

The main aim of this work is to examine Fink's concept of play with regard to animals, or the justification of his thesis that animals do not play. The work is divided into three parts. The first one deals with the Fink's concept of play. The key concept in this section is "*play world*". The chapter is concluded by the analysis of the structural moments of the play world. The second part presents the game in the current ethology and definition of the game at Burghardt. The chapter also deals with the greatest problems of ethological exploration, such as anthropomorphism and consciousness and thought of animals. The results of contemporary etological research and their comparison with the structural moments of play at Fink's concept are presented at the end. The third part offers a philosophical reflection and sketching other possible ways for thinking about play. The work provides clear analysis of Fink's concept of play and an overview of the results of contemporary ethological explorations. The comparison shows that we cannot deny animals play as such, but also more complex relationship to the world. Thus play offers new possibilities of the problem of human-animal difference.