, because even small arsenal of the current ally can possibly become a significant threat in the future. It is also the reason, why nuclear weapon states should try to discourage its allies from the tries to obtain their own nuclear arsenals.²⁷

1.3.3 Non-proliferation bargain

This model is based on the fear from the uncontrolled proliferation of the nuclear know-how even into the unstable countries and conflict areas all around the world, which motivates the current nuclear weapons states to introduce and maintain non-proliferation schemes such as the Non-proliferation treaty and other nuclear arms control treaties.²⁸ The trigger moment for the adoption of the non-proliferation model and start of the bargaining of the non-proliferation treaties usually is the situation, in which one side shares its know-how with its allies and the other side answer with the same action

26 WOHLSTETTER, Albert. Nuclear Sharing: Nato and the N+1 Country. The Foreign Affairs. April 1961 Issue. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1961-04-01/nuclear-sharing-nato-and-n1-country>

27 SCHOFIELD, Julian. Strategic nuclear sharing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. ISBN 9781137298447. Page 10-11.

28 MEYER, S.M. a FOREWARD BY J.S. NYE JR. Dynamics of nuclear proliferation. S.I.: Univ Of Chicago Press, 1986. ISBN 0226521494. Page 193.

toward its allies, which is understood by both sides as the possible starting position for the almost uncontrollable spread of the nuclear know-how.²⁹

1.4 The nuclear sharing and the NPT

There are several international treaties, which are affecting the possession, handling with, testing and development of the nuclear weapons and the proliferation of the military grade nuclear know-how. The most influential of those treaties is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is directly affecting not only the above mentioned but also the nuclear sharing concept.

The NPT was negotiated by both sides of the East-West race during the 1970s and was opened for signature internationally in 1968. Since then 191 states from all around the world signed the treaty, which is significantly limiting the threat of the nuclear proliferation and the cooperation in the field of the military nuclear research. The main aim of the treaty is to bolster the peaceful nuclear cooperation and avoid the risk of the nuclear war.³⁰

One of the key concepts presented in the text of the treaty is the distribution of the signed states to two categories – the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapon states. This distinction is based on the right of those states to legally possess the NWs. The text of the treaty clearly allows only the NWS to possess and handle the NWs in exchange for the security guarantees for the NNWSs, that the NWs of those recognised NWSs would not be used against them not even indirectly in the form of bargaining leverage.³¹

As problematic in the context of the nuclear sharing are sometimes seen the first two articles of the NPT:

29 SCHOFIELD, Julian. Strategic nuclear sharing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. ISBN 9781137298447. Page 12-13.

30 NTI. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Published on 25/07/17. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/>

31 UNODA. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/>

Article I: “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”³²

Article II: “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”³³

The reasons for the perception of those two articles as violating the wording and the spirit of the NPT are relatively clear, even though the criticism of the NATO’s nuclear sharing as the violation of NPT occurred as relatively new phenomenon and was not strongly present in the international debate about the nuclear weapons and their proliferation during the Cold War era and in first approximately two decades after the dissolution of the USSR. According to the critics, the first article of the NPT could be violated by the USA through their deployment of its NWs on the soil of the allied NNWSs, and the second article by the hosting countries in the case of the transfer of the control over the American nuclear weapons deployed in the European member states of the Alliance.³⁴

The nature of the new criticism toward the NATO’s nuclear sharing within the NPT framework is clearly stated in the statement of M. Uliyanov the head of the Russian delegation to the NPT review conference from 27th April 2015:

*„Article I of the Treaty stipulates that nuclear-weapon states undertook not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly, or indirectly. Non-nuclear weapon States in their turn under Article II of the NPT undertook not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or of control over such weapons directly or indirectly. Both articles are violated during so called “nuclear sharing” when servicemen from NATO non-nuclear weapon States are trained to apply nuclear weapons and participate in the nuclear planning process.”*³⁵ And

32 UNODA. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – Text of the Treaty. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>

33 Ibidem.

34 NASSAUER, Otfried. Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal? BITS – Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security. Published in April 2001. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: <https://www.bits.de/public/articles/sda-05-01.htm>

35 ALBERQUE, William. The NPT and the origins of NATO’S nuclear sharing arrangements. Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Published in February 2017. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/alberque_npt_origins_nato_nuclear_2017.pdf. Page 11.

Mr Ulyianov continued with his criticism even on the next session, where he stated: *“The Russian Federation neither deployed nuclear weapons outside its territory nor transferred control of its nuclear weapons to other States, directly or indirectly. In contrast, the nuclear-sharing arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were a clear violation of articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”*³⁶

But this critic is usually seen only as the consequence of the worsening relations among the U.S. and the Russian Federation in the last few years, which does not have real justification in the text of the treaty. As another example of this worsening, we can take the Russian withdrawal from the INF treaty in 2014.³⁷ As the main reason is often mentioned the fact, that the NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements were already negotiated and American NWs deployed under the shared command in Europe in the time of the negotiation of the NPT. And the concept was not questioned by any of the treaty signing states for several decades.³⁸

The American side comes with an even stricter justification of the concept. On 30th September 1966, the American diplomat Adrian Fisher suggested, that there should be paragraph directly banning the case of war itself. The reason for this claim was, that in the case of war, the U.S. could argue, that the NPT is no longer binding and provide them with the opportunity to transfer the NWs to its allies through the already described mechanism of the nuclear sharing concept.³⁹

As was mentioned in the opening paragraph of this subchapter – there are several other international treaties limiting the handling or possession of nuclear weapons. At this point, we can name the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However, those treaties are of just limited influence to the nuclear sharing, because of their interest in the limiting of the development and testing of NWs. The slightly different role has the Treaty

36 Summary record of the 1st meeting - 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Published on 10/06/15. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT%20CONF2015%20MC.I%20SR.1.pdf>

37 ALBERQUE, William. The NPT and the origins of NATO’S nuclear sharing arrangements. Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Published in February 2017. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/alberque_npt_origins_nato_nuclear_2017.pdf. Page 12.

38 NATO. NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. NATO. Published on March 2017. Accessed on 13/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170323_170323-npt-factsheet.pdf

39 FISHER, Adrian. Memorandum for Mr Bill Moyers, Subject: Working Group Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear Arrangements. Published on 30/09/65. Accessed on 14/04/18

Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles signed on 8th December 1987⁴⁰ which banned the deployment of the whole category of IRBMs, which created the significant part of the shared nuclear deterrent of the Alliance in Europe.⁴¹

1.5 History of NATO nuclear sharing and brief prospect for future

The concept of the nuclear sharing among the U.S. and its European allies within the NATO framework was introduced in 1952 and the very first stockpile of the American nuclear weapons arrived in Britain in September 1954.⁴² In the next decade, the U.S. deployed their nuclear weapons in France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Germany and Netherlands as the consequence of the significantly increasing Soviet stockpile of their own nuclear weapons. The amount of the American NWs in Europe was reaching the level higher than seven thousand warheads in 1971. Since then, the stockpile of shared nuclear weapons is continuously decreasing with exception of the period of the negotiations about the INF Treaty.⁴³ The development of the NATO's nuclear policy until 1999 is summarised in the chart included as the Appendix no. 1.

The nuclear sharing with some allied states was abandoned or the stockpile of the stationed NWs has been reduced significantly than in the case of other participating states during the years – as an example we can take the case of Greece after military coup d'état from 1976, which was accompanied by the increasing tensions between Greece and Turkey.⁴⁴ As the consequence, the U.S. decided to reduce its stockpile of Nike Hercules missiles which led to the withdrawal of the Greek military forces from the Alliance's military command structures. At that point, the U.S. had to rethink its approach

40 U.S. Department of State. Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). U.S. Department of State. Accessed on 14/04/18. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>

41 The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Accessed on 14/04/18. Available at: <https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/INF-Treaty-Factsheet.pdf>

42 BELLAFANTE, Valentina. US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: a made in New Mexico Problem. Los Alamos Study Group. Published on 21/06/16. Accessed on 11/04/18. Available at: http://www.lasg.org/talks/US_Nuclear_Weapons_in_Europe_Bellafante_21Jun2016.pdf

43 KRISTENSEN, M. Hans. U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning. Natural Resources Defense Council. Published on February 2005. Available at: <https://assets.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/euro.pdf>. Page 24.

44 NYT. Symington Finds Flaws in NATO's Warhead Security. The New York Times. Published on 23/11/70. Accessed on 15/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/11/23/archives/symington-finds-flaws-in-natos-warhead-security-greek-incident.html>

of the reductions because the complete removal of the NWs from Greece would be seen as the act of mistrust and very probably would further alienate Greece from the rest of the Alliance.⁴⁵

On one hand, those events were followed by the gradual reductions of the stockpile of the American NWs through the all the countries participating in the nuclear sharing. On the other, it was balanced by the modernisation of the launchers, means of delivery or even the nuclear warheads itself which significantly increase the Alliance's opportunities for the flexible response to the hostile actions.⁴⁶ The reductions were stopped and the amount of the Alliance's stockpile of NWs in Europe even increased in the reaction to the Soviet introduction and deployment of the SS-20 Satan missiles at the shrink of the 1970s. As the consequence of the NATO's dual-track decision adopted in the reaction to the Soviet move, more than four hundred of ground-launched cruise missiles and more than one hundred of Pershing II ballistic missiles were deployed in Europe till 1983. As the consequence, the shared stockpile of the NWs stationed in Europe before the disillusion of the Soviet Union was about seven thousand of warheads.⁴⁷

Since the end of the Cold War, the stockpile was reduced to approximately between 150 and 180 American NWs deployed in Europe, all of which are non-strategic gravity bombs B-61 in version 11 in several modifications with different yields.⁴⁸ All the other NWs and their launchers were removed by the President Bush's decision in September 1991.⁴⁹ Even though some authors, such as Hans M. Kristensen, were arguing that there are more than four hundred warheads still deployed in Europe in the middle of 2000s. *"Until now, most observers believed that there were no more than half of those weapons still left on the continent. Declassified documents obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, military literature, the media, non-governmental organizations, and other sources show that the 480 bombs are stored at eight air bases in six NATO countries – a*

45 SIPRI, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives. SIPRI. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd. 1978. Page 40.

46 NATO. Final Communiqué – Nuclear Planning Group 1976. 1976. Published on 26/01/76. Accessed on 15/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c760121a.htm>

47 HALLORAN, Richard. Report to Congress Provides Figures for Nuclear Arsenal. The New York Times. Published on 15/11/83. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/15/world/report-to-congress-provides-figures-for-nuclear-arsenal.html>

48 BELLAFANTE, Valentina. US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: a made in New Mexico Problem. Los Alamos Study Group. Published on 21/06/16. Accessed on 11/04/18. Available at: http://www.lasg.org/talks/US_Nuclear_Weapons_in_Europe_Bellafante_21Jun2016.pdf

49 KAMP, Karl-Heinz and Robertus C. N. REMKES. Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Published on 17/11/11. Available at: http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Framework_Chpt4.pdf?_=1322701823. Page 80.

formidable arsenal larger than the entire Chinese nuclear stockpile.”⁵⁰ But the same author is currently mentioning only 150 nuclear warheads under the shared command in Europe stored at six bases in five European countries.⁵¹

Those weapons are currently deployed in Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Turkey, and are about to be modernized to the version 12 between 2021 and 2024 according to the U.S. Nuclear Doctrine from 2010.⁵² But such a modernisation is facing two imminent problems – American unwillingness to pay enormous sums of money for the European security and the significant unpopularity of nuclear weapons and their deployment in Europe by the European public. The first problem is connected with the international isolationism rising in the U.S. under the president Trump’s government and is pushing for the increasing reliance on the European NWS – France and the United Kingdom.⁵³

But the problem is, that France is still not willing to put its nuclear forces under the shared NATO command and is not participating on the NPG meetings, which makes it just hardly believable, that its nuclear arsenal could once become the backbone of the deterrent of the European part of the Alliance.⁵⁴ And the British arsenal underwent significant reductions in the last two decades, which are about to continue to the levels, which cannot guarantee the sufficient level of the deterrent for the whole European part of the Alliance.⁵⁵ According to this, there are voices within the Europe that are arguing,

50 KRISTENSEN, M. Hans. U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning. Natural Resources Defense Council. Published on February 2005. Available at: <https://assets.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/euro.pdf>. Page 4.

51 KRISTENSEN, Hans M. a Robert S. NORRIS. Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* [online]. 2017, 73(5), 289-297 [cit. 2018-04-16]. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995. ISSN 0096-3402. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995>

52 BELLAFANTE, Valentina. US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: a made in New Mexico Problem. Los Alamos Study Group. Published on 21/06/16. Accessed on 16/04/18. Available at: http://www.lasg.org/talks/US_Nuclear_Weapons_in_Europe_Bellafante_21Jun2016.pdf

53 MARKSTEINER, Alexandra. Alternative Futures: Rethinking the European Nuclear Posture. The Atlantic Council. Published on 18/07/17. Accessed on 12/04/18. Available at: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/alternative-futures-rethinking-the-european-nuclear-posture>

54 MEIER, Oliver. NATO Sticks With Nuclear Policy. Arms Control Association. Published on 31/05/12. Accessed on 11/04/18. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_06/NATO_Sticks_With_Nuclear_Policy

55 KRISTENSEN, Hans M. a Robert S. NORRIS. Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* [online]. 2017, 73(5), 289-297 [cit. 2018-04-16]. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995. ISSN 0096-3402. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995>

that Germany as one of the key players of the European integration should become NWS, but such a development is even less likely than the French scenario.⁵⁶

This brings us to the second already mentioned problem connected with the NWs and their sharing in Europe, which is the public support. *“None of the governments in any of the current hosting countries would be willing to risk a public debate on nuclear deployments at a time when no immediate nuclear threat could be brought forward as a justification. Sophisticated arguments on conceptual deterrence requirements or nuclear sharing agreements would hardly suffice to convince the public in any of the old NATO member states of the wisdom of such a step.”*⁵⁷ Explains the NTI report from 2011. The willingness to accept the deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil could be higher in the case of the new NATO member states from Eastern and Central Europe. But the deployment of the NWs into those countries is blocked by the NATO declarations from the mid of the 1990s, in which the Alliance clearly declared its unwillingness to do so.⁵⁸ As the consequence, the future of the nuclear sharing is very unclear.

2 Methodological framework

This thesis is based on the use of the constructivist approach to the theory of the international relations. It means that the main goal of this thesis is to explain how has the normative debate and thinking about the nuclear sharing concept constructed during the last approximately seventy years, with emphasis on the changes in the normative wording used in the NATO strategic documents and accompanying reports adopted since the NATO was created.

According to the intended outcomes of this thesis, I decided to use the methodological framework of the content analysis of the NATO's strategic documents, put in context of the historical development of the security and political situation among global

56 MARKSTEINER, Alexandra. Alternative Futures: Rethinking the European Nuclear Posture. The Atlantic Council. Published on 18/07/17. Accessed on 12/04/18. Available at: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/alternative-futures-rethinking-the-european-nuclear-posture>

57 KAMP, Karl-Heinz and Robertus C. N. REMKES. Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Published on 17/11/11. Available at: http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Framework_Chpt4.pdf?_=1322701823. Page 84.

58 NATO. Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State, Press Conference. NATO. Published on 10/12/96. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25112.htm?selectedLocale=en

powers. At this point, it is important to stress out, that the content analysis created by only one researcher without independent verification is not one hundred percent reliable because of the subjective influence of the researcher.⁵⁹ Which is described by S. Elo, M. Kääriäinen, O. Kanste, T. Pölkki, K. Utriainen and H. Kyngäs in their article *Qualitative content analysis: a focus on trustworthiness*, which is primarily oriented on the mentioned problematic of the reliability of the content analysis as the method itself.⁶⁰

2.1 Data gathering

For the purposes of the content analysis, I created a set of 108 documents, which are reflecting the changing normative perception and the attitude of the Alliance and its member states towards the nuclear weapons and respectively to the nuclear sharing concept during the period between 1950 and 2016. The set of documents consists of four previously classified strategic concepts from the period before 1969 with their most important supplements, three public strategic concepts published after the end of the Cold War, all the final communiqués of NATO ministerial summits, all the Nuclear Planning Group communiqués and the Report of the committee of Three⁶¹, which is mentioned on the official NATO web page as the document with the significant influence on the formation of the NATO's thinking about the Nuclear Weapons and nuclear doctrine.⁶²

I decided to not to include the Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, also called the Harmel Report, from the December 1967 because of its nature and scope – because of its nature the Harmel Report consists of several dozens of documents and reports from several working groups and committees and a lot of those documents

are not publicly available in the NATO archive. According to this, I would not be able to analyse this document in its whole wording.⁶³

59 BENGTTSSON, Mariette. How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis. *NursingPlus Open* [online]. 2016, 2, 8-14. DOI: 10.1016/j.npls.2016.01.001. ISSN 23529008. Available at: <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2352900816000029>

60 ELO, Satu, Maria KÄÄRIÄINEN, Outi KANSTE, Tarja PÖLKKI, Kati UTRIAINEN a Helvi KYNGÄS. *Qualitative Content Analysis*. SAGE Open [online]. 2014, 4(1), 215824401452263-. DOI: 10.1177/2158244014522633. ISSN 2158-2440. Available at: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2158244014522633>

61 NATO. Report of the Committee of Three. NATO. Last updated on 05/09/17. Accessed on 04/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_65237.htm

62 NATO. Strategic concepts. NATO. Last updated on 16/11/17. Accessed on 04/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_56626.htm

63 NATO. Harmel Report. NATO. Last updated on 16/11/17. Accessed on 04/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_67927.htm

The detailed content of created dataset is summarized in the table available as the Appendix no. 2 of this thesis. Following the suggested categories of the documents, the dataset should include 108 documents, unfortunately, two documents are not included. The Final Communiqué of the 1985 NATO ministerial summit is not existing – the summit was just a special meeting of the NATO member states representatives with the U.S. president Regan after his meeting with General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Gorbachev during the autumn of 1995. And the final communiqué of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting from December 1998 is not uploaded to the NATO archive.

The Nuclear Planning Group final communiqués are of high value for the purposes of this thesis, because of the position of the NPG in the NATO structure. The official web page of the Alliance describes the NPG as follows: *“The Nuclear Planning Group acts as the senior body on nuclear matters in the Alliance and discusses specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces (...). The Defence Ministers of all member countries, except France, meet at regular intervals in the NPG, where they discuss specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces. The Alliance's nuclear policy is kept under review and decisions are taken jointly to modify or adapt it in the light of new developments and to update and adjust planning and consultation procedures.”*⁶⁴

On one hand the final communiqués of NPG meeting create significant part of the dataset, on the other hand they are usually quite short and their content is rather declaratory, because of their immediate publication, which means, that their influence on the Alliance's strategic thinking about the nuclear sharing and even nuclear weapons itself is smaller than in the case of strategic concepts. Since the half of the 1990s, the NPG meetings were connected with the meeting of NATO's Defence Planning Group and their communique were merged. Unfortunately, since the June 2007, the NPG is not publishing its final communiqués in the NATO archive or elsewhere and the NPG meetings during the ministerial summits are also without any public communiqué or declaration.

The final communiqués or reports of NATO summits organised on the level of ministerial meetings are of the high value for the purposes of this thesis because of the overall nature of those documents. Almost all of those documents are reacting to the most recent development of the NATO thinking and the development of the strategic postures

64 NATO. Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). NATO. Last updated on 07/04/16. Accessed on 08/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50069.htm

of the Alliance in the certain period of its existence. And the thinking of and perception of the nuclear weapons and their sharing for the defensive purposes is among the vital questions of the NATO existence.⁶⁵ At the same time, it is also important to stress out, that there are several NATO ministerial summits, which were keen on tightly specific topics such as the disillusion of the Soviet Union in the 1990s or several meetings directly after 2001 and the start of the international War on Terror and allied invasion in Afghanistan. The final communique or reports of those summits are partly mentioning the problematics of nuclear weapons or other vital tasks of the Alliance, but their main part is devoted to those specific events.

The last category of documents subdued into the set of analysed documents is composed of all the strategic concepts of the NATO since its creation till today. Those documents are of the highest value for the purposes of the analysis of the change of perception of the nuclear weapons and their sharing among the Alliance's members. To the set of documents, I included all four previously classified strategic concepts adopted between 1950 and 1969. Two of them, namely the MC 14/2 (Rev) Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area from 23rd May 1957 and MC 14/3 (Final) Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area from 16th January 1968 are each accompanied by additional documents called MC 48/2 (Final Decision) Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept from 23rd May 1957, respectively MC 48/3 (Final) Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area from 8th December 1969. Those six documents are accompanied by three public NATO Strategic Concepts adopted after the end of the Cold War.⁶⁶

At this point, it is important to stress out, that those two, respectively three categories of documents are of slightly different nature because of the circumstances of their adoption. First four strategic concepts and their additional measures to implement are much straightforward and concrete in the description of the suggested steps, then the last three strategic concepts, which were adopted after the disillusion of the former Soviet Union and which are public since their adoption. The three most current strategic concepts are also more interested in the communication of the NATO positions toward topics such

65 NATO. Summit meetings. NATO. Last updated on 08/12/17. Accessed on 04/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_50115.htm

66 NATO. Strategic Concepts. NATO. Last updated on 16/11/17. Accessed on 08/04/18. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm#

as peacekeeping or protection of the sustainable environment around Alliance's borders, which were not present in the previous four strategic concepts.

This set of 106 documents created and adopted between 1950 and 2016 provides me with the opportunity to examine and analyse the changing perception of the Alliances thinking about nuclear weapons itself, their use and role in the international environment with special emphasis on the concept of the nuclear sharing, which has been one of the key elements of the NATO strategy since 1950s.

2.2 Analytical tools and coding script

For the processing of the content analysis itself, I chose to use the NVivo 12 program created by Australian software company QSR International. Their software is dedicated to the processing of the qualitative or mixed-method data research of textual or visual documents in different fields of science.⁶⁷ The only disadvantage of this software is the fact, that it does not have an ability to convert the results of the coding into the textual table, which could be used as the dataset for the further analytical work and the visualisation of the gathered data. The NVivo 12 is able to export data only into the diagrams representing the relations between specific nodes and cases; charts of occurrences of specific node or case; or mind maps. On the other hand, this disadvantage could be quite easily overcome by the manual transcript of the results into the dataset.

As a first step, I had to upload all the gathered documents and coded them as new cases. I coded all of them as cases with three attributes, all of which have at least two attribute values or variables. These attributes are as follows:

Attribute I – Type of document with possible attribute values:

1. Strategic Concept & Measures to Implement
2. Summit Declaration or Communiqué
3. Nuclear Planning Group Communiqué
4. Other

Attribute II – Status of the document at the time of adoption with attribute values:

1. Classified

⁶⁷ QSR International. What is NVIVO?. QSR International. Accessed on 10/04/18. Available at: <http://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/what-is-nvivo>

2. Public

Attribute III – Decade of the publication of the document with attribute values:

1. 1950s
2. 1960s
3. 1970s
4. 1980s
5. 1990s
6. 2000s
7. 2010s

This coding of the documents into different cases with several attributes provided me with the opportunity to analyse the only specific group of documents with specific features in the subsequent steps of the analysis.

As a second step of the preparation for the coding of the documents, it was necessary to code specific nodes, which are the key elements of the conducted content analysis. Nodes could be understood as the folders, which consist of all the mentions of the specific terms or topics. For the basic assignment of the nodes to the specific documents, the keywords query could be often used. Unfortunately, because of the nature of the nodes chosen for this concrete content analysis, it was not the case of this study. I created four specific nodes, all of which have its own specific sub-nodes. The nodes and sub-nodes are as follows:

Node I – Nuclear Weapons

1. Nuclear Weapons – direct mention
2. Nuclear Weapons – indirect mention

Node II – Nuclear Sharing

1. Nuclear Sharing – direct mention
2. Nuclear Sharing – indirect mention

Node III – Perception

1. Positive

2. Negative
3. Mixed
4. Neutral

Node IV – Actor

1. NATO
2. Other
3. Mixed

From this specification of the prepared nodes it should be clear, why the coding through key words query was not possible for this analysis – the results of this content analysis are not based just on the exact amount of occurrences of specific words from nodes I and II in the body of analysed documents, but rather on the relations between specific nodes which were coded through the use of Node III and Node IV. Another reason, why the simple key word query was not useful for the purposes of this thesis is the fact, that Nodes I and II include even indirect mentions of examined concepts, which could not be coded through key word query.

Based on last mentioned fact, I also decided to code whole paragraphs mentioning the specific concept or posture, not just sentences in them – otherwise, it would be really questionable to define the borders especially of those indirect mentions because of the contextual information usually present in the whole paragraph. This decision was also supported by the fact, that most of the analysed documents are structured into the paragraphs usually containing only one specific topic.⁶⁸

After the coding of all the included documents I created several node search queries through the NVivo 12 interface, which gave me access to the numerical values of the percentage of the coverage of the specific combinations of nodes in all the analysed documents. The detailed list of used coding queries can be found among the appendices of this thesis as the Appendix 3.

Then, I summarized the numerical values of the percent coverage of specific documents by those 54 node combinations into the table, which was later used for the analysis of the change of the normative perception and thinking about the nuclear

⁶⁸ KLOTZ, Audie a Deepa PRAKASH. *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. ISBN 0230542395. Page 157-160.

weapons and especially nuclear sharing concept itself within the NATO's internal strategic debate between 1950 and 2016. The use of such structuring of results of the content analysis in the connection with the such a huge amount of analysed documents brought this analysis on the shrink between the quantitative and qualitative research, which is typical feature of studies using the content analysis methodology.⁶⁹

The results of the described content analysis provided me with the basic data for understanding how have been the perception and normative thinking about the nuclear weapons and nuclear sharing concept constructed through the adopted documents within the NATO official structures and among its member states during the years. It is based on the constructivist theory described by Alexander Wend and leaning on the theoretical work of Alexander Onuf from 1989.⁷⁰ In the reaction just ten years later Wendt wrote: *"The structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature."*⁷¹ It means that the understanding of social constructivism in this thesis is rather moderate and based on the Wendt thinking, rather than on the original Onuf's theory, which is seen as more robust and complex, but for the purposes of this thesis would not be such sufficient because of its expansiveness and outreach to far to the postmodernist thinking.⁷²

2.3 Definition of nodes and coding

This subchapter explains, how was the coding of the chosen documents into the prepared nodes conducted. As was already mentioned in one of the previous sub-chapters I coded whole paragraphs including the concepts of interest, rather than just sentences. In the following paragraphs I present several examples of such coding with the explanation, why are such examples coded as specific nodes.

There were four node categories with several sub-node categories, that had to be coded. Probably the easiest one to define is the Node IV Actor with its sub-node

69 KLOTZ, Audie a Deepa PRAKASH. Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. ISBN 0230542395. Page 1-7 and 211-220.

70 JACKSON, Robert a Georg SØRENSEN. Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. ISBN 0199548846. Page 165-167.

71 WENDT, Alexander. Social theory of international politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN 0521465575. Page 1.

72 KUBÁLKOVÁ, V., Nicholas Greenwood. ONUF a Paul KOWERT. International relations in a constructed world. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, c1998. ISBN 0765602989. Page 58-62.

categories – NATO, Other, Mixed – the coding of this node was based on the perception of the main actor of the described actions. It means, that even though it is always NATO's perception of the reality because of the nature of analysed documents, it is often speaking about the actions committed by different actors or their thinking about the analysed concepts. It means, that in the case, that the NATO is the main actor of the event or the bearer of the idea described – the case is coded as *Actor – NATO*. This node is used also in the situation, where just one of the NATO's NWSs member is mentioned as the main actor. In the case, that the paragraph is about actions or thinking of the different specific or unspecific actor – the paragraph is coded as *Actor – Other*. This node usually covers the USSR or the Russian Federation, partly China, Iran or the North Korea in the later documents. In the case, that the paragraph is speaking about the common thinking about NWs or the join attitude or action of NATO and other actors, such a paragraph was coded as *Actor – Mixed*.

The coding of first two node categories – Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Sharing – was quite easy in the case of one of the possible sub-node categories – the direct mentions. Especially in the case of the nuclear weapons are the direct mentions easily trackable through the text query. Into this node, *Nuclear Weapons – Direct*, I coded all the direct mentions of the nuclear weapons, their possession, thinking about their use, nature and future.

The second sub-node category, *Nuclear Weapons – Indirect*, was significantly more complicated for coding. I coded all the indirect mentions of the possession, thinking about or the perception of the nuclear weapons. It means that into this category I coded even the mentions of the anti-ballistic systems or anti-aircraft systems devoted to protecting the chosen target from the nuclear attacks. Also, the examples of the thinking about the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction without specific mention of nuclear weapons were coded as the indirect mention.

I used very similar attitude for the coding of the node Nuclear Sharing. Into the first sub-node *Nuclear Sharing – Direct* I coded all the direct mentions of the already described nuclear sharing concept and all the thinking about it. The case of the second sub-node *Nuclear Sharing – Indirect* was much trickier to code. The reason is, that sometimes it was complicated to distinguish between the clear declaration of the NATO willingness to use all the resources and means available for the protection of its members from the possible external threat and the exact indirect mention of the nuclear sharing. According to this fact,

I coded as the *Nuclear Sharing – Indirect*, only the cases in which was strong contextual information of the willingness of the use of the nuclear sharing concept and I avoided coding of questionable paragraphs especially from the openings of strategic documents which were already described above.

And finally, the fourth node category *Perception* was coded according to the perception of other already coded nodes I and II. This node is divided into four sub-node categories *Positive*, *Negative*, *Mixed* and *Neutral*. I coded this node based on the perception of the action, idea or thinking described by the NATO. This coding could be from the certain perspective a bit tricky in the case of mentions of the non-proliferation or the nuclear disarmament. From the already described logic of coding for the purposes of this thesis, I decided to usually code the mentions referring to the positive outcomes of the nuclear disarmament as *Perception – Negative*, because of the fact, that such an action is, in fact, negative for the nuclear weapons category. The exception to this could be the situation, in which the overall reduction of world stockpile is mentioned, which could be understood as of neutral or mixed perception based on the further context, because of its relatively low implications for the broader nuclear weapons existence.

The first two concrete examples we can take from the final communique from the very first NATO summit held in December 1957. "*The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kind, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.*"⁷³ – according to the mentioned coding script is this section about to be coded as *Nuclear Weapons – Direct*, *Perception – Negative*, *Actor – Other*. The reason is, that the main actor of described view and actions is the USSR and its nuclear weapons stockpile, which is perceived negatively by NATO. As another example from this document, we can take the following paragraph: "*The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defence. The*

73 NATO. Final Communiqué – Summit in Paris 1957. NATO. Published on 19/12/1957. Accessed on 03/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm>

Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved.”⁷⁴ Which coded into the nodes – *Nuclear Weapons – Direct, Nuclear Sharing – Direct, Perception – Positive, Actor – NATO*. The reason for such a coding is the fact, that suggested quote is describing the action committed by NATO, which is positively perceived by the Alliance itself and which deals directly with both topic of nuclear weapons and their sharing.

As another example of coding, we can take the case of NPG meeting communiqué from June 1976. *“Ministers then resumed their discussions on improving the effectiveness of NATO's theatre nuclear force posture. These NPG discussions began in 1974 as part of the process of consultation within the Alliance on desirable improvements to forces and employment concepts which would enhance defence and deterrence. Echoing the views expressed during the recent Defence Planning Committee meeting, Ministers expressed concern at the continuing increases in the military strength of the Warsaw Pact forces beyond levels justified for defensive purposes and at the resulting effect on the strategic balance between East and West, particularly in regard to Europe. They discussed the importance of the contribution of theatre nuclear forces to NATO's strategy of flexible response, as a part of the NATO Triad of strategic, theatre nuclear, and conventional forces. In particular, Ministers agreed on the need to improve the effectiveness of NATO's theatre nuclear forces, including their survivability. They emphasized their continued support for broad Allied participation in nuclear planning and in NATO's nuclear defence posture.”*⁷⁵ This section I coded as *Nuclear Weapons – Direct, Nuclear Sharing – Indirect, Perception – Positive, Actor – NATO*.

The reason for such a coding is the fact, that the Alliance is the main actor of the described action even though the paragraph is also mentioning the actions adopted by the Warsaw Pact forces, but their actions are only mentioned as the reasoning for the NATO stance. From the context of the paragraph, it is clear, that the NATO's possible future defensive actions will be based on the usage of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe under the nuclear sharing concept, even though it is not directly mentioned. On the other hand, the nuclear weapons itself are directly mentioned and the perception of the alliance of both those concepts is clearly positive because of its contribution to Alliance's security.

74 NATO. Final Communiqué – Summit in Paris 1957. NATO. Published on 19/12/1957. Accessed on 03/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm>

75 NATO. Final Communiqué – Nuclear Planning Group 1976. 1976. Published on 15/07/76. Accessed on 09/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c760614a.htm>

And as the example of the mixed perception of NATO's nuclear arsenal and mixed actors we can take the final communiqué of the NATO summit from July 1990. *"Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort."*⁷⁶ This paragraph was coded as *Nuclear Weapons – Direct, Nuclear Sharing – Indirect, Perception – Mixed, Actor – Mixed*. The reason for such coding is the fact, that the described situation is the result of the Soviet withdrawal and also the adoption of the CFE Treaty, which was signed by multiple sides. And the perception of this situation by NATO towards nuclear weapons is mixed because it is based on the reduction of NWs stockpiles deployed in Europe, while it is at the same time clearly stated, that the nuclear weapons remain the key pillar for the security architecture of the Alliance.

And finally, as the example of the neutral perception, we can take the case of second NPG meeting held in 1972. *"Continuing the practice the United States has followed in the past, Mr Laird briefed Ministers on the balance of strategic nuclear forces. Ministers then engaged in a discussion of recent developments and trends that are of interest and concern to NATO."*⁷⁷ This section was coded with nodes *Nuclear Weapons – Direct, Nuclear Sharing – Indirect, Actor – NATO, Perception – Neutral*. The reasons, why is this section coded as containing node *Nuclear Weapons – Direct* is clear. Also, the reasons why the NATO is seen as the main actor of this section shouldn't be questionable. Based on the contextual information present in the 1972 NPG communiqué it is clear, that this section is mentioning the nuclear weapons stationed under the nuclear sharing concept in Europe, on the other hand, the quoted text is not judging the benefits or negatives of the nuclear weapons or the nuclear sharing in this section.

76 NATO. Final Communiqué – Summit in London 1990. NATO. Published on 06/07/1990. Accessed on 09/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>

77 NATO. Final Communiqué – Nuclear Planning Group 1972. NATO. Published on 27/10/1972. Accessed on 09/04/18. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c721026a.htm>

3 Development of the NATO's normative thinking

The results of the percent coverage of all the documents included in the above-described content analysis are summarized in the dataset which is available among the electronic supplements of this thesis under the name “NVIVO_results_full”. According to the huge amount of columns and rows, it is not possible to include this dataset in its full form among the appendices of this thesis.

Using those results we can observe several trends presented in the NATO's thinking about the nuclear weapons and nuclear sharing concept. Those trends and concepts will be examined separately in next two chapters. Even though the main aim of this thesis lays in the understanding of the thinking and normative perception of the nuclear sharing concept within the Alliance's structures, the understanding of the general perception of nuclear weapons has to be examined as well, because it provides us with the important context for the main part.


According to the fact, that this thesis stands between the categories of qualitative and quantitative research the simple visualisation of full results at once would be rather confusing and without any real value. As an example, we can take the chart visualising the overall percentages of the perception of nuclear weapons in the all analysed documents with all four categories of perception merged for all three categories of actors.

This visualisation, which is included in the appendices of this thesis as the Appendix no. 4, is of just questionable usage because of the huge amount of data included. From this chart, we can read just a very little amount of information because of its complexity. It provides us just with the information, that the interest of NATO strategic documents in the category of nuclear weapons significantly decreased after the dissolution of the former USSR and the end of bipolar nuclear arms race and again slightly increased after 2000, which is on the other hand based just on the fact, that there were several NPG meeting in a row, which makes the increased interest of documents in the nuclear weapons understandable.

3.1 NATO's approach towards Nuclear Weapons

As was explained above, for the purposes of this analysis it was significantly more beneficial to use just the visualisation of partial data with the explanation based on the

contextual information derived from the nature of included documents and also the historical developments.




Appendix no. 5: Nuclear Weapons in Strategic Concepts (Chart)

From the chart listed as the appendix no. 5, it is clearly visible the development of the mentions of nuclear weapons in the strategic concepts and accompanying measures to implement. We can observe that the interest of those documents was rising through the whole Cold War era with the only exception which are the Measures to implement from 1969 accompanying the last previously classified NATO strategic concept from 1968. The reason why is the amount of mentions of nuclear weapons significantly lower in this document is rather simple – this document is significantly longer than any of the previous ones and is describing the overall realisation of the NATO's defence policy sketched in the strategic concept, which means that most of the parts of the document are keen on the conventional military capabilities and also the division of the defensive tasks among the specific member states.

After this document, we can observe the very sharp rise in the coverage of nuclear weapons in the first public NATO's strategic concept from 1991. And again, the reason for this increase is relatively simple to explain – the significant part of the document is keen on the explanation why should the Alliance remains to be nuclear alliance and on the possible threats of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal in the times of turbulent revolutionary development in the Eastern and Central Europe. Since then, the amount of mentions and also the overall coverage of the next two strategic concepts with nuclear weapons is

decreasing. This would be much better visible from the chart visualising the combinations of actors and perceptions of nuclear weapons.




Appendix no. 6: Nuclear Weapons - Actors and Perceptions in Strategic Concepts (Chart)

For the purposes of this chart, I merged the data for both direct and indirect mentions, because it would be of relatively small informative value to keep them separated, while it would significantly mess up with the clarity of the chart. While the previous chart showing the coverage of the strategic concepts and accompanying documents with the thinking about the nuclear weapons, this chart shows us the perception of nuclear weapons. It is probably of low surprise, that the perception of NWs in the connection with NATO as the main actor is almost strictly positive, with just very few examples of mixed or neutral perception. This is especially the case of 1991 strategic concept, which was explaining the need of the NATO to remain nuclear alliance even though the Cold War ended as was already mentioned. Which led to several cases in which were the nuclear weapons mentioned as the possible threat for the world peace and NATO has signed to the idea of the reduction of the world arsenal, but on the other hand the NWs were mentioned as one of the key pillars of the NATO's defensive policy even for the years to come.


The whole coverage of the mixed actors is just very marginal compared to the NATO or Other actor. The actor Mixed is present almost only in the connection with the mixed perception in the last three public strategic concepts, which represents calls for the overall

reduction of the world arsenals of nuclear weapons while also suggesting the significance of those weapons for the deterrence of the possible world conflict. The partly similar situation we can observe in the case of actor Other, which is mostly representing the Soviet and later Russian nuclear arsenal, partly than other states such as the North Korea or Iran. From the chart above it is clear, that the NATO's perception of the nuclear arsenals of other actors in Alliance's strategic concepts is consistent through the almost whole-time period with the only exception represented by the already mentioned Measures to implement adopted in December 1969.



Appendix no. 7: Nuclear Weapons in Final Communiqués/Declarations (Chart)

The very similar pattern in the amount of coverage with the NWs we can observe among the final communiqués or declarations of the NATO summits. There is one significant peak on the turn of the eighties and nineties, which is connected with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and one significant rise in between 1978 and 1988 which is directly connected to the Soviet deployment of IRBMs in the Eastern and Central Europe and follow-up negotiations of the INF treaty. As an interesting fact, I consider the changing coverage and nature of the indirect mentions of nuclear weapons. While in the first four decades of the nuclear era the indirect mentions are represented by certain ambiguity in the NATO wording towards its own defensive capabilities, after the start of new millennia the indirect mentions rather represent the direct mention of the whole category of the WMDs and the fear from the possible proliferation of those weapons. This development is better visible in the forthcoming chart included as the appendix no. 8.



Appendix no. 8: Nuclear Weapons - Actors and Perceptions in Final Communiques/Declarations (Chart)

This chart even better illustrates the above-described situation around the INF negotiations, which could be observed on the extreme peak of the mixed perception of the NATO arsenal, which was on the one hand seen as the main pillar of the security of the European part of the Alliance, but on the other hand even the NATO documents understood, that the Alliance's nuclear arsenal stationed in Europe is perceived as a possible threat to the USSR. This perception is significantly stronger than in the case of previously analysed texts of strategic concepts. As the probable reason for such different wording, we should take into the account the fact, that first four strategic concepts were classified in the times of their adoption, which means, that the declaratory function of their wording was significantly lower than in the case of public communiqués/declarations from Summits. Almost the same trend we can observe in the case of the negative perception of the arsenals of other actors or the positive perception of the NATO's own arsenal.

The chart included among the appendices of this thesis as the Appendix no. 9. clearly shows us, that the category of final communiqués of the NPG meetings is significantly more heavily keen on the topic of the nuclear weapons than the previous two categories, which is rather understandable, because of the nature of this body of the Alliance. It is also illustrated by the fact, that most of the covered mentions are from the category of the direct mentions.

At the same time, we can observe the very similar development of the graph curve, even though the percentages of the coverage are significantly higher than in the case of both previously analysed categories. There is the clearly visible increase since the beginning of the 1970s, which is related to the NPT adoption and later is culminating during the INF negotiations and which is followed by the relative decrease during the first decade after the disillusion of the former USSR.


The chart of the percent coverages of the NPG communiques with the interest in the actors and the perceptions of their actions, which is included as the Appendix no. 10, shows us another interesting development in the Alliance's approach toward the NWs. The first decade of the NPG meeting is almost entirely covered with the mentions connected with the NATO itself as the main actor. It is of little surprise, that those cases are mostly perceived positively or neutrally. While in the period between 1973 and the end of the Cold War we can observe the significant rise in the coverage of the combinations Mixed actor and mixed perception and also Other actor and negative perception. These two trends split in the 1990s – the negative perception of the arsenals and actions of the Other actors remained, while the second category was almost entirely replaced by the negative perception in connection with the mixed actor. At this point, it is also important to stress out, that the decrease of the coverages of the NPG communiques with the topic of NWs visible from the 1990s is partly caused by the fact, that the NPG meetings were merged with the NATO Defence Planning Committee.

The combination of the results visualised in the charts from the Appendices 5 – 10 shows us the changing nature of the perception of the NWs by NATO since the 1950s. It is clear, that the perception of the NATO's own arsenal remains to be positive, even though the mixed or negative perception of the nuclear weapons, in general, is significantly more visible in the documents from last three decades. This is accompanied by the remaining negative perception of the nuclear arsenals or related actions of the Other actors. The data also shows us, that overall coverages of the Alliance's strategic document with the topic of NWs is significantly decreasing since the end of the Cold War, while the relative increase of the number of mentions in the new millennia is mainly connected with the rise of threat of the proliferation of the WMDs, not just exclusively NWs.

3.2 NATO's approach towards Nuclear Sharing

The previous subchapter explained, how the NATO's thinking and normative perception of the nuclear weapons developed during the existence of the Alliance. Such an understanding is necessary for the analysis of the same development related to the concept of the nuclear sharing. For the better understanding of the results, the collected data will be analysed with the same pattern as in the previous subchapter and then those partial results will be put together.

At first, we should start with the analysis of the strategic concepts and the accompanying measures to implement. The visualisation of the coverages of the direct, indirect and merged mentions of the nuclear sharing concept within those documents is relatively closely following the development of the coverages with NWs.



Appendix no. 11: Nuclear Sharing in Strategic Concepts (chart)

The chart from the appendix no. 11 shows us two significant peaks – first in the case of the strategic concept from January 1968 and second in strategic concept from November 1991. The justification of those peaks is relatively simple. In the case of the last previously classified strategic concept, it is connected with the adoption of the NPT and later with the already mentioned situation immediately preceding the negotiations and the signing of the INF treaty. It is also worth noting, that the indirect mentions are more often than the direct mentions, which is slightly countering the classified nature of this document.

The strategic concept from the November 1991 is on the other hand significantly more heavily filled with the direct mentions of the nuclear sharing concept and the overall coverage of the document with the thinking and perception of the nuclear sharing is significantly higher than in the case of the other strategic concepts. The explanation of this results is connected to the previously mentioned nature and wording of this specific document, which was adopted as the Alliance's reaction to the end of the Cold War and the general notion, that the nuclear deterrence would not play such an important role in the future of the international security environment. The 1991 NATO Strategic concept on the other hand clearly expressed, that the NATO is determined to stay nuclear alliance and is also willing to keep the nuclear sharing concept alive for the years to come.


Significantly more complicated is the explanation of the results for the NPG meetings, which are visualised in the Appendix no. 12. During the Cold War era, we can see the coverages of specific documents with the mentions of nuclear sharing concept varying from the values lower than 10% to more than 60% in several cases and even more than 70% in the communique from November 1979. These significant differences in the values of coverages are probably related to the instability in the length and form of those communiqués. After the end of the Cold War, we can observe the significant decrease in the coverage of both – direct and indirect mentions. This trend stopped in 2001 and since then we can observe the rising coverages, especially those of the direct mentions. The relatively high overall values of the coverages in the NPG meeting final communiqués are caused by the nature of this NATO body.

The difference in the coverages with the nuclear sharing is even more visible in the case of the final communiqués from the NATO summits, which are visualised in the Appendix no. 13. This visualisation is almost completely following the pattern present in the chart with same features of the NATO's strategic concepts. It means, two peaks connected to the negotiations of the INF treaty and to the end of the Cold War, which are followed by almost two decades of low interest, which is just gently changed at the end of the first decade of the new millennia.

Significantly more important for the main research aim of this thesis is the visualisation of the data connecting different actors and the perceptions of their actions and arsenals in the coded documents. It should be of no surprise, that the very basic pattern of those visualisations is copying the previously mentioned trio of charts. It means,

that charts representing the coverage of strategic concepts and final communiques of NATO summits are both primarily concentrated around two peaks – one in the period directly before the INF Treaty negotiations and second after the disillusion of the former USSR. And similarly, the chart visualising the data for NPG meeting's communiques is rather complicated to explain, while the values are varying significantly.


Another not surprising fact visible from the charts is, that from 12 actor/perception combinations only very few are present. Those are NATO combined with all four categories of perception, Other actor with negative perception; and the Mixed actor in connection with mixed perception, while most of the coverage is represented by NATO in connection with positive, mixed or neutral perception.



Appendix no. 14: Nuclear Sharing - Actors and Perceptions in Strategic Concepts (Chart)

The chart included as the appendix no. 14. shows us, that the perception of the nuclear sharing concept within the NATO strategic concepts is strictly related to the former bipolarity of the international system. The perception of the nuclear sharing by NATO had been dominantly positive during the entire period and was peaking directly after the collapse of the former USSR. Since then, the amount of mentions and even the perception of the shared nuclear capabilities has been decreasing. We can observe the distinctive increase of the mixed perception in the 1991 strategic concept which is followed by the already mentioned decrease of the positive perception in the 1999 strategic concept and even more heavily in the document from 2010.

Reasons for such development were partly visible on the charts from the previous subchapter – the overall Alliance’s interest in the field of nuclear weapons is decreasing since the end of the Cold War, while the main aim of this field lays in the notion to limit possible proliferation of those weapons, more broadly of all the WMDs. It means, that the nuclear sharing concept is no longer seen as the key element, which had to be put among the key ideas of the public strategic concepts in the times of the international War on Terror and broad international commitment to the reduction of the world nuclear stockpile and blocking of the possible proliferation. It also explains why the combination of the other actor and the negative perception occurs in the last adopted strategic concept. The documents itself admits, that the Alliance’s nuclear sharing could be seen as problematic by the Other actors and could be even used as the justification for the maintenance or acquisition of their own arsenals.




Appendix no. 16: Nuclear Sharing - Actors and Perceptions in Final Communiques/Declarations (Chart)

The similar logic can be observed on the visualisation of the data for the final communiques or declarations of the NATO ministerial summits, even though the overall perception of the nuclear sharing in those documents is more deflected to the mixed or neutral perception. The already mentioned pair of peaks connected to the adoption of NPT and INF Treaty negotiations and later to the end of the cold war is present even there, but the influence of the firstly mentioned INF Treaty negotiations is even more visible according to the fact, that the NATO summits were held even during those negotiations,

whereas the strategic concepts were adopted only in 1968 and then in 1991. This logic stands also behind the sooner rise of the coverage of the combination NATO and mixed perception or neutral, which is in that case again related to the INF negotiations and more specifically to the NATO's adoption of the double-track decision.

Also, this category of analysed documents shows, that there is a slight rise in the ambiguity in NATO's own perception of the nuclear sharing at the end of the first decade of the new millennia. The fact, that the final communiques or declaration from NATO ministerial summits are available till the very current days, we can also observe something, which could be sign of the possible new trend – the rising interest of the Alliance in the nuclear sharing following the rise in the Russian assertive policy, even though it is too soon to judge such a development in the texts of the strategic documents.



Appendix no. 15: Nuclear Sharing - Actors and Perceptions in NPG Communiques (Chart)

The results for the NPG meetings communiques, which are visualised in the appendix no. 15, are on one hand again a bit more complicated, but on the other provides us with the even closer and more immediate look at the development of the NATO's perception and thinking about the nuclear sharing because of the nature of this NATO body.

The positive perception in the combination with the NATO as the main actor perceives to be the most significantly present combination, while the mixed perception and mixed actor is also present through the significant part of the covered period. It clearly represents the NPG understanding of the importance of the nuclear sharing for the deterrent capabilities of the Alliance and the knowledge of its simultaneous possible negative influence on the perception of the Alliance by other actors, namely the USSR

during the Cold War. After the end of this period we can also observe the significant decrease in interest of the NPG in the nuclear sharing concept, which is on one hand related to the merge of NPG with the meetings of the NATO's Defence planning committee and on the other the relative decrease of the importance of the nuclear sharing concept for the maintenance of the Alliance's reaction capabilities to the current international security threats.

If we put all those partial explanations and date together, we can observe, that the overall NATO's perception of the nuclear sharing concept was and remains positive, while the relative interest of the Alliance in the is decreasing as the consequence of the development of the international security environment, which is more keen on the threats caused by non-state actors or the conflicts in the developing world, for which the question of the NATO's nuclear capabilities is of just minor impact. At this point, it would be interesting to observe the development of this trend in the next decades, following the newly occurring pattern already mentioned in relation to the NATO ministerial summits communiques or declarations.

Conclusion

The NATO has been the nuclear alliance almost since the beginning of its existence and according to the current events will with high probability stay to be. One of the main features of the Alliance's nuclear policy is the nuclear sharing concept, which puts the significant part of the American nuclear arsenal under the shared command with other member states. This sharing of nuclear capabilities in connection with national arsenals creates the NATO's nuclear deterrence capabilities, which were of a key influence to the Alliance security during the whole period of the Cold War. The benefits of nuclear sharing in the current state of the international political system are sometimes questioned, sometimes even the legality of the nuclear sharing is put into the question.

That creates the need for the understanding of the development of the NATO's perception and approach toward the nuclear weapons and the nuclear sharing concept, for the opportunity to possibly reshape the Alliance's nuclear policy to meet the current state of the international security and political environment and its rules. The main aim of this thesis was to describe, explain and understand the development of the NATO's normative perception and thinking about the nuclear sharing concept through the content analysis of its strategic documents related to the nuclear policy. For this purpose, it was also necessary to put the general approach of the Alliance toward the nuclear weapons under the same analytical framework.

Both main tasks were fulfilled through the creation of the set of 108, respectively 106, documents from the whole period of the NATO's existence and their analysis via the content analysis software NVivo 12. The complete coding script with explanation is available on the pages of this thesis and in the appendices. The NVivo project file and the created dataset summarising the results of my content analysis are attached as the electronic supplements. Those two documents provide the reader of this thesis with the opportunity to verify the presented results and also to use them for the possible further research. Such a research could be beneficial for the understanding and possible prediction of the future development of the Alliance approach towards the nuclear weapons and especially towards the nuclear sharing concept.

The presented results show us, that the NATO's perception of the nuclear sharing was and still remains to be positive. The shared arsenal remains to be one of the key

elements of the defence capabilities especially of the European part of the Alliance, even though the overall posture towards the nuclear weapons is of significantly lower enthusiasm than during the Cold War era. Nuclear sharing was perceived as the two-side solution before the collapse of the former Soviet Union. On one hand, it significantly increased the defence and deterrent capabilities of the Alliance to the possible Soviet threat, but on the other, it also served as the justification for the increase of the Eastern nuclear arsenal. This ambiguity is clearly visible on the data presented in chapter three, especially on the data representing the outcomes of the NPG meetings.

This analysis also shows us that there were two significant peaks in the NATO's interest about the nuclear weapons and their sharing. First of them is related to the era after the NPT adoption and during the INF Treaty negotiations and the second to the disillusion of the USSR and following the transitional period of the international environment. After those two peaks, the interest of the Alliance in nuclear weapons and their sharing decreased, even though the perception remained dominantly positive in relation to its own nuclear arsenal and capabilities, while also the stronger representation of the mixed or neutral perception occurred.

The perception of the foreign nuclear arsenals, currently merged with the risk of the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and the other kinds of WMDs, remains negative during the entire analysed time period and through all the categories of analysed documents. The NPG meetings communiques shows us also the cases of the mixed perception toward the nuclear weapons and their sharing in connection with the mixed actors, which is completely in accordance with the already mentioned ambiguity of the perception of the nuclear sharing as the two-sided weapon during the Cold War era.

An interesting outcome of the analysis is the possible rising interest combined with the positive perception of the nuclear sharing and nuclear weapons visible on the very last analysed final communique of the NATO ministerial summit from 2016. It will be interesting to analyse the documents from 2018 NATO summit in Brussels and observe, whether it is a start of a new rise in the Alliance's interest in nuclear weapons and their sharing, or whether it is the just isolated case.

It will be also interesting to observe the NATO's reaction to the increasing ambiguity about the Iranian military nuclear program and also the future of the North Korean program. Both of those programs are perceived as the possible threat for the Alliance and

are significantly destabilising the security environment in the surroundings of the NATO's borders. The documents about the Iranian military nuclear program currently revealed by the Israeli shows us, that the threat of the hostile nuclear state actor in the close distance of the NATO borders is not connected just with the case of our eastern neighbours.

Summary

This thesis analyses the development of the NATO's normative perception and thinking over the nuclear weapons and the nuclear sharing concept. While the nuclear sharing lays in the main area of the interest of this thesis, the approach towards the nuclear weapons itself is the inseparable component of this research. This thesis is divided into three main chapters.

The chapter one explains the historical position of the nuclear weapons in the NATO thinking and the history of the nuclear sharing. It also introduces the definition of the nuclear sharing and the basic theoretical framework explaining why the actor could be willing

to adopt it. The very important part of the chapter is covering the relation of the NATO's nuclear sharing and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the main international treaty limiting the proliferation of the NWs, institutionalising the current relations among the NWS and NNWS, and which is used as a legislative background for the international criticism of the nuclear sharing concept.

The chapter two explains the chosen methodological framework, describes the set of analysed documents and sets rules for the coding of those documents. For the purposes of this analysis, I decided to use the methodological framework of the content analysis, which is created through the content analysis software NVivo 12. It is followed by the chapter three which is visualising and explaining the results of the content analysis created following the script already described in the chapter two.

The results of the content analysis show, that the NATO's perception of the nuclear sharing concept stays dominantly positive, even though there were periods of time in which the occurrence of the mixed perception was also relatively significantly present. The Alliance's perception of the foreign nuclear arsenals remains to be negative or at least mixed, while the overall interest of the NATO in the category of the nuclear weapons represented by the coverage of the strategic documents with this topic is decreasing.

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
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Appendices

Appendix no. 1: Evolution of NATO strategy 1949-1999 (Chart)



Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

Appendix no. 2: List of analysed documents (Table)

Number	Year	Month	Available	Type of document
1	1950	January	Yes	Strategic Concept
2	1952	December	Yes	Strategic Concept
3	1956	May	Yes	Report of the Committee of Three
4	1957	May	Yes	Strategic Concept
5	1957	May	Yes	Measures to implement
6	1957	December	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
7	1967	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
8	1968	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
9	1968	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
10	1968	January	Yes	Strategic Concept
11	1969	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
12	1969	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
13	1969	December	Yes	Measures to implement
14	1970	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
15	1970	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
16	1971	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
17	1971	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
18	1972	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
19	1972	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
20	1973	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
21	1973	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
22	1974	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
23	1974	June	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
24	1974	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
25	1975	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
26	1975	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
27	1976	January	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
28	1976	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
29	1976	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
30	1977	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
31	1977	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
32	1977	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group

33	1978	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
34	1978	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
35	1978	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
36	1979	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
37	1979	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
38	1980	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
39	1981	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
40	1982	March	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
41	1982	June	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
42	1982	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
43	1983	March	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
44	1983	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
45	1984	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
46	1984	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
47	1985	March	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
48	1985	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
49	1985	November	No	Final Communiqué / Declaration
50	1986	March	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
51	1986	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
52	1987	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
53	1987	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
54	1988	March	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
55	1988	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
56	1988	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
57	1989	April	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
58	1989	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
59	1989	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
60	1989	December	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
61	1990	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
62	1990	July	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
63	1991	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
64	1991	November	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
65	1991	November	Yes	Strategic Concept

66	1991	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
67	1992	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
68	1992	October	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
69	1993	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
70	1993	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
71	1994	January	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
72	1994	May	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
73	1994	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
74	1995	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
75	1995	November	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
76	1996	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
77	1996	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
78	1997	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
79	1997	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
80	1997	July	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
81	1997	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
82	1998	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
83	1998	December	No	Nuclear Planning Group
84	1999	April	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
85	1999	April	Yes	Strategic Concept
86	1999	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
87	2000	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
88	2000	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
89	2001	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
90	2001	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
91	2002	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
92	2002	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
93	2002	November	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
94	2003	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
95	2003	December	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
96	2004	June	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
97	2005	February	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
98	2005	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
99	2006	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group

100	2006	November	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
101	2007	June	Yes	Nuclear Planning Group
102	2008	April	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
103	2009	April	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
104	2010	November	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
105	2010	November	Yes	Strategic Concept
106	2012	May	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
107	2014	September	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration
108	2016	July	Yes	Final Communiqué / Declaration


Appendix no. 3: List of coding queries (List)

- **Nuclear Weapons (Node I)**
 - **Direct mentions (sub-Node I)**
 - NATO (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - **Indirect mentions (sub-Node I)**
 - NATO (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)

- Mixed (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
- **Nuclear Sharing (Node II)**
 - **Direct mentions (sub-Node I)**
 - NATO (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - **Indirect mentions (sub-Node I)**
 - NATO (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - NATO (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
 - Other (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)
 - Mixed (Node IV) + Positive perception (Node III)

- Mixed (Node IV) + Negative perception (Node III)
- Mixed (Node IV) + Mixed perception (Node III)
- Mixed (Node IV) + Neutral perception (Node III)


Appendix no. 4: Perception of Nuclear Weapons (Chart)




Appendix no. 5: Nuclear Weapons in Strategic Concepts (Chart)




Appendix no. 6: Nuclear Weapons - Actors and Perceptions in Strategic Concepts (Chart)




Appendix no. 7: Nuclear Weapons in Final Communiqués/Declarations (Chart)




Appendix no. 8: Nuclear Weapons - Actors and Perceptions in Final Communiqués/Declarations (Chart)



Appendix no. 9: Nuclear weapons in NPG communiques (Chart)




Appendix no. 10: Nuclear Weapons - Actors and Perceptions in NPG communiques
(Chart)




Appendix no. 11: Nuclear Sharing in Strategic Concepts (chart)




Appendix no. 12: Nuclear Sharing in NPG communiques (chart)




Appendix no. 13: Nuclear Sharing in Final Communiqués/Declarations (Chart)




Appendix no. 14: Nuclear Sharing - Actors and Perceptions in Strategic Concepts (Chart)



Appendix no. 15: Nuclear Sharing - Actors and Perceptions in NPG Communiques
(Chart)



Appendix no. 16: Nuclear Sharing - Actors and Perceptions in Final Communiqués/Declarations (Chart)



CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies
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**The change of normative perception and thinking about
the Nuclear Sharing within NATO**

Project of Diploma Thesis

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Study programme: Security Studies

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Year of the defence: 2018

1 The goals of the thesis and thematic definition

The nuclear sharing concept has been one of the key pillars of the nuclear policy and capabilities of the NATO. It was introduced as the consequence of the rising hostility among the East and West during the Cold War and as the guarantee of the security and deterrence capabilities of the European part of the Alliance. The relatively newly emerging international criticism of this concept, mainly represented by the concerns of the Russian Federation during the NPT review conferences, accompanied with the general international commitment to decrease the risk of the nuclear conflict and the reduction of the international stockpile of the NWs puts the future of this concept into question.

The main interest of this thesis lays in the understanding of the development of the NATO's normative perception and understanding of the nuclear sharing concept, its benefits and possible risks and also how were these approaches and perceptions constructed through the wording of the Alliance's strategic documents. Such an understanding would provide us with the better position for the possible future research of the sustainable development of the NATO's nuclear deterrent and shared arsenals. Without the proper understanding of the Alliance's perception and attitude toward such a concept, it would be rather complicated to understand, how could this phenomenon develop. According to the close relation of this concept to the perception of nuclear weapons as the weapon category and a tool in the international relations, it is important to also analyse the NATO's understanding, perception and approach toward the nuclear weapons itself.

For these purposes, I decided to use the methodological framework of the content analysis and utilize it to understand the development of the NATO's thinking and perception of nuclear sharing in the set of to the nuclear policy related strategic documents. I created a set of 108 documents from the whole period of the Alliance's existence. This set consists of the Nuclear Planning Group final communiques, the NATO's ministerial summit final communiques or declarations and the strategic concepts accompanied by its most important supplements. This set of documents is about to be expanded by the documents mentioned by the NATO's official website as those of high influence to the Alliance's perception and thinking about the nuclear weapons and the nuclear sharing.

2 Theoretical framework and methodology

This thesis is based on the use of the constructivist approach to the theory of the international relations. It means that the main goal of this thesis is to explain how has the normative debate and thinking about the nuclear sharing concept constructed during the last approximately seventy years, with emphasis on the changes in the normative wording used in the NATO strategic documents and accompanying reports adopted since the NATO was created.

According to the intended outcomes of this thesis, I decided to use the methodological framework of the content analysis of the NATO's strategic documents, put in context of the historical development of the security and political situation among global powers. At this point, it is important to stress out, that the content analysis created by only one researcher without independent verification is not one hundred percent reliable because of the subjective influence of the researcher.⁷⁸ Which is described by S. Elo, M. Kääriäinen, O. Kanste, T. Pölkki, K. Utriainen and H. Kyngäs in their article *Qualitative content analysis: a focus on trustworthiness*, which is primarily oriented on the mentioned problematic of the reliability of the content analysis as the method itself.⁷⁹

78 BENGTSSON, Mariette. How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis. *NursingPlus Open* [online]. 2016, 2, 8-14. DOI: 10.1016/j.npls.2016.01.001. ISSN 23529008. Available at: <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2352900816000029>

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3 Structure of thesis

Introduction

1 The concept of nuclear sharing and its theoretical understanding

1.1 Brief history of nuclear sharing and Why Is It Important

1.2 Definition of nuclear sharing and the European reality

1.3 Theories of nuclear non-sharing

1.3.1 The elusive deterrence

1.3.2 The intervention

1.3.3 Non-proliferation bargain

1.4 The nuclear sharing and the NPT

1.5 History of NATO nuclear sharing and brief prospect for future

2 Methodological framework

2.1 Data gathering

2.2 Analytical tools and coding script

2.3 Definition of nodes and coding

3 Development of the NATO's normative thinking

3.1 NATO's approach towards nuclear weapons

3.2 NATO's approach towards nuclear sharing

Conclusion

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2. NATO ministerial summits communiques/declarations
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