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Adorno and Foucault: Unsystematic Way of Doing Philosophy

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SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

System is a problematic aspect in Adorno and Foucault's philosophies. The idea of a closed framework of concepts does not fit into a scenario with thoughts strongly associated with the notion of criticism as a privileged mode of analysis. Both Adorno and Foucault abhor the conception of a high, finished and systematic theory that purports to explain all things that exists in the world. Adorno and Foucault prefer to take the opposite way and adopt a posture of uncertainty against that which is given aprioristically by an absolute ideal system. While Adorno reacts to the great systems with a kind of radicalization of the critique, Foucault presents types of analysis that, instead of taking a transcendent inspiration, focuses its attention on what happens in the scope of the historicity. In view of this, the central thesis of this research consists in an approximation between these two philosophies in relation to their unsystematic character.

Divided into three parts, our pathway begins with an examination of Adorno's philosophy. In this section, we investigate Adorno's critique of systems, something that he undertakes in the beginning of *Negative Dialectics*. Then, we examines the way that this critique of systems appears in Adorno's philosophy, especially in relation to other moments of his thought, *e.g.* the period in which he writes *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Finally, this thesis focus on the unsystematic way of writing in Adorno. Adorno explicitly reports the critical potential that exists in non-systematic scriptures, a perceptible feature throughout his work. Therefore, the research presents both the content of this asymmetrical method (for example, its praise for the essayistic model) and its formal manifestation in some of its books (for instance, *Minima Moralia*).

The second part is devoted to Foucault and his critical models of analysis, notably archeology and genealogy. This way, this thesis focuses on archeology as a type of analysis that demonstrates the form of production of discourses, explaining the systematic homogenizing processes present in their formation. In this regard, this research also demonstrates how archeology is applied as a revealing critique of this kind of knowledge production. After that, this research turns to the genealogical analysis and its destabilizing function against narrative blocs created in a logic of totality that does not imply what is not in consonance with an ideal and coherent universe of elements. From this, this chapter investigates how genealogy is applied to the classical Foucauldian triad of research, i.e.

power, knowledge, and moral subject. Finally, the research demonstrates how Foucault also presents an unsystematic mode of production, a work completely diffused by interviews, courses, essays and conferences.

As a conclusion, the last part shows the effective approximation between Foucault and Adorno, using five points of clear intersection between the denials to the system expressed by the two philosophers. Thus, the research responds to the central point proposed by this thesis.

2. ADORNIAN CRITIQUE OF SYSTEM

Adornian critique of system pervades his entire work and has its main aspects detailed in *Negative Dialectics*, book from 1966. Summing it up, Adorno aims to construct a critical thinking model displaced from the logic of identity between thought and concept, something common to great theoretical systems. In fact, Adorno tries to escape from the omnipresent and cohesive systems that absorb everything in an idealist frameworks of concepts that are aprioristically thought. It is a kind of absolute identity between subject and object, between object and what is thought systematically in a transcendental stage. In other words, Adorno rejects all this principle of identity without which the philosophy of the great systems is not sustained. The German philosopher intends to disrupt all this systematic production of positivity, which transforms thought into an attitude calculated according to a ready-made framework of ideas. Absolute theories bring transcendental and finished guidelines without a necessary critical construction, a model that tends to unify everything around and homogenize what is different.

Adorno's proposal leads precisely to the contrary position: a negative dialectic. Only non-identity can reveal the critical potential of thought. Unlike ideal systems that confuse subject and object, Adorno seeks to mark the difference between these two instances. Subject and object do not belong to a regime of absolute identity. They are separate bodies and must be considered like that. Moreover, Adorno emphasizes the necessity of a primacy of the object. In a context in which enlightenment and instrumental reason predominate, the thing must be reconsidered in order to present its own specificities. The thing itself has to be studied: the thing cannot be subsumed to a systematic, pre-finished, and totalitarian framework. At the end, Adorno seeks to recover the critical potential of thought, something that is lost amidst the great systems that homogenize everything that exists in ready universes. Non-identity and negativity are capable of reinstating a perpetual mode of criticism that unveils the chaotic singularities once obscured by encompassing systems.

2.1. NEGATIVE DIALECTICS: ADORNIAN CRITIQUE OF SYSTEM

According to Adorno, the *telos* of philosophy is open and uncovered, something unsystematic due to its freedom of interpretation of phenomena[1]. Nothing is stranger to Adorno's thought than the idea of a closed system of concepts immediately comprehensible in its own internal logic. That idea is expressed mainly in *Negative Dialectics*, a book written by Adorno in 1966 as a possible response to the traditional philosophy. In fact, Adorno identifies, under the development of classical philosophy, a tendency to systematize the world according to universal frameworks of concepts. In other words, the history of philosophy tries to cover the entirety of life in conformity with a self-contained system. Adorno perceives a synthesis of diversity made by the traditional philosophy. In the beginning of *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno guides his critique directly towards Hegel and the tentative of reduction of empirical multiplicity to the possibilities given by systematic concepts. The heterogeneity is overshadowed by the effort of totalizing all the nature through the Hegelian Philosophy[2]. Thus, Hegel represents an example of these frameworks of concepts that try to exterminate everything that escape from its coherency. The system has necessarily to deal with what is heterogeneous as a way of consolidation of an administered world. The strategy consists of transforming differences into trivial elements, that is, elements hierarchically inferior concerning the perfection of system. There is an absolute knowledge that is a principle and an end to all operations inside a closed system. This economy ignores aspects from an empirical ground that is a fundamental condition for what operates inside the system: the system does not consider what is materially manifested in singular facts[3].

The configuration of a system oriented to an absolute knowledge is registered in a context in which philosophy tries to be something scientific and mathematical. Even during the contemporary philosophy, Adorno can identify some tendencies to construct

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[1] ADORNO, Theodor. Dialectique négative. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 31

[2] ADORNO, Theodor. Dialectique négative. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 13

[3] ADORNO, Theodor. Dialectique négative. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 32

exhaustive systems capable to contemplate all theoretical and practical aspects. Adorno mentions the philosophy of history as an example. To sum it up, the traditional view of history, as all big systems, is guided by a compensatory end, a type of *telos* that works like an ordained and transcendental direction. There is a kind of impulse for order that responds to something that Adorno calls *fear of chaos*. The system cannot deal with any elements that does not agree with its own operation. It is a perpetual necessity of ordering that never satisfies the system: there is ever something to be ordered. Because of this, the history of systematic theories is made by a succession of systems that overcomes the previous ones. The notion of closed system is never completely satisfied. Moreover, the origin of this ordering process comes from a transcendental and formal reflection, something separated from the content, the real things, the empirical. In other words, the system cannot dominate the content; it violates the objectivity to the benefit of the systemic order. The system excludes qualitative aspects of objective singularities to affirm itself as a perfect order. The systemic interest is not about describing things so that they are. Contrariwise, the system aims to subsume them according to ideal guidelines produced by it[4].

That introduces an important operation of systems: the principle of identity. The great systems of philosophy have a paranoia: the system does not support nothing that escapes from its own logic. Things have to identify with the system. It is the only way in which they can exist. Non-identity is definitively sidelined[5]. Husserl, for instance, by persecuting the idea of first philosophy, intended to create a system in order to a universal, strict and primordial knowledge. He had so many difficulties to sustain his project, especially because of ruling out elements of difference[6]. Thus, the systems respond to a positive logic: there is, above all, an effort of identification. The world have to be identified with the concepts thought within the system. There is no space for singularities and discordant specificities. The Adornian criticism of system is a manifest against dialects that operate in a positive way: Hegel, despite all his influence over Adorno, is a good target. The Idealism is in general a problem. The transcendental *ego* works as a

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[4] ADORNO, Theodor. Dialectique négative. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 33

[5] ADORNO, Theodor. Dialectique négative. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 33-34

[6] *Cf.* ADORNO. T. *Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden - Band 5*: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp. 7-246.

standard of an absolute identification. Everything is perceived and rationalized in relation to an egoist perspective. The *altrui* and the nature are considered as inferior things. The man is the center that violates what is not identical to his rationalized idealistic process. Adorno defines the idealistic system as a kind of entirety that makes an effort to contemplate all things from an economy of identity. This way, nothing rests outside of the theory, transforming the thought into something absolute with regard to all contents. In the end, the idealism loses its true connection with the contents that it aims to dominate[7]. In accordance with Adorno, systems, in general, works in order to answer a bourgeois demand. The way in which the systems are replaced by others because of its own insufficiency is related to a social procedure linked to the bourgeoisie: the bourgeois class, by denying the previous system, affirms itself as a representative of a freedom that does not exist actually (a kind of system revolution). In truth, it is just a strategy to eclipse the fact that the bourgeoisie denies an old system inside a new one[8].

Adorno sees behind this intention for categorization a systematic spirit that is present in the life of bureaucrats. This spirit of system moves in order to force his domination over the openness of singular moments. The system cares about the maintenance of its entirety: the microanalysis of difference is subsumed by a coherent unicity. Better saying, there is a tension between the multiplicity present in reality and the systematic philosophy, whereas this wants to reduce everything in its categories. Adorno mentions again Hegel as an example of systematic absorption. Hegel can only reduce the tension between static and dynamic through a principle of unicity in a spirit that is pure, a fundamental condition, a basic-transcendental element that contains in itself a kind of eidetic being[9]. The problem with that structure is, and it can be assumed, the presupposition of identity between all the beings with the principle of knowledge constructed by the systematic need of totalizing derivative from the idealistic speculation. Everything is locked by a large and universal framework of ideas that are thought without dealing with the object itself. The object is not considered as a ground from which the theory is established. Instead of this, the object has to be fit into the universality of theory.

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[7] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative*. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 33-34.

[8] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative*. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 36.

[9] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative*. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 37-38.

A classificatory logic reduce the object to a forced part of a system. Necessarily it has to adequate itself in a big system of contents. Thus, the principle of identity operates bearing in mind a deductive procedure: the system precedes its contents. There is no possibilities to think the thing itself. The system ever will try to adapt it, link it to a framework of references[10].

Under the point of view of Adorno, reason is the founder of systems. The pure method is precedent to all content. This transcendental operationalization does not have stipulated limits. Moreover, the system behaves as an infinite process of categorization that goes towards the exterior side. It wants eliminates the heterogeneous elements that are not conform to the totality of the system. This represents a complete effort for assimilating the difference visible in historical contents within the ideal system. An operation that results in a metaphysics. In other words, the metaphysical system works as an absolute process of production that more and more advance beyond all limits: in the end, it is a pure becoming. This infinite movement inside a complete entirety reveals an interesting antinomy. Adorno regards the system as something inevitably antonymic between totality and infinity: the system is a total framework of concepts that can never satisfy itself and always asks for an infinite expansion over what rests outside. The system reposes in itself and moves towards infinite at same time. The system owes its existence to infinity. This antinomy is, as per the indicated by Adorno, an essential aspect of the bourgeoisie. As the system, the bourgeois capitalism also extends itself over all the possible limits. The bourgeoisie has to carry the capitalism beyond its limits, expanding, as a system, its frontiers repeatedly. Because of this, Adorno does not agree with the idea of system as an ancient notion. The transcendental, total and infinite dynamics of system, in the Adornian thought, is a modern-bourgeois creation:

> *This makes clear why, Aristotle notwithstanding, the modern concept of dynamics was inappropriate to Antiquity, as was the concept of the system. To Plato, who chose the aporetical form for so many of his dialogues, both concepts could be imputed only in retrospect. The reprimand which Kant gave the old man for that reason is not, as he put it, a matter of plain logic; it is historical, modern through and through. On the other hand, systematics is so deeply ingrained in the modern consciousness that even Husserl's anti-systematic efforts—which began under the name of ontology, and from which "fundamental ontology"*

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[10] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative*. Trad. : Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 38.

branched off later—reverted irresistibly to a system, at the price of formalization[11].

Thus, due to the fundamental antinomy present inside the system, it is possible to realize an unsolvable conflict. There are a static essence and a dynamic essence. The system is simultaneously a closed network of concepts and a body that moves without limits towards the positive infinity. There are no limits as far as there is always something outside the system to be systematized in a positive framework of concepts. Indeed, the modern theories receive the antagonism between static and dynamic. The system is something very rooted in the modern mentality. Even the attempts for unsystematic philosophies (that arose with Husserl under the name of fundamental ontology) were remodeled as systems that need a kind of formalization to be operationalized[12]. For Adorno, Hegel is a good example of positive systematized dialectics. He claims that Hegel identifies thought and concept. Summing it up, the Hegelian notion of thought does not think about the object itself, but about a concept of object previously systematized. Thought is, therefore, oriented to a category of things, not to the thing itself. For Adorno, only negativity can break the system and expose its antinomy: the system can, according to our German philosopher, show the indissoluble. Negativity can survive to the systematic movement towards everything. Negativity can emerge the singular that, instead of being inside a homogenizing system, shines outside with a unique character[13]. It represents a revolution against the Hegelian positive dialectics.

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[11] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 39. English Translation: Trad. E. B. Ashton. London: Routledge, 2004, p. 27.

[12] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 40.

[13] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 41.

2.2. HOW DOES ADORNO'S CRITIQUE OF SYSTEM APPEAR IN HIS PHILOSOPHY?

The centrality of the critique concerning systems is related to the development of Adornian dialectics and its antagonism towards Hegel's philosophy. In fact, Hegelian dialectics is a system with a relational structure of identity in which the difference is subsumed, internalized by an exhaustive network of concepts. A dialectics that constructs itself on a positive production of concepts under a search for identity between system/thought and objects/reality. The Hegelian philosophy is a philosophy of identity: as the absolute spirit is something that is manifested in all reality, the thought can operationalize it inside a system and according to a dialectical logic. The principles of identity and non-contradiction, for instance, can be used as a referential to understand the movement of dialectics: the concept is the identic that differentiates itself only in the logic-dialectical process as an overcoming. In that relation, the system identifies itself in the premise that the being is the thought thinking on itself as an absolute idea. All the beings are ideas that exist because of the representation of the Absolute Spirit, in which we identify thinking and being, concept and reality. The absolute is, finally, the concept, and the concept is the identity itself[14]. Despite the reality represents the movement of Spirit (that is, something non-static), the system can provide a way to perceive this dynamics through an infinite process of conceptualization under the paradigm of universal. For Hegel, Philosophy is precisely the *locus* in which universality can be revealed. And universality, by the way, includes in itself singularity[15]: the difference is always included in a relational system of identification.

In this sense, the Adornian notion of negative dialectics is something that collides against the Hegelian tradition. Even though Hegel can deal with the notion of negative, this characteristic is also subsumed from logical criteria. The dialectic negation is, for Hegel, something subordinated: by following a principle of non-contradiction, the negation might be denied in a type of double-negativity, becoming, consequently, a positivity. The negativity is also positive, and the contradictory is not solved by a nothingness, but it has to be denied in its particular content insofar as it cannot survive as

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[14] LEÃO, E. C. *Aprendendo a pensar*. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1977, p. 254.

[15] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2011, p. 3

an internal contradiction[16]. Obviously, Adorno tries to escape from that sense of positive totality that subsumes everything. The Hegelian positivity is constructed by the hegemony of entirety over singularity, which is, in the end, a reduction of particularities to the cohesion defended by the whole system. Thereby, negativity in Hegel has a positive essence because it is conditioned by a totality that is always presented as a discretion of truth when the system deal with singular moments. In other words, it is true that negativity has an interesting role in Hegel, which works as a negativity of negativity, or in a better way, as a negativity of singularities as an affirmation of a positive system and its framework of concepts. That way, despite negativity is also an element of Hegelian dialectics, it is in order to the establishment of a positivity. Thus, we can say that an object X can be defined by what it is not (that is, by its negation), but this process aims to reinforce its identity. X is white, not black, and saying that it is not black contributes to its definition (i.e. X is not black, then it is white):

> *The negative contains the positive in it and itself becomes determinate through the content it takes into itself. It is in this way that the determinate negation is "just as much positive as it is negative, which is an important characteristic of the determinate negation in Hegel's mature works.[17]*

This notion of determinate negation is also used by Adorno, but evidently in a different form. In contrast to Hegel, in which negative is a logical tool that leads to positive, Adorno constructs a dialectics focused on the notion of negativity. Adorno concentrates on the element that cannot be subsumed and runs counter the authoritarianism present in the movement that seeks to homogenize what is not identical. The notion of identity is, according to Adorno, something that is manifested in the social system of market changes (in which the value in use of goods is subsumed by its exchange value)[18], and something that can be perceived in the transcendental level of formation of concepts as a totalizing process of identification. There is a kind of primacy of individual consciousness over objects: the object only reflects the subject through notions as Spirit

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[16] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Wissenschaft der logik.*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1963, p. 35.

[17] SPARBY, T. *Hegel's Concept of Determinate Negation*. Leiden: Brill, 2014, p. 112.

[18] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 255-358.

and do not have right to manifest itself in its singularity. Philosophies as Hegelian philosophy, for example, identify consciousness with consciousness of the object, and put thoughts in a self-centered structure. Summing it up, thinking is identifying. The idealistic philosophy needs to assume the truth of a totality placed by a transcendental subject and capable to absorb all particularities[19].

The negative dialects aims precisely to destroy the identity between thinking and the thing as it is thought, subject and object, universal and singular. Adorno intends to evince the non-identity between thinking and the thing itself. The thing itself is not identical to its concept, to the relational structure of definitions constructed inside an idealistic rational system. In contrast to Hegel and other idealistic philosophers, the entirety in Adorno does not have an assumption of truth. Totality is not true, "*Das Ganze ist das Unwahre*"[20]:

> *The claim of immediate truth for which it chides the words is almost always the ideology of a positive, existent identity of word and thing. Insistence upon a single word and concept as the iron gate to be unlocked is also a mere moment, though an inalienable one. To be known, the inwardness to which cognition clings in expression always needs its own outwardness as well.[21]*

Therefore, negative dialectics presents a critique of totalizing identity also as a form of reproving the ideological potential that remains behind this dynamics. Instead of subsuming the difference of reality to the power of concept, Adorno proposes to expose that difference between the thing itself and the thing as it is thought, highlighting the distance of thing and concept as a way of materializing the dialectical procedure. In other words, Adorno uses the concept to evince its non-identity in relation to what is conceptualized. He maintains the concept as a key of intelligibility of dialectical process, but the connection between it and the object is not guided anymore by the notion of

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[19] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, pp. 11-74.

[20] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Zwergobst. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 53.

[21] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 71. English Translation: Trad. E. B. Ashton. London, Routledge, 2004, p. 53.

identity: the concept is not identical to thing that it defines. Thus, negative dialectics reaches the non-identical precisely in a persecution of going beyond the concept, but through the concept. Or, as Adorno says, *"it must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept"*[22]. By that, the form of thinking beings is still dialectally done by means of the concept, but in a negative way. Instead of affirming the identity between thought and things, Negative dialectics affirm the non-identity as the main mark of this relation. There is a relation that depends on a relation of non-identity, which respects a variability of different things. The concept cannot be considered as a real instance, as something that exists by itself. Adorno aims to break the compulsion to satisfy the necessity for identity by using the energy present in its objectifications. The concept is given as non-identical to itself (and non-identical to the object, of course), and inevitably it leads to an otherness without subsuming this otherness[23].

Nevertheless, the singularity, despite it cannot be thought as a subsumed object to a system of identity, is still immersed in a historical context. Adorno tries to materialize dialectics, and have to explain how to place the non-identical pair concept/object historically. Because of this, Adorno introduces the notion of constellation. The notion of constellation allows the execution of negative dialectics. There is a constellation in which the object is localized. Inside this constellation, we can find a relational structure between objects. Constellation is exactly a group of concepts or objects that confers historical intelligibility to the singularities in a relational structure. This way, despite Adorno criticizes the system of relational concepts in an idealistic system, he resorts a set with interlinked elements in a material context. And the difference between the two ways of relating objects is quite obvious: while the first one is an idealistic type of relational system that absorbs the difference in a logic of identity, the second one represents a materialistic exit that conserves the singular value of object by its impossibility of reduction to identity. Therefore, constellation is the tool by which negative dialectics is

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[22] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 26. English Translation: Trad. E. B. Ashton. London, Routledge, 2004, p. 15.

[23] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 193.

achievable[24]. Something that is always a conceptual provisory ordination of the no-concept[25].

Anyways, what is the extension of the notion of system designed in *Negative Dialectics* in Adornian philosophy? Is it possible to trace some intersections between this book and his early books? After all, *Negative Dialectics* (published in 1966) and *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (published in 1944), for instance, have 22 years of difference and the connections between them are not evident. Especially if we consider that Adorno reviewed some of his former positions in this period. For that, it is necessary to find some resonances of that negative critique of system in the content developed in other works. Howsoever, we will start to search possible relations between *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, written by Adorno with Horkheimer, and *Negative Dialectics*, insofar as they represent the two main Adornian books. After that, we will be ready to search possible links in other works, e.g. *Minima Moralia*.

2.2.1. POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH *DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT*

According to Hans-Günther Holl, *Negative Dialectics* exposes a program authentically philosophical that is anticipated in a fragmentary way in the theory of history written by Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. For Holl, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is important to the following Adornian works, especially concerning the historical background and the object analyzed[26]. Luciano Gatti, for example, explains that it is possible to recognize, in *Negative Dialects*, the characterization of the most advanced stage of capitalism as a system of social domination that blocks the desire of philosophy for a fairer society. In this sense, Adorno would

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[24] ADORNO, Theodor. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 201.

[25] NEVES SILVA, E. S. *Filosofia e arte em Theodor W. Adorno*: a categoria de constelação. Tese de Doutorado. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2006, p. 73.

[26] HOLL, H-G. Postface. Émigration dans l'immanence. Le mouvement intellectuel de la dialectique négative. In : ADORNO, T. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 512.

express this impossibility by demonstrating the falsity of idealistic thoughts that also would be a support for the preponderance of bourgeois goals. In Negative Dialectics, the history of philosophy would be transformed into a history of ideologies[27]. Holl clarifies that Negative Dialectics presents its theory as a type of heritage: if the application of philosophy, in *Negative Dialectics*, is impeded by a totalizing thought pro-identity, this is possible due to a negative vision of rational processes of homogenization that can be noticed in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. History, element that Adorno and Horkheimer sees as connected to an unified theory linked to *Enlightenment*, can be understood in a substantial derogative way[28]. Negative is precisely the self-critique from the thought towards the organization of Enlightenment in systems: a philosophical organization in the Hegelian system or a social organization in a capitalist system[29]. The Adornian thesis against the rationalism (realized as *Aufklärung*) as a form of construction of History is something that, as reported by Holl, appears in the notion of identity inside a complex and positive system of ideal concepts[30].

Luiz Gatti alerts about a possible irreconcilable difference between *Negative Dialectics* and *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: the thesis concerning the self-destruction of Enlightenment, executed by an historical development that leads humanity to a barbarian state, puts the philosophical thought in a kind of unsolvable problem. This problem corresponds to a lack of openness for the critical element because of its connection with an integrated system of social domination. The preface to the 1969's edition introduces a suspension of that first diagnosis, in which the capitalism would be on the march to the complete domination. It does not mean that Adorno and Horkheimer deny the existence of domination structured by market, government, bureaucracy and media. But the preface of 1969 unlocks the possibility of critical consciousness, insofar as that diagnosis does not block the exercise of thought towards the political contingence. This change of

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[27] GATTI, L. Exercícios do pensamento. In: *Novos estudos/CEBRAP*, no.85, São Paulo, 2009. Available in: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-33002009000300012 (Access: 02/05/2017).

[28] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 186.

[29] ADORNO. T. *Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden - Band 5*: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 275.

[30] HOLL, H-G. Postface. Émigration dans l'immanence. Le mouvement intellectuel de la dialectique négative. In : ADORNO, T. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 513.

interpretation reflects directly on *Negative Dialectics*. According to Gatti, the diagnosis present in the context under *Negative Dialectics* can realize, in the recent history, singular aspects from the experience non-subsumed to the social totality. In this sense, the composition of the experience is an important question in *Negative Dialectics*. The experience becomes a place in which is possible to make an exercise of critique in relate to the history of thought in the light of an epical/temporal diagnostic. The idea of experience as an exercise of thought circumscribes the role of negative within the Adornian critical theory with regard to effective correlation between the philosophical tradition and social domination. For Gatti, the effort to escape from this "*aporia* freedom/domination" is the reason that leads Adorno to formulate the theory that sustains the *Negative Dialectics*[31].

Holl also sees a contradiction between thought and freedom in the traditional way in which Adorno build the notion of *Enlightenment*. In fact, thought is oriented to something opposite to the free act. Thought is guided by a necessity for positivity, unicity, totality and guided by a speculative reason that is, in the end, merely instrumental. Thus, despite enlightenment presents itself as a tool of emancipation, it sustains a system that leads to a universal domination. The humankind wants to dominate all nature, but culminates in the domination of humanity inside its own system of totalizing. The subject's reason becomes also an object for the positive need of system. The systematic reason is a fundamental means to the administrate world, and it has as a final effect the systematization of humans as well. The rational thought is oriented to totality and its attempt for systematization, which includes the humankind. Adorno executes this critique by a complex argument against the philosophy of history and its implications in a history of system of ideas. Anyways, Holl also shows the *Negative Dialectics* as a form of escaping from the *aporia* that we can find in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. According to him, Adorno always could see that contradiction and the difficulties that comes from the self-critique of rationalism. And it is in *Negative Dialectics* that Adorno finally provides rigorously his intention[32].

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[31] GATTI, L. Exercícios do pensamento. In: *Novos estudos/CEBRAP*, no.85, São Paulo, 2009. Available in: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-33002009000300012 (Access: 02/05/2017).

[32] HOLL, H-G. Postface. Émigration dans l'immanence. Le mouvement intellectuel de la dialectique négative. In : ADORNO, T. *Dialectique négative.* Trad. Gérard Coffin, Joëlle Masson, Olivier Masson, Alain Renault et Dagmar Trousson. Paris : Payot, 2003, p. 514-522.

That way, there is some conclusions to consider. Firstly, it is difficult to measure the exact relation between *Negative* Dialectics and *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Nevertheless, we can perceive some resonances between both works, especially concerning the critique of systems and its consequences. It is not impossible to remark the background behind *Negative Dialectics* and link it to what Adorno and Horkheimer were thinking in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Secondly, it is possible to put *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as an important influence for everything that Adorno writes after it. Of course, Adorno reviews many concepts after the first publication of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The notion of critique, for example, only get some operationalization after Adorno solves the contradiction of the self-annihilation of *Enlightement* (in the 1960's preface or even in *Negative Dialectics*). Anyways, the *Negative Dialectics* can be seen as an alternative for that instrumental reason that Adorno describes some years earlier. It is about a negative way to exercise freedom and critical thought in the midst of all these systematical philosophies of ideas. Finally, Negative Dialects is an interesting option to react against the entirety that absorbs everything in a homogenizing theory.

2.2.2. DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT

Dialectic of Enlightenment analyzes a context in which Enlightenment corresponds to a system based on an ideology (capitalism), guided by an instrumental reason (i.e. a reason oriented to the execution of useful ends), and constructed for the domination of nature. In other words, Enlightenment, despite it is something correlated to a rational impulse, blocks any perspective of critical action because of an instrumentalisation of reason. Because of this, Adorno and Horkheimer present an intriguing alternative end for the supposed search for progress that we can realize in contemporary times: the *barbarie*. Only *barbarism* can be the end of all the primacy of reason seen as an instrument by technology. There is *"a reversion of enlightened civilization to barbarism in reality"*[33]. *Enlightenment*, in this sense, leads society to a system of a repressive entirety. If the *lumières* were stimulated by a need for emancipation

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[33] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. Preface (1944 and 1947). In: *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. XVIII.

through reason, its realization in 20th century is something that results in the opposite effect: people are subordinate to a totality that controls an administrated society and, as a last moment of this procedure, humankind is guided to a barbarism situation. Instrumental reason and Enlightenment are keys to a word of dehumanization and violence. Adorno describes "*a rational organization in the hands of the utterly enlightened as they steer society toward barbarism*".[34]

Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) was written in a period of war. The situation of generalized destruction was seen by Adorno and Horkheimer as an effect of all the efforts made by the rationality for dominating nature and, in a last movement, also other human beings. In this sense, it is the vision of reason as a superior thing that leads humanity to a barbarian state. Thought, philosophy and all the history of idealistic philosophies provide the governments with tools to sustain a process of domination even in the contingence of Western democracies. Dehumanization is common to all States in those years, although Fascism and Nazism represent the most iconic symbols of radicalism of that moral degradation. Thus, barbarism is a phenomenon that is general in all the societies, and a perverse effect of capitalism impulse for domination. Something that is a paradox when we consider 20th centuries as a period of intense rationalization. In fact, this rationalization was target of economical processes of submission of nature by means of a technology that transforms production in something that aims to a useful result. Barbarism is, that way, a subjacent characteristic of a society that does not have problem by degrading and controlling human nature to the benefit of a capitalist domination made by a total system. Therefore, Adorno writes to a time that *"is producing the international threat of fascism: progress is reverting to regression*"[35].

Adorno and Horkheimer reconstructs an entire historical movement related to the connection of domination between men and nature. Kant lays the foundation for an idea of political liberation by the means of rationalization, fighting obscurantisms that do not regard to nature and world in a proper way (i.e. a non-mythical way)[36]. Adorno and

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[34] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 15.

[35] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. Preface (1944 and 1947). In: *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments.* Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. XVIII.

[36] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. 64-93.

Horkheimer see an interesting phenomenon in this movement: a disillusionment concerning world. It causes a rupture in the link between men and nature: enlightened men think that they are free from nature. In this sense, men are ready to dominate the nature[37]. In this background, the notion of a history that walks under an idea of positive progress arises. The progress would be the standardized element of a History that evolves in order to liberation of individuals. Nevertheless, Adorno and Horkheimer see the opposite movement: if there is a progress that unifies disperse and chaotic events in a historical movement, this evolution leads to the monstrosity of domination and barbarism. There is no the case of a negation of existence of an absolute universal history. On the contrary, it is more a question about a new paradigm: history may be seen through the domination and the violence against humans and nature. Universal history must be built and denied. Despite his criticism, Adorno recognizes a unity that unifies discontinuous moments of history, a unity that, from the domination of nature, becomes a dominion over men and, finally, a domination over nature. History, as the correlative of unified theory, is horrific.[38]

Indeed, the rationalization built by the French Enlightenment is the theoretical basis on which the situation of barbarism grew up. It is a *"reversion of enlightened civilization to barbarism in reality"*[39]. French Enlightenment is the ground for a consolidation of knowledge as an element that priors neutrality and scientific objectivity. In some sense, the persecution for knowledge is a way to reinforce the power of domination of nature via emancipation. If we confer objectivity to everything, nothing can be interpreted as an incomprehensible thing. There is nothing more horrible to instrumental reason than the possibility of unintelligibility. The thing has objectives and not has to be evaluated by supposed illusions. Technology is the tool that can lead humankind to its goals. "*Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the*

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[37] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 35-61.

[38] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. 184-187.

[39] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. Preface (1944 and 1947). In: *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. XIX.

labor of others"[40]. The objective spirit of manipulation is imposed by experimental rules, valuations of each situation, technical criteria, economically unavoidable calculations and the full weight of industrial apparatus. And if someone consults the masses, they would answer with the systematized omnipresence of knowledge[41]. Subsuming the entire world using an instrumental knowledge to get power and hegemony is the main goal. It is a system of production of truth inside a totalizing theory that, combined with a technical logic in its execution, is in order to dominate everything. The capitalism system invests in a theoretical system of production of truths capable to dominate human beings and nature. *"Power and knowledge are synonymous"*[42].

Consequently, men are also dominated by this system of submission. Technology is a violence done equally to human beings and to nature. Men dominate other men trough this machinery of rationalization. Human beings, in this sense, lose his own principle of humanity, degrading all the sense of dignity and freedom that Enlightenment puts as a basis. "*The doctrine that action equals reaction continued to maintain the power of repetition over existence long after humankind had shed the illusion that, by repetition, it could identify itself with repeated existence and so escape its power*". Nevertheless, "*the more implacably repetition, in the guise of regularity, imprisons human beings in the cycle now objectified in the laws of nature, to which they believe they owe their security as free subjects*"[43]. Modern times identify thought with a kind of instrumental reason. Thought and science are seen as the same thing, and scientific science is the only one possibility of thinking in order to a true knowledge. This context is a common view in all types of state. From the authoritarian states to the liberal ones, the domination of nature through a scientific and instrumental reason is a goal that brings the world, as an ulterior effect, to the social coercion of humans under a collectivity that kills the potential of individuals. In that sense, Enlightenment is as authoritarian as any system, insofar as subsumes the society and nature without considering theirs singularities and special

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[40] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 2.

[41] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, pp. 229-232.

[42] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 2.

[43] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 8.

traces. Society and nature are disposed in a system of homogenization of ideas, something close to the notion of entirety that unifies all the elements in a same scheme of conceptual identity. Summing it up, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* prepares the guidelines for all the Adornian critique of co-relational networks of identity placed in systems of submission[44].

If men are also controlled by this system of domination (the ulterior victims of this negative progression (or regression)), the market is the special agent of this kind of submission. Individuals are just gears of a machinery that manipulates them according to its two main goals: production and profit. As science does, market also dominates nature from the principle of objective indifference, transforming the thought into something without critical reflection. Then, thought is reified in midst of this process of useful production. "*To open that industry to clever people is the function of the otherwise largely regulated market, in which, even in its heyday, freedom was the freedom of the stupid to starve, in art as elsewhere*"[45]. In fact, the technology that came from science is the key to the market's domination. The instrumental thought blocks any attempt for a critical vision on the society and its relations of power. Men are just elements that persecutes to contribute to the operation of market through the principle of competition. Adorno says: "*The inherent principle of competition was the wrong done to the individual. This relates, however, not only to the function of the individual and its particularistic interests in society but also to the inner composition of individuality itself*"[46]. Without criticism, the society becomes an amorphous sea. Market has an autonomy that individuals do not have. Individuals are totally guided by a dependence and a necessity for consuming more or more, sustaining an economic system of a society completely ruled by an administered world[47].

Finally, there is an important element that helps to sustain, in the social context, the homogenization of individuals under the enlightened system of submission: the

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[44] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. 8-34.

[45] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 104.

[46] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 200.

[47] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 181.

culture industry. Culture industry is actually the tool by which the system of domination can subsume individuals. Works of art lack its critical power when it is captured by the instrumental propagation made by the massive reproduction and distribution that fit into the systems of media. The cultural industry is shaped by mimetic regression[48]. Communication media is a perfect aspect of an administered world because has simultaneously a complex framework of production and an ideological dissemination of a homogenous instrumental thought. At the same time, culture industry can establishes a technology of reproduction of goods that lack their originality in a system of repetition, and can incapacitate individuals to construct critical actions because of a homogenization of ideas. The culture industry aims to produce a passive mass by means of the reproduction of standardized goods[49]. Then, the process of general standardization is a way by which mass can be also standardized:

> *"This is also a madness of political reality. As a dense web of modern communications, the world has become so standardized that the differences between diplomatic breakfasts in Dumbarton Oaks and Persia have to be specially devised as an expression of national character, while actual national peculiarity is experienced primarily by the millions hungering for rice who have fallen through the narrow meshes. Although the abundance of goods which could be produced everywhere and simultaneously makes the struggle for raw materials and markers seem' ever more anachronistic, humanity is nevertheless divided into a small number of armed power blocs. They compete more pitilessly than the firms involved in the anarchy of commodity production ever did, and strive toward mutual liquidation. The more senseless the antagonism, the more rigid the blocs. Only the total identification of the population with these monstrosities of power, so deeply imprinted as to have become second nature and stopping all the pores of consciousness, maintains the masses in the 'late of absolute apathy which makes them capable of their miraculous achievements."[50]*

Therefore, industrial cultural guarantees the standardization of ideas that is fundamental for the consolidation of cultural system. Adorno and Horkheimer uses *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a denunciation: all the notions originated from the

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[48] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, pp. 226-227.

[49] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. 94-136.

[50] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 169.

Enlightenment's background represent, in truth, a theoretical framework that leads to a situation of barbarism. As all systems, Enlightenment aims to homogenize each difference according to a universal idea of technological progress based on the principle of instrumental rationality. In this sense, the power of criticism and divergence is lost in midst of the movement of standardization.

2.2.3 MINIMA MORALIA AND OTHER WORKS

Adorno's social philosophy is circumscribed by the two aforementioned works: *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Negative Dialectics*. In this sense, his other works are, to some extent, influenced by these two paradigms. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Negative Dialectics* provides the main lines of what structures Adorno's dialectics, despite all the ruptures that Adorno has in this pathway (for example, when Adorno and Horkheimer declare, in 1969, that the diagnostic made in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was suspended). Consequently, *Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life* (published in 1951) is also a book that indicates some affiliations to the critiques that Adorno offers sooner, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), or quite later, in *Negative Dialectics* (1966). In fact, because of its form and its content, *Minima Moralia* is the archetypical model of Adornian philosophy. First, it is necessary to take in mind the model in which *Minima Moralia* develops its criticisms: the aphorism. As Nietzsche, Adorno uses the aphorismatic writing to establish guidelines for his thought in an unsystematic and fragmentary way. The content of *Minima Moralia* reveals the reason of this option: Adorno denounces, in many excerpts, the problems concerning totality and the homogenization of difference under the unifying theory of systems. By using different contextual subjects, Adorno criticizes the authoritarian potential of system and its standardization of individuals, singularities, and everything that escapes from the correlational identity of that schematic framework. In *Minima Moralia*, Adorno intends to present its philosophy in an honest form: he talks about the problems with system in the most unsystematic kind of philosophical production.

In its dedicatory, *Minima Moralia*'s author adverts about its refuse to systems: Adorno remembers the existence of an aspiration for totality of a system that does not permit that something can escape its bonds. On the contrary, aphorisms insist in negativity. Aphorismatic writing is a kind of denying of totality that wants to eliminate the difference and everything that does not agree with the supra-system. Totality aims to the establishment of harmony through homogenization of antagonisms that places individuals (and singularities) in an inferior position in the construction of an entirety. If we consider classical economy, for instance, the totality is produced by means of the dispute between individual's interests in order to a totality that subsumes them in its own interests[51]. From this general background traced in *Mimina Moralia*'s dedicatory, Adorno gives, in other aphorisms, examples concerning the problems of system. In *For Nach-Sokratiker*, for instance, he explains about the limits of Hegelian philosophy: Hegelian philosophy is restricted to its truth, that is, to the guidelines of a *prima philosophia*, to the assumption that exists an idea that comes before all the things. In this aphorism, by the way, Adorno writes that dialectics has the task of eliminating every theory based on a deductive thinking[52]. Hegel intends to reduce world to words in order to a sovereignty over nature[53].

In this sense, Adorno links the German idealism to the idea of barbarism, probably in a similar context as that he uses in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*[54]. The persecution for homogenization triggers authoritarianism and difficulties to deal with what is not in accordance with the universal. The system imposes it unifying principle to everything, even though universal and particular are irreconcilable[55]. System is a totality that is

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[51] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, pp. 13-20.

[52] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 77.

[53] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 97.

[54] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 98.

[55] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 121.

dominated by a quantification hostile to the qualitative difference[56]. The system is violent and constrictor[57]. In name of a progress (and liberty), system tries to order the entire world, but leads society and people, in its relationship with humankind and nature, to domination and regression[58]. Enlightenment speaks about society as an immediate coexistence of men from whose attitude the whole derives, rather than considering it as a system that encompasses, deforms, and reaches the humanity that once determined them as individuals[59]. The metaphysical categories are not only the enculturating ideology of the social system, but simultaneously express its essence, the truth about it[60]. Thus, the true function of dialectics is to dissociate all system or at least deal with the things outside the logic of unification. Dialectics reveals the particular as necessary appearance, as something that exists by itself, and not as a moment of the whole. Everything that escapes the dissociative potential of dialectics represents misuse of it.[61] To sum it up, in *Minima Moralia*, Adorno presents a kind of framework of everything that he will lay as a solution, so many years later, for problems that he already take in mind clearly in 1950s, *i.e.* the domination imposed by a system of ideas.

Besides *Minima Moralia*, it is possible to realize the unsystematic character of Adorno's philosophy among the set of his other works. A good example for this aspect is *Prisms*, from 1955, where Adorno unifies a multiplicity of essays about cultural criticism and society under the form of a kaleidoscope that presents a non-symmetrical perspective. The form of prisms reflected into a kaleidoscope is an image that express a preoccupation towards details, shades and highlights, particular aspects that, in a global system, are neglected or superficially overlooked. The combinations between different colors in the

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[56] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 175-180.

[57] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 139.

[58] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 165-166.

[59] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 167-168.

[60] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 262-263.

[61] ADORNO, T. *Minima Moralia.* Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1957, p. 278-279.

prism can reveal contradictions inherent to the dynamics of society. An essay is a prism because it demonstrates resonances, heritages and fractures that do not appear clearly in a systematic article. Prisms *represents* a collection of essays written from this methodological image, especially concerning a cultural critique regarding social issues: *A Portrait of Walter Benjamin*, *The Sociology of Knowledge and Its Consciousness*, *Veblen's Attack on Culture*, *The Sociology of Knowledge and Its Consciousness*, among others. "*The essays collected in Prisms*", according to Samuel Weber, *"are literature, if by literature is meant language in which imagination, fiction and form are moments which constitute the 'content'"*. A content that have a *"less mediate relation to truth"*[62].

In *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (1969), Adorno directs his critique against the positivist tradition in Social Sciences, mainly against that related to the heritage from Max Weber. Max Weber thinks of a set of value-free judgments, that is, judgments circumscribed by a model of scientific objectivity in a social context. Weberian theory, in one hand, contests the utilitarian notion of value (in which value and use are the same) and, on the other hand, is contrary to the unscientific particularism of the generation affiliated to the Historical School (for instance, Knapp). Adorno prefers a kind of critique model out of a scientific and systematic paradigm. Even Weber has a critique towards the sense of utilitarian value, he remains with a scientific standard of thinking, something common to all the positivist theoreticians[63]. Social Sciences, according to Adorno, have to follow a critical type of analysis outside the totalizing form in which the scientific model operates. In other words, Adorno is interested in the open possibilities of a non-systematic critique. Essays, fragments and aphorisms, by the way, are a good form of producing precisely because of its aperture to possibilities that are not clear in closed theories. The expression critical model appears, for example, in a Adorno's book called *Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords (1969)*[64]. In *Critical Models*, Adorno proposes a new model of scanning critically the world.

Therefore, the potential of critique is a fundamental key to understand Adorno and his refuse to systems. Maybe it is the reason that is subjacent to the suspension of

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[62] WEBER, S. Translating the Untranslatable. In: ADORNO, T. *Prisms*. Translated by Samuel and Shierry Weber. Cambridge (US), MIT Press, 1997, pp. 09-10.

[63] ADORNO, T. *Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie*. Berlin: Luchterhand, 1969.

[64] ADORNO, T. *Critical models: interventions and catchwords*. Translated by Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia, 1998.

Horkheimer-Adorno's first diagnosis concerning the movement in direction to self-annihilation of Enlightenment: the rescue of possibility of critique. It is precisely the possibility of criticism that leads Adorno to search for a way of knowledge different from the traditional one (that is, locked by an instrumental reason). The totality and its craving for the universal excludes the openness to what is special and particular. Consequently, new critical models should be considered.

2.2.4 THE FRAGMENTARY WAY OF WRITING

The refuse to systems is a characteristic that is also remarkable in the favorite way of writing for Adorno: fragmentary, essayistic and non-ordained. In the opposite of great treatises and complex theories, Adorno prefers to write in an unsystematic structure (or non-structure). The previously mentioned *Minima Moralia* is an interesting example of this form of production. Aphorismatic, *Minima Moralia* does not intend to construct a correlational system of concepts. Instead, that book is disposed in a manner that little excerpts spread the subjects analyzed in the text. As Nietzsche, *Minima Moralia* uses the aphorism as a discursive strategy.

The Essay as Form is a good reference for the unsystematic model of Adorno's production. In this work, Adorno highlights the importance of the essay as a privileged way of writing. An essay written between 1954 and 1958, *The Essay as Form* is part of the collection of Adornian works about literature, *Notes zur Literatur*, published between 1958 and 1974. According to Adorno, the essayistic form leads to autonomy because is not locked by a systematic economy: essays do not have the scientific deduction, that is, are not dependent of a thought that comes from up to bottom in a coherent framework. Essays are free, think through bumps and discontinuities, take the anti-systematic impulse into its own procedure in a movement of disrupting of rational concepts. Adorno places the essay as the unsystematic form of writing *par excellence*. It is an effective mode of escaping the unifying logic of identifying all the things under an omnipresent framework of concepts. The subject covered by an essay is always contextual and does not aim to get solutions from a deductive process. Essays are focused on the partial, on the fragments.

Essays do not want to cover all the reality in a correlational totality of concepts: on the contrary, essays pay attention to singular things and its special particularities. In this sense, essays have three fundamental aspects: the first one is that fragmentary character. The essay is not a treaty that is ordered to handle a totality. The essay always analyzes discontinuous and dissociated objects. As an instrument of critique, essays do not think of lines, transcendental unities or any type of systematic logic that provides a universal key of intelligibility. The second characteristic is the openness of essays. Essays are not pieces that sum closed and finished theories. Contrariwise, essays are open to a perpetual experimentation. This is the critical form quintessentially: since the essayistic subject is something that can be reviewed any time, the potential of critique is ever possible. Finally, essays are not associated with hierarchical categories. Theirs fragments do not have positions and are considered as a singular thing[65].

This fragmentary preference appears in the whole Adorno's work. Even *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the biggest work that Adorno wrote with Horkheimer, is organized by unsystematic styles of production. Precisely, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*'s subtitle is *Philosophische Fragmente*, which ever exposes the fragmentary character of this book. Through a couple of essays (among others, *The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception*[66] and *Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment*[67]), Adorno writes about the contemporary context of an instrumental reason with the purpose of destructing the myth of history as a progressive instance. The essayistic form allow that Adorno and Horkheimer use, besides all the critique concerning the problems of an order of rationality, an unsystematic way of writing that points out a diffuse methodology. In other words, Adorno and Horkheimer establish a non-systematic approach in relation to both the content and the form. There is not a separation between method and studied objects, that is, the critique regarding system is related to the ensemble content-form: criticizing systematic theories requires an unsystematic way of writing. Summing it up, "*the German*

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[65] ADORNO, T. Der Essay als Form. In: ADORNO, T. *Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden - Band 11: Noten zur Literatur.* Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2003, p. 09-33.

[66] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. 94-136.

[67] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. 137-174.

text of Dialectic of Enlightenment is a fragment"[68] and keeps its critical potential from this open structure.

Aesthetic Theory brings an important aspect about this fragmentary aspect. Published after Adorno's death, in 1970, *Aesthetic Theory* can be considered the biggest work of the last years of his bibliography. The concept of parataxis is an interesting way to understand how the poetical language operates in a different way from that in which the discursive one expresses its ideas. By examining the poetical language, Adorno describes the parataxis as, in a distinct form in comparison to general discourses, a mode of language in which the terms are not disposed according to a hierarchical logic of subordination. Parataxis designates only syntactic structures in which coordinated sentences are privileged in detriment to subordinate clauses. In this sense, terms are ordained in a coordinated sequence and not in a framework of subordination in relation to each other. The singular terms have its own sense and the contextual sense is not given by a hierarchical system of connections, but by the sum of all terms placed horizontally, with each one providing its own signification without a supra-scheme of conceptualization. Parataxis is a concept that fills the unsystematic way of writing that followed Adorno in his work. From this notion, Adorno exposes an important methodological example of critical production. "*Adorno's aesthetic is driven to parataxical presentation*"[69] and this orientation can reveal an interesting philosophical background that leads to the refuse to systems:

> *"Adorno organized Aesthetic Theory as a paratactical presentation of aesthetic concepts that, by eschewing subordinating structures, breaks them away from their systematic philosophical intention so that the self-relinquishment that is implicit in identity could be critically explicated as what is non-intentional in them: the primacy of the object."[70]*

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[68] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. Preface to Italian Edition. In: ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, pp. XIII.

[69] ADORNO, G. TIEDEMANN, R. Editors' Afterword. In: ADORNO, T. *Aesthetic Theory*. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor. London, Continuum, 2002, p. 364.

[70] HULLOT-KENTOR, R. Translator's Introduction. In: ADORNO, T. *Aesthetic Theory*. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor. London, Continuum, 2002, p. XIV.

Thus, the refuse to systems that pervades the Adornian philosophy during his life is also linked to the way of writing. Fragmentary, essayistic and non-ordained texts are the Adorno's favorite style to fight systems and theirs problems with homogenizing identity of concepts. Fragments challenge that instrumental logic of ordained frameworks that aims to reduce the world to prefabricated concepts. Adorno is interested in the singular, in the particularities that cannot be subsumed to great idealistic systems. In this sense, essays and other diffuse forms of production are perfect to develop his main criticism.

3. FOUCAULDIAN CRITIQUE OF SYSTEM

We can divide the work of Michel Foucault into three major parts. The first one, which includes the Foucaultian writings of the 1960s, is commonly named *Archeology of Knowledge*. Jean Terrel explains that this phase is dedicated to investigations concerning truth (ἀλήθεια) and its mechanisms of production. In this context, the French philosopher's research is focused on knowledge and its conditions of possibility (constructed inside the instance of discourses). In this period, Foucault published, among other works, *The Order of Things* (1966) and *The Archeology of Knowledge* (1969). The second Foucauldian period of studies has politics (Πολιτεία) as the main subject. Called *Genealogy of Power*, this phase corresponds to the years between 1971 and 1979. In this sense, the 1970s are concentrated on the question about power and its relations. There is a redirection of his attention towards political issues. *Discipline and Punishmen*t (1975) and *The History of Sexuality I* (1976) are the most important works from these times. The philosopher also taught his first course in the *Collège de France*, begun in December 1970, called *Lectures On The Will to Know*. In the genealogical-political phase, he also taught seven other lectures: *Penal Theories and Institutions* (1971-1972); *The Punitive Society* (1972-1973); *Psychiatric Power* (1973-1974); *Abnormal* (1974-1975); *Society Must Be Defended* (1975-1966); *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978); *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978-1979). Finally, the 1980s are dedicated to studies of ethical relevance (ἦθος). Because of this, the *Genealogy of Moral Subject* becomes the Foucauldian main theme. In these years, Foucault published the two last volumes of *The History of Sexuality* (1984) and taught more four courses at Collège de France: *On the government of the living* (1979-1980), *Subjectivity and Truth* (1980-1981), *Hermeneutics of The Subject* (1981-1982), *Government of Self and Others* (1982-1983), *The Courage of Truth* (1983-1984)[71]. Beside these publications, Foucault's bibliography has many interviews, essays, conferences and other fragmentary productions, which can be found mostly in the four volumes of the collection *Dits et Écrits*, published in France in 1994.

Anyway, this division is made merely to establish a didactic intelligibility. There is not a rupture between these phases and they are not strict concerning the subjects.

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[71] *Cf.* TERREL, Jean. *Politiques de Foucault*. Paris: PUF, 2010.

Knowledge is still important and a subject analyzed in many moments of the genealogy of power, as well as power is also a recurrent question in the first Foucauldian phase. In the same sense, ethical questions is present during the whole Foucault's work, and it is possible to find discursive and political resonances as fundamental notions of the genealogy of moral individual. In other words, Foucauldian work is not a thought broken in three parts, but a philosophy with a variety of subjects that are interconnected through researches that, depending on the period, are more focused on a specific subject (firstly on knowledge, secondly on power, finally on moral individuals)[72]. Of course, these resonances cannot be interpreted as a continuity. Despite some internal references, Foucault refuses all the sense of a supra-continuity of thought. Continuity has a pre-oriented movement that excludes the value of singularity, something that is quite essential for the development of Foucault's philosophy. On the contrary, Foucault works with the notion of discontinuity, a term that can be used to interpret the form in which we can understand the dynamics of his philosophy, even though its original meaning is linked to the discontinuous space existent between two different epistemic eras *("that is, the fact that within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a new way"[73])*. Discontinuity represents something that is neither a break nor a linearity, but an inflection.

In this sense, Foucault has a strong refuse to systematic paradigms, e.g. linearity and closed thematic treatises. In fact, Foucault problematizes terms as theory and history of ideas. Foucault rejects the term theory to describe his own philosophy because this word presupposes a universal system of idealistic concepts that ignores local knowledges and singular facts. Foucault is most interested in what is accidental and arbitrary, not in the totalizing world of essences and universal identities. Roberto Machado explains that Michel Foucault does not construct a theory about power, for example, since his analyzes do not consider it as a reality endowed with an essential and universal nature[74]. By describing the Foucauldian notion of dispositive, Deleuze explains that the universal reveals nothing. On the contrary, it is the universal what must be explained. All the lines are variation lines, which do not have constant coordinates. The unified, the total, the

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[72] *E.g.* TERREL, Jean. *Politiques de Foucault*. Paris: PUF, 2010, p.3.

[73] FOUCAULT, M. *The Order of Things*. London: Routledge, 2005, p. 56.

[74] MACHADO, R. Por uma arqueologia do poder. In: FOUCAULT, M. *Microfísica do Poder*. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1979, X.

truth are not universal in a real sense, but singular processes of unifying, totalizing, verifying[75]. Instead of deductive processes, Deleuze explains that Foucault examines a movement that comes from the ground. But an inductive process is not also adequate to describe the Foucauldian method of analysis. In this sense, history of ideas has an inductive process and presents a consistent problem: its attempt for totalizing is, in the end, a doxology that is order to the consolidation of a body of ideas that lacks the importance of specificities. Therefore, despite it is a type of analysis that focuses, through a form of induction, on objects marginalized by the scientific rigor (i.e. something similar to archaeology), its efforts towards totalizing and continuity link it to the traditional way of making history. Thus, this unifying linearity, although it is applied on non-scientific subjects, is problematic because of the loss of local discourses themselves and its specificities (that is, because of an interpretation in which discourses represent a constitutive element of a coherent unicity of ideas or a temporal/revelatory particle in a continuous supra-flux endowed with causality)[76]. Even the way by which Foucault produces is also not systematic. Obviously, we can find some 'classic' works in his bibliography (for instance, *Les mots et les choses*). Even so, Foucault left a large heritage of interviews, short essays and oral courses, which introduces a clear preference for a fragmentary way of writing. As aforementioned, the most of these fragmentary texts can be found in the collection *Dits et écrits*, published in 1994.

With that in mind, this chapter will analyze the presence of an unsystematic vocation in the Foucauldian philosophy. Firstly, it will focus on the archaeological part of Foucauldian work. After that, it will describes the main aspects of genealogy, its unsystematic structure and its application. Finally, it will exposes the fragmentary way of doing philosophy present in the whole Foucault's production.

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[75] DELEUZE, Gilles. Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif? In: Michel Foucault philosophe. *Rencontre internationale* (Paris, 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988). Paris: Le Seuil, 1989, p. 188.

[76] *Cf*. FOUCAULT, M. *Archéologie du savoir*. Paris, Gallimard, 1969, pp. 177-183.

3.1. ARCHAEOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF A SYSTEMATIZED KNOWLEDGE

Archaeology is the type of analysis that Foucault uses as a method in his early studies, i.e. in the period that corresponds to the 1960s. In truth, this terminology is formulated from the last half of the decade, especially in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, book from 1969. Nevertheless, it is possible to affirm that the predominant subject in this period (it means the entire decade) is concentrated on the dynamics of knowledge's production and its application in practical cases (for instance, the discursive production concerning madness). In other words, although this period represents a great variety of themes (also eventually pervaded by questions involving power and ethics), the discourses and the diagnosis about the systematic formation of knowledge are the biggest interest of Foucault in researches before the advent of the 1970s.

Therefore, the archeological phase has a focuses oriented to the question of discursive practices inscribed in a system of production of knowledge. Knowledge is analyzed by Foucault from the point of view of its condition of possibility, that is, from discourses that are placed in the contextual basis of its formation. During the 1960s, Foucault precisely examines particular cases (for example, the consolidate knowing about psychiatry or human sciences) to understand how a determinate knowledge is shaped in the corpus of postulates crystalized in a field. Foucault investigates what is subjacent to the process of legitimation provided by a multiplicity of discourses that develop, from theirs relations to each other, the set of principles that represents the condition of possibility for all the knowledge produced in a specific space and time, i.e. in a given temporal-material context. In this sense, knowledge has this connection with a circumstantial network of discourses, and the Archaeology's work is scanning this ground of discursive formations with the purpose of revealing the system of production of knowledge located in a delimited temporal conjuncture. Foucault says clearly that "*there is no knowledge without a definite discursive practice, and all discursive practice can be defined by the knowledge that it forms*"[77]. Thus, knowledge and discourses have an interdependency relationship: the archaeological analysis of discourses reveals the way in which contextual systems of knowledge are formed and the exclusion of every sign of

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[77] FOUCAULT, M. *Archéologie du savoir*. Paris, Gallimard, 1969, pp. 238-239.

wisdom that is not consonant with the process of homogenization and validation of utterances. Summing it up, knowledge is 1) formed by a network of discourses and 2) placed in a given conjuncture.

By reconstructing the Foucault's bibliography during the 1960s, we find *History of Madness*, published in 1961. In this book, Foucault scrutinizes the trajectory of discourses about madness and the consequent knowledge consolidated about it along different times. In the opposite to the scientific and systemic way of selection of discourses, Foucault examines all types of wisdom: the French philosopher does not confer a hierarchical superiority to scientific knowledge and analyzes discourses that are not linked to the psychiatric discipline. It is necessary, on one hand, to fight the hierarchical logic of systems of production of knowledge and, on other hand, to understand the differences between scientific and non-scientific knowledges with the same commitment. Archaeology aims to reveal the formation of the knowledge about madness in different eras, as tragic and sacred consciousness in the classic period or as non-reason/mental illness in the scientific modernity. For this exam, Foucault uses mainly the analysis of institutions of control over people with mental disabilities, *e.g.* asylums, hospitals, family, church and justice. These institutions are the places where the medical knowledge about madness is historically constructed and applied. Since classical age, these institutions are places of control and reclusion, condemning people with mental illness to a regimen of normalization[78]. Foucault explains the entire context under the development and inflections on the knowledge about madness, leading its *History of Madness* to the onset of psychiatry in a procedure of radicalization of institutional domination of people with mental diseases[79]. This interest in the operations of institutions transforms *History of Madness* into the work more political in the period that is conventionally named as *Archaeology*. Institutional domination corresponds to an attention to political questions, even though the focus is still on the conditions of formation of knowledge on psychiatry:

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[78] *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. Preface to the 1961 Edition. FOUCAULT, M. *History of Madness*. Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. London, Routledge, 2006, pp. XXVII-XXXVI

[79] MACHADO, Roberto. Por uma genealogia do poder. In: FOUCAULT, Michel. *Microfísica do Poder*. Organização e Tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1985, p. VIII.

"With this beautiful and moving book, Michel Foucault transformed our understanding of the processes that had made psychiatry possible – the process which had brought its object, mental illness, into existence, and which inscribed it into our modern imagination as pathology, negativity, incompetence and deficiency."[80]

The Birth of Clinic (1963) has a similar approach. As in *History of Madness*, Foucault analyzes the context that circumscribes a scientific knowledge. In *The Birth of Clinic*, the object is the clinical medicine and its link to the institutionalization concerning treatment of illness in closed and specialized places, *e.g.* hospitals and asylums. The medicine becomes a field of knowledge that needs the control of diseases as a global phenomenon, using confined institutions as an effective tool[81]. Thus, *The Birth of Clinic* is also directed to a discursive analysis that can reveal a consolidation movement of a scientific field. Anyway, despite there are some references to the existence of institutions and its operation, the political issues appear in this book in a weaker way. In this sense, clinical medicine is a discursive reconfiguration of what is spoke and seen, that is, a research even more archaeological than in the former Foucauldian investigations: the discursive plan and its consequences are clearly the predominant focus. In this work, it is remarkable how a scientific field is built: the homogenization of discourses is made in order to/by a definitive establishment of the clinical medicine, its content and where/how it operates. The possibility of a clinical experience is something completely new because works in two moments: firstly, the exam of individuals allows the construction of discourses about them; secondly, the discourses sustain the body of knowledge that justifies and fortifies the clinical medicine. The possibility of clinical experience underpins a discourse with scientific structure on the individual[82].

Michel Foucault intensifies his archaeological project in *The Order of Things*, from 1966. The French philosopher examines the emergence of human sciences from a consolidation movement of a body of knowledge. In a more general overview, Foucault pays attention to the dynamics regarding the formation of a knowledge in a given spatial-temporal context. In this characteristic, it is possible to find the notion of *episteme*.

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[80] ROSE, N. Praise for the Edition. In: FOUCAULT, M. *History of Madness.* Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. London, Routledge, 2006, p. I.

[81] *Cf.* FOUCAULT, Michel. *La naissance de la clinique*. Paris: PUF, 1988, p.19.

[82] FOUCAULT, Michel. *La naissance de la clinique*. Paris: PUF, 1988, p. X.

Episteme is the word that precisely defines the set of discursive relations that sustain and create a body of knowledge in an epochal conjuncture. It means that *episteme* coincides with the temporal-material conditions of possibility for the consolidation of a scientific field, that is, the contextual ground of discursive relations on which a scientific and systematized knowledge emerges. That way, *Episteme* is identifiable through the scenario where is possible to observe the confluences and antagonisms between discourses, a historical and discursive background. In view of this, Foucault can describe the onset of human sciences and link this occurrence to the repositioning of the human being as subject and object of knowledge at the same time. A logic originated from a contextual change that Foucault identifies in the modernity, *"and underwent an irremediable modification"*: knowledge itself becomes *"an anterior and indivisible mode of being between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge"*[83].

In *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Michel Foucault consolidates the main guidelines of the archaeological form of analysis. Renato Janine Ribeiro explains that archaeology means searching for *"conditions of possibility, or of production, of texts and readings"*, by scrutinizing what is subjacent to them[84]. In *Archaeology of Knowledge*, in a different perspective, *episteme* seems be described from the notion of *discursive formation*. Foucault intends to fill the notion of *episteme* with the description of the operational mode of discourses. And the content of *episteme*, according to Foucault, is precisely the notion of discursive formation. Discursive formation are originated from a set of utterances that follow a logic of regular dispersion. Among a number of utterances, there is an economy of dispersion with regularity that is operationalized according to a dynamics of correlations, positions, some order, functions and transformations. These regularities constitutes the movement of discursive formation that explains the way in which knowledge is established in a given context. The context provides with the rules that determines the form of utterances dispersion: the modalities of these utterances, the objects that are designated, concepts, thematic choices, etc[85]. Anyway, discursive formations represent the exposition of the system behind the logic of contextual homogenization that is remarkable in the formation of knowledge. The system represents

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[83] FOUCAULT, M. *The Order of Things*. London: Routledge, 2005, p. 274.

[84] RIBEIRO, Roberto Janine. O discurso diferente In: RIBEIRO, Roberto Janine (org.) *Recordar Foucault – Os textos do colóquio Foucault*. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985, p. 26.

[85] FOUCAULT, M. *Archéologie du savoir*. Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 53

the effort for giving content to a spectrum of scientific paradigms, by excluding, reducing or subjugating wisdoms that are not conform to the majoritarian discursive framework.

Thus, *Archeology of Knowledge* explains the form by which episteme works. Like that, archaeological analysis need focus on discursive formations (that are revealed by the relationship between texts and readings) that coincide with the necessary contextual ground to the consolidation of a knowledge, i.e. with the content of episteme. Episteme is precisely the set of relations that can unite, at a given time, discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, to sciences, eventually to formalized systems. It is also the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, it happens the processes of epistemologization, scientification, and formalization. Moreover, *episteme* is the partition of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to each other or be anachronistic. Finally, *episteme* is the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences, insofar as they come from distinct but neighboring discursive practices[86]. In view of this, Foucault aims to dissociate the system of regularity behind the formation of episteme and reveal the particular procedures of homogenization of knowledge. Archaeology is a form of analysis that is different from the great models of history because it can discover movements overshadowed by all this dynamics of discursive unification of sciences. The Foucault's main goal is to find out the particular resonances that are missed by the lust for unifying inherent to the history of great idealist systems.

Foucault distinguishes his form of analysis, the archaeology, from the scientific rationality, that is, the philosopher clarifies that his kind of description is completely different from the epistemology or the history of sciences. In opposite to history of sciences, archaeology does not want to form units, sustain closed works, restore traditions or origins, or revive the author and his role as a creator[87]. Foucault compares archaeology to history of ideas for clarifying the distinction between the two forms of analysis. Firstly, the French philosopher explains that archaeology does not define thoughts, representations and images from the manifestation of a discourse. Contrariwise, archaeology examines the discourse itself, connecting to practices that satisfy an ensemble of formation rules. This way, discourses are not signs that represent another

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[86] FOUCAULT, M. *Archéologie du savoir*. Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 250.

[87] FOUCAULT, M. *Archéologie du savoir*. Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 54.

instance or an essence, but practices that are manifested in a material context. It is oriented to discourses in its own volume. Discourse do not represent the allegorical face of an ideal world. The second difference concerns the continuity (and the consequent notions of origin and causality) that is desired by history of ideas. Archaeology does not seek to find the continuous transmission that relinks the discourses to what is anterior or posterior to them. It does not have interest in origins or ends, in a slow progression that exposes a system or a doxology. Archaeology uses an analysis strictly oriented to the manifestation of discourses. Furthermore, archaeology is not restricted to the high figure of a work. The content work is not a kind of incontestable source for the archeology. Rather, archaeology wants to investigate the work as a piece pervaded by discursive practices. Summing it up, archaeology is not limited by the unicity and the supposition of superiority of a work. Lastly, archaeological analysis does not have interest in restore the figure of an author. It does not pursues a creative instance or the moment in which a discourse was thought or the reason behind this act. In other words, archaeology does not care about origins, but prefers to take in mind the discourses themselves and the description of its manifestation[88].

For that reason, Foucault separates archeology and history of ideas/other disciplines with a scientific purpose. With his form of analysis, the French philosopher intends to discover discrepant resonances obscured by a homogenizing system of discursive formations. By scrutinizing texts and readings, Foucault wants to reveal tendencies, process of unification, relations ordained to the consolidation of a knowledge. Consequently, archaeology can also bring out dissonances and singularities affected by the excluding filter of science. Archaeology dissociates the unities of system and calls everything into question from a constant critical perspective.

3.2. GENEALOGY: A NON-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Genealogy corresponds to the form of analysis that Foucault uses in his studies from the 1970s, especially from the essay *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, published in

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[88] FOUCAULT, M. *Archéologie du savoir*. Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 182-183.

1971. In his objects, there are two big focuses that can be highlighted: the power, main Foucault's subject during the 1970s, and the moral subject, an issue of ethical nature that dominates the Foucauldian studies along the decade of 1980.

It does not mean that knowledge is neglected in the genealogical times. Despite an emphasis on power and its forms of manifestation, knowledge has an important role in the political exercise: the power only can act on the normalized individual (disciplinary power) or on the population (bio-power) from the knowledge that it has about these receptacles. For normalizing the abnormal in the daily life of institutions (e.g. prisons), it is necessary to know about him through exhaustive discourses and apply over him institutional correction policies. Foucault does not invalidate the past, but departs from another question. Archeology, seeks to establish the constitution of knowledge, responds to how the knowledge appears. Genealogy, in this turn, also takes the knowledge in its investigations, but is focused on the question of why it appears. Its purpose is not primarily to describe the compatibilities and incompatibilities between the knowledges from the configuration of its positivities; what genealogy intends is to explain the emergence of knowledge from conditions of possibility external to the knowledge itself, by describing institutions and its art of operation towards strategies of discipline or regulation[89]. At the same time, the 1980s contain, besides the clear attention to ethical questions, issues regarding politics and knowledge. By the way, Jean Terrel clarifies that the erasure of politics because of the advent of ethical investigations is only apparent. From 1980, Foucault wishes to show that all politics need some forms of subjectivation[90]. In this sense, the research about knowledge are also present when Foucault, by describing a new manner of constitution of the self through the technologies of the self, recovers discourses about subjectivation in different times (e.g. the ancient care of the self). Moreover, ethical themes (as subjectivation) eventually permeates, in an incipient way, the previous Foucauldian works. Summing it up, Foucauldian philosophy presents innumerous resonances between the periods of his life: Michel Foucault's thought is not a systematic closed bloc that can be divided in three hermetic parts.

In light of this, genealogy is a new form of analysis that Foucault inaugurates in his thought from the beginning of the 1970's. As archaeology, genealogy has an

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[89] MACHADO, Roberto. Por uma genealogia do poder. In: FOUCAULT, Michel. *Microfísica do Poder*. Trans. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1985, p, X.

[90] TERREL, Jean. *Politiques de Foucault*. Paris: PUF, 2010, p.3.

unsystematic approach, but from another point of view. If archaeology intends to reveal discursive formations, genealogy is interested in the relationship between these processes and historical resonances that discover emergences motivated by political strategies. Genealogy, in the opposite to the stability, unicity and linearity of idealistic theories, aims to dissociate systems of thought in order to singular facts that can disclose its historical proveniences and effects. If theories work according to a homogenizing bloc of ideas (and under the legitimation of a supra-linear history), genealogy analyzes local contexts and its historical symptoms. Power and moral subject, in this sense, are analyzed from an immanent point of view: there is a context that, by the genealogist's task, gives access to historical urgencies that are placed behind local occurrences.

3.2.1 WHAT IS GENEALOGY?

In *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, Michel Foucault defines genealogy from the counterpoint to the traditional historical method. In fact, the philosopher soon anticipates that history, as understood by the classical tradition, deals with linear chains that move according to a metaphysical criterion, a kind of essential genesis that gives logic and intelligibility to a succession of great events. There is an ideal direction behind the current outlined in the History of mankind. Something that Foucault calls origin as *Ursprung*. It is in the *Ursprung* that we can find the essence and the truth that resonate, in a causal and deterministic way, in the historical future. The perverse effect of this thought is clear: events are no longer considered in their uniqueness. There is, actually, no concern for circumstances beyond the system imposed by constant identity at the origin as *Ursprung*. Errors, accidents, and all obstacles to the course founded by the meta-historical idea are left out of consideration. The work of the genealogist, then, consists in dwelling on what is forgotten by the ideal meanings of indefinite teleologies. That is why genealogy strives to mark the singularity of events, far from any monotonous purpose, to stare at them where they least expect and in what is held to have no history: feelings, love, conscience, instincts. Genealogy wants to grasp things not to trace the slow curve of an evolution, but

to rediscover the different scenes where they play distinct roles. And even set the point of their gap, the moment they do not happen[91].

It is from Nietzsche that Foucault takes inspiration when he criticizes the question of origin as *Ursprung*. In the foreword to *On the Genealogy of Moral* (1887), the German philosopher uses the terms *Ursprung* and *Herkunft*, both translated at first sight as origin. For Michel Foucault, however, the use of the two distinct words cannot be considered arbitrary. Although such notions are used synonymously in other works of the author (e.g. *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882), paragraphs 110, 111, 300[92], the play of words present *On the Genealogy of Moral* signals the marking of an opposition. In this sense, the search for origin as *Ursprung* is different from the search for origin as *Herkunft*, a concept that Foucault prefers to translate as provenience. Nietzsche, indeed, seems to confer a negative aspect to the research for the *Ursprung*, preferring to give to the methodology of his own work the quality of *Herkunft*. He speaks in *Ursprung* when he quotes Paul Rée (who tells the story of morality linearly through a guiding criterion), but uses Herkunft to characterize his research in other works[93].

In addition to *Herkunft*, Nietzsche also uses the term *Entestehung* as the paradigm of his studies. This term, as the guiding criterion of a historical research turned to the singularity of appearance, will have enough importance in the elaboration of Foucault's thought regarding genealogy. As the *Herkunft*, the *Entestehung* is ordinarily understood as origin. Michel Foucault, however, prefers to give precision to the theoretical meaning of the term, translating it as an emergency. In this way, it can be said that the translation of Foucault indicates the intention to signal the difference between *Entestehung* and *Ursprung*, something that he also does in relation to the notion of *Herkunft*. Anyways, the Nietzschean approaches to Entestehung do not really refer to a naive conception of origin. Even though Nietzsche sometimes treats the terms as synonyms (as in *On the Genealogy of Moral*, II, paragraphs 6 and 8), Foucault finds in various passages from the German philosopher the particularity of using of the word *Entestehung*. For example,

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[91] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Tr. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 15-16.

[92] *Cf.* NIETZSCHE, F. *The gay science*. Edited by Bernard Williams. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian del Caro. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[93] NIETZSCHE, F. *Zur genealogie der moral: Eine streitschrift*. Cologne, Anaconda, 2010, pp. 10-11.

Foucault describes the Niezschean *Entstehung* of the concept of good as the emergence of conflicting forces in a space of confrontation[94].

Thus, the pathway of genealogy tends to follow the search for provenance and emergence, not depending on a belief in the existence of a distant and ideal origin. *Entstehung* and *Herkunft,* in this sense, are shown as alternatives for the genealogy concerning the insufficient historical search for *Ursprung*. For deconstructing the idea of *Ursprung*, Michel Foucault presents the conceptual tripod that underpins it. Firstly, origin is seen as the place of the preserved essence of all things, the pure identity of all that, not by chance, happens later. In addition, the origin is portrayed as the highest point, the moment of creation, the state of perfection that precedes the fall, the body, the world and time. Finally, origin is also described as the residence of truth, the condition of possibility of all subsequent knowledge, the principle that every discourse can reveal and at the same time obscures in its inevitable distance. Thereby, the search for *Ursprung* presupposes the search for the essence, for the divine state of creation, and for the truth of object in question. Based on Nietzsche, Foucault elaborates his criticism on these presuppositions.

For that objective, Foucault starts by refuting the belief in the metaphysics of essence. Things, contrary to the traditional research, do not have an innate nature. Far from it, the essence of things is constructed by elements foreign to them. By explaining better, the original character of what is apprehended in history is the result of contingent processes perceived in midst of immanence. What is at the beginning of history is not the identity gathered in itself or the essential element anterior and unrelated to everything that is external/accidental. The origin of things is composed of feelings, conflict, fissures, the marks of difference that hardly enter into the account of *Ursprung* in its eagerness for an idea of homogeneity[95]. The second postulate of origin that Foucault refutes is something that corresponds to the idea that *Ursprung* is the moment of perfect creation, i.e. the point at which the thing, before its inexorable decay, finds itself in a higher state. However, this is not the Foucauldian perspective. The historical beginning, in the terms of the French philosopher, is low, far from what generally is qualified as divine. Foucault explains the ironic character present at the root of human existence: in the contrary to what was

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[94] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Tr. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 24.

[95] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Tr. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 18

thought in the paintings of creationism, at the origin of man is the monkey. The beginning of the human being is not marked for an instant of divinity, but by a burlesque figure, by the caricature of what, subsequently, humankind became[96]. Finally, the last presupposition to be demystified concerns the origin as the place of truth. In this view, *Ursprung* contains the truth that enables the manifestation of knowledge, positioning itself as the place prior to all knowledge. Knowledge, in fact, would be linked to the truth present at the origin, although, as a simultaneous result of its discourse, it also obscures it in its fallen positivity. Foucault, on the other hand, does not see the truth as parked on an ideal plane. His studies about Nietzsche lead him to the conclusion that truth is nothing more than the product of the historical proliferation of errors. Truth, ultimately, owes its existence to a process of sedimentation that leads to an error to be regarded as an irrefutable principle[97].

Thus, the search for *Ursprung* cannot guide the genealogical research. Traditional historical inquiry, based on the notion of a unifying metaphysical genesis that gives rise to a rational continuum, disregards precisely the most important element to the interest of the genealogist: the event considered in its singularity, in its difference. Genealogy focuses on the contingent particulars of beginnings, accidents, and movements that are not always congruent with commencements. In the necessity of a criterion that exists in this historical labyrinth of meticulousness, Foucault's interest arises from the Nietzschean notions of *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*.

3.2.1.1 HERFKUNT

According to Foucault, the traditional use of *Herkunft* is placed in Nietzsche as the trunk of a race. Otherwise, provenance uses the notion of belonging to the circumstances of a group. In *Die fröhlische Wissenchaft*, for example, the German

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[96] *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Organização e tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 18.

[97] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Organização e tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 19.

philosopher invokes the Jewish root to locate the origin (*Herkunft)* of Christian sin[98]. Foucault cautions, however, that the search for the provenance of a thing does not correspond to the stipulation of general characteristics that allow to put it in comparison of similarity to other things that belong to the group investigated. In other words, genealogy is not searching for elements that are common to all individuals of the same set. On the contrary, the genealogist is interested in the marks of difference that intersect and are capable of forming the network that gives provenance to the thing. It is not a matter of finding a coherent beginning that confers an unequivocal and unique identity on a well-defined causal line. The interest of the genealogical method rests precisely in the different beginnings that are not always found in confluent links. The provenance is something with confusion, with the tumult, with innumerable beginnings that almost never fit into the ideal of thing unified by facts connected by a principle of coherence[99].

As a result of this thought, another central feature of the genealogical method emerges: from the search for *Herkunft*, it is possible to discover the various facts that participated in the formation of the thing, even though it is obscured with a so-called inseparable unity. From this, the genealogist is able to see, behind something unified by the belief in the teleological linearity of historical movement, the multiplicity of events that swarm at the origin, whether they conform or oppose the constitution of what has already been formed. The facts are, independently of representing a criterion of cohesion or dispersion, analyzed singularly. The search for *Herkunft*, therefore, also gives voice to the accidents, the errors, any elements that, even escaping from the notion of continuity that bases the discourse of history, cross the pathway of the object searched. Only in this way, abrupt or moderate failures (insofar as they contribute to the emergence of what is investigated) are able to enter into the account of historical analysis[100].

Moreover, Foucault warns that the inheritance left by the provenance of the thing is not composed of a kind of baggage accumulated along the spectrum of events. On the contrary, *Herkunft* is composed of a set of schisms that, before consolidating what

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[98] NIETZSCHE, F. *The gay science*. Edited by Bernard Williams. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian del Caro. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001., p. 124-125.

[99] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Organização e tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, pp. 20-21.

[100] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Organização e tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 21.

happens, causes instability and denounces the heterogeneity of what is supposed as immobile and absolutely coherent. It is the provenience of processes of acquisition and solidification. The examination of *Herkunft*, in a very different perspective, attests to the existence of fissures and inconstancies that put in check the presumed non-dissociability of the historical model of organization of objects. It locates, in effect, the role of what is accidental, of the curve that escapes the notion of a straight line that limits the analytical horizon. *Herkunft* is therefore responsible for the agitation of what has already been established. It fragments what is seen as unbreakable and presents the various points of tension that exist in the itinerary of formation of thing.

Besides that, *Herkunft* is inscribed in the body. Rather than settling as a mere succession of events, provenance is inevitably marked in the present. The image of the human body is adequate: the body of man reproduces all that is capable of affecting him, *e.g.* the quality of the environment, the ills of his ancestors, a kind of nourishment, his innermost desires. Thus, this circumstantial context directly influences the human body structure, leaving scars on its constitution. Consequently, the various factors stigmatized in man throughout his existence can be unveiled from the examination of his body. In the marks of the body, it is possible to locate the myriad of events present in its formation. Therefore, the thing itself points out its trajectory. All events responsible for its history are embodied in its body. The body, in this sense, carries the fissures that make genealogical dissociation possible. Genealogy can only peer at the facts in its uniqueness because the body carries them inscribed on its surface. Therefore, the genealogical method fulfills the role of articulator: by carrying out the analysis of the stigmas that are inscribed corporately, the genealogy becomes the great articulator between the body and history[101].

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[101] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Trad. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 22.

3.2.1.2 ENTSTEHUNG

Traditional history usually describes the emergence according to the notion of the final term. From the notion of finality inserted in a teleological line, history would follow its course towards an inexorable fate destined to come from the beginning. The end, in effect, would serve as the metaphysical foundation of all movements present in a chain of events. However, the emergency in Foucault concerns a series of circumstantial relations. It does not consider the emergency as an isolated instant located in the final moment of a continuum of events. What is understood as ultimate purpose corresponds to only one moment integrated with a series of circumstances that is correlated to games of forces. And it is precisely this conflicting context that gains importance in investigations on emergence. This is because *Entstehung*, by designating the point of arising, is confused with the conjuncture of relations of force that surrounds and gives form to the appearance of the thing. In short, *Entstehung* is a state of tension[102].

In fact, emergency operates in a scenario invaded by forces that are related in different configurations: they collide, react to circumstantial adversities or even fight against themselves. The forces changes according to their varied needs. The evolution of a species, for example, depends on the endless struggle against unfavorable environmental conditions or on occasional enemies. In addition, the forces can also turn against themselves. When it goes through a weakening state, by the way, it is natural that the force turns against itself as a way of reacting to its own weakness. The instinct of a body that is taken up by weakness is to fight for its existence in an individual process. The natural consequence of this combat is subdivision. By dividing, the force finds ways to reinvigorate itself and subsist in the face of fragility. For exemplifying this logic, Michel Foucault mentions a *Gay Science* aphorism, in which Nietzsche speaks about the contextual conditions that led to the split of the Reformation. Christianity, though corrupted, was very strong in Germany and had enough energy to turn against itself[103].

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[102] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Trad. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 23.

[103] NIETZSCHE, F. *The gay science*. Edited by Bernard Williams. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian del Caro. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pg. 130.

Consequently*, Entstehung* corresponds to the eruption of these forces and theirs relations. It is the scenario where the struggles develop. Explaining better, the emergency takes place amidst the historic succession of dominations, in which forces overlap in a kind of perpetual and pervasive combat. There is no an equality between adversaries who face each other in a space rationalized by equal efforts. What is in mind is the battle circumscribed by a tense game of repeated dominations. The war, in this ambience, does not cease with the advent of the armistice. The laws that regulate the terms of peace are nothing more than the continuation of war: they only legitimize the basis of a domination. Violence, on the face of it, continues and is institutionalized. The rules, moreover, guarantee the continuity of violence: its content is given by the one who dominates them. Obviously, the action of mastering the rules requires an engagement in a ceaseless combat against others interested in mastering them. In this sense, laws are always at the service of an interest constituted in the space of overpowering forces. Summing it up, the war is prolonged and adapted to the new resources of established society. By the way, the war extended to political instances is also a Foucault's subject[104].

In any case, it is interesting to note that *Entstehung* takes place in a violent setting. The emergency appears, actually, in the field of forced submissions. Hence, the historical path is constructed in a framework of repetitive dominations, systematic substitutions, subversions in authority relations, unexpected and abrupt inflections. Searching for *Entstehung* presupposes the abandonment of the notion that history owes its motion to a metaphysical and predetermined direction guided by an origin. There is no a watercourse that has its pathway already laid out on an ideal plane. Everything is born by agitation, by war, by a conflict that never ends[105].

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[104] *E.g.* FOUCAULT, M. *Il faut défendre la société*. Paris : Gallimard, 1997.

[105] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Tr. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 24.

3.2.1.3 GENEALOGY AND HISTORY

The historical sense of genealogy in this way is completely dissociated from the teleological-metaphysical notion instituted over the years by the classical approach to history. The effective history (*Wirkliche Historie*) is not interested, as in the history of the historians, in processes of connection of events in a continuity traced by an ideal paradigm of totality. Differently, when the genealogist deals with units established from models supported by supra-historical elements of constancy, he has the fragmentation of these apparently non-dissociable bodies as its central method, pointing to the contingent and reiterated movements of instability that make possible the process of formation of things. There are two distinct historical meanings here: that of History, which is integrative and systematic, and that of the genealogical mode of analysis, which is dissociative and unsystematic. The latter, by looking at a complex of events, does not seek to reunite what is perennial and inexorable. Instead of this, effective history undertakes a careful dissection of history into the accidental circumstances that mark the uniqueness[106].

With these assumptions, Michel Foucault traces the three innovative characteristics of *Wirkliche Historie* in relation to traditional History. The first of them has already been introduced. It is the reconfiguration of the relation between the event and the continuity: instead of prioritizing the ideal totality that encompasses a set of events along a continuum, the genealogist turns to the singular events and theirs contingencies. The second characteristic concerns the inversion of the classically established relationship between the near and the distant. The history of historians, in their eagerness to search for a metaphysical principle, concentrates their attentions on what is distant, far from the fact manifested in the field of immanence. The historian's gaze is oriented to the transcendental, to what surpasses that which is consubstantiated in that which is nearest to the sight. For this, the researcher is responsible for making an extraordinary effort: he seeks the closest approximation of something that stands in the distance; he strives to gain familiarity with something remotely located. On the opposite side, the *Wirliche Historie* is directed towards what is near, to what is closer to its field of vision. It confronts the particular and unstable contingencies of the relations of force

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[106] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Tr. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 27.

that manifest immediately. Meanwhile, the approach of genealogy to fact presents its peculiarities: it turns to the nearest, but at the same time keeps distance from its object. His perspective, in this sense, is based on the realization of a diagnosis. Finally, the last characteristic of the actual history corresponds to the notion that knowledge is always constructed prospectively. While traditional history believes in an unbiased and detached historian of the circumstances surrounding it, genealogy is based on the assumption that research is conditioned to a point of view. The historian conducts his work in a way that tries to conceal his feelings, his inclinations and his reality. The genealogist, in the opposite direction, places his contextual position as an essential element of his genealogical analysis[107].

3.2.2 HOW TO UNDERSTAND POWER AND MORAL SUBJECT?

From 1970, Foucault applies the genealogical form of analysis in two main objects: power and moral subject. In this context, genealogy wants to find out how to understand disciplinary/bio-political practices and/or ethical processes of moral subjectivation from a method that is concentrated on revealing the manifestation of historical emergencies. This reveal of historical emergences, in its turn, depends on an effort for dissociating unities in direction to singularities and its co-relations. Genealogy (of power and moral subject) is not interested in origins understood as supra-historical beginnings, but in the material scenario behind the correlations of particular situations. It discovers the ground and its specialties, the conditions in which the correlation of political forces acts or the subjectivity of a moral individual is constituted. This is not about an ideal and progressive line that excludes differences in a distant and metaphysic history. Contrariwise, genealogy desires to access non-regularities and confrontations that emerges from an analysis towards immediate historical processes.

Power is an interest more and more important in the Foucauldian philosophy, especially from his descriptions concerning disciplinary institutions, something more

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[107] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, a genealogia e a história. In: FOUCAULT. M. *Microfísica do poder*. Tr. Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1985, p. 28-30.

obvious after his lessons in *Abnormal* (1973) and *Psychiatry Power* (1974). Jean Terrel separates the analysis dedicated to power in two different parts: the first one, linked to the courses that Foucault taught in 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975 at *Collège de France* (besides *Surveiller et punir* and the beginning of the first volume of *Histoire de la sexualité*), regards the relations of power that circulates inside the operation of disciplinary institutions. The second one, evolved from the final section of *Histoire de la sexualité I* and in the courses of 1976, 1977, and 1979, corresponds to the period in which the philosopher investigates bio-politics and the arts of government that are articulated with those relations of power[108].

Discipline is a microphysical mode of exercise of power, i.e. a set of institutional tools of normalization. Developed by Foucault in the first half of the 1970s, it represents a terminal and capillary power manifested inside the operation of disciplinary institutions, *e.g.* prisons, asylums and hospitals. By studying the discipline and its mechanisms, Michel Foucault finds, in the activity of several institutions, something that acts as a strategic dispositive that links institutional discourses to local political practices that are in order to reach a microphysical subjection of individual's body. Therefore, his first analysis aims to reveal strategies of individuation that occur within disciplinary power. Summing it up, discipline coincides with a set of techniques by which political mechanisms pursue the singularization of individuals. In this sense, the actuation of political disciplines is in accord with mechanisms of individuation[109]. In *Discipline and Punishment,* the philosopher reports that the discipline of the individual owes its improvement to the discovery, during the eighteen century, of the body as the target of power. In fact, a docile body can be shaped by political mechanisms more easily. It means managing the rationalization and profitability of industrial labor by the surveillance of the body and, consequently, controlling the labor force[110]. Thus, power aims to transform the body into a machine that, like an obedient soldier, responds according to the interests of a strategic dispositive. Discipline is the diagram of a power that manipulates bodies and its behavior for making the type of man necessary to the operation and maintenance of an

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[108] *Cf.* TERREL, Jean. *Politiques de Foucault*. Paris: PUF, 2010.

[109] FOUCAULT, Michel. L'incorporation de l'hopital dans la technologie moderne. In. *Dits et écrits III*. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, p. 516.

[110] REVEL, Judith. *Le vocabulaire de Foucault*. Paris: Ellipses, 2002, p. 17.

industrial and capitalist society[111]. *Discipline and Punishment*, for example, scrutinizes the prison system and devotes all its analysis to the examination of the disciplinary power in the jail. It describes techniques of distribution of bodies, individuals, time, and labor forces in a scenario of spatial composition. In short, discipline uses the incarceration and distribution of bodies in a determinate time/space to reach individuation procedures of docilization/normalization. All these practices maximize the domination and are ensured by some instruments of discipline, *e.g.* constant surveillance, the reiterated examination of inmates (and the production of documents about them for optimizing the exercise of their domination), and the application of sanctions[112]. Therefore, disciplines are a type of exercise of power in which political practices are parsed in its own manifestation inside (or through) institutions.

From the second half of the 1970s, Michel Foucault changes his focus with regard of his investigations of power. With the first volume of the *History of sexuality*, Michel Foucault notes the existence of a type of exercise of power that, in conjunction with the disciplines, intends to manage not only individuals, but populations and its economic-demographic effects. It is the bio-power. Bio-power presents an interesting innovation: bio-political mechanisms. Bio-political mechanisms represent a management of populations that is determined by the point of view concerning the human body as a body-species, as a living being that is dependent to biological processes that lead to several phenomena with an economic-demographic repercussion, *e.g.* birth rate and mortality, proliferation of habitants, life expectancy, etc. Thus, inside the set of technologies that Foucault calls bio-power, bio-politics and disciplinary power coexists and, in fact, disciplines help in the consolidation of the power over life processes[113]. According to Foucault, the installation of bio-power is made during the classical era of this great two-sided technology: anatomical (disciplinary) and biological (bio-political), respectively individualizing and specifying, focuses on the performance of the body and faces the processes of life. Therefore, bio-power assumes the task of controlling and managing biological processes and its economical repercussion. Bio-power characterizes a power whose function is not to kill anyone, but investing in life. The old power of killing from

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[111] MACHADO, Roberto. Por uma genealogia do poder. In: FOUCAULT, Michel. *Microfísica do Poder.* Organização e Tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1985, p. XIX.

[112] FOUCAULT, Michel. *Vigiar e Punir.* Tr Raquel Ramalhete. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2004, pp. 117-142.

[113] FOUCAULT, Michel. Les mailles de pouvoir. In: *Dits et écrits IV.* Paris: Gallimard, 1994, p. 193.

the ancient sovereign is substituted by the administration of bodies and by the calculating management of life[114]. By administrating phenomena typical to human lives, the bio-power can deal with many population issues, *e.g.* famine, epidemics, demographical explosions, migration, among other things. It is in this context that the biological fact began to surround the configuration of the art of governing. Life processes, in other words, have become determinants within what Michel Foucault calls governmentality, which represents a calculated regulation of phenomena related to demographic contingents. A new perspective regarding political issues that coincides with an extension to a new object[115]. In this sense, bio-political dispositives represent the instrument by which a population is transformed into a useful mass for governmental interests. More specifically, the security dispositives (i.e. bio-political dispositives) correspond to a set of power-knowledge mechanisms arranged in a population control. Bio-power operationalizes a set of institutions, procedures, political-economic analysis, diagnoses and demographic projections in order to the regulation of multiplicities and their effects of large scale. Bio-political mechanisms work with the purpose of bio-political regulation of populations. This way, Foucault describes an ensemble of dispositives by which fundamental biological features of human beings can be used by a general political strategy[116].

Both descriptions of power have an unsystematic approach: power is not a theoretical and unified instance that can be localized in a determinate place. In a different way, power circulates, that is, it is something that manifests its presence in the entire social body through co-relation of forces. First of all, it is necessary to clarify that Foucault does not consider power in the same way as the traditional view of power, identified by the notion of sovereignty (as in Hobbes) or repression (as in Marx). Foucault does not even look upon the power as a fundamental element of a theory. Roberto Machado explains that Michel Foucault does not compose a theory about power, since his analyzes do not consider it as a reality endowed with an essential and universal nature.

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[114] FOUCAULT, Michel. *A História da Sexualidade, Volume 1:* A vontade de saber. Tradução de Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque e J.A. Guilhon Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2007, p. 152.

[115] SENELLART, Michel. As artes de governar do regime medieval ao conceito de governo. Tradução de Paulo Neves. Rio de Janeiro: 34, 2006, p. 522.

[116] ALCADIPANI, Rafael. *Michel Foucault, poder e análise das organizações*. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2005, p. 88.

The Foucauldian examination presupposes, on the contrary, that there is not something unitary called power, but only disparate, heterogeneous forms, constantly changing. Power is not a natural object, a thing; it is a social practice[117]. As a genealogist, the French philosopher is interested in evaluating the mechanisms, effects and relationships of power in social dynamics, seeking to reveal theirs material peculiarities. An analytic of power considers power as the result of relations of force that change according to material contingencies[118]. In other words, the dynamics of power is not theorized, but analyzed in its materiality, in a critical and constant way. Analytics of power concerns mechanisms of power and its circulation[119].

Bearing this in mind, Foucault points out the guidelines of his analysis of power. In contrast to the classical political theories, the French philosopher uses what he calls Nietzsche's hypothesis for clarifying three important interpretations: firstly, power is not confused with sovereignty and its mechanisms of subjection. Moreover, power cannot be translated into a body of laws. Finally, power is not confused with a universal structure of domination of one individual or group over others. According to Foucault, such configurations represent, ultimately, effects of the actual configuration of power's manifestation. Power is, as Foucault explains, a multiplicity of correlations of forces immanent to the domain in which it is exercised and constitutive of its organization. It is also the game that, through constant struggles, transforms, reinforces, inverts those correlations. Finally, power is the supports that these correlations of force find in each other, forming chains or systems or, on the contrary, the lags and contradictions that isolate them from each other[120]. These aspects lead to another typical characteristic of Foucauldian power: as a diffuse context of generalized correlations of forces, there is no a central frame of reference responsible for the irradiation of power. In other words, power is not instantiated at a prime and primordial point. Power is diffuse, perpetuated by correlations of force that are disseminated by the social body. Power is a widespread

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[117] MACHADO, R. Por uma arqueologia do poder. In: FOUCAULT, M. *Microfísica do Poder.* Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1979, X.

[118] DREYFUS, H. RABINOW, P. *Michel Foucault:* Un parcours philosophique. Paris: Gallimard, 1984, pp. 264-265.

[119] FOUCAULT, Michel. *Sécurité, territoire, population.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 3.

[120] FOUCAULT, Michel. *A História da Sexualidade, Volume 1:* A vontade de saber. Trans. Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque and J.A. Guilhon Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2007, pp. 102-103.

relational strategy and, because of this, permeates the tiniest of relationships, ensuring its maintenance because of a saturated presence. Power is omnipresent[121].

In accordance with these general considerations, Foucault also establishes five specific characteristics inherent to his understanding of power: The first corresponds to the refutation of the idea of power as an object that can be possessed. Explaining better, power is not a property, that is, it is not something that can be acquired, shared, saved or lost. Second, power relations are intrinsic to all kinds of relationships. Economic, sexual or knowledge relations have the same dynamics of power relations. In all of them, there is a tension between forces that intersect in some way. Furthermore, power comes from below, or rather occurs in what underlies the performance of institutional domination. It is not an instance that originates in a high and absolute place, i.e. cannot be understood as something placed in the logic of sovereignty. Fourth, relations of power are intentional: they translate an intention that is externalized by the arrangement of certain correlations of forces. However, such relationships are not subjective. Foucault means that the dispositional tactical purpose is not derived from the will of an individual. Power does not obey the decisions of a particular subject. Ultimately, another fundamental component of understanding the analytic of power is resistance. For Foucault, where there is power, there is resistance participating in these political relations. The correlations exist only in function of a multiplicity of points of resistance that play the role of opponent and/or target[122].

The moral subject, in its turn, is the main theme of the last Foucauldian studies, especially those that were developed from the beginning of the 1980s. As Foucault's analysis concerning power, the question on moral subject cannot be interpreted under the paradigm of a theory. In other words, Foucault does not intend to make a theory about the subject, i.e. something available to resume the essence of men in an *a priori* knowledge, but prefers to analyze the question in its manifestation. As a genealogist, Foucault wants to scrutinize the modes of self-subjectivation that are made through games of discursive production of truth. In fact, subject is a historical instance, something produced by the

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[121] FOUCAULT, Michel. *A História da Sexualidade, Volume 1:* A vontade de saber. Trans. Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque and J.A. Guilhon Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2007, pp. 102-103.

[122] FOUCAULT, Michel. *A História da Sexualidade, Volume 1:* A vontade de saber. Trans. Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque and J.A. Guilhon Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2007, pp. 104-108.

games of truth in which the individual is inscribed[123]. Subject is constituted historically, and Foucault is interested in the genealogy of cases of subjectivation among different contexts. Concerning the moral self-subjectivation, the philosopher regards especially ancient times and the notion of επιμέλεια εαυτού. That way, Genealogy is focused on modes of self-subjectivation observable historically, or rather, how, in a historical conjuncture, human beings become subjects through the relation with themselves. Modes of subjectivation are precisely the forms by which the relation of subject with himself happens. Strictly speaking, Foucault observes different forms of subjectivation that are made by means of practices of subjective constitution from the relation of the individual with himself. These practices are always circumscribed by a regimen of production of truth that can affect the configuration or that self-relation. Then, Foucault intends reconstruct the genealogy of modes of subjectivation.

Therefore, these practices of subjectivation coincide with the subjective exercise over the self. In this context, Foucault identifies three correlates terms: practices of the Self, technologies of the Self and care of the Self. Practices of the Self represent an experience, an exercise over and with the Self in order to a subjectivation. The technologies correspond to the reflexive attitude that is related to these practices. Technologies are tactics and strategies, i.e. means and ends with which the practices are used. Thus, technologies and practices are fundamental to understand the modes of subjectivation. According to Foucault, the subjectivation has evolved throughout antiquity as a history of care of the Self. Taking the care of the Self as central issue, it is possible to make the genealogy of subjectivity through the cultural formations and transformations of relations with the Self (that is, through the practices and techniques of the Self). The care of the self emerges in a conjuncture in which the practices of transformation of the Self are extremely important among the Greeks. The necessity of occupying himself is a condition to be a citizen with education, instructed and able to govern other citizens. In Platonic dialogues with Socrates and Alcibiades, the notion of take care with himself is a requirement to transform himself into someone able to deal properly with the world and to take responsibility in the government of others. In this context, it appears an interrogation about what is care of the Self (επιμέλεια εαυτού)[124].

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[123] FOUCAULT, M. *Dits et écrits*, IV. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, pp. 631-636.

[124] FOUCAULT, M. *Hermenêutica do sujeito*. Tr. Márcio Alves da Fonseca e Salma Tannus Michail. São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 2006, pp. 3-54.

The care of the Self, beyond a specific mode of subjectivation common to the ancient times, is the way in which individual freedom is thought as an ethical element. Ethics becomes a tool for being and conducting oneself. Actually, genealogy of moral subject represents the closure of a triangle that involves power, knowledge and subjectivity. It means the subjectivity was an important theme for Foucault during his entire life, pervading also his studies that precede genealogy of moral subject. The interest for a free instance of subjectivation appears more evidently since the last years of genealogy of power, what indicates the existence of a resonance between all his studies. By the way, Deleuze points out the existence of lines of subjectivation when he speaks about the dispositive (concept that appears stronger from the beginning of the 1970s), identifying an ethical posture *vis-à-vis* a reality of exhaustive actuation of power. The lines of subjectivation correspond to the production of subjectivity within the dispositive. According to Deleuze, the lines of subjectivation are a response to the action of the political lines of forces that enclose the individual in its mechanisms of normalization. In this sense, the dimension of power (manifested by the lines of forces) functions as a limit, something like a wall to subjectivation. As a reaction, lines of subjectivity transpose the lines of forces that surround the dispositive. It is through them that the individual becomes a subject, resisting, therefore, to the limits imposed by powers and knowledges. It is because of this that the lines of subjectivation work as lines of escape for oneself. They consist of a way of avoiding the logic of the power/knowledge towards freedom[125].

The dimension of freedom becomes more and more relevant since 1979 (especially in the *Birth of Bio-politics*), when Michel Foucault gives attention to the question of liberalism. At a time when the regulation of populations by the State reveals the full extent of its interventionist character, liberalism appears as the tradition that distrusts this excess of government. It problematizes and denounces the implications of a regulation that works excessively. Therefore, liberalism is a new orientation for the governmentality: before being something that is perpetuated from the mere logic of the strengthening of State, the governmentality can be understood as a practice to be constantly reflected, posed as a question of analysis, rationalized in order to optimize the administration of men within a framework that, at least initially, can lead to a critical

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[125] DELEUZE, Gilles. Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif? In: Michel Foucault philosophe. *Rencontre internationale* (Paris, 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988). Paris: Le Seuil, 1989, p. 187.

scenario of limiting of abuses[126]. In this sense, liberal democracies inscribe new issues at the heart of governmentality. By putting freedom in the index of governmental consideration, the dimension of individual subjectivation overcomes its former role as a mere receptacle of the modulating political technologies. Government is not anymore only oriented to a manageable population, but also can be directed to oneself, a notion that Foucault develops when he writes his genealogy of care of the Self.

In this sense, both power and moral subject are analyzed in a genealogical perspective. When Foucault describes historical modes of subjectivation (by the correlation of external forces (individualization/objectification) or by a self-centered attitude (self-subjectivation)), he considers the context of production of power and knowledge that is under them. Genealogy intends to find resonances, little effects that can reveal emergences and singularities that are obscured by the metaphysical line of history made by great systems. It is a look at the ground and its micro-particularities; an immersion in the irregularities that do not appear in the homogeneity, unicity and totality of systematic theories.

3.3 THE FRAGMENTARY WAY OF WRITING

As in Adorno, a considerable part of the Foucault's work corresponds to unsystematic forms of production, especially interviews, essays, short articles, conferences and lessons. The most of this production is reunited in the collection *Dits et écrits*, published in 1994 in four volumes organized by Daniel Defert and François Ewald. In a chronological organization, the work covers all the subjects investigated by Foucault during his life, showing the diversity of subjects that the philosopher analyzes between 1954 and 1988 (mainly concerning power, knowledge and subjectivity, his established interests). The first volume appreciates the period between 1954 and 1969, presenting writings as *La prose du monde* (1966). The second volume collects writings related to the period between 1970 and 1975, including *Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire* (1971),

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[126] FOUCAULT, M. Naissance de la biopolitique. In: FOUCAULT, Michel. *Dits et écrits III*. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, pp. 818-825 c/c FOUCAULT, M. *Nascimento da biopolítica*. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008.

Human Nature: Justice vs. Power (1974), etc. The third volume looks at the period between 1976 and 1979, and collects, among other, writings as *Pouvoir and stratégie* (1977) and *L'esprit d'un monde sans esprit* (1979). Finally, the last volume regards the period between 1980 and 1988, and brings *The Subject and Power* and *Pierre Boulez: l'écran traverse*, both from 1988.

Besides these publications, there are the Foucault's lectures at Collège de France. The lessons were published between 1997 and 2015. *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir*, the first lecture, is an interesting overview on the will to know, the formation of knowledge, and coincides with the time connected to the inflection from archaeology to genealogy. This lesson was taught in 1970-1971 and published in 2011. *Théories et institutions pénales* was the last lecture published (in 2015), even though it was taught between 1971 and 1972. It investigates the emergence of justice and the judicial apparatus. *La société punitive* was published in 2013 and taught in 1972-1973. This lesson speaks about disciplinary institutions and works, together with the previous lecture, as a prelude for subjects that Foucault approaches in *Truth and Juridical Forms* (1973) and *Discipline and Punishment* (1975). *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* was published in 2003, taught in 1973-1974, and regards the psychiatric dispositive implemented in disciplinary institutions. *Les anormaux* analyzes the institutional-discursive establishment of abnormal human beings and their subjection to disciplines of exclusion or normalization. This lecture was taught in 1974-1975 and published in 1999. *Il faut défendre la société* concerns mainly the question of correlations of power as a historical instance of constant war. This lecture was published in 1997 and taught in 1975-1976. *Sécurité, territoire, population* improves the discussions about bio-power, especially regarding the bio-political dispositives of security. It was published in 2004 and taught in 1977-1978. *Naissance de la biopolitique* purposes to reconstruct a kind of genealogy of bio-politics. It was published in 2004 and taught in 1978-1979. *Du gouvernement des vivants* brings a genealogy of obedience, examining the link between power and subject. It was taught in 1979-1980 and published in 2012. *Subjectivité et vérité*, published in 2014 and taught in 1980-1981, introduces the questions on subjectivation and truth that Foucault continues to regard in *L'Herméneutique du Sujet*, taught in 1981-1982 and published in 2001, in which he focuses on the genealogy of care of the Self. *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres I* (taught in 1982-1983 and published in 2008) and *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II* (taught

in 1983-1984 and published in 2009) develop the idea of government of oneself and works on notions as courage to say the truth, παρρησιαστής, and παρρησία.

In any case, it is important to remind that the Foucauldian bibliography is unsystematic formally and materially. It means that both form and content are non-systematic, insofar as the non-structural way of Foucault's production concerns a philosophy completely anti-totality, anti-unicity and anti-linearity. Foucault is anti-theory and anti-system *par excellence*: archaeology denounces the systematic filter of scientific knowledge in a historical discursive analysis and genealogy intends to dissociate homogenizing theoretical systems to discover what happens in the fractures and local struggles. Foucault refuses systems, premade ideas and aprioristic concepts. The perpetual openness allows the eternity of a critical posture:

> *"A fundamental characteristic of archaeology is precisely the multiplicity of its definitions; it is the mobility of a research that, not accepting to be stuck in hard canons, is always instructed by the researched documents. Therefore, the continuous shifts of archaeology do not attest an insufficiency nor a lack of rigor: they pinpoint a fugacity that is assumed and reflected through analysis. With Michel Foucault, it is the very idea of an immutable, systematic, and universally applicable historical method that is discredited."[127]*

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[127] MACHADO, R. *Ciência e saber*. Rio de Janeiro, Graal, 1982, p. 14.

4. CONCLUSION: THE INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN TWO CRITIQUES OF SYSTEM

Refuse to systems is a common trace in Adornian and Foucauldian philosophies. Systematic frameworks, theories and historiographies tend to reduce the facts to a metaphysical instance that intends to unify all the singularities under a totalizing bloc of concepts. In the Adornian case, the refuse to systems appears more evidently in *Negative Dialectics*, but it pervades all his philosophy in order to a critical posture in face of pre-made units of ideas. The different, the heterogeneity, everything that is not conform to the entirety is overshadowed by the principle of identity and its tendency to determinate the things in consonance with the supra-totality. Foucault, in his turn, problematizes the system in relation to the notion of big theories and the system of discursive production that obscures singularities and dissonant microprocesses. In archaeology, Foucault intends precisely to discover how the discourses are formed over a context of multiplicity and difference. Genealogy, type of analysis that Foucault uses from the 1970's, wants to discover historical irregularities, fractures and setbacks that are subsumed in the unifying great lines of systematic history of ideas. Then, system is a problematic way of analysis because excludes the critical potential in its procedures of unification. Systems lose the strength of particularities and its capacity of revealing material specificities. In view of this, we can find five similitudes between the Adornian and the Foucauldian refuses to system.

The first one concerns the rejection to processes of totalizing, unifying and homogenizing typical systems. Systems tend to reunite all the elements around it according to a principle to homogenizing and unifying towards the establishment of a totality that encompass everything in a logic of identity with an idealistic point sited in a transcendental omnipresent instance. Totality becomes problematic for Adorno and Foucault because it subsumes as many elements as possible in its machinery without realizing the strength of their singularity, their contextual situation, how they present themselves in a dynamics of analysis without be took in a connection to a system, to an end established in some metaphysical place, to a network of concepts that compel them to be conformed to a universal structure that provides prefabricated answer and ideas. The

imposed unification of facts and objects under a unique key of understanding the world represents a practical limitation to the critical potential. The necessary identity between thought and systematized concepts leads to an authoritarian posture that does not consider the difference, the specific object and the singularity of its manifestation. Thus, Adorno and Foucault pay attention to new models of critique: a sight over the specificity of the element itself, without interpret it as a part of a larger system of transcendental conceptual forms. Archeology, for example, does not need "*a fixed point or an absolute reference from universal values to think of the historicity of discourses*"[128].

The second common characteristic regarding the refusal to systems in Adorno and Foucault is the privilege of the look at singularities and its material manifestation. Adorno and Foucault pay attention to the object itself and potentiality of its manifestation. It reveals forms of submission and allows the philosophers more freedom to analyze a contextual situation outside of the metaphysical logic of great systems of ideas. The singularity, whether in relation to the genealogical potential that it reveals in Foucault or in connection with the Adornian attempt to detach it from a forced identity, represents a sign of critical emancipation towards the analysis turned to the revelatory capacity of a context that its simple historical manifestation brings. This posture represents a liberation of non-identical elements and the emergence of obscure proveniences dissonant from the homogenizing totality. It is a primacy with respect of the object. The primacy of the object presents elements for the critique and for the effective, material and historical overcoming of the perspective of this philosophy of consciousness, by the establishing of the materialistic priority of a reflection capable of reaching the non-identical as object[129].

The third intersection corresponds to the critique of history and its tendency to the constitution of great metaphysical continuity that moves in line with an idealist justifying principle, something related to a sacred point of origin or a high teleological end. In this sense, there is the old notion of history as a progressive movement that is guided by the incontestable reason of a transcendental enlightenment. A linearity that absorbs all facts and events according to a logic of unification guided by those principles of origin/end given by an absolute rationality. Anyways, the alternatives glimpsed by Adorno and

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128 ALVES, A. A crítica de ponta-cabeça. A significação de Kant no pensamento de Foucault. São Paulo, *Transformação*, 2007, vol. 30, n.1, pp. 25-40, p. 29.

129 MAAR, W. Materialismo e primado do objeto em Adorno. São Paulo, Transformação, Volume 29, 2006, pp. 133-154, p. 151.

Foucault are different. Foucault, inspired by Nietzsche, establishes a new model de analysis: the genealogy, a method completely independent from the notion of linearity. Genealogy intends to dissociate the great historical narratives that subsume the singular facts and its contextual signification. According to Foucault, the very history happens under the movement of these narratives, in a dynamic material context where singular and not always consonant facts swarm, emerge and relate to one another (confrontations, adjustments and miroconformities). Definitely, this scenario does not fit the great line of official history. Adorno, in his turn, prefers to deal with a kind of linearity, but inverts its direction: instead of a progression that leads to a high teleological end, the German philosopher sees a regression towards a generalized barbarism. The progressive line stipulated by the enlightened instrumental reason only can result in the complete domination of men.

Moreover, Adorno and Foucault deny the idea of knowledge imposed by the movement of modern scientific character. Adorno criticizes the idealistic philosophies and its tendency to create a network of pre-fabricated concepts that subsumes all the different. This way, knowledge is produced by a transcendental instance that excludes the potential of the heterogeneity and its openness to the constant critical posture. Foucault points to the scientific cleavage of knowledge that modern rationality undertakes. Only a kind of scientifically verified knowledge can be established, which eliminates all possibility residing in what is different. As Foucault reveals, knowledge is produced historically by a set of discursive relations (which are submitted to interests of power), a movement that, in modernity, is endowed with a scientific character. Foucault purposes an archaeological-genealogical form of analysis that highlights everything that is excluded by that process of scientific cleavage (that happens also in human sciences). Adorno, in his turn, purposes a new way of relationship between subject and object. Instead of an identity, Adorno deals with the difference that exists between these two instances. There is a primacy of the object, but this does not mean an objectivism. *"It is obvious that idealist philosophy imposes its subjective forms on the object. But scientific objectivism is no less subjectivist when it imposes its mathematical grid on nature, its realist self-interpretation notwithstanding"*. Adorno purposes that *"the subject enters into the object altogether differently from the way the object enters into subject"*, conceiving that the subject is not the object, that is, conserving the difference present in

the relation between them[130]. As Foucault, Adorno intends to detach knowledge from a logic of capitalist domination over nature and human beings. *"Power and knowledge are synonymous"*[131], Adorno and Horkheimer say.

The fifth intersection between Foucauldian and Adornian critiques of system coincides with the unsystematic way of writing perceptible in theirs bibliographies. Foucault has a lot of essays, short articles, transcribed lessons, interviews and conferences that are reunited in the texts collects in the four volumes of *Dits et écrits* or in the lectures given at *Collège de France* published from the decade of 1970. Adorno demonstrates his preference for prisms, aphorisms, essays and all the mode of texts open to a perpetual condition of critique. *"A central virtue of the essay form is that it has successfully raised doubt about the absolute privilege of method"*[132]. Adorno and Foucault emphasize the unsystematic way of writing to the detriment of large treatises that hold closed theories that do not yield space for a constant and punctual critical posture. This critical stance is precisely what motivates Adorno and Foucault toward a refusal for systematic works. Through essays or interviews, for example, criticism manifests itself in its most forceful form. A treaty, conversely, always puts ready-made answers to predetermined problems. This means that Adorno and Foucault, through diffuse works, can maintain a constant critical attitude, detached from authoritarian theories: writing unsystematically generates an opening for new models of analysis. In Foucault, this coincides with archeology and genealogy, analytical types that focus on historicity. In his analysis about the Kantian notion of *Aufklärung*, Foucault highlights the existence of a critique of present times, a notion that inspires Foucault to create his critical method of analysis that implies current contexts[133]. In Adorno, the critical stance derived from the principle of non-identity leads to much more efficient models of analysis. Adorno, in his refusal to the instrumental traces of reason imposed by the *Aufklärung*, brings the critical attitude to something new.

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[130] WHITEBOOK, J. Weighty Objects. In: *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno*. Edited by Tom Huhn. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 61-62

[131] ADORNO, T. HORKHEIMER, M. *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University, 2002, p. 2.

[132] JARVIS, S. Adorno. *A Critical Introduction.* New York, Routledge, 1998. p. 138.

[133] FOUCAULT, M. Qu'est-ce que ce les lumières ? In : FOUCAULT, M. *Philosophie, anthologie*. Paris, Gallimard, 2004, pp. 857-881.

Therefore, there are many similitudes between the models of refuse to system in Adorno and Foucault. Both authors intend to escape great idealist frameworks of concepts. Adorno and Foucault want to liberate what is different from the moorings of the system imposed by philosophies based on scientific criteria. It is a new point of view: a liberating analysis that provides types of interpretation that are not in conformity with totalizing and unifying paradigms. Ultimately, Adorno and Foucault revive the perpetual critique embodied in the present.

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