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**Assessing the role of the São Paulo Forum in
Brazilian foreign policy.
A neoclassical realist perspective.**

Master thesis

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my precious Brazilian friends: Cláudia, Wilson, Aline, Clécio, Rafael and Raquel, who provided me with love and support during my stay in São Paulo in 2016,

and to all the wonderful people I have met in Brazil throughout my journey.

Bibliographic note

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Abstract

Institutional regional integration has become the main focus of Brazil's foreign policy during the administration of the Workers' Party 2003-2016. Why has Brazil decided to involve itself so deeply into the process of Latin American integration?

The main objective of this single case study is twofold. First, applying the theory of neoclassical realism, this thesis aims to discuss all the driving forces (variables) behind Brazil's decision to make regional integration its top foreign policy priority since 2003. Second, it attempts to clarify that the São Paulo Forum, a continental network of the leftist political parties, should also be included into the set of driving forces behind the foreign policy choices in Brazil from 2003 to 2016. The following research question is put forward: *What role does the São Paulo Forum play in Brazil's intensified involvement into regional integration during the period of the Workers' Party in power?*

Assessed through the congruence procedure and process tracing technique, the influence of the Forum is placed under the intervening variables of the neoclassical realist theory. The results of the study demonstrate that since the Workers' Party coming to power, its leader, Lula da Silva has used the directives, elaborated at the São Paulo Forum, to restructure, intensify and maintain the regional integration scheme.

Keywords

Brazil, Latin America, foreign policy analysis, neoclassical realism, São Paulo Forum

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 05/01/2018

Anna Novichkova

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List of Abbreviations

(all acronyms from Portuguese)

MERCOSUL	Southern Common Market
UNASUL	Union of South American Nations
CELAC	The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
FOCEM	Structural Convergence Fund
CALC	Summit of Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Government on Integration and Development
BNDES	Brazil's National Bank for Social and Economic Development
PT	Workers' Party
PSDB	Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PMDB	Brazilian Democratic Movement
PRN	Party for National Reconstruction
PFL	Liberal Front Party
PCdoB	Communist Party of Brazil

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Introduction

Context and subject significance

The thirteen years (2003-2016) of the Workers' Party in power have become a prominent landmark in the foreign policy of Brazil. Two presidents governed Brazil during that period of time. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva served two terms from 2003 to 2011 and his successor Dilma Rousseff served one full term and a half of the second term from 2011 until her impeachment in 2016. From the beginning of its term in 2003, the new government, under the leadership of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, has acquired a very active stance in external affairs. Although, both Lula and Dilma followed some of the lines of the previous administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), the newly emerged ambitions have spread in different foreign policy directions and manifested themselves in "the predominance of change over continuity"¹ and the dominance of the Workers' Party initiatives, diverging from some of the traditional orientations of the *Itamaraty*, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.² It affected the priorities and the foreign policy discourse as well as the diplomatic style and preference in alliances.

Several new elements of Brazilian foreign policy can be highlighted. An initiative of the so-called "South-South" cooperation as Brazil's attempt to perform as a leader of the global south, African countries in particular. An active participation in multilateral trade negotiations with G20. From 2001 to 2008 Brazil has participated in all ministerial phases of the Doha round. Another notable incentive was the attempt to mediate the international nuclear agreement with Iran. Besides that, Brazil has engaged into the reformation of the UN Security Council and

¹ Maria Regina Soares De Lima and Mônica Hirst, "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities," *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2006): 22.

² Steen Fryba Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013): 273.

actively campaigned for the permanent seat and the veto power. It also intended to strengthen the BRICS summit and enhance the cooperation between its members.

The above-mentioned new initiatives were launched under the traditional idea of the political multilateralism. However, it quickly became evident that the Workers' Party ideas were far from the conventional pragmatic diversification of political alignments but merely an anti-western (anti-imperialist) polemics directed against the "US unilateralism".³ That is why, when in 2011 Brazil entered into economic and later political crisis, all the commitments to the newly emerged allies became a financial burden for Brazil rather than a benefit. *Itamaraty* implemented severe budget cuts which affected a lot of recently built embassies in African countries. Brazil could not fulfil their financial obligations to International Organisations and ended up with large debts to the United Nations, Organisation of American States and International Atomic Energy. The country escaped from the mediation of Iran nuclear deal and became less active at the G20 Summits.

Thus, Brazil's international involvement outside of its continent can not be considered its primal interest and a constant focal point. The regional integration, on the contrary, has become the main focus of Brazilian foreign policy over the given period of time. The initiative of the regional integration has been given the highest priority at the speech by the president Lula da Silva at the Conference at the University of Beijing in 2004.⁴ Moreover, the integration of South American countries has been given a strategic importance by including it into one of the top priorities of the National Defense Strategy in 2008.⁵ From 2000 onwards, the process of

³ Paulo Roberto De Almeida, "Lula's Foreign Policy: Regional and Global Strategies," *Brazil under Lula*, 2009, 171.

⁴ Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, Bureau of Diplomatic Planning, *Brazilian Foreign Policy Handbook* (Brasilia, 2008), 43-4, http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/454-Brazilian_Foreign_Policy_Handbook.pdf

⁵ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *National Strategy of Defence*, (Brasilia, 2008), 17, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154868/Brazil_English2008.pdf

integration has boosted quickly in South America. Brazil has been taking a very active role in promoting the creation of several new organizations aiming at regional integration.

The initiative of the South American integration is not new to Brazilian foreign policy. In 1991 Brazil was one of the founding members of the MERCOSUL. However, while created originally as an idea of a free trade area and customs union, the organisation took a different path in the beginning of 2000's.⁶ Political and institutional integration became the main focus of MERCOSUL. A judiciary body called a Permanent Tribunal of Revision was established in 2004, followed by a Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) the same year. Brazil agreed to pay around 70 % of costs⁷ to help to assist its less fortunate neighbours, showing willingness to invest large sums of money into the region. Another institutional body, the MERCOSUL Parliament was created in 2005.

In 2008, the Union of South American Nations, which is the most ambitious organization for the integration, was created in Brazil's capital Brasilia. It includes 12 member states (all countries on the continent except French Guiana), and aspires for the deeper integration in the cultural, social, economic, political and military fields.⁸ The same year Brazil took the initiative to host the first Summit of Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Government on Integration and Development (CALC).⁹ Two years later, in 2010, CALC united with the Rio Group and grew into The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the largest international organisation in terms of the territorial spread and the number of the member states (24 from Latin America and the Caribbean).

⁶ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, "Lulas foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): 1323.

⁷ Mercosul, Unidade Técnica FOCEM, Secretaria do MERCOSUL, *O Fundo para a convergência estrutural do Mercosul - FOCEM (2005-2016)*, Janeiro 2016, 4-8. <http://focem.mercosur.int/pt/focem-em-acao/>

⁸ UNASUL, *South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty*, Article 2,3, <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/regional-organisations/unasur.%202008,%20establishing%20treaty.pdf>

⁹ Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos*, Accessed November 20, 2017, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/integracao-regional/689-comunidade-de-estados-latino-americanos-e-caribenhos>.

Beside actively participating in the institutional regional arrangements, Brazil has invested large sums of money directly into big industrial projects in the region. One of such projects, financed by the Brazil's National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) and built by the Brazilian engineering firm Grupo Odebrecht, was the construction of the port in Mariel, Cuba.¹⁰

In 2016, Brazil's Federal Court of Accounts concluded that from 2006 to 2014 BNDES has lent 50,5 billions reals (approx 15,2 billion dollars) to the big construction works outside Brazil. Several countries received the most money: Angola (14 billion reals), Venezuela (11 billion reals), Argentina (8 billion reals), Dominican Republic (8 billion reals) and Cuba (3 billion reals). Overall, more projects were financed outside than inside Brazil.¹¹ All the foreign investments caused a lot of controversies, but were defended by Lula da Silva and Rouseff.

Why has Brazil decided to involve itself so deeply into the process of integration with the region? The answers to this question may vary based on the theoretical perspective and the level of analysis. Systemic explanations uncover Brazil's challenging geography of the continental realm and lack of material resources to enter the international political arena as an independent player. In this vein, neorealism approaches Brazil's focus on the political and cultural Latin American integration as an attempt to counterbalance the US Hegemony in Americas without frightening its regional neighbours.¹² Domestic explanations highlight the ideological orientations of the Workers' Party and personal preferences of the president Lula da Silva.

¹⁰ Nelson Acosta and Marc Franc, "Cuba opens new port built with Brazilian aid," Reuters, January 27, 2014, accessed November 20, 2017. <https://in.reuters.com/article/cuba-brazil-port/cuba-opens-new-port-built-with-brazilian-aid-idINL2N0L10XO20140127>.

¹¹ Dimmi Amora, "Financiamento do BNDES às obras no exterior é maior do que o feito no país," Folha de S.Paulo, January 06, 2016, accessed November 20, 2017, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2016/06/1777284-financiamento-do-bndes-as-obras-no-exterior-e-maior-do-que-o-feito-no-pais.shtml>.

¹² Kurt Weyland, "Realism under Hegemony: Theorizing the Rise of Brazil," *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, February 8, 2016, 153-4, <https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/download/961/968>

However, as argued in this thesis, there exist another important actor, which contributed to the strengthening of the Latin American integration. The São Paulo Forum, an organisation of the leftist parties from Latin America and the Caribbean, was founded in 1990 by Lula da Silva and Fidel Castro. The main aims of the Forum, declared at their first meeting in 1990 in São Paulo, Brazil, included elaboration on the alternatives to imperialism and neoliberal capitalism and to revise the “American integration” formulated by President Bush.¹³ Since Lula da Silva, the creator of the organization, became the president in Brazil, a lot of prescriptions formulated earlier by the Forum were applied in Brazil’s foreign policy, especially in the realm of Latin American integration.

This thesis argues that the São Paulo Forum has been performing the role of the platform for the formulation of the Latin American integration project and the network of communication for the leftist parties on the continent. Therefore, it should be included into the analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy from 2003 to 2016.

Aim of the research and the research question

The main objective of this thesis is twofold. There is a *general aim* and a *specific aim*. The *general aim* is to discuss all the driving forces (variables) behind Brazil’s decision to involve itself so deeply into the regional integration since the Workers’ Party coming to power in 2003. However, it not only aims to discover those driving forces, but place them under the single theoretical framework of the neoclassical realist theory. The *specific aim* is to clarify that the São Paulo Forum, an international organisation, should also be included into the set of driving forces behind the foreign policy choices in Brazil from 2003 to 2016, and thus, should be studied under the intervening variables of the neoclassical realist theory. Thus, this thesis attempts to explain

¹³ Foro de São Paulo. *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, I Encontro. Declaração Final – São Paulo, Brasil, 4 de julho de 1990, 11-13, Accessed December 15, 2017. <http://forodesaopaulo.org/declaracao-final-dos-encontros-do-foro-de-sao-paulo-1990-2012/>

how the Forum influenced the foreign policy in Brazil in the particular instance of the strengthening of Latin American integration during Workers' Party in power.

In this way, the thesis conducts an inquiry into the process of formation of Brazilian foreign policy. The following research question is put forward: *What role does the São Paulo Forum play in Brazil's intensified involvement into regional integration during the period of the Workers' Party in power?*

Methodology

To achieve its aim and to answer the main research question, this thesis uses a theory application approach and a single case study method. The variables of the neoclassical realist theory are applied to the empirical case of Brazilian foreign policy during the administration of the Workers' Party (2003-2016), particularly in the domain of the regional integration. The congruence procedure and process tracing techniques are applied to explain the influence of the São Paul Forum on the decisions of the foreign policy executives in Brazil.

Structure

The first chapter of the thesis aims to introduce the problematic of the specific phenomenon under study, the São Paulo Forum. It does so, through the review of the existing literature, a summary of the secondary sources, to provide context for the research. It consistently discusses several academic articles and books covering the topic of the São Paulo Forum, published since the foundation of the organization in 1991 up to the most recent works of 2017. This chapter puts forward different standpoints on the impact of the São Paulo Forum on political processes in Latin America and particularly, in Brazil.

The second chapter lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis and justifies the choices made by the author. First, it brings in the main assumptions and the model of the neoclassical realist theory. It further explains, how the influence of the São Paulo Forum can be incorporated into the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy through the variables of the neoclassical realism. Second, it explains the methodological considerations of the theory application approach and presents methodological steps, necessary for the conduct of the study. Finally, the possible theoretical and methodological limitations are discussed.

The third chapter begins the empirical study of the Brazilian foreign policy 2003-2016, under the independent variable (Systemic Stimuli) of neoclassical realism. The impact of the systemic imperatives on Brazil's decision to involve itself so deeply into the regional integration project is analysed consistently through three steps. First, the estimation of Brazil's relative material capabilities and its place in the multipolar world. Second, the regional strategic environment and its effect on Brazilian foreign policy choices. Third, the clarity of the international system and its components.

The fourth chapter continues the empirical study of Brazilian foreign policy under the set of four intervening variables of neoclassical realism. The variable of Leader Images identifies Brazil's foreign policy executives and their affiliation with the São Paulo Forum. The impact of the ideological perceptions on Brazilian foreign policy and Latin American integration is discussed under the Strategic Culture variable. The third variable called State-Society Relations studies the reciprocal effect of the government relations with the public in Brazil and the public opinion on regional integration. The fourth variable of Domestic institutions analyses the capabilities of the Brazilian executives to extract state resources for the implementation of the desirable foreign policies. The influence of the resolutions of the São Paulo Forum is analysed in each intervening variable.

The fifth chapter achieves the general aim and the specific aim of the master thesis. Under the neoclassical realist model, it summarizes all the driving forces (including the São Paulo Forum) behind Brazil's strengthened regional involvement. It further answers the main research question of the thesis and explains how the São Paulo Forum influenced Brazilian foreign policy choices in the particular instance of the strengthening of Latin American integration during Workers' Party in power.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes all the achieved results and discusses the implication of the findings of this thesis. It also acknowledges the possible limitations of the study and gives recommendations and the scope for the future research.

1. Literature Review

This chapter introduces a summary of the secondary sources to provide context for the research. It consistently discusses several academic articles and books covering the topic of the São Paulo Forum, published since the foundation of the organization in 1991 up to the most recent works of 2017. This chapter puts forward different standpoints on the impact of the São Paulo Forum on political processes in Latin America and particularly, in Brazil.

Throughout the 1990s, during the first decade of the existence of the São Paulo Forum, few academics had been considering the organization to be a significant player on the regional or international arena. At the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc, many scholars mistakenly believed in the everlasting triumph of the liberal democracy over its adversaries and the impossibility of a new strategic and ideological confrontation. Therefore, the emergence of the considerable socialist and neo-marxist coalition anywhere in the world seemed unlikely at that period. Despite the ambitious objectives set forth at the first meeting of the São Paulo Forum, such as the elaboration on the alternatives to imperialism and neoliberal capitalism and the creation of the joint strategy of Latin American integration¹⁴, and the irrefutable growth in the number and political scope of its members, the organization received modest attention from the scholars of the political science. Moreover, in the 1990s the member parties of the São Paulo Forum hold limited political power within their states. They occupied few important governmental seats and were mostly in opposition (except for Cuba).

Petras, for instance, claimed that the established São Paulo Forum, an important and useful attempt to revive the leftist agenda in the post-communist period, had merely lost its

¹⁴ Ibid.

relevance by the mid-1990s. He argued that its members de-radicalised their political programs assimilating with the right-wing and center parties and aligned with neoliberal leaders around the world, which, in its turn, undermined revolutionary nature of the Forum. Ascribing the organization to the less radical, compromising, the second wave of the left, Petras concluded that the coalition could not raise any serious socialist alternative on the continent.¹⁵ He entitled the Forum as “an increasingly ritualistic event divorced from the radical social movements that confronted the neoliberal regimes.”¹⁶ However, Petras’s attribution of the temporary neoliberal economic measures towards the conservative right-wing political agenda seemed inaccurate and arbitrary. So did his presumption that neoliberalism had reinforced its position in Latin America.

Green, on its side, criticized the participants of the São Paulo Forum for the demagogy and the lack of practical ideas in the economic realm. Commenting on the third meeting of the São Paulo Forum in Managua, dedicated to finding an economic alternative to neoliberalism in Latin America, Green noted that denouncing the evils of neoliberalism, politicians offered no actual economic proposals instead.¹⁷

However, some other scholars placed larger significance on the creation of the São Paulo Forum and saw bigger potential in the recently emerged organization. Robinson, already in 1992, has acknowledged the founding member parties of the Forum as strong political players in their countries. He summarized the main principles of the newly emerged leftist coalition relating to both internal and external political strategies including the call for political action and the focus on the continental realm via Latin American political and social integration.¹⁸

¹⁵ James Petras and Timothy F. Harding, "Introduction," *Latin American Perspectives* 27, no. 5 (2000): 4.

¹⁶ James Petras, "Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Latin America," *Latin American Perspectives* 24, no. 1 (1997): 84-85.

¹⁷ Duncan Green, "Latin America: Neoliberal failure and the search for alternatives," *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1996): 120-121.

¹⁸ William I. Robinson, "The São Paulo Forum: Is There a New Latin American Left?" *Monthly Review* 44, no. 7 (1992): 1-12.

Löwy emphasized the capacity of the São Paulo Forum to unify the organized left with the social and guerrilla movements and the European and US progressive forces, referring to it “as the common expression of the main progressive socialist or left-nationalist parties in the continent.”¹⁹ In another article, Löwy and Stanley acknowledged the São Paulo Forum as an compelling regional initiative contributing to the resistance against capitalist globalization and its main institutions: “the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], the Group of 7, North American Free Trade Agreement, the Maastricht Treaty, and Multilateral Agreement on Investment.”²⁰

Since the late 1990’s members of the Forum have one by one started getting to power in their countries. Analyzing the progressing agenda of the organization, Silva inferred that since the members’ gaining more power on the continent, the resolutions of the Forum and the policy prescriptions (both for the common strategy and particular states) has become more explicit and precise. The regional integration and the creation of the continental institutions became a priority on the agenda.²¹

Silva examined the positions defended at the official joined declarations of the São Paulo Forum to show how they coincide with the foreign policy strategies of the Latin American countries, in particular, within the process of the regional integration. Tracing the growth in the members of the Forum and its organizational scope, Silva noted that the Latin American left has never been so strong and successful since the begging of the independence movement on the continent two hundred years ago.²² Following the evolution of the ideas presented at

¹⁹ Michael Löwy, "Hasta La Victoria ...," *Latin American Perspectives* 25, no. 6 (1998): 76-7.

²⁰ Michael Löwy and Charlotte C. Stanley, "Toward an International of Resistance Against Capitalist Globalization," *Latin American Perspectives* 29, no. 6 (2002): 128-9.

²¹ Bruno de Paula Castanho e Silva, “The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration” (paper presented at the XXIIInd World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, 2012): 9-13.

²² Silva, “The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration”, 2-3.

the annual meetings and resolutions of the organization on the one hand and the actual policy developments in regional integration on the other, Silva found evidence that since the Workers' Party coming to power in 2003 in Brazil, the agenda of MERCOSUL trade block has been closely following the ideas of the official declarations of the Sao Paulo Forum, while the agenda of UNASUL has particularly materialised what the resolutions of Forum prescribed for a Latin American Community of Nations.²³ Malamud reached similar conclusions and stated that MERCOSUL, which was initially created as a pragmatic free trade area agreement has turned into a "symbol for progressive political activism and leftist ideologies."²⁴ Moreover, Silva's research confirmed that the closer study of official declarations and the agenda of São Paulo Forum could provide an insight into the perceptions of some of the member parties, officially in power in their countries, their future intentions for the continental strategy as well as foreign policy objectives.²⁵

Not only the issue of the regional integration appeared in relation to the Forum. Fleischman, in his book, analyzed the anti-US political orientations of the Latin American leaders of the extreme left and mentioned the São Paulo Forum as a network, forging solidarity among those leaders and coordinating their political agendas.²⁶

Despite the ideological differences between a large number of member parties of different origin in the Forum, their foreign policy orientations have shared a strong solidarity. French referred to it as a "convergence in praxis." He attributed the existence of such a unity to a joined anti-neoliberal and anti-US political strategy created by the São Paulo Forum.²⁷

²³ Ibid., 13-20.

²⁴ Andrés Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Latin American Politics and Society* 53, no. 3 (2011): 7.

²⁵ Silva, "The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration", 19-20.

²⁶ Luis Fleischman, *Latin America in the post-Chávez era: the security threat to the United States* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013).

²⁷ John D. French, "Understanding the Politics of Latin Americas Plural Lefts (Chávez/Lula): social democracy, populism and convergence on the path to a post-neoliberal world," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2009): 360

Regarding the foreign policy of a particular Latin American country and its correlation with the São Paulo Forum, a significant number of works written about the activities of the Forum and its role in Brazilian foreign policy belongs to a conservative journalist and a philosopher, Olavo de Carvalho. Similar to Silva, Carvalho emphasized the value of studying the agenda of the São Paulo Forum. He insisted that investigating into the political connections of the state officials in Latin America, the content official resolutions of the organization, together with the publications of its members one can predict the future political developments on the continent.²⁸ Concerning Brazil, Carvalho concluded that the country's foreign policy does not reflect the national interest of the state and is rather subordinated to the objectives of the São Paulo Forum. In his analysis, Carvalho went even further, claiming that the organization performs a role of a supranational institution which poses a threat to the entire existence of the Brazilian sovereign state.²⁹ Assessing the character of Lula's diplomacy, Almeida reached conclusions similar to Carvalho's, asserting that Brazilian foreign policy had been largely based on the Workers' Party ideological preferences, rather than the traditional diplomatic practices and foreign policy continuities of the state. Moreover, Almeida asserted that Lula's foreign policy choices served more his personal motivations rather than Brazil's national interest.³⁰

However, the most profound analysis of the role of the São Paulo Forum in Brazilian foreign policy (as well as applied geopolitics) has been recently conducted by Morgado. By introducing the innovative variable of the elites perceptions into geopolitical analysis, Morgado concluded that the São Paulo Forum had been lately performing a role of strategic command in a long lasting continental focus of Brazilian political elites. He also contended

²⁸ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota*. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2013)

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Paulo Roberto De Almeida, "Never before seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's grand diplomacy," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. 2 (2010): 162.

that the Brazilian foreign policy orientation on Latin American integration undermines its power projection capabilities.³¹ Analysing the Brazilian White Book of Defense, Morgado argued that the official inclusion of the South American integration into strategic objectives of the country and a certain disregard of the United States as its traditional ally are not independent of the São Paulo Forum, because the organisation is the “leftist socio-political hegemony in the subcontinent.”³² In his other work, Morgado touched upon the role of the São Paulo Forum within the larger framework of the regional ideological project of Meridionalism (focusing on the idea of the united “south” of the globe) and its relation to the objectives of the Neo-Eurasianist Anti-Western strategy.³³

³¹ Nuno Morgado, "Continentalization versus Maritimization – the debate within Brazilian School of Geopolitics and its political consequences," 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM2016, Arts, SGEM Vienna Hourg, Book 2 Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism, Volume I Political Science, 2016, 93.

³² Nuno Morgado, "Analysis of Brazil's Geopolitical Design: Prioritizing the South American Regional Integration Maneuver," *Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 5, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 16.

³³ Nuno Morgado, "Assessing the role of Brazil in the New World Order: a geopolitical study of Meridionalism and neo-Eurasianism," *Anuario Latinoamericano Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales* 4 (2017): 183.

2. Theory and Methodology

This chapter lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis and justifies the choices made by the author. First, it brings in the main assumptions of the neoclassical realist theory of international politics. It further explains, how the influence of the São Paulo Forum can be incorporated into the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy through the variables of the neoclassical realism. Second, it explains the methodological considerations of the theory application approach and lays out methodological steps, necessary for the conduct of the study. Finally, the possible theoretical and methodological limitations are discussed.

2.1 Neoclassical Realism. Main theoretical assumptions.

Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism” and introduced a systematized formulation of the basic provisions of the theory dealing with the behavior of states within the realm of foreign policy. Rose initially elaborated the theory of neoclassical realism in distinction with three other theoretical approaches to foreign policy: *Innenpolitik*, offensive realism, and defensive realism. Thus, the theory incorporated the assumptions from those approaches, combining them with certain insights from the classical realist thought. Challenging the assumptions of *Innenpolitik* theories, Rose argued that unit-level factors alone have low explanatory value, especially when it comes to accessing why states with similar domestic backgrounds act differently in the foreign realm (and vice-versa). Those unit-level explanations, therefore, can not be regarded as independent variables and should be placed second, as intervening variables. Rose also indicated the weaknesses of neorealist approaches, both offensive and defensive realism, particularly their inability to access domestic differences between the states. The main idea of the neoclassical realism, which differs it profoundly from neorealism (offensive and defensive), is that there is no “perfect transmission belt linking relative

material capabilities to foreign policy behavior” and therefore, those indirect and complex systemic pressures can only be accessed through intervening variables at the unit level. ³⁴

The main argument of neoclassical realism, thus, holds that the country’s place in the international system and particularly its relative material power capabilities constitute the core parameter of its foreign policy and should be the starting point of the analysis. These factors represent an objective reality that in the long term will influence states’ ambitions on the international arena.³⁵ However, there is no direct causal connection that can be observed between the independent and dependent variables. Systemic imperatives alone rarely force policymakers to adopt one policy over another. The decisions regarding foreign policy are made on the domestic level, by individuals with their views, beliefs and personality traits. Policymakers adopt personalized vision on the international system and on the opportunities and constraints imposed by it. Moreover, political elites may have limited ability to extract and to mobilize material power resources of their states. Political organization of the country, its institutions, ideology and regime type, can influence the speed and the scope of implementation of some foreign policy strategies by the government.³⁶ Therefore, neoclassical realism incorporated intervening variables dealing with elites perceptions and elites capacities.

Wohlforth, while analyzing the end of the Cold War, insisted that the different level explanations should not be seen as competitive, but rather compatible and complementary. In order to create an integrated theoretical foundation for the foreign policy analysis, he advocated adding unit-level explanations to the traditional systemic level of neorealism.³⁷

³⁴ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 01 (1998): 147-151.

³⁵ Ibid, 144-147.

³⁶ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State.” *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 467.

³⁷ William Curti Wohlforth, *Cold War endgame oral history, analysis, debates* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).

Schweller also included non-structural explanations of state behaviour in his “Underbalancing Theory.” He contended that the reason why some states fail to employ balance-of-power strategies lies in its domestic political processes, in particular, in the internal considerations of policy elites. Accordingly, Schweller rejected the neorealist idea that structural imperatives alone can make policymakers adopt one policy over another.³⁸

2.2 The Neoclassical Realist theory of international politics.

Neoclassical realism was initially designed as a separate foreign policy theory. However, in his recent work, Ripsman et al rejected the Waltz’s distinction between the realms of international politics and foreign policy³⁹, concluding that in the long-term, foreign policy of the state is what produces international politics. Hence, labeled as a Type III Neoclassical Realism⁴⁰ (as shown in Figure 1), appears a systematized theory of international politics. According to the theory, “every state’s external behavior is shaped first and foremost by its power and position in the international system and, specifically, by its relative share of material capabilities.”⁴¹ In line with the realist theoretical tradition, territorial states are understood as the primary units of the international system. Thus, “Systemic Stimuli”⁴² constitutes the independent variable of the theory. It involves several steps of analysis of the international system and the country’s position in it. The first step implies the assessment of “structural modifiers”⁴³ at the level of international system or a regional subsystem. These include geography, the rates of technological diffusion,

³⁸ Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

³⁹ Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy.” *Security Studies* Vol. 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 54-57.

⁴⁰ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical realist theory of international politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 34.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 56.

⁴² *Ibid*, 34.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 38.

and the offense-defense balance in military technologies. The next steps include, the estimation of the relative distribution of power and polarity, strategic environment and the clarity of the international system. Neoclassical realists perceive power as a means to an end and adopt the “elements of national power approach.⁴⁴” Therefore, state's material capabilities are identified through a class of tangible and intangible indicators. The third step of the analysis requires the assessment of the clarity of the international system, which, in its turn, is a product of both structure and agency and therefore should be readdressed through the intervening variables later. The fourth step entails the analysis of the state’s strategic environment, a concept that relates to the imminence and the magnitude of threats and opportunities that state faces.⁴⁵

At the domestic level of analysis, there are four broad categories of intervening variables introduced by the neoclassical realism: “*the images and perceptions of state leaders*”, “*strategic culture*”, “*state-society relations*” and “*domestic institutional arrangements*”. These variables are systematically placed within the model of the neoclassical realist theory. The intervening variables influence how foreign policy executives perceive constraints and opportunities of the international system. Rejecting the neorealist notion of a state as a black box, the intervening variables unveil the process of the foreign policy formulation and the objectives laying behind it. Moreover, it reflects the relations between the state and society. A causal chain, created through the systematization of independent and intervening variables, produces foreign policy responses of the state. In the medium and long-term, policy responses shape international outcomes and comprise the entire sphere of international politics.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 44.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 33-57.




Figure 1: Type III Neoclassical Realist Model (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016)

2.3 Why Neoclassical Realism?

There are four principal justifications for the application of neoclassical realist theory to the analysis of the Brazilian foreign policy and the role of the São Paulo Forum in it. First, neoclassical realism incorporates specific variables, such as elites' perceptions, which are crucial for the examination of the decision-making-process. It gives the possibility to study the agenda of the Forum in detail, because the São Paulo Forum presumably contains the actual perceptions of Brazilian political elites.

By including into the analysis the role of individuals in international relations, which has been “largely ignored by many other theories”⁴⁶, it allows to decompose decision-making by identifying concrete Brazilian foreign policy executives and their involvement with the São Paulo Forum.

Second, the combination of material and non-material (cognitive, ideational) explanations, that usually come from the competing schools of thought, gives neoclassical realism an advantage over both neorealist and constructivist theories by widening its explanatory scope and

⁴⁶ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (2001): 108.

using variables operating at all three levels of analysis, each capturing a significant aspect of a complex causal process.

Third, the theory allows to analyze the involvement of non-state actors in the foreign policy realm, without compromising the state-centric approach. There is a substantial difference between the structural realist and neoclassical realist treatment of international organizations. While the first assume that the non-state actors can not produce any independent results in the international system, neoclassical realists propose that, interacting with its intervening variables, non-state actors are able to constrain the statesmen policy options and consequently influence the foreign policy outcomes.⁴⁷

2.4 Methodological Assumptions

This thesis is mostly a descriptive study, which adopts a theory application approach. By applying the variables of the neoclassical realism to the empirical example of Brazil's foreign policy over a certain period of time (2003-2016) it seeks to lay out an integrated framework for the explanation of the strengthening of the Latin American integration in Brazilian external orientation. It also seeks to explain how the São Paulo Forum (an external actor) can be incorporated into the domestic variables of the neoclassical realism and explain the correlations between the agenda of the Forum and the particular foreign policy choice of Brazil.

This thesis represents a single case study research of Brazilian foreign policy. As strictly defined by Gerring, "a case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case" as a "unit, observed at a single point in time or over some period of time".⁴⁸ The choice to focus on the single case is conditioned, evidently, by the research question, and by the peculiarity of the

⁴⁷ Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 184.

⁴⁸ John Gerring, *Case study research: principles and practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20.

empirical case of Brazil. As highlighted by Bennet and Elman, an intensive study of one or few cases can contribute to the development of conceptual innovations and theory development in future, because it requires theoretical concerns and a very detailed knowledge of particular empirical cases.⁴⁹

The empirical case of Brazilian foreign policy contains a research puzzle, as identified by Ripsman et al, which revolves around a political phenomenon that appears to be inadequately explained by existing theories, particularly due to unspecified predictions.⁵⁰ Here, the São Paulo Forum represents the political phenomenon under scrutiny. The review of the existing literature in the previous chapter demonstrated that this organization was rarely included within the framework of any grand theory of international relations. Single case study method helps to solve the puzzle. It allows to conclude that the agenda of the São Paulo Forum can and should be incorporated into the neoclassical realist analysis of Brazilian foreign policy, without jeopardizing the state-centric approach.

The general methodological approach of the master thesis is qualitative. By combining individual, domestic and international-level explanations through the variables of neoclassical realism, it adopts a multivariate model of causation, typical for the qualitative research.⁵¹

The empirical case study extends over three following chapters. In the third chapter, the independent variable of the neoclassical realism (Systemic Stimuli) is applied. In the fourth chapter, four independent variables of neoclassical realism are analysed together with the resolutions of the São Paulo Forum. A simple congruence procedure identifies the number of Brazil's foreign policy executives engaged into the agenda of the São Paulo Forum from 2003 to

⁴⁹ Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007): 178-80.

⁵⁰ Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 103.

⁵¹ James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," *Political Analysis*, (2006): 234.

2016. Then, the sequence in timing between the resolutions of the Forum and policy implementation in Brazilian foreign policy is examined. In Chapter 5, the full neoclassical realist model is filled in to demonstrate jointly all the driving forces that contributed to the deepening of the Latin American integration during the period of the Workers' Party in power in Brazil.

In terms of the techniques used to explain the empirical case, the research adopts the process tracing technique. As defined by Van Evera, it “explores the chain of events of the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes⁵²”. By focusing on the specific foreign policy outcome and the role of the São Paulo Forum in it, the research traces below the original level of analysis and focuses on a specific decision-making dynamics by investigating into the perceptions of actors, strategic calculations and the decisions of individual political leaders (parties) involved in the agenda of the São Paulo Forum and in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy at the same time.⁵³

2.5 Theoretical Limitations

The major theoretical limitation concerns the theory application approach. Since this thesis does not intend to test neoclassical realism against the empirical case, its results are not achieved through casual inferences. The author's choice to not test the theory is conditioned by the lack of parsimony of neoclassical realism, which makes it difficult to trace the large amount of variables and their causal linkage. Moreover, since it is hard to scientifically evaluate non-material factors, the explanatory power of the theory may rely on the comprehensive counterfactual analysis, which was not found practical for this thesis due to the width of the aim and the limitations in

⁵² Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of political science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64,74.

⁵³ Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 114.

size of the master thesis. However, the descriptive character of the study produces an intellectual framework for the possible future research.

3. Systemic Stimuli

The third chapter begins the empirical study of the Brazilian foreign policy 2003-2016, under the independent variable (Systemic Stimuli) of neoclassical realism. The impact of the systemic imperatives on Brazil's decision to involve itself so deeply into the regional integration project is analysed consistently in three steps. First, the estimation of Brazil's relative material capabilities and its place in the multipolar world. Second, the regional strategic environment and its effect on Brazilian foreign policy choices. Third, the clarity of the international system and its components.

3.1 Relative Distribution of Power and Polarity

Conditioned by structural modifiers, such as the rates of technological diffusion and geography, the relative distribution of power and polarity constitute the first two steps in the analysis of the independent variable. Power, in this case, is understood as an actual or potential relationship between actors with the elements of national power approach. While polarity serves as a function of the relative distribution of capabilities between the major states in the system.⁵⁴

To clarify why has Brazil chosen the South American integration as a top priority in its foreign policy, it is first necessary to look at several key indicators of the country's material capabilities, such as the size and the composition of the territory; natural resources endearments; the size and the relative strength of the military; demographic trends and characteristic of the society and the size and the function and the economy.⁵⁵

3.1.1 Brazil's Relative Distribution of Power

The size and the composition of the territory:

⁵⁴ Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 43-45.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

The total area of Brazil is 8.515.767,049 km².⁵⁶ It is the fifth largest country in the world, which occupies 5,7% of the total land area of the world and 45 % of South American continent. Brazil occupies a central position on the continent and has 17.000 km land border with every country in Latin America, except Equator and Chile.⁵⁷ Geographically, the country is protected from any conventional international threats by the Amazon rainforest in the north, the Atlantic Ocean in the east and three buffer states in the west: Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. The size, the central location on the continent, and the natural protection from the external threats give Brazil an advantageous position and a potential of a regional power.

Brazil's geographical configuration is represented by several heterogeneous regions. The Amazon river basin is a jungle rainforest. It occupies almost one third of Brazil. Its poor soils, humid climate and the inability to construct on the muddy banks of the Amazon river makes this geographical region the least hospitable for the population on economic activity. Cerrado, a tropical savannah, is an inland region which stretches discontinuously from the south-west towards the northeast and occupies almost 20 % of the country's territory. It is less challenging for the economic activities, but lacks navigable rivers, which make irrigation and logistics very expensive. The Brazilian highlands and a very narrow strip of land between the highlands and the coast is the ecumenic region of the country. This is where the majority of the population is located and the most economic activities occur. ⁵⁸ Another important topographical feature is the Brazilian Shield, which sharply drops to the Atlantic ocean appearing as a wall. Such topography protects Brazil from the external threats from the Atlantic ocean, but creates a barrier for the traditional growth of the coastal cities towards the interior, which poses economic, logistic and

⁵⁶ "Brazilian Territorial Area," IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, accessed November 13, 2017 http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/geociencias/cartografia/default_territ_area.shtm

⁵⁷ "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed November 15, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>

⁵⁸ Stratfor, "Brazil's Geographical Challenge," Stratfor Worldview, May 17, 2013, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.stratfor.com/video/brazils-geographic-challenge>

strategic difficulties.⁵⁹ Due to the geographical barriers, circulation in Brazil is developed very poorly and unevenly, mostly distributed in the South and Southeast regions and along the coastline.⁶⁰

Apart from an extensive land border, Brazil also has an opened coastline of 7,5 thousand kilometres on the Atlantic Ocean, the longest 15th sea line in the world.⁶¹ The presence of these two types of borders divides Brazil's geography into two realms: continental and maritime. Each realm possesses different features in terms of foreign policy implications, to a point where they may be considered antagonistic.

The continental realm is comprised of a large landmass with a lot of potential for the agriculture and the extraction of natural resources. However, it contains a lot of geographical barriers that constraint external power projection. The northern international border located in the remote jungle in the area of the Amazon Basin is almost impossible to control, which represents a major challenge for the defence of the country. The lack of navigable rivers, connecting the core costal areal with the inland rises extraordinary costs for logistics. In order for Brazil to to be secure its external performance it needs to acquire a very large capital, investment and infrastructure domestically first.

On the other hand, maritime realm gives a lot of economic and strategic opportunities. Compared to the Pacific, the Atlantic coastline receives much more intensive marine and air traffic. It is also much more hospitable for human activities, such as tourism, due to a large number of beached and lagoons, against the mountainous Pacific coastline in Chile and Peru. At

⁵⁹ Stratfor, "The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography," Stratfor Worldview, May 13, 2012, accessed November 20, 2017, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-brazil-emergent-powers-struggle-geography>.

⁶⁰ "Brazil Road Map," Maps of the World, accessed November 30, 2017, <https://www.mapsofworld.com/brazil/road-map.html>. and "Brazil Rail Map, Railway Map of Brazil," Railway Map of Brazil, accessed November 30, 2017, <http://www.mapsofworld.com/brazil/rail-map.html>.

⁶¹ "Coastline," *The World Facebook*, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed November 15, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2060.html>.

the same time, the mouth of the Amazon river, controlled by Brazil, is right in front of the main lines of the Atlantic ocean (compared to the La Plata mouth, controlled by Argentina).⁶² The Brazilian coastline also is little cut, which complicates the access to internal waters and creates additional protection. Brazilian territory also includes several archipelagos in the Atlantic Ocean, in particular: Fernando de Noronha, Rocas, São Pedro and São Paulo Archipelago, and Trindade and Martim Vaz. The possession of these archipelagos extends Brazil's exclusive economic zone and creates an additional opportunity to provide strategic military presence in the Atlantic Ocean.^{63 64} Moreover, the majority (94 %) of the oil reserves are located offshore, in the waters of the South Atlantic ocean.⁶⁵

Natural resources endearments:

Brazil is a country with well diversified agriculture and large self sufficiency in food. There are also unique forest resources that cover 60% of Brazilian territory and the largest renewable fresh water resources in the world.⁶⁶ Other important exported resources are: niobium,⁶⁷ iron ore, sugar cane, and crude oil. Brazil is the 8th largest consumer and 10th largest producer of energy in the world.

The size and the relative strength of the military:

Brazilian Armed Forces are formed under the authority of the President of the Republic, a Commander-in-Chief. National Defence Ministry is its main institutional body. The military forces of Brazil consist of three branches: Brazilian Army (219.585 of active personnel and 1.8

⁶² Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil*, (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935) 20,51.

⁶³ Marianne L. Weisebron, "Blue Amazon: Thinking the Defense of Brazilian Maritime Territory", *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 3 (2013):101.

⁶⁴ Danielle de Lima Viana... [et al.], *O Arquipélago de São Pedro e São Paulo: 10 anos de Estação Científica*, Marinha do Brasil, Secretaria da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar (SECIRM) (Brasília, 2009) 55.

⁶⁵ National Agency of Petroleum (ANP), Natural Gas and Biofuels, *Oil, Natural Gas, and Biofuels Statistical Yearbook 2014*, 20-62.

⁶⁶ "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, CIA.

⁶⁷ Adilson Rangel Alves and Aparecido Dos Reis Coutinho, "The Evolution of the Niobium Production in Brazil," *Materials Research* 18, no. 1 (2015): 107.

million reserve soldiers and 400.000 men of Brazilian State Police), Brazilian Navy (60.000 active personnel) which includes Naval Air and Marine Corps and Brazilian Air Force (77.000 military personnel and 740 aircrafts).⁶⁸ It is the biggest military in size and manpower on the continent.⁶⁹ Its units specialising in jungle warfare are internationally renowned, and recognised as the best fighting units in this field.⁷⁰ In crude terms, Brazil is the strongest military power on the continent, followed by Argentina.⁷¹

However, since 2003, military expenditures in terms of GDP have decreased from 1,5 to 1,3 percent.⁷² The actual capacity of military is low. There is a lack of modern equipment, maintenance and training, only 30% of tanks are operational and the artillery is outdated. There is a lack of modern aircraft, attack helicopters or medium range air-to-air missile and its pilots only trained 80 hours per year.⁷³ In the Navy, the ships are few and old, which is the biggest problem for a country with such a large maritime potential.⁷⁴

Regarding the weapons of mass destruction, Brazil is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1998. However, it still possesses key technology necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. In 2007 Brazil announced its decision to build to nuclear-propelled submarines, as a part of the Navy project for the defense of the Atlantic coast. The

⁶⁸ Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Title IV, Chapter II, Session II, Article 84, 57 http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/243334/Constitution_2013.pdf?sequence=11

⁶⁹ "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, CIA.

⁷⁰ Cesar Augusto Modesto Borges, "Brazilian Military Renowned for Jungle Warfare Training", *Dialogo, Digital Military Magazine*. November 2, 2015, accessed November 23, http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/2015/02/11/feature-04

⁷¹ "2017 Military Strength Ranking," GlobalFirepower.com - World Military Strengths Detailed, accessed November 29, 2017, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

⁷² World Bank, "Military expenditure (% of GDP)." Data, accessed November 30, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=BR>.

⁷³ João Fábio Bertonha, "Brazil: an emerging military power? The problem of the use of force in Brazilian international relations in the 21st century," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. 2 (2010): 116.

⁷⁴ Stratfor, "Evaluating Brazil's Rise," Stratfor Worldview, June 22, 2010, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/evaluating-brazils-rise>.

submarines are expected to enter in service in from 2017 to 2021.⁷⁵ Despite the fact that the nuclear enrichment is claimed to be intended the peaceful purposes only, it potentially strengthens Brazil's power capabilities both on and outside the continent. Moreover, it enhances Brazil's bargaining power on the international non-proliferation agenda.⁷⁶

Demographic trends and characteristics of the society:

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of population with 207 million inhabitants. Its population is predominantly young with 43,7 % within 25-54 age group and 40,3 % under 25 years. It is strategically and economically beneficial for the country.⁷⁷ However, the population density in Brazil is quite low - 25 people per km² ⁷⁸ because the population is also distributed very unevenly across the country. Due to the geographical barriers, most of the population of the country is located in the narrow coastal area, while the northern states of the Amazon region are almost empty. This problem of the uninhabited Amazon has always been a problem for Brazilian government because of the fear of the foreign occupation of this area.⁷⁹

Brazilian society can be characterised by the multiracial structure and religious diversity. As a nation, Brazil was formed by the mixing of native Indians, africans and europeans. It has ethnically and racially heterogeneous population.⁸⁰ Despite of a religious diversity, there is no official religion as such and no conflicting groups. Brazilian society demonstrates high levels of adoptability, as well as creative mentality and cultural resilience, evident from the historical and

⁷⁵ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *National Strategy of Defence*, (Brasilia, 2008), 22, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154868/Brazil_English2008.pdf

⁷⁶ Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa, "Brazil's Nuclear Submarine: A Broader Approach to the Safeguards Issue," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 60, no. 2 (2017): 15-16, doi:10.1590/0034-7329201700205.

⁷⁷ "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, CIA.

⁷⁸ "Population density (people per sq. km of land area)," The World Bank, Data, accessed November 23, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST>.

⁷⁹ Carlos De Meira Mattos, *Uma geopolítica pan-amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1980) 123-4.

⁸⁰ "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, CIA.

cultural perspective.⁸¹ It is interesting to notice that such cultural openness and adoptability is typical for the thalassocratic powers.

However, the cohesiveness of the population is not very strong, due to large economic and racial inequalities. Other societal problems include, the bad quality of the education, low healthcare spendings⁸² and public safety problems due to the gangster violence and low levels of internal security.⁸³

The size and the function and the economy:

Brazil is the largest economy in South America with well-developed, diversified agricultural sector and large mining and service sectors. Due to stable primary sector, rise in world commodity prices and capital inflow, Brazil has been able to expand its exports and experienced rapid economic growth. However, from 2011 to 2017 Brazilian economy has been in severe recession; the foreign investment reduced, the inflation started to increase persistently and the imports constantly started to outnumber the exports.⁸⁴

Brazilian economy faces several structural challenges that prevent its market expansion and the GDP growth, such as the inappropriate currency appreciation coming from external funding; inflation cycles, the dominance of the oligarchy in the Brazilian economy; and the access to China to enter Brazilian markets.⁸⁵ The decrease in economic power became a severe constraint on Brazilian internal security and the promotion of political influence abroad.

3.1.2 Polarity

⁸¹ Robert M. Levine, *History of Brazil*. (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 1999). ProQuest ebrary. 147-150, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Roots of Brazil* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 13-49.

⁸² "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, CIA.

⁸³ "Brazil: Statistical Profile", World Health Organisation (WHO), accessed November, 28, <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/bra.pdf?ua=1>

⁸⁴ "Brazil," *The World Facebook*, CIA.

⁸⁵ Stratfor. "The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography."

In the current multipolar world Latin America still occupies a peripheral place within the great power competition. Brazil can clearly be considered a regional **power** in Latin America. Its continental power projection capabilities have constantly been strong, regardless of the political context, due to its dominance in territory, population, size of the economy and military power. Brazil's external projection capabilities outside the continent remain limited.

Brazil, as a regional power, can not be considered a pole. And despite its intention to appear as a more independent state with multilateral foreign policy, it still gravitates towards bigger powers. Throughout the Cold War Brazil has inclined more towards the United States. However, from 2003 onwards, Brazil's political orientation started to change towards the Russia-China axis through the participation in the BRICS summits as well as giving the market access to the Chinese firms. (Nuno paper)

Systemic factors alone are unable to explain such a shift, because pragmatically the United States, as a dominant power in the Atlantic, remains a preferable ally to Brazil. At the same time, receiving investment from China and granting it with the access to the Brazilian market has already damaged Brazilian economic system. Brazil's manufacturing industries have lost exports to China, which can attribute to the deindustrialization of the Brazilian economy and weaken its technological development and long-term growth.⁸⁶ As it was mentioned above, systemic imperatives can not clarify the decision of Lula to develop such a strong partnership with China and therefore, the intervening variables account for the explanation.

3.2 Strategic Environment

Brazil has long been enjoying some peaceful environment and the absence of the conventional armed conflicts in the region. The country's topography mostly protects it from the

⁸⁶ Rhys Jenkins, "China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship", in: *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 41, no. 1, (2012): 21-47.

external threats. Since the Acre War 1899-1903⁸⁷, no international wars have been fought on the Brazilian borders.

Argentina, Brazil's historical continental rival, experienced a severe economic depression in 1998-2002, which gave Brazil a chance to emerge even easily in the beginning of the new millennium.

Throughout the 20th century Latin American has been a strong ally of the United States (with the exception of Cuba) and was under their sphere of influence. Therefore, Brazil's foreign policy was restrained by the presence of the superpower interest in the region. However, the new millennium has brought a discontinuity in this trend. Since the beginning of the 2000's the interest of the United States in South America has been quite weak. First, due to the US military involvement in the Middle East in the first decade of 2000's and later due its competition with growing China over the influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This definitely gave Brazil a larger freedom of maneuver both in the South American the region and internationally, which leads to define Brazil's strategic environment as mostly permissive.

However, there exist a different type of threat coming from the politically problematic neighbour countries. The northern border of Brazil, fully located in the remote jungle, is a subject to illegal plantations of coca (in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru) used for the cocaine production as well as illegal narcotics and FARC paramilitary activities from Colombia that penetrate Brazil's border region with Venezuela.⁸⁸ The question here is whether the transnational border threats restrain Brazil's freedom of foreign policy choices and specifically demand them to be deeply involved in (and desire) the profound regional integration.

Obviously, the necessary control of the borders requires large financial investments and some degree of control over the region. However, the deep political and cultural integration is

⁸⁷ Mattos, *Uma geopolítica pan-amazônica*, 50-58

⁸⁸ "Amazon," WWF, accessed November 30, 2017, <https://www.worldwildlife.org/places/amazon>.

not required to solve the problem. On the contrary, opened borders and freedom of movement may create easier access of the illegal drugs on the Brazilian market and a growth of the transnational chain of organised crime. In fact, since the Workers' Party coming to power and an intensified integration process, Brazil has emerged as "a privileged transit point for cocaine smuggling to Europe through Central and West Africa".⁸⁹ Moreover, there has been a significant increase in consume of cocaine⁹⁰ and crack⁹¹ in Brazil.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that Brazil's strategic environment is permissive, especially in regard to their foreign policy choices. The country's decision to involve itself into the profound Latin America integration project can not be explained by the strategic necessity. As it is noted by the neoclassical realism, the permissive strategic environment can give more power to the domestic intervening variables in the explanation of the foreign policy choices⁹² (eg. the role of ideological perceptions of political elites).

3.3 The Clarity of the International System

Analysing the systemic attributes *post factum*, it is now possible to conclude that the profound South American integration was not the most pragmatic option for Brazil's national interest, taking into account its geographical disposition to the maritime development, offshore oil reserves and societal attributes. The question is, whether the systemic imperatives were clear in 2003, when the new government came to power.

⁸⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2013* (Vienna: United Nations, 2013), 42.

⁹⁰ Brasil, Revista de audiências públicas do Senado Federal, Dependência Química. Crack assusta e revela um Brasil despreparado., vol. 2, series 8 (2011), 25,26.

⁹¹ <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Miraglia-Brazil-final.pdf> 4

⁹² Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 52-56

In the beginning of the 2000's Brazil's material capabilities have increased, which was quite an evident fact. It's GDP has been increasing steadily since 2001.⁹³ With the rising commodity prices at that period and the devaluation of the Real currency Brazil expanded its exports, boosted foreign and domestic investment and discovered quite larger offshore oil reserves. The country enjoyed the peaceful international environment and a balance of capabilities in the region shifted in their favour. Thus, the systemic opportunities were discernible at that period of time and it was evident that the consequential parties lacked the willingness to resist the possible growth of Brazil.

However, the time horizons were not quite clear at that point. It was not easy to predict how long the commodity prices would remain high and how long Argentina would remain in decline. At the same time, Brazil's leaders understood that the off-shore petroleum discoveries and foreign investment would favour them in the long term. Therefore, Brazil could neither enjoy the never-ending opportunity nor was it constrained by the strict time frame.

The lack of clarity of the international system can also be explained by Brazil's geographical dualism (pointed out in 3.1 Relative Distribution of Power). The longitude of the land border, remote frontier location, and internal topographical barriers has long been confusing Brazilian policymakers, restraining it from strengthening of its naval force and maritime commerce. The debate on whether Brazil is a continental or a maritime country has been a prominent topic of Brazil's school of geopolitics. In terms of actual political application, the continentalization strategy has been predominant, mistakenly though, since the beginning of the 20th century.⁹⁴

Thus, when the international system clearly presented an opportunity for Brazil to acquire some capital, the optimal foreign policy options were not clear. Consequently, in the less clear

⁹³ "GDP (current US\$)," World Bank | Data, accessed November 22, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2006&start=1965>.

⁹⁴ Morgado, "Continentalization versus Maritimization – the debate within Brazilian School of Geopolitics and its political consequences," 94.

systemic environment, there appeared a larger place for the political leaders and parties to pursue decision-making based on their ideological preferences.⁹⁵

3.4 Systemic Stimuli and Latin American integration

Summarising the analysis of the influence of the structural imperatives on Brazilian foreign policy it is possible to conclude that Brazil's decision to involve itself deeply into the process of the regional integration since 2003 can only be partially explained by the independent variable of neoclassical realism.

Brazil's relative material capabilities in the region largely exceed its capabilities in the rest of the world. Due to its inability to successfully enter into competition with the major world powers, Brazil prefers to project its power within Latin America. The extensive land border, as well as the remote northern border of the Amazon has required Brazil to maintain a certain degree of involvement into the region. At the same time, Brazil's massive maritime potential (complemented by the societal characteristics) creates a different possible scenario for the country's foreign policy. Moreover, the intensified political and cultural direction and the financial scope of the integration can not be explained by the systemic factors, because neither economically nor strategically Brazil requires to invest so much into the region.

Brazil has chosen the regional integration scheme in an attempt to counterbalance the future possible US involvement in the Latin America, because geographically the region is located in the direct sphere of influence of the US. However, with the intention to obtain independency of the major power, Brazil has entered into dependency of another major power - China. Allowing China's involvement into Brazil's market has not been the most pragmatic choice, because it has

⁹⁵ Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 50.

discarded the manufacturing and the industrial sector. Again, the systemic explanations do not clarify the preference of such an alliance.

Besides that, due to some features of the Brazil's economic system (and in the rest of the Latin American countries), such as the long presence of the oligarchical segment, the MERCOSUL trade agreement has created a network of the monopolies, damaging the competitiveness of the Brazilian economy.⁹⁶

The systemic features, such as the permissive strategic environment and the lack of clarity of the international system gave more weight to the domestic explanations, such as the ideological preferences of the political leaders, the executive monopoly over the foreign policy-making and the involvement of non-state actors, that will all be discussed in the following chapter.

⁹⁶ Stratfor. "The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography."

4. Intervening Variables of Neoclassical Realism

The fourth chapter continues the empirical study of Brazilian foreign policy under the set of four intervening variables of neoclassical realism. The variable of Leaders Images identifies Brazil's foreign policy executives and their affiliation with the São Paulo Forum. The ideological perceptions of the Workers' Party impact on Brazilian foreign policy and Latin American integration is discussed under the Strategic Culture variable. The third variable called State-Society Relations studies the reciprocal effect of the government relations with the public in Brazil and the public opinion on regional integration. The fourth variable of Domestic institutions analyses the capabilities of the Brazilian executives to extract state resources for the implementation of the desirable foreign policies. The influence of the resolutions of the São Paulo Forum is analysed in each intervening variable.

4.1 Leader Images

Being a product of governments, foreign policies are directly (or indirectly) connected to the internal composition of states. However, the domestic realm is a very broad area of analysis. Not all domestic policies relate to the external power projection, taking into account the fact that foreign policy choices are exclusively made by a small group of people (in both democratic and authoritarian states). As indicated by Taliaferro, in terms of the foreign policy, "state consists only of the top officials and central institutions of government charged with external defence and the conduct of diplomacy"⁹⁷. This influential group of people is composed of the Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defense together with their staff and teams of institutions' technocrats. Consequently, these decision making elites should appear as the starting point in the analysis of the domestic influences on the foreign policy

⁹⁷ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State." *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 470.

Presidents

Name	Year	Political Party
Fernando Collor	1990	PRN
Fernando Collor	1991	PRN
Fernando Collor	1992	PRN
Itamar Franco	1993	PMDB
Itamar Franco	1994	PMDB
Itamar Franco	1995	PMDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1996	PSDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1997	PSDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1998	PSDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1999	PSDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	2000	PSDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	2001	PSDB
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	2002	PSDB
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2003	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2004	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2005	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2006	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2007	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2008	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2009	PT
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2010	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2011	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2012	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2013	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2014	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2015	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2016	PT

Chiefs of Staff

Name	Year	Party
Marcos Antônio de Salvo Coimbra	1990	PRN
Marcos Antônio de Salvo Coimbra	1991	PRN
Marcos Antônio de Salvo Coimbra/Henrique Hargreaves	1992	PRN/PFL
Tarcisio Carlos de Almeida Cunha	1993	
Henrique Hargreaves	1994	PFL
Clóvis Carvalho	1995	PSDB
Clóvis Carvalho	1996	PSDB
Clóvis Carvalho	1997	PSDB
Clóvis Carvalho	1998	PSDB
Pedro Parente	1999	independent
Pedro Parente	2000	independent
Pedro Parente	2001	independent
Pedro Parente	2002	independent
José Dirceu	2003	PT
José Dirceu	2004	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2005	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2006	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2007	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2008	PT
Dilma Rousseff	2009	PT
Erenice Guerra/ Carlos Eduardo Esteves Lima	2010	PT
Antonio Palocci	2011	PT
Gleisi Hoffmann	2012	PT
Gleisi Hoffmann	2013	PT
Aloizio Mercadante	2014	PT
Aloizio Mercadante	2015	PT
Jaques Wagner	2016	PT

Ministers of Defence

Name	Year	Party
	1990	
	1991	
	1992	
	1993	
	1994	
	1995	
	1996	
	1997	
	1998	
Élcio Álvares	1999	independent
Geraldo Magela da Cruz Quintão	2000	independent
Geraldo Magela da Cruz Quintão	2001	independent
Geraldo Magela da Cruz Quintão	2002	independent
José Viegas Filho	2003	PRB
José Alencar	2004	PRB
José Alencar	2005	PRB
Waldir Pires	2006	PT
Waldir Pires	2007	PT
Nelson Jobim	2008	PMDB
Nelson Jobim	2009	PMDB
Nelson Jobim	2010	PMDB
Nelson Jobim	2011	PMDB
Celso Amorim	2012	PT
Celso Amorim	2013	PT
Celso Amorim	2014	PT
Jaques Vagner	2015	PT
Aldo Rebelo	2016	PCdoB

Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Name	Year	Party
Francisco Rezek	1990	independent
Francisco Rezek	1991	independent
Francisco Rezek	1992	independent
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1993	PSDB
Celso Amorim	1994	PT
Luiz Filipe Lampreia	1995	independent
Luiz Filipe Lampreia	1996	independent
Luiz Filipe Lampreia	1997	independent
Luiz Filipe Lampreia	1998	independent
Luiz Filipe Lampreia	1999	independent
Luiz Filipe Lampreia	2000	independent
Celso Lafer	2001	independent
Celso Lafer	2002	independent
Celso Amorim	2003	PT
Celso Amorim	2004	PT
Celso Amorim	2005	PT
Celso Amorim	2006	PT
Celso Amorim	2007	PT
Celso Amorim	2008	PT
Celso Amorim	2009	PT
Celso Amorim	2010	PT
Antonio Patriota	2011	independent
Antonio Patriota	2012	independent
Antonio Patriota	2013	independent
Luiz Alberto Figueiredo	2014	independent
Mauro Vieira	2015	independent
Mauro Vieira	2016	independent

Figure 2: Brazil's foreign policy executives (1990-2016)

outcomes.

Moreover, as neoclassical realism assumes, that external actors, both international governmental or non-governmental organizations can produce independent results in the international system only interacting with its intervening variables, related to the composition of state.⁹⁸ Thus, to link the São Paulo Forum with the Brazilian foreign policy, this part of the thesis will assess the group of individuals responsible for the formulation of the foreign policy in Brazil and their affiliation with the São Paulo Forum.

In accordance with Taliaferro's definition of state, four positions are chosen: the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Chief of Staff of the Presidency of the Republic, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These individuals are directly in charge of the decision making in external affairs in Brazil.

As indicated in the Constitution, the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil has the exclusive powers: "to maintain relations with foreign States and accredit their diplomatic representatives"; "conclude international treaties, conventions and acts, subject to the approval of the National Congress"; "to decree a state of defense or a state of siege"; "declare war..." and "to make peace...". The executive branch, represented by the President and his cabinet, is the most powerful one. The Chief of Staff of the Presidency of the Republic is a position similar to a prime minister in a parliamentary system of governance. In Brazil, the Chief of Staff holds the most important and powerful position after the president. Overall, it assists the President in carrying out his duties and controls the functioning of the government. Two other positions, relevant for the foreign policy making are: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense.

Since the time-frame chosen for the analysis covers fourteen years, instead of assessing each person individually, it is more useful to analyse them quantitatively, according to their party affiliation. For this purpose, on the Figure 2, four tables were created, listing the names and the

⁹⁸ Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 184.

party affiliation of each individual per year, who occupied the position of the foreign policy executive since 1990 (the first presidential inauguration under the new Constitution).⁹⁹ The 2003-2016 time period, important for this research is outlined in bold. Three major trends can be observed through the tables:

The first trend demonstrates the so-called *partidarização*¹⁰⁰ of the foreign policy decision making. Since 2003, the positions of the foreign policy executives were much more often occupied by the party candidates. In comparison, before 2003, there were more independent executives (military and diplomats), especially in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The second trend shows the concentration of power in the hands of one particular party. Two thirds (75%) of time during the time period under study (2003-2016) the positions of the foreign policy executives have been taken by the members of the Worker's Party (*PT - Partido dos Trabalhadores*¹⁰¹).

The third trend derives from the second trend and relates to the affiliation of the decision making elites with the São Paulo Forum. It depicts that more than two thirds of the time the foreign policy executives (77 %) were members of the parties participating in the São Paulo Forum (marked bold in the tables). It leads to assume that since a large majority of the foreign policy executives from 2003 to 2016 took part in the São Paulo Forum (and were among its creators in 1990 as well) they were eager to adopt the directives from the resolutions collectively formulated and signed during the meetings of the Forum.

⁹⁹ The Ministry of Defense in Brazil was established in 1991. Until 1999, the three branches of military were maintained under separate ministries.

¹⁰⁰ Predominance of the interests of the political party in power over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰¹ The translation of all the abbreviations of the political parties can be found in the **List of Abbreviations**.

4.1.1 Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff

The Workers' Party was established in 1980 in Brazil, in an opposition to the former military dictatorship. The party was formed by the combination of many different groups: representatives of the labour movements, small radical left political parties, including old guerrilla-fighters (inspired by the Cuban revolution) and religious movements, influenced by the Theology of Liberation - all strong believers of socialism. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former president of a Steel Workers' Union, soon became the leader of the party and its presidential candidate. He campaigned for the presidency in 1989, 1994 and 1998 and was finally elected in 2002.¹⁰² When the Workers' party came to power, for the first time, the external affairs in Brazil started to be managed by the non-professional politicians.

The ideology of the Workers' Party, perfectly summarized by Almeida, is comprised of a traditional Marxist anti-capitalist, anti-Americanism, a strong statism (trust in the planned economy), social-democratic economic beliefs (mostly of a redistributive character) as well as some features of Stalinism, Castorism, Trotskyism, and Liberation Theology beliefs.¹⁰³

Since the Workers' party politics was much based on the strong presidentialism (discussed in detail in *4.3 State-Society Relations* and *4.4 Domestic Institutions*), the assessment of the personalities and the political ideas of the two presidents that governed Brazil from 2003 to 2016 is required.

When Lula da Silva took office in 2003, his charisma and charm quickly turned him into one of the most popular politicians of his time. His personality of a pure proletarian contributed to the image of reliability to a huge mass of poor Brazilian population and ensured him with

¹⁰² Dan La Botz, "Brazil: Lula, Rousseff, and the Workers Party Establishment in Power," *New Politics*, 58th ser., XV-2 (Winter 2015): 53-55, accessed December 21, 2017, <http://newpol.org/content/brazil-lula-rousseff-and-workers-party-establishment-power>.

¹⁰³ Almeida, "Never before seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva grand diplomacy," 162.

popularity ratings over 80%. However it was not the only reason why Lula da Silva gained support of the population. In 2006 he started a *Bolsa Familia* social welfare program that provided direct money transfers to poor families to ensure children's school attendance and vaccination. Despite being only a short-term solution of the structural poverty problems in Brazil, Lula's social welfare program (received by more than 12 million families) has gained huge popularity and ensured him with a large electoral base.¹⁰⁴

His leadership skills and the desire to lead the socialist revolution in Latin America led to the more ambitious foreign policy initiatives that resonated with the public perception of Brazil's grandness. Being one of the creators of the São Paulo Forum, Lula has several times publicly admitted the influence of São Paulo Forum on the Brazilian and Latin American politics, considering it his personal achievement. First, the impact of the Forum was mentioned by Lula da Silva in his discourse at the celebration of fifteen years of the São Paulo Forum in 2005¹⁰⁵ and later, in 2014, addressing the members of the Forum during the 20th Meeting in Bolivia, La Paz in 2014. In his speech, Lula da Silva contributed "*the transformations in Latin America to the growth of the São Paulo Forum*" and related the strengthening of the Latin American integration with the expansion of the Forum through the construction of the new mechanisms of integration (such as UNASUL and CELAC), that helped "*to promote political and cultural integration and full emancipation of our peoples.*"¹⁰⁶

In contrast to Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, his successor, demonstrated a rather reserved public behaviour the lack of personal interest in international affairs. In fact, Rousseff did not bring the new vision to Brazil's foreign policy, but strictly continued Lula's incentives.

¹⁰⁴ Perry Anderson, "Lula's Brazil," London Review of Books, 7th ser., 33 (March 31, 2011). <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n07/perry-anderson/lulas-brazil>.

¹⁰⁵ Foro de São Paulo, *Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo* (São Paulo, Brazil, 2005), accessed December 23, 2017. <http://forodesaopaulo.org>.

¹⁰⁶ Foro de São Paulo, *Mensagem de Lula aos companheiros do Foro de São Paulo* (2014), accessed December 23, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M5wTn4Q8wTU>

Constrained by the economic recession and a political crisis, beginning with the corruption scandal around the state-owned Petrobras, involving the Workers' Party, Rousseff quickly lost popularity and her approval ratings dropped to 10%, initiating the impeachment process in 2015.¹⁰⁷

4.1.2 The resolutions of the São Paulo Forum, Brazilian foreign policy and Latin American integration

Already examined by Silva, the correlations between the resolutions of the São Paulo Forum and the process of the Latin American integration were detected through the temporal conformity of the creation of the regional integration institutions to the declarations of the Forum. Tracing the growth in the number of the members of the Forum and its organizational scope, Silva noted that the Latin American left has never been so strong and successful since the begging of the independence movement on the continent two hundred years ago.¹⁰⁸

Following the evolution of the ideas presented at the annual meetings and resolutions of the organization on the one hand and the actual policy developments in regional integration on the other, Silva found evidence that since the Workers' Party coming to power in 2003 in Brazil, the agenda of MERCOSUL trade block has been closely following the ideas of the official declarations of the Sao Paulo Forum, while the agenda of UNASUL has particularly materialised what the resolutions of Forum prescribed for the Latin American Community of Nations. Silva also mentioned the capabilities of the UNASUL, the most powerful regional institution, to create constraints for the new leaders of the nation states, who might not support the ideological foundations of the Latin American integration.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Stratfor, "Brazil: The Political Cost of Corruption," Stratfor, July 22, 2015, accessed December 27, 2017, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/brazil-political-cost-corruption>.

¹⁰⁸ Silva, "The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration", 2-3.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 13-20.

Silva also emphasised that the intention to exclude the United States from the involvement into Latin American integration coincide with the intensified regional integration processes carried out since 2003, especially in case of the Community of the Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).¹¹⁰

It is also appropriate to apply the resolution of the Forum in relation to some other cases of Brazil's foreign policy. Particularly, the strengthening of the South-South cooperation dimension and relations with the countries in the region. Several notable cases worth mentioning here.

The initiative of the South-South cooperation, highlighted by Lula da Silva at the press conference to media organizations in Algeria in 2006: *“the South-South relationship is not only possible; it is also necessary. The South is not an amorphous complex of underdeveloped and dependent countries that have nothing to offer other than raw materials to wealthy countries,”*¹¹¹ was in a similar manner formulated at the 3rd meeting of the São Paulo Forum in Managua, Managua in 1992. At the final resolution of the meeting it was concluded that *“there exist a situation of dependence in which societies of the South can not reproduce without the decisions of the North. Those countries that have always lived from the sale of primary products face a phenomenon of “fourth globalization”, which consists of their increasing exclusion from the global process of production and exchange.*¹¹²” And a call for the creation of the *“new international economic and political order, which allows the promotion of processes of integration of peoples and nations at the regional and South-South levels*¹¹³” was voiced. The

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 16.

¹¹¹ Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, *Brazilian Foreign Policy Handbook*, 23.

¹¹² Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, III Encontro. Declaração Final – (Managua, Nicaragua, 1992), 28.

¹¹³ Ibid, 38.

initiative was repeated again in the resolution of the 12th meeting of the Forum in Brazil, São Paulo: “*we believe it is essential to work hard to create a new South-South integration.*”¹¹⁴ ”

Another correspondence of the Brazil’s foreign policy to the resolutions of the São Paulo Forum can be observed in two instances of the Honduras Constitutional Crisis resulting with the exile of the President Manuel Zelaya by the military in 2009 and the impeachment of Fernando Lugo from the presidential post in Paraguay in 2012.

In 2008, the former president of the Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, a member of the São Paulo Forum with the Liberty and Refoundation Party was captured by the military, due to the accusations of the constitutional violations and large corruption allegations. The São Paulo Forum in its 14th resolution, signed in Montevideo, collectively condemned the removal of Zelaya from power, calling it a military coup and “*the right-wing strategy of using as a pretext the fight against organized crime to promote security policies that militarize societies*”¹¹⁵, ordering “*defeating the coup organizers, infiltrated in the armed forces, in the media, in the judicial power and in the Honduran legislative power*”¹¹⁶. MERCOSUL also condemned the actions of the military and proclaimed ambitiously that “*no member state of MERCOSUL will recognize a Honduran government that is not led by Manuel Zelaya.*”¹¹⁷”

While the actions of the Honduras military were criticised by many states and international organizations, no country has done as much as Brazil to support Manuel Zelaya, reaching a point of absurdity. Escaping from the military, Zelaya has set up a camp in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa, a capital of Honduras. Creating a siege in the Brazilian embassy, with his family

¹¹⁴ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XII Encontro. Declaração Final – (São Paulo, Brasil, 2005), 126.

¹¹⁵ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XV Encontro. Declaração Final – (Cidade do México, México, 2009), 148.

¹¹⁶ Stratfor, "Brazil: The Political Cost of Corruption."

¹¹⁷“Mercosur condena el golpe militar y exige la inmediata restitución de Zelaya,” Agencia EFE, June 29, 2009, accessed December 26, 2017, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090630052932/http://www.telecinco.es/informativos/internacional/noticia/979548/979548>.

and dozens of supporters, Zelaya has been giving interviews to foreign and domestic media. As a result, Lula da Silva has been largely criticised by Brazil's national government and legislators for being directly involved in the foreign dispute and providing the country's embassy and its diplomatic staff for the political use.¹¹⁸

The June 2012 impeachment of the Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, another member of the São Paulo Forum with the Guasú Front was approved by the Supreme Court of the Paraguay and the country's electoral court. The Executive Secretariat of the São Paulo Forum quickly condemned the impeachment, calling it "*a coup, disguised as impeachment, to get the President out of office*" and called "*all its member parties to promote mobilizations in defense of democracy and against the coup.*"¹¹⁹ Shortly after the impeachment, Paraguay was expelled from the MERCOSUL by the proposition of Dilma Rousseff and the concordance of the other Latin American political leaders. At the resolution of the 18th meeting of the São Paulo Forum of July 2012 in Caracas, Venezuela, the impeachment was labelled an attempt of "*the right to use violent means and/or manipulation of institutional ways to overthrow governments that serve their interests*" and honoured the decision "*to suspend the coup government of Paraguay from MERCOSUL until democracy is restored*"¹²⁰

The study of the official resolutions of the São Paulo Forum, and the implementation of the similar policies in Brazilian foreign policy and in regional integration schemes does not uncover the causal relationship between them. However, the sequence in timing demonstrates the correlation between the Forum agenda and the Brazilian foreign policy, especially in regard to the Brazil's intensified involvement into political and cultural regional integration.

¹¹⁸ Raymond Colitt, "Lula faces criticism in Brazil over Honduras role," Reuters, September 29, 2009, accessed December 20, 2017.

¹¹⁹ Foro de São Paulo. *Nota de apoio a Fernando Lugo – FSP*, 22 de Julho de 2012, Secretaría Ejecutiva, accessed December 22, 2017. <http://forodesaopaulo.org/nota-de-apoyo-a-fernando-lugo/>.

¹²⁰ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XVIII Encontro. Declaração Final – (Caracas, Venezuela, 2009), 174.

4.2 Strategic Culture

Since the discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese in 1500 and throughout its further development as an independent state, Brazilians did not see themselves as an integral part of the Latin American continent. It was due to the language difference, the lack of economic cooperation and the geographical distance of the coastal Brazilian core from the other countries on the continent, the continental belonging did not made part of Brazilian political and strategic culture.¹²¹

The involvement into the continental politics became more of a necessity for Brazil. First, during a series of post-colonial wars from 1823 to 1870¹²² and later, in the 20th century, during the regional competition with Argentina. Despite of some past regional conflicts, Brazil always expressed itself as a peaceful country. It has developed a strong diplomatic tradition and a peaceful conflict resolution, established by the Baron Rio Branco in the beginning of the 20th century. Since then, Brazil has become much more prone to use the soft power mechanisms in its foreign affairs. The latest National Defense Strategy begins with the confirmation that “Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradition and conviction...It runs its international affairs, among other things, adopting the constitutional principles of non-intervention, defense of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts.”¹²³

At the same time, Brazilian strategic culture has been always characterised by the understanding of its grandness, both in the regional and global terms, and a strong belief in its potential prosperous future.¹²⁴ To achieve that, Brazil used to ally with the dominant Atlantic

¹²¹ Luis Bitencourt and Alcides Costa Vaz, “Brazilian Strategic Culture,” Miami: Applied Research Center, Florida International University, (2009): 11-17. https://blackboard.angelo.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/LFA/CSS/Course%20Material/CCSS3312/Readings/11.9.FIU-SOUTHCOM_Brasil.pdf

¹²² Platine War (1851-1852), Uruguayan War (1864-1865), Paraguayan War (1864-1870).

¹²³ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *National Strategy of Defence*, 8.

¹²⁴ Rosas Degaut Pontes Marcos, "Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical ought," (2016): 104-60 Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 5105. <http://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/5105>

Powers (with Great Britain - in the first half of the 19th century, and later with the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine during the 20th century).¹²⁵ A strong nationalist sense characterised a series of military regimes ruling in Brazil throughout the 20th century, based on the “Doctrine of National Security,” economic nationalism and diplomatic pragmatism.

However, by the end of the 20th century and the overthrow of the military rule in 1985, Brazilian military forces became largely contained by the government, and the nationalist policies started to be criticised. Latin American integration was slowly becoming a priority. With Workers’ Party coming to power in 2003 this trend continued with a larger force. And with the escalation of demonstrations against the Workers’ Party and the public demands of military intervention in 2015, the government of Dilma Rouseff, in a fear of a possible military revolt, issued a decree, in which confirmed “the transfer of the paid top, middle and junior officials to the reserve”¹²⁶.

With the anti-liberal and anti-US agenda, the ideology of the Workers’ Party became directed against the national security doctrine and the US influence in the region. In the latest National Defence strategy the integration of South America is given a strategic importance by including it into one of the top priorities¹²⁷ At the same time, as it is accurately noticed by Morgado, the United States, Brazil’s traditional ally, is not mentioned once in the document.¹²⁸

The resolutions of the São Paulo Forum contain an immense amount of opinions, demands and calls for collective actions against the conservative right-wing national security concept

¹²⁵ Stratfor. "The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography."

¹²⁶ Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, Decreto N° 8.515, de 3 de Setembro de 2015, http://legislacao.planalto.gov.br/legisla/legislacao.nsf/Viw_Identificacao/DEC%208.515-2015?OpenDocument

¹²⁷ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *National Strategy of Defence*, (Brasilia, 2008), 17, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154868/Brazil_English2008.pdf

¹²⁸ Nuno Morgado, "Analysis of Brazil’s Geopolitical Design: Prioritizing the South American Regional Integration Maneuver," *Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 5, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 15.

(contra-posing it to the “peaceful” political and cultural regional integration) and against the involvement of the United States in the region. These two are always linked together.

During the 2nd meeting in Mexico in 1991 Forum criticised *“neoliberalism and the survival of national security doctrines, the militarization of societies and the growing role of the armed and paramilitary forces in several Latin American states and governments that rely on states of emergency and emergency, undermining the democratic rights of the population.”*¹²⁹ On the 14th meeting in Montevideo in 2008 Forum still was expressing its concerns with *“the right-wing offensive that introduced the concept of preventive war in Latin America and increased militarization.”*¹³⁰ The Forum has called for *“the confrontation of the imperialist doctrine of hemispheric security, which promotes militarization.”*¹³¹ and *“the reorientation of military spendings by the major powers to the development of the South, driving global disarmament.”*¹³²

Several times the São Paulo Forum denounced *“the right-wing strategy to use the fight against organized crime to promote security policies that militarize societies, reduce the scope of political action for the left, criminalize social struggle and promote fear among the population”*¹³³ and *“the US claim to impose its Hemispheric Security agenda, particularly in some countries whose right-wing governments allow the militarization of public security, threatening democracy, peace and human rights.”*¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, II Encontro. Declaração Final – (Cidade do México, México, 1991), 20.

¹³⁰ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XIV Encontro. Declaração Final – (Montevideu, Uruguai, 2008), 139.

¹³¹ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XIII Encontro. Declaração Final – (San Salvador, El Salvador, 2007), 131.

¹³² Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, III Encontro. Declaração Final – (Managua, Nicaragua, 1992), 37.

¹³³ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XV Encontro. Declaração Final – (Cidade do México, México, 2009), 148.

¹³⁴ Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, XVII Encontro. Declaração Final – (Manágua, Nicarágua, 2011), 169.

4.3 State Society Relations

Traditionally, the sphere of Brazil's foreign policy has been under an exclusive control of the *Itamaraty*. The influence of public opinion, media as well as other societal group has remained limited. For example, throughout the 20th century, the open disputes among the diplomats were never made public, so people could not even know about them.¹³⁵ Despite some of the recent changes in the public involvement in foreign policy (that will be discussed below), the latest polls of 2013 demonstrate that the foreign policy is not in the list of the top priorities for the country, according to the public consideration.¹³⁶

Brazilian society has long been characterised by the large social and economic inequalities. Even though, the number of the people living under the extreme poverty line has decreased over the past decades, the inequality ratio did not change much.¹³⁷ Due to the problem of quality and access to education large portion of Brazilian population participate in low status occupation, including the unskilled workers and informal types of work.¹³⁸ Only 51% of Brazilians held secondary diplomas in 2011, in contrast to 91% of Americans, which are 2nd and 1st largest populations in Americas.¹³⁹ Literacy rate of the total population is 91,7 %, which is lower than in many Latin American countries.¹⁴⁰ Evidently, a very small portion of society obtains knowledge

¹³⁵ Guilherme Stolle Paixão e Casarões, "Media and Foreign Policy in Lula's Brazil," *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, 2nd ser., 1 (July & dec. 2012): 201-203.

¹³⁶ Law and order, fair juridical system, fair multiparty elections, freedom of the media, freedom of speech. (large gap between what the public considers top priorities for the country and perceptions of how well these priorities are met) <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/21/dissatisfaction-in-brazil-despite-positive-views-of-the-economy/>

¹³⁷ Marcelo Medeiros, "World Social Science Report 2016. Income inequality in Brazil: new evidence from combined tax and survey data," UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and International Social Science Council, 1-2, accessed December 11, 2017, <http://en.unesco.org/inclusivepolicylab/sites/default/files/analytics/d>

¹³⁸ Alexandre Gori Maia and Arthur Sakamoto, "Occupational structure and socioeconomic inequality: a comparative study between Brazil and the United States," *Economia e Sociedade* 24, no. 2 (2015): 255-60.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ "Brazil, Country Profile," UNESCO Institute for Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, April 12, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017, <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/br>.

about the foreign policy. Domestic problems has always been of a larger concern in Brazil, while foreign policy has not been an issue of interest of the general public.

With the Workers' Party in Power, the dynamics between the society and the state has been changing. The foreign policy debate in Brazil has gained some relevance among different inter-state actors. The realm of the international economics became especially relevant, due to the increase in the international trade and due to its direct importance for the capital accumulation and the public well-being. Labour unions, for instance, became concerned with the developments of regional integration.¹⁴¹

The strategy for the promotion of the idea of the political and cultural regional integration for the internal populations has begun to develop at the agenda of the São Paulo Forum already in 1992. It was concluded at the 3rd annual meeting of the Forum in Nicaragua, Managua, under the name of an "*alternative integration, starting from the bottom of societies*".¹⁴² The basis for such an integration was "*the strengthening of the means of social communication among the popular movements.*" "*This alternative integration should include the cultural component capable of responding to the interest of various societal groups: urban and rural workers, the unemployed, peasants, women, indigenous peoples, ethnicities, religious, small and medium-sized businessmen, and all economic forces that put national interest above private interests*".¹⁴³

The changes in the state's approach to the public is mostly connected with "presidentialization" of the foreign policy¹⁴⁴ and the personal figure of Lula da Silva. Foreign affairs became associated with the president, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With Lula da Silva coming to power, the diplomatic style, traditional to the *Itamaraty*, changed

¹⁴¹ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, "Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification," 1323.

¹⁴² Foro de São Paulo, *Declaração Final dos Encontros do Foro de São Paulo (1990-2012)*, III Encontro. Declaração Final – (Managua, Nicaragua, 1992), 30

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 34

¹⁴⁴ Casarões, "Media and Foreign Policy in Lula's Brazil," 201-203.

towards the unique way of the Workers' Party, and even more to the dominance of personal preferences of Lula.¹⁴⁵

The affiliation of the foreign policy with the president by the Brazilian society is seen in the public opinion polls. The survey of 2010 (during Lula da Silva presidency) demonstrated very positive attitudes towards the international performance of Brazil. 53 % of Brazilians believed that their country will eventually become a world power, while 24 % considered that Brazil is already a world power.¹⁴⁶ In contrast, in the polls of 2014, conducted at verge of the economic and political crisis, 71 % of the respondents disapproved how Rouseff was dealing with foreign policy.¹⁴⁷ A remarkable difference in public perception of its foreign affairs was not triggered by the changes in the course of the foreign policy (Dilma continued within the guidelines of Lula and the Workers' Party), but by the different perception of the presidents and the overall dissatisfaction with the government policies since 2013.¹⁴⁸

The analysis of the public opinion on economic and political integration in Latin America demonstrated that the public support of the regional integration is high. However, the overall sympathy for the political integration is lower than for the economic one. Also, the highest peak of the public support of the regional integration (both political and economic) in Latin America (and particularly in Brazil) was in 1998 and has decreased since then.¹⁴⁹ The lack of public appreciation of the political aspect of regional integration is not a surprise. Besides the overall

¹⁴⁵ Almeida, "Never before seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's grand diplomacy," 161-2.

¹⁴⁶ "Chapter 3. Brazil and the World," Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, September 22, 2010, accessed December 20, 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/09/22/chapter-3-brazil-and-the-world/>.

¹⁴⁷ "Chapter 2. Ratings of Key Leaders and Institutions in Brazil," Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, June 03, 2014, accessed January 20, 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/03/chapter-2-ratings-of-key-leaders-and-institutions-in-brazil/>.

¹⁴⁸ Juliana Menasce Horowitz, "Dissatisfaction in Brazil, Despite Positive Views of the Economy," Pew Research Center, June 21, 2013, accessed December 20, 2017, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/21/dissatisfaction-in-brazil-despite-positive-views-of-the-economy/>.

¹⁴⁹ Emanuel Deutschmann and Lara Minkus, "Swinging Leftwards: Public Opinion on Economic and Political Integration in Latin America, 1997-2010," proceedings of Interdisciplinary Workshop on Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decision, Jacobs University, Bremen (5-7 July, 2017), http://odcd2017.user.jacobs-university.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Deutschmann_and_Minkus_SwingingLeftwards.pdf

low interest in the foreign affairs, the public may also struggle to understand complex institutional schemes of the integration. The number and the scope of the institutional bodies for the Latin American integration, as well as the frequency of the summits and meetings complicates the public understanding of the integration processes. It also depreciates government credibility, because the heads' of the state constant attendance of the events that have no clear meaning for the public rises the question of the purposefulness of the national budget resources spent on these meetings.¹⁵⁰

The trend in the public attitude towards the deepening of the Latin American integration has not reflected in the government's change of its foreign policy course during the Worker's Party in Power. It can be explained by the traditional monopoly of the state over the foreign policy matters and a strengthening of the executive (presidential) control of the external realm throughout the Workers' Party administration.

However, in 2015-2016, Brazilian public has vigorously expressed its discontent with the Workers' Party at a series of protests all over the country against the corruption allegations of the Workers' Party, calling for the impeachment of the President Rousseff.¹⁵¹ Around 8.5 million Brazilians have taken part in protests nationwide.¹⁵² ¹⁵³ The demonstrations were directed against the corruption allegations discovered during the ongoing *Operação Lava Jato* (Operation Car

¹⁵⁰ Jorge Heine, "Regional Integration and Political Cooperation in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 47, no. 3 (2012): 209-10.

¹⁵¹ Dilma Rousseff was impeached in August, 2016.

¹⁵² Additional Rodrigo Viga, Anthony Boadle, and Cesar Bianconi, "Record Brazil protests put Rousseff's future in doubt," Reuters, March 14, 2016, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-rousseff-protests/record-brazil-protests-put-rousseffs-future-in-doubt-idUSKCN0WF0IX>.

¹⁵³ IBOPE inteligência, accessed December 17, 2017, http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/noticias/Documents/JOB_0948_BRASIL%20-%20Relatorio%20de%20tabelas.pdf

Wash) investigation. This investigation revealed that the politicians of the Workers' Party and some other allied parties have been receiving contract bribes from several large companies.¹⁵⁴

Brazil's regional allies were also involved in the scandal. Allegedly, Brazilian companies were also paying the construction bribes to the politicians in Argentina, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela and Mexico.¹⁵⁵ Interestingly enough, during the demonstrations, alongside with the pressures of the impeachment, many people demanded *Fora Comunismo!* (Communism Out) and *Fora Foro!* (Forum Out), perceiving that the regional corruption network, uncovered in *Lava Jato* operation was generated and backed by the São Paulo Forum leftist agenda.

4.4 Domestic Institutions

According to the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the President is the head of the state, the head of the government and a multi-party system. He has a right to exercises supreme command over the Armed Forces and to decree a state of defence or a state of siege.¹⁵⁶ The organisation of the executive branch in Brazil, represented by the President and his cabinet, is the most powerful one. Formally, the Congress has a right to veto presidential decisions, but in reality it never does. There also exists an oversized presidential apparatus, which, at its largest, included a cabinet with 39 ministers in 2015.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ The biggest companies involved in the money laundering scheme were: the state-owned energy company *Petrobras*, a construction firm *Odebrecht*, another construction conglomerate *OAS*, and the meat packer company *JBS*. (The investigations are still in process, but there has been estimated already around 1 billion US dollars in misappropriated funds in 2017)

¹⁵⁵ "Odebrecht scandal: Peru president Kuczynski resists pressure to quit," BBC News, December 15, 2017, accessed December 17, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42362305>.

¹⁵⁶ Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Title IV, Chapter I, Session IV, Article 58, 48 http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/243334/Constitution_2013.pdf?sequence=11

¹⁵⁷ Filipe Matoso, Laís Alegretti, and Nathalia Passarinho, "Dilma anuncia reforma com redução de 39 para 31 ministérios," Globo, G1 Política, October 02, 2015, accessed December 22, 2017, <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/10/dilma-anuncia-reducao-de-39-para-31-pastas-na-reforma-ministerial.html>.

Since the overthrow of the military rule in 1988, the Brazilian party system has become very fragmented. This may be explained by the former containment of the left wing political opposition by the military dictatorship, but also by the heterogeneity of the public interests. However, after Lula da Silva took office in 2003, the political fragmentation reached extreme levels. A large variety of political parties does not demonstrate clear distinctions, to a point where voters can not differentiate between the “right” and “left” on the political spectrum. Under the closer study, such fragmented party-system represents a one party system of “Workers’ Party versus the incoherent rest”.¹⁵⁸

This type of governmental system undermines democracy and interest representation. However it gives a lot of power to the decision-making elites both in domestic and international affairs. Within such type of politically fragmented system Lula da Silva was able to generate a lot of benefits and increased the already existing power of the executive branch. He concentrated political and economic power through alliances and negotiations, especially with non-communist (social democratic) parties with a slightly different ideological agenda.¹⁵⁹ Pro-governmental appointees have often got ministerial posts even without the qualified knowledge within the area. The same tendency has been observed in the market sector, where private business should be politically linked to large state owned companies in order to succeed.

The incoherence and high fragmentation of the party system and the concentration of power in the executive (specifically presidential) hands allowed foreign policy executives in Brazil to become autonomous from the legislative and popular opposition even before the Workers’ Party coming to power. Moreover, the increase in the concentration of power in the presidential hands further helped to strengthen the politization of the Latin American integration.

¹⁵⁸ Kevin Lucas and David Samuels, “The Ideological “Coherence” of the Brazilian Party System, 1990-2009”, *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 2, 3, (2010): 63.

¹⁵⁹ Olavo De Carvalho, "El Mayor," *Diario do Comercio*, November 18, 2015, accessed December 16, 2017, http://dcomercio.com.br/categoria/opiniao/el_mayor.

As argued by Malamud, presidential intervention has started to push the process of regional integration already during the Cardoso administration, because Brazil's Constitution and legislation gave a president enough power to suppress other potential veto players such as the cabinet—including the economy and foreign ministers, who did not always belong to the president's party.¹⁶⁰ As it was already mentioned, under the administrations of Lula da Silva and Rouseff, most of the foreign policy executives were from the same party, so it took even less effort to push the integration incentives forward.

The market sector and its close linkage with politics, traditionally present in Brazil, represent the long lasting trend of the oligarchical dominance of the Brazilian economy (as well as in many other Latin American countries). The creation of the MERCOSUL and its further politization became a new lucrative platform for the Brazilian oligarchs. The regional trade negotiations conducted on behalf of the politicians, but backed by the oligarchs, allowed the huge accumulation of capital in hands of the very few share holders. MERCOSUL allowed several Brazilian industrialists to block off entire sectors of the economy for themselves, largely eliminating foreign competition.¹⁶¹

4.5 Intervening variables of neoclassical realism and Latin American integration

The theory of the neoclassical realism presumes, that the importance of the intervening variables may vary depending on the independent variables, such as *The Nature of the Strategic Environment* and the *Clarity of the International System*. All four intervening variables increase its explanatory scope, under the condition of a permissive strategic environment and a low clarity

¹⁶⁰ Andres Malamud, "Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of MERCOSUR: An Empirical Examination," *Latin American Research Review* 40, no. 1 (2005): 158-61.

¹⁶¹ Stratfor. "The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography."

of the international system.¹⁶² This is perfectly applicable to describe the systemic imperatives impact in Brazil's foreign policy 2003-2016.

¹⁶² Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, 95.

5. The Neoclassical Realist Model and the Brazilian Foreign Policy 2003-2016

The fifth chapter achieves the *general aim* and the *specific aim* of the master thesis. Under the neoclassical realist model, it summarizes all the driving forces (including the São Paulo Forum) behind Brazil's strengthened regional involvement. It further answers the main research question of the thesis and explains how the São Paulo Forum influenced the decision-making process in Brazil in the particular instance of the strengthening of Latin American integration during Workers' Party in power.

5.1 Systemic stimuli, intervening variables and the foreign policy processes

The neoclassical realist model applied to the case study of Brazilian foreign policy 2003-2016, demonstrated on the Figure 3, achieves the *general aim* of this thesis and lists all the driving forces behind Brazil's decision to intensify its involvement into the process of regional integration from 2003 to 2016.

Having already discussed the independent and intervening variables in the previous chapters, it is now appropriate to discuss the three foreign policy processes that are influenced by the neoclassical realist variables: Perception, Decision Making and Policy Implementation, in order to achieve the *specific aim* of this thesis and include the agenda of the São Paulo Forum into the set of driving forces behind the foreign policy choices in Brazil from 2003 to 2016, and study it under the intervening variables of the neoclassical realist theory.

5.1.1 Perceptions

The foreign policy executives' perceptions of the opportunities and constraints provided by the international system, are influenced by the independent variable Systemic Stimuli and the intervening variables, such as Leader Images and Strategic Culture. Thus, the decision of Brazil




Figure 3: The Neoclassical Realist Model and Regional Integration of Brazil

to involve itself deeply into the regional integration originates from Brazil's perception of Latin American integration as a way to ensure control over the region, in order to acquire independence from the United States. Such a perception was influenced, on the one hand, by the ambitious political aspirations of Brazil, entrenched into the country's strategic culture, and on the other hand, by the anti-imperialist and anti-US ideological beliefs of the Worker's Party and Lula da Silva.

In order to ensure that this perception would spread and persist both in Brazil and in other Latin American countries, Lula da Silva created the São Paulo Forum in 1990. The organisation intended to serve as an ideological framework for the regional integration and to support the rise of the friendly leftist leaders in other Latin American states. Also, it became a tool to promote collectively a change both in strategic culture and the public attitudes of the countries in the region (the concept of alternative integration).

5.1.2 Decision Making

The decision making process in foreign policy in Brazil has been long monopolised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since Workers' Party coming to power, the monopoly shifted to the presidential hands. Within the politically fragmented political system, Lula da Silva was able to generate a lot of benefits and increased the already existing power of the executive branch, through the creation of various alliances in the government. The strengthening of the regional integration also became beneficial for the Brazilian oligarchs, whose industries were closely connected with the government. Their economic interests started to be represented at the regional level by the country's leaders. At the same time, the promotion of the Latin American identity (not typical for the country's strategic culture) to the Brazilian public generated some societal support for the regional integration. The resolutions of the São Paulo Forum contain a very extensive set ideas and approaches on the promotion of the cultural integration to the masses.

They also include the plans for the confrontation of the possible opponents of the political regional integration, such as the right-wing parties and the United States.

5.1.3 Policy Implementation

The deepening of the Brazil's involvement into Latin American integration consisted of the creation of the political regional institutions, a very active presidential diplomacy, and the large investments and aid to the regional neighbours. A predominance of the soft power approach was influenced by the long lasting diplomatic tradition and the self-perception of Brazil as a peaceful nation. At the same time, the creation of the political institutions for the Latin American integration materialised the prescriptions of the neo-marxist agenda of the São Paulo Forum for the creation of the joint strategy of Latin American integration against the right-wing establishments in the region and against the US influence in Latin America. In this logic, the financial investments to the regional neighbours (as it was unveiled during the Car Wash investigation) were directed towards the political support of the friendly leftist governments, also members of the São Paulo Forum. The exact implementation of the Latin American integration incentives formulated at the São Paulo Forum turned easy because of the lack of public interest in foreign affairs and the independence of the executive branch from the legislative opposition, as well the the ability to avoid vetos from the cabinet and the congress.

5.2 The Role of the São Paulo Forum in Brazilian foreign policy 2003-2016

Coming back to the research question - *What role does the São Paulo Forum play in Brazil's intensified involvement into regional integration during the period of the Workers` Party in power?* - it is important to notice that the role of the organization has increased since its inception in 1990.

First, since the 1990s the São Paulo Forum has served as a framework for the joint strategy of the leftist continental parties in formulating the political initiatives for the regional integration, under the auspices of the neomarxist anti-US and anti-capitalist ideology.

When the Workers' Party, and its leader Lula da Silva, came to power, Forum's extensive institutional structure and developed ways of communication allowed fast and smooth restructuring of the former MERCOSUL integration scheme and the creation of various regional organizations (under the Brazilian leadership), such as the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUL) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Domestically, it became a tool (containing ready strategies) for the Workers' Party to execute changes in Brazil's strategic culture and promote Latin American integration and shared cultural identity to the Brazilian public.

When the new integration schemes were already in place, in the second half of the Workers' Party administration (during the Rousseff's presidential terms), the São Paulo Forum practically merged with the regional institutions and, to a certain point, helped to maintain the integration structures and its member parties in power in Latin American countries.

Thus, the placement of the São Paulo Forum under the intervening variables of the neoclassical realism demonstrates the influence of the organization in the perception and the decision making processes of Brazilian foreign policy.

Conclusions

This thesis analysed Latin American integration as a top priority of Brazilian foreign policy during the Workers' Party in power from 2003-2016. The *general aim* of the thesis was to discover and summarize all driving forces behind Brazil's decision to focus on the Latin American integration. The *specific aim* was to include the São Paulo Forum into the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy, under the domestic variables of the neoclassical realist theory.

The review of the secondary sources related to the São Paulo Forum, in the first chapter, demonstrated that the academic interest towards the organisation has been increasing throughout the last decade. Since the beginning of the 2000's, the member parties of the Forum have started coming to power in their countries and the resolutions of the São Paulo Forum have begun to be implemented in national foreign policies, the political, academic and public attention to the organisation began to grow.

The main assumptions of the neoclassical realism and the model of the neoclassical realist theory of international politics were introduced to create a theoretical structure for the further analysis of the Brazil's case study.

The application of the independent variable of the theory showed that Brazil's decision to involve itself deeply into the process of the regional integration since 2003 may only be partially explained by the structural imperatives. Brazil's material capabilities, its extensive land border as well as other geographical features of the continental realm required a constant involvement into the regional affairs and prompt for Brazil's regional leadership. Also Brazil's choice to prioritise regional integration became an attempt to counterbalance the possible US involvement in the Latin America. However, the Brazil's neglected massive maritime potential as well as some structural problems in its economic system require different type of international alignment.

In case of Brazil's foreign policy, the permissive strategic environment in the region and the lack of clarity of the international system gave more weight to the domestic explanations, such as the ideological preferences of the political leaders, the executive monopoly over the foreign policy-making and the involvement non-state actors, such as the São Paulo Forum.

Indeed, the analysis of the intervening variables showed more influences on Brazilian foreign policy 2003-2016. The deepening (and politicising) of the Latin American integration was of the primary interests of the Workers' Party. In particular, it materialised the socialist international dream of the party's leader - Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was one of the creators of the São Paulo Forum in 1990. The study of the resolutions of the Forum demonstrated that the political regional integration project started to be formulated since the inception of the organisation. The implementation of the Latin American integration in Brazil's foreign policy and "selling" the idea to the public domestically did not represent any problem, due to the high executive monopoly over the foreign affairs, high popularity ratings of the president, and the creation of the benefits from the regional integration for the Brazilian oligarchs.

The analysis of the intervening variables and the foreign policy processes demonstrated that the São Paulo Forum served as an ideological framework for the Latin American Integration. Moreover, the regional leftist network, created by the members of the Forum, through the organisational coordination means, allowed to create regional integration institutions, based on the structures designed by the Forum. At this point, the network of the parties established by the São Paulo Forum, backed by the regional institutions, such as UNASUL and CELAC, gained a capacity to constraint national leaders, who did not conform with the regional integration scheme.

Apart from the achieved findings, the author considers that main contribution of this thesis generates a basis for the future research agenda, particularly the field of the foreign policy analysis and theory testing. The future possible research topics may include, the counterfactual

analysis of the role of the São Paulo Forum in Brazilian foreign policy, the study of the functioning of the internal mechanism of the São Paulo Forum, and the influence of the continental leftist network in the foreign policies of the other Latin American countries.

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