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Institute of Political Studies

Reconstructing Nuclear Deviance

Stigma Politics and the Rules of Nonproliferation Game

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I, Michal Smetana, hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, that I have, to my best knowledge, acknowledged all the sources and literature used in its preparation, and that this thesis has not been used to earn another degree elsewhere.

August 18th, 2017
Prague

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Michal Smetana

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Abstract

In this dissertation, my aim is to unpack the relationship between deviant behavior and normative change in global nuclear politics. I draw on the interactionist approach in sociology to conceptualize "stigma politics" as an interactive, dynamic process of the social construction of deviance in international affairs. I connect these insights with contemporary IR theories on norm contestation to theorize the way how (re)constructions of deviance contest and affirm boundaries of appropriate behavior in social orders. I employ this theoretical perspective to study the (re)constructions of "nuclear deviance" in global nuclear order, and the dynamics of norms and rules in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

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This Ph.D. thesis is the result of my five-year doctoral study of International Relations at Charles University. In retrospect, it was surely one of the most challenging things I have ever done in my entire life – yet, at the same time, it has been also a priceless experience and an incredibly exciting journey. In this short text, I would like to acknowledge individuals that have been there for me during all the ups and downs of Ph.D. studies and helped me reach the final destination.

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Needless to say, all errors are in the text of this thesis are mine.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AP	Additional Protocol
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
HEU	Highly-enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IR	International Relations
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KCNA	Korean Central News Agency
LEU	Low-enriched Uranium
LWR	Light-water Reactor
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NNWS	Non-nuclear-weapon-state
NSA	Negative security assurance
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon-free Zone
NWS	Nuclear-weapon-state
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNODA	United Nations Organization for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.
Barack Obama, Prague, April 5, 2009

Without deviance from normality, there can be no progress.
Frank Zappa

1. Reconstructing Nuclear Deviance: An Introduction

In July 2016, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology announced a $250,000 cash prize for "disobedience", to be awarded to individuals who challenge the norms, rules, or laws of society with the aim to promote positive change. Upon the announcement, the M.I.T. Media Lab Director Joi Ito made the following statement:

> You don't change the world by doing what you're told. […] I'm not encouraging people to break the law or be disobedient just for the sake of being disobedient, but sometimes we have to go to first principles and consider whether the laws or rules are fair, and whether we should question them. […] I believe that being 'disobedience robust' is an essential element of any healthy democracy and of any open society that continues to self correct and innovate.[1]

As a researcher in the field of International Relations (IR), I have found this link between norm-violating conduct and social change fascinating. In our discipline, the issue of *deviance*, commonly understood as transgressive behavior in conflict with shared norms and rules, has been understudied and under-conceptualized. At the same time, the problem of *change* is arguably in the forefront of scholarly inquiry. In the decades following the end of the World War II, the competition between the two ideological blocks made the world a relatively stable and predictable place. However, the traditional IR theories were not able to fully account for the changes in international politics following the unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union and the events of 9/11. Today, there seems to be a prevailing feeling that we live in an age of turmoil, and the political scientists are constantly confronted with surprising events that challenge our earlier attempts to make sense of the world – perhaps this is why the 2017 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association had as its main theme *Understanding Change in World Politics*.

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[1] For the full statement and the rules of the competition, see the Disobedience Award FAQ at M.I.T. Media Lab website: https://www.media.mit.edu/posts/disobedience-award-faq/

Many changes in post-Cold War era are closely related to the problem of global governance and to the changing landscape of international norms and rules that guide behavior of states in international system. As such, many IR scholars have been particularly interested in studying *normative* change that has been taking place with respect to the shared standards of appropriate behavior in world politics. Although the international norm dynamics has been a "topic of the day" for many years, and it seems to be more relevant today than ever before, the scholarly understanding of the link between norm violations and the changes in the normative structure of world politics is arguably still in its infancy.

In this dissertation, my aim is to unpack the relationship between deviant behavior and normative change in international politics. Since the IR theory seems to be poorly equipped to address this particular problem, I decided to turn to the field of research that has been dealing with norms and transgressions for decades: a sociology of deviance. In particular, I draw on the "interactionist perspective" of sociologists such as Erving Goffman, Howard S. Becker, Kai Erikson, and Edwin M. Schur, all of whom study deviance as a contingent, socially constructed phenomenon. Eventually, I resorted to theoretical eclecticism and connected the interactionist perspective with the contemporary IR theories on norm contestation and change (e.g., Wiener 2008; Sandholtz 2007; Müller & Wunderlich 2013). Through this endeavor, I also aim to join the ranks of "third generation constructivists" who draw on the symbolic interactionism in sociology to deal with the issues of identity, deviance, norms, and order in international politics (cf. Adler-Nissen 2016; Zarakol 2014; Kessler & Steele 2017).

Empirically, I focus on the phenomenon of "nuclear deviance" with respect to the norms that regulate the spread of nuclear weapons in international system. The looming threat of nuclear war led to the gradual emergence of international regimes, institutions, practices, and initiatives that should have halted further proliferation of nuclear weapons among state and non-state actors. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiated in the late 1960s has been the most prominent attempt to agree on the key rules of the nonproliferation game.[2] In IR scholarship, the violations of these rules have been mostly treated as a strictly negative phenomenon, hindering the efforts of states to sustain order in nuclear affairs. In my dissertation, I instead develop an argument about the contestedness of "normal" and

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[2] The text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is available at the United Nations website: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text

"deviant" conduct in nuclear politics, and study the close relationship between the social (re)construction of nuclear deviance and the development of nuclear norms.

In this introductory chapter, I proceed as follows. First, I provide a brief commentary on some of the terminology I use throughout the dissertation. Second, I introduce the interactionist perspective on deviance in sociology, which I later use to build my conceptual framework. Third, I review the existing IR attempts to employ interactionist theorizing in the field of international politics. Fourth, I provide a summary of my theoretical argument, drawing both on the interactionist perspective and the IR literature on norm contestation and dynamics. Fifth, I introduce the notion of the "nonproliferation game", an empirical setting of my case studies. Sixth, I elaborate in detail on my research strategy in this dissertation. Seventh, I discuss the scholarly contribution of my dissertation. Finally, I provide a brief outline of each individual chapter and the overall plan of the dissertation.

Notes on Terminology

Before I introduce the theoretical, empirical, and methodological underpinnings of this dissertation, I would like to provide the reader with a brief note on my use of some of the field-specific terminology. While students of IR and Security Studies will likely be familiar with most of the terms I employ in this dissertation, there are four specific terms that I use heavily throughout the dissertation and likely deserve further elaboration: deviance, stigma, norms, and rules.

Deviance

I use the term *deviance* in its traditional sociological understanding of "certain deviations from social norms which encounter disapproval" (Clinard 1957, p.vii).[3] In most sociological accounts, "deviance consists of norm violations" (Stafford & Scott 1986, p.81). Addrain Conyers and Thomas Calhoun nevertheless propose that

> deviance is a matter of degree – from behaviors or persons who attract strong
> condemnation from practically everyone, to behaviors or persons who attract
> weak condemnation from practically no one. The more serious the normative

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[3] While the main focus of sociology as a discipline has been on the deviant behavior, the deviance also encompasses norm-violating attitudes (beliefs) and conditions (Adler & Adler 2014, p.13). For a discussion over competing definitions of deviance in sociology, see Clinard & Meier (2011, pp.6–9).

violation and the stronger the condemnation, the more likely it is that sociologists refer to it as deviance and the greater the likelihood that they have studied it (Conyers & Calhoun 2015, p.259)

The "deviant", then, is a person (or, in the case of international politics, a *state* with a distinct social identity) that violates the norms of the society (in the case of international politics, the *international* society). I also frequently use the term "deviant" as an adverb, to point to the norm-violating quality of a certain social category. The terms "transgression", "transgressor", and "transgressive" are used interchangeably with "deviance" and "deviant". Often, I use quotation marks with "deviance" or "deviant" to stress the contingent and socially constructed nature of deviance. However, I do not use quotation marks when I speak of a deviant image, for example, as the notion of image already implies that I deal with a societal reflection rather than an objective evaluation of the given object.

Stigma

The notion of *stigma* or *stigmata* originally comes from Ancient Greek, in which it was used as a word for a tattooed "mark" on a person's face or other part of the body (see Jones 1987). In modern times, it has been widely used in sociology, psychology, and psychiatry for characteristics that make a person somehow excluded from the "normal" society. In *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Erving Goffman describes stigma as a "deeply discrediting attribute", an "undesired differentness from what we had anticipated" (Goffman 1963, pp.12–14).

Although the problems of stigma and deviance are necessarily connected, the sociological literature mostly lacks the explicit conceptualization of the link between the two notions. Perhaps the closest link between stigma and deviance can be found in the work of Stafford & Scott (1986), who redefine stigma as "a characteristic of persons that is contrary to a norm of a social unit" (Stafford & Scott 1986, p.80). Dijker & Koomen (2007) define *stigmatization* as "the process by which an individual's or group's character or identity is negatively responded to on the basis of the individual's or group's association with a past, imagined, or currently present *deviant* condition" (Dijker & Koomen 2007, p.6, *emphasis added*). In my dissertation, I follow up on these insights to treat stigmatization as a process that

involves negotiations and contestations of deviant identities, and as a social practice that (re)constructs the limits of deviance and normality in society (see chapter 2).

Norms vs. Rules

Constructivist IR scholars mostly use the notion of a *norm* for behavior of states that is considered appropriate in international politics. Most constructivists therefore follow the definition of norms as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996a, p.5). Besides the intersubjective nature of norms and their constitutive relation to social identity of individual actors, many constructivist authors also stress the "oughtness" of norms, insofar the norms provide the actors with guidelines on how they *should* act and speak in an international realm (cf. Jepperson et al. 1996; Towns 2012, p.187). At the same time, norms as "standards of 'appropriate' or 'proper' behavior" also offer the possibility to *evaluate* the actor's behavior in terms of its appropriateness for the given identity and specific situation (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p.891).[4]

Among the problems I encountered during my research were the differing perspectives on the conceptual difference between *norms* and *rules*. For example, the international regime theory differentiates between norms and rules as different analytical categories. Whereas the norms are "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations", the rules are "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action" (Krasner 1982, p.186; Zacher 1987; cf. Müller 1993). I frequently encountered similar suggestions in the IR literature that the "difference between rules and norms is that rules are written and codified (in a treaty or an agreement), whereas norms transcend rules because they have a social significance and thus provide boundaries which are flexible and open to interpretation" (Onderco 2012 fn. 3).

I find this distinction conceptually problematic and in conflict with the common usage of these terms in the sociology of deviance as well as much of the IR constructivist literature on norm dynamics. As I discuss and demonstrate in chapters 3 and 4, even rules in written and codified international treaties and agreements are frequently to some extent ambiguous and subject to different interpretations among the relevant stakeholders (cf. Krook & True, 2012; O'Mahoney, 2014; Sandholtz, 2008; Wiener, 2008). At the same time, norms also often carry

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[4] The use of the concept of norm in the study of international politics has not been unproblematic and many scholars highlighted various terminological and conceptual issues connected with the use of this term in IR. See for example Goertz & Diehl (1992), Raymond (1997), Crawford (2004, p.40), or Björkdahl (2010).

quite specific prescriptions and proscriptions for action (cf. Wiener 2007; Wunderlich 2013, p.23). In many cases, the rule-norm distinction would be a truly daunting task, as many scholars observed in the empirical applications of international regime theory (cf. Hasenclever et al. 1996, p.180).

Many scholars in IR constructivism and sociology therefore use the two terms interchangeably rather than separately. For example, Nicholas Onuf suggests that norms are just "rules by another name" (Onuf 2014, pp.1–2). Similarly, Wayne Sandholtz draws on the standard practice in legal scholarship to suggest that rules "are the same thing as norms" (Sandholtz 2007, p.5). Although Friedrich Kratochwil suggests that "all rules are norms, [but] not all norms exhibit rule-like characteristics", he also admits that in his book, he uses the terms "more or less interchangeably" (Kratochwil 1989, p.10). Much of the modern constructivist literature that I draw on in my theoretical framework also uses the term "rule" in places where the 1990s generation of IR constructivism would use the term "norm" (Sandholtz 2008; O'Mahoney 2014a; Daase & Deitelhoff 2014).

In the sociology of deviance, the scholars also use both terms quite interchangeably. For example, Howard Becker argues that "social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance" (Becker 1963, p.9), and coins the widely used terms "rule enforcers" and "rule creators" that correspond to "norm enforcers" and "norm entrepreneurs" in constructivist IR literature.

In my dissertation, I often avoid the terminological distinction by jointly referring to "rules and norms" as the normative base of behavior in social orders. When I use the terms separately, it is usually to highlight the more generality of the norm versus the specificity of the rule. However, when I need to differentiate the degree of specificity and formalization in a precise manner, I follow Antje Wiener's vertical distinction among fundamental norms, organizing principles, and standardized procedures (see Wiener 2014 and chapter 3 of this dissertation).

Sociology of Deviance and the Interactionist Perspective

Whereas in this dissertation I primarily aim to contribute to the broader discipline of IR, my theoretical framework is largely built on the (symbolic) interactionist approach to deviance and stigma in sociology. In this section, my aim is to introduce the interactionist perspective as an interactive, dynamic process of the social construction of deviance.

The study of deviance is among the most prominent topics in modern sociology. In the early days of the discipline, a norm-violating behavior was primarily treated as a social pathology, a sort of "disease" contrasted with a "healthy" normal state in the medical analogy. The first systematic accounts of deviance as a complex phenomenon naturally occurring in all social orders appeared in the 1950s; U.S. sociologist Edwin Lemert (1951) is sometimes hailed as one of the pioneers of the concept itself. The focus of the emerging sociology of deviance eventually split into two major research agendas: *explanatory* approaches and *interactionist* approaches.

Explanatory approaches have been primarily concerned with causal explanations for deviant behavior in society. They correspond to the positivist tradition in sociology, seeking to identify variables on the level of society that would explain *why* some individuals violate social norms – while others do not. Inherent to this approach is the metatheoretical assumption that social sciences are able to employ rigorous methods that reveal essential, "objective" conditions that "cause" human action. What exactly stands for deviant behavior is taken for granted and is not by itself subject to scientific inquiry in these approaches.[5]

In contrast, interactionist approaches study *how* deviant categories come into being. Interactionists strictly depart from the absolutist conception of norms and deviance, and point to the (inter)subjective, socially constructed nature of both. In this endeavor, they draw on the tradition of symbolic interactionism in sociology, most notably the works of George H. Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969). A symbolic interactionist tradition is concerned with the *meanings* that people attach to "things" in their life – i.e., themselves, other people, physical objects, ideas, behavior, or institutions. These meanings are not fixed but constructed and constantly negotiated in social interaction, primarily through spoken and written language and cultural symbols. The self and the society are mutually constitutive; we internalize shared meanings and reactions of others and we simultaneously participate in the co-construction of meanings and the overarching social order (Hall 1972). Even though the meanings are in flux and always open to further (re-)negotiation, they nevertheless have a far-reaching influence on

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[5] Some of the most influential achievements in this area of research are, for example, Edwin Sutherland's (1947) differential association theory explaining how individuals learn deviant behavior (cf. Matsueda 1988); Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) control theory that focuses on the social bonds and the (lack of) self-control; Robert Merton's (1938) work on anomie and opportunity structures; or Ronald Akers' (1977) social learning approach.

the lives of individuals and society as a whole; in the famous dictum of W. I. Thomas (1938, p.572), "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

The dynamic and interactive understanding of the intersubjective construction of meanings in society forms the ontological and epistemological core of interactionist approaches to deviance. Howard Becker (1963) built upon these principles to redefine deviance from a more relativist and "reactionist" view. In his seminal book *Outsiders*, he argues that

> *social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance*, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label (Becker 1963, p.9, *emphasis in the original*).

This focus on the *labeling* of individuals as deviant by the "normal" society and the non-essential, contingent nature of these labels, shifted the interest of interactionist researchers to the reactions of the societal "audiences" and the mutual deviant-audience interaction. It is precisely *within* this interaction where the deviance is (re-)constructed through the social negotiations of disvalued labels.[6] What counts as disvalued is both historically and culturally contingent, and subject to constant reinterpretation in ever-changing contexts. In fact, the very same behavior can be labeled as deviant in one specific social setting and pass as completely normal in another (cf. Plummer 1979, pp.98–99; Goode 2015, pp.15–20).

The early tendencies to sometimes treat labeling as a general *cause* of deviance (cf. Akers 1968; Dotter 2004, p.93) eventually led Becker (1973) to clarify the interactionist perspective in the newly expanded edition of his book, and place the labeling process in the broader context of the social construction of meanings. The hypothesized causal link between labeling and deviant behavior, however, has remained debated and further theorized in the wider discipline. For example, many studies in sociology and criminology (e.g., Farreu & Nelson 1976; Ray & Downs 1986; Paternoster & Iovanni 1989) draw on Lemert's (1951) distinction

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[6] Some authors promote the inclusion of *positive* deviance, as a distinct type of highly valued, yet rare behaviors, traits, and conditions (such as "genius" or "hero") that signal exceptional over-conformity with shared norms. See for example Heckert and Heckert (2002). For a critique, see Dotter (2004, p.88).

between primary and secondary deviance: while the former represents the first, isolated act of deviance, the latter is a consequence of the internalization of the deviant label by the offender. The reflexive self-fulfilling prophecy of treating someone as inherently morally flawed and the impossibility to fully get rid of a deviant identity, leads an individual to eventually develop a "deviant career" and reenact the negative expectations of the "normal" society in his or her future behavior (see also Tannenbaum 1938, pp.19–20; Becker 1963, pp.34–38; Lofland 1969, p.121).

Most interactionist scholars subscribe to the classical Emile Durkheim's "functionalist" understanding of deviance in society. In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, one of the founding texts of modern sociology, Durkheim (1895, pp.98, 101) offered a novel perspective on crime as a social phenomenon: instead of being a strictly pathological element, it is in fact "an integrative element in any healthy society, (…) indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law". These claims laid the foundations for the functionalist theory of deviance in sociology that revolves around four societal functions of deviance: affirmation of shared norms and values; clarification of moral boundaries; reaffirmation of moral and social ties in a group; and encouragement of social change (Macionis 2012, p.197).

Among other interactionist scholars, Kai Erikson (1966) further explored this nexus of moral boundaries and deviance in society. In *Wayward Puritans*, he suggests that "each time the community moves to censure some act of deviation, (…) it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and restates where the boundaries of the group are located" (Erikson 1966, p.13; see also Dentler & Erikson 1959). The (re-)construction of deviance in social orders corresponds to two main processes of normative dynamics: normative *stability*, as a reaffirmation of group values and normative consensus; and normative *change*, as a redefinition of acceptable and appropriate behavior in the group, leading to innovation and moral adaptation (cf. Ben-Yehuda 1990, pp.6, 10–11; Adler & Adler 2006).

Bringing Outsiders in: Deviance and the Study of International Politics

The interactionist approach to deviance has been predominantly used to study minorities in contemporary society, such as marihuana smokers (Becker 1955), male prostitutes (Luckenbill 1986), mentally ill (Link 1987), transsexuals (Kando 1972), and ex-convicts (Harding 2003). In fact, Alexander Liazos (1972) pointed to a certain case selection bias in the sociology of deviance, which had been predominantly concerned about "nuts, sluts, and perverts", instead

of focusing on, for example, unequal power relationships and deviance among the political elite. Since Liazos' call, there have been several notable interactionist attempts to examine deviance in the political sphere of social life (cf. Lauerdale 2015). In this section, I review the existing attempts to employ the interactionist perspective in the realm of *international* politics.

IR scholars have not shied from occasionally using the notion of *deviance* for the norm-violating conduct of states, but to date there have been only limited attempts to provide systematic accounts of this phenomenon, as sociology has been doing for decades. In one of the few IR books dedicated to this topic), Wagner, Werner, & Onderco (2014b, pp.1–3) argue that this neglect of deviance in IR scholarship is a "legacy of structural theorizing" that works with the assumption of the "likeness" of states, as well as the predominance of positivist methodologies that rather deal with large *n* samples and behavioral regularities than with inherently rare, "deviant" cases. Perhaps the most comprehensive work done on the problem of deviance in international politics was written by Deon Geldenhuys (2004), who provided an impressive overview of deviant actors from the Ottoman Empire and Bolshevik Russia to terrorist organizations and norm-violating states of the early 2000s. However, while the book is certainly exhaustive in terms of the actors included, this quantitative advantage also precluded the author from deeper qualitative engagement with individual cases and a more thorough application of interactionist conceptual apparatus.

Furthermore, some critically oriented strands of IR scholarship draw, more or less explicitly, on the key tenets of interactionist literature to provide alternative perspectives on the problem of "rogue states" and their position in international society.[7] For example, many scholars have highlighted the social constructedness of the rogue state phenomenon and the labeling practices that bring deviant images into being (Mutimer 2000, pp.93–97; Geldenhuys 2004; Nincic 2005; Malici 2009; Malici & Walker 2014; Onderco 2015a; Wunderlich 2017b).[8]

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[7] In response to the post-Cold War securitization of the rogue state phenomenon, many IR scholars and policy experts have also actively engaged in the debates over the causes of and possible responses to the norm-breaking behavior of "international outlaws" such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, or Libya (see, for example, Klare 1996; Tanter 1998; Litwak 2000; Smith 2006; Lennon & Eiss 2004; Rotberg 2007). For a review of different perspectives on "rogues", see Herring (2000).

[8] Some scholars (e.g., Kustermans 2014; Onderco 2014a) observed the similarities between the interactionist process of labeling and the use of speech act theory in IR, particularly in the securitization theories frequently used by the students of international security studies. Indeed, the securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998; Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008) is concerned about intersubjective constructions of social categories by "labelling" certain subjects "security threats", in a way that does not seem to be far from labelling practices in interactionist theorizing. However, as I also discuss in chapter 2, the interactionist literature provides a much more

Others noted the hierarchical stratification of international politics that allows hegemonic states to impose these deviant labels from unequal power positions (Werner 2014; Homolar 2011). Some other scholars argued that the practices of exclusion of certain states from international society and their unequal treatment are themselves problematic and deserve further scrutiny (Saunders 2006; Corrias 2014). More recently, it has been pointed out that the "outcasts" are not merely passive objects of labeling practices but they also exhibit their own normative agency and often challenge their exclusion from and marginalization in international society (Wunderlich 2014; Wunderlich et al. 2013; cf. Acharya 2012, p.202). Many academics therefore problematize the use of the "rogue state" label (Wagner et al. 2014b; Jacobi et al. 2014; Wunderlich 2017a), or even claim that if the norm-breaking character is the foremost attribute of rogue states, the label should primarily apply to the United States as the ultimate "rogue" of world politics (Chomsky 2000).

Recent IR scholarship also turns renewed attention to the concept of *stigma*. In some form, the notions of stigma or stigmatization already appeared in some earlier constructivist works; for example, Tannenwald (1999b; 2005; 2007) explores how gradual stigmatization of nuclear weapons as illegitimate tools of war led to the creation of informal normative prohibition, a "nuclear taboo", on their use; Price (1995; cf. Price & Tannenwald 1996) observes the emergence of stigma attached to the use of chemical weapons; Legro (1996) notes the stigmatization of certain kinds of warfare in the interwar period; and Shamai (2015) makes an inquiry into the stigmatization of weapons of mass destruction as a distinct category of unconventional arms. Indeed, even Finnemore & Sikkink briefly mention that "we recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval or *stigma*" (1998, p.892, *emphasis added*). Nevertheless, some of the more recent works try to follow up on the interactionist conception of stigma developed by American sociologist Erving Goffman (1963) to study constructions of deviance in international politics. Notably, Ayşe Zarakol (2011) in *After Defeat* described the attempts of post-war Turkey, Japan, and Russia to cope with their stigmatization of the predominantly Western international society. Elsewhere, Zarakol provided additional insights into the role of deviance and stigma in international politics, and argued that it is mainly stigmatization that drives norm diffusion and widespread normative compliance in international realm, rather than "friendly" persuasion and socialization as suggested by many

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dynamic and interactive conception of the construction of social phenomena, by granting much more meaningful agency to social audiences and well as to actors that are subject to labelling practices.

conventional constructivists (Zarakol 2014). Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014b) further elaborated on stigma management strategies – stigma recognition, stigma rejection, and counter-stigmatization – that "deviant" states employ in order to cope with shame (see also Adler-Nissen 2014a). Drawing on Adler-Nissen's research framework, Jeffrey Chwieroth (2015) subsequently studied stigma dynamics in the global financial governance. As such, Adler-Nissen notes that "today, third generation constructivists are returning to the sociology of Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel and other symbolic interactionists to address problems of identity, power and deviance in international politics" (Adler-Nissen 2016, p.27; cf. Kessler & Steele 2017).

Social construction of deviance is also highlighted in the recent IR works that study *dissidence* as a practice of political resistance against the hegemonic rules of international society. Daase & Deitelhoff (2014, p.2) distinguish between "'opposition,' which accepts the ruling order as such and makes use of the institutionalized forms of political involvement to express its dissent, […] and 'dissidence,' which rejects the rules of the order and chooses unconventional forms of organization and articulation to exercise radical critique of rule." In a recent book on this subject, Gertheiss & Herr (2017, p.1) draw on this distinction and propose that international "dissidents […] frequently seek to institute radically different concepts of political order. In some cases, they succeed in bringing (partial) change to the global order and are (re)admitted to the international community; in others, their attempts fail and they continue to be delegitimised as 'pariahs' by proponents of the dominant order." In this respect, Wunderlich (2017a, p.174, *emphasis added*) argues that "use of the term 'rogue state' constitutes a radical example of dissidence by ascription: a collection of widely differing countries are charged with violating core norms of the ruling order and are thus marked out as *deviant* in relation to the international community of states." Some authors indeed advocate the use of the term dissidence for studying deviant actors, as it does not presuppose a prior conception of what counts as "normal" in international politics (Jacobi et al. 2014).

Finally, another group of scholars explore the notion of *abnormality* as it appeared throughout the work of Michel Foucault, in particular his *Lectures at the Collége de France 1974-1975*. In these texts, Foucault (1975; see also 1965; 1977) uncovers the way in which the contours of "normal" are delimited by the social construction of "abnormal" behavior. The normal/abnormal categories are constructed through the process of differentiation, with disciplinary discourses and practices applied to correct and normalize abnormal individuals.

Within a larger trend in critical IR to bring some of Foucault's original insights to international political research, some scholars apply the notions of (ab)normality and normalization on states instead of individuals, and study how these processes constitute the identity of these states and enable/constrain action in international contexts. For example, Hagström (2014) recently studied the "abnormality-normalization nexus" on the case of contemporary Japan, identifying identity-producing processes in relation to Western norms, Japanese self-perception of exceptionalism, and the dynamics of securitization in the context of Japan's relationship with China and other Asian countries. Zanotti (2008) explored how Euro-Atlantic institutions have attempted to normalize Croatia and how these attempts have been continuously resisted at the local level (see also Zanotti 2011). Dillon & Reid (2009, pp.141–142) observe how the advancement of surveillance technology enables more and more sophisticated detection of deviant behavior and "in this context any action or thought that borders on abnormality is likely to be targeted as a potential source of threat."

All of the aforementioned approaches bring the "outsiders" of international politics into the center of analysis and provide valuable insights into the intersubjective processes, by which the international society distinguishes the "normal" from the "deviant", and how these conceptions of (ab)normality develop over time. In effect, the theoretical and empirical observations of these approaches should also be of high interest for at least two large segments of contemporary theoretical debates in IR: the issue of international norm dynamics; and the problem of identity in inter-state relations. As for the norms research, understanding what "deviant" means also reveals what is considered "normal" in the given social orders; changes in deviance perception then simultaneously delimit what we would still consider to be a norm (cf. Hagstrom 2014, p.133; Adler-Nissen 2014b). As for the social identity inquiries, the interactive social construction of deviant actors is highly relevant in the context of "othering" practices, a common theme in critical constructivist and poststructuralist accounts of self-identity constitution in relation to difference (see e.g., Campbell 1992; Doty 1996; Neumann 1996; Rumelili 2004).[9]

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[9] In critical constructivist and poststructuralist accounts, however, the "other" is often treated as a passive entity without agency, with "self" independently (re)constructing its own identity through representational practices involving the image of the "other". In symbolic interactionism, the "other" is actively involved in the process of identity negotiation, opposing, contesting, and subverting definitions imposed by the "self". See also Connolly (2002), Rumelili (2007, pp.30–31), and Adler-Nissen (2016).

Summary of the Theoretical Argument

My theoretical perspective in this dissertation is built on two key premises. First, "deviance" is not an objective quality of the subject, but instead an intersubjective phenomenon, socially constructed and continuously reconstructed through the process of *stigmatization*. Second, the (re)constructions of deviance constitute normative change and stability in social orders, as they contest and affirm the boundaries between "right" and "wrong" behavior in society.

The argument about the social constructedness of deviance draws on the interactionist tradition in sociology (e.g., Becker 1963; Erikson 1966; Goffman 1963; Schur 1980; Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994), which I introduced in the previous pages. In contrast with the positivist approaches in sociology that seek to find "objective" causes of deviant behavior, interactionists are primarily interested in *how* deviance comes into being in human society. Interactionist scholars mostly share the following assumptions about the nature of deviance:

- deviance is historically and culturally contingent;
- deviance is negotiated in the interaction between the (potential) "deviants" and the "audiences" that label certain behaviors, acts, beliefs, or conditions "deviant";
- deviance (re)construction is an inherently political process, embedded in a complex net of power relationships, social stratifications, and hierarchies;
- deviance is not an *a priori* pathological element in society, but a natural occurrence in all social orders, where it functions as a source of both social stability and normative change;
- constructions of deviance take place both in an immediate reaction to specific "deviant acts", as well as across longer periods of time, during which the deviant categories are continuously reenacted and embodied in specific discourses and practices.

Interactionist scholars also frequently utilize the notion of "stigma", originally introduced to modern sociology by Erving Goffman as a "deeply discrediting attribute" that prevents the individual from full social acceptance (Goffman 1963). Interactionist theorizing, however, often lacks an explicit conceptualization of the link between stigma and deviance. In my thesis, I consider "stigmatization" to be a *process* in which the deviant labels are negotiated between

the deviant and the audiences. If the deviant label is successfully imposed, the resulting "stigma" becomes a part of the deviant's social identity. As noted by Daniel Dotter, "the label transmutes the quality of the original 'act' to suggest that the individual is somehow naturally deviant" (Dotter 2004, p.89). As such, the process of stigmatization always involves the contestation and negotiation of deviant identities.

Drawing on these insights, I introduce the concept of "stigma politics" as an interactive, dynamic process of the social construction of deviance in international affairs. The idea behind stigma politics is based on the premise that states in international politics possess distinct social identities that are continuously (re)negotiated in their mutual interaction through discourse and practices. This leads me to the assumption that individual states can be subject to the process of stigmatization when their behavior is interpreted as "deviant" with respect to the norms and rules of international society. In chapter 2, I conceptually unpack five dimensions of stigma politics through which the deviant categories are negotiated, contested, stigmatized, and possibly de-stigmatized in the international realm:

- *stigma nexus* is an actor-specific site of deviance (re)construction, involving the (alleged) deviant individual and various social audiences;
- *stigma imposition* stands for attempts of the rule-enforcing audiences to construct a deviant image of an actor;
- *stigma management* refers to the discursive strategies that (potential) deviants employ to cope with stigma imposition;
- *stigma reversal* stands for societal attempts to de-stigmatize the deviant and (re)integrate him into "normal" society;
- *stigma power* is tied to social stratifications, hierarchies, and operations of power in social orders that play a role in the process of stigmatization.

In chapter 3, I connect these interactionist insights with IR literature on norm contestation and dynamics (e.g., Wiener 2008; 2014; Wiener & Puetter 2009; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013; Sandholtz 2008; O'Mahoney 2014a; Müller & Wunderlich 2013; Krook & True 2012; Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007). Eclectically fusing the two perspectives, I theorize the way stigma politics shifts the moral boundaries of international order. I hereby work with the assumption that the normative structure of international politics is subject to continuous contestation, and is

therefore undergoing constant development. I propose three types of action in the process of deviance (re)construction that drive the dynamics of international norms:

- *applicatory* contestation and affirmation, reconstructing the meanings of international norms;
- *justificatory* contestation and affirmation, challenging and re-affirming the legitimacy of international norms;
- *hierarchical* contestation and affirmation, contesting and reaffirming the relative value and importance of international norms.

While the contestation of international norms also takes place across longer periods of time, norm violations are usually seen as serious crises of cooperation in international politics, and they are therefore something that the states and international organizations both feel obliged and justified to react to. When norms are violated, the stakeholders find themselves in a more legitimate position to propose new laws, rules, and institutions, as well as new mechanisms of social control. As such, the "deviant events" provide moral entrepreneurs with a window of opportunity to introduce new measures that would bolster the authority of the norm and/or to make its meaning more precise. The process of stigmatization therefore does not only "spoil" identities of actors, but also promotes normative change, reaffirms moral boundaries, and generally helps to clarify what the "new normal" is in a given social order.

Nuclear Deviance and the Nonproliferation Game

In this dissertation, I employ the aforementioned theoretical perspective to study how deviance is socially constructed and reconstructed in global nuclear politics, and how this process constitutes changes in the normative structure of nuclear order. Specifically, I focus on what I call the *nonproliferation game*, a continuously negotiated techno-political order that aims to create and sustain a patterned behavior of states with respect to the global diffusion of nuclear technology. Since the late 1960s, the main source of norms and rules for this "game", and also for the global nuclear order as such, has been the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPT is undoubtedly one of the most prominent arms control achievements of our time. After more than forty-five years since the treaty adoption, the current membership now includes 190 state parties, with adherence second only to the United Nations Charter. The international regime that revolves around the NPT is often viewed as the prime institutional

barrier against uncontrolled spread of the world's most destructive weapons. Nevertheless, both scholars and policy-makers frequently claim that the contemporary nuclear order has been increasingly experiencing an existential crisis (e.g., Sauer 2006; Pilat 2007; Kittrie 2007; Meyer 2009; Allison 2010; Thakur 2011; Miller 2012; Müller 2017; cf. Horovitz 2015).

The stated reasons for the alleged crisis are undoubtedly complex. There has been, however, a particular concern about the deviant behavior of certain states that is in conflict with the rules of the nonproliferation game. Perhaps most visibly, there has been a frequent international outrage towards states that are (or used to be) NPT signatories, violated their obligations under the treaty, and either developed their own nuclear weapons capabilities (North Korea) or have been under strong suspicion that they plan to do so (Iran). At the same time, the NPT parties have been concerned about the remaining NPT "outsiders": states that had decided to stay out of the treaty regime and acquire nuclear arms (India, Pakistan, and Israel). Finally, the five countries that acquired a legal status of the official nuclear-weapon states (NWS) in the NPT (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China) are regularly accused of avoiding their commitments to nuclear disarmament and engaging in practices that are in conflict with their obligations under the NPT.

Nuclear scholarship usually treats these patterns of "nuclear deviance" as a strictly problematic phenomenon negatively influencing the health and stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (e.g., Carranza 2007; Goldschmidt 2009; Huntley 2006; Walker 2007b; Thakur 2011). There are studies that focus on the sources of and motivations for such deviant behavior (Ogilvie-White 2010; Solingen 2007; Akhtar & Khan 2014; cf. Betts 1993); options for dealing with and eventually "normalizing" the deviant actors (Fitzpatrick 2009a; Laney & Shaplen 2003a; Sagan 2006a); or generally on the problem of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation regime rules and norms (Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann & Berejikian 2012; Acton 2009). Authors of these studies mostly describe the behavior under consideration as "objectively" deviant, problematic, or simply wrong.

In my dissertation, I deal with the phenomenon of nuclear deviance from a different perspective. I make the argument that as nuclear order itself is built upon ill-defined, contestable (and contested) normative structures, so are the categories of what constitutes "normal" ("good", "responsible", "orderly"…) or "deviant" ("bad", "irresponsible", "disorderly"…) conduct in nuclear affairs. Instead of trying to normatively evaluate the "wrongness" of specific cases of norm violations, I interpret these cases as interactive "stigma

contests" (Schur 1980). In these contests, states employ different discursive strategies to (re)negotiate the "normal" and the "deviant" categories (acts, practices, discourses, or identities) in the nonproliferation game. As such, the (potential) deviants are not seen merely as passive objects of labeling practices, but they rather exhibit their own agency, trying to strategically cope with shaming and promote alternative normative conceptions (cf. Wunderlich 2014; Wunderlich et al. 2013; Adler-Nissen 2014b). Normative argumentation notwithstanding, the outcomes of these stigma contests are largely contingent on operations of power and hierarchical positions of individual actors.

This perspective allows me to demonstrate how the understanding of what is "good" and "wrong" behavior in nuclear order changes over the course of time; and how certain acts, practices, and discourses that at one time could have been considered more or less "normal" have become contested and eventually stigmatized. It also allows me to unpack the process of how certain states become "outlaws" in nuclear politics; how these outlaws are disciplined; and how they are sometimes de-stigmatized and re-integrated among the "normal" states. In fact, the interactionist approach reveals how our own conceptions of a good, proper, or responsible nuclear/non-nuclear state transforms as a consequence of the stigmatizing dynamics. Finally, the theoretical perspective reveals the contingent nature of NPT rules and norms, and the processes that constitute normative change in nuclear order with respect to the operations of stigma politics.

Research Strategy

The research in my dissertation is conducted in the tradition of interpretive social-scientific inquiry. As such, I do not engage in strict measurements of analytical variables or explanatory research strategies that would test causal explanations for the given phenomena. Instead of searching for *causes* of deviant behavior, I try to unpack the *process* of deviance creation in a specified context.[10] In other words, I study *how* deviant categories become "social facts" (cf. Doty 1996, p.4).

Like several other IR constructivists (cf. Adler-Nissen 2016), my meta-theoretical anchoring draws on the "Chicago School" of symbolic interactionism in sociology (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969). A symbolic interactionist tradition is concerned with the *meanings* that people

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[10] On the importance of studying *processes* of world politics in IR, see Crawford (2004, p.2) and Lebow (2008, p.59).

attach to "things" in their life – themselves, others, physical objects, or abstract ideas. These meanings are not fixed but socially constructed and perpetually (re)negotiated in social interaction – primarily through spoken and written language, human practices, and cultural symbols. The "self" and the society are mutually constitutive: we internalize shared meanings and reactions of others, and we simultaneously participate in the negotiation and (re)construction of meanings in the overarching social order (Hall 1972).

In the field of Political Science and IR, this logic is compatible with the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of "discursive institutionalism" (Schmidt 2008; 2010; 2011), or generally with the research strategies that use discourse analysis to study normative change in political orders (cf. Krook & True 2012).[11] For this purpose, the notion of "discourse(s)" is understood as "sense-making practices" that *construct meanings* of social phenomena. The focus is, nevertheless, not just on "words" the actors say or write, but also on what actors "do", insofar their actions and (material) practices represent sites of meaning-production (Epstein 2008, pp.4–6). In this dissertation, I study the employment of meaning-making discourses in dialectical patterns among relevant actors in stigma politics, using the social-relational dialectics as an approach to study an open-ended transformation and change in world politics (Brincat 2011)

To employ this theoretical perspective in the real-world setting of global nuclear politics, I selected three empirical cases of "nuclear deviance" that take place in a similar period. Two of them are the "usual suspects": North Korea and Iran, examined in the context of respective nuclear crises that both started in 2002. The third case is the rarer case of India after the 1998 nuclear tests. Although India is usually not considered to be on par with the "rogue states" like North Korea or Iran, its nuclear testing was perceived by the international community as a serious violation of international norms, and its refusal to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state (NWS) makes it a perpetuate outsider to the NPT regime. The end date for analysis of the three cases is 2015, corresponding to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that formally solved the Iranian nuclear crisis.[12] The similar timeframe allows me to observe the similarities and differences in the dynamics of stigma politics across comparable cases, and the case selection accounts for relevance and sufficient

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[11] The (meta-)theory behind this approach is discussed in further detail in chapter 3.
[12] 2015 is also the year when I started writing this dissertation. However, during several revisions, I also managed to include some observations related to the relevant development in 2016 and 2017.

diversity. I conduct a brief cross-case comparative analysis in the concluding chapter 8 and highlight some interesting observations.

To uncover the relevant behavioral patterns and trends within the three cases, what I primarily examine on the empirical level of my research are the dialectical patterns among relevant stakeholders in global nuclear politics, and the communicative and institutional dynamics in nuclear non-proliferation institutions. To do so, I have conducted a longitudinal, thematic discourse analysis (Boyatzis 1998; Clarke & Braun 2013; Attride-Stirling 2001; Singer & Hunter 1999; Marshall & Rossman 1999) of primary data produced at various nuclear non-proliferation fora.[13] The use of publicly available sources is justified by my focus on the dominant patterns in the open use of language in international interaction, as opposed to motivational analyses that would be trying to uncover the "real" motives behind behavior of individual actors through in-depth interviews and study of declassified archival materials. My pool of textual data includes:

- statements and working papers by representatives of particular states and group of states at the NPT Review Conferences, NPT Preparatory Committees, or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors;
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) discussion reports and resolutions;
- public statements of particular states referring to the (alleged) norm violations;
- individual proposals for amendments and establishment of relevant initiatives, plans of actions, practices, rules, procedures and institutions.

The secondary literature (mostly academic publications, journal articles, conference papers, and expert working papers), newspaper articles, and first-hand reports provided me with the necessary context in which these documents were once produced. The broader context is also

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[13] Most of the data I used in this project is publically available for download in pdf format at the website of United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt) and the Reaching Critical Will project (http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora). I also made a research stay at the UN Library in Geneva in November 2016 to study relevant archival materials that are not available online. Furthermore, I conducted numerous interviews at the 2015 NPT Review Conference that helped me to get a closer look at the dynamics of negotiation among the NPT parties (see Smetana 2016).

critically important for understanding the long-term patterns in discourse and practice of individual actors; arguably, once the researcher understands the patterns of continuity, it makes it easier for him or her to identify the points of rupture or *change.*

In this dissertation, the thematic discourse analysis is necessarily theory/concept driven. I use the conceptual apparatus elaborated in chapters 2 and 3 to structure individual case studies and identify the main categories and components of stigma politics in the data. To make sense of a large amount of textual documents, I use NVivo coding software to "flag" particular concepts, themes, and categories in the data, and identify patterns among them. I generally use an abductive approach to the analysis, in the sense that I first use the theorization of stigma politics to develop a basic set of themes and categories and use them to conduct the preliminary analysis. Then, I refine the themes and categories, develop new ones, and organize them in coherent thematic clusters. I subsequently re-apply the final set of codes on the collected data and try to identify relevant patterns within the stigmatizing dynamics. Finally, I engage in a comparison of these patterns within individual case studies and interpret them in the context of the overall long-term normative development of global nuclear order.

Scholarly Contribution

By writing this dissertation, I aim to contribute to four academic (sub-)fields: (1) nuclear scholarship; (2) Security Studies in general; (3) IR literature on norm dynamics; (4) emerging IR literature on stigma and deviance in world politics.

First, I introduce a novel theoretical perspective to nuclear (weapons) scholarship, a field at the intersection of IR, Security Studies, Strategic Studies, and Peace Research that deals with the problem of nuclear weapons in political and military contexts.[14] The issue of nuclear proliferation has been in the forefront of scholarly inquiry in this sub-discipline for decades, resulting in a large pool of academic literature that deals with the causes[15] and consequences[16] of the spread of nuclear weapons in the international system. With the rise of the constructivist approaches in IR, there has also been a growing interest in studying the normative

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[14] For a debate over the state of contemporary nuclear scholarship, see Sagan et al. (2014).

[15] See for example Sagan (1996b), Ogilvie-White (1996), Solingen (2007), Hymans (2006a), Monteiro & Debs (2014), Jasper (2013), Potter & Mukhatzhanova (2010), Müller & Schmidt (2010), Jo & Gartzke (2007), or Kroenig (2010). For a review of the state of the art, see Sagan (2011) and Hymans (2006b).

[16] See for example Sagan and Waltz (2012), Waltz (1981; 2012), Mearsheimer (1990; 1993), Feaver (1993; 1995; 1997), Lavoy (1995), Knopf (2002), Karl (2011), Kroenig (2015), Cohen (2016), and Smetana, Ludvik, Sokolski, & Krepon (2017).

underpinnings of nuclear (non-)proliferation, and the dynamics of rules and norms in nuclear non-proliferation regime.[17] Although nuclear scholarship has also been concerned with violations of non-proliferation norms and rules,[18] so far there have been only a few attempts to study "deviant actors" and their behavior as a source of normative change in nuclear order.[19] Although the Iranian nuclear crisis, North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship, and the aftermath of India's nuclear testing have been subject to extensive research in nuclear scholarship (see literature reviews in respective empirical chapters), the interactionist approach to deviance arguably provides a new perspective on these cases and their implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

Second, this dissertation can be also understood as a continuation of a broader trend to apply social theory in the field of Security Studies. Since the end of the Cold War, Security Studies, as a distinct academic discipline, has been undergoing a dynamic change, widening and broadening its reach and opening its arms to theoretical and methodological innovations (cf. Buzan & Hansen 2009; Mauer & Cavelty 2010). The interactionist approach represents another addition to post-positivist/reflexive approaches in the field that allows us to better understand the socially constructed nature of security and the resulting implications.

Third, I explicitly contribute to one of the large debates in IR constructivism about the dynamics of international norms and rules. The social construction of deviance in international order arguably represents one of the major mechanisms of normative change, insofar the understanding what is "abnormal" also provides us with insights to what is "normal" in international politics. In chapter 3, I draw on the discursive approaches to norm contestation and change (primarily Wiener 2008; 2014; 2017; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013; Sandholtz 2007; 2008) to provide an original conceptualization of the process of normative change with respect to deviant conduct in international politics.

Fourth, I provide a new theoretical, conceptual, and empirical material for the latest attempts in IR to grapple with sociological concepts of stigma and deviance in the setting of international politics (Adler-Nissen 2014b; 2014a; 2016; Zarakol 2011; 2014; Chwieroth 2015; Wagner et al. 2014a). To my knowledge, this dissertation is, so far, the most comprehensive

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[17] See for example Müller et al. (2013), Tannenwald (2013), Rublee (2009), Lantis (2011; 2014), or Kienzle (2014b).
[18] See for example Fuhrmann & Berejikian (2012), Acton (2009; 2009), Goldschmidt (2009), Ogilvie-White (2010; 2007), or Huntley (2006).
[19] For notable exceptions, see for example Wunderlich et al. (2013) or Wunderlich (2014; 2017).

attempt to conceptualize the link between Goffman's approach to stigma and the broader interactionist literature on constructions of deviance. Furthermore, the empirical cases studied in this dissertation provide new insights to how the logic of deviance and stigma operates in international politics. As such, this dissertation is also a contribution to the attempts of "third generation constructivists" to translate the main tenets of symbolic interactionism to IR (cf. Adler-Nissen 2016; Kessler & Steele 2017).

Outline of Chapters

In chapter 2 ("International Deviants and the Concept of Stigma Politics"), I draw on the interactionist perspective introduced in this introductory chapter to conceptualize "stigma politics" as an interactive, dynamic process of the social construction of deviance in the international realm. I integrate insights across the interactionist literature to operationalize components of stigma politics in five dimensions: stigma nexus, stigma imposition, stigma management, stigma reversal, and stigma power. I use this conceptual apparatus to study the dynamics of stigmatization in empirical cases in the second part of this dissertation.

Chapter 3 ("Changing Norms and Rule-breaking in World Order") provides a comprehensive overview of the state of the art IR research on the dynamics of international norms and their violations. The aim of this chapter is to map the dominant trends in this area of IR and situate my own research in the wider discipline. To fill the existing gap, I draw on both sociological interactionism and IR norm contestation scholarship to propose a new theorization of the link between deviance and change in in world affairs.

In chapter 4 ("On Nuclear (Dis-)Order"), I proceed from the broader theoretical discussion of deviance and international norms to the issue of rules and order in global nuclear politics. One of the goals of this chapter is to provide the reader with the basic context for understanding the problem of rule-based global nuclear order. Moreover, I use the analytical apparatus introduced in chapter 3 to re-interpret the normative structure of the nonproliferation game. I also elaborate on my argument on the inherent contestedness of nuclear norms and identify major patterns of deviance in nuclear affairs.

Chapter 5 ("Iran and the Limits of Peaceful Nuclear Use (2002-2015)"), represents an empirical case study of stigma politics as it unfolded in the Iranian nuclear crisis between 2002 and 2015. I use the conceptual apparatus from chapter 2 to study the (re)construction of Iran as a "(quasi-)nuclear rogue" after the 2002 revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities.

Furthermore, I apply the insights from chapter 3 to study the relation between stigma politics in Iran's case and the dynamics of nuclear norms and rules outlined in chapter 4.

In chapter 6 ("North Korea and the Crossing of Nuclear Rubicon (2002-2015"), I employ my conceptual framework to unpack the case of North Korea's nuclear deviance, starting with the 2002 accusations of a clandestine enrichment program, soon after followed by Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT. I also discuss the relationship between North Korea's norm violations and the contestation and affirmation of normative structure of nuclear order.

Chapter 7 ("India and the Aftermath of the Pokhran-II Nuclear Tests (1998-2015)") examines the operations of stigma politics on the empirical case of India after the 1998 nuclear tests. As in the Iranian case, I use the components of stigma politics elaborated in chapter 4 as an analytical lens to study the attempts to stigmatize and later de-stigmatize India as an NPT "deviant outsider". Furthermore, I discuss the reconstruction of the normative conceptions of "responsible nuclear states", and trace the resulting normative dynamics concerning the rules of participation in nuclear order.

In the final chapter 8 ("Shades of Deviance: Analytical Synthesis and Conclusions") I conduct a cross-case comparison, synthetize the findings from the empirical chapters, and summarize the results of the dissertation as a whole. Furthermore, I discuss the broader theory and policy implications of my findings, limits of my inquiry, as well as possible avenues for future research.

2. International Deviants and the Concept of Stigma Politics

English School theorists have long maintained that international politics is not a mere systemic interaction of individual units but a *sui generis* social order: an *international society*, underpinned by shared norms, rules, institutions, and practices (Bull 1977; Bull & Watson 1984). As such, some authors argue that international politics is, in principle, "constitutively normative" (Jackson 2004, p.6) – and arguably ever more so, as the common norms and rules of international society, both legal and informal, expand to more and more areas of international life.

In consequence, it would be difficult to identify virtually any "anomic", or norm-free spaces in today's world politics. Those who violate these norms are then frequently subject to widespread condemnation and sanctioning by the self-proclaimed "international community", whether it is the case of North Korea's nuclear saber-rattling, Syria's use of chemical weapons against its own population, or Russia's annexation of Crimea. The patterns of – supposedly – deviant behavior are arguably in the forefront of contemporary international affairs.

In this chapter, I draw on the interactionist perspective in sociology to conceptualize "stigma politics" as an interactive process of social construction of deviance in world politics. Specifically, I elaborate on the ways how deviant categories – social identities, acts, practices, and discourses – are negotiated, contested, stigmatized, and possibly de-stigmatized in international realm. In this perspective, stigmatization represents a widespread social practice of (re)constructing deviant images through discourse and practices, separating the "normal" from "deviant" in international society.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the conceptual underpinnings of stigma politics and position the concept vis-à-vis IR theory. In turn, I introduce five interrelated dimensions of stigma politics that take place within the process of deviance (re)construction: (1) stigma nexus; (2) stigma imposition; (3) stigma management; (4) stigma reversal; and (5) stigma power. In conclusion, I summarize the findings of this chapter and discuss their relevance with respect to the goals of this dissertation.

Conceptualizing Stigma Politics

The sociological accounts of deviant behavior often lack the conceptual link between deviance and *stigma.* The notion of stigma was introduced into the mainstream sociology by Erving Goffman (1963), referring to a "deeply discrediting attribute" that prevents the individual from being fully socially accepted. In the forefront of Goffman's inquiry was the relationship between a specific attribute and a more general stereotype that leads to *stigmatization* and social exclusion of certain individuals and groups (Goffman 1963, p.13; cf. Jones et al. 1984; Stafford & Scott 1986).

However, stigmatization also implies a *process*, in the course of which the deviance labels are negotiated. If successfully imposed, the stigma becomes a part of the transgressor's identity: "the label transmutes the quality of the original 'act' to suggest that the individual is somehow naturally deviant" (Dotter 2004, p.89). Stigmatization process therefore always involves negotiations and contestations of deviant identities and as a widespread social practice it (re)constructs the limits of deviance and normality in given social orders (cf. Dijker & Koomen 2007).

In the tradition of symbolic interactionist theorizing, Goffman (1963) did not perceive the stigmatized individuals as merely passive objects of labeling but rather active agents who employ different strategies to manage and negotiate their "spoiled" identity. Schur (1980) integrated the interactionist perspectives on deviance, stigma, and power to elaborate on the notion of "stigma contests", in which actors compete over social definitions and meanings. These contests are continuously replayed in various politicized socio-cultural settings, in which competing cultural cores and the surrounding symbolic-moral universes clash and evolve in relation to prevalent power configurations (Ben-Yehuda 2015, p.556). Such process involves the alleged deviants as well as various audiences and rule enforcers who struggle over the definition of the situation in hand and apply deviant labels to particular individuals, specific behaviors, contested practices, and broader social categories (Dotter 2004, p.129; see also Dotter & Roebuck 1988; Dotter 2002). In the course of this process, the individual actors justify their positions in reference to different conceptions of morality, abstract principles, traditions, as well as specific norms and rules.

Drawing on these insights, I use the notion of *stigma politics* for the depiction of an interactive, dynamic process of the social (re)construction of deviance in international society.

I conceptualize this process as an interaction of specific components across five interrelated dimensions of stigma politics: (1) stigma nexus; (2) stigma imposition; (3) stigma management; (4) stigma reversal; and (5) stigma power. *Stigma nexus* represents the actor-specific setting of deviance (re)construction, encompassing the interactions of the (alleged) deviant individual and various social audiences. *Stigma imposition* stands for the attempts to construct a deviant image of an actor. *Stigma management* refers to discourses and practices that alleged deviants employ to cope with stigma imposition. *Stigma reversal* stands for societal attempts to de-stigmatize the deviant and (re)integrate him to the "normal" society. *Stigma power* relates to the inherently political and power-laden nature of deviance-making, and the respective stratifications and hierarchies in social orders.

These five dimensions of stigma politics should not be treated as sequential steps; instead, they frequently take place *simultaneously* as a part of individual stigma contests. Within a single stigma nexus, actors interactively attempt to impose, manage, and eventually reverse stigma, with each step infused with power and the resulting inequalities. In this inherently dynamic and interactive understanding, stigma politics represents a layered meaning-generation process in international society.

Stigma politics process is generally concerned with the construction of deviant *categories*. As in the sociological literature, it is not only *behavior* that is considered deviant in international politics. Deviant labels can be imposed on specific *physical acts* (e.g. a nuclear test), *practices* (e.g. torture of prisoners), *material objects* (e.g. gas chambers), *discourses* (e.g. holocaust denial), or *traits* (e.g. "communist"). The deviance-making process, however, does not only construct a single deviant act or characteristic, but simultaneously involves a potential for marking the transgressor as being "deviant" himself, "spoiling" his social identity by linking the specific attribute to a more general stereotype. With reference to individual practices or characteristics, the states and non-state actors are then labeled "rogue", "barbaric", or "backwards", and within the social hierarchy inferior to "normal" actors.

Moving the interactionist approach to deviance and stigma to the level of international society then logically presupposes an analytical anthropomorphization of states and international institutions. Today, most mainstream IR theories treat states as possessing a certain level of individual social "actorness" in the international realm. Many of these theories – in particular constructivist and post-structuralist ones – also subscribe to the assumption that states and international institutions maintain social identities that are constituted (also) in

interaction with other relevant actors of international politics (cf. Wendt 1999; Rumelili 2007, p.13; Adler-Nissen 2016). In fact, Adler-Nissen (2014b) argues that it is particularly an ontological insecurity – an uncertainty about one's identity – that drives the need of states to secure the meaning of their identity by stigmatizing others as deviant and pushing them to the margins of international society.[20]

A successful construction of deviant identities may have serious impact on the course of events in international politics. Becker (1963, pp.32–33) observed that a deviant label imposed on an individual has a tendency to take on the character of a "master status" in relation to social identity, effectively overshadowing other traits the given individual may possess (Hughes 1945). The social construction of a "deviant" state does not directly *cause* any particular course of events but it does enable and constrain actions that would otherwise (not) be possible. It justifies unequal treatment of the state in diplomatic, economic, and/or security matters (Zarakol 2014, pp.326–327), and opens up the window for extraordinary measures to be taken in defense of the "normal" states (Müller 2014).[21] In extreme cases, this possibly includes even legitimizing the use of violence against the alleged deviant: invasion to Iraq in 2003 is the case in point. Many interactionists also point to "self-fulfilling, self-reinforcing, and self-propelling processes" that lead to the individual's engulfment in the deviant's role (Schur 1980, p.13; cf. Lemert 1951; Lofland 1969).

Interactionist scholars often highlight the intersubjective nature of deviance and refrain from moral judgment of the alleged deviants and their conduct. From the perspective of conventional Western scholarship, interactionist approach to deviance and stigma can be easily blamed for a certain moral relativism, which may seem problematic in cases of "evident wrongness" of certain acts and practices in international realm. Indeed, even states frequently accused of serious human rights violations, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, or sponsoring terror attacks in other countries, are hereby treated in interactionist perspective as both objects of stigmatization and agents influenced by their own set of normative beliefs. Interactionist approach to deviance is, however, analytical rather than normative. However questionable may be the states' behavior in certain matter, interactionist researchers aim to

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[20] On ontological (in)security in international politics, see also Mitzen (2006), Steele (2008), or Zarakol (2010).
[21] On the consequences of being outside and inside of international society, see also Buzan (1996)

looks at these actors through "neutral glasses" (Wunderlich 2014, pp.132–133) as they promote and justify their own interpretations of moral standards.[22]

The interactionist underpinnings of stigma politics situate the concept in a specific position vis-à-vis IR theory. First, stigma politics is concerned with the *process* of deviance (re)construction rather than explanation of deviant behavior. As argued by Crawford (2004, p.2), "the usual understanding of agents and structures as constituting the major forces of world politics is incomplete without an understanding of the *processes* of world politics" (*emphasis added*; cf. Lebow 2008, p.59). Interactionists therefore employ an interpretive approach to answer *how* certain social facts came into being (cf. Doty 1996, p.4).[23] Second, the research in the social constructions of deviance represents an inherently critical inquiry, in that it questions the "natural" existence of seemingly taken-for-granted institutions, and reveals associated power relations as well as the potential for change (cf. Cox 1986; Linklater 1992). Third, besides the concern with international norms and rules, deviance-making is also closely connected with the diffusion of power, social stratification, and the issue of hierarchical relationships in international society (Hobson & Sharman 2005; Towns 2012; Barder 2015; Bially-Mattern & Zarakol 2016). Fourth, interactionist approach to deviance and stigma subscribes to the view that international norms are historically and culturally contingent (cf. Epstein 2012, p.136; Bucher 2014), as well as often vague and ambiguous, dynamic, and constantly open to different interpretations as well as to perpetual contestation in global arena (cf. Wiener 2004; 2008; 2014).

In the next five sections, I conceptualize the specific components of the five aforementioned dimensions of stigma politics: (1) stigma nexus; (2) stigma imposition; (3) stigma management; (4) stigma reversal; and (5) stigma power. In doing so, I draw on the interactionist literature introduced in the previous chapter, as well as on the more recent attempts to analytically unpack the stigmatization process in sociology (e.g., Link & Phelan

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[22] This is not in contradiction to the claim that certain acts are essentially unjustifiable in the public as they are counter to the general principles of justice that are shared by the human kind as such. Cf. Müller (2011b).

[23] The fact that explanatory analyses take these issues for granted in the aim to answer their research questions, however, does not preclude the causal researchers to seek to explain *why* a certain actor got engaged in policies that were perceived as deviant by others, or if the specific actor's compliance with the norm was a product of stigmatization or socialization. While many interactionist researchers would probably doubt the value of aims to generalize the causes of deviant behavior, there is no a priori metatheoretical obstacle to study a contextual cause-and-effect relationship in specific cases of deviance, through process tracing or other social scientific methods of causal explanation. On the issue of causality in constructivist IR theory, see for example Ruggie (1998, p.869), Hopf (1998), Finnemore and Sikking (2001, p.394), Farrell (2002, p.57), Jackson (2011, pp.134, 199, 206–207), or Onuf (2013).

2001; Dotter 2002), communication studies (Smith 2007; Meisenbach 2010), and political science/IR (Adler-Nissen 2014b; Zarakol 2011).

Stigma Nexus

Stigma nexus stands for the actor-specific setting, in which the deviant interacts with various social audiences. The *audiences* and their reaction to deviance arguably represents the cornerstone of interactionist theorizing.[24] In this perspective, the deviance as a social phenomenon exists only if there is a social audience that interprets the given social category as deviant and labels it so. Different audiences mobilize in response to normative transgression, and engage in the dynamic meaning-generation for the given situation. Often the deviant conduct is not merely verbally denounced by the audiences but it is also subject to sanctions, punishment, and disciplinary practices in answer to what the audience defines to be the moral boundaries of the given social order.

The *deviant* actor, then, is constituted by these meaning-making discourses and practices employed by the audiences. The alleged deviant, however, is not a passive object of stigmatization but an active agent able to actively subvert, contest, and possibly prevent the construction of deviance, or cope with the imposed stigma by employing different stigma management strategies. In international politics, the main focus of interactionist-inspired approaches to deviance has been on individual sovereign states as entities with recognizable social identities (cf. Zarakol 2011; Adler-Nissen 2014a; Chwieroth 2015). With the arguably growing role of non-state actors in international politics, however, there is also a potential to study NGOs, international organizations, and other non-state entities (e.g., terrorist groups) as stigmatizable and stigmatized actors in international realm.

Different types of audiences are usually established in response to what may be considered a violation of the norm in the given social setting (cf. Goode 2015, p.4). In interactionist theorizing, a prominent place among the audiences is reserved for *moral*

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[24] I am aware of the potential problem of using the interactionist term "audience(s)" in the discipline of IR, where it is commonly used in connection with securitization theory (as an "audience to the securitizing speech act"; cf. Buzan et al. 1998, chap.2; Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008) and signaling theory (with respect to the "audience costs"; cf. Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997; Weeks 2008; Slantchev 2006). Although the audience in both securitization and signaling theory is not completely passive, it is expected to be primarily reactive to the speaking actor's attempts to securitize certain issue as a security threat, or to create credible commitment through hands-tying, respectively. The audiences in interactionist theory are portrayed as more proactive, discursively labeling certain categories deviant, and bringing them to the forefront of political agenda. As such, the audience in interactionist theorizing does not only "listen" (and react), but also "speaks".

entrepreneurs, who actively participate in the process of identification of deviance and its social control (Becker 1963, pp.147–162; Ben-Yehuda & Goode 2009, pp.121–122; cf. Lemert 1967; Deflem 2015; Dotter & Roebuck 1988). The constructivist IR scholarship use a similar term "norm entrepreneurs" for actors that participate in the social construction and diffusion of international norms (cf. Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse & Sikkink 2013; Wunderlich 2014) – what would Becker (1963, pp.147–155) call the *rule creators*. However, most conventional constructivists fall short of capturing the full normative dynamics in international politics by focusing on norm entrepreneurship only up to the "end point" of norm internalization. Wunderlich (2013, pp.28–29) critiques this teleological view of norm diffusion and argues that even after the norm has reached its tipping point and spread in the international society, "norm entrepreneurs continually have to work for the consolidation of the norm they propagate and the meaning that they attach to it and to defend it against norm challengers."

In interactionist approach to deviance, this defense of the norm is the task for *rule enforcers*, typically the judicial system or law enforcement agencies (Becker 1963, pp.155–162). Through the institutions of social control, rule enforcers monitor and identify the instances of rule violations, and apprehend and sanction the offenders. As such, they often assume the role of "stigmatizers", labeling certain behavior transgressive and thereby imposing the stigma on the alleged deviant (Link & Phelan 2001). They also often attempt to mobilize the *audience of normals*, that separates itself from the deviant and thereby participates on the deviance (re)construction (cf. Adler-Nissen 2014b). In the wake of the normative transgression, the window of opportunity frequently opens for rule creators to return on the scene and propose and implement new measures with respect to the norm in question, that would prevent repeated instances of its violation in the future.

In international politics, the audiences are usually composed of sovereign states; regional and issue-based groupings of states such as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); international organizations such as Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); influential individuals such as United Nations Secretary-General; and different non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Individual international players comment on behavior they perceive as violating international norms through press statements or at various international fora. An important part in the (re)construction of deviance is also played by the media, that participate on the (re)interpretations of the deviant events, and distribute them in the form of (de-)stigmatizing narratives to the broader audiences (cf. Dotter 1997; 2002).

The role of rule enforcer in international politics is usually assumed by one or more major powers that possess material resources and sufficient authority to enforce the norms and discipline the transgressor through the use of sanctions (cf. Wunderlich 2013, p.33; Florini 1996, p.375; Müller, Below, et al. 2013, p.316). Although international society clearly lacks social control mechanisms comparable to those in domestic societies, it does possess certain institutions that are able monitor possible norm violations (e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that verifies states' compliance with nuclear non-proliferation rules), or even impose binding sanctions on transgressors – most notably the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that has the unique authority to enforce norms in the areas of international peace and security.

Stigmatization in international politics also often involves a broader mobilization of the "normals" to form a coalition that collectively denounces and punishes norm-violating behavior. Nevertheless, as noted also by Wagner et al. (2014b, p.7), such coalitions rarely speak in a single voice as a monolithic whole. For example, Kustermans (2014, p.18) points to the fact that despite the salience of rogue states discourse in international politics, not even many U.S. allies in fact accepted the label as unproblematic. Frequently, the actors in international politics differ not just on what they consider deviant, but also how serious the given norm-violation is and what is the best course of action in response.

Furthermore, some audiences will likely decline to label certain behavior deviant, or even really in support of the alleged deviants and provide "normalizing counter-arguments" in their favor (Dotter 2002, p.441; Goode 2015, p.4). This is particularly the case of actors that are considered *in-group* vis-à-vis the deviant, either sharing the stigma or otherwise subscribing to the common values with the deviant that somehow differ from those promoted by the rule enforcing audience. As such, the constitution of stigma nexus often reveals particular in-group/out-group alignments with respect to the deviant. The deviant's in-group allies frequently tend to defend him against the out-group enemies. However, sometimes we also experience the cases of defection from the in-group supporting position, or even broader tendency of the in-groups to distance themselves from the deviant and isolate him *within* the group, while framing the issue as an "in-group deviance" (cf. Goffman 1963, chap.5). For example, in chapter 5, I demonstrate the variations in behavior of Iran's natural in-group allies among NAM states, ranging from an expression of unconditional support (Cuba, Syria, or Venezuela) to voting *against* Iran in the IAEA Board of Governors (e.g., India or Egypt). The issue

at hand often gets even more complicated due to the multiplicity of alignments, with a single state simultaneously defining itself in-group with respect to the specific regional groupings (e.g., Arab states), larger political groupings (e.g., NAM), issue-based international regimes (e.g., NPT regime), or a group of states sharing a similar domestic form of government (e.g., liberal democratic states).

Stigma Imposition

The imposition of stigma on the alleged deviant usually consists of the two inter-related components. First, the *stigma message*, a discursive (re)construction of the deviant image; and second, the *rule enforcement*, an act of sanctioning of the deviant behavior and disciplining the deviant.

In his seminal book on stigma, Goffman (1963, p.14) argued that in the process of imposing a deviant label on an individual, "we construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents." A necessary component of stigma politics is therefore the discursive construction and communication of such a stigma message. The content of a stigma message is continuously reconstructed by the social audiences and the media that jointly participate in the layered meaning-generation of the particular case of deviance (cf. Dotter 2002; 2004). Below I discuss seven components that are frequently communicated through the stigma message: (1) label; (2) stereotype; (3) separation; (4) responsibility; (5) transgressive linkage; (6) norm linkage; and (7) threat linkage.

Link and Phelan (2001) highlighted three important elements of stigma imposition that are frequently conveyed in the stigma message: labeling, stereotyping, and separation.[25] *Label* represents a symbolic cue to distinguish certain social categories as different, based on a selective choice of a specific attribute. The process of labeling therefore "singles out certain human or social differences and deems some salient while others are ignored" (Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.147). The important point from interactionist perspective is that these labels are not imposed as an objective description of reality (although they are often claimed to be so) but rather value-laden linguistic acts that *constitute* a certain social reality (Zarakol 2011, p.57).

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[25] Link and Phelan suggested that "stigma exists when elements of labeling, stereotyping, separating, status loss, and discrimination co-occur in a power situation that allows these processes to unfold" (Link & Phelan 2001, p.382; see also Yang et al. 2007). I deal with the issue of status loss and discrimination in the Stigma Power section of this chapter.

Labeling has been arguably a constant feature of international politics, from nations called "barbaric" or "backwards" to states designated as "rogues" and "pariahs".

Stereotypes draw on widespread beliefs about coherent, often negative, attributes shared by a group. The individual ceases to be an individual but is instead treated a part of disvalued, seemingly homogenous collectivity (cf. Schur 1980, p.4). In this regard, Smith (2007, p.469) highlights the role of entitativity in human observations of difference, which makes us single out specific attributes to categorize individuals in apparently meaningful aggregated groups (see Campbell 1958). An example from world politics may be a stereotypified representation of "African countries" in the Western post-colonial discourse (cf. Werbner & Ranger 1996).

Separation aims to draw a distinction between "us", the "normals", and "them" – the "deviants" (Link & Phelan 2001, p.370). The process distinguishes between insiders and outsiders, while the latter are not presented as merely *different*, but socially and morally inferior to the former (Falk 2001). In IR, critical constructivist and post-structuralist scholars highlighted the role of similar practices of differentiation in constitution of states' "self" identities in relation to "others" (see e.g., Campbell 1992; Doty 1996; Williams 1998; Rumelili 2004).

Stigma message also frequently indicates the deviant's *responsibility* vis-à-vis the specific norm violation. Such a responsibility relates to the extent the deviant attribute is deemed to be a matter of choice for the actor rather than a result of forces beyond his control (Smith 2007, pp.470–471).[26] This does not necessarily imply that a deviant act conducted involuntarily completely precludes deviance; however, premeditated, deliberate deviance is usually perceived by the society to be more serious and therefore also more condemnable (Smith 2007, p.470; cf. Goffman 1963).[27]

Then there are three types of linkages that norm enforcers often provide within the stigma message: *transgressive linkage*, *norm linkage*, and *threat linkage*. All three linkages are arguably instrumental for the rule enforcers' appeal to broader constituencies in international

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[26] Robert Jervis convincingly argues that in the international politics, the actors generally "tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is" (Jervis 1968, p.475; see also Jervis 1976, chap.8).

[27] In international politics, this matter is often more complicated due to the attribution problem and the issue of states' responsibility under international law (cf. Crawford et al. 2010; Werner 2014).

society and for the mobilization of the coalition of "normal" states that "legitimately" exclude and discipline the transgressor (Schur 1980, p.145; Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.152).

Transgressive linkage stands for the discursive association of a selected deviant attribute with other traits of the individual that may be deemed deviant; and/or, with some past behavior of the actor that had been already constructed or was newly reconstructed as deviant. This linkage is often taken for granted as commonsensical in the international politics; for example, many decision-makers in liberal democracies are sympathetic to the claim that states that violate human rights of their own population are also naturally aggressive towards other states (cf. Havel 1985, chap.9). A similar reasoning is epitomized in "once a thief, always a thief" attitude, that makes states point to the past norm-violating conduct as an argument why the current behavior should also be understood as deviant, as if the former failures made the state somehow "naturally deviant" (cf. Kitsuse 1962; Schur 1980, p.90).

Norm linkage discursively connects the deviant act to norms, rules, or moral principles that were allegedly breached in the given case of deviance. As such, the norm linkage serves as a moral justification for the stigmatization and discrimination of the deviant in contrast with the "normal" members of international society. As argued by Jackson (2004, p.5), "normative discourse in international relations, as in any other sphere of human relations, operates by reference to certain assumptions and expectations concerning justified and unjustified conduct." Even the exercise of power by states therefore does not operate in moral void and it is almost always accompanied by more or less concrete normative justifications that resonate with values of the given social order (Jackson 2004, p.9; cf. Finnemore 1996a, p.159; Schmidt 2011, p.117).[28] International as well as domestic public expect states to provide normative argumentation for their actions, so that their behavior is perceived moral and legitimate (Crawford 2004, p.35).

Threat linkage is usually employed as an argumentative strategy to stress the extent to which the deviant behavior represents a peril to the society (Smith 2007, pp.471–472). Actors put forward instrumental, practical, and possibly scientific arguments to highlight the cause-effect relationship between the deviant behavior or attribute and common good (Crawford 2004, pp.5–6). In international politics, threat linkage often involves language of endangered

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[28] Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) coined the concept of "orders of worth", as separate repertoires of moral discourses and specific evaluative practices that are used by social actors to justify their positions. For an IR application, see Niemann (2015) or Hanrieder (2016).

peace, international security, or stability.[29] Another common theme is the language of precedents that serve to justify (in)action in international politics (cf. Kier & Mercer 1996). Furthermore, the common tactics of rule enforcers is to discursively link an existing (or potential) problem in the society with the behavior of the alleged deviant (Schur 1980, p.144).

As noted above, stigma is also imposed through the practices of *rule enforcement*: *sanctioning* of the deviant behavior and *disciplining* of the deviant (cf. Becker 1963, chap.7). In world politics, sanctioning beyond verbal shaming may include diplomatic isolation of the deviant state (Klotz 1999), economic and trade sanctions (Damrosch 1994; Lindsay 1986), or even a threat of force or a direct military intervention (Bellamy 2008). These practices of *social control* are usually justified as legitimate instruments of the international community to discipline the transgressors and bring them to compliance with international norms (cf. Kunz 1960). As such, rule enforcers mostly accompany sanctions with some sort of disciplining message, stating the conditions (or "benchmarks") for the deviant in order to pass as normal. The sanctions are also frequently justified as a symbol of resolve of international community to punish the instances of deviance, and thereby to maintain a general sense of justice in global governance, to strengthen the norm in question, and to deter future instances of norm violation (cf. Klotz 1995, chap.9; Nadelmann 1990; Nossal 1999; Axelrod 1986). Garfinkel (1956) and Erikson (1962) point to the dramatic, ritualized nature of the sanction imposition, a "sharp rite of transition, at once moving [the individual] out of his normal position in society and transferring him into a distinct deviant role" (Erikson 1962, p.311). Nevertheless, as Geldenhuys (2004, p.327) observes, "in the politics of deviance [...] punishment is not always chosen to fit the crime, but rather to fit the criminal."

Stigma Management

In interactionist theorizing, the understanding of the dynamics of deviance-making would be incomplete if we would not account for the agency of the deviant individual. As noted above, actors that are subject to labeling practices actively engage in meaning-making process of deviance (re-)construction, and strategically cope with deviant label once their identity was "spoiled" in this process.

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[29] The use of this terminology has also a legal dimension with respect to the UN Charter, whereas they serve as formal justifications for the involvement of the UNSC in the given issue. See for example Szasz (2002).

Examining strategies of states defeated in major wars, Zarakol (2011, pp.96–99) suggested that there are two broad strategies that states employ in order to cope with their stigma: either they attempt to normalcy by hiding or correcting their deviant attribute, or they embrace the stigma and reframe it as a "blessing in disguise". Adler-Nissen (2014b) introduced three types of stigma management strategies employed by states: stigma recognition, in which the actor accepts the deviant label; stigma rejection, in which the actor accepts the normative standard but rejects that his or her own behavior would constitute a breach of the norm; and counter-stigmatization, in which the actor accepts the normative judgment but turns the stigma into an "emblem of pride".

In this section, I further elaborate on stigma management discourses and practices employed by deviant actors in world politics. I differentiate among four different sets of stigma management strategies: (1) *normalization*, in which the actor recognizes the transgression and takes active steps to be accepted as "normal"; (2) *neutralization*, in which the actor recognizes the violation of the norm but tries to reduce the shame by justifying, excusing, or downplaying the transgression; (3) *applicatory rejection*, in which the actor denies the transgression by contesting the interpretation that the (otherwise recognized) rule should apply in the specific case; and (4) *justificatory rejection*, in which the actor stands up for the transgression, rejecting the legitimacy of the norm and its enforcement. These categories are not, however, necessarily exclusive, and the same actor often applies them simultaneously or on different levels of stigma contests.[30]

Normalization presupposes that the actor recognizes the deviant category and takes actions to normalize his or her identity in the given social order. The logic of this approach lies therefore in accepting and reaffirming the rules of the social order, and improving one's position by reconstructing one's deviant image towards normalcy (cf. Warren 1980, p.60). Some attributes are not necessarily permanent: if the stigmatization relates to deviant behavior or a changeable characteristic, an individual may alter his behavior or directly correct the problematic attribute(s) (Goffman 1963; Mankoff 1971). A deviant actor may also rise in the eyes of the society by performing outstandingly in areas that are supposedly beyond the reach

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[30] Arguably, the actor can also opt for a purely passive strategy, silently accept the stigma imposition, and simply avoid any comments or activities in relation to the stigmatization process. This approach is, however, quite rare in international politics, and it is generally considered problematic and inefficient from the perspective of strategic communication. See Meisenbach (2010, p.278).

of those specific deviant individuals (Goffman 1963, p.19; Warren 1980, pp.64–66; cf. Conyers & Calhoun 2015, pp.269–270), or by demonstrating its ability to fully follow the moral standards and in that respect outperform even most "normals" (cf. Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.160).

Correcting a problematic attribute is a sometimes viable option for states in a similar way as it is for individuals: the stigmatized state can cease deviant activities, the political system can undergo change from an autocratic form of government to pluralistic democracy.[31] For example, Zarakol (2011) suggests that Japan, Russia, and Turkey, after being defeated in major conflicts, internalized the deviant labels ("backward" and "inferior") imposed by the Western countries and attempted to normalcy by strategically engaging in self-correcting policies. Japan, for instance, embraced a new pacifistic constitution after the 1945 defeat and has rebuilt its reputation through economic development; Russia in the 1990s adopted democratic reforms and market economy; and Turkey went through the process of secularization and modernization inspired by the European countries.

If the discrediting attribute has not yet been publicly disclosed and therefore subject to stigmatization by others, an actor can actively attempt to *pass* as normal by managing the display of discrediting information (Goffman 1963, p.92). While this is generally a rather daunting task in contemporary context, the concealment of norm-breaking activities such as certain human rights abuses or the development of prohibited technology does take place in world politics.[32] As observed by Zarakol (2011, pp.97, 105), some states also try to pass as normal by disassociating themselves from the deviant behavior of the previous governments or regimes and from discrediting historical periods.[33]

Neutralization represents "an attempt to justify or excuse one's own rule-violating behavior" (Conyers & Calhoun 2015, p.270). It has been argued elsewhere that both individuals (Sykes & Matza 1957) and states (Shannon 2000a; Crawford 2004) have a strong tendency to provide verbal justifications for their transgressive conduct. To neutralize feelings of guilt and

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[31] Rumelili (2007, pp.38–39) distinguishes between inclusive and exclusive identities; the former, such as "democratic", implies a possibility for conversion once the state fulfills certain intersubjectively perceived criteria; the latter, such as "African", are tied to geographical location or other inherent characteristic that is bound to be permanent. On the issue of contingency and permanence of norm violation in general, see Ainlay et al. (1986, pp.83–84).
[32] For the interactionist discussion on "secret deviance", see Becker (1973, chap.10).
[33] See Conyers & Calhoun (2015, p.269) for a taxonomy of the most common passing strategies.

shame,[34] reduce cognitive dissonance, and limit the impact of norm violation on one's public image, deviant actors employ different discursive strategies directed towards themselves and others.

In their widely cited article, Sykes and Matza (1957) introduced several such "techniques of neutralization".[35] A "denial of responsibility" relates to the extent the rule-violating action was intentional and fully under the actor's control. A "denial of injury" suggests that no serious harm was inflicted in consequence to the norm violation. A "denial of the victim" highlights that even if the act was intentional and caused harm, the actor affected by the transgression is not an innocent victim but deserved it as a legitimate punishment or retaliation. A "condemnation of condemners" points to those who attempt to stigmatize the alleged deviant and questions their motivation for such accusations and the moral right to do so. Finally, an "appeal to higher loyalties" justifies the norm-breaking conduct with reference to other norms, rules, or principles that got preference in the given situation.[36] This last technique seems to be particularly common among actors of international politics, who frequently justify their deviant behavior as a legitimate exception related to the supreme goal of national security. In chapter 7, I describe India's attempts to neutralize its violation of nuclear non-proliferation and non-testing norms in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests.

Applicatory rejection stands for situations, in which the alleged deviants discursively recognize and accept the normative validity of the norm in question, but simultaneously reject that the specific attribute or behavior would represent a violation of that norm. As I elaborate in more detail in the next chapter of this dissertation, norms and rules of international politics are very often vague and ambiguous, and their actual meaning-in-use dynamically develops in the discourse among the relevant actors (cf. Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007; Wiener 2009;

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[34] Rebecca Adler-Nissen recently suggested that "shame and embarrassment […] are major drivers of world politics" and "can be studied as the social production of normality" by constructivist scholars in IR discipline (Adler-Nissen 2016, p.33; cf. Subotic & Zarakol 2013).

[35] Pfuhl & Henry (1986, pp.68–70) extended the list of neutralization strategies in interactionist literature by including a "metaphor of the ledger", in which the alleged deviant argues that the transgression was a single slip of an otherwise conforming individual; a "claim of normality", in which the norm is portrayed as merely formal, regularly violated by others; and a "claim of relative acceptability", in which the deviant conduct is discursively reconstructed as relatively normal in comparison with much more serious transgressions of others. Stigma management communication research also stresses the role of mortification and apologia discourses in deviance neutralization, in which the transgressor publicly acknowledges his or her wrongdoing, apologizes, and asks the "normals" for forgiveness (Benoit 1995, p.92; Meisenbach 2010, p.276).

[36] Constructivist IR literature also frequently points to the fact that states are often caught in a behavioral dilemma between different conflicting norms. See for example Ba (2005, p.259), Sandholtz (2008, pp.108–109), or Shannon (2000a, p.303), and the discussion in the next chapter of this dissertation.

Sandholtz & Stiles 2009; Krook & True 2012). As such, the alleged transgressor engages in *applicatory* contestation of the specific meaning of the norm in favor of an alternative meaning that would make his conduct normatively appropriate. In other words, the alleged deviant does not contest the legitimacy of the norm but the interpretation and specific *meaning* of the norm in his particular case.

Applicatory rejection resembles the notion of "stigma rejection", in which "the stigmatized accept the categories of deviance, but deny being different from the norm abiders" (Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.154). This strategy can potentially lead to a mutual embarrassment of both the stigmatizing actor and the alleged deviant, as Adler-Nissen (2014b, pp.160–165) demonstrated on the empirical case of Austria after the far-right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) entered the Austrian government in 2000. In chapter 5, I show how Iran engaged in applicatory rejection of the claims that its behavior had seriously violated the nuclear non-proliferation norm of the NPT.

Justificatory rejection corresponds to situations in which the deviants recognize the transgression but simultaneously reject the normative legitimacy of the violated norm. The communicative side of these strategies often involves the employment of justificatory discourses, which "directly target the validity of a norm, i.e. the basis of its normative obligation" (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.1). In justificatory discourses, individuals use unconventional interpretations together with ethical and identity arguments to challenge, deconstruct, denormalize, and delegitimize dominant perceptions and understandings of the "normal" and consequently of the "deviant" (cf. Crawford 2004, pp.100–103; Goffman 1963, p.20; Meisenbach 2010, p.283). The legitimacy of the norm or its enforcement is often questioned with reference to the conflicting (higher) principles and alternative normative conceptions. As noted by Martha Finnemore, in international politics "an argument that says, 'I won't play by the rules' is a political loser. It is much more palatable and effective politically to fight rules with rules and argue, 'I am playing by the rules; they just aren't your rules, and your rules are wrong […]" (Finnemore 2005, p.197).[37]

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[37] The transgressions are sometimes framed as explicit contestations of an illegitimate or obsolete norm that should be no longer part of the given social order. Students of international law sometimes use the term "operational noncompliance", as a specific way of changing the existing rules by violating them – a process that is sometimes practical and indeed desirable, especially when the original norms no longer serve their purpose in international politics of the time. See for example Cogan (2006) and Kirk (2008), cf. Byers (1999).

In response to stigma imposition, the alleged deviants sometimes engage in "defiance": a conscious, overt, and repeated flaunting of norms, carried out even when the actor possesses a capability to behave in compliance with given prescriptions or proscriptions (cf. Monin & O'Connor 2010). In this concept, the alleged deviant resists the attempts to enforce the norm and often even intensifies the transgressive behavior in the face of shaming and sanctions. Actors who engage in defiance frequently "not only accept a 'spoiled' identity, [...] but embrace stigma as markings of moral commitment and political authenticity (Hughey 2012, p.1). In this respect, Adler-Nissen (2014b) studied the Case of Castro's Cuba that managed to turn the stigma imposed by the United States into an 'emblem of pride' (Adler-Nissen 2014b, pp.165–169; cf. Zarakol 2011, p.98). In chapter 6, I observe a similar dynamic in the case of North Korea, its defiance of numerous UNSC and IAEA resolutions, and symbolic reconstruction of its nuclear arsenal to "life and soul" of the nation.

The stigmatized actors that reject the legitimacy of the rule or its enforcement often face choices on the continuum between isolation and proactive resistance of the hegemonic normative order. As such, the deviants sometimes engage in practices of separation and self-isolation (Jacobi et al. 2014), purposefully disassociating themselves from the normal majority to create a sufficient social distance (Rumelili 2007, pp.41–42). Furthermore, Goffman (1963, p.30) also observed that stigmatized individuals often tend to bond with others who share the same or a similar kind of stigma. Such cooperation leads to creation of distinct "social buffers" (Ashforth et al. 2007) and, *inter alia*, provides the alleged deviants with an "opportunity to transcend their discredited status and assume a role invested with interactional legitimacy' (Roschelle & Kaufman 2004, p.33). In international order, this can possibly involve an engagement in anti-hegemonic projects of integration that can eventually serve as "spaces of resistance" against the prevalent normative conceptions (Jacobi et al. 2014, pp.187–188). The acquisition of international allies then allows the deviant to engage in a more effective contestation of global rules through active resistance and employment of revolutionary discourses (cf. Wunderlich et al. 2013; Daase & Deitelhoff 2014; Gertheiss & Herr 2017).

Stigma Reversal

Stigma reversal stands for the societal attempts to de-stigmatize deviant actors. As such, the process involves the social de-construction of the deviant image and the (re)integration of the deviant to the "normal" society. This process sometimes follows deviants' own efforts to

normalize their identity. In consequence, the individual sometimes undergoes a dramatic purification, a "rebirth" in which his former deviant self is replaced with a new, clean identity, which conforms (or *overconforms*) to the norms of the society (Warren 1980). In those cases, the "success stories are printed, tales of heroes of assimilation who have penetrated new areas of normal acceptance" (Goffman 1963, p.36).

However, successful de-stigmatization appears to be significantly less common in society than stigmatization (Lofland 1969, p.210). Even the change of the deviant attribute does not necessarily imply that the stigmatized state ends up being embraced by the international society as a normal member. Bauman (1991, p.67), for example, argues that the essence of stigma lies "in a difference which is in principle beyond repair, and hence justifies a permanent exclusion." Similarly, Erikson notes that the degradation ceremonies that turn the normal member of society into the deviant are "almost irreversible" (Erikson 1962, p.311; cf. Maruna 2011).

Even if the stigmatized states correct all the characteristics that allowed for the construction of their 'deviantness', the original stigma is often merely traded for a new stigma of being the "former deviant", who is perhaps considered a part of the social group yet still remains under constant suspicion (Goffman 1963, p.9; Schur 1980, p.90; Zarakol 2014, pp.316–317). As such, "the community is apt to place the returning deviant on some form of probation within the group, suspicious that he will return to deviant activity upon a moment's provocation" (Erikson 1962, p.312).[38] Full normalization of the deviant status and transformation of the spoiled identity is therefore usually possible only if there are more substantial changes within the power configurations in the social order, and the original stigma as such is subject to new interpretation and social legitimation (Elias & Scotson 1994, p.XX; Bauman 1991, p.68; cf. Ben-Yehuda 1990, pp.221–250; Dombrink & Hillyard 2007).

The history of international politics arguably offers many examples of this process (and its failings). Illustrative may be the cases of Germany and Japan, and their re-integration into international society after the Second World War. After the decades of attempts at normalization, "German leaders are [still] carefully watched by the rest of the world and by its own population", continuously exerting effort to avoid the remnants of the deviant past by

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[38] Jones and Nisbett (1972) claim that the audience has a natural tendency to interpret norm-violating behavior of 'other' as a problem of the character, while the same behavior of the 'self' is more likely to be interpreted as situational.

constantly reaffirming that Germany is able to "live up to the highest moral standards" (Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.160; cf. Jackson 2006). Similarly, Linus Hagström highlights the constructions of abnormality in relation to Japanese foreign and security policy, and the specific securitizing imaginations brought to the international discourse in the context of the recent modest attempts at Japanese remilitarization (Hagström 2014; cf. Zarakol 2011, chap.4). In chapter 7, I study the (partially successful) attempts to de-stigmatize India's deviant identity in the international nuclear order and integrate the NPT outsider into the global non-proliferation architecture.

In international politics, stigma reversal process is also highly relevant to the debates about rogue states and the possibility of "redemption from rogue-hood".[39] As argued by Geis & Wunderlich, "labelling an adversary as 'rogue' at least leaves open alternative policy options beyond pre-emption and destruction, such as confrontation (containment), coexistence and eventually the prospect that the 'rogue' might be punished and then re-integrated into the international society" (Geis & Wunderlich 2014, p.466; see also Wunderlich 2017a, p.165). One can observe these dynamics in the recent attempts of the President Obama's administration to reconcile with the (former) rogues such as Cuba or Myanmar, or in the preceding case of Libya after its 2003 decision to forsake WMD activities and support of terrorist groups, and normalize its relations vis-à-vis the West in general and the United States in particular (cf. Zoubir 2006; Müller 2007). However, in this particular case of "de-rogueing", Michal Onderco (2014a) observers that instead of full normalization, Libya acquired a status of a "parolee", somehow reintegrated to the international society but permanently on probation. As such, Onderco suggests that "the failure to completely replace the old status with a new one is likely to be due to the sticky old [rogue] status, too strongly internalized by the public and always ready to be revived" (Onderco 2014a, p.184). Cases like this highlight the difficulty of stigma reversal in international politics and the power of deviant labels to make a profound and long-lasting impact on state's social identity.

Stigma Power

In their new conceptualization of stigma, Link and Phelan (2001) stressed an earlier interactionist claim that "stigmatization is entirely contingent on access to social, economic,

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[39] I am indebted to Virginie Grzelczyk for this point.

and political *power* that allows the identification of differentness, the construction of stereotypes, the separation of labeled persons into distinct categories, and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, exclusion, and discrimination" (Link & Phelan 2001, p.367, *emphasis added*). The salience of power in interactionist theorizing[40] suggests that the discursive reconstructions of deviance in stigma politics do not correspond to Habermasian "ideal speech situations", in which it is the better argumentation that prevails and decides over the outcome (cf. Habermas 1970; Risse 2000; Crawford 2004, p.31; Müller 2004; Deitelhoff & Müller 2005). While communicative action is still a necessary part of meaning-negotiation process and the way the arguments are presented and framed does matter, the successful construction of deviant categories largely relies on the power configurations in respective social orders.

Power in stigma politics can be understood as simultaneously *multi-dimensional*, *layered*, and *processual*. It is multi-dimensional in the sense of maintaining a polymorphic character, with different *forms* of power exercised during individual stigma contests (cf. Barnett & Duvall 2005; Guzzini 2005). It is layered in the sense of affecting the process of stigmatization on multiple levels, often simultaneously (Dotter 2015, p.111). It is processual in the sense of operating as both cause and effect, both determining and being determined by the outcomes of stigmatization (Schur 1980, p.7; Hall 1972, p.46).

Multi-dimensional character of power in stigma politics highlights that there are different conceptions of how power operates in social sphere. Barnett and Duvall (2005) identified four conceptual types of power in international politics: *structural* (based on direct co-constitutive relationships); *productive* (based on diffuse constitutive effects of social production); *compulsory* (based on direct interaction among actors); and *institutional* (based on diffuse interaction mediated through social institutions). The first two types in this taxonomy are of particular interest from the interactionist perspective, as they relate to the way how identities and other social categories are socially constituted. In that, they are more concerned about "power to" (do something), rather than more straightforward "power over" (someone) (see Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.46; Guzzini 2013, p.78; Hynek 2017).

The direct co-constitutive relationships in *structural power* are related to structural positions of individual actors. In this view, the structure of the given social order constitutes

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[40] Interactionist approach to deviance and stigma corresponds to the broad conception of power as "the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate" (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.42).

identities and interests of these actors and provides them with different capacities and (dis-)advantages according to their structural position (Barnett & Duvall 2005, pp.52–55). The "logic of positionality" then enables and constrains action in international politics according to the vertical relations of super- and sub-ordination, or the hierarchies based on social or material stratification (Bially-Mattern & Zarakol 2016; Daase & Deitelhoff 2014).[41] Such hierarchies allow for constructions of norms and deviance, and constructions of norms and deviance in turn perpetuate the very same hierarchies (cf. Stafford & Scott 1986, p.214; Adler & Adler 2006, p.145; Towns 2012). There are arguably many different structures of differentiation in world politics, with multiple hierarchies (often interconnected and nested) that produce varying stratifying effects and potentially both compliance and resistance in the international order (Bially-Mattern & Zarakol 2016, pp.625, 640; Donnelly 2009; Daase & Deitelhoff 2014, p.10). Werner (2014), for example, points to the legal practices of the UNSC that allow for labeling of certain states as "renegades". From the perspective of deviance (re)construction, the five permanent UNSC members enjoy a structurally advantageous position vis-à-vis effectively lower-rank states, having formal instruments at their disposal to label and punish transgressive states.

Productive power goes beyond the binary hierarchical relationships and co-dependent structural positions. Instead, it is based on diffuse constitutive effects that produce subjects through meaningful, discursive practices in the social sphere (Barnett & Duvall 2005, pp.55–57; cf. Doty 1996, p.4). Inquiries into the operations of productive power are often informed by the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony (cf. Cox 1983; Gill 1993; cf. Lauerdale 2015, p.525), as well as by the Foucauldian conceptual apparatus, such as the "power/knowledge" nexus, "regimes of truth", or "subjugated knowledges" (cf. Foucault 1977; Foucault 1981; Foucault 1972). In the area of deviance (re)construction, the operations of productive power establish and fix widely accepted norms as well deviant images and as meanings of deviant categories, such as "rogue", "irresponsible", or "non-democratic" state.

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[41] Students of IR are usually taught about the anarchical nature of world politics that differentiates it from the domain of domestic politics (Waltz 1979, pp.103–123). However, many IR scholars have been investigating also the different hierarchical systems that underpin the operations of international relations. For the IR literature on hierarchy in international realm, see for example Clark (1989), Wendt & Friedheim (1995), Lake (1996), Dunne (2003), Kang (2004), Donnelly (2006), Hobson & Sharman (2005), Cooley (2008), Lake (2009), Bukovansky et al. (2012), Towns (2012), Sharman (2011), Goh (2013), Barder (2015), Bially-Mattern & Zarakol (2016), or Pouliot (2016a). For an international law perspective, see Byers (1999).

Compulsory power represents probably the most intuitive conception of power, as "the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do" (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.49; cf. Dahl 1957). In the field of IR (and within security and strategic studies in particular), this phenomenon has been primarily studied in the context of strategic coercion, the use of threats and promises to deter or compel the target to alter its behavior (cf. Schelling 1966; Snyder 1960; George 1991; Freedman 1998). The enforcement of norms in international politics often rests on military and/or economic coercive power of individual states or collective actors such as NATO (cf. Morgan 2009). However, constructivist IR scholars have also highlighted increasing compulsory power of non-state actors such as transnational NGOs, primarily in the form of "naming and shaming" of deviant actors (cf. Keck & Sikkink 1998; Risse & Sikkink 1999).[42]

Institutional power also relates to the control of actors' behavior; however, it does so *indirectly* by constraining action through norms, rules, and procedures of both formal and informal institutions (Barnett & Duvall 2005, pp.51–52). (Non-)compliant outcomes are then produced by the (re)creation of incentives and disincentives that constitute actors' interests (cf. Bially-Mattern & Zarakol 2016, p.634). In the world politics, this has been a major function of international regimes, in particular those that prohibit certain behaviors of state and non-state actors in the global context (cf. Nadelmann 1990; Hynek 2017).

All the aforementioned forms of power in stigma politics are also *layered* through different phases of deviance-making process. Power is required to *establish and promote norms and rules* at the expense of alternative norms and rules that could be applied in given situations (cf. Clinard & Meier 2011, pp.13–14; Becker 1963, p.17; Ben-Yehuda 2015, p.560). Power is required to be able to *define situation and label* certain attributes, behaviors, or actors deviant (cf. Hall 1972, p.51; Carpenter 2007a; Guzzini 2013; Ben-Yehuda 2015, p.560).[43] Power is required to *prevail in the argumentation*, since the value of an argument also depends on the structural position of an actor that puts the argument forward (Risse 2000, p.16; Crawford

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[42] Drawing on Laclau (1999), Panizza and Miorelli (2013, p.306) pointed out that even the process of persuasion is in its nature coercive.

[43] In the context of critically oriented strands of IR, Wagner et al. (2014a, p.6) note that " 'rogue states' have been studied predominantly as products of the 'power to define'; the authority of (hegemonic) states to dictate what counts as basic community norms and the ability to determine who should be regarded as perennial or unredeemable violator of those norms."

2004, pp.31–32).[44] Finally, power is required to *enforce rules and punish* those who do not comply with them (cf. Becker 1963, p.17; Ben-Yehuda 2015, p.560).

Power is further required to be able to (successfully) *engage in stigma contests*; not all actors in international politics share the same access to discourse and public deliberations (Risse 2000, p.16). as well as to the material and social resources to stigmatize or manage stigma (cf. Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.154; Schur 1980, p.6). There exist several ways how the access to material and social resources may strengthen the actor's position in particular stigma contests: for example, economically powerful countries may be more resilient against economic sanctions, or afford efficient diplomatic corps that represent them in the international arena. Furthermore, social resources such as close allies can be used to forge alliances within individual stigma contests. Edwin Schur, however, argues that "what is most essentially at stake in such situations is the power or resource of moral standing or acceptability" (Schur 1980, p.6).

As I mentioned above, the operations of power in stigma politics are also *processual.* In this view, power is not only the *cause* of stigma politics outcomes, but also a consequence or *effect.* The differences in power of individual actors partially determine how the stigma contests play out; and at the same time, the new distribution of power in the aftermath of stigma contests is tied to the outcome of these contests (Schur 1980, p.228). In this process, some actors rise in power and become more valued at the expense of others, who are less valued and disempowered in effect (cf. Schur 1980, pp.6–7; Gusfield 1986, p.5; Link & Phelan 2001, p.367). As such, the (re)construction of deviance "is a key element in forging a system of social stratification, with some groups buoyed by pushing others down" (Adler & Adler 2006, p.133). It has been already argued in the critical strands of IR scholarship that what we sometimes describe as a benign norm diffusion and socialization in international society is in fact a process of stigmatization and social stratification, which merely perpetuates and reproduces the pre-existing inequalities and hierarchies (Zarakol 2014). Towns (2012, p.180) similarly contends that "in defining what is normal and desirable, norms set the terms for what is abnormal and undesirable behavior and provide the means for ranking those states that do

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[44] Schmidt (2011, p.120), however, notes that "actors can gain power from their ideas even where they may lack the power of position". Similarly, Ben-Yehuda (1990, p.13) argues that power may be generated by essentially "powerless" actors by persuading others of the legitimacy and morality of their cause.

not meet a norm as deficient and inferior", and argues that "this ranking dimension is a crucial component of what norms are and it provides a better understanding of norms' dynamism."[45]

There is a clear link between power, status loss, and discrimination practices in the (re)construction of deviance, since individuals who experience a downward social mobility are often subjected to varieties of discrimination that close doors to certain possibilities and put constrains on the choices of these actors (Goffman 1963, p.5; Link & Phelan 2001, p.373).[46] Dotter (2004, p.87) speaks of the transformative power of the deviant label that leads to unequal treatment of alleged deviants on the base of the perceived stigma (Dijker & Koomen 2007, p.9). Beyond the varieties of rule enforcing sanctions, some scholars also call for attention to the practices of structural discrimination that are not direct as the aforementioned sanctions; instead, the structural discrimination is embedded in institutions that provide the stigmatized actors with unequal treatment (Link & Phelan 2001, pp.372–373; Yang et al. 2007, p.1525). Patterns of discrimination are also often recognizable below the macro-level social practices, as stigma becomes embodied in various micro-practices of social interaction (see for example Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.162).

In some cases, however, attempts to impose stigma on individuals can also lead to the distinct *empowerment* of such individuals. In international politics, the shaming, sanctioning, and disciplining of states sometimes unites domestic actors in "rally around the flag" (cf. Jaeger 2016; Veebel & Markus 2016). This potentially turns to the increased support for the government in power, and increased domestic pressure on resisting and defying the international community. The stigmatized, but resisting, actor can also raise in the eyes of its in-group peers, transforming the shame into a badge of honor and symbol of resistance against illegitimate exercise of hegemonic power. As such, the stigma politics also offers a potential for the alleged to deviant state to strengthened its position and "turn vice into virtue" (cf. Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.165; 2014c).

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[45] The notion of norm as a vessel for the circulation of power has already appeared throughout Foucault's (e.g., 1975) works (cf. Taylor 2009).

[46] In this regard, Zarakol (2011, p.66) notes that "far from corresponding to some kind of inherent, objective cause of relative inferiority, stigma labels often are themselves enough to generate inferior conditions, which are then mistaken as a cause."

Conclusion

American sociologists Peter and Patricia Adler once noted that deviance-making is "a fundamental force at the core of society, not merely at the fringes" (Adler & Adler 2006, p.133). In this chapter, I conceptually unpacked *stigma politics* as a dynamic, interactive, and layered process of social construction of deviance in international society. I introduced and operationalized components of stigma politics that interact across five dimensions:

- *Stigma nexus* represents the actor-specific setting of deviance (re)construction, encompassing the interactions of the (alleged) deviant individual and various social audiences. This process frequently involves the mobilization of moral entrepreneurs, and the identification in-group/out-group alignments with respect to the deviant.

- *Stigma imposition* stands for the attempts to construct a deviant image of an actor. Stigma is usually imposed through the stigma message, a constitutive communicative act that labels certain behavior or attribute as deviant with respect to the shared social norm(s); and through rule enforcement, a process of sanctioning and disciplining the alleged deviant.

- *Stigma management* refers to discourses and practices that deviant actors employ to cope with stigma imposition. These include stigma management strategies of normalization, neutralization, applicatory rejection, justificatory rejection, and isolation.

- *Stigma reversal* stands for societal attempts to de-stigmatize the deviant and (re)integrate him to the mainstream society. The persistence of stigma in the spoiled identity of the (ex-)deviant nevertheless highlights the limits of these normalization attempts.

- *Stigma power* relates to the interactionist assumption that social actors usually do not have an equal position in defining what is right and wrong. As such, the deviance reconstruction is tied to the stratifications and hierarchies in social orders, and operations of power that take place with respect to the individual stigma contests.

In Table I., I summarize the individual dimensions of stigma politics together with their key components and second-order concepts that I introduced in individual sections of this chapter. I believe that there are at least four reasons why my conceptualization of deviance-making

process represents a valuable contribution to the literature. First, I integrate insights from sociology, communication studies, and political science/IR into a coherent conceptual frame. Second, my conceptualization is concerned with the full cycle of deviance (re)construction, including the attempts to de-stigmatize the deviants and (re)integrate them into "normal society". Third, in line with the interactionist approach to deviance, I explicitly conceptualize power as one of the dimensions of stigmatization process. Fourth, I believe I provide a conceptual framework that is analytically useful to be directly applied to empirical cases in international politics.

In the following chapter, I return to the concept of stigma politics to discuss how international norms are contested and (re)affirmed on individual levels of deviance-making process. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I employ the five dimensions of stigma politics and their individual components as analytical lens to study deviance (re)construction in the specific empirical setting of global nuclear politics.

Table I. The Concept of Stigma Politics

The Concept of Stigma Politics		
Dimensions of Stigma Politics	Key Components	Second-order Concepts
Stigma Nexus	deviant actor	
	audience(s)	*moral entrepreneurs (rule enforcers, rule creators), in-group/out-group alignments, social control*
Stigma Imposition	stigma message	*label, stereotype, separation, responsibility, transgressive linkage. norm linkage, threat linkage*
	rule enforcement	*sanctioning, disciplining*
Stigma Management	normalization	*correction, concealment/passing*
	neutralization	*techniques of neutralization (denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of condemners, appeal to higher loyalties)*
	applicatory rejection	*applicatory discourses, contestation, meaning-in-use*
	justificatory rejection	*justificatory discourses, defiance, (self-)isolation, social buffers/spaces of resistance*
Stigma Reversal	de-stigmatization / (re)integration	*purification, partial/full normalization, spoiled identity, probation*
Stigma Power	multi-dimensional power	*structural power, productive power, compulsory power, institutional power*
	layered power	*layers/phases of deviance-making process*
	processual power	*status loss, discrimination (sanctions, structural, macro-/micro-level practices), disempowerment/empowerment*

3. Changing Norms and Rule-breaking in World Order

A few years ago, U.S. sociologists Brian Wolf and Phil Zuckerman (2012) published an article about "deviant heroes", whose rule-breaking behavior led to the positive change in our society. While certainly not all kinds of deviance can be cast in such a positive light, the deviance-*cum*-change proposition has become one of the tenets of sociological theorizing. This has been particularly true for the interactionist approaches in sociology, which consider social construction of deviance to be one of the main driving forces behind the dynamics of social norms and order.

Research in this dissertation is largely based on the premise that much of this interactionist logic can be applied in the context of *international* society, composed of individual state and non-state actors rather than individual persons. In particular, I argue that the interactionists' conceptual link between deviance and change is largely compatible with the contemporary constructivist research on normative contestation and dynamics in International Relations (IR).

In this chapter, I aim to provide the reader with a critical overview of relevant segments of IR literature, i.e. those related to international norm dynamics and norm violations. The survey clearly reveals that we already know a great deal about how norms change, yet we know much less about the role the norm violations play in this process. To fill the existing gap, I draw on both sociological interactionism and IR norm contestation scholarship to propose a new theorization of the link between deviance and change in in world affairs. I suggest that the discourses and practices employed within the dynamics of deviance (re)construction should be considered against the backdrop of broader norm contestation processes in international politics. Within these processes, intersubjective meanings, legitimacy, and hierarchy of international norms are continuously re-established.

With respect to this claim, I conceptualize three types of normative contestation and affirmation that take place in connection with deviance (re)construction: (1) applicatory contestation and affirmation, reconstructing the meanings of international norms; (2) justificatory contestation and affirmation, challenging and re-affirming the legitimacy of

international norms; and (3) hierarchical contestation and affirmation, contesting and reaffirming the relative value and importance of international norms. In consequence of these dynamics, deviance-making produces both stability and change in the normative structure of world politics.

I divided the body of this chapter into several sections. First, I introduce the first two generations of norm research in IR and discuss their approach to the dynamics of international norms. Second, I provide a diverse intra-disciplinary critique of these earlier works on norms and present alternative approaches that further advance norm dynamics research in IR. Third, I elaborate on how scholars interested in the dynamics of international norms deal with the issue of norm violations. Fourth, I elaborate on the meta-theoretical congruence between interactionist approach to deviance and IR norm contestation literature. Fifth, I conceptualize three types of normative contestation and affirmation that take place in the process of stigma politics. Sixth, I connect my conceptualization with Antje Wiener's hierarchical taxonomy of international norms, and elaborate further on the dynamics of stigmatization and norm contestation vis-à-vis normative structure of international order. In a conclusion, I summarize the findings of this chapter and their relevance for the goals of this dissertation.

Static Norms and Linear Models of Normative Diffusion

The importance of norms and rules in international politics has been recognized in the discipline of IR since its very inception (see Angell 1909). While realist approaches that dominated IR after the Second World War did not pay much attention to the normative dimension of world politics, international norms gained prominence in the theories of Karl Deutsch (1957), and later appeared among the building blocks of international society in the writings of English school scholars (e.g., Bull 1977; Bull & Watson 1984; Butterfield & Wight 1968). However, what arguably sparked the full-fledged research focused on norms *themselves* were the works of regime theorists in the 1980s, who studied international regimes as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 1982, p.185; see also Haas 1980; Young 1986; Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986; Haggard & Simmons 1987; Nadelmann 1990; Zacher 1987; Hasenclever et al. 1996; Rittberger & Mayer 1993). In these theories of patterned cooperation among states in anarchical environment, norms were conceptualized not merely as components of the cooperative behavior, but also as a key to our understanding of regime dynamics: as suggested by Stephen

Krasner (1982, p.188), international regimes themselves truly change only if norms and principles that guide them change (see also Müller 1993).

Notwithstanding the importance of norms in the regime theory, rationalist theorists still portrayed norms as having only a limited causal influence on the actual behavior of states. At best, norms were seen as intervening variables between exogenous interests and endogenous behavior, or "road maps" that guide us in the absence of unique equilibrium in a given strategic setting (Goldstein & Keohane 1993). As such, the role of norms in (neo)liberal theorizing was primarily to facilitate interaction, to help solving the coordination problem of collective action, to lower the transaction costs, and generally to maximize payoffs of individual actors in the long run (Keohane 1984; Oye 1985; Axelrod & Keohane 1985). For most (neo)realists, international norms were merely the reflection of power and interests of major/hegemonic states (cf. Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994; Strange 1982).[47]

A substantially different role of international norms has been envisioned by scholars who subscribe to the constructivist turn in IR theorizing. Building upon the works of "fathers" of IR constructivism such as Alexander Wendt (1987; 1992), Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), or Nicholas Onuf (1989), the constructivist scholars of the 1990s were preoccupied with attempts to provide empirical accounts of how norms enable and constrain action in world politics. Norms were newly operationalized as independent variables, regulating behavior of actors, but also constituting their very identities and interests (Wendt 1999, pp.165–184; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996b). As opposed to utilitarian "logic of (expected) consequences" that guided rationalist understanding of individual actions, constructivist scholars subscribed to the "logic of appropriateness", rule- and identity-driven sociological explanation for actors' behavior (see March & Olsen 1998).[48] While the role of material dimension of the world politics was not completely discarded, the constructivist research aimed to explain how norms shape our interpretation of material factors and how this process provides the actors with a "range of legitimate policy options" (Klotz 1995, pp.461–462). The presence of intersubjectively

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[47] I am aware of the fact that this statement represents a certain simplification of realism as a unified school of thought. While all realists assign a causal primacy to power and material capabilities over norms and ideas, some of them still acknowledge the existence and even positive effects of international norms for the mitigation of anarchy and the resulting security dilemma in international politics (cf. Davis 1993, p.82; Taliaferro 2000, p.130; Tang 2008). Barkin's (2003, p.337) article about an inherent compatibility between realism and constructivism also encourages an eclectic inquiry in interplay between power (as understood by IR realism) and norms in international realm (cf. Jackson & Nexon 2004).

[48] For a critique of the IR constructivist use of the logic of appropriateness, see Sending (2002).

perceived norms was identified in practically all areas of international politics, including state sovereignty (Barkin & Cronin 1994), human rights (Klotz 1995; Risse & Sikkink 1999), international development (Finnemore 1996b), decolonization (Goertz & Diehl 1992; Jackson 1993), collective security (Cortell & Davis 1996), foreign aid (Lumsdaine 1993), conduct of war (Legro 1996), science policy (Finnemore 1993), international/humanitarian intervention (Reed & Kaysen 1993; Finnemore 1996a), crisis bargaining (Gelpi 1997), nuclear policy (Tannenwald 1999b), use of chemical weapons (Price 1995), use of landmines (Price 1998), and security regimes in general (Müller 1993). Some scholars also aimed to "bridge the divide" between rationalist (neo/liberal) and constructivist conception of norms, and explore conditions when norms have merely constraining and when truly constitutive effect (Checkel 1997; cf. Legro 1997).

This first generation of the 1990s IR norm research primarily aimed to demonstrate the *relevance* of norms in world affairs, in an intra-disciplinary debate with rationalists and their preoccupation with interests of states (cf. Widmaier & Park 2012; Wiener 2007; Hoffmann 2010). Most constructivist scholars of the time still analyzed the impact of norms on behavior from structuralist/systemic perspectives, where ideational factors, as opposed to material factors in rationalist theories, were in the forefront of scholarly inquiry (Wendt 1999, p.1; cf. Reus-Smit 1999; Legro 2000). This structural approach, however, had its shortcomings: first, it treated the norms as static entities and therefore did not properly account for change in ideational structures; and second, its focus on structure led to the neglect of agency in norm dynamics.[49]

These two gaps were eventually addressed in one of the most cited articles in international norm dynamics research, written by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). The authors coined the famous notion of a norm "life cycle", which develops through three stages: from (1) norm emergence to (2) norm acceptance, and eventually to (3) norm cascade. The cycle is considered completed once the "tipping point" of normative diffusion is reached in the international system, the norms are broadly internalized, and acquire a "taken-for-granted quality" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, pp.895–896). The authors also highlighted the

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[49] Admittedly, while this argument holds for the majority of Anglo-American scholarship of that time, there were attempts among constructivists in continental Europe to deal with both agency and normative change already in the early 1990s. See for example Gehring (1994) or Müller (1993). On the problem of agency in norm dynamics research in general, see Bucher (2014).

critical role of "norm entrepreneurs" – states, NGOs, or influential individuals – who push certain norms in the forefront of international attention and persuade (other) states to adopt them (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, pp.896–899; cf. Sunstein 1996, pp.6–7; Wunderlich 2014).

To somehow address the rationalist-constructivist divide in IR norm research, Finnemore and Sikkink introduced the term "strategic social construction", a strategic action in the process of norm diffusion. In the logic of this process, transnational norm entrepreneurs make "detailed means-ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players' utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p.910). In other words, norm entrepreneurs engage in rational utility-calculations under the logic of consequences, while the actual normative goals they promote can be only understood using the ideational, logic of appropriateness framework.[50] Among the tools in norm entrepreneurs disposal would be "strategic use of information, symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics, issue framing and shaming" (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, p.401).

Empirical studies in this second generation of IR norm research covered norm diffusion across all three phases of norm life cycle. Some scholars primarily focused on norm entrepreneurs as agents of normative change, including previously largely neglected actors of IR such as political activists and transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1999; Price 1998), international organizations (Barnett & Finnemore 1999; Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Greenhill 2010), private business companies with transnational outreach (Flohr et al. 2010; Sjöström 2010; Deitelhoff & Wolf 2013), emerging powers (Xiaoyu 2012), or small and middle powers (Björkdahl 2008; Ingebritsen 2002; Becker-Jakob et al. 2013).[51] Other scholars rather focused on the very *process* of normative diffusion to study *how* exactly norms move through the individual phases of their life cycle. For example, in their study of human rights norm diffusion, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink suggested three ideal types of socialization processes that drive normative change: first, processes of adaptation and strategic bargaining, i.e. the instrumental compliance under pressure from other actors; second,

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[50] I should note that to some limited extent, rationalist scholars also tried to explain emergence of norms in international realm, mostly drawing on earlier behavioralist evolutionary/functionalist perspectives (e.g., Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Opp 1982). See for example Axelrod (1986), cf. Florini (1996).

[51] Widmaier & Park (2012b, pp.124–127) suggest that the second generation norm scholarship should also include the work of Adler (1992) and Haas (1992) on "epistemic communities" that diffuse knowledges, ideas, and practices on (inter-)national level.

processes of moral consciousness-raising, shaming, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion, i.e. the use of "argumentative discourses" to persuade the actors into compliance; third, processes of institutionalization and habitualization, i.e. final implementation and internalization of norms as standard operating procedures in domestic policy (Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp.11–17; cf. Schimmelfennig 2001).[52]

Risse (2000) then further elaborated on the role of persuasion in norm dynamics following the "logic of arguing", as a distinct logic of action based on argumentative rationality previously theorized by Jürgen Habermas (1990; cf. Müller 2004; Deitelhoff & Müller 2005). The importance of persuasion in normative diffusion also resonates in the writings of Rodger Payne, who depicted framing and frames as "basic building blocks for the construction of broadly resonant norms" (Payne 2001, p.39). Furthermore, Jeffrey Checkel (2001) incorporated argumentative persuasion in his model of social learning as a cause of compliance with international norms. A number of researchers of normative diffusion also examined spread of norms in international system via domestic processes and the role of domestic actors in this dynamic (see for example Cortell & Davis 1996; Gurowitz 1999; Farrell 2001; cf. O'Faircheallaigh 2014).[53]

Blind Alleys and New Routes in Constructivist Norm Research

In the inter-paradigmatic debate between rationalists and constructivists, the first two generations of constructivist norm research successfully defended the idea that norms do *matter* in world politics. Constructivist scholars, whose work I briefly outlined in the previous section, laid a solid foundation to the broader research program that placed norms themselves in the forefront of research inquiry. However, a rather simplified conception of norm dynamics in the first two generations provides ground for an intra-disciplinary critique, which highlights limits and biases of these early approaches. In this section, I elaborate on five major points of this critique: (1) prevailing liberal, Western bias; (2) linear bias that did not properly account for norm erosion and disappearance; (3) selection bias on positive cases of norm diffusion and successful norm entrepreneurs as agents of change; (4) insufficient attention to emotional and

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[52] See also the "boomerang model" (Keck & Sikkink 1998) and "spiral model" (Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp.17–37; Risse & Sikkink 2013), which conceptualize the processes of human rights norm diffusion.
[53] Some constructivist scholars label these approaches a "second-wave" of norm scholarship, whereas the first wave would be engaged with only international-level diffusion. See Cortell & Davis (2000) for a comprehensive overview of this research program.

psychological factors; and (5) predominant focus on strength and salience of norms as opposed to the contested meanings of norms.

The first point of critique is related to the "often unstated, though invariably discernible, belief in the progressive trajectory of international norms" (Hehir 2013, p.34). Scholars in the first two generations inclined to portraying a world in which liberal, progressive norms are being transmitted from enlightened Western teachers to "uneducated", mostly Third world, states. Norm diffusion of Western norms is then considered a part of positive global change towards joyful, liberal future. As noted by Amitav Acharya (2013, pp.468–469), this notion of "moral cosmopolitanism" implicitly suggested that there is a clear dichotomy between inherently progressive *global* norms and problematic *local* norms and practices that need to be corrected, without critically questioning a potential lack of legitimacy of these global norms in some local contexts. What the literature often considers to be a "socialization" of non-Western actors into the enlightened global society of states through persuasion and teaching, often involves silencing a legitimate normative resistance, as well as coercion, stigmatization, and "infantilization" of socializees (Epstein 2012; Zarakol 2014). Within this critical understanding, "in setting out standards of behavior, norms also draw on and generate social hierarchies" in international society (Towns 2012, p.180). The predominant focus on the spread of allegedly "good norms" (Barkin 2003, p.335), such as human rights, arms control, or humanitarian intervention, promoted by Western norm entrepreneurs, also led to a certain selection bias, in which diffusion of alternative normative beliefs by non-Western and/or non-liberal actors was often overlooked (Wunderlich 2014; Wunderlich et al. 2013). Steinhilper (2015), for example, also highlights this extreme "West to the Rest" inclination of norm dynamics research, and examines a case in which Western countries eventually accepted a new norm crafted by the indigenous people in Global South.[54]

The second point of critique relates to the linear bias in the second generation of IR norm research. Arguably, the alleged "norm cycle" does not represent a cycle at all; since the final stage of norm diffusion in the model is a norm internalization, the theory is not capable of dealing with the possibility of subsequent norm weakening, erosion, and eventual disappearance from international realm. One could argue that the recent developments in world politics clearly suggest that many international norms are much more fragile and

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[54] On the issue of post-colonial agency in the construction of international normative order, see Jabri (2014).

unstable than previously thought (Tannenwald 2016). Norm erosion and decay should therefore become, according to some voices, "the topic of the day" in normative research (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.1; see also Müller 2013, p.13). Some of the relatively recent works try to address this gap: Deibert & Crete-Nishihata (2012), for example, studied contemporary "norm regression" in cyber governance; Panke & Petersohn (2012; 2016) developed a set of hypotheses related to the stability of environment and normative precision that influence the processes of norm degeneration and disappearance; Beyer and Hofmann (2011) attempted to further theorize normative revision and decline in the context of neutrality norm; Cottrell (2009) studied a link between legitimacy and normative replacement; McKeown (2009) elaborated on regress of torture norm in the United States; and Heller, Kahl, & Pisoiu (2012) studied normative erosion in consequence of post-9/11 counterterrorism activities.

The third point of critique is based on the (positive) case selection bias of majority of early norm research. In the attempts to demonstrate the effects and spread of norms in world politics, the preference was usually given to successful cases of norm emergence and diffusion, as opposed to situations in which norms did *not* emerge, or their spread was halted at some stage of their norm cycle. It was only recently when constructivist scholars started to properly address also the *non-emergence* of norms. For example, Rosert (2015) made a comparative study of the emergence and non-emergence of certain weapon prohibition norms in the Inhumane Weapons Convention; Kingston (2013) made an inquiry into non-emergence of statelessness issue; Carpenter (2007a; 2007b) studied non-adoption of norms related to children of war-crime victims and recently (Carpenter 2014) also identified specific "gates" and "gatekeepers" that often need to be passed by norm entrepreneurs in order to promote the given normative issue in the global arena. The positive selection bias also turned the exclusive attention of constructivist scholars on norm entrepreneurs as agents of normative change, as opposed to actors who resist the change. In response to this caveat, Bloomfield (2015) coined the notion of "norm antipreneurs", "actors who defend the entrenched normative status quo against challengers" (Bloomfield 2015, p.12). Some "norm renovators" also strive to "travel backwards" and change prevailing normative order to (what they perceive to be) a normative status quo ante (Wunderlich 2014, pp.95–96). Furthermore, Symons and Altman (2015) studied the phenomenon of international norm polarization that materializes in consequence to the strong resistance against emerging norms.

The fourth point of critique may be formulated as inattention to the role of emotions and more generally (social) psychological factors in norm diffusion. The role of sentiments, feelings, desires, and cognitive biases are in the forefront of interest in what Widmaier & Park (2012) label the "third-generation" norm research. For example, in her acclaimed book on the dynamics of non-proliferation norms, Maria Rublee (2009) extends the constructivist work on normative persuasion with the use of social psychological concepts such as social conformity and identification. Shannon and Keller (2007) focus on specific beliefs and decision-making styles of individual leaders in normative environment (see also Shannon 2000b). Crawford (2004) elaborates on the role of emotions, in particular empathy, in the construction of ethical arguments that drive normative change. While we still lack systematic research that would convincingly incorporate study of emotions in the analysis of norm diffusion, some of the existing attempts to theorize emotions in world politics offer promising avenues in this direction (see for example Crawford 2000; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006; Sasley 2010; Jeffery 2011; Hutchison & Bleiker 2014; Ahäll & Gregory 2015; Eberle 2017; Renshon et al. 2017).

The fifth point of critique is the most substantive one with respect to the subject matter of this dissertation. While the second-generation norm research acknowledged that norms do *change*, such conception of change has been primarily related to the dynamics of their salience in world politics. The content, or the *meaning* of the norm was considered to remain stable, and essentially uncontested throughout the process of diffusion. What has been sometimes called a critical constructivist (Wiener & Puetter 2009)[55] or a "third-wave" (Tholens & Groß 2015) approach to IR norm research aims to address this gap by exploring how meanings of international norms are *contested* in different global and local contexts and how these meanings dynamically change – precisely as a result of such contestations.

Some works in this direction focused on the processes of "localization" of global norms in specific regional/local settings. In his seminal article, Acharya defined localization as "the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices" (2004, p.245). With more focus on the dynamics of local-global

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[55] Wiener (2009, p.179) suggests that "conventional [...] constructivists focus on the structuring power of norms and their influence on state behaviour in world politics", while "critical constructivists focus on the meaning of norms as constituted by and constitutive of specific use." However, this claim is not wholly unproblematic and many scholars that study normative contestation would likely resist the "critical" label. For a more general discussion of differences between conventional and critical constructivist research in IR, see Hopf (1998).

contestation, he later coined the term "norm circulation" as a two-way process during which transnational norms diffuse to local context, in which they are contested and altered by local actors; then, as the transnational norm undergoes a certain change in the process of localization, it subsequently travels back on the global level (Acharya 2013, pp.469–471). Merry (2006) enriched the localization literature by incorporating anthropological insights on how norms are "translated" to local settings. Further elaboration of global-local norm translation was done, among others, by Zimmermann (2014), recognizing translation into domestic discourse, law, and implementation, and Zwingel (2012), who conceptualizes different 'constellations' of norm translation. Finally, some scholars fused these approaches with the current research in critical peacebuilding and studied norm localization/contestation in the context of post-war reconstruction (see for example Tholens & Groß (2015), Björkdahl & Gusic 2015, and other articles in the respective special issue of the *Journal of International Relations and Development*).

Other authors deal with the contestation of transnational norms in the global context. This sub-field of research is built on the premise that even after their adoption and widespread internalization, international norms continue to be contested, defended, (re)negotiated (Elgström 2000, p.459), and possibly redefined (Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007, p.219). In this process, international norms, which are frequently ambiguous and relatively vague, are subject to new interpretations with regard to their practical application.[56] As such, the practical meanings of global norms undergo a dynamic development and change as a result of contestation practices. For example, Krook & True (2012) studied the development of gender equality norms; Wiener (2017) examined the contestation of rule of law in international affairs; Sandholtz (2008) explored the changes of norms against wartime plunder; and O'Mahoney (2014b) theorized the early 20th century change in norms allowing aggressors to gain profit from victorious wars.

Among the aforementioned five points of intra-disciplinary critique, the last point related to the contested meanings of international norms is particularly relevant to my own

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[56] As argued by Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007, p.221), vague and ambiguous norms tend to be more suitable for acceptance across wider audiences; in fact, it is particularly this vagueness that allows for successful global diffusion of these norms (Krook & True 2012, p.109). Drawing on Putnam (1988), Müller (2013, pp.9–10) conceptualizes two-level norm discourses in which "agents may at times stretch the interpretability of the new international norm set to the extreme in order to gain domestic assent" (on two-level discourses, see also Müller 2004, pp.422–425).

conceptual framework. Furthermore, my focus on the deviants of world politics assumes normative agency of actors that have not been frequently in the center of norm dynamics analysis, thereby partly redeeming the Western/liberal bias of the early norm research. However, before I turn to the actual theorization of the link between deviance and norm change, I will provide the reader with a discussion of how has the IR norms literature so far approached the problem of norm violation, an inherent aspect of deviant behavior.

Observing the Dark Side: Norm-breaking in IR Literature

The core logic of this dissertation is based on the premise that in order to understand what is considered "right", we need to observe what is considered "wrong"; specifically, that the "dark side" of norm-compliance – i.e., norm-violation – can tell us much about norms under scrutiny and their dynamics. In this section, I make a brief overview of how the IR literature on norms deals with the issue of norm-breaking and its consequences for the norms in question.

In rationalist theorizing, the question of the day was often not why would actors violate the norms, but rather why would they ever want to comply with them in the first place. For (most) realists, this issue has been settled by the claim that norms do not influence the behavior of states in any significant way, but merely reflect power distributions in the international system (Mearsheimer 1994; cf. Davis 1993). Neoliberal institutionalists instead highlight the strong patterns of cooperation in international realm and theorize the strategic logic behind regular compliance with norms and rules: states consider not only short-term costs and benefits of cooperation and defection but also the gains they can obtain in the long term. The concerns with reputational costs that would negatively influence one's potential for gains in the long run – the "shadow of the future" – contribute to the prevailing compliance and norm-following in international politics (Keohane 1984).

A bulk of the literature on compliance[57] focuses on how and why states do and do not comply with norms codified in international law, which is often considered to be a rather weak instrument in the anarchical structure of international system. Assuming the correctness of Henkin's (1979, p.47) observation that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time" (cf. Zürn & Joerges 2005), Chayes & Chayes (1993) identified three main reasons why some states, not necessarily

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[57] For the survey of IR compliance literature and the identification of "the violations gap", see Cardenas (2004).

deliberately, violate the rules: the language of international treaties is often ambiguous; some states are not *capable* of upholding their commitments; sometimes it takes time for parties to be able to actually carry out their undertakings in full (Chayes & Chayes 1993, p.188; see also 1995).[58] Franck (1990) further enriched this literature with the notion of normative legitimacy, focusing on the "compliance-pull" of international norms and rules that are perceived to be legitimate (see also Hurd 1999).[59]

Constructivist scholars have been since the very beginning confronted with question of how we can talk about the validity of certain norms if the very same norms are being violated. In this regard, most contemporary students of norms follow the early assumption of Kratochwil & Ruggie that "norms are counterfactually valid [and] no single counterfactual occurrence refutes the norm" (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986, p.767). In a similar fashion, Deitelhoff & Zimmermann add that "norms are deontological entities that primarily derive their validity from the shared inter-subjective acceptance of their obligatory claims by their addressees and only secondarily from their factual enforcement" (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.4).[60]

In fact, I would argue that there is no *a priori* reason to expect that the violated norm becomes *weaker* after the violation than *ex ante*. Most constructivist scholars agree that what mainly determines the impact of transgression on the norm is what follows after the violation: how the transgressor justifies his or her behavior and how other actors in the system react to the violation – for example, whether the act is framed as a legitimate, permissible exception, or a rejection of the validity of the norm itself; whether it is justified in reference to another, contextually more powerful norm or principle; and whether other states silently accept it, condemn it, or punish it (Kratochwil 1989, pp.63–64; Ba 2005, p.259; Sandholtz 2008, pp.108–109; Fields & Enia 2009, pp.187–188). From the perspective of a social scientist, norm violations also represent quite unique situations that allow us to "see" the presence of the norm, which

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[58] Some of the constructivist literature (e.g., Brunnee & Toope 2000) also draws on Fuller (1966) and his interactional (legal) theory of norms and compliance.

[59] Lebow (2008, p.4) notes that "given the inequalities of all social orders, and the exclusions, restrictions and compulsions they entail, it is nothing short of remarkable that most people in most societies adhere to stipulated practices and rules". In this regard, he provides four general explanations of compliant behavior: fear, interest, honor, and habit.

[60] These arguments are, in fact, just building up of what I find to be one of the central claims in the works of English School. Hedley Bull (1997, p. 53), for example, observes that "the effectiveness of a rule does not consist in its being carried out by all those persons or groups to which it applies in every instance; on the contrary, any effective rule of conduct is normally violated from time to time, and if there were no possibility that actual behaviour would differ from prescribed behaviour, there would be no point in having the rule."

is certainly an important epistemological argument for the IR norm research as such (cf. Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.4).

The second-generation constructivist scholars put a lot of emphasis on practices of norm entrepreneurs that are also closely related to norm violations: naming, blaming, and shaming of transgressors. Risse & Sikkink (1999, p.15) included shaming in the "spiral model" of norm diffusion, observing that when it is successful, shaming "implies a process of persuasion, since it convinces leaders that their behavior is inconsistent with an identity to which they aspire." Even if they are not genuinely persuaded, some of the norm-violating states may be pressured this way into compliance in order to avoid further ostracizing from international community (Schimmelfennig 2001, pp.62–65; Zarakol 2014). As Wunderlich (2013, p.37) notes, the shaming practices are usually applied in the second phase of norm cycle when at least a part of international society has already accepted the norms as valid standards of behavior.[61]

The problem of norm-breaking received a lot of attention in newer studies that engaged with norm erosion and disappearance. While still acknowledging the aforementioned postulate about the counterfactual validity of norms, the studies nevertheless contend that certain amounts of non-compliance could obviously imply that the norm might be eroding. For example, Panke & Petersohn (2012, p.720) test hypotheses under which the act of norm-violation triggers "non-compliance cascades" that lead to the eventual disappearance of the norm from international sphere. Elsewhere they note that "if a norm is not embedded in an institutional negotiation system, it is usually not abolished by negotiations, but by norm violations" (Panke & Petersohn 2016, p.4); what counts in this process is the power of the states that challenge the norm by violating it. Although the literature clearly agrees that constant non-compliance eventually destroys the norm, "how much is enough" to significantly contribute to the norm erosion is still a matter of intra-disciplinary debate (cf. Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.4).

Other approaches also attempted to shed light on the psychological causes of norm-violating behavior, with the aim to explain why actors break norms in specific circumstances. With a first-image focus on individual decision-makers, Shannon (2000b) argues that leaders

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[61] Note that in most second-generation scholars' works, the agency of transgressors is practically non-existent; the norm-breakers are usually portrayed as facing a binary choice of either comply or not with the given norm in response to shaming.

often face moral dilemmas between personal desire to break the norm when it is advantageous for them, and a variety of social constraints that speak against the norm violation. In order to reduce cognitive dissonance, the "actors must feel justified to violate a norm to satisfy themselves and the need for a positive self-image, by interpreting the norm and the situation in a way that makes them feel exempt" (Shannon 2000b, p.300). Leader-specific determinants such as "belief in ability to control events, need for power, ingroup bias, and especially distrust" are some of the individualized factors indicating that the given decision-maker is more prone to violating the norm (Shannon & Keller 2007, p.80; cf. Herrmann & Shannon 2001). The "sentimental" approaches also point to strong emotional reactions – "bad feelings" – that are connected with violations of internalized norms (and *absence* of these emotions when the norms have not been internalized), once again something that should be in principle observable in the study of empirical cases (cf. Mercer 2006, pp.298–299; Crawford 2000, p.154).

In the literature that focuses on contested meanings of norms, the issue of norm violation is more complex. Sometimes the difference between a legitimate contestation of a norm and violation of such a norm lies only in the eye of the beholder. For example, Iran's behavior in the NPT regime is often treated as clear violation of non-proliferation norm in conventional constructivist literature (e.g., Panke & Petersohn 2016, p.7); Wunderlich's (2014, p.144) critical account, on the other hand, assumes the alleged norm-breaker's perspective to portray Iran as a "norm renovator", a type of norm entrepreneur advocating the return to what it perceives to be the original meaning of the norm in question. The question whether a norm is being violated or *which* of the norms are being violated is often the one of framing and counter-framing (Krook & True 2012, p.111). Jose-Thota adds that "sometimes, norm violations occur because actors, operating in an ambiguous normative environment, formulate their own understanding of the norm's requirements. These interpretations may differ from those enforcing the norm, causing the *appearance* of norm violation" (Jose-Thota 2011, p.12, *emphasis added*). Much of this debate on the intersubjective quality of norm violating behavior is at the heart of the interactionist perspective and I am dealing with it in more detail throughout this dissertation.

Deviance, Discourse, and Normative Change

In the previous sections of the chapter, I reviewed various trends in the IR literature on international norms and their dynamics. Before that, in the introductory chapter, I discussed

the interactionist theory in sociology that understands deviance as one of the elements of both stability and *change* in society. Is there a way how to merge these two distinct theoretical streams?

I argue that the interactionist perspective on the societal functions of deviance is, in fact, in many ways compatible with scholarly works on norm contestation and change in IR. The two theoretical streams could also provide valuable insights to each other: whereas the IR norm contestation literature can benefit from the explicit incorporation of deviance-reconstruction theorizing, the interactionist research on deviance still lacks a more sophisticated elaboration of the link between deviance, discursive contestation, and the dynamics of social norms. In this section, I elaborate on the ontological congruence of these two approaches, and on the interplay among discourse, practices, contestation, and normative change in international politics.

In interactionist theorizing, the (re-)constructions of deviance in social orders corresponds to two main processes of normative dynamics: normative *stability*, as a reaffirmation of group values and normative consensus; and normative *change*, as a redefinition of acceptable and appropriate behavior in the group, leading to innovation and moral adaptation (cf. Ben-Yehuda 1990, pp.6, 10–11; Adler & Adler 2006). The theoretical explanation for these two seemingly contradictory, yet in fact largely complementary dynamics, lies in the interactionist assumption about the contingent nature of social orders. Hall (1972), for example, suggests that social objects have a tendency to produce tensions due to their ambiguous quality. To maintain a sense of order, the meanings of these social objects are bargained and negotiated in the interaction among different constituencies, hence the concept of *interaction order* (Goffman 1983) or *negotiated order* (Strauss et al. 1963; Hall 1972) as a societal model in interactionist theorizing.

In the interactionist perspective, norms and rules as social objects in modern society are therefore considered similarly contingent, ambiguous, and open to negotiation and different interpretations. The application of norms in practice is not as straightforward as portrayed by their creators, resulting in conflicts over the "right" way to comply with them. Furthermore, norms sometimes clash, their prescriptions are contradictory, and their direct links to abstract values of the society are problematized (cf. Becker 1963, pp.15, 131–132; Turner 1964, pp.382–425; Dotter & Roebuck 1988, p.24). As deviance is constructed and reconstructed in the society, norms, and their meanings, are challenged. This leads different

audiences to either reaffirm or shift the boundaries of particular symbolic-moral universes (Ben-Yehuda 2015, pp.553–554). As such, "in the process the problematic norms are negotiated, often well beyond the original act in question" (Dotter 2004, p.124).

The interactionist understanding of social norms, rules, and order seems to be close to the meta-theoretical assumptions of the so-called "discursive approaches" to norm contestation and change in IR.[62] Discursive approaches share the dynamic view of continuity and change in social structures, achieved in discursive interactions of "sentient" (thinking, speaking, doing) actors (Schmidt 2011). In accordance with the interactionist approach, norms are portrayed as intersubjectively constructed, contingent, flexible, and dynamic. From the agent-structure perspective, norms are both "constructed and structuring" (Wiener 2004, p.201): while the institutions are constantly open to both continuity and change through discursive interventions of actors, they simultaneously constrain these actors in what they think, say, and do.

In line with the interactionist theorizing, the discursive approaches to norm contestation and change in IR move away from the conception of stable norms (norms as "things") that was prevalent in the early constructivist norm research. Instead, they treat norms as *processes* (Krook & True 2012, pp.104–105). In this reflexive understanding, all norms undergo a constant development. This development takes place in relation to "external" interactions with other existing (and often competing) norms, rules, and principles, but also in relation to "internal" discursive interventions that aim to problematize and (temporarily) fix the meanings of these norms (Krook & True 2012, p.105,108; Sandholtz 2008; Müller 2013, p.11). While these discursive interventions often take a form of communicative action, they still play out in the context of the broader normative environment, pre-existing conceptions of legitimacy, precedents, and power relations (cf. Schmidt 2008; Reus-Smit 1999; Krook & True 2012).[63] Furthermore, these discursive interventions and normative change are also related to

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[62] Discursive approaches largely operate in the broader framework of political science research that Vivien Schmidt (2008; 2010; 2011) labels "discursive institutionalism". The *discourses* in these approaches are understood as "sense-making practices" that construct *meanings* of social phenomena. The focus is, nevertheless, not just on "words" actors say/write, but also on what actors "do", insofar their actions and (material) practices represent sites of meaning-production. See Epstein (2008, pp.4–6).

[63] Broader normative environment, pre-existing conceptions of legitimacy, precedents, and power relations also partly determine the outcomes of competing discursive interventions. To "prevail" in these ideational/discursive "contests", the actor must be "convincing in cognitive terms (justifiable) and persuasive in normative terms (appropriate and/or legitimate)" (Schmidt 2008, p.313). Unequal access to discourse (Fairclough 1992, p.212) in society and other power-related aspects are nevertheless still critically important to determine which ideas will

the actors' practice, that reproduces and alters the norms and their meanings in society (cf. Kratochwil 1989, p.61; Sandholtz 2008).

The key observation related to this dynamic conception of social structures is that norms, while being seemingly stable over substantive periods of time, are in fact also regularly *contested* by actors. There are different forms of normative contestation in international politics. Sometimes contestation is practiced as an explicit discursive intervention in the form of a more or less formal affirmation, objection, or deliberation; other times, contestation would take a more implicit shape when the actor simply ignores the norm or defies it. All these modes then "reflect a specific (re-)enacting of the normative structure of meaning-in-use" and are therefore "constitutive towards norm change" (Wiener & Puetter 2009, p.10); in other words, we can speak of the "norm-generative power of contestation" (Wiener 2014, p.2; cf. Tully 2002).[64]

As I already mentioned above, the IR constructivist literature on norm dynamics has often used different perspectives to study normative change: while the more conventional branch of constructivist research has been mainly preoccupied with the strength and robustness of international norms in time, some more recent streams of constructivist thought have instead focused on the changing meanings or content of international norms. In the more conventional constructivist accounts (e.g., Panke & Petersohn 2012), contestation contributes to norm degeneration and possible disappearance from world politics. Other constructivist scholars nevertheless argue that norm contestation may in fact boost the legitimacy of the norm, and therefore its strengthening in the long-run (Acharya 2013) and further advancement through conceptual clarification (Badescu & Weiss 2010). Sandholtz (2008, p.110) contends that beyond the changing meanings, the norms can end up being "weaker or stronger, more clear or less, more specific or less, more qualified by exceptions or less", as a result of discursive interventions by different stakeholders. Effectively bridging these approaches found in norm dynamics literature, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2013) suggested that there are, in fact, two main types of contestation in world politics: *justificatory* contestation, as the opposition

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eventually have a broader impact on the normative structure of the given social order (cf. Krook & True 2012, p.108; Wiener 2015, p.10; Sandholtz 2008, p.103; Schmidt 2011; Payne 2001).

[64] Antje Wiener's theory of contestation is not only analytical, but also explicitly normative. She suggests that 'contestedness' should be understood as a "meta-organising principle of governance in the global realm". To enhance and maintain legitimacy of global governance, "access to regular contestation […] needs to be facilitated […] for all involved stakeholders" (Wiener 2014, p.3). See also Wiener (2004; 2015; 2017).

towards the norm as a whole; and *applicatory* contestation, that questions the way the norm is applied. In the former, the legitimacy, appropriateness, or validity of the norm are contested. In the latter, it is the meaning of the norm that is the object of contestation. Whereas successful justificatory contestation can lead to the erosion or eventual disappearance of the norm, applicatory contestation carries the potential for the norm's strengthening (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.5).[65]

Another important distinction within the discursive approaches to norm contestation and change relates to whether the contestation and change is gradual or driven by a specific event or crisis (see Schmidt 2011, p.108). As for the latter, Müller, Fey, et al. (2013, p.141) suggest that "individual events, shocks, or traumas of a certain magnitude hold potential for triggering norm change", since "they might challenge dominant ideas and ideological paradigms, put new issues on the table that call for collective action, alter cost-benefit calculations of member states, or shake the international balance of power, and thus impact on both agency and structure"(Müller, Fey, et al. 2013, p.141). Arguably, such crises open a window of opportunity, in which actors have a chance to (more or less) fundamentally reconstruct normative standards in the given social order. It may be also an impulse for the enactment of new initiatives – e.g., laws, agreements, organizations, procedures – that solidify the norm and clarify its meaning. Furthermore, a crisis represents a "high stakes" situation, in which there is increased potential for contestation "as time constraints enhance the reduced social feedback factor" (Wiener 2008, p.64).

In this respect, Wayne Sandholtz (2008) developed a crisis-based model of cycles of norm change, driven by tensions between norms and the actual behavior of actors; due to the contingent and mostly ambiguous nature of international norms, the actions of particular actors frequently trigger disputes related to application of the given norms in practice. In consequence, "the outcome of such arguments is always to modify the norms under dispute, making them stronger or weaker, more specific (or less), broader or narrower" (Sandholtz 2008, pp.103–104; see also Sandholtz & Stiles 2009). Whereas these normative conflicts can sometimes lead to the establishment of competing normative perspectives in the international society, they also represent a unifying (and norm-bolstering) opportunity when it comes to

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[65] Despite this simple and elegant distinction, what originally starts as a justificatory contestation can sometimes also lead to the reinterpretation of the norm and thereby to the change of its original meaning. (I am indebted to Harald Müller for making this point.)

normative development; in fact, as Wiener (2017, p.11) concludes, "validity claims obtain legitimacy precisely through public dissensus."

Typology of Normative Contestation and Affirmation

In this section, I conceptualize three types of normative contestation and affirmation that take place in connection with deviance (re-)construction. Some constructivist IR scholars already pointed to the close relationship between deviance and the dynamics of international norms and order. For example, Rebecca Adler-Nissen recently proposed that

> each time international society censures some act of deviance, it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and reestablishes the boundaries of international society. Processes of stigmatization are lessons through which states teach one another what norms mean and how far they extend. Stigma helps ensure ontological security and moral cohesion. Thus, stigmatization can in itself, in controlled quantities, be a factor in maintaining international order (Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.170).

Adler-Nissen subsequently connected these assumptions with her taxonomy of stigma management strategies in international politics. Whereas *stigma recognition* – i.e. admittance of transgression – strengthens the moral cohesion of international society, *stigma rejection* questions this moral cohesion. Furthermore, *counter-stigmatization*, in which the alleged deviant "turns the stigma into an emblem of pride", leads to the split in different normative conceptions in international order (Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.155).

Chwieroth (2015) later tested these propositions in the field of international political economy and elaborated on the transformative potential of these stigma management strategies: instead of just creating competing normative conceptions, both stigma rejection and counter-stigmatization can also ignite a process that *transforms* the normative structure of international order through successful promotion of new norms or new understanding of old norms. This suggests that "deviant states" can also sometimes play a role of norm entrepreneurs in international politics, introducing new normative standards from positions that were once constructed as morally questionable (Wunderlich 2014; Wunderlich et al. 2013).

I aim to contribute to these debates by conceptually unpacking three dimensions of the process of deviance (re-)construction that drive the dynamics of international norms: (1) *applicatory* contestation and affirmation, reconstructing the meanings of international norms; (2) *justificatory* contestation and affirmation, challenging and re-affirming the legitimacy of international norms; and (3) *hierarchical* contestation and affirmation, contesting and reaffirming the relative value and importance of competing international norms.

Applicatory contestation and affirmation is based on the aforementioned assumption that social norms in general, and international norms in particular, are often (to some extent) ambiguous, vague, and open to different interpretations; in other words, norms have an "open texture" (O'Mahoney 2014a, p.839). As such, their *meanings* are contingent and subject to permanent contestation and reconstruction.[66] Ambiguity and internal contradictions necessarily lead to disputes and conflicts when norms are applied in practice through actions and behavior of actors; during these conflicts, the meanings of norms are contested and either (temporarily) fixed or reinterpreted (cf. Taylor 1993; Wiener 2004; Sandholtz 2008; Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007). In the process, actors employ *applicatory discourses* to "clarify whether (1) a norm is appropriate for a given situation and (2) which actions it requires in the specific situation" (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.5). Applicatory discourses employed by deviant actors can be treated as "oppositional" conduct, in which the actors accept the existence of normative standards and generally comply with them, yet contest the idea that the norms in question would apply in the specific case of their activity (see Daase & Deitelhoff 2014). In some cases, the deviant actors could also seek to "reform" the meaning of the norm in a progressive way, in the light of external challenges such as new technological developments or power shifts; in other cases, the argument could be more of a "renovation" of the norm, in the sense of return to the "original" meaning (Wunderlich 2014, p.134).

Justificatory contestation and affirmation is based on the assumption that norms as social objects can be questioned in terms of their legitimacy and appropriateness. As such, their general validity can be contested and affirmed in relation to vertically superordinate norms, or

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[66] Even in case of norms embedded in written and codified international treaties, the legislators who engaged in drafting the original text could hardly anticipate all possible ways how the legal agreement might be carried out in the actual states' practice (cf. Chayes & Chayes 1993, pp.188–189). Furthermore, besides these tensions 'between the generality of rules and the specificity of concrete experience', there are also frequent "conflicts between separate bodies of rules" (Sandholtz 2008, p.101), i.e. clashes between contradictory normative prescriptions. All these types of tensions necessarily lead to disputes over the 'correct' application of general norm in a specific situation (cf. Sandholtz 2007; Sandholtz & Stiles 2009; O'Mahoney 2014).

broader meta-principles of justice and fairness. As noted by Steele (2017, p.3), "norms may not only stigmatize but also generate resistance"; *justificatory discourses* employed in these normative conflicts are then not about competing meanings of these norms but instead about their legitimacy and existence as such (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2013, p.5). Justificatory discourses by deviant actors can be treated as "dissident" conduct, in which prevailing normative standards are resisted and alternative normative conceptions proposed (cf. Daase & Deitelhoff 2014; Jacobi et al. 2014). In some cases, the justificatory contestation takes a form of "revolutionary" norm entrepreneurship, which "aims at the overthrow of the prevailing system and the establishment of a new order that defines clear boundaries from the overthrown one" (Wunderlich 2014, p.89; cf. Wunderlich et al. 2013).

Finally, *hierarchical* contestation and affirmation assumes that actors of international politics operate in a complex normative environment, containing a large number of frequently competing norms, rules, and principles that actors refer to in their decision-making. The relative weight and position of individual norms in a broader normative hierarchy is not a priori determined but instead contested and affirmed in normative conflicts when norms are applied in actors' practice. Deviant actors then often employ *ordering discourses*, implicitly or explicitly reconstructing the relative super- and sub-ordinate positions of norms, rules, and general principles in social order. As such, through ordering discourses actors do not contest the meaning or the legitimacy of the norm, but instead its inferiority vis-à-vis a superior normative standard (see Table II.).

Table II. Typology of Normative Contestation and Affirmation

Type	Discourse	Target
applicatory contestation and affirmation	applicatory discourses	*meanings* of norms and rules
justificatory contestation and affirmation	justificatory discourses	*legitimacy* of norms and rules
hierarchical contestation and affirmation	ordering discourses	*relative weight/position* of norms and rules

Depending on the outcome of individual stigma contests, these three types of contestation and affirmation help to clarify what is the "new normal" in the given normative order. They can also be linked to the relevant dimensions of stigma politics discussed in the previous chapter. The discursive interventions that contest and affirm international norms take place in the dialectical dynamics in the *nexus* between the deviant actor and the audience(s). Within this nexus, they are communicated through s*tigma imposition*, *stigma management,* and *stigma reversal* processes; and they are dependent on pre-existing *power* configurations and at the same time their results affect ex-post power configurations.

The *stigma imposition – stigma management* dialectics represents the discursive core of normative contestation in the process of stigma politics. In stigma imposition, the stigma message provides a *norm linkage* that discursively connects the alleged transgression with specific rules, norms, and principles. Hence, through *applicatory* contestation and affirmation, the rule enforcing audience re-enacts the linkage between a specific action, behavior, or practice, with the specific meaning of a specific norm or norms; and, at the same time, contests alternative meanings of such norm(s) that would justify the deviant's behavior. Through *justificatory* contestation and affirmation, the audience implicitly or explicitly re-affirms the validity of the norm and defends its legitimacy in the given social order. Finally, through *hierarchical* contestation and affirmation, the audience discursively re-enacts the sub- and super-ordinate positions of individual norms and principles in a way that supports the intersubjective construction of the given conduct as deviant.

Particular *stigma management* strategies are closely tied to individual types of normative contestation and affirmation:

- *Applicatory rejection* presupposes the use of applicatory discourses, through which the alleged deviant recognizes the legitimacy of the norm in question, yet denies that the specific attribute or behavior would represent a violation of that norm. As such, the alleged transgressor engages in *applicatory* contestation of the specific meaning of the norm in favor of an alternative meaning that would make his conduct normatively appropriate. This process sometimes involves also the employment of ordering discourses that suggest that the deviance claim does not apply in the specific case because of the super-ordinate applicability of another norm, rule, or principle (*hierarchical* contestation).

- *Justificatory rejection*, on the other hand, involves the use of justificatory discourses, contesting the validity of the norm as such. This *justificatory* contestation often involves

attempts to de-normalize and delegitimize prevalent normative beliefs, rejecting them in favor of alternative normative conceptions that are constructed as "more just" (see Crawford 2004, pp.101–103). The discursive practices of (self-)isolation and creation of social buffers also represent a type of *justificatory* contestation, in which the alleged deviant resists the rules of the game as such and instead promotes alternative normative conceptions.

- *Neutralization* is a stigma management strategy that sometimes involves the use of *ordering* discourses. The "appeal to higher loyalties" (Sykes & Matza 1957) can be also considered a form of *hierarchical* contestation, in which the alleged deviant justifies his norm-violating conduct with reference to other norms that received preference in the given situation. In effect, whether explicitly or implicitly, actors reconstruct the mutual positioning of individual norms in the broader normative hierarchy.

- *Normalization* differs from the other stigma management strategies in that it re-affirms the "normal" interpretation of the meaning of the norm, reinforces the validity of the norm, and re-enacts the links between norms in the broader normative hierarchy. As such, normalization is a strategy of *applicatory*, *justificatory*, and *hierarchical* affirmation, contributing to the stability and reproduction of international order.

The process of *stigma reversal* has a potential to substantially change the norms when the whole deviant category is de-stigmatized and reconstructed as normal and appropriate in the given social order. More often, however, stigma reversal involves a de-stigmatization and normalization of a specific "deviant", either reaffirming the prior rules of the order (through *applicatory*, *justificatory*, and *hierarchical* affirmation) or partly changing the rules in a way that the deviant can newly "fit in".

Finally, the occurrence of "deviant events" (Dotter 2002) also provides a window of opportunity for moral entrepreneurs to take specific actions that would bolster the authority of the norm or make its meaning more precise. In international politics, norm violations are usually seen as prominent crises of international regimes and therefore something that the states and international organizations feel both obliged and justified to react to. As such, when norms are violated, the actors find themselves in a more legitimate position to introduce new laws, rules, and institutions, as well as new mechanisms of social control. This event-driven social reconstruction then contributes to the broader process of *applicatory*, *justificatory*, and/or *hierarchical* contestation and affirmation.

Contested Normative Structure of International Order

How to use the aforementioned conceptual apparatus given the complexity of international environment? To convincingly apply interactionist approach to deviance in international politics, one need to assume a perspective that contemporary inter-state relations resemble *society* in the sociological sense, and the states operate within a distinct social *order*.[67] An argument about the existence of modern *international society* has indeed been one of the hallmark ideas of English School of IR, later incorporated in most IR constructivist accounts. Hedley Bull, one of the main English School theorists, suggested that international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull 1977, p.13). The shared goals of such international society are then sustained by patterned behavior in mutual interaction, an international order (Bull 1977, pp.3–4, 8; cf. Bull & Watson 1984, pp.1–9; Dunne 2003; Suganami 2003; Dunne & Reus-Smit 2017).

The existence of international society and international order is necessarily tied to the existence of shared norms of proper behavior. These norms then form complex *normative structures*, in which individual norms, rules, and broader moral principles are mutually interconnected. Wayne Sandholtz, for example, suggests that:

> the word 'structure' is appropriate for describing the larger whole created by relationships among rules. Those relationships can be of various kinds. Some norms are linked hierarchically, with a broad rule delineating standards of conduct for a general class of actor (vehicle drivers, say) and subordinate rules governing narrower sub-categories (freight haulers, for example). Some rules clarify the application of other rules in specific circumstances, creating exceptions, for instance. Some rules establish means of enforcing other rules, authorizing (and delimiting the permissible conduct of) police, judges, and jailers. Links among rules are therefore not random but patterned, or structured (Sandholtz 2007, p.6).

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[67] The existence of *order* allows for the patterned and predictable social interactions, something that all societies arguably need for the exercise of their basic functions. Cf. Lebow (2008, p.4).

In the discursive approaches that study relationships between contestation and the dynamics of international norms, these normative structures are then "constituted by discursive interventions that secure the (re)construction of the values, norms and rules entailed in [them]" (Wiener 2004, p.190).

Several IR scholars attempted to provide an analytical dissection of normative structures that would account for the complexity of both vertical and horizontal relationships among individual norms in international order. As such, these scholars also aimed to provide and apply conceptual tools that would facilitate analysis of the specific normative dynamics. Kersbergen & Verbeek (2007), for example, used the original concepts of international regime theory: the distinction among principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures (cf. Krasner 1982). Jackson (2004) suggested to distinguish between "procedural" and "prudential" norms of the global covenant, contrasting between political principle and political virtue. Crawford (2004, pp.86–92) differentiates between substantive, procedural, constitutive, and meta-normative "normative beliefs" (i.e., beliefs about right and wrong), and "behavioral norms" (i.e., dominant practices).

To study the relationship between contestation and changes in normative structures in my dissertation, I opted for the application of Antje Wiener's (2008) typology of *fundamental norms*, *organizing principles*, and *standardized procedures*. The three types of norms differ in the degree of specificity: whereas fundamental norms represent the most general, abstract, "constitutional" norms of international politics (e.g., non-intervention), organizing principles are already more concrete standards tied to political processes (e.g., gender mainstreaming or responsibility to protect); standardized procedures are then the most specific rules and regulations (e.g., the rules of qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union). There is also a vertical logic that links the fundamental norms on the macro level with organizing principles on the meso-level and standardized procedures on the micro-level: the most abstract norms are often reflected and referred to in more specific political processes, which are then implemented through already very concrete regulations (cf. Wiener 2008, pp.65–68; Wiener 2014, pp.35–39; Wiener 2017).

Whereas this three-level typology can be applied on the normative structure of international politics as such, I argue that it is also suitable to study sub-ordinate normative structures of specific areas of international conduct such as international finance system or, as I do in this dissertation, global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Norms in these lower-level

normative structures then still interact – converge or possibly clash – with norms in the higher-order normative structure of international politics. Fundamental norms of international politics such as rule of law then serve as meta-norms for the lower-order normative structures; in other words, they serve as general guidelines for social life in an international realm and therefore serve as normative guidance for (re)constructions of normative structures of individual international regimes (cf. Müller 2013, pp.5–7; Sandholtz 2007, pp.21–22; Wiener 2017). The three types of norms in specific issue-areas can also be discursively linked to fundamental institutions: bulks of rules, norms, and practices that guide state action in international society, for example diplomacy, balance of power, or war (cf. Bull 1977; Reus-Smit 1999). Finally, all the norms and institutions of international order are linked to even more super-ordinate meta-norms of 'general order' of human conduct, such as the principles of justice and fairness that have arguably underpinned the normative structures of *all* political orders across cultures and time-epochs (cf. Lebow 2008, p.6; Reus-Smit 1999, p.34; Müller 2011c) – see Figure I.

Figure I. Vertical Structure of International Order

Meta-norms of general order

⬆

Meta-norms and institutions of international order

⬆

Ordinary norms of the specific international regime	
Level	*Type*
Macro	Fundamental norms
Meso	Organizing principles
Micro	Standardized procedures

According to Wiener (2008, p.66; 2015, p.3), norms on the macro-level of normative structure are, in principle, more likely to be contested, as they do not offer a sufficient number of "normative grids", reference points created through the practice of individual stake-holders.[68] However, if we take into account the three aforementioned types of normative affirmation and

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[68] In Wiener's theory of contestation, the norms on the meso-level represent an area of "legitimacy gap" in global governance that ought to be closed through regular access to contestation available for all stake-holders. See Wiener (2014).

change that take place in the process of deviance (re)construction, it seems likely that the intensity of contestation on individual levels of normative structures differ according to the logic of the individual types of contestation. It is plausible to expect that fundamental norms on the macro-level are least likely to be object of justificatory contestation as they are widely shared and accepted as legitimate principles of global governance; however, they are the most likely to be object of applicatory contestation, as they are the least specific and the most ambiguous in their meaning. Conversely, standardized procedures on the micro-level are least likely to be object of applicatory contestation, as they are the most specific and the least ambiguous in their meaning; at the same time, they are the most likely to be object of justificatory contestation as they can be easily rejected by actors *in toto*, portrayed as clashing with higher-order norms or meta-norms. Hierarchical contestation takes place on all levels in a similar pace as it is based on relative positioning: higher-order norms (across normative structures) are contested (and affirmed) as super-ordinate to lower-order norms, and vice versa.

As I demonstrate in the empirical part of this dissertation, these dynamics can be well observable in the discourse of actors in individual sectors of international affairs. In the case of my field of interest – the global nuclear non-proliferation regime – the principled validity of fundamental nuclear norms such as "non-proliferation" or "disarmament" is hardly ever questioned. However, what it *means* to act in violation of disarmament norm has been subject to perpetual contestation between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Then, once we move this debate on the micro-level of normative structure, we can observe that for example standardized procedures of the IAEA Additional Protocol are relatively clear to all the participants. Yet, the attempts to reconstruct the Additional Protocol as the obligatory standard of the regime have been met with strong resistance from many states of the Non-Aligned Movement, contesting the legitimacy of such normative innovation with reference to the meta-norm of sovereignty. As such, the discursive practices in the nuclear non-proliferation regime reveal the multiple patterns of contestation and affirmation, referring not just to the ordinary norms of the regime, but also to the general normative standards of international order.

Conclusion

Since the inauguration of new U.S. administration of President Trump, journalists, policy analysts, and politicians alike have been frequently invoking the notion of "rules-based

international order", as a post-WWII constant that is now supposedly being subject to a rapid change. However, many IR scholars have previously observed that the normative structure of international order is, in fact, dynamically developing all the time – as new norms and rules appear, old ones disappear or simply acquire new meanings to better adapt to altered circumstances. Since the 1990s, the international norm dynamics has become one of the major topics in the IR discipline.

In this chapter, my aim was to provide the reader with a critical review of IR literature dealing with norm dynamics and norm violations – the topics that are closely related to the subject matter of my dissertation. Within this impressive pile of scholarship, I particularly highlighted the latest constructivist literature on norm contestation and change and demonstrated the compatibility of this sub-set of IR literature with the interactionist perspective in sociology. Eclectically fusing the two theoretical streams, I theorized the link between deviance, contestation, and the dynamics of international norms. Specifically, I conceptually unpacked three types of normative contestation and affirmation that take place as a part of the process of deviance (re)construction: (1) applicatory contestation and affirmation, reconstructing the meanings of international norms through applicatory discourses; (2) justificatory contestation and affirmation, challenging and reaffirming the legitimacy of international norms through justificatory discourses; and (3) hierarchical contestation and affirmation, contesting and reaffirming the relative value and importance of competing international norms through ordering discourses. I also linked these three types of contestation and affirmation to the individual components of stigma politics introduced in the previous chapter and integrated those concepts into a coherent analytical frame. Finally, I demonstrated how this whole process operates on different levels of normative structure of world order, with respect to the stability and change of fundamental norms, organizing principles, and standardized procedures.

In the broader theoretical framework of this dissertation, this chapter provides the missing link between the operations of stigma politics and the dynamics of international norms. In chapter 4, I use the insights from this chapter to analytically reconstruct the normative structure of the global nuclear order and the "nonproliferation game". Furthermore, in each empirical case study (chapters 5, 6, and 7), I include a section called *Game and Rules*, in which I use the logic of the three types of normative contestation and affirmation to examine normative stasis and change with respect to the individual cases of "nuclear deviance".

However, it is probably worth highlighting that the conceptual apparatus introduced in this and the previous chapter is not by any means tailored strictly to the specific area of global nuclear diplomacy – instead, it is designed in a way to allow study of the dynamics of deviance and normative change in any sector of international affairs.

4. On Nuclear (Dis-)Order

Ever since the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima ushered in what is often dubbed the "atomic age" or the "nuclear era," people have obsessed about the potential for massive, even civilization-ending, destruction seemingly inherent in the weapon exploded there. Over the decades this obsession has variously focused on an endless array of creative, if consistently unfulfilled, worst-case scenarios deriving from fears about the cold war arms race, nuclear apocalypse, and the proliferation of the weapons to unreliable states (or even to reliable ones). (Mueller 2010, p.ix)

The quote from the preface to John Mueller's controversial book is mocking the decades-long obsession of scholars, journalists, and politicians with the exaggerated dangers of nuclear weapons. Despite Mueller's arguments that such "nuclear alarmism" is unfounded and largely irrational, the fact is that since 1945, international community has gone to great lengths to prevent nuclear Armageddon from taking place. In today's world politics, most states are subject to the rules of global nuclear institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while the violations of these rules are largely considered some of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

The aim of this chapter is to bridge the theoretical and empirical parts of the dissertation and provide the reader with a broader context of norms, rules, and order in global nuclear politics. The "nonproliferation game", a subject of my inquiry in this dissertation, was defined in the introductory chapter as a continuously negotiated techno-political order that aims to create and sustain a patterned behavior of states with respect to the global diffusion of nuclear technology. The game takes place primarily within the international regime that revolves around the NPT, but also across the more encompassing *global nuclear order*, a bulk of norms, rules, practices, and institutions that underpin the international dimension of nuclear affairs. In the logic of my research design, understanding the contingent and dynamic character of nuclear order and the normative structure of nonproliferation game allows me to apply my general theoretical perspective in individual empirical cases.

The existence of order also logically implies a possibility of *disorder*. If nuclear norms and rules are the building blocks of nuclear order, the violation of these norms and rules can be interpreted as disorderly, *deviant* behavior. As such, besides examining the normative structure of nuclear politics, I also aim to identify major patterns of deviance in nuclear affairs and highlight the prominent cases of norm violations in nuclear order since its institutionalization in the late 1960s. Once again, this should provide the broader context to the specific cases of "nuclear deviance" in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

In this chapter, I proceed as follows. First, I briefly discuss the historical constitution of nuclear order as it gradually emerged after the Second World War. Second, I review the dominant perspectives on nuclear order in contemporary nuclear scholarship. Third, I use the conceptual framework from the previous chapter to reconstruct a normative structure that underpins the nonproliferation game. Fourth, I elaborate on the contestedness of nuclear order with respect to ambiguous concepts, clashing norms, and technological change. Fifth, I highlight notable patterns of deviant behavior in nuclear politics of the last few decades, with respect to nuclear "outsiders", "rogues", and "keepers". Finally, in a brief conclusion, I discuss the findings of this chapter and how they relate to the goals of my dissertation.

Emergence of Nuclear Order

In this section, I aim to briefly elaborate on the historical constitution of global nuclear order. In the macro perspective, I treat *nuclear order* as nested within the broader *international order* (cf. Walker 2004, p.9; Müller et al. 1994, p.8). Nonetheless, the unique character of nuclear technology and its undisputed political relevance provide nuclear order with a privileged position in international affairs.[69]

The unprecedented destructive character of nuclear weapons demonstrated in August 1945 during the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki arguably brought about a strong ordering imperative towards nuclear technology in international politics. As early as 1946, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed its very first resolution to establish the Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), with the objective "to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy" (UNGA 1946). In the same year, the United States put forward a proposal for

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[69] On the notion of *"nuclear exceptionalism"*, see Hecht (2012).

the establishment of international control over nuclear arms, widely known as the Baruch plan (see Gerber 1982). However, both the U.S. proposal and the Soviet counter-offer eventually fell prey to the Cold War competition and mistrust between the two ideological blocks; and so did the 1957 Rapacki plan that would establish a regional nuclear-free zone in Central Europe (see Stefancic 1988; Ozinga 1989).

Despite these failed formal attempts, the 1940s and 1950s still saw a birth of some early norms, practices, and institutions that were highly relevant to the later establishment of global nuclear order. Perhaps most importantly, the Korean war and its aftermath led to the gradual emergence of informal norm of nuclear non-use in military conflicts (cf. Tannenwald 2007, chaps. 4–5; Paul 2009, chap. 3). Furthermore, the 1957 Atoms for Peace speech and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM established possible pathways for the future international control of fissile materials and the global diffusion of nuclear technology (Smith 1987, p.259).

The 1960s was arguably the period when nuclear order took shape through the incremental sedimentation of arms control practices and the establishment of several formal initiatives. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis that could have resulted in all-out nuclear war, the United States and the Soviet Union laid the foundations to the practice of bilateral strategic arms control. The (originally reluctant) Soviets eventually accepted the idea, successfully promoted by the U.S. strategic expert community (see Adler 1992), that the relationship of the two nuclear superpowers should be built upon the logic of strategic stability achieved through mutual nuclear deterrence and a "realistic" approach to nuclear reductions. The 1963 "Hot Line Agreement" and the subsequent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that culminated in the signature of the 1972 SALT I Interim agreement and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty represented the first attempts to formally institutionalize the emerging practice of bilateral nuclear arms control.[70]

In the same period, we could also observe a gradual institutionalization of arms control practices in multilateral setting. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty reflect three important trends in the dynamics

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[70] For the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of strategic arms control idea, see Schelling and Halperin (1961), Bull (1961), Brennan (1961), and Jervis (1993). For the emergence and spread of the arms control idea and its institutionalization in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, see Adler (1992), Krause and Latham (1998), and Tannenwald (1999a).

of nuclear order: a regional approach (that continued in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco and the following agreements establishing regional nuclear weapon-free zones); a limitation of nuclear testing (that continued in the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the subsequent efforts to negotiate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – CTBT); and a domain-control (that continued in the 1972 Seabed Treaty).

However, the key multilateral achievement in the context of emerging global nuclear order was arguably the successful negotiation of the NPT. In early 1960s, the U.S. Department of Defense prepared a secret memorandum for President on the increasing pace and danger of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation in the next years and decades; in this very context, President Kennedy made his famous speech about the United States having to face a world with "15 or 20 or 25" nuclear-armed nations in the next decade (Kennedy 1963). The need for a multilateral solution to the "non-proliferation problem" emerged hand in hand with the growing pressure to open doors to a truly global diffusion of civilian nuclear power (Walker 2012, p.73). The Soviets eventually joined the United States in this endeavor in the fear of possible nuclear weapons acquisition by West Germany and Japan, and the establishment of NATO multilateral nuclear force (cf. Krause 2007b, p.488; Walker 2012, p.74; Simpson 1994, p.22). Eventually, the process which started in the 1959 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) "Irish" resolution culminated in the 1968 signature of the NPT by 62 states. By 2016, the number of states that both signed and ratified the treaty has reached 190, with only India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan currently being non-signatories.[71]

The details of the NPT negotiation are discussed in more detail elsewhere.[72] In brief, there were arguably three key innovations in the NPT that laid the foundation for the emerging nuclear order. First, the NPT established two categories of states with different rights and obligations according to the treaty: *nuclear-weapon states* (NWS), defined as the ones that tested nuclear weapons before 1967(UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968), i.e. the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China; and *non-nuclear-weapon states* (NNWS), i.e. all the other signatories. Second, the NPT set a number of (more or less specific) prescriptions and proscriptions for the aforementioned categories of states;

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[71] North Korea is the only state that had acceded to the NPT and later withdrew.
[72] See for example Burns (1969), Epstein (1976), Unger (1976), Shaker (1980), Nye (1981), Müller et al. (1994, chap.2), Bourantonis (1997), Paul (2003), Krause (2007b), Bunn and Rhinelander (2008), Walker (2012, chap.3), and Popp, Horovitz, and Wenger (2016).

conventionally, they have been treated as the three normative pillars of the treaty, with respect to the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, the peaceful nuclear use, and finally the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament.[73] Third, the NPT established a system of quinquennial conferences that would "review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968).[74]

Together with the regional nuclear weapon-free zone agreements (see Goldblat 1997; Thakur 1998), the NPT and its review process have laid foundations to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime (Nye 1981, p.16; cf. Keeley 1990).[75] In the heart of this regime also lies the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, joined by a sheer number of supportive institutions, initiatives, international treaties, practices, declarations, resolutions, trade agreements, and pieces of domestic legislation in individual states, that have emerged over the course of the last few decades (cf. Fischer 1987; Smith 1987; Biswas 2014, chap.1; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013). Among them are also the "non-proliferation clubs" such as the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, or Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) (see Müller et al. 2014).

The NPT-based non-proliferation regime represents the key component of the global nuclear order, and arguably remains the main source of normative dynamics within this order (cf. Walker 2007b, p.432). As I highlight below, the regime itself has evolved quite dynamically since the early 1970s, implementing new rules, initiatives, and procedures to adapt to new requirements of states as well as to changes in the external environment. A key point in the regime's evolution was the 1995 agreement of the state parties to extend the (originally twenty-five years) duration of the NPT indefinitely, as a part of the "package deal" that included the strengthening of the review process and introduction of new "principles and objectives" to

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[73] The obligations of NWS in peaceful nuclear use and disarmament pillars are frequently interpreted as a grand "bargain", that had justified the fact that NNWS pledged to permanently forgo an option to develop their own nuclear weapons. For a critique of the notion of an NPT bargain as merely a "prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school", see Krause (2007b; cf. Gilinsky & Sokolski 2017).

[74] William Walker argues that "most state parties had by now come to regard the NPT [Review] Conference as a quasi-legislative assembly with authority to set the broad agenda" (Walker 2007b, chap.439; cf. Walker 2007a, chap.750). On the legal and policy dimensions of NPT Review Conferences, see Stoiber (2003).

[75] Shampa Biswas suggests that beyond the declared goal of solving the "problem of nuclear weapons", global nuclear non-proliferation regime also "helps to constitute a certain rendition of the problem of nuclear weapons that serves a global ordering function" (Biswas 2014, p.74). See also Ruzicka (2017).

assess the implementation of the NPT provisions (NPT/CONF.1995/32 1995; cf. Jayantha Dhanapala & Rydell 2005; Welsh 1995; Rauf & Johnson 1995).

The issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament have been also dealt with within the Conference on Disarmament.[76] Furthermore, the adoption of the CTBT or the 2016 resolution on the nuclear ban treaty negotiation were subject to a general vote in the UNGA.[77] Finally, in 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided the advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, suggesting, *inter alia,* that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (ICJ 1996; cf. Matheson 1997; Heffernan 1998).

Scholarly Perspectives

Nuclear scholarship has generally accepted the idea that a certain kind of order had gradually evolved in global nuclear affairs. Furthermore, nuclear scholars broadly acknowledge the importance of the NPT as the normative cornerstone of this order, even if they usually understand global nuclear order as including also the NPT non-members. Nevertheless, the contemporary nuclear scholarship still approaches this subject from different, and sometimes principally competing, perspectives.

Perhaps the most famous depiction of nuclear order comes from the British scholar William Walker (2000; 2004; 2007a; 2012). Walker portrayed global nuclear order as comprising of the two interlinked systems: a managed system of deterrence and a managed system of abstinence. In the system of deterrence, a "recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound"; in the system of abstinence, "other states would give up their sovereign rights to develop, hold and use such weapons in return for economic, security and other benefits" (Walker 2000, p.706; cf. Harrington & Englert 2014). The two systems would be connected through "normative and instrumental tissue", including reciprocal

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[76] The work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had stalled for more than a decade since the late 1990s due to the inability of member states to agree on the program of work. The key item on the agenda of this forum has been (for several decades) the negotiation of Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The treaty is, however, still in the stage of preliminary debates rather than actual negotiation, mostly due to the opposition of Pakistan. See for example Meyer (2011).

[77] On the role of UN in nuclear order, see Boulden et al. (2009).

obligation, NPT norms, rules, bargains, security guarantees, cooperative institutions, and shared narratives (Walker 2012, p.84). Walker also suggested, not unproblematically, that the international construction of these two systems can be understood as a progressive, cooperative project based on the ideal of "enlightenment", in which "the commitment to disarmament represents a direction of travel—towards an increased political and instrumental restraint, now serving the avoidance of both nuclear war and catastrophic terrorism" (Walker 2007b, p.451).

Scholars who draw on the English School conception of world order sometimes have a similar tendency to depict the existing global nuclear order as progressively expanding in the context of the more general normative expansion of international society. For example, Ogilvie-White (2010) argued that there has been a long-term trend within the nuclear non-proliferation regime towards a consensus on how to respond to regime threats, and a greater willingness among states to sacrifice a certain amount of their sovereignty in favor of more intrusive regime rules. This development can then be seen as a parcel of the more general "shift from 'pluralist' to 'solidarist' international society" (Ogilvie-White 2010, p.118; cf. Wheeler 1992; Makinda 2010). Elsewhere, Ogilvie-White also stressed Walker's earlier point about the importance of great powers (the United States in particular) in maintaining order that unquestionably contributes to the common good (Ogilvie-White 2013).[78]

The aforementioned depiction of nuclear order as a common "enlightenment project" of global community has not been accepted without opposition. In the special issue of *International Affairs* on this subject,[79] Joachim Krause critiqued Walker's argument as "an example of how ideological tenets have taken over today's liberal arms control school" (Krause 2007b, p.485). Krause portrays a more pragmatic, actor-specific interest-driven picture of global nuclear order that is in contrast with "myth-based" liberal arms control perspective. In particular, he contests the notion of a disarmament "bargain" between the NWS and NNWS as something that does not reflect the historical positions of individual countries in the NPT negotiations. Krause contends that

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[78] Hedley Bull – likely the most prominent English School scholar – was himself sometimes vary about hegemonic tendencies of Western states in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and explicitly recommended to pursue a "Low Posture" doctrine, "in which nuclear countries can best contribute to the management of proliferation by attempting to minimize the gap that separates them from the non-nuclear" (Bull 1987, p.207). At the same time, he viewed the existing conception of nuclear order as largely beneficial and criticized the unsatisfied Third World countries for the inability to formulate a coherent alternative conception (Bull 1987, pp.195–196).
[79] See also Roberts (2007) and Hassner (2007).

the NPT is a treaty that was agreed upon as a measure to stop horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation, but it has never been a disarmament treaty. It is a treaty with unequal obligations and it might even be called an unfair treaty. But it has found broad support because the huge majority of states know that without this treaty their security would be diminished. (Krause 2007b, p.492)

A similar reasoning was applied in Horovitz's (2015) critique of the widespread pessimistic assessments of the future of nuclear order. It is also prominent in the recent writings of Elbridge Colby, who views the contemporary status quo nuclear order as "malleable, responsive, and realistic", and certainly less hazardous than alternative nuclear abolition scenarios (Colby 2015).

On the other hand, much of the existing nuclear scholarship problematizes *particularly* the existing status quo in the global nuclear order. Authors such as Albin (2001, chap.6), Müller (2010a; 2017; cf. Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013), and Tannenwald (2013) highlight the justice/fairness-driven normative conflicts in the contemporary nuclear order, and the resulting erosion of legitimacy of this order (cf. Rathbun 2006; Doyle II 2010; Perkovich 2008; Dalton et al. 2016; Acheson 2016).[80] Similarly, Ken Booth critiques the idea of "indefinite nuclearism" with reference to its incompatibility with the culture of human rights (Booth 1999a; 1999b; on the perils of nuclear status quo, see also Hanson 2002; Thakur 2000).

The introduction of various critical perspectives from sociology and continental philosophy to IR also led some nuclear scholars to apply these perspectives as analytical lens to study the dynamics of nuclear order (for an overview, see Burke 2016a). For example, Jasper (2016) employed a conceptual toolbox developed by French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu to interpret global nuclear order as a "quasi-religious field" with its own stabilizing ceremonies, myths, and practices (cf. Marin 1987). In a much earlier account, Keeley (1988; 1990) provided a reading of the non-proliferation order from the "power/knowledge" perspective of Michel Foucault. Peoples (2016) discussed the scope of nuclear critique in IR and the role of "nutopianism" in nuclear order. Burke (2016b) studied the temporal dimension of nuclear order through the hybrid of post-structural and new materialist perspective. Harrington (2009) focused on the phenomenon of "nuclear fetishism" in world order, in which nuclear weapons

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[80] In this regard, Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010) point to the importance of "trusting relationships" among states in the NPT regime, that need to be sustained (and preferably bolstered) in order to prevent the erosion of international nuclear order. For a critique, see Bluth (2012).

function as the "currency of power" (see also Harrington 2016). Finally, several authors employ a post-colonial perspective to denounce the global nuclear order as a predominantly Western conception that has aimed to establish a form of a "nuclear apartheid" vis-à-vis the Third World states (cf. Singh 1998a; Krause & Latham 1998; Biswas 2001; Biswas 2014; Maddock 2010; Das 2012a; Mathur 2014; Mathur 2015).

Structure of the Game

In this section, I draw on the theoretical perspective elaborated in the previous chapter to analytically reconstruct the normative structure of the "nonproliferation game". The nonproliferation game can be defined as a continuously negotiated techno-political order that aims to create and sustain a patterned behavior of states with respect to the global diffusion of nuclear technology.[81] The game takes place primarily *within* the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also *across* the more encompassing global nuclear order. The nuclear order itself is then nested within the international order, and the general social order as such (cf. Walker 2004, p.9; Müller et al. 1994, p.8) – see Figure II.

Figure II. Playfield of the Nonproliferation Game

General Social Order

International Order

Global Nuclear Order

Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime

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
[81] Ursula Jasper uses the similar notion of a "technopolitical negotiated order", which is "based on ongoing processes of re-negotiation, re-affirmation or re-configuration" (Jasper 2016, p.3).

The NPT represents the main, albeit not the only, source of the rules of the nonproliferation game. Drawing on Antje Wiener's (2008; 2014; 2017) vertical typology of norms in international order, I provide an interpretation of the normative structure of nonproliferation game consisting of macro-level *fundamental norms*, implemented in meso-level *organizing principles*, and eventually micro-level *standardized procedures*. In Table III., I provide a simplified depiction of this normative structure, followed by more detailed discussion of individual norms and rules.

Table III. Normative Structure of the Nonproliferation Game

Fundamental Norms	Non-proliferation	Peaceful nuclear use	Disarmament	Deterrence	Military Non-use	Universality
Organizing Principles	IAEA safeguards, NWFZ, NSA, extended deterrence, export control rules, counterproliferation, enforcement					
	IAEA technical assistance, bilateral trade agreements, transparency (CSA, AP), non-enrichment/non-reprocessing/multilateral fuel bank, PNE					
	comprehensive test-ban/nuclear non-testing, strategic arms control, irreversible stockpile reductions, role reduction, halt of warhead/fissile material production, multilateral arms control, NWS transparency, NWFZ, legal ban, general and complete disarmament					
	NWS declaratory policies, civilian oversight, strategic force postures, strategic arms control					
	principles for institutional membership and withdrawal (NPT, IAEA Board of Governors, export control clubs etc.), universalization, treaty extension/transformation					
Standardized Procedures	standardized procedures of the IAEA, NSG, Zangger Committee, Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, etc., specific rules of U.S.-Russian strategic arms control treaties, NPT Articles VIII.-X., standardized nominating and voting procedures of the IAEA, individual export control clubs etc.					

Fundamental Norms

I propose that the global non-proliferation order is built on six fundamental norms: (1) non-proliferation; (2) peaceful use; (3) disarmament; (4) deterrence; (5) military non-use; and (6) universality. The three fundamental norms are enshrined (with different level of specificity) in the individual articles of the NPT and they are also frequently referred to as the three "pillars" of the treaty. In contrast, the fundamental norms of deterrence and military non-use have gradually evolved through states' practice since 1945 (although they are also regularly referred to in key policy documents). The fundamental norm of universality was ascribed in the NPT preamble and it has been an inseparable part of NPT dynamics ever since.

As a truly international norm, *non-proliferation* emerged during the 1960s and has become formally validated in the NPT.[82] The treaty preamble states a cause-effect conviction that "proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war", and therefore the NPT aims to prevent the "wider dissemination of nuclear weapons" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968). In the first two articles, the NPT has established the key rules for non-proliferation norm: the rules of non-assistance for NWS (proscribing transfer of nuclear weapons to other recipients and any kind of assistance to NNWS with nuclear weapons acquisition; NPT Article I), the rules of abstinence for NNWS (proscribing acquisition of nuclear weapons; NPT Article II), and the rules of institutional control for both NWS and NNWS (prescribing the acceptance of IAEA safeguards for NNWS nuclear activities, and proscribing all states to export fissionable material or relevant equipment unless these are subject to IAEA safeguards; NPT Article III).

The fundamental norm of *peaceful use* has emerged in the international context of the establishment of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the "Atoms for Peace" speech, and the foundation of the IAEA. The norm reflects a key distinction in global nuclear order between the use of nuclear energy for "bad" (i.e., military) and "good" (i.e., civilian) purposes. Unlike the dissemination of nuclear weapons that has been widely recognized as a major global threat, the spread of nuclear technology for electricity production and scientific purposes has been predominantly hailed as largely beneficial.[83] During the NPT negotiations, the support for the expansion of civilian nuclear trade and assistance was frequently constructed as a post-colonial issue that would enhance the economic development of Third World countries (cf. Hecht 2007, pp.102–103). The norm itself was formally validated in the NPT preamble and then Article IV., which asserts an "inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article IV, Para 1). However, the same paragraph

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[82] For an excellent discussion of the metaphor of proliferation with respect to the spread of weapons, see Mutimer (2000) and Pelopidas (2011; 2015). In spite of occasional theories of beneficial systemic and sub-systemic effects of horizontal spread of nuclear weapons (the so-called "proliferation optimism" – e.g., Waltz (1981; 2012) and Mearsheimer (1990; 1993)), the vast majority of scholars, experts, international organizations, and governments subscribe to "proliferation pessimism": an idea that the spread of nuclear weapons is a dangerous phenomenon with strictly negative consequences for international security and order. See also Feaver (1993; 1995; 1997), Lavoy (1995), Knopf (2002), Karl (2011), Sagan & Waltz (2012), Cohen (2016), and Smetana, Ludvik, Sokolski, & Krepon (2017) .

[83] This is not to suggest that there is no political resistance to civilian use of nuclear energy. However, the notion of the beneficial, peaceful use of nuclear energy has been central to the normative logic of the NPT and the global nuclear order as such.

also states "conformity with Articles I and II" as the condition for peaceful use. Furthermore, Article IV. prescribes that "all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article IV, Para 2). Guided by the logic of post-colonial economic development, these efforts should be especially directed towards the NNWS "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article IV, Para 2).[84]

Disarmament is arguably the most contested fundamental norm of contemporary nuclear order. The very first resolution of UNGA in 1946 called for the "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons", and the notion of disarmament has been a common rhetorical device in Cold War political proclamations. However, among the fundamental norms enshrined in the NPT, disarmament has received the shortest and the most ambiguous formal validation of the three. The heavily contested NPT Article VI. prescribes all parties to the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article VI).[85] The meaning of this article has been subject to numerous interpretations over the course of the last few decades. There were also many attempts to make the normative prescriptions and proscriptions more specific, most prominently in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 1995), the "Thirteen Steps" in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (UNODA 2000, pp.14–15), and the 2010 NPT Review Conference "Action Plan" (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010a, pp.19–24; cf. Mukhatzhanova 2013; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, p.55). Nuclear disarmament, as the fundamental norm of the nuclear order, has also been formally validated

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[84] Hecht (2012, p.102) suggests that "the NPT's text offered a worldview that conjoined Cold War moral injunctions (to avoid planetary destruction) with postcolonial ones (to transcend the sociotechnical injustices of the colonial order)." See also Hecht (2006, p.327).

[85] Although nuclear disarmament itself naturally presupposes a qualitatively different effort by the NWS than NNWS, the fact that the article VI. has been explicitly formulated as an effort of both NWS and NNWS has been often omitted in nuclear debates. See Sagan (2009a), cf. Sagan et al. (2010).

in the aforementioned ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ 1996), and in numerous resolutions of the UNGA and other international bodies.[86]

Nuclear *deterrence* is usually understood as the employment of coercive threats to use nuclear weapons in order to dissuade military attacks against oneself or one's allies. In nuclear scholarship, nuclear deterrence is most often treated as a strategy, doctrine, or policy.[87] However, it has arguably also established itself as a norm in global nuclear order (cf. Freedman 2013). With the exception of Israel (which does not publicly acknowledge its nuclear status),[88] all the current nuclear-armed states (as well as NATO as an explicitly nuclear alliance) have explicitly incorporated nuclear deterrence in their broader security and defense strategies. Furthermore, the articulation and development of deterrence postures has become standard conduct among them. Whereas the NPT itself is completely silent on the issue of deterrence, it has been sometimes considered as an "unofficial pillar" of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Tannenwald 2013, p.302). As an international norm, however, it has been continuously contested as illegitimate by many NNWS and NGOs alike – and arguably ever more so in the recent years (see for example Wilson (2008) and Ifft (2017)).

Military non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 remains one of the puzzles in nuclear scholarship. Whereas the realist perspective usually refers to the operations of deterrence, self-interest, and prudence when explaining non-use (cf. Gray 1999, pp.103–108; Sagan 2004), several scholars have tracked the gradual emergence of non-use norm proscribing direct military employment of nuclear weapons in conflict (see Tannenwald 1999b; 2005; 2007; Potter 2010; cf. Paul 2009; 2010; Sauer 2015; Press et al. 2013).[89] Although the NPT preamble warned about "the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968), the treaty itself has not established any rules with respect to the military use of nuclear weapons. However, the legitimacy of military nuclear use has been repeatedly contested in both inter- and intra-state debates, and non-use has

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[86] On July 7th, 2017, the UNGA adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as the first international agreement banning nuclear weapons and providing framework for their elimination (see UNGA 2017). However, the Treaty was adopted without the participation of nuclear-armed states and most NATO allies, who rejected to recognize its validity and to abide by its terms.

[87] The review of deterrence-related literature in nuclear scholarship is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Perhaps the most prominent attempts to conceptually tackle this issue were written by Brodie (1946), Schelling (1966), Morgan (1977), Jervis (1989), Freedman (1989), and Powell (1990) .

[88] On Israeli nuclear opacity – or the *amimut* – see Cohen & Frankel (1987) and Cohen (1998; 2010).

[89] Nuclear scholars frequently use the notion of "nuclear taboo" for the military non-use norm. However, the use of the term is not wholly unproblematic as a number of works have been contesting the "taboo-like" nature of the norm (e.g., Press et al. 2013; Paul 2010).

remained a consistent behavioral pattern among nuclear-armed states since the end of the Second World War.[90]

The fundamental norm of *universality* is based on the notion that the threat of nuclear war concerns "all mankind", and the solution to this problem therefore requires the "co-operation of all States" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968; the treaty preamble). As such, the nonproliferation game is underpinned by the idea that its rules ought to guide the behavior of and (eventually) apply to *all* states in international order. In the spirit of this norm, the NPT Review Conferences have repeatedly reaffirmed the aim of the NPT community to actively extend the treaty membership towards universal participation. For example, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the very first item on the list of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" noted that the "universal adherence to the [NPT] is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective" (NPT/CONF.1995/32 1995, p.365). Since the 2000s, this effort equates to convincing the remaining few outliers – India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan – to accede to the treaty as NNWS (cf. Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, pp.53–54).[91]

Organizing Principles and Standardized Procedures

With respect to these six fundamental norms, a number of *organizing principles* have gradually emerged in states' practice and more or less formal initiatives. Perhaps most prominently, they include the IAEA safeguards system as a monitoring, verification, and confidence building tool of social control in the nonproliferation regime (see Brown 2015). Another such principle, enshrined in the NPT Article VII., has been the creation of regionally-defined nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) (cf. Goldblat 1997; Thakur 1998; Müller et al. 2015). Since the NPT

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[90] The 1996 ICJ ruling on this matter stated rather indecisively that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; however, […], the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake" (ICJ 1996). The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted by the UNGA on July 7th, 2017 states that "any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict" and explicitly prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in Article I. of the Treaty (UNGA 2017).

[91] In the case of all the states except South Sudan, this would involve their de-nuclearization prior to their accession.

negotiations, the NNWS have also sought to gain security assurances from the NWS in exchange for their nuclear abstinence (cf. Walker 2012, p.78; Bunn & Timerbaev 1993; Bunn 1997; Simpson 1994, pp.24–25); whereas the NWS had refused to include any such assurances to the NPT text itself, they were later pledged in the form of "negative security assurances" in the unilateral statements of the NWS (albeit with qualifications), and again confirmed in the 1995 UNSC resolution 984.[92]

Another organizing principle of nuclear non-proliferation order, arguably even since before the NPT adoption, has been the formulation of extended deterrence guarantees provided by the NWS (in practice, primarily by the United States) to their allies.[93] The states have been gradually introducing new counter-proliferation initiatives to interdict transfers of sensitive materials, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (cf. Winner 2005; Joyner 2005). Furthermore, the states have devised an organizing principle of multilateral norm enforcement (through the UNSC) and unilateral or "minilateral" enforcement (sanctions applied by individual states or coalitions of like-minded states outside the UNSC framework).

With respect to the global diffusion of civilian nuclear technology, the key organizing principles have been the IAEA's technical assistance and the bilateral inter-state agreements on nuclear trade. Nevertheless, these two instruments have been conditioned by the compliance of the NNWS with the norms of transparency, with the adoption of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as the compulsory requirement.[94] Another principle has been the creation of extra-NPT non-proliferation clubs to harmonize export control policies with respect to proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment, and international initiatives to secure vulnerable facilities and materials (see Müller et al. 2014). Many of the aforementioned organizing principles are then reflected in the micro-level standardized procedures of the IAEA, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), or the UNSC Resolution 1540.

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[92] The negative security assurance is a pledge of a NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a NNWS, whereas the positive security assurance would have a NWS come to the aid of a NNWS in response to the aggression by another state armed with nuclear weapons. See Bunn & Timerbaev (1993).

[93] On the link between U.S. extended deterrence/assurance and non-proliferation, see Bleek and Lorber (2014) Knopf (2012), Müller & Schmidt (2010), Kroenig (2016), and Reiter (2014).

[94] The IAEA safeguards have been originally applied only to the NNWS, which eventually had to put *all* of their nuclear facilities under the IAEA monitoring. However, the five NWS eventually accepted application of safeguards on *some* of their civilian facilities through the Voluntary Offer Agreements, to somehow balance the unequal treatment in the NPT (cf. Baeckmann 1988; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, p.53; Tannenwald 2013, pp.304–305). On the Additional Protocol, see Hirsch (2004).

Since the 1970s, some states have also aimed to introduce measures that would limit the capability of the NNWS to develop a full indigenous nuclear fuel cycle (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing) (see Zhang 2006), and propose initiatives such as multilateral fuel banks (cf. Goldschmidt 2010; Meier 2006; Müller 2005; Tannenwald 2013, pp.306–307; Ford 2010a). Furthermore, Article V. of the NPT also originally granted the NNWS the, now obsolete, right for "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions", prescribing conditions for both the NNWS as a beneficiary ("international observation and […] appropriate international procedures") and NWS as a supplier ("the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development") (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article V).[95]

The general norm against nuclear testing has been continuously referred to as both disarmament *and* non-proliferation measure (cf. Jones & Marsh 2014; Bunn 1999; Johnson 2009; Keeley 1989) – despite the fact that the CTBT, in which the norm was formally validated, has not yet entered in force (cf. Bunn 1999; Holum 1997; Kamra 2009).[96] With respect to the practical implementation of disarmament norm, the practice of bilateral strategic arms control (as a "management of arms race") and irreversible stockpile reductions of NWS have been in the forefront of global attention (cf. Müller et al. 1994, chap.1; Mutimer 2011). The following principles have been also gradually re-constructed as organizing principles for nuclear disarmament since the NPT signature: reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines of NWS, halt of warhead and fissile material production, multilateral arms control, NWS transparency, and establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (cf. Mukhatzhanova 2013). In recent years, pressure has been increasing from a large number of NNWS to negotiate a legal ban on nuclear weapons as a new disarmament measure.[97] On the other hand, NWS and their allies frequently point to steps towards "general and complete disarmament" and the improvement of global security situation as critically important organizing principles for the

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[95] Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) offer an excellent example of the dynamic normative development of nuclear order. Whereas PNE's received its own article in the NPT, the concept nevertheless underwent a normative contestation through states' practice and discursive interventions. Soon the very idea has become completely obsolete and in the 1990s prohibited under the CTBT. Cf. Long (1976) and Harrington & Englert (2014).

[96] See also Rockwood (2016) and the related articles in the special section of The Nonproliferation Review.

[97] By the successful adoption of UNGA resolution 71/258, the majority of UN member states agreed to convene a UN conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons in 2017; however, all the NWS and most of U.S. allies voted against the resolution and declined to participate at the conference (see UNGA 2016; Reif 2016; Fihn 2017; Sauer 2017). As noted above, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was eventually adopted by the UNGA on July 7th, 2017 (UNGA 2017).

disarmament norm.[98] Despite numerous attempts of the NNWS to establish standardized procedures for the NWS in disarmament area, the NWS and their allies mostly resist these attempts (cf. Ritchie 2014; Sauer & Pretorius 2014; Smetana 2016; Müller 2017). As such, widely accepted standardized disarmament procedures are currently limited to bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms control (currently based on the 2010 New START Treaty) and the halt of nuclear testing (as specified by the CTBT).

The organizing principles of deterrence norm have primarily been declaratory policies of nuclear-armed states; strategic force postures, including employment and deployment patterns of individual delivery systems and defenses; and strategic arms control, that has institutionalized the deterrence relationship between Washington and Moscow. The implementation of military non-use norm has primarily relied on the declaratory policies of nuclear-armed states, which limit contingencies under which nuclear weapons could be used militarily, and the norm of civilian oversight over nuclear employment. There have been minimal standardized procedures implemented in these areas except for those that have been agreed between U.S. and Russian counterparts in strategic arms control agreements.

The NPT also includes the organizing principle of withdrawal from the treaty, based on "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, [that] have jeopardized the supreme interests [of the members state]" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968). The standardized "three-months-in-advance" procedure for such withdrawal is then specified in the first paragraph of the NPT's Article X.

Furthermore, the NPT includes organizing principles for the extension of the treaty and standardized procedures for its amenability. The original rule enshrined in the NPT was the limited (twenty-five-year) duration of the treaty, after which the state parties would decide over its extension (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, NPT Article IX., Para 2). After the 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, the remaining organizing principle that would arguably grant the legitimacy to the NPT membership norm would be the gradual *transformation* of the NPT towards equality through nuclear disarmament, a principle that so far lacks any standardized procedures despite numerous proposals in this direction by some of

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[98] Although some scholars suggest that the commitment to general and complete disarmament had already been "disjoined from nuclear disarmament obligations" (Granoff 2006, p.1001), the issue of mutual linkage between these concepts is still subject to contestation in the NPT context (cf. Burroughs 2016; Meyer 2016; Rydell 2016).

the NNWS.[99] Finally, Article VIII. of the NPT (Paras 1–2) stipulated the standardized procedure for the amenability of the treaty, requiring the amendments to be approved by the majority of member states, including all of the NWS and all the members of the IAEA Board of Governors.

The NPT and other institutions of the nonproliferation game have developed a number of organizing principles that follow the fundamental norm of *universality,* yet not necessarily the norm of *equality*. With respect to the rules of NPT membership, the treaty introduces Article IX., which opens the possibility to accede to all states, but at the same time distinguishes between the two types of membership. The NWS are defined as states "which ha[ve] manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968); the rest of the signatories would then assume the roles of the NNWS.[100] From the NPT perspective, the states outside of the treaty remain in a certain vacuum with respect to their identity in nuclear order.[101]

Other institutions of the nonproliferation game also operate under the fundamental normative conception of universal applicability of nuclear norms. However, the organizing principles for their actual membership varies. For example, the IAEA Board of Governors is partly elected and partly nominated on the basis of the states' level of development in the area of nuclear energy (see Fischer 1997). The NSG and several other export control clubs usually have limited (if growing) membership, composed of important suppliers and a few other states that comply with the standardized trade procedures of these clubs (cf. Gahlaut & Zaborsky 2004; Strulak 1993; Cupitt & Khripunov 1997). Arguably, the only global forum dealing with nuclear issues in which all the states of international order are represented on equal footing would be the UNGA. The founding documents of these institutions also usually include specific standardized procedures with regard to membership, extension, and decision-making rules.

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[99] For the discussion of different approaches, see Ware (2015).

[100] As some scholars observed, this rule has some rather unconventional implications. For example, if any of the current NWS decides to unilaterally dismantle all of its nuclear weapons, it would continue to be treated as a NWS under the treaty terms; at the same time, the states acquired nuclear weapons after 1967 cannot be granted the NWS status and can only join the treaty if they disarm and join as NNWS (see Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, p.54).

[101] As I discuss in the last section of this chapter, the legitimacy of this norm that has divided the formally equal states (in international order) to unequal categories (in nuclear order) has been heavily contested by the NPT "outsiders" since the NPT adoption (cf. Singh 1998a; Tannenwald 2013).

The Inherent Contestedness of Nuclear Order

At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei proposed in his statement that "the Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. While our twin goals - security and development - remain the same, our mechanisms for achieving those goals must evolve" (ElBaradei 2005).

Normative structure of nuclear order has indeed been perpetually contested, and many original norms and rules have significantly evolved since the inception of NPT in the late 1960s. After decades of deliberations and attempts to formally codify the "normal" behavior in international nuclear affairs, the NPT regime, as the key normative source for the global nuclear order, still remains "an incomplete and contested construct, facing both internal strains and competing understanding and practices in its environment" (Keeley 1988, p.7) This section elaborates on the three sources of tension in the nonproliferation game that provide the ground for the contestedness of nuclear norms, rules, and principles: the ambiguity of nuclear concepts, the clashes between individual norms, and the problem of technological change.[102]

Some scholars have correctly observed that most of the notions that the nonproliferation game is built on, such as "proliferation", "disarmament", "peaceful use", but even "nuclear" and "weapons", are to a large extent ambiguous and frequently contested themselves. For example, Zhang (2006) highlights the ongoing contestation of one of the key concepts in NPT rules: the prescription "not to *manufacture*" nuclear weapons (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article II.). Whereas some states have interpreted this clause as allowing anything short of assembling the actual weapon, other have promoted an interpretation that the NPT also precludes "sensitive activities" that may lead to the weaponization of fissile materials (Zhang 2006).

The ambiguity in nuclear order nevertheless does not reside merely in the general vagueness of international norms, but also in the inherent, structural ambivalence of nuclear technology (Abraham 2006). To define a certain state or activity as "nuclear" remains to be a political act rather than an objective decision based on preexisting scientific or technological

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[102] Due to space concerns, this section is far from being exhaustive, and rather points to some of the trends that are in the forefront of contemporary nuclear discourse.

criteria (cf. Abraham 2006; 2010; 2016; Hecht 2006; 2007; 2012; Jasper 2016). Hecht famously suggested that

> "[…] nuclearity is a regularly contested technopolitical category. It shifts in time and space. Its parameters depend on history and geography, science and technology, bodies and politics, radiation and race, states and capitalism. Nuclearity is not so much an essential property *of* things as it is distributed *in* things. Settlements about *degrees* of nuclearity have significant consequences. They structure global control over the flow of radioactive materials." (Hecht 2007, p.101, *emphasis in the original*).

This realization has profound consequences for our understanding of the tensions between vaguely defined norms in international treaties such as the NPT, and the actual practice of states. In fact, even the boundary that would determine whether the state actually crossed the nuclear threshold, which is the key distinction between actors in nuclear order, remains blurred, making the insights into the dynamics of horizontal proliferation rather complex (cf. Hymans 2010; Hymans & Matthew S. Gratias 2013; Harrington & Englert 2014; Bourne 2016; Robinson 2015). As I will demonstrate in the following section, some "deviant events", such as India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, led to the implementation of standardized procedures that would specify the individual categories in more detail. Nevertheless, even previously-agreed detailed lists of problematic items that are subject to specific treatment in nuclear order are made through the techno-political consensus of the time, and remain open for continuous re-negotiation.

Individual norms within the normative structure of nuclear order are also mutually interconnected, both vertically and horizontally, through discursive linkages. They often take the form of (quasi-)causal statements, hinting to cause-effect connections between behaviors in individual normative categories. Some organizing principles are in fact shared by different fundamental norms, whereas others are potentially clashing, opening the stage for normative conflicts in nuclear order.

Perhaps the most prominent tension has traditionally been between the norms of *non-proliferation* and *peaceful nuclear use*. The key issue is the inherently ambivalent, dual-use nature of nuclear fuel cycle: as noted by Nye, "distinction between peaceful- and weapons- use of the atom [is] primarily a question of politics rather than physics" (Nye 1981, p.17). What

would clearly separate the two – the *intent* of the state – is very difficult to assess even with the most stringent controls. As such, to draw a line where peaceful use stops and military use starts is often a political act rather than purely technical assessment (cf. Acton 2009; Fields & Enia 2009, pp.174–175). As the peaceful, civilian nuclear capabilities spread, so do the potential capabilities for military nuclear programs (cf. Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009; Brown & Kaplow 2014). On the other hand, ever more intrusive non-proliferation measures are sometimes opposed as hindering the "inalienable right" for peaceful use of nuclear energy (cf. Tannenwald 2013, pp.302–304; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, pp.55–57; Quester 1979, pp.556–564; Sotomayor 2013, p.96).

Non-proliferation and (nuclear) *disarmament* norms, on the other hand, were practically inseparable at the dawn of the nuclear age; for example, the aforementioned Baruch plan and the Soviet counter-proposal directly merged these concepts. By the 1960s, the two emerging norms had become separated normative bodies. However, the link between them appeared (implicitly) in the NPT and it has been frequently, and often explicitly, reconstructed in nuclear discourse ever since, mostly in the sense that "nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation require each other" (Rublee 2014b, p.107; cf. Thakur 2007). More specifically, both actors of nuclear diplomacy and nuclear experts often put forward the claim that the unwillingness of the NWS to cease the arms races and proceed to nuclear disarmament weakens the non-proliferation norm by creating incentives for other states to proliferate (cf. Freedman 2013, p.96; Quester 1979, pp.548–549; Walker 2007b; Booth 1999a).[103] And *vice versa*, steps towards strengthening the disarmament norm are frequently seen as benefiting non-proliferation norm; in some interpretations, "good-faith disarmament" encourages deeper cooperation between NWS and NNWS on non-proliferation initiatives, and decreases the demand for nuclear weapons in international politics (cf. Harrington de Santana 2011; Tannenwald 2013, p.314; Rathbun 2006).[104] Some NWS and their allies sometimes suggest another policy-relevant link between the two norms: more substantial steps towards disarmament can only come when the nuclear proliferation issue is solved, and we are able to

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[103] Some scholars and experts question the existence of this connection. For example, Oliver Thränert even suggests that nuclear arms races of the 1970s and 1980s in fact prevented further horizontal proliferation at the time (Thränert 2008, p.334).

[104] For a study that suggests that such link is not supported by empirical evidence, see Kroenig (2014b).

prevent "break out" scenarios by rogue actors that would take advantage of their sudden nuclear primacy (cf. Quester 1979, pp.549–550; Tannenwald 2013, p.308; Smetana 2015).

The relationship between the *non-proliferation* and *deterrence* norms is relevant especially in the context of extended deterrence and assurance of NNWS allies. The conventional logic of the nonproliferation game suggests that many allied states that would otherwise acquire a nuclear deterrent of their own instead rely on a "nuclear umbrella" provided by the United States (and, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union); should the U.S. extended deterrence be weakened or disappear altogether, some of the U.S. allies may reconsider their nuclear restraint and eventually proliferate (Smith 1987, p.258; Freedman 2013, p.97; Krause 2007a, p.494; cf. Müller & Schmidt 2010). On the other hand, the continued discursive reconstruction of extended nuclear deterrence as something critically important for the security of a large number of states implicitly boosts the value and importance of nuclear weapons in international politics. As suggested by Scott Sagan, "a security-oriented strategy of maintaining a major role for U.S. nuclear guarantees to restrain proliferation among allies will eventually create strong tensions with a norm-oriented strategy seeking to delegitimize nuclear weapons use and acquisition" (Sagan 1996a, p.86). In a similar fashion, many NNWS, NGOs, and scholars today argue that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence embraced by the NWS *itself* necessarily encourages proliferation and therefore weakens the non-proliferation norm (cf. Doyle 2013, p.22). Similarly, abolition proponents have been also stressing the principal philosophical incompatibilities between the logics of *deterrence* and *disarmament* norms; whereas the logic of deterrence implicitly recognizes the value of nuclear weapons for (inter-)national security, entrepreneurship of disarmament norms largely relies on devaluing nuclear weapons as illegitimate tools of security management (cf. Ritchie 2013; 2014; Berry et al. 2010).[105]

A necessarily paradoxical relationship exists between *deterrence* and the *military non-use* of nuclear weapons. Whereas nuclear use in deterrence is only latent, the credibility of nuclear deterrence still relies on the belief that it actually could take place under some circumstances (cf. Schelling 1966, chap.1; Freedman 2013, p.97). Arguably, the practice of *non-proliferation* and *disarmament* generally strengthens the "taboo" by limiting circumstances

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[105] Note that unlike nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms control practices are philosophically fully compatible with the norm of nuclear deterrence. For the elaboration of this argument, see for example Mutimer (2011). For the evolution of arms control idea in the context of nuclear deterrence, see Adler (1991; 1992).

under which the use of nuclear weapons would be available or even plausible. The hypothetical violation of the "taboo" might have a significant transformative impact on all norms of nuclear order and perhaps even the international order as such. The nature and level of this impact would largely depend on the circumstances of taboo violation and the reconstruction of such an event in international discourse (cf. Tannenwald 2007, pp.14–15; Quester 2005; Zuberi 2003, p.45).

The fundamental norms of nuclear order are also linked to the institutions and (meta-)norms of broader international order. The ever more intrusive verification, control, and monitoring mechanisms of nuclear non-proliferation, to some extent, clash with the institution of state *sovereignty* in the international realm (cf. Rislove 2006, p.1075; Sotomayor 2013, p.97; Homan 2013, pp.73–74; Tannenwald 2013, p.304; Ogilvie-White 2010, pp.118–119). The unequal arrangement of the NPT, in which a small number of states receive special treatment and very different rights and obligations, is in the conflict with *sovereign equality,* one of the fundamental meta-norms of international order (see Tannenwald 2013, p.304; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013). Issues connected with nuclear deterrence and the implicit possibility of nuclear use are often discussed in the context of the *international humanitarian law* norms, and the idea that any military use of nuclear weapons would necessarily constitute a breach of these norms (cf. Sauer & Pretorius 2014; Borrie 2014; Smetana 2016). Furthermore, the acquisition of nuclear arms has been frequently linked to the status of *great power* in international order (Tannenwald 2013, p.305; Ogilvie-White 2013); arguably, these concerns have been highly relevant to the decision-making of several nuclear-armed states that understand their nuclear capabilities as directly linked to their exceptional status in world politics (see Sagan 1996a; Lodgaard 2011, p.26,91,213).

The contested nature of the nonproliferation game also stems from the embeddedness of meta-norms of *general* social order in international nuclear affairs (Walker 2004, p.9). Perhaps most prominently, several scholars have studied key normative conflicts in global nuclear order from the general perspective of justice and fairness.[106] The meta-norm of *distributive justice* is tied the distribution of rights and obligations in the NPT and the global nuclear order in general. According to one perspective, the NPT regime has been constructed

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[106] See for example Albin (2001, chap.6), Albin and Druckman (2014), Müller (2010a; 2011b; 2017), Müller, Becker-Jakob, and Seidler-Diekmann (2013), Tannenwald (2013), Fahmy (2006), Schaper (2014), Rathbun (2006), or Fey and Melamud (2014).

as a transformative regime, the justice foundations of which were based on "microjustice" principles (Brickman et al. 1981), with different obligations and rights related to the different, but temporary, status of the two groups (cf. Walker 2007b; Tannenwald 2013; Smetana 2015, pp.50–53). As such, the justice within the regime was supposed to be maintained by temporarily forgoing the distributive justice principle of *equality* and upholding the principle of *equity*, with the NNWS accepting obligations in the non-proliferation area, in exchange for the assistance with civilian nuclear programs and steps made by the NWS towards nuclear disarmament.[107] In this perspective, nuclear abolition and the resulting nuclear equality in nuclear order would be the final, "macrojustice" goal of the NPT regime.

Besides the equity concerns that have been arguably in the forefront of nuclear discourse since the NPT inception, the norms of nuclear order also, to some extent, clash with the meta-norm of *procedural justice*. There is a long-standing issue linked to the norm enforcement practice that uses the UNSC as the exclusive enforcement body, in which the five NWS possess prominent voting rights in contrast to the NNWS (cf. Müller 2010a; Simpson 2005, p.3). In a similar fashion, many NNWS frequently put forward complaints related to their underrepresentation in the IAEA Board of Governors and export control groups (cf. Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, pp.58–59).

Finally, since the non-proliferation regime is essentially a "*techno*-political" order, the global scientific and technological development also represents a potential driver for normative contestation and change of the nonproliferation game. As Harald Müller suggests, "*new technologies* create a new reality; insofar as existing norm systems were designed to regulate the policy field on the basis of the old 'technological reality,' they have to be adapted in order to do their job. Technological innovation thus opens windows of opportunity for norm entrepreneurs by posing challenges as well as offering tools for solutions" (Müller 2013, p.12, *emphasis in the original*). In the nuclear order, this issue has been especially relevant to the technological developments in uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies (and their global spread), delivery systems for nuclear weapons, and the general "revolution in military affairs" (Fortmann & Hlatky 2009; Lieber & Press 2017). The technological progress was also critical to the formal validation of the non-testing norm in the CTBT, with respect to the

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[107] For a critique of this perspective, see Krause (2007a), Thränert (2008, pp.333–336), and Colby (2015).

emergence of advanced verification technologies and the possibility to conduct sub-critical testing and computer modelling of nuclear tests (Rosert et al. 2013, pp.122–127).

The unequal power positions of individual actors notwithstanding, contestation of nuclear norms has been a widespread practice in the global nuclear politics. In consequence, the rules of nonproliferation game have been undergoing dynamic normative development over the course of the last few decades. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, and indeed this dissertation, to capture all the relevant trends in nuclear norm contestation and dynamics. It is, nevertheless, worth pointing to the general pattern in which the NWS and their allies tend to be more focused on the normative contestation of the micro-level standardized procedures of technical character, particularly in the connection with the rules of non-dissemination and peaceful use. The non-allied NNWS, on the other hand, rather tend to tackle larger political issues, and focus primarily on organizing principles of the rules of disarmament and the peaceful use with respect to technological assistance and development. The key "sites of contestation" in the nonproliferation game have traditionally been the regular NPT Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committees (PrepComs), the Conference on Disarmament, and the UNGA First Committee, all of which provide the majority of states with the possibility to dynamically contest and affirm the norms of global nuclear order.

Nuclear Rules and the Patterns of Deviant Behavior

Émile Durkheim was one of the first sociologists to promote the idea that deviance is not just a natural part of society but also that however much we may try to achieve it, a deviance-free society cannot possibly exist. In *Rules of Sociological Method*, he mentioned the following example:

> Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes will there be unknown; but faults which appear tolerable to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, the society of saints has the power to judge and punish, it will define these lesser acts as criminal and will treat them as such.
> (Durkheim 1895, p.68)

International politics is, in many aspects, far from the proverbial society of saints. Global nuclear politics is no exception. While serious violations of nuclear norms have not been widespread,

they have been taking place occasionally since the NPT inception in the late 1960s. Often, these violations were considered serious issues for international security at the time, and had a profound impact on the development of norms and rules of nuclear order. In this section, I will highlight some notable patterns of deviant behavior in nuclear politics of the last few decades, which will allow to place the empirical cases in my dissertation in a broader historical context. I divide this section in three parts: the "outsiders", the "rogues", and the "keepers".

The Outsiders

As I noted above, one of the fundamental norms of the nonproliferation game has been the norm of universality, based on the normative conviction that norms, rules, and principles enshrined in the NPT are not applicable merely to the NPT signatories, but are normatively valid, or *ought to be valid*, in the international order more broadly. As such, the long-time aim of the NPT member states has been to achieve the universality of NPT membership through the accession of the remaining "outsiders" as NNWS.

As the number of NPT signatories has gradually increased since the late 1960s, the remaining outsiders started to be seen as "non-signatory deviants" rather than states exercising their sovereign right not to join the specific international agreement (Keeley 1988, p.28). As noted by William Walker,

> non-membership of the NPT was widely regarded as infringing the norm of non-proliferation and thus as being *politically* unacceptable. It was therefore considered legitimate to make [the NPT outsiders] suffer for their opposition to membership. They were thus regarded as prospective insiders rather than legitimate outsiders [...] (Walker 2012, pp.148–149, *emphasis in the original*)

In many aspects, the "deviant behavior" of the outsiders had a profound influence on the normative structure of the nonproliferation game. This was particularly the case of countries that have crossed the threshold of being merely suspected of potential proliferation intentions and took more radical steps towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability outside the NPT rules.

In the early days of the NPT, the most prominent example of such behavior with far reaching normative consequences was undoubtedly the case of the Indian underground nuclear explosion in 1974. Although the government in New Delhi labeled the test a "peaceful

nuclear explosion" (PNE) (cf. Jaipal 1977; Abraham 1999, chap.4), Indian behavior was widely interpreted as a breach of the non-proliferation norm among the NPT members – particularly on the side of the United States and Canada that supplied India with heavy water and a research reactor, respectively, and saw the test as "cheating on the basic bargain of the nuclear regime" (Nye 1981, p.18; cf. Epstein 1976, p.285; Epstein 1975, p.262).

The experience with the Indian PNE pointed to the inadequacy of the NPT in stopping the global dissemination of nuclear weapons among NPT non-members. As such, this "deviant event" also opened a window of opportunity to introduce new rules with respect to exports of nuclear technologies. Soon after the explosion, the major nuclear suppliers – United States, Soviet Union, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada – started the process of nuclear export policy coordination that led to the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the "London Club", imposing restraint of the transfer of sensitive technologies. The group adopted the original "trigger list" of the Zangger Committee (cf. Schmidt 1994) and expanded it by including other items that can be subject to export only to countries with implemented IAEA safeguards (see Anthony et al. 2007, chap.2; Müller et al. 1994, pp.22–23). As noted by Wan, "the specification of items and facilities to be safeguarded would deter any copycatting that might be sparked by India" (Wan 2014, p.221).

Furthermore, in the wake of the Indian PNE, the Ford administration decided that the United States "should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle" and called upon "all concerned governments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of international behavior, which would set in motion strong and immediate countermeasures" (Ford 1976; cf. Andrews 2006). The subsequent administration of President Carter launched the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation in 1977 to discuss the options the establishment of joint regional fuel-cycle facilities and practical aspects of multilateral cooperation on storage of plutonium (cf. Skjoldebrand 1980). Furthermore, in 1978, the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to put further restrictions on U.S. nuclear exports. The India's PNE also led to the termination of the U.S. nuclear assistance to Egypt and Israel and French assistance to Pakistan and South Korea, that the two main nuclear exporters previously pledged to their customers (Rabinowitz & Sarkar 2017).

In addition to that, Zuberi notes that "by the late 1970s the definition of proliferation changed from acquiring nuclear weapons or other explosive devices to developing a "nuclear explosive capability", and "consequently, the objective of safeguards changed from early detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful to military pursuits to 'prevention of development of nuclear explosive capability'" (Zuberi 2003, p.44). All these attempts represented a contestation and reinterpretation of the original "benevolent" understanding of the peaceful use norm in the NPT, which was widely understood as allowing the NNWS practically any use of nuclear technology short of nuclear explosion (cf. Zhang 2006; Lellouche 1981).

By the 2000s, the number NPT outsiders that might have followed the Indian example gradually shortened. The problem of non-signatory deviants eventually shrinked to three "nuclear holdouts" (Hagerty 2012): India, Israel, and Pakistan.[108] Unlike some of the previous outsiders that were only suspected of keeping an option to develop nuclear weapons, these three states are widely treated as nuclear-armed, although Israel does not publicly confirm (nor deny) its nuclear weapons capability (cf. Cohen & Frankel 1987; Cohen 1998; Cohen 2010). Although they are still regularly called to accede to the NPT as NNWS, there have been attempts in the nuclear order to start considering these remaining states as "exceptions" that should be perhaps treated differently than just "prospective insiders" or "perpetual outsiders" (Walker 2012, pp.148–155). For example, former IAEA Director General ElBaradei famously noted in 2006 that "however fervently we might wish it, none of these three is likely to give up its nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons option outside of a global or regional arms control framework /...) Our traditional strategy – of treating such states as outsiders – is no longer a realistic method of bringing these last few countries into the fold" (Mohammed ElBaradei 2006). However, as I demonstrate in chapter 7 on the case of India, occasional attempts to "normalize" the outsiders have also met with strong resistance from many states of global nuclear order.

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[108] In 2011, a newly independent South Sudan joined this group. Although South Sudan has not acceded the NPT yet, it is likely due to the internal problems that the newborn state is dealing with, and the country is not considered a proliferation threat. Furthermore, although North Korea could be also considered an 'outsider' since its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the legality of North Korean withdrawal has been heavily contested and in the NPT setting North Korea is therefore treated differently than India, Pakistan, and Israel(see e.g., Bunn & Rhinelander 2005b).

Nothing is closer to the typical image of nuclear deviants than the rules-defying, international "rogues", cheating on their nonproliferation obligations to develop a clandestine nuclear arsenal. The issue of non-compliance with non-proliferation norm has been discussed since the early years of NPT negotiations. As in many other arms control agreements, the potential for cheating led to the development of mechanisms to monitor and verify states' compliance with the treaty. However, it was only in the 1990s and the following decades when this issue moved to the forefront of international security debates, as a part of the discourse on "rogue states" and "evil" actors in world politics. Despite differences in their behavior and rhetoric, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran (and to a lesser extent Libya and Syria) have been constructed as prototypical nuclear outlaws, repeatedly violating the norms of nuclear order, and therefore representing a great threat to the international society of the "normal" states.

As I noted above, the logic of nuclear order largely relies on the structural ambivalence of nuclear technology (cf. Abraham 2006; 2010), in the sense that uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are dual-use processes, relevant in both civilian and military applications of nuclear energy. Since the Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program and later the NPT explicitly encouraged global diffusion of peaceful nuclear capabilities, many states have feared that some actors would accept scientific and technological assistance under the pretext of civilian nuclear development, and, at some point, clandestinely turn their peaceful nuclear capabilities into military ones. Instead of directly prohibiting the enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the NPT sought to construct a "firewall" (Wan 2014) in the form of IAEA safeguards that would ensure that nuclear facilities conduct strictly peaceful operations. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement provided standardized procedures for the monitoring and verification tasks outline in the Article III of the NPT. Among other things, the IAEA adopted the earlier U.S. threshold of 20 percent uranium enrichment as an international norm that distinguishes "low" from "high" enriched uranium (cf. Brown & Glaser 2016; Schaper 2013; Harrington & Englert 2014).

Arguably, the truly defining case of non-compliant behavior that shaped the rules of the nonproliferation game was the discovery of the clandestine dimension of the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1990s. Iraq was the first state party of the NPT that deliberately and explicitly cheated. The extent of Iraq's breach of its NPT obligations came as a shock to many

at the time (cf. Albright & Hibbs 1991; 1992; Wan 2014). Even many countries that previously opposed more intrusive verification measures in the NPT now called for the change of the IAEA safeguards norms towards more stringent monitoring and control (Zuberi 2003, p.44; Sloss 1995). In the wake of this prominent deviant event, the IAEA safeguards underwent a major review in order to be able to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material (Hooper 1995). Most importantly, the IAEA introduced new monitoring practices such as environmental sampling and analysis (Donohue 1998).

Moreover, in 1997 the IAEA introduced the Additional Protocol (AP), a result of four years-long negotiations among NPT member states, led by the United States and Germany. The AP significantly increased the IAEA verification and monitoring capability, providing the Agency with much more in-depth information about member states' nuclear activities (including exports and imports) and with authority to access on short notice any facility for inspection (previously, the IAEA was only allowed to inspect so-called "declared" nuclear facilities). As of October 2016, 127 states had both signed and ratified the AP (IAEA 2016).

The members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) also reacted to the discovery of Iraq's clandestine activities by amending the export control rules for nuclear trade. In 1992, the NSG agreed that any future supplies to the NNWS will be conditioned by the acceptance of the IAEA full-scope safeguards (NSG 1993).

Another high-profile non-compliance crisis of the 1990s, the case of North Korea, was temporarily put on hold by the adoption of the 1994 Agreed Framework between Pyongyang and Washington (see introduction to chapter 6 for more details). The 2000s nevertheless brought about a new wave of compliance issues, with the prominent cases of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and the Khan network. The story of Iraqi continued defiance of international norms (see Strategic Survey 1998) ended with use of force by the United States and its allies, and the resulting regime change that removed Iraq from the group of states of proliferation concern. Whereas the issue of Iran has been resolved – at least for the time being – through a comprehensive JCPOA agreement in 2015 (see the next chapter), North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 2006 (see chapter 6). The discovery of black market nuclear trade network organized by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan – what the IAEA chief ElBaradei once called the "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation" (cited in Allison 2010, p.79) – highlighted the role of non-state actors in nuclear proliferation and

suggested the alternative way how "rogues" can defy the IAEA safeguards and clandestinely obtain sensitive material and technologies (cf. Corera 2006; Albright & Hinderstein 2005).

The Keepers

In contrast with the vast majority of international agreements, the NPT established two classes of states with substantially unequal rights and obligations. The five countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1967 – United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China – were designated as states that are legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons under the regime rules. However, they have been also frequently subject to accusations that their behavior breaches the fundamental norms of the NPT.

Actors which accused the NWS of violating the regime rules have mainly focused on two patterns of (allegedly) deviant behavior. First, the avoidance of obligations under NPT Article VI., i.e. behavior inconsistent with the disarmament norm. Second, the practice of "nuclear denial" with respect to the sharing of nuclear technologies under NPT Article IV., i.e. behavior inconsistent with the peaceful use norm. The behavior of (some of) the NWS in these three areas led to the construction of an image of nuclear "keeper": a nuclear state that aims to keep its nuclear weapons indefinitely and take advantage of this privileged nuclear oligopoly for its parochial interests.[109]

Since the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, many NNWS have been exerting pressure on the NWS to take concrete steps towards the fulfillment of Article VI. After the end of the Cold War and the cessation of nuclear arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the pressure on the NWS to lower the salience of nuclear weapons in international politics and take specific actions towards nuclear disarmament gradually increased. Many NNWS also started to call for a process that would shift the policies of NWS from "surface" devaluing to more substantive, "deep" devaluing of nuclear weapons (Ritchie 2014). The "surface" devaluing would largely correspond to the practice of strategic arms control, involving primarily the quantitative limitations on "deployed" nuclear weapons and

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[109] Whereas the NWS usually contest the fact that their behavior would be inconsistent with the fundamental norms of the NPT, there were also situations in which some of the NWS would engage in a forthright defiance of the existing standards – for example, under George W. Bush administration, the new U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton publicly rejected the prior commitments to work towards nuclear disarmament (Allison 2010, p.80).

gradual reductions of total stockpiles of the United States and Russia.[110] The "deep" devaluing, however, would require more significant qualitative changes in doctrines of the NWS with respect to the prevailing practice of nuclear deterrence (Ritchie 2014, pp.608–609).

As several scholars observed (Müller 2010a; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013; Tannenwald 2013), the illegitimacy of the insufficient activity of the NWS towards nuclear disarmament has been primarily framed by the NNWS as an issue of justice, fairness, and equity with respect to the distribution of rights and obligations in the non-proliferation regime. In this interpretation, the NNWS have been holding their part of the bargain (i.e., "nuclear abstinence" through non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and compliance with the IAEA safeguard agreements), whereas the NWS had been avoiding their Article VI. obligations. In 1995, the NNWS used the extension of the NPT as a bargaining chip to agree with NWS on formal validation of specific organizing principles of disarmament, including the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (adopted in 1996) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (still under negotiation) (NPT/CONF.1995/32 1995; cf. Jayantha. Dhanapala & Rydell 2005). The meaning of the nuclear disarmament norm was further specified in the "Thirteen Steps" outlined in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document and "Action Plan" of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including the principle of "irreversibility", transparency, and generally the norm of accountability of NWS vis-à-vis their disarmament obligations (cf. UNODA 2000; NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010a; Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, p.55).

In the years following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, however, the frustration with the (still) slow pace of nuclear disarmament led to the emergence of Humanitarian Initiative (HI) among the NNWS and pro-disarmament NGOs, that would further intensify the pressure being put on the NWS. The HI would frame the urgent need for nuclear abolition primarily through the lens of human security, international humanitarian law, and new scientific findings related to the horrific consequences of the potential use of nuclear weapons (cf. Nielsen & Hanson 2014; Borrie 2014; Sauer & Pretorius 2014; Smetana 2016; Bolton & Minor 2016; Müller 2017, p.4). An integral part of the HI norm entrepreneurship, however, has been also the stigmatization of nuclear weapons and a complete delegitimization of nuclear deterrence

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[110] Although France and the United Kingdom also engaged in some quantitative reductions in their – significantly smaller – nuclear arsenals, they have been doing this unilaterally, put of any formal arms control framework. For a critical discussion of the conceptual link between arms control and disarmament, see Mutimer (2012) and Dalton et al. (2016, pp.7–8).

as a morally acceptable military posture in international politics.[111] In response to the continued "defiance" of the disarmament norm by the NWS and their NNWS allies, the HI initiated the process of negotiation of the ban treaty as a new organizing principle for nuclear disarmament (cf. Fihn 2017; Williams 2017).

Since the 1970s, many NNWS states also blamed the NWS for continued attempts to violate their obligations under Article IV. to facilitate the spread of civilian nuclear technology. As noted above, in the wake of Indian PNE, some of the nuclear suppliers, particularly the United States, decided to tighten the rules for nuclear exports and problematize the possibility of widespread development of indigenous full cycle capabilities. This "nuclear revisionism" (Zuberi 2003, p.43) was met with resistance in the newborn NPT-based nuclear order. At the time, the rift did not appear merely between the states of the developed North and the developing South, but also between the United States and its allies in Western Europe (particularly United Kingdom, France, Germany) and Japan. The government in Washington was accused of violating the norm of peaceful use enshrined in Article IV. of the NPT, by implementing the "policy of denial" and thereby illegitimately discriminating the NNWS in their access to nuclear technology (see Walker 2012, p.92). A similar critique was directed towards the export control clubs such as the NSG, which have been perceived by many states of the Global South as attempts to further stratify the global nuclear order and hinder the economic development of Third World states (Nye 1981, pp.21–22; Walker 2012, p.94).

Most Western states gradually joined the U.S. with respect to limiting the spread of nuclear materials and technologies. However, the sentiments among the developing states of the Global South that the practices of the developed states are in breach of the peaceful use norm have not faded away. The NAM states, in particular, have been regularly accusing the West (and especially the United States) of implementing denial policies that are infringing their "inalienable right" for civilian nuclear use and that are counter to the obligations of the NWS under the NPT (see Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2011a, chap.3; Ogilvie-White 2007, p.462). Together with the frustration about the lack of disarmament progress, these developments largely explain the resistance of many NNWS towards the implementation of any new obligatory non-proliferation measures that would further limit the civilian use of nuclear energy (cf. Müller 2010b, pp.195–196; Walker 2012, p.172; Tannenwald 2013).

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[111] It should be noted that many themes of the Humanitarian Initiative have previously appeared in the earlier statements of like-minded NNWS, the NAM states in particular.

Conclusion

In this chapter, my aim was to build a bridge between the theoretical-conceptual chapters of my dissertation and the empirical case-studies. I focused on the nonproliferation game as a specific techno-political space in international politics, guided by norms and rules that have been undergoing a dynamic development since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945. After reviewing the historical constitution of nuclear order and the relevant scholarly perspectives, I introduced my own reconstruction of the normative structure of nonproliferation that draws on Wiener's typology of international norms introduced in the previous chapter. I elaborated on the contested nature of nuclear order and the patterns of deviant behavior in nuclear order since the NPT inception in the late 1960s.

Besides the main aim of providing the reader with a broader context of global nuclear politics, this chapter achieved three more goal with respect to the goals of my dissertation. First, by critically surveying a large pile of relevant expert and academic literature, this chapter helped to clarify my analytical position vis-à-vis nuclear scholarship. My understanding of the "nonproliferation game" is not far from Ursula Jasper's conception of "technopolitical negotiated order", which is "based on ongoing processes of re-negotiation, re-affirmation or re-configuration" (Jasper 2016, p.3). Furthermore, my conceptual approach allows me to study inter-norm conflicts and dynamics as do the constructivist accounts of scholars such as Harald Müller (2010, 2013) or Nina Tannewald (2013). Finally, similarly to William Walker (2004), I also consider the NPT to be the key source of norms of global nuclear order, which is itself nested within the broader international order and general social order as such.

Moreover, I provided the reader with an original interpretation of the normative structure of nuclear order. I proposed that the structure consists of five macro-level fundamental norms, implemented in a number of meso-level organizing principles, and micro-level standardized procedures. This novel analytical dissection of nuclear rules in vertical (level of specificity) and horizontal (issue-area) axes arguably represents a convenient tool for studying the normative dynamics in global nuclear politics. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I use this analytical framework to study the changes in the complex net of prescriptions and proscriptions that define the "appropriate" conduct of states in nuclear affairs.

Finally, the findings of this chapter support my broader interactionist argument about the contingent nature of social institutions, norms, and order – a claim that does not apply just

to the "ordinary" human society, but also to the high realm of international and nuclear politics. With respect to the subject matter of my dissertation, this logic necessarily applies that as nuclear order itself is built upon ill-defined, contestable (and contested) normative structures, so are the categories of what constitutes a "normal" ("good", "responsible", "orderly"…) or "deviant" ("bad", "irresponsible", "disorderly"…) conduct in global nuclear affairs.

5. Iran and the Limits of Peaceful Nuclear Use (2002-2015)

For more than a decade, the issue of the Iran's nuclear program stayed at the top of international security agenda. The crisis started in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the Iranian opposition group in French exile, disclosed information about the clandestine dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. The group revealed the existence of two secret nuclear facilities in Iran, a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and a heavy water production facility in Arak, that had been under development without the knowledge of the IAEA. It took years of multilateral diplomacy, several United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, numerous economic and trade sanctions, and even threats of military strikes, before agreement was reached in 2015 to significantly limit the Iranian nuclear program. For many observers, the successful outcome of the Iranian nuclear crisis was a close-call, achieved through the skillful use of carrots and sticks that persuaded Iranians to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions. For sceptics, however, this is at best a temporary solution that buys some time before the prototypical "rogue" cheats and once again tries to clandestinely acquire nuclear arms.

The story of the Iran's nuclear program started as far back as the late 1950s, when Shah Reza Pahlavi signed an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation with the United States. Iran ratified the NPT in 1970 and soon after embarked on an ambitious civilian nuclear program (while keeping an option open for a military path). By the mid-1970s, Tehran received material and technological assistance for its nuclear program from a number of foreign countries, including the United States, France, and West Germany (cf. Kidotbaroğlu 2007; Chubin 2006; Squassoni 2009; Milani 2010). The 1979 revolution and the establishment of the new regime of Ayatollah Khomeini led to the halt of the program, to be revived only in the 1980s in the context of Iraq-Iran war. With its ties to the West cut, Tehran eventually reached out to China and India (Mukhatzhanova 2010, p.43), and also received technological assistance in enrichment technology from the clandestine network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan (Hymans 2012, p.256; Squassoni 2009, p.285; Bowen & Kidd 2004, p.262). In 1992, Tehran signed an agreement with Moscow to complete Bushehr nuclear power plant and supply the Islamic

Republic with the equipment necessary for its renewed nuclear program (Albright 1995, pp.49–51; Einhorn & Samore 2002). While Iran was frequently subject to suspicion with regard to the possible WMD development during the 1990s, particularly in the context of its ambitious ballistic missile program, it was not until 2002 when the full-fledged crisis over its nuclear program unfolded.

Nuclear scholarship has so far offered diverse perspectives on the Iran's nuclear crisis.[112] In this chapter, I aim to contribute to the debate by employing the concept of stigma politics as an analytical lens through which to study the Iranian case. Drawing on the interactionist perspective, I try to unpack the dynamics of reconstructing Iran's deviant image in the course of the crisis. Furthermore, I analyze the interactive stigma contest between the rule-breaking Iran and the rule-enforcing audiences against the backdrop of the broader normative dynamics in the global nuclear order. From this perspective, Iran is not seen as an a priori "outlaw", but rather as an actor contesting competing normative conceptions, and strategically coping with stigmatization by powerful others.

The structure of this chapter follows the conceptual apparatus introduced in the previous chapters of this dissertation. In turn, I discuss the five dimensions of stigma politics – stigma nexus, stigma imposition, stigma management, stigma reversal, and stigma power – and how they played out in the Iranian crisis between 2002 and 2015.[113] After that, I analyze the link between the reconstruction of Iranian deviance and the dynamics of the rules of the non-proliferation game. At the end, I summarize the main findings of the chapter.

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[112] For example, some policy-oriented texts suggested strategies that the West can employ to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (e.g., Sagan 2006b; Fitzpatrick 2009b), discussed the costs and benefits of preventive strikes against Iranian facilities (cf. Kroenig 2012; Kahl 2012), and hypothesized the options that would be available for the international community *after* Iran gets nuclear bomb (Lindsay & Takeyh 2010; Jones 2012; Dobbins 2011). Other texts focused on Iranian motivations for nuclear acquisition (e.g., Mukhatzhanova 2010; Sherrill 2012), the inherent ambivalence of Iranian nuclear program (Disney 2012; Harrington & Englert 2014; Hymans & Gratias 2013), or the Iranian "hedging strategy" (Bowen & Moran 2014; Bowen & Brewer 2011; Bowen et al. 2016). Some scholars analyzed the responses of the global community, whether those of the United States (Pollack 2013), the European states (Onderco 2014b), or the states of the Global South (Ogilvie-White 2007; Onderco 2015b). Some voices even suggested that nuclear Iran might not be such a bad idea after all (Waltz 2012; cf. Manning 2012). Despite significant differences, many scholars have had a tendency to compare Iran and North Korea as the two prime nuclear deviants of the 2000s (e.g., Ogilvie-White 2010; Huntley 2006; Fitzpatrick 2006a; Litwak 2008). Most academic accounts also implicitly or explicitly accepted the idea the Iran seeks (or sought) military nuclear capability – at least in some latent form (Fitzpatrick 2006b; Bowen & Kidd 2004; Takeyh 2004; cf. Robinson 2015).

[113] For a more detailed empirical account of the events leading up to the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and of the history of the Iranian nuclear program as such, see for example Howard (2004), Sokolski & Clawson (2004), Chubin (2006), Fitzpatrick (2009b), Rose et al. (2012), Pollack (2013), Kroenig (2014a), Bernstein (2014), Kaussler (2014), Joyner (2016), Bowen et al. (2016), Homayounvash (2016), or Rezaei (2017).

Stigma Nexus

The negotiation of an Iranian deviant identity vis-à-vis the rules of nonproliferation game took place in the nexus involving Iran as a *deviant actor* and various international *audiences*, jointly participating in the discursive reconstruction of the 2002 NCRI revelations and the subsequent events. In this section, I outline the actor-specific setting of the crisis and sketch the basic alignments among the relevant actors.

Iran , "a veteran of rule-breaking behaviour within and beyond its borders" (Geldenhuys 2004, p.112) , has frequently been treated as an international pariah since the 1979 revolution – among other things, for its human rights violations, sponsorship of terrorism, and the implacable hostility towards the State of Israel. The experience with Iraq's clandestine nuclear activities also led many decision-makers and analysts during the 1990s to believe that there may be Iranian military intentions behind the veil of its civilian nuclear program (cf. Cordesman & Al-Rodhan 2006, p.210; Disney 2012, p.160; Jones 1998, p.42; Bowen & Kidd 2004, p.263). However, Iran has also actively participated in the normative development of the NPT regime and the global nuclear order as such. As one of the most visible states in nuclear diplomacy, Iran has been loudly and consistently employing discourses of injustices and double standards in the nuclear order, directed towards NWS and their allies (cf. Moshirzadeh 2007). It has also been a prominent proponent of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the developing world, and a strong verbal supporter of nuclear disarmament and generally the steps that would reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in world politics (cf. Wunderlich 2014). Furthermore, Iran has been actively promoting establishment of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. A cornerstone of Iranian nuclear diplomacy has been Tehran's position in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), where Iran has consistently been one of its most vocal and radical members (cf. Abidi 1981; Ogilvie-White 2007; Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2012).[114]

Among the global audiences, the E3+3[115] assumed the role of *moral entrepreneurs*, enforcing the NPT rules with respect to Iranian transgressions. However, the rhetoric as well as

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[114] It is nevertheless worth noting that during the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Iran assumed a rather moderating role as a chair of the NAM. This was primarily due to the cautious policy of President Rouhani and his attempts not to endanger the JCPOA deal. I am indebted to Harald Müller for this observation.

[115] The E3+3 (or EU-3+3) stands for the three EU states (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) plus the remaining three UNSC permanent members (United States, Russia, and China). In the United States, the group is usually referred to as "P5+1" (five permanent members of the UNSC – United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom – plus Germany).

specific policy preferences differed among the members of the group. The United States (together with Israel) took the hardest out-group stance towards Iran during the crisis, following up on the decades of explicit enmity between the two countries (cf. Kemp 1994). As such, the United States – primarily, but not exclusively, under the George W. Bush administration – was at the forefront of international rule enforcement, mobilizing the audience of normals to stigmatize, punish, and discipline Iran for its transgressive behavior.

The E3 – France, the United Kingdom, and Germany – were the first to engage in an active diplomatic dialogue with Iran. Whereas the United States originally aimed at isolating Iran and refused to negotiate before Tehran ceased its nuclear activities, the European states engaged in negotiations to reverse the Iranian course of action. However, besides the offer of carrots, the E3 did not shy away from sticks in the form of public shaming and sanctions.[116] China and Russia assumed a significantly more moderate role in the crisis. Whereas they both cooperated with the remaining permanent UNSC members on the adoption of the disciplining resolutions against Iran, they mostly refrained from harsh stigmatizing rhetoric, and firmly opposed some more radical proposals that would further impact Iran's sovereignty in this issue (cf. Bowen & Brewer 2011, pp.936–937). An important role in the overall rule enforcement was assumed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as one of the key institutions of social control in the nonproliferation regime, monitoring Iranian compliance with the NPT rules and referring the Iranian case to the UNSC.

For Iran, the closest in-group allies have been the NAM states, who share with Iran not only the political grouping in global nuclear diplomacy but also similar concerns about increasing limitations on peaceful nuclear use and the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament (cf. Tannenwald 2015; Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2012; Dalton et al. 2016; Onderco 2015b). Nevertheless, since the NAM represents a large and heterogeneous group, there were also patterns of divergence among individual states when it came to supporting Iran during the crisis. Whereas states such as Cuba, Syria, or Venezuela have consistently backed up the Iranian regime in the international fora, a number of other key NAM members eventually

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five permanent members of the UNSC (United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) plus Germany. The group is also frequently referred to as E3+3 (the three EU countries plus).

[116] It should be nevertheless noted that despite the European attempts to deal with Iran as a single negotiating body (later headed by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), the positions of the individual countries towards Tehran still largely diverged. See Onderco (2010; 2014b) and Onderco & Wagner (2012; 2014).

withdrew their strong support, and even voted for the resolutions against the Iranian nuclear program in the IAEA Board of Governors and in the UNSC (see Ogilvie-White 2007).

Stigma Imposition

The imposition of stigma on Iran after the 2002 NCRI revelations had two main components, which I elaborate in more detail in this section. First, a *stigma message*, (re)constructing the deviant image of Iran vis-à-vis the rules of the NPT; and second, a *rule enforcement*, sanctioning and disciplining Iran through trade embargoes and other types of international sanctions.

The 2002 revelations followed the 1990s construction of Iran as one of the international "rogues" in U.S. discourse, among other things for its alleged aims to acquire nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (cf. Homolar 2011; Müller 2014; Malici 2009). In his January 2002 State of the Union address, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an "axis of evil", regimes that are "seeking weapons of mass destruction" and supplying them to their terrorist allies. Iran was specifically singled out as a state that "aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom" (Bush 2002c).

The stigma message of the Bush administration during the first years of the crisis followed a similar path of *labeling*, *stereotyping*, and discursively *separating* Iran as a (quasi-)nuclear rogue. After the 2002 revelations, the White House asserted its conviction that Iran "is actively working to develop nuclear weapons capability" (CNN 2002). In subsequent presidential speeches, the Iranian regime has been interchangeably labeled "outlaw", "(Shia) extremists", or an "ally of terror", who is an "enemy of civilization" (Bush 2006b). The President's speeches often supported this claim by portraying an image of the unified international community ("us") aiming to normalize the deviant ("them"), as in "working together to prevent Iran's regime from acquiring the tools of mass murder" (Bush 2006b).

One of the consistent threads in U.S. discourse was the *transgressive linkage* that Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons primarily because of its extremist, non-democratic nature, as well as its sponsorship of terrorism. As Bush noted in the 2003 State of the Union address, "in Iran, we continue to see a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass destruction, and supports terror" (Bush 2003). In the 2004 speech, Bush said that "America is committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes" (Bush 2004). On other occasions, the U.S. president stated that Iran is "a

nation now held hostage by a small clerical elite that is isolating and repressing its people. The regime in that country sponsors terrorists in the Palestinian territories and in Lebanon, and that must come to an end. The Iranian government is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons" (Bush 2006a). As Hayes (2009) notes, "the portrayal of Iran's government as undemocratic would become a central theme in constructing the Iranian threat. [...] The nature of the country's government fundamentally makes it aggressive, untrustworthy, and a threat to the democratic United States" (Hayes 2009; Jones 2011).

Such *threat linkage* was not limited only to the United States but more broadly to the problem of regional and international stability, peace, and security. During the 2006 press conference in Kabul, Bush suggested that "the most destabilizing thing that can happen in this region and in the world is for Iran to [...] develop a nuclear weapon" (Bush 2006d). On another occasion, Bush proposed that "the free world wants there to be a peaceful future. And we don't see a peaceful future with the Iranians developing a nuclear weapon" (Bush 2007c). Both the Bush and later the Obama administrations also linked Iranian behavior to the threat of the "proliferation cascade" (cf. Jones 2012, pp.209–210); for example, Bush once noted that "it's really important for the free world to work together to prevent [Iran] from having a nuclear weapon. I'm very worried about a nuclear arms race in the Middle East" (Bush 2007b). Similarly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton later stated that "in addition to threatening Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran would embolden its terrorist clientele and would spark an arms race that could destabilize the region" (Clinton 2010a).[117]

Beyond this macro-discursive representation of an "unacceptable nuclear Iran",[118] the stigma message also contained a *norm linkage* with respect to the question of which norms and rules had been breached by Iranian behavior. The central themes in the reconstruction of

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[117] During the crisis, the French President Jacques Chirac once made an off the record remark that nuclear-armed Iran would not be "very dangerous". After these remarks had appeared in the press, they sparked a diplomatic controversy and Chirac had to retract them and reaffirm the official French position about "unacceptable nuclear Iran" (The Guardian 2007).

[118] As noted by Hymans & Gratias (2013), the question still remained how do we define "nuclear Iran". In his numerous statements, Bush often noted that "the international community [...] will not tolerate construction of a nuclear weapon" (The Guardian 2003) and Obama later repeatedly asserted that "it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon" (CNN 2012). Others – such as presidential candidate Mitt Romney or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – instead referred to the unacceptability of Iranian nuclear *capability* (Sink 2012; Cohen 2012) – in other words, to the development of *latent capability* to produce nuclear weapons without actually assembling one (or demonstrating the weaponization capability through nuclear test).

Iranian deviance were the violation of IAEA safeguards, refusal to fully cooperate with the IAEA in order to verify the peaceful nature of its remaining activities, and generally the violation of transparency norms through concealment of undisclosed nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak.

The European countries were originally reluctant to fully buy into "rogue state" labelling and confrontational discourses. However, also their rhetoric eventually hardened, with German chancellor Merkel claiming that Iran had "overstepped the mark" (The Guardian 2006a), and French President Sarkozy calling upon the international community to "steadfast in its opposition to those countries that violate the standards for collective security", while noting that "someone who cheats does not have the same rights as an honest person"(cited in Keller & Charlton 2010). Arguably, it was primarily the content of the IAEA reports, noting the impossibility to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's undeclared activities and hinting to the "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program, that convinced many European about the seriousness of Iran's non-compliance.[119]

Furthermore, in September 2009, the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly announced during the G-20 Summit that Iran had also been constructing a second secret nuclear facility for uranium enrichment (The Huffington Post 2009).[120] During the joint U.S.–UK–French press conference, the three statesmen asserted that "Iran's decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime" (The White House 2009b). The non-disclosure of the facilities to the IAEA and the following non-cooperative attitude towards IAEA inspections had primarily been portrayed as a sign that Iran was likely to *further* violate the norms of NPT, i.e. use the facilities for purposes other than civilian ones, thereby violating the fundamental non-proliferation norm. Furthermore, the attempts to conceal elements of the Iranian nuclear program were often tied to the "deviant nature" of the Iranian regime and the expected likelihood that these violations would recur unless special mechanisms of control and normalization were applied to prevent them. As noted by President Bush during the 2007 press conference: "If somebody hid their program once, they could hide it again. If somebody

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[119] See, e.g., GOV/2006/14 2006. Arguably, the credibility of IAEA's reporting was further supported by the fact that the change of tone towards more serious assessment of the situation took place under the directorship of Mohammed ElBaradei, himself representative of a developing Muslim country, who under other occasions frequently stood up against the United States.

[120] Iran reportedly sent a letter to the IAEA with the information about the existence of the facility a few days before this announcement. See Cooper and Mazzetti (2009).

defied the agreement that they signed, the codicils of the agreement they signed, they could do it again" (Bush 2007a).

The (repeated) violation of the transparency norm, the suspicion of nuclear weapons-related activities, and the resulting general loss of confidence were also used as an argument for the prohibition of *any* Iranian enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. For example, during the UNSC deliberations, the United Kingdom representative referred to an Iran's "history of concealment" to support the demand that Iran "could not be allowed to continue its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research" (UNSC 2006b). Whereas all countries have repeatedly stressed the validity of the right for peaceful use, the United States and the E3 also subsumed this *right* under *responsibility* vis-à-vis the NNWS non-proliferation obligations. In this context, any expansion of Iranian nuclear capabilities, in particular the increase in the number of centrifuges used for uranium enrichment, towards the ability to master the full nuclear fuel cycle was framed as defiance (Obama 2010a). The United States, E3, as well as their NNWS allies, the rule-enforcing coalition of the audience of normals, "have adopted a consistent position that Iran should be held to account for its past safeguards violations, and should be punished for its failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA since the exposure of its secret nuclear activities" (Ogilvie-White 2007, p.457). For much of the crisis, this also involved a stigmatization of any enrichment or reprocessing-related activities that Iran would embark upon. The discursive linkage between concealment and the inherently ambivalent fuel cycle practices has been at the heart of stigma politics towards Iran, portraying the Iranian regime as simultaneously untrustworthy and dangerous, and therefore requiring special treatment as opposed to "normal" NNWS:

> The problem that most of the world has seen in Iran stems from the fact that they hid their program. […] Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous, and Iran will be dangerous if they have the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. […] And plenty of people understand that if they learn how to enrich, that knowledge can be transferred to a weapons program, if Iran so chooses. (Bush 2007a)

The stigma message about Iranian deviance was also frequently supported by the "sufficiency" and "economic utility" arguments, suggesting that the size of the Iranian nuclear program was inappropriate for a purely civilian program and that the Iranian insistence on maintaining a full

nuclear fuel cycle was not an economically viable option. It was repeatedly suggested that whereas "Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power that meets the energy needs of its people, […] the size and configuration of [Iranian nuclear facilities] is inconsistent with a peaceful program" (The White House 2009b; see also UK Statement on Behalf of the EU 2005), and that "there is no economic gain for a state that's rich in oil and gas like Iran to build costly nuclear fuel cycle facilities […] Iran flares more gas annually than the equivalent energy its desired reactors would produce" (CNN 2002). In the absence of unambiguous evidence of Iranian intention to *acquire* nuclear weapons (as opposed to evidence about specific safeguards violations), the deductive, cost-benefit framing carried the indirect evidence that "if the economic argument is not convincing, Iran must have ulterior security and military motives" (Moshirzadeh 2007, p.525; see also Hayes 2009, p.991).

The United States, E3, and their NNWS allies also aimed to carry a strong stigma message in the NPT Review Conference setting. For example, in his speech at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, President Obama singled out "Iran's failure to live up to its NPT obligations" as "the greatest threat to proliferation in the Middle East, and to the NPT" (Obama 2010c). On a similar note, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton noted that "Iran is the only country […] to be currently in noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations – the only one. It has defied the UN Security Council and the IAEA, and placed the future of the non-proliferation regime in jeopardy" (Clinton 2010). France even suggested that "disarmament and the development of civil nuclear energy can only continue in good conditions if we halt nuclear proliferation", highlighting "the defiant attitude opted for by the Iranian government" (Danon 2010). Despite the fact that the Iranian nuclear program remained one of the most debated issues during the Conference, Tehran, with some help from its NAM allies, nevertheless succeeded in not being named and shamed in the Final Document, which contained only general references to non-compliance (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b; cf. Müller 2010b). Expressing his discontent with such an outcome, the U.S. representative noted that "the failure of the resolution to mention Iran, a nation in longstanding violation of the NPT and UN Security Council Resolutions which poses the greatest threat of nuclear proliferation in the region and to the integrity of the NPT, is […] deplorable" (Jones 2010).

Rule enforcement through the disciplining and sanctioning of Iran was carried out both through the actions of the E3+3 and via the formal procedures of multilateral institutions, in

particular the IAEA Board of Governors and the UNSC.[121] The IAEA, as the key institution for monitoring and social control in the NPT regime, originally avoided the words "non-compliance" or "violation". A couple of months after the 2002 revelations, the IAEA launched inspections of Iran's facilities. In June 2003, the IAEA resolution asserted that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed" (GOV/2003/40 2003, p.7). The 2005 resolution GOV/2005/77, however, already spoke of Iranian "non compliance" (GOV/2005/77 2005, p.2). As noted above, the IAEA also later made references to the evidence about "possible military dimensions" of Iranian nuclear program (especially the work on high explosives used for nuclear detonations) and the possible connections between Iran and the A. Q. Khan illicit network in the 1980s (see, in particular, GOV/2006/14 2006; GOV/2008/4 2008; GOV/2009/82 2009; GOV/2011/69 2011).

The disciplining message of the IAEA Board of Governors called for the complete suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities; ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol; implementation of transparency measures beyond the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and even beyond the Additional Protocol; and negotiations with the E3 over its nuclear program (IAEA Board of Governors 2005, p.3). When Iran resumed its enrichment activities in 2006, the IAEA Board hardened its stance, pointing to "Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities", and referred the case to the UNSC for further action (GOV/2006/14 2006, pp.1–2).

In the UNSC, U.S. representatives called upon the Council to pass a binding resolution to account for the fact that "Iran had remained non-compliant with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement for the preceding three years and the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran constituted a direct threat to international peace and security" (UNSC 2006a), using the norm linkage and threat linkage to

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[121] The aims to formally validate Iranian's norm violations by declaring Tehran in "non-compliance" by the IAEA and referring the case to the UNSC were carried out in particular by the United States. The European allies originally opted for finding a diplomatic solution without isolating Iran at the multilateral fora (although their stance gradually hardened as the crisis unfolded – see above). See Bowen and Kidd (2004, pp.267–270).

legitimize a corrective action against the deviant state. The first legally binding resolution 1696 defined the Iranian nuclear program as presenting "proliferation risks" and requested both the suspension of enrichment/reprocessing and cooperation with the IAEA under Additional Protocol (S/RES/1696 2006). This and the subsequent UNSC resolutions concerning Iran formed the normative base for the consequent shaming of Iran as a state that defies both the IAEA and the UNSC resolutions (UNSC 2006c; DeYoung 2007).

Between 2006 and 2015, the Iranian nuclear program has been subject to seven binding UNSC resolutions adopted under UN Charter Chapter VII. Since the first binding resolution 1696, the UNSC also linked the issue of the Iranian nuclear program with its activities in developing and testing ballistic missiles, as potential nuclear-capable delivery systems (S/RES/1696 2006). The subsequent resolution 1737, adopted in response to Iranian failure to comply with resolution 1696, demanded the cessation of Iranian "proliferation sensitive nuclear activities", defined as enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, and imposed sanctions on Iran as a country as well as on particular Iranian individuals and entities such as the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran or the companies involved in nuclear or ballistic missile programs (S/RES/1737 2006). These sanctions required other countries to take both passive measures against Iran, i.e. not to transfer specific products and materials that were labeled relevant for nuclear or ballistic missile programs; and active measures such as freezing economic funds for designated individuals. The "gradual turning-on-the-screws" (George 1991) eventually got to the point of a complete conventional arms embargo on Iran, expanded monitoring mechanisms, and other measures used to discipline and normalize Iran in accordance with the rule enforcers' demands (UNSC 2010). Furthermore, after the designation of Iran as a "non-complying state", the IAEA withdrew from a number of cooperative projects with Iran, as well as withdrawing technical assistance that had been provided under the peaceful use pillar of the NPT (Boureston & Lacey 2007).

The pattern of sanctions and diplomatic negotiations followed for several years, with Iran continuously expanding its enrichment capability. In contrast with the Bush administration, however, the new U.S. administration of President Obama signaled its dedication to fully participate in talks with Iran, but it continued with the imposition of economic sanctions and even did not rule out the use of military force (cf. Akhtar & Khan 2014, p.625). The pressure also grew from the Israeli side, when Prime Minister Netanyahu, during his speech in the UNGA,

presented an Israeli "red-line" in terms of Iranian enrichment capabilities, implying the possibility of a preventive military strike (Reuters 2012).

Stigma Management

In response to stigma imposition, Tehran opted for an active approach and employed a combination of different stigma management strategies in the course of the crisis. Arguably, the meta-narrative employed by Tehran has been the *applicatory rejection* of the claim that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons and that Iranian behavior represents a transgression of NPT rules. In response to the rule enforcement, Iran also frequently resorted to the *justificatory rejection* of the enforcement and resorted to practices of defiance vis-à-vis the IAEA and UNSC resolutions. Furthermore, Iran aimed at *neutralizing* the shame and mobilizing its domestic audiences and NAM allies by "condemning the condemners" downplaying the seriousness of its transgressions, and justifying its behavior with reference to the overarching right to peaceful nuclear use and the legitimate need to conceal part of its nuclear activities. Finally, in the context of international negotiations, Iran also took several steps to *normalize* its behavior, and to portray itself as newly "overconforming" to the transparency norm.

Whereas Iranian representatives admitted to the development of an indigenous nuclear program and acknowledged the validity of the non-proliferation norm, they also repeatedly claimed that the program had been strictly civilian and therefore fully in compliance with the rules of peaceful use. In almost all diplomatic encounters, Iranian diplomats categorically stressed that "nuclear energy is not equating to nuclear weapons" (Salehi 2011), that "Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program" (CNN 2002), that "all [Iranian] nuclear activities are for non-military fields" (Borger 2002), and they are therefore pursued for "exclusively peaceful purposes" (Rouhani 2013; Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers 2003). On the link between non-proliferation and peaceful use norms, Iran has consistently insisted on the interpretation that "non-proliferation [...] should not be a pretext for restricting the inalienable right of States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as the Treaty clearly stipulates that *nothing* in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right" (Najafi 2014, *emphasis in the original*). Due to the "purely peaceful, civilian nature" of Iran's nuclear program, Tehran also rejected the proposal that the issue should be subject to deliberations within the UNSC and the Conference on Disarmament (Statement by Iran 2012; Daryaei 2013).

In the course of the crisis and beyond, Iran has also been insisting on the interpretation of the peaceful use norm as containing an inalienable right for *full fuel cycle* nuclear activities for all NNWS. Framing it as a sovereign decision that cannot be limited by non-proliferation concerns, Iran repeatedly stated that "each State party […] has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, including the inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel-cycle" (Zarif 2015; see also Statement by Iran 2015). As noted by Moshirzadeh (2007, p.531), the statements are in line with Iranian meta-discourse of self-sufficiency and independence from foreign support in its policy. Furthermore, Iran also several times contested the notion of "sensitive" activities, technologies, equipment, or material, as long as they are subject to IAEA safeguards and intended for peaceful use (Najafi 2014).

To counter the arguments about the deviant nature of the concealment of its nuclear facilities, Iran put forward its interpretation of the NPT rule that the IAEA must be informed only after the country was ready to start enrichment in the given facilities. Specifically, when asked about the newly discovered Fordo facility near the city of Qom, President Ahmadinejad replied that the plant is "perfectly legal", since "according to the IAEA rules, countries must inform the Agency 6 months ahead of the gas injection in their uranium enrichment plants. We have done it 18 months ahead and this should be appreciated not condemned" (Ahmadinejad 2009; cf. Bowen & Brewer 2011, p.928; Khan 2010, p.90; Ogilvie-White 2010, p.124).[122]

Iran also put forward four broad practical and normative arguments to counter its deviant image of an "emerging nuclear proliferator": an economic & green environmental argument, security & military doctrine argument, religious norms argument, and a victim-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction argument. First, in response to the claim of Iranian energy self-sufficiency, Iran justified its program by citing rising domestic demand, the economic logic of diversification of its energy production, the diverse usability of nuclear products beyond energy production, and finally the (low) environmental impact of nuclear energy in comparison with fossil fuels (Ambassador of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2003; Ahmadinejad 2010; Moshirzadeh 2007, p.524). Second, Iranian representatives frequently stressed that nuclear weapons do not fit Iran's defense doctrine and their acquisition would, in fact, leave Iran less secure than without them (e.g., Davies 2011). Third, Iranian diplomats regularly

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[122] The 2003 agreement that Iran would declare to IAEA *any* new nuclear facility was presented by Iran as a voluntary agreement and unilaterally terminated in 2007. See Bowen and Brewer 2011, p. 928.

pointed to the religious fatwa issued by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that explicitly forbids nuclear weapons as they are inconsistent with the Islamic faith (Akhondzadeh 2012; Soltanieh 2013). Fourth, Iran has portrayed itself as a victim of weapons of mass destruction during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s and mentioned this infamous historical experience as one reason for its strict ideological rejection of nuclear weapons (UNSC 2006a, p.819).

The aforementioned strategy has mainly aimed at reconstructing Iran as an actor who plays by the rules. Iranian representatives did so by contesting the applicability of the general normative principles in the particular case of Iran. At times, however, Iran also assumed a more radical, defiant position towards the rules of the nonproliferation game, as well as of the nuclear and international order as such. In this regard, Carmen Wunderlich argues that

> Iran seems to be torn between leading the existing normative order back to what is seen as the original, correct interpretation of norms, and an upheaval against existing structures for which purpose it refuses to play by the rules of the system. Feeling betrayed by the NWS and rejecting Western hegemony, Iran from time to time transcends a reformist opposition and adopts a confrontational, even obstructive posture. Iranian delegates often apply rather destructive strategies, engage in confrontational moves and consciously strive to undermine a regime that is deemed unjust and partisan (Wunderlich 2014, pp.93–94).

During the nuclear crisis, the Iranian *justificatory rejection* has not been directed towards the fundamental nuclear norms themselves, but rather to the legitimacy of some of the organizing principles and Iranian-specific rules that had been formally validated in the IAEA Board of Governors and UNSC resolutions. With respect to the demands to cease enrichment and reprocessing activities, interpreted by Iran's as its sovereign "inalienable" right, Tehran mostly assumed a defiant posture, with further expansion of its activities and strong verbal opposition to the legitimacy of such demands. Similarly, Iranian representatives repeatedly rejected the legitimacy of organizing principles that would set "arbitrary and self-serving criteria and thresholds regarding proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone technologies and countries" and declared that Iran "is determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment" (Kharrazi 2005).

The defiant posture started to be prominent in the Iranian broader stigma management strategy after the June 2005 election of new Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a

conservative and in many aspects a controversial figure for the West. Iran turned down the E3 offer for a long-term agreement, in which it would, *inter alia*, give up on most fuel cycle activities (except light water and research reactors) in exchange for supplies of nuclear fuel, and economic and other cooperation (Framework for a Long-Term Agreement 2005). In January 2006, Iran stopped the implementation of the Additional Protocol, removed IAEA seals on its centrifuge projects, and resumed its suspended uranium enrichment activities (Squassoni 2009, p.288). After the IAEA Board of Governors passed the resolution that referred the Iranian case to UNSC (GOV/2006/14 2006), President Ahmadinejad declared that Iran "can't give in to the coercion of some bully countries who imagine they are the whole world" (CBS 2006). The top foreign policy adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei similarly suggested that Iran "will not retreat even one step from its peaceful nuclear activity" (Reuters 2009). Soon after Iran resumed full enrichment activities at Natanz facility and inaugurated the Arak heavy-water production plant (BBC 2006).

Framing the issue as the one of procedural justice, Iranian representatives labeled the UNSC resolutions against Iran "unjust and illegal" (Rouhani 2015; Zarif 2006). Iran therefore largely opposed these instruments and carried out activities from enrichment expansion to ballistic missile testing, often in explicit defiance of the resolutions (cf. Ogilvie-White 2010), stressing the Iranian interpretation that any cessation of these activities ought to be a *voluntary* measure of confidence-building rather than a mandatory request (Soltanieh 2013).[123] In April 2006, for example, in response to the March letter from the UNSC to cease enrichment activities, President Ahmadinejad declared that "dear Iran has joined the club of nuclear countries" by successfully enriching uranium for the first time (The Guardian 2006b; CNN 2006a). Whereas Iran subscribes to non-proliferation norm but contests its (Western) interpretation in practice, it also strictly rejects, on a justificatory basis, a validation of the non-enrichment norm as an organizing principle for the peaceful use norm (cf. Tannenwald 2013).

Despite string Iranian involvement in multilateral settings such as the NPT review process, Iran has also engaged in some limited practices of (self-)isolation from the stigmatizing "normals". The Islamic Republic has actively sought links with anti-hegemonic states such as Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela (O'Grady 2014), as well as North Korea, to further develop its ballistic missile program (Fitzpatrick 2006a). The creation of distinct social buffers against

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[123] The stress on the "voluntary" nature of Iran's steps also permeates the JCPOA, despite its clearly mandatory dimension codified in the UNSC resolution.

hegemonic normative conceptions also involved the promotion of specific multilateral, nuclear-related initiatives. For example, in response to the Washington-sponsored Nuclear Security Summit, Iran organized its own Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, juxtaposing the prime focus of nuclear disarmament against a "technical" Western approach with its focus on non-proliferation and the security of existing materials and arsenals (Khamenei 2010). Iran has been also active in the current negotiations nuclear ban treaty, organized without the participation of the NWS and most U.S. NATO allies (Pitts-Kiefer 2017).

A regular feature of Iran's nuclear diplomacy has also been an attempt to *neutralize* stigma by condemning the condemners, i.e. pointing to the rule-enforcing states and questioning their motivation for shaming Iran, as well as their moral right to do so. The principal targets have been the United States and Israel, followed by European countries at times of heightened crisis (e.g., CNN 2006b). In line with its traditional rhetoric employed in the NPT setting, Iran's counter-stigmatization discourse revolved primarily around the alleged motivation of the United States and its allies in stigmatizing Iran, the hypocrisy of the NWS, who are themselves in fundamental breach of nuclear norms, and the issue of double standards towards non-NPT members such as Israel.

In terms of the rule enforcers' motivations, Iran usually discusses alleged motives on the level of bilateral relations, on the regional level, and on the global level. The approach of the United States in particular was attacked as a "prejudgment", made in the context of the broader "political burden of US-Iran bilateral relations" (Johnson 2003). Furthermore, Iran has been highlighting the regional context of the crisis, whereas "certain circles within the United States are trying to create tensions and poison the international atmosphere, and to avert international public opinion away from the real regional danger, which is Israel" (CNN 2002). With regards to the global dimension of North-South relations, Iran has primarily aimed at reconstructing the Western approach as an aim at hindering the industrial progress of developing countries by depriving them of the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. In this context, Iran sometimes employs a discourse of a "nuclear and scientific apartheid" (Habib 2009; cf. Singh 1998a) and a "colonialist approach" (Soltanieh 2008), "assigning the North the center stage and relegating the South to the periphery" (Rouhani 2013).

Iran also frequently cites the hypocrisy of the NWS – in this case, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom – in blaming and shaming Iran when they themselves violate

nuclear norms – by keeping and even modernizing their nuclear arsenals despite their Article VI. disarmament pledges, and sharing their nuclear technology with NPT outsiders (Hosseini 2009). These claims are usually framed as a justice, equality, and/or equity issue, whereas "the IAEA has been putting the most possible pressures on non-nuclear weapon states under the pretext of proliferation risks, while those having nuclear bombs continue to enjoy full immunity and exclusive rights" (Ahmadinejad 2010, p.5). Using the language of "non-compliance", Iran's diplomats suggest that "one of the major challenges facing the NPT is the cases of non-compliance by the US, UK, and France with their Treaty obligations" (Soltanieh 2013). Furthermore, the United States has frequently been accused of double-standards, by "ignoring the non-parties violations and even awarding them for the rejection of the NPT" (Soltanieh 2008) – a thinly-veiled reference to Israel. A similar argument in this direction has been that "the US today is trying to create a second discrimination, one between those that have peaceful nuclear technology and those not allowed to have peaceful nuclear technology" (Perkovich 2005b). In this context, Iran also points to the hierarchies of the broader international order, in which the NWS enjoy "especial privileges in the highest global security decision-making bodies", "exploit[ing] these platforms against the [NNWS], contrary to the spirit of the NPT" (Ahmadinejad 2010, p.4).

Arguably, these counter-stigmatizing discourses are crafted in a way to resonate in particular with the Iranian domestic audience and the NAM allies. Indeed, differences on other domestic issues notwithstanding, the Iranian public seem to be largely receptive to the discourse on nuclear discrimination towards Iran and support the continuation of Iran's nuclear program by an overwhelming majority (see Herzog 2006).[124] Similarly, a large segment of NAM's membership shares Iranian concerns about the imbalance between the rights and duties of NWS and NNWS, as well the tightening up of monitoring and export measures and the continuing limitations on the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy (cf. Wunderlich et al. 2013; Tannenwald 2013). Iran often tries to assume the role of "an advocate of the developing countries fighting against all forms of discrimination and (Western) domination" in the multilateral bodies (Wunderlich 2014, p.92), or the "avenger of the disposed" for the NNWS of the Global South (Wunderlich et al. 2013, p.266). Indeed, this strategy helped to mobilize support for Iran among the NAM after the 2002 revelations, with some of the key NAM

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[124] For a survey of Iranian public's attitude towards the NPT, see Fair et al. (2013).

members trying to soften the language against Iran, avoiding direct criticism at NPT Review Conferences (Johnson 2005; Potter 2005; Müller 2011a; Johnson 2010), and either abstaining or voting in Iran's favor in the IAEA Board of Governors and UNSC (cf. Onderco 2015b). As such,

> framing strategies and alliance-building have […] been of key importance in determining the success of Iran's cause. The link Teheran made between 'nuclear rights' and the demand for historical wrongs to be righted and for discriminatory structures to be abolished struck a particularly strong chord with its non-aligned fellows and its framing of the issue in terms of a denial of technology fitted well with the NAM narrative about oppression and Western domination (Wunderlich 2017b, p.171).

As the crisis progressed, NAM unity eventually crumbled and many NAM members also supported harsher measures in response to Iranian activities (cf. Ogilvie-White 2007; Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2012). Nevertheless, even the defecting NAM members referred to the Iranian nuclear program as a source of concern rather than a "true deviance". Finally, Iran's counter-stigmatizing discourse directed towards NWS has also had some success in convincing part of the pro-disarmament non-governmental sector about its cause (Wunderlich et al. 2013, p.272).

In some individual aspects, Iran also opted for a "denial of responsibility" for some transgressions identified by the IAEA. For example, when the IAEA used environmental sampling methods to detect highly-enriched uranium particles during inspections in 2003, Iran put forward the claim that this was due to the previously contaminated centrifuge-components imported to Iran from abroad (Bowen & Kidd 2004, p.259). Iran admitted to the communication that had been revealed between Iran and the A.Q. Khan proliferation network yet it still portrayed this as being one-sided and initiated by the network itself, without any impact on the Iran's stance, nor on its nuclear capabilities (Fitzpatrick 2006b, p.529).

Furthermore, whereas Iran eventually admitted certain "deficiencies" in terms of the standardized procedures of IAEA safeguards, the Iran's representative to the IAEA nevertheless asserted that these were only minor and "insignificant failures", "at the level of gram and microgram of nuclear materials" (La Guardia 2003; cf. Howard 2004, p.93; Fitzpatrick 2006b). Iran also stressed these are the kind of failures that are widespread and common in the NPT context, once again linking the issue to the broader meta-narrative of double standards in the nuclear order (Zarif 2006). Iran also frequently mentioned the numerous IAEA inspections in

the past that had not revealed any military purpose to those facilities (Howard 2004, p.93). To account for the inability to fully explain some activities with a potential military dimension, Iran referred to its conventional military applications and the sensitivity of revealing such information (Bowen & Brewer 2011, p.929).

The confrontational rhetoric notwithstanding, Iran also engaged in corrective steps that can be interpreted as *normalization* of its policy, in terms of what the rule enforcers interpreted as a desired "normal" for Iran. For example, in 2003 Tehran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing, and pledged to sign and eventually ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, which would allow for more intrusive inspections of Iran's facilities, despite the discord this move caused at home (cf. Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers 2003; Bowen & Kidd 2004, pp.269–270). The enrichment was once again resumed and the implementation of Additional Protocol suspended in 2006. However, after the election of new President Hasan Rouhani in 2013, the E3+3–Iran negotiations intensified, and Iran expressed its willingness towards implementing additional transparency and confidence-building measures.

Stigma Reversal

After new Iran's President Rouhani assumed office in 2013, new intensive meetings between Iran and the E3+3 were held in Geneva. On November 24, the two sides signed the Joint Plan of Action, outlining the specific steps for the coming months as well as a basic framework for the future comprehensive deal (Joint Plan of Action 2013). On July 14th, 2015, the negotiating teams in Vienna announced that they had reached agreement on all points of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By this agreement, Iran successfully defended its interpretation of peaceful use norm, while the E3+3 secured the imposition of strict verification and monitoring measures that would prevent an unexpected break out of Iran from the rules of nuclear abstinence.

The JCPOA seemingly laid down the foundations for Iran's normalization within the global nuclear order. First, Iran agreed to answer outstanding questions on the military aspects of its nuclear program within the months following the agreement. Second, the JCPOA set time-bound quantitative and qualitative limits for Iranian enrichment capabilities and holdings of high-enriched uranium. Third, Iran agreed to cut the size of its low-enriched uranium stockpile, and forgo its reprocessing capabilities that could be used for plutonium production, as well as

certain nuclear weapons-sensitive activities, such as computer simulations of nuclear explosions. Fourth, the agreement establishes a "procurement working group" to continuously review (for the next 10 years) and possibly veto Iran's imports of dual-use items and technology. Fifth, the deal granted the IAEA regular access to Iran's facilities in order to monitor Tehran's compliance with the deal – this represented a level of intrusiveness that went beyond even the access granted by the Additional Protocol.[125] In exchange, the E3+3 would lift all nuclear program-related UNSC and other sanctions imposed on Iran; however, the agreement also includes a "snap back" provision that allows for a quick re-imposition of sanctions in case of Iran's non-compliance with the terms of the JCPOA.[126]

With respect to military aspects of Iran's nuclear program, the IAEA subsequently declared that there are "no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009 […] nor has the Agency found any credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions" (Amano 2015; see also GOV/2015/68 2015). Although new U.S. President Trump vigorously opposed the JCPOA during his presidential campaign and suggested its possible renegotiation, the deal has so far been successfully implemented by all sides (cf. Hannay & Pickering 2017; Fitzpatrick 2017; Michaels & Williams 2017). Despite outrage over Iran's testing of ballistic missiles (Reuters 2017a) and the Trump administration's inflammatory remarks against Tehran (Goldenberg & Rosenberg 2017; Lederman & Colvin 2017), Iran's behavior in the nuclear domain has been largely interpreted by the international community as normalized after the JCPOA, and Iran has been praised for compliance with the terms of the deal (cf. Fitzpatrick 2017).[127]

The language of the JCPOA is undoubtedly one of recognition and reintegration. To account for Iran's justice-framed request to end its singular discrimination among the NNWS, the agreement notes that the "successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully

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[125] As suggested by the IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, "in cases where proliferation concerns exist, I will continue to urge States to be open and transparent. Even if such measures go beyond a State's legal obligations, they pay valuable dividends in restoring the confidence of the international community." (ElBaradei 2005). The JCPOA, however, also includes a provision, under which Iran can propose alternative means for verification of certain facility to protect its commercial or military secrets. If the IAEA would not agree with the proposal, the agreement establishes a dispute-resolution mechanism that would eventually allow the IAEA inspection no later than 24 days since the intitial verification request was made.

[126] The full text of JCPOA (including five annexes) is available at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/. For a comprehensive analysis of its terms, see Strategic Comments (2015).

[127] Even Trump's administration, albeit reluctantly, recently certified Iran's compliance with the JCPOA (The New York Times 2017).

enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes [...], and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT' (JCPOA 2015a, p.3). The subsequent UNSC resolution 2231 embraced the deal as a "comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue", and expressed "its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion its consideration of this matter" (S/RES/2231 2015).

However, the operational articles of the JCPOA suggest that the deal would not lead to the complete de-stigmatization of Iran and its full normalization in the broader nuclear order. As a part of the agreement, Iranian civilian enrichment activities have been significantly limited and reprocessing activities prohibited for the duration of the agreement.[128] This is in stark contrast with the approach towards other NNWS, such as Japan, that are significantly closer to "break out" capability than Iran has ever been.

Whereas, under the so-called 'sunset clause', many of these restrictions will eventually be phased out during an 8 to 15-year period (cf. Fitzpatrick 2015), many verification and monitoring provisions will extend well beyond these 15 years and some of them will remain in place indefinitely (JCPOA 2015b). As a result, during and even after the "probation period", Iran will remain under strict surveillance by the IAEA to an extent incomparable with any other state in the contemporary nuclear order. As one NPT delegate noted in an interview, "Iran will be from now on always paying the price for being non-transparent" (Interview with the EU NPT delegate 2015).

Stigma Power

The stigmatization of Iran as a "(quasi-)nuclear rogue" has been contingent on the multi-dimensional, layered, and processual operations of power. In this section, I briefly unpack several dimensions of power that have been relevant to the Iran's case after 2002 revelations.

One such dimension is structural power, related to the structural positions of super- and sub-ordination of individual actors, providing them with different capacities and options (Barnett & Duvall 2005, pp.52–55). For example, although monitoring and verification of compliance with IAEA safeguards is a principally technical activity, the decision of the IAEA

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[128] Notably, all these provisions of the agreement are framed as "voluntary" in the agreement, with Iran expressing its intention not to resume reprocessing after the end of the JCPOA.

Board of Governors to convey the Iranian case to the UNSC is inherently political. In the composition of the Board, however, the "developing" states, a large part of NAM membership and therefore more likely allies of Iran in the given issue, are underrepresented in comparison with the "developed", industrialized countries with already expanded nuclear energy programs (cf. Müller, Becker-Jakob, et al. 2013, p.58; Behnam & Mahmoudy 2013). Similarly, in respect to the labeling practices of the UNSC that designate specific behaviors a "threat to international peace and security", the NWS enjoy the structurally privileged positions of "great powers" with permanent seats and veto rights (cf. Werner 2014).

Productive power is more concerned with the diffuse, constitutive effects of power that produce subjects through discursive practices in the social setting (Barnett & Duvall 2005, pp.55–57; cf. Doty 1996, p.4). As such, the discursive practices of the rule enforcers, the IAEA, and the UNSC, have managed to establish and fix Iran's deviant identity of a non-transparent, secretive state that deserves special treatment in the nuclear order and whose behavior should be constantly (re)interpreted in the context of nuclear weapons aspirations.[129] The "spoiled identity" of Iran has been repeatedly reconstructed over the course of the crisis, with the dominant majority of actors tacitly accepting the idea that Iran belongs to a specific deviant category of states, whose nuclear practices cannot be perceived in the same way as those of Japan, for example.

The compulsory power employed by the norm enforcers arguably played a significant role in the course of the crisis (cf. Ruzicka 2017; Parsi 2017). The demands for Iran to normalize its behavior in accordance with the IAEA and UNSC demands were backed up with coercive diplomacy involving both economic sanctions and, in the case of the United States and Israel, more or less thinly-veiled threats of the use of military force. The nuclear crisis also saw a rather non-traditional use of compulsive power including Stuxnet cyber-attacks against Iran's facilities (see Farwell & Rohozinski 2011) and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists (Tobey 2012; cf. Sanger 2012).

Despite Iranian attempts to cope with the stigma by employing a range of stigma-management strategies, the process of deviance reconstruction arguably reaffirmed the hierarchies and social stratification of the nuclear order and international order as such. While

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[129] This, however, does not mean to imply that there was not a clear factual basis for finding Iran in violation with IAEA safeguards agreement – on contrary, the evidence in this case was rather unambiguous. However, the *implications* of these findings in terms of Iran's status were inherently political and open to contestation.

Iran was finally allowed to maintain its civilian nuclear program with limited domestic enrichment capabilities, Tehran still ended up in a significantly constrained and structurally weaker position vis-à-vis more powerful actors in global nuclear order. As an actor formally labeled a "transgressor" by formal international institutions, Iran has been subject to both direct (sanctions) and indirect (structural) discrimination in its nuclear – but its conventional military – activities. In fact, even its vanguard position in the NAM in-group was weakened as the crisis progressed.

However, we could also observe a process of empowerment of the Iran's government with respect to its domestic politics. Differences on other issues notwithstanding, the Iranian public largely seemed to support Iranian nuclear program and during the crisis opposed attempts to restrict Iran's ability to master nuclear fuel cycle. As one Iranian official privately noted to George Perkovich, "US pressure has unified the people in wanting nuclear technology even more because the US says we can't have it" (Perkovich 2005a).

Game & Rules

The case of the Iranian nuclear crisis can certainly be read as a story of stigmatization, coercion, negotiation, and at the end a diplomatic solution. However, in the broader perspective, it is also a story of contestation and affirmation of the norms and rules of the nuclear and international order. In particular, the reconstruction of the Iranian deviant image after the 2002 revelations also involved reconstruction of broader normative structure underpinning global nuclear politics. This reconstruction was related to: (1) the meanings and interpretations of the fundamental norms of peaceful nuclear use and non-proliferation (*applicatory contestation and affirmation*); (2) the legitimacy of organizing principles of the rules of peaceful use, and specific procedures of rule enforcement in response to Iranian transgressions (*justificatory contestation and affirmation*); and finally (3) the contingent hierarchy and sub-/super-positions of individual norms (*hierarchical contestation and affirmation*). The crisis, widely interpreted as a unique deviant event in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, also provided the actors with the window of opportunity to propose new initiatives and decision-making procedures with respect to the rules of nonproliferation game.

In the course of the Iranian crisis, no significant actor would contest the validity of the peaceful use norm as such. In fact, in most multilateral encounters, the United States has explicitly affirmed that both Iran and all other NPT signatories maintain the right to develop

their peaceful, civilian nuclear programs (e.g., Obama 2010b). What has, however, become an issue, is the interpretation and *meaning* of the peaceful use norm, and its applicability in the context of nuclear non-transparency and non-compliance with the non-proliferation norm.

As I noted in the previous chapter, the interpretation of the "inalienable right" to peaceful use enshrined in the NPT has been vigorously contested at least since the mid-1970s. Over the course of the crisis, Iran has consistently pushed for the interpretation that "concerns related to nuclear non-proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty" (Statement by Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2015). The option to develop full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities has been framed by Iran as a nation's sovereign right (Rublee 2014a, p.87). Iranian diplomats often claim that this right also applies to the option of developing full national fuel cycle (Zarif 2015), and any limitations to these activities on the side of Iran should be interpreted as "temporary confidence-building measure" rather than "permanent abandonment of a perfectly lawful activity" (INFCIRC/648 2005). This interpretation was also reaffirmed in several NAM statements (Hussain 2006).

The UNSC resolutions with respect to Iran usually opened with the reaffirmation of the right of the NNWS, "in conformity with Articles I and II of [the NPT], to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" (S/RES/1696 2006; S/RES/1737 2006); the word *inalienable*, however, was omitted, as it was in the statements of the United States representatives. Whereas the United States repeatedly acknowledged Iranian right to peaceful use, it simultaneously emphasized the conditionality of this right on the NPT non-proliferation articles I and II, arguing that Iranian behavior was in breach of these articles and, in light of this fact, Tehran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy should have been limited (Obama 2010a). The construction of Iran as deviant–by–concealment was discursively placed in the context of nuclear norms: the breach of IAEA safeguards norm and nuclear transparency norm should be followed by a significant limitation of Iran's rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In the first part of the crisis, the United States actively contested the interpretation of peaceful use norm with respect to individual states being able to freely develop their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, for example, the U.S. representative argued that "the Treaty is silent on the issue of whether compliant

states have the right to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle", that the "efforts to restrict the spread of proliferation-sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology" are not "in any way inconsistent with Article IV", and that it should be the goal of the regime to limit the spread to these technologies and opt for solutions that do not require development of indigenous fuel cycle (Ford 2005). This interpretation was met with strong opposition from not only Iran, but also a number of other NAM countries, who perceived this promotion of "non-enrichment norm" as another attempt to further limit their NPT rights without any concessions from NWS (Tannenwald 2013). Notably, the rule enforcers eventually accepted Iranian demand to maintain its uranium enrichment capability in the JCPOA.

Furthermore, as Hecht (2007) notes, "Iran's nuclearity-as-world-crisis was not merely about the number of centrifuges it could string together into cascades for enriching uranium. It also involved the trustworthiness of the Iranian government, the other nations or entities with which Iran had technological relationships […], the other technologies Iran had already developed and might develop in the future […], and much more besides" (Hecht 2007, p.103). The NPT articles I and II speak of undertakings "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons", a rather ambiguous wording that that fails to set *clear* boundaries between "peaceful use" and "nuclear proliferation" (cf. Harrington & Englert 2014; Hymans & Gratias 2013). In the 1980s, for example, the United States held the position that "the NPT commitment not to 'manufacture' nuclear weapons includes a prohibition on all related development, component fabrication and testing", promoting this interpretation even against the strong opposition from its European and Asian allies (Zhang 2006; Lellouche 1981). In the course of Iranian crisis, the U.S. allies (still opposed by many NAM states in this regard) seemed to move closer to the U.S. view of "appropriate" interpretation.

The JCPOA eventually reaffirmed the validity of peaceful use as a fundamental norm of nuclear order, including the possibility to limit the right of states to develop their civilian nuclear programs once they are found in non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. There seems to be a wide endorsement of the JCPOA in the broader international community, with most states likely agreeing with the words of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that the deal represents "a triumph of diplomacy for the resolution and prevention of conflict and [which] also strengthened global non-proliferation norms" (United Nations Secretary-General 2016).

In the course of the crisis, the actors also contested the hierarchical juxtaposition of individual nuclear norms. During the Bush administration, for example, the U.S. representatives

contested the *equality* of the three pillars (disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful use) within the normative structure of the NPT, arguing that the three-pillar structure is merely a

> convenient shorthand for 'the three issues mentioned in the NPT about which people care the most in diplomatic circles.' One should not infer from such phrasing, however, that these three elements are of equivalent importance to the regime. In fact, the NPT, as its title suggests, is a nonproliferation treaty, built around the core provisions of Articles I and II (Ford 2010b).

Whereas the Obama administration explicitly reaffirmed the validity of the three pillars (Kerry 2015), it nevertheless also implicitly acknowledged the hierarchical link between non-proliferation and peaceful use, making the former super-ordinate in relation to the latter (cf. Müller 2017, p.5; Kuppuswamy 2006, p.144).

There seemed to be a consensus in the NPT regime about the affirmation of the IAEA's role as an institution of social control, and the implementation of the monitoring and verification practices in Iranian case (cf. Ogilvie-White 2007, p.457; S/RES/2231 2015; NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p.3). Nevertheless, the use of economic sanctions as a legitimate rule-enforcing instrument has been contested throughout the crisis, primarily by the NAM countries. Both the Final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the Draft Final Document in 2015 stressed that "responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations" (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p.3; NPT/CONFZ.2015/R.3 2015, p.2). Both these Review conferences also reaffirmed the role of the UNSC and UNGA in dealing with cases of non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p.3; NPT/CONFZ.2015/R.3 2015, p.2)..

As a high-profile deviant event, the Iranian nuclear crisis also opened a window of opportunity for relevant stakeholders to actively modify the rules or promote new initiatives within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Indeed, at both the 2005 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, several states, in particular the United States and its NATO allies, proposed new measures to strengthen the non-proliferation norm – the new "gold standards" (Dhanapala 2010, p.2). Many of these proposals were rhetorically linked to the need to react to the "recent non-compliance issues", or even explicitly to the Iranian case (or Iranian *and* North Korean cases) (cf. Jones 2010). The three most debated measures have been: first, the

multilateralization of nuclear fuel cycle, in the form of international fuel bank, which would guarantee the external supply of reactor fuel and therefore promote the standard that NNWS would forgo their domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities (cf. ElBaradei 2005; IAEA 2005; Yudin 2009; Rauf & Simpson 2004); second, promotion of the (so far voluntary) Additional Protocol as a new verification standard in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and possibly a precondition for new supply arrangements (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43 2008, para.38; cf. NPT/CONF.2005/WP.10 2005; ElBaradei 2005; Asada 2011); third, the clarification of the rules of withdrawal from the NPT under article X., specifying the conditions for withdrawal, the overall procedure, as well as the role of the UNSC in the withdrawal process (cf. NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32 2005; NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16 2005; NPT/CONF.2005/WP.59 2005; ElBaradei 2005, p.5; Ford 2008).

However, a large number of countries, primarily the NAM states, strongly resisted adoption of any binding language on these measures. The NAM position, continuously reaffirmed at various non-proliferation fora, has been "that it is fundamental to make the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19 2005), and that the decision to forgo domestic enrichment or the adoption of the Additional Protocol should belong to the latter (cf. Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2011b, chap.2). Many of these issues have been contested by ordering discourses, pointing to the super-ordinate validity of state sovereignty in international order (see e.g., NPT/CONF.2005/WP.33 2005, para.7). Similarly, a number of states contested the attempts to adopt a stricter interpretation of the rule of withdrawal, one that goes beyond Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the customary international law (e.g., Statement by South Africa 2005).

The NAM also framed the (non-)adoption of new non-proliferation measures as an issue of *equity* with respect to the rights and obligations of the NWS and the NNWS. Many states have already expressed their intention not to accept any new non-proliferation obligations unless the NWS accept adopt more specified rules of disarmament (cf. Müller 2011a; Müller 2017; Tannenwald 2013; Simpson & Nielsen 2005, p.289). In consequence, the aforementioned measures to strengthen the non-proliferation toolbox were merely mentioned in the final documents, but without any binding language that would formally validate them as new rules of nonproliferation game (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b).

Outside the NPT framework, the nuclear exporters in NSG nevertheless decided to implement new standardized procedures, explicitly referring to non-compliance of Iran, North Korea, and Libya as a reason for implementing the new rules. In 2004, the NSG adopted a "catch-all" rule to "provide a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with a nuclear weapons programme" (NSG 2004; cf. Hibbs 2011). In 2011, the Chairman of the NSG sent a formal letter to inform the IAEA about the further strengthening of NSG guidelines with respect to exports of nuclear material, equipment, and technology. In particular, for the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the updated NSG rules newly required not only NPT membership and compliance with IAEA safeguards, but also an implementation of an Additional Protocol or comparable appropriate regional arrangement approved by the IAEA (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 2011; cf. NSG 2011; Thränert & Bieri 2013). This meant that some of the normative innovations in response to Iran's crisis were adopted on the sidelines of the NPT regime, in the export control club where the consensus on the appropriate response was significantly higher than in the broader NPT review setting.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I applied the conceptual apparatus introduced in chapters 2 and 3 to study the operations of stigma politics in international crisis following the 2002 revelations of Iran's secret nuclear facilities. The United States and its European allies were at the forefront of international rule enforcement, mobilizing the "audience of normals" – including China, Russia, Arab Sunni states, and others – to stigmatize, punish, and discipline Iran for its transgressive behavior. They jointly engaged in the discursive (re)construction of Iran's deviant image of a "cheat", requiring a special treatment as opposed to "normal" NNWS. The United States in particular discursively linked the Iranian behavior to its earlier image of an international rogue, labeling, separating, and stereotyping Iran as a prototypical international outlaw. The stigma message about untrustworthy Iranian regime and the repeated violations of IAEA safeguards was meant to support an argument of the rule enforcers for the prohibition of *any* Iranian enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, including those for (allegedly) civilian use.

The case of Iran also shows how states are often able to employ a range of different discursive strategies to cope with the stigma imposed by more powerful actors and (to some extent) mobilize the in-group support to help them deal with the processes of stigma politics.

In the course of the crisis, Iranian representatives engaged in the *applicatory rejection* of the claim that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons or that Iran's behavior represents a transgression of fundamental NPT norms. In response to the institutionally imposed sanctions, Iran also frequently resorted to the *justificatory rejection* of the rule enforcement and resorted to practices of defiance vis-à-vis the IAEA and UNSC resolutions. Furthermore, Iran aimed at *neutralizing* the shame and mobilizing its domestic audiences and NAM allies by verbally attacking the United States and its European allies for their own transgressions of NPT rules, downplaying the seriousness of Tehran's transgressions, and justifying Iran's behavior with reference to the overarching right to peaceful nuclear use and the legitimate need to conceal part of its nuclear activities. Finally, in the context of negotiations with the E3 and later E3+3, Iran also took several steps to normalize its behavior, and to portray itself as newly "overconforming" to the nuclear transparency norms.

However, the Iran's case is also a demonstration of the interactionist claim about the difficulty to fully de-stigmatize and normalize the "spoiled" identity. The reconciliatory rhetoric of the JCPOA notwithstanding, Iran's position in the nuclear order has been only partly normalized. Under the agreement, Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy will remain limited in comparison with many other NNWS, and Iran will remain under surveillance as a closely watched "parolee". And, even after the end of the formal "probation period", Iran will still be subject to the mechanisms of exceptional social control unlike other states in the nuclear order. Iran's future policies in the nuclear domain will likely to continue to be (re)interpreted in the light of its previous deviant behavior.

The case of Iran reveals the limits of stigma management with respect to power inequalities and the social stratification of global nuclear order. Perhaps most importantly, the rule enforcing coalition was able to use its structurally advantageous position in the IAEA Board of Governors to refer to Iran's case to the UNSC – and then enforce the NPT norms through the formal UNSC procedure of sanctioning Iran's behavior. The IAEA Board of Governors and the UNSC resolutions were sometimes even supported by some of the Iran's NAM allies, partly due to the successful construction of "Iran problem", but to some extent also due to the diplomatic persuasion exerted by the United States and its allies.

In the process of deviance reconstruction, several rules of the nonproliferation game were subject to contestation and (re)affirmation or change. The final JCPOA eventually reaffirmed the validity of peaceful use as a fundamental norm of nuclear order and the

possibility to limit the right of states to develop their civilian nuclear programs once they are found in non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards. Although many states, the NAM in particular, strictly opposed the interpretations of peaceful norm as imposing any limits on NNWS in their development of full nuclear cycle, this limitation was nevertheless acknowledged in Iran's case due to its non-transparent behavior. There also seemed to be a consensus among the NPT parties about the reaffirmation of the IAEA's role as an institution of social control, and the implementation of the monitoring and verification practices in Iran's case.

Several "moral entrepreneurs", once again mainly the United States and its allies, also used the window of opportunity to put forward new initiatives that would strengthen the non-proliferation norm vis-à-vis future cases of deviance. These new non-proliferation measures included, for example, the multilateralization of nuclear fuel cycle, promotion of the Additional Protocol as a new verification standard, or the clarification of the rules of withdrawal from the NPT under article X. Their implementation as obligatory measure for NNWS, however, was mostly blocked by the NAM with reference to the resulting limitations on sovereignty and the equity and justice concerns with respect to the NWS refusal to accept new measures in the rules of disarmament. At the same time, some new normative innovations were successfully implemented on the sidelines of the NPT regime, primarily in the NSG that managed to find a new consensus on how to adapt to the similar cases of nuclear deviance.

6. North Korea and the Crossing of Nuclear Rubicon (2002-2015)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is likely the most prototypical case of normative deviance among states in today's international order. Once labelled "the poster child for rogue states" (Wit 2001, p.77), displaying behavior of "an archetypal deviant" (Geldenhuys 2004, p.174), North Korea's list of transgressions ranges from human rights abuse to the support of terrorism, abductions of foreign citizens, and threats of war towards its neighbors. However, it is primarily the attempt to acquire WMD – nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in particular – that has been "North Korea's foremost sin" (Geldenhuys 2004, p.189).

The story of North Korea as a nuclear power dates back to the 1950s, with the establishment of mutual cooperation in nuclear science and development with the Soviet Union (Zhebin 2000). During the 1960s, with Soviet assistance, North Korea laid the foundation for its nuclear infrastructure, including a research reactor and nuclear facilities in Yongbyon (see Szalontai & Radchenko 2006; Pollack 2011, pp.53–59). Under a growing suspicion that North Korea would not use its nuclear program only to meet its energy needs, the Soviets pressured Pyongyang to accede to the NPT in 1985 (Hecker 2010b, p.45).

North Korea, however, delayed the implementation of obligatory IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program until 1992. When the IAEA inspectors finally arrived in the country, their findings indicated that Pyongyang had not declared all of its plutonium stocks as required by the IAEA safeguards rules (IAEA 2011, p.2). These findings spurred an international crisis, with the IAEA reporting North Korean non-compliance with safeguards to the UNSC, Pyongyang announcing its decision to withdraw from the NPT, and the United States even considering a preventive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities (Wit et al. 2004, chap.4; Ludvik 2016, chap.5). The crisis was resolved by the adoption of the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States, which was supposed to put a halt on the North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for the supplies of heavy fuel oil, the delivery of light water reactors, and the normalization of mutual relations between the two countries.

Despite numerous problems on both sides with fully complying with the terms of the Agreed Framework during the 1990s (cf. Sigal 2002; Huntley 2004, n.32; Chanlett-avery &

Rinehart 2014, p.9; Grzelczyk 2015, p.33), the agreement remained in place until October 2002, when the United States accused Pyongyang of clandestine pursuit of uranium enrichment program.[130] This subsequently led to the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. Since then, North Korea declared itself a nuclear weapon state and conducted five nuclear tests (in 2006, 2009, 2013, and two in 2016). Attempts to reverse Pyongyang's actions through multilateral Six-Party Talks failed,[131] and, in response to its escalatory behavior, North Korea has been subject to numerous UNSC resolutions and sanctions. In 2017, the behavior of nuclear-armed North Korea is still considered a major security issue in the region and beyond.

Thus far, nuclear scholarship has been primarily concerned about the logic and causes of Pyongyang's deviant behavior (e.g., Cha 2002; Park 2007; Hymans 2008; Ogilvie-White 2010; Ahn 2011; Lee 2012; Akhtar & Khan 2014; Cho 2014), about available (and desirable) courses of action in response to the North Korean nuclear issue (e.g., Wit 2001; Cha & Kang 2003; Laney & Shaplen 2003b; Moltz & Quinones 2004; Hymans 2007; Zhang 2009b; Fitzpatrick 2009a; Panda 2011; Fitzpatrick 2013; Plant & Rhode 2013; Hilpert & Meier 2013), and about the links between the North Korean nuclear/missile program and proliferation attempts by other state and non-state actors (Braun & Chyba 2004; Fitzpatrick 2006a; Huntley 2006). There is a broad agreement in the aforementioned literature about the "deviantness" of Pyongyang's behavior and about the negative implications of such behavior for the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Wunderlich et al. 2013), there is a clear lack of comprehensive analyses of North Korea's actions and argumentation vis-à-vis the backdrop of norms and rules of global nuclear order.

In this chapter, I apply the conceptual apparatus introduced in chapters 2 and 3 to study the (re)construction of North Korea's deviant image in global nuclear politics during the second nuclear crisis in the North Korean peninsula (2002-2015).[132] I use this framework to analytically

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[130] Scholars and experts frequently call the events following the 2002 revelations the "second nuclear crisis" in Korean peninsula. For more detailed empirical accounts of the first and the second nuclear crisis, see for example Sigal (1998), Pollack (2003), Ness (2003), Bleiker (2003), Liu (2003), Lee & Moon (2003), Samore (2003), Kang (2003), Park (2004), Wit et al. (2004), Dukmin (2005), Rozman (2007), Pritchard (2007), Chinoy (2010), Pollack (2011), Rozman (2011), Grzelczyk (2012), Choi (2015), or Kwak (2016).

[131] Those six parties in the Six-Party Talks include the United States, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea (for literature on Six-Party talks, see for example Park 2005; Kwak 2008; Grzelczyk 2009; Buszynski 2013; Ness 2005; Moon 2005; Choo 2005; Shulong & Xinzhu 2008).

[132] The selection of 2015 as an "end date" is strictly related to the data availability at the time of writing this dissertation and does not imply any particular event that would suggest a significant transformation of the crisis.

unpack the North Korean case in five sections, which correspond to five distinct dimensions of stigma politics: (1) stigma nexus, (2) stigma imposition, (3) stigma management, (4) stigma reversal, and (5) stigma power. Then, I discuss the implications of these processes for the dynamics of the normative structure of the nonproliferation game. Finally, I summarize the findings of this chapter in a concluding section.

Stigma Nexus

This section unpacks the actor-specific setting of the interactive negotiation of North Korea's "deviant" identity against the backdrop of international norms and rules. This negotiation has been taking place in the nexus of North Korea (the *deviant actor*) and international *audiences,* who have been jointly participating in the discursive (re)construction of events following the uranium enrichment accusations by the United States in October 2002.

Considered by many a "strange socialistic fortress" (Lee 2001) and a proverbial "hermit kingdom", North Korea largely operates at the margins of international order. Although the country is significantly less diplomatically isolated than average Western newspaper articles would suggest (see Grzelczyk 2017, chap.3), it still maintains a very low degree of interaction capacity vis-à-vis international society (Ogilvie-White 2010, pp.122–123). North Korea's voice is rarely heard at international institutions and fora (Grzelczyk 2016, p.72) – this also applies to NPT Review Conferences, where North Korea did not even participate in 2000, when it was still a treaty member.[133] Although some of the North Korean anti-hegemonic, anti-colonial, and anti-US statements should, in principle, resonate with the traditional NAM proposals, North Korea does not properly engage in broader normative coalition-building within nuclear order (Wunderlich et al. 2013, pp.279–281).

While most statements from the international community condemned North Korean nuclear pursuit, the most active rule enforcers in the second nuclear crisis have been the United States and its allies, in particular Japan and South Korea. Since armed conflict in the Korean peninsula during the 1950s, North Korea has technically been in a state of war with both its southern neighbor and the United States. Despite occasional attempts to normalize mutual

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[133] North Korea did participate at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. However, Pyongyang withdrew from the conference proceedings after a mere week of debates, noting the "biased" approach of the Conference towards itself as the reason for withdrawal. See Rauf & Johnson (1995, p.40).

relations, most interactions have been marked by hostility, tensions, and the lack of recognition.

Another North Korean neighbor, China, is often considered North Korea's closest ally. Beijing has been Pyongyang's principal economic partner, with an increasing rate of both cross-border trade and direct investments in recent years (Jung & Rich 2016; Lee & Gray 2016). However, the proverbial "close as lips and teeth" relationship has become significantly strained as a result of North Korea's nuclear pursuit, with China publicly condemning Pyongyang's actions and participating in international rule enforcement, including sanctions. Although Beijing has been active in the Six-Party Talks and is frequently calling for strictly diplomatic solutions to the crisis, its opposition to North Korea's behavior has been increasingly stronger over the course of the last fifteen years.

Russia, the last state participating in the Six-Party Talks, has also been participating in the UNSC resolutions in response to North Korea's nuclear activities. However, as Russia itself has been subject to stigmatizing discourses in response to its involvement in the Ukraine crisis, Moscow and Pyongyang have been cooperating more closely on both economic and political levels (Talmadge 2014).

Finally, Pyongyang has engaged in limited "social buffering" with other "deviant" states of international politics, such as Iran, Syria, and Cuba.[134] With respect to the stigmatization of North Korea by the West, these countries often display an in-group stance, refraining from criticizing North Korea for its nuclear transgressions (or even declaring a limited support and understanding).

Stigma Imposition

This section elaborates, in detail, on two components of the imposition of stigma on North Korea after the events of October 2002: a *stigma message*, communicating and (re)constructing the deviant image of Pyongyang; and a *rule enforcement*, in the form of sanctions and disciplining discourses directed towards North Korea.

The brief U.S. announcement in October 2002 commented on U.S. Assistant Secretary James Kelly's visit in Pyongyang, during which North Korean representatives had allegedly

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[134] On the shift of economic ties towards these states in response to the imposition of the UNSC sanctions, see Haggard & Noland (2009, p.3).

admitted existence of a uranium enrichment program.[135] The U.S. press statement framed this situation as a "serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under [NPT], its [IAEA] safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", and once again made a transgressive linkage to other North Korean "sins", including "weapons of mass destruction programs, development and export of ballistic missiles, threats to its neighbors, support for terrorism, and the deplorable treatment of the North Korean people" (Boucher 2002). In November, the Executive Board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)[136], consisting of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the EU, "condemn[ed] North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons program" in a "clear and serious violation" of the aforementioned agreements (KEDO 2002a; similarly Bush 2002a).

Similar to the case of Iran that was analyzed in the previous chapter, the social (re)construction of North Korea as a "nuclear-armed deviant" drew on the earlier labeling, stereotyping, and discursive separation of the country as an international "rogue". Despite the U.S.-North Korea proclamation that "neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and [they are both committed] to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity" (U.S. Department of State 2000), the United States kept North Korea on its list of terrorism-sponsoring states, and the rhetoric of new administration of President George W. Bush significantly hardened. In the 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush famously included North Korea in the international "axis of evil", calling it "a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens" (Bush 2002c). Similarly, the later Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice labelled North Korea an "outpost of tyranny", stereotyping it together with Cuba, Myanmar, Iran, Belarus, and Zimbabwe in the concept of "fear societies", separated from "free societies" of democratic states (Rice 2005).

Notably, the stigmatization of North Korea as a deviant state also frequently took a personal turn directed towards the ruling dynasty in Pyongyang. Bush called the then-leader of North Korea a "tyrant" and a "pygmy", with a behavior of a "spoiled child at a dinner table"

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[135] Whereas it is clear today that North Korea indeed took steps to the uranium enrichment capability under the Agreed Framework, the state of North Korea's uranium program in 2002 as well as the nature of North Korean admittance in October 2002 (which Pyongyang subsequently denied) have been subject to controversy in the literature (cf. Mukhopadhayay & Wolfstahl 2003; Kerr 2003; Kahn & Chira 2003; Hecker 2004; Harrison 2005; Gusterson 2008; Zhang 2009a; Hecker 2010b).

[136] Under the Agreed Framework, KEDO was responsible for budilding of two light water reactors in North Korea. See Wit (1999).

(cited in Cooper 2007). Causing a diplomatic incident, U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control John Bolton labeled Kim Jong-Il a "tyrannical rogue state leader" who "seems to care more about enriching uranium than enriching his own people" (Bolton 2003). The deviant image of North Korea as "a foreign, secluded and dangerous place" (Shim 2014, p.78), run by a "paranoid, potbellied Stalinist" with "comically eccentric, excessive tastes" (Gusterson 2008, pp.21–29), has been continuously reproduced by almost all mainstream Western media to date.

While the "rogue" *labeling* and *stereotyping* has been predominantly a Western imposition,[137] North Korea's actions following the 2002 accusations – i.e., withdrawal from the NPT and nuclear and missile tests – invited stigmatizing responses from not only the United States and its allies, but also from China and Russia. In particular, many observers noted Beijing's growing impatience with its problematic ally, and the willingness to harshly condemn Pyongyang's activities and cooperate with the Western countries on the adoption of disciplining UNSC resolutions and sanctions (cf. Zhang 2009c; Glaser 2009; Snyder 2007, p.36). Russian President Putin likewise declared, in response to the first North Korean nuclear detonation, that "Russia unconditionally condemns the test", which had caused "tremendous harm […] to the regime of WMD non-proliferation in the world" (Putin 2006).

The stigma message contained in the statements made by the rule-enforcing audience has consistently carried several discursive components. The first such component has been the *separation* of deviant North Korea and the united international community, whose will is being "defied" (Bush 2006c) or "disregarded" (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009), despite its "repeated warnings" (Government of the ROK 2006). This theme also frequently appeared under U.S. President Obama's administration, who claimed that North Korea "has no interest in being a responsible member of the international community" (The White House 2016), and the new Trump administration, addressing North Korea in the UNSC meeting: "the international community wants to support you, but as long as you test and as long as you continue your nuclear program, you are on an island by yourself" (Haley 2017).

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[137] Notably, even Asian U.S. allies like South Korea sometimes argued against counterproductivity of labelling, suggesting that "what we don't need are statements like 'he's the bad guy' or these categorizations of the regime. What we need is an answer aimed at the problem and not a giving in to anger" (ROK Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min Soon, cited in Faiola & Sakamaki 2005).

The second consistent component has been the threat linkage between North Korean deviant behavior and its dangerous consequences in both global and regional contexts. Recent U.S. Presidents have repeatedly claimed that North Korea's nuclear program "threatens regional and international security and undermines the international non-proliferation regime" (Bush 2002b; similarly The White House 2009a), not least because of the potential dissemination of nuclear weapons or materials to other state and non-state actors (Bush 2006e; Obama 2016). The UNSC resolutions also highlighted the challenge "to the [NPT] and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger [North Korean nuclear testing] poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond" (e.g., S/RES/2321 2016).

The third such component has been the norm linkage between North Korea's behavior, the UNSC resolutions, and international norms and rules more broadly. Whereas most UNSC resolutions and states' statements mentioned above usually framed North Korea's conduct as transgressions vis-à-vis (earlier) UNSC resolutions and Pyongyang's prior commitments, other statements by representatives of international institutions also explicitly pointed to non-proliferation and disarmament norms (United Nations 2016) and norms against nuclear testing (UN Secretary-General 2016; CTBTO Executive Secretary 2016). The IAEA Board of Governors also found North Korea to be in non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards rules – arguing that they are still valid even after Pyongyang's notice of withdrawal (GOV/2003/14 2003). The NPT Review Conference Final Documents in 2000 and 2015 (not adopted) also deplored Pyongyang's non-compliance and highlighted the collisions of its conduct with the status norms of the NPT, according to which North Korea "cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty in any case" (NPT/CONF.2000/28 2000a, p.16; NPT/CONF.2015/50 2015, p.21).

In response to what has been widely interpreted as a serious violation of common norms and rules, North Korea has been repeatedly subject to sanctions and other disciplining measures that aimed to "normalize" its behavior. In the follow up to the 2002 uranium enrichment accusations, KEDO suspended deliveries of heavy fuel until Pyongyang demonstrated "concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly-enriched uranium program" (KEDO 2002b). After North Korea withdrew from the NPT, the IAEA urged Pyongyang "to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement" and reported the case to the UNSC (GOV/2003/14 2003).

Until 2006, however, the UNSC did not deal with the IAEA non-compliance referral, primarily due to China's opposition towards any measures that could complicate a diplomatic solution to North Korea's issue (Huntley 2006, p.725). The situation changed in 2006 when the UNSC unanimously agreed on the resolution to condemn North Korea's ballistic missile test launches and banned any sales or financial operations that could contribute to Pyongyang's missile program (S/RES/1696 2006). The subsequent UNSC Resolution, 1718, passed in response to North Korea's first nuclear test, invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and imposed limited sanctions (S/RES/1718 2006). Further resolutions with increasingly strengthened sanction regimes were passed in response to North Korea's nuclear test in 2009 (S/RES/1874 2009), the 2012 satellite launch (S/RES/2094 2013), and the 2016 nuclear and missile tests (S/RES/2270 2016; S/RES/2321 2016).[138]

Despite partial differences on the ratio of sticks and carrots in the dealings with North Korea, the stigma politics in major multilateral fora led to the construction of the consistent picture of a defiant nuclear North Korea, repeatedly violating its prior commitments, binding UNSC resolutions, and fundamental norms of international order. The recurring theme of North Korea as an "isolated island" on the edge of the international community was also joined by the unanimous refusal to acknowledge and legitimize North Korea's identity of a de facto nuclear-armed state. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT has been contested and North Korea has been therefore in a specific liminal position vis-à-vis nuclear order since 2003. For the NPT community, North Korea has remained a non-compliant member, rather than an NPT "outsider" such as India, Pakistan, or Israel. In light of this, any of North Korea's activities towards further development of its nuclear or ballistic missile program has been interpreted as strictly deviant conduct. The image of a disciplined and "normalizing" North Korea, on the other hand, would involve cessation of all such activities and return to the IAEA safeguards system, while carrying out the steps towards "the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization" (NPT/CONF.2015/50 2015, p.21).

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[138] Some states and institutions also used the instrument of bilateral sanctions towards North Korea, including the United States (e.g., The White House 2008; The White House 2011), Japan (The Japan Times 2015), or the EU (Council of the EU 2017). For the analysis of proliferation-related sanction against North Korea, see Haggard & Noland (2009).

Stigma Management

The previous section highlighted North Korea's deviant image of an isolated state that acts with a complete disregard of the world's communal opinion. Contrary to popular belief, however, North Korea also actively contests its deviant identity in international order and draws on the normative resources to manage its stigma – however strange and inconsistent its discursive strategies may seem to outside observers.

After the brief period of *applicatory rejection* regarding the 2002 accusations, North Korea started to frame its non-compliance under the broader *neutralizing* narrative, justifying its actions by the U.S. transgressions and the super-ordinate norms of sovereignty. This has been pursued in parallel with the *justificatory rejection* of stigmatizing discourses and sanctions imposed by the UNSC, with North Korea insisting on the legitimacy of its entitlement to nuclear and missile programs; in fact, these programs started to be reconstructed by Pyongyang as a key defiant symbol, a "badge of honor", of North Korea's strength and independence. Finally, at numerous points during the crisis, North Korea also engaged in *normalizing* practices vis-à-vis nuclear norms, by making concessions to the rule enforcers and portraying itself as a "normal nuclear-armed state".

Pyongyang originally rejected the October 2002 accusations of a clandestine uranium enrichment program as fabricated by the United States, although already at that time it insisted on its entitlement to "have weapons more powerful than those based on enriched uranium" (DPRK Foreign Ministry 2002; KCNA 2003b; see also Harrison 2005). In December 2002, North Korea sent a letter to the IAEA about the decision to "lift the freeze on [its] nuclear facilities" (Son 2002) and soon after removed the IAEA seals from nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, that had been shut down under the terms of the Agreed Framework (The New York Times 2002). In January 2003, North Korea announced its immediate withdrawal from the NPT, justifying it as "a legitimate self-defensive measure taken against the U.S. moves to stifle the DPRK" (KCNA 2003c).[139] In the statement on its withdrawal, Pyongyang also attempted to delegitimize the IAEA as "a servant and a spokesman for the U.S." and highlighted the U.S. systematic violations of the Agreed Framework. The statement also repeatedly invoked the norms of sovereignty that would be breached by the IAEA resolution. At that time, still, North Korea stressed that it

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[139] The detailed report explaining and justifying North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is available at KCNA (2003a).

had "no intention to produce nuclear weapons and [its] nuclear activities […] will be confined only to peaceful purposes" (KCNA 2003c).

It was not long after the withdrawal notice when North Korea changed its rhetoric and publicly admitted its plan to acquire nuclear weapons. In June 2003, Pyongyang announced its "intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force", in response to the U.S. "hostile policy" and the need to "reduce conventional weapons […] and channel manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the betterment of people's living" (KCNA 2003d). In January 2004, North Korea invited scientists from Stanford University to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, to convey a message about the advanced state of its nuclear program and its "possession of a deterrent" (Hecker 2010b, p.46). Shortly before the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Pyongyang officially announced for the first time that it had successfully acquired nuclear weapons, stressing the anti-U.S. justification and its own self-defense as the only purpose (KCNA 2005).

The anti-US claims, together with the appeal to meta-norms of equality, sovereignty, and the need for self-defense, have been the consistent pillars of North Korea's neutralizing discourse. The need to further proceed with its nuclear program has been framed as a "self-defensive measure to cope with the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the United States" (Yong 2015), which does not change the fact that it is still "the position of the DPRK to oppose nuclear war, nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation" (Yon 2010). North Korea frequently contests the intention as well as the legitimate authority of the UNSC and highlights the problem of double standards, selectiveness, and politicization of the UN-decision making process that is used as a tool of big powers (Yon 2011). Pyongyang also frequently points to the norms of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, which are violated under the guise of non-proliferation (Yong 2015).

In time, the nascent nuclear capability has been reconstructed into a "badge of honor" (Adler-Nissen 2014b) and a symbol of self-reliance in North Korea's discourse. In October 2006, the KCNA proudly announced that North Korea, "with indigenous wisdom and technology", conducted its first nuclear test (KCNA 2006). In 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test as an "an irrefutable exercise of […] independent right and sovereignty for the defence of [..] dignity, system, and safety of the nation", "greatly inspiring the army and people of the DPRK" (Rodong Sinmun 2009; KCNA 2009b). In the same year, Pyongyang also announced to the UNSC that it is in the final phase of its experimental uranium enrichment (KCNA 2009a), and once invited a U.S. delegation composed of Stanford University scientists to observe and

report on the development of North Korea's nuclear program (see Hecker 2010a for the detailed report of the visit). At the UNGA Disarmament commission, Pyongyang's representative started to refer to North Korea's nuclear arsenal as "life and soul of [North Korean] nation" (UN Disarmament Commission 2015a).

Another distinct pattern in a North Korea's stigma management discourse has been a harsh justificatory rejection of the UNSC and IAEA disciplinary measures, and the defiant actions that have usually followed the adoption of individual statements and resolutions. For example, in response to the UNSC Presidential statement condemning North Korea's missile test (S/PRST/2009/7 2009), Pyongyang declared the UNSC actions "an unbearable insult to our people and a criminal act never to be tolerated" (KCNA 2009c), ceased the cooperation with the IAEA that was resumed as a result of the Six-Party Talks (IAEA 2009), declared its decision to strengthen its nuclear deterrent both qualitatively and quantitatively (KCNA 2009d), stressed that ''it has become an absolutely impossible option […] to even think about giving up […] nuclear weapons'' (KCNA 2009c), and eventually carried out another nuclear test. Pyongyang also declared that due to the "worsening policy of hostility toward North Korea, the six-party talks and the joint September 19 statement were rendered null and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was put to an end" (Yonhap News 2013). The UNSC actions have been labelled by Pyongyang "a flagrant violation of the principles of respect for sovereignty and equality" and questioned in the broader terms of legitimacy of contemporary global governance, in which the UNSC decisions should be supervised by the UNGA as a more legitimate representative of the broader international community (Yon 2013). On this level of discourse, North Korea assumes a truly dissident position vis-à-vis the rules of international order, rather than a mere oppositional stance (cf. Daase & Deitelhoff 2014; Gertheiss & Herr 2017). In the words of Ogilvie-White (2010, p.123),

> from the perspective of a state in this position of extreme marginalization, outright defiance of the nonproliferation regime and development of a nuclear deterrent send a clear message to international society: ''We reject your values, laws and systems of governance, just as you reject ours. We are independent; we have a right to exist on our own terms. Cross us at your peril.''

However, North Korea also sometimes resorts to discourses that seem to suggest the desire to normalize its identity in the global nuclear order. To some extent, this has been the case of concessions promised in the context of Six-Party Talks. For example, under the terms of the February 13 agreement in 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility, resume (partial) IAEA monitoring, and declare all of its nuclear programs (Joint Statement 2007). However, for a while, Pyongyang has also been seeking recognition as a "normal" nuclear power, on par with other nuclear-armed states. In a revised version of its constitution, North Korea declared itself a "nuclear-armed state and an indomitable military power" (Yonhap News 2012) and repeatedly stressed that its nuclear weapons "are neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings" (KCNA 2013). The stand-offs between North Korea and the United States have been discursively reframed to confrontations between "the oldest and newest nuclear-weapon States" (UN Disarmament Commission 2015b). As noted by Wunderlich et al. (2013, p.277), "a strong motivation lies in the North Korean leadership's desire to receive recognition by the United States as a worthy and formally equal interlocutor and a respected partner in a regional order". In this regard, North Korea has repeatedly made offers to engage in bilateral nuclear arms control processes with the United States rather than disarmament negotiations (cf. Hecker 2010b, p.50; Cha 2009).

Furthermore, Pyongyang also repeatedly expressed its willingness to behave as a "responsible nuclear weapon state" (Yon 2010), "join the international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and for the safe management of nuclear materials", refrain from "produc[ing] more nuclear weapons than is necessary", and engage in "nuclear disarmament on an equal footing with other nuclear weapons states" (KCNA 2010). North Korea also announced its declaratory policy including negative security assurances, pledging "not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nukes as long as they do not join nuclear weapons states in invading or attacking it" (KCNA 2010). Furthermore, Pyongyang has repeatedly proposed a moratorium on nuclear testing, albeit with this offer being contingent on U.S. behavior (Associated Press 2015; CNBC 2017).

Stigma Reversal

Despite the continuous process of (re)constructing North Korea as a major "nuclear rogue", there have been occasional attempts in the international community to co-participate on the normalization of North Korea's deviant identity. After the adoption of the Agreed Framework,

the Clinton administration engaged in a partial rehabilitation of North Korea, including lifting the majority of sanctions, removal from the U.S. "rogue list", and a high-prolife meeting between Secretary of State Albright and Kim Jong Il (Henriksen 2001, p.361; Geldenhuys 2004, p.193; Litwak 2000, p.81). This reconciliatory approach was epitomized in Albright's on-stage cabaret performance at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2000, in which, referring to the North Korea's Foreign Minister Paek, she rhymed that she "used to think he was a rogue, but here at ARF, he's so in vogue!" (The Japan Times 2000).

Although the Bush administration was active in its exclusionary labeling of North Korea during the second nuclear crisis, the U.S. discourse in the Six-Party Talks also suggested an option for rehabilitating North Korea's deviant image. Perhaps most significantly, Bush removed North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, noting that "If North Korea continues to make the right choices, it can repair its relationship with the international community" (Bush 2008).

Similarly, Obama's re-labeling of North Korea from "rogue" to an "outlier" suggested a turn from confrontation towards engagement (Litwak 2012). In the joint U.S.-EU statement, it was proposed that "the United States and the European Union stand ready to work with others in welcoming into the international community a North Korea that abandons its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and policy of threats aimed at its neighbors and that protects the rights of its people" (The White House 2009c) – echoing Obama's pledge from the inauguration speech that the United States "will extend a hand" if the outliers "unclench [their] fist" (Obama 2009a). In the press meeting with South Korea's President Lee, Obama declared that "there is another path available to North Korea, a path that leads to peace and economic opportunity for the people of North Korea, including *full integration* into the community of nations" (Obama 2009b, *emphasis added*).

However, any re-integratory attempts concerning North Korea since 2002 have been short-lived. Even at the times when the Six-Party Talks seemed to produce positive results, the rhetoric on both sides of the fence soon turned back from conciliatory statements to accusations and renewed stigmatization. In this respect, Wunderlich's (2017b, p.169) recent study on rogue states and dissidence notes that "North Korea remains the only one of the core 'rogues' under scrutiny here that cannot be regarded as (at least partly) rehabilitated".

Stigma Power

The discursive (re)construction of North Korea as a "nuclear deviant" is inseparable from the power dimension of the stigma politics process. In this section, I highlight the operations of power as well as *limits* of power with respect to the stigmatization of North Korea in global nuclear order.

Perhaps most importantly, the case of North Korea demonstrates the relevance of structural power in the meaning-making process of deviance (re)construction. In this respect, North Korea with its relatively negligible position in the broader international hierarchy possesses only a limited maneuverability vis-à-vis stigma imposition through the legal instruments of the UNSC. The case also demonstrates the importance of the United States in the overall process and the productive power of its labels such as "rogue" or "outlier".

However, the development of the crisis also highlights the impact of continuous power shifts in the international system. As argued by Grzelczyk (2009, p. 98), "changes within the power structure of the system have become catalysts in the [Six-Party Talks] negotiation"; "the distribution of power has shifted within and between actors, and preferences also seem to have been modified as a result" (Grzelczyk 2009, p. 111). This is especially relevant with respect to the rising power of China in the region and beyond, and the role China has been playing as a chair of the Six-Party Talks (see e.g., Shulong & Xinzhu 2008).

The case of North Korea also demonstrates the limits of power of normative argumentation, in situations when the actors are unable (or unwilling) to mobilize broader audiences to its cause. While some of the normative themes – such as the discourse on double-standards or anti-hegemonic sentiments – have been also frequently used by many states of the Global South, North Korea rarely reaches out to them in the context of broader entrepreneurial initiatives, and often (re)frames them in its own specific context rather than as generally valid principles. Other scholars similarly observe that

> while North Korea has picked a set of norm proposals that resonate with long-standing NAM aspirations, most of the time it has pronounced them as national positions without a lasting effort to attract allies and shape coalitions to collectively promote these norms. There was no approach to nongovernmental actors critical of NWS that populate the scene of the nonproliferation regime. North Korea's pronouncements on its preferred

norms have assumed a quasi-autistic character (Wunderlich et al. 2013, p.280).

Furthermore, the case shows the limits of compulsory power of economic sanctions in bringing the "deviants" in line with the rule-enforcers' demands. As many studies convincingly demonstrate (e.g., Frank 2006; Noland 2009; Haggard & Noland 2010), North Korea has been able to evade sanctions and even bolster its economy despite the increasingly expanding UNSC list of embargoes. This is particularly relevant with respect to the role of China in implementing the sanction regime and its (in)capability to influence strategic options of its problematic weaker ally.

The case of the second nuclear crisis in Korean peninsula also highlights the productive power of nuclear weapons as both a symbol of prestige in contemporary international order and the key defining feature of "roguish" deviant behavior. While Pyongyang's nuclear acquisition facilitated its (re)construction as a "quintessential rogue state" (Noland 2007, p.89), North Korea also managed to frame it as a symbol of its strength, high level of industrial and scientific development, and self-reliance, in full congruence with its Juche ideology. While, in the course of the second nuclear crisis, North Korea has arguably been pushed even further to the edge of international society, this dynamic did not seem to have a significant influence on the power-grip of the regime in Pyongyang, and the nuclear acquisition also significantly strengthened North Korea's bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States, essentially avoiding the fate of its "deviant peers" such as Libya or Iraq.

Finally, the case of North Korea also points to the strengths and weaknesses of the NPT-based non-proliferation regime in the exercise of institutional power. On one hand, as has been often criticized in the NPT Review Conference setting (see below), the NPT architecture allowed North Korea to maneuver on the edge of actual proliferation for a long period of time while receiving assistance in nuclear technology. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards, once applied, in fact allowed for the discovery of discrepancies in Pyongyang's declarations of nuclear material and for the resulting involvement of international institutions – including the UNSC – in the issue.

Game and Rules

North Korea's nuclear pursuit arguably represents a major normative contestation of the rules of the nonproliferation game. North Korea has been the first state to date that withdrew from the NPT and remains the only state conducting nuclear weapon tests, challenging the norms and rules related to non-proliferation, disarmament, and status in nuclear order. On the one hand, the reaction of the international community seems to have reaffirmed the meaning, validity, and hierarchy of many affected norms and rules, by (more or less) consistently condemning North Korea's conduct as deviant, normatively unacceptable, and unjustifiable. On the other hand, the NPT community had a rather difficult time creating a resolute and unified stance with respect to Pyongyang's announcement of withdrawal, and has not been able to reconstruct the rules in a way that would allow the nonproliferation regime to effectively address similar instances in the future.

North Korea's claim that its acquisition of nuclear weapons can be justified by hostile U.S. policy and threats of preventive nuclear strikes has been widely rejected in the international community, even though many states are similarly sensitive to the issue of negative security assurances and the related pledge of NWS not to threaten NNWS with nuclear weapons (see Bunn 1997).[140] The NPT Review Conferences reaffirmed the fundamental norm of universality and rejected the possibility of a legitimate increase in a number of NWS by calling on Pyongyang "to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations" (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p.31), declaring that "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty in any case" (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p.16).

North Korea's decision to conduct several nuclear tests since 2006 has also represented a challenge to the global non-testing norm that was enshrined in the CTBT in 1996. The last states to engage in nuclear testing before North Korea were India and Pakistan in 1998, yet both South Asian states have since kept their moratoria on nuclear testing. Other nuclear-armed states have not conducted any nuclear tests since the adoption of the CTBT. The uniqueness of North Korea's case and its near universal condemnation, however, demonstrates

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[140] North Korea has been primarily referring to the conclusions of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews in 2001 (under Bush administration) and 2010 (under Obama administration). Both documents acknowledged the possibility of nuclear first-use against North Korea (U.S. Department of Defense 2001, p.16; U.S. Department of Defense 2010, p.3,15-16).

the strength of a norm rather than its weakening, despite the fact that the CTBT is yet to enter in force. Many states have also praised the accuracy and reliability of the CTBTO's International Monitoring System, which provides detailed data about North Korea's nuclear tests, and highlighted the CTBTO's capability to verify states' compliance with the norm (UNGA 2009).

North Korea has also actively contested the rules of enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation norms, particularly with respect to the involvement of the UNSC. For example, North Korea's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Kil Yon proposed at the 2013 UNGA session that

> in addressing key international issues, the UN General Assembly should be empowered to have the final say as it represents the general will of the entire membership, and particularly, the UN Security Council resolutions affecting peace and security such as sanctions and use of force should be made effective only under the authority and approval of the UN General Assembly (Yon 2013).

The UNSC resolutions related to the North Korea's nuclear program, however, have so far seemed to enjoy wide acceptance and legitimacy in the nuclear order. In comparison with the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, the UNSC has been much more resolute and unified in its approach. All resolutions between 2002 and 2015 with respect to the North Korea's nuclear program were passed unanimously in the UNSC, despite occasional disagreements between the U.S. and the Chinese and Russian counterparts about the wording of the resolutions and/or the extent of sanctions (Glaser 2009, p.3; McKirdy & Roth 2017). Some actors even suggested that "the role of the UN Security Council, as the final arbiter on the consequence of non-compliance, […] needs to be effectively strengthened" (Council of the European Union 2003, p.6).

The UNSC Resolution 1874 also established a new control mechanism – a "panel of experts" – to oversee and report on the implementation of sanctions against North Korea and make recommendations to the UNSC on further actions (S/RES/1874 2009; S/2014/147 2014). According to Haggard & Noland (2009, p.21), the establishment of this mechanism "shows the growing depth of Chinese disaffection with North Korea's behavior since the missile and nuclear tests of 2006. This resolution is by far the strongest public Chinese signal to North Korea to date."

With respect to the rules of enforcement, the United States and some of its allies also used North Korea's case to further promote the establishment of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)-style counter-proliferation as an organizing principle for the global non-proliferation norm. This has been primarily related to the interdiction of North Korea's vessels and inspection of cargo that could contain WMD-related materials or technology. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France originally wanted to make such inspections mandatory for UN member states. While this proposal was blocked by Russia and China,[141] the UNSC Resolution 1874 nevertheless "*calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports" (S/RES/1874 2009, p.3, *emphasis in the original text of the resolution*). As such, the "resolution comes close to making the PSI a formal multilateral effort" (Haggard & Noland 2009, p.20; cf. Snyder 2007, p.40). Notably, in the wake the North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, South Korea formally joined the PSI (Yonhap News 2009; see also Cha 2012, pp.273–274).

The Six-Party Talks also brought about the contestation of the meaning of peaceful use norm in the case of a state's non-compliance with the NPT. Although Pyongyang rarely refers to NPT Article IV., it does insist on its sovereign entitlement to the civilian nuclear program without restrictions (Wunderlich et al. 2013, p.278). The question of North Korea's civilian program became of the major issues in the Six-Party Talks, with United States and Japan opposing the idea of North Korea's civilian nuclear program and China and South Korea (conditionally) supporting it (see Grzelczyk 2009, pp.105, 111). The Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks represented a compromise closer to North Korea's position, noting that "the DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy", while "the other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor" (Six-Party Talks 2005).

In 2012, North Korea's satellite launch brought up of question of legitimacy of such conduct vis-à-vis the relevant UNSC resolutions. North Korea had repeatedly declared that the "development of outer space for peaceful purposes is a legitimate right of a sovereign state" (Yong 2015) and its launch "followed the universal international law" (Yon 2012). However,

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[141] China expressed its sympathies for the PSI's "nonproliferation objective" but also noted its concern that some of PSI's activities might be "outside the domain of international law" (China's Foreign Ministry, cited in Glaser 2009, p.3).

most countries condemned the launch as a violation of the UNSC resolutions, and the UNSC passed another round of sanctions, targeting, *inter alia*, the North Korean officials and institutions responsible for space technology (S/RES/2087 2013).

Although Pyongyang's specific actions may have suggested otherwise, North Korea did not rhetorically contest the fundamental validity of non-proliferation and disarmament norms in principle. North Korea's representatives have repeatedly stressed that "there is no change in the position of the DPRK to oppose nuclear war, nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation" (Yon 2010) and highlighted the necessity to acquire nuclear weapons in the specific regional security context. The rhetorical commitment to "always sincerely implement its international commitment in the field of nuclear non-proliferation as a responsible nuclear weapons state," however, is at odds with the long-standing practice of disseminating missile technology and knowledge to states such as Iran (see e.g., Fitzpatrick 2006a), which is widely considered as a serious norm-breaching activity.

Similarly, North Korea has repeatedly expressed its commitment to "the unanimous demand of the international society to completely eliminate all nuclear weapons and to build a nuclear weapon free world through nuclear disarmament", and the related organizing principles proposed by NAM, such as the legal codification of the negative security assurances and the legal ban on nuclear-weapon use (Yon 2013). North Korea also voted in favor of the 2016 UNGA resolution on nuclear disarmament negotiations (UNGA 2016) as the only nuclear-armed state – although, at the end, North Korea did not participate in the actual nuclear ban negotiations. The compliance with a disarmament norm is always conditioned by Pyongyang with reference to U.S. behavior; the "denuclearization of Korean peninsula" has been interpreted in the North as not a mere removal of physical weapons from the territory, but also the guaranteed removal of the U.S. nuclear threat.

North Korea's announcement of withdrawal from the NPT also sparked a debate about the meaning of Article X. of the NPT, the legal status of North Korea vis-à-vis the NPT, and about the possibility to *change* the rules in order to prevent such situations from taking place again in the future. The NPT rules of withdrawal state that

> each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
> withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to
> the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of

its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968, Article X., Para 1).

North Korea originally declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993, eventually suspending this decision one day before the required three-month period would pass. According to Pyongyang's interpretation, this suspension placed it in a "unique position" vis-à-vis the NPT (Kuppuswamy 2006, p.149, fn. 31), allowing it to simply withdraw with a one-day notice in 2003.

This interpretation of withdrawal rules did not go uncontested. According to the majority of states and experts alike, North Korea could not simply interrupt the withdrawal period and had to inform all the concerned parties as well as remain under the Treaty terms for the new three-months period (cf. Müller 2010b, p.7; Hilpert & Meier 2013, p.4; Hayes 2007, p.130). Furthermore, according to Bunn & Rhinelander (2005), "the NPT and the United Nations Charter provide limits on the right of withdrawal from the treaty by authorising the UN Security Council to take action against NPT withdrawals that could lead to threats to international peace and security." The whole issue has been further complicated by the fact that the withdrawing party violated its obligations under the Treaty prior to the withdrawal notice.

The initial reaction of neither the UNSC nor the NPT community, however, did not seem to adequately reflect the withdrawal. The UNSC originally did not initiate any action, despite its authority to deal with the withdrawal as an issue related to international peace and security (Bunn & Rhinelander 2005a; for this interpretation of the role of the UNSC, see also Shaker 1980, p.896). At the first NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee following the withdrawal, the participants mostly avoided dealing with the issue directly, and the Chair of the Committee even personally took North Korea's nameplate and placed it in the conference Secretariat, leaving the question of Pyongyang's membership in the NPT open (Potter 2005, p.26; Johnson 2005). In practice, in the first years following the withdrawal, North Korea seemed to remain in a certain "limbo" position from the perspective of the NPT parties (Asada 2004, p.345).

To address the issue of withdrawal for future cases of non-compliance, Western countries – together with Russia – proposed new initiatives at the NPT-setting meant to specify the conditions under which the states would be allowed to leave the Treaty. For example, Germany directly suggested that a state's right to withdraw cannot be exercised if the state had violated the NPT; furthermore, the withdrawing state would not be allowed to further use nuclear capacities obtained from the IAEA or the NPT member states under Article IV. (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.16 2004, p.4). The EU proposal called for special IAEA inspections that would assess the state's compliance and for the "key role of the Security Council as the final arbiter" in the withdrawal process; furthermore, it suggested that the nuclear facilities, equipment and materials obtained during the NPT membership "must be frozen, with a view to having them dismantled and/or returned to the supplier State, under IAEA control" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32 2005, pp.2–3). The joint working paper of the United States and South Korea also proposed a strengthened role of the UNSC, including "holding the withdrawing party responsible for its past noncompliance" and taking steps "to continue implementation of safeguards until such time as past violations have been remedied fully" (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.42 2008).

However, the states calling for reinterpretation of norms concerning withdrawal from the NPT did not seem to be able to find consensus in the wider NPT membership. The NAM states, in particular, contested the need for any revisions of the rule and proposed that the withdrawal should be governed by standard international treaty law rather than new measures that, in their view, "go beyond the provisions of the NPT" (e.g., Puja 2008). As such, despite North Korea being regularly urged to return to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system (NPT/CONF.2015/50 2015, p.21, Para 162), the NPT state parties still do not agree on what should be the new normative standard that would govern withdrawal from the treaty.

Conclusion

The sociologists studying stigma and deviance have observed that the stigmatized outsiders are often considered "less than human" by the "normal" majority. In the case of North Korea, the prevalent construction is similarly the one of a bizarre, deviant country on the edge of international society that does not hold to our general standards of a "normal state". While nuclear scholarship has been debating for years over the extent of rationality in Pyongyang's

brinkmanship, there has been lack of accounts of North Korea as an actor systematically using normative argumentation with respect to the norms of nuclear order.

It is undisputable that North Korea's argumentation is significantly less consistent and seemingly more instrumental and self-centered than the one of Iran, for example. However, from the perspective of interactionist theories of stigma and deviance, it is still possible to study North Korea's discourse and practices as stigma management strategies, coping with the imposition of deviant labels while at the same time trying to achieve its strategic objectives in a complicated regional security situation.

This chapter unpacked the operations of stigma politics during the second nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula and the (re)construction of North Korea's deviant identity after the 2002 U.S. accusations of North Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment program. I aimed at unpacking the stigma nexus involving the government in Pyongyang and various international audiences, including states that have been in the forefront of international rule enforcement – primarily the United States, its East Asian allies, the EU, and to some extent also the remaining members of the UNSC. Much of the deviant image of North Korea in the 2002-2015 period drew on the earlier images of an international rogue and "isolated island", with a new level of perceived defiance of the will of international community, formalized in the numerous UNSC resolutions.

Whereas North Korea has been, in fact, active in publicly justifying its conduct, the attempts to neutralize its actions by "condemning the condemners" and by referring to the higher norms of sovereignty and sovereign equality did not seem to gain it much sympathy among states in the international community. Even its closest ally and economic partner, China, seems to have been losing patience with its troublesome neighbor and regularly participated on the adoption of the UNSC sanctions. In North Korea's proclamations, nuclear weapons have been gradually reconstructed from a mere "necessity" to a true "badge of honor" – a "life and soul of [North Korean] nation", in the words of one North Korean diplomat. Pyongyang has also been seeking the recognition of its de facto nuclear status, invoking the idea of engaging in arms control practices with the United States and proposing "normalization" of its nuclear behavior towards the one of a "responsible nuclear-weapon state".

In the logic of this dissertation, the (re)construction of North Korea's nuclear deviance is also inseparable from the dynamics of norms and rules of global nuclear order. While Pyongyang's practices of development and testing of its nascent nuclear arsenal indeed

represented a serious contestation of the rules of nonproliferation game, the condemning reaction of the international community mostly reaffirmed the meaning, validity, and hierarchy of fundamental norms in question, and did not come close to "normalizing" North Korea's nuclear acquisition. At the same time, the NPT member states failed to react consistently and resolutely to North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty, leaving the issue of Pyongyang's NPT membership in a rather strange "limbo" state. Furthermore, the numerous attempts to use North Korea's case as an opportunity to clarify and *change* the rules for withdrawal did not find sufficient support in the broader NPT membership base, especially with the NAM states rejecting the need for the acceptance of any new normative standards in the nonproliferation order.

7. India and the Aftermath of Pokhran-II Nuclear Tests (1998–2015)

In the decades following its independence in 1947, India has emerged as one of the prominent global actors contesting the norms of the new-born nuclear order. For many outside observers, the means and goals of Indian nuclear diplomacy may have at times been perceived as contradictory and puzzling; despite being an active proponent of global nuclear disarmament and cessation of nuclear testing, India refused to join the NPT as a NNWS with reference to its "discriminatory" character. In 1974, India tested its own nuclear device, declaring it a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE).[142] After the end of the Cold War, India pulled out from the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and in May of 1998, joined the ranks of nuclear-armed states by conducting a series of nuclear weapon tests.[143] Indian regional arch-rival Pakistan promptly retaliated by testing its own nuclear weapons for the first time, effectively moving the security dilemmas in South Asia on nuclear level.[144]

The crossing of the nuclear threshold in the Indian subcontinent arguably represented *the* defining deviant event in the global nuclear order of the late 1990s. After the successful denuclearization of South Africa and the three post-Soviet states (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus), the number of nuclear-armed states suddenly increased from six to eight, and the specter of nuclear war has loomed over every confrontation between India and Pakistan ever since.[145] The tests were widely condemned by other states as a breach of the non-proliferation norm, even more so in the light of the 1996 adoption of the CTBT. However, the sanctions

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[142] However, India only weaponized its arsenal in the late 1980s and, according to the latest evidence, was not able to technically deliver the weapons until mid 1990s. See Kampani (2014)

[143] In nuclear scholarship and policy analysis, the 1998 tests conducted by India are usually referred to as *Pokhran-II* or *Operation Shakti*. The 1974 test is mostly referred to as *Pokhran-I* or *Smiling Buddha*. Both series of tests were carried out in Pokhran testing site in Rajasthan in western India.

[144] The history of and rationale behind the development of Indian nuclear program are discussed in greater depth elsewhere. See for example Abraham (1999), Perkovich (2001), Weiss (2010), Paul (1998), SarDesai & Thomas (2002), Sagan (1996a, pp.65–69), Sidhu (1997, chap.1), Biswas (2001), or Das (2015). For the literature on the nuclear dimension of Indian-Pakistan rivalry, see for example Sagan (2009), Kapur (2005) Ganguly & Wagner (2004), Ganguly & Kapur (2010; 2015), Ganguly (2013), Ganguly & Hagerty (2012), Rajain (2005), Dittmer (2005), or Mistry (2009).

[145] Since the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan fought a 1999 "Kargil war" along the Line of Control in the disputed Kashmir region, and got engaged in a serious military standoff in the 2001-2002 crisis. On the nuclear aspects of these encounters, see Tellis et al. (2002), Kapur (2003), Kapur & Ganguly (2009), Sidhu (2000), Raghavan (2009), Kalyanaraman (2002), Bratton (2010), or Ganguly & Kraig (2005).

imposed on the two states in response to the tests were soon lifted, and India promptly began its quest for the normalization of its nuclear identity.

In this chapter, I apply the interactionist concept of stigma politics to study the (re-) construction of Indian deviant identity following the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests. In particular, I analyze the ways how international society (re)imposed stigma on India for its violation of the non-proliferation norm; how India dealt with the shame through the combined stigma management strategies of neutralization and normalization of its nuclear status; and how some states, the United States in particular, strategically reversed their earlier position and sought to de-stigmatize India and normalize its position as a "responsible" nuclear power in the contemporary nuclear order. Furthermore, I discuss the link between the stigma politics in India's case and the dynamics of the rules of the nonproliferation game.

Stigma Nexus

For most of its post-colonial history, India has sought to sustain its identity of a non-aligned moral entrepreneur in the global nuclear order. The first Indian Prime Mister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a vocal proponent of the global nuclear disarmament in the newly-born United Nations, and he was also among the first political figures to promote a norm prohibiting nuclear testing, launching an initiative that eventually led to the adoption of Limited Test-Ban Treaty in 1963. However, although the normative calls for global disarmament have remained a consistent part of Indian nuclear discourse, the image of a "moral beacon of international politics" (Fey, Hellmann, et al. 2014, p.188) has been eventually spoiled by India's decision to not become part of the NPT-based non-proliferation order, and eventually develop its own nuclear arsenal.

The Indian opposition towards the NPT (and, in the 1990s, the CTBT[146]) has been nevertheless still largely framed in normative terms. Whereas India did not oppose the formal validation of the global nuclear non-proliferation norm *per se*, India's negotiators have contested the rules of the non-proliferation regime as one-sidedly focused on the horizontal non-dissemination of nuclear weapons on the expense of disarmament measures. The dissemination-disarmament linkage also underpinned the broader Indian oppositional discourse, contesting the NPT legitimacy with reference to the unequal and discriminatory nature of the resulting nuclear order (cf. Singh 2000a; Fey, Hellmann, et al. 2014, pp.189–190;

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[146] For a comprehensive study of Indian opt-out from the CTBT, see Möller (2014).

Kienzle 2014a). This justice-laden discourse highlighting the NWS privileges over NNWS has been epitomized in the term "nuclear apartheid", frequently employed by Indian representatives to criticize the illegitimacy of global nuclear hierarchies (cf. Singh 1998a; Biswas 2001; Das 2012a; Maddock 2010).

Whereas many India's NAM colleagues have been sympathetic to the Indian normative critique of the NPT, India has eventually remained one of the last regime outsiders, contesting the rules of the non-proliferation game from the *outside*, rather than from *within*. Furthermore, the demonstration of India's nuclear capability in 1974 led to the construction of a specific deviant image of India vis-à-vis the global nuclear order. Whereas the Indian government insisted on the peaceful nature of the explosion that was not meant to imply a decisive intent to become a nuclear-armed state, the international community has since then treated India as a state of permanent concern that had already crossed the line to the space of nuclear proliferation (cf. Marwah 1981). However, it was the 1998 nuclear tests and the Indian proclamation of now being a "nuclear weapons state" that ended more than two decades of uncertainty over the Indian nuclear future, and shifted the Indian image towards an "established" nuclear-armed actor that remains outside of the NPT order (cf. Abraham 2009; 2010).

The international condemnation of the 1998 tests was almost universal, yet the interpretation of the event and the subsequent enforcement of the non-proliferation norm was far from uniform and also varied in time. Among the international audiences, the United States and China assumed roles of rule enforcers, mobilizing the audience of normals among the G-8 and the U.S. allies, primarily the Japan, Canada, Australia, and selected European states, such as Denmark or Sweden (see Diamond 1998). Nevertheless, the United States soon relaxed its rule-enforcing posture and embarked on a path of de-stigmatization and normalization of India's deviant image in global nuclear order. Furthermore, states such as Russia or France publicly criticized India's actions, yet refrained from enforcing the rules by not sanctioning India for its misconduct (Wadhva 1998, p.1604).

The testing event also immediately moved to the forefront of the NPT deliberations. The NPT in-group states attending the following Review Conferences predominantly positioned themselves as the "normal" audience, condemning the tests as a deviance directly affecting the operations of the global non-proliferation regime and the newly-born CTBT. Among the remaining NPT outsiders, neighboring Pakistan directly followed India's actions by conducting

a series of nuclear tests of its own in the same month. As such, the dominant representation of the deviant event soon turned into a violation of the non-proliferation norm in South Asia, and the resulting "proliferation issue" in the Indian subcontinent.

Stigma Imposition

Rule enforcers attempted to impose stigma on India following the 1998 nuclear tests on two interconnected levels: the communication of a *stigma message* towards India and international and domestic audiences, (re)constructing the image of India's deviance vis-à-vis the global nuclear order; and the *rule enforcement* through economic and other sanctions, disciplining India towards a specific conception of "nuclear normality". As noted above, while the international community largely condemned India's behavior, the stigma imposition in general and the actual norm enforcement in particular have not been uniform across the audiences.

The stigma message expressed in statements of states and international institutions mostly tied the India's testing to the breach of *universal* nuclear non-proliferation/NPT and non-testing/CTBT norms; rejected the Indian justification for its norm-breaking conduct; and discursively linked Indian testing with the threat of new regional instability and endangered international security. Right after the tests, the U.S. President Clinton called the tests "unjustified", and claimed that they had created "a dangerous new instability in their region" (Clinton 1998). Canada's foreign minister Axworthy asserted that the tests "constitute a clear and fundamental threat to the International Security regime" and suggested that "thirty years of successful management of the nuclear proliferation threat has been undermined, and the consensus view of 186 nations that have signed the [NPT] has been deliberately flouted." He also dismissed the Indian justification of the tests, suggesting that "it's not evident that any significant change in regional security took place in the period leading up to the tests" (Parliament of Canada 1998).The originally subdued reaction of China was soon followed by much harsher statements, expressing "shock" and "strong condemnation", and stressing the international community's opposition to the tests (cited in Garver 2001; cf. Rappai 1999).

In a surprisingly strong statement, the European Union also condemned the tests as "a grave threat to international peace and security and to the global efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament" and noted that "the conduct of these tests has not advanced but hindered [India's] aspirations in the international community" (European Union 1998). Condemnation of the tests was also expressed in the joint G-8 statement at the 1998

Birmingham Summit, suggesting that India's behavior "runs counter to the will expressed by 149 signatories to the CTBT to cease nuclear testing, to efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and to steps to enhance regional and international peace and security", and that "India's relationship with each of [the G-8 countries] has been affected by these developments" (G-8 Summit 1998).

A strong message to India was also conveyed by the states attending the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the first since the testing took place. Despite the attempts of France and Russia to deal with nuclear tests as a mere regional issue in NPT Subsidiary Body II instead of a non-proliferation issue in Main Committee I, a vast majority of states, including India's NAM colleagues, rejected this framing and condemned the tests as a violation of the global non-proliferation norm (cf. Johnson 2000; Rauf 2000). Almost all parties were unified in their framing of non-proliferation and non-testing norms as universally valid and applicable to NPT outsiders; in their rejection of status-defining dimension of the tests; in their view of the NPT regime being damaged by India's behavior; and in the link between the tests and the increased likelihood of nuclear use. For example, the Irish representative stated that India, Pakistan, and Israel "were continuing to disregard the norms which States parties had adopted", and that NPT member states jointly "denied legitimacy to any State embarking on nuclear weapons proliferation", noting that the "danger of a nuclear Armageddon must outweigh all such considerations" (Cowen 2000). The representative of Belgium suggested that India's behavior "challenged the very spirit of the non-proliferation regime" (De Ruyt 2000), and the Canada's foreign minister Axworthy asserted that the tests "had added a frightening dimension to the insecurity in that region and had flagrantly violated international norms against nuclear proliferation" (NPT/CONF.2000/28 2000b, p.31). Abdallah Baali, President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, likewise suggested that "India and Pakistan had dealt a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime by conducting nuclear tests, as a result of which the world was facing the spectre of nuclear war for the first time since the end of the cold war" (Statement by the President of the Conference 2000). The Final Document of the Review Conference explicitly deplored the tests and stressed that "such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon-State status or any special status whatsoever" (NPT/CONF.2000/28 2000b).

The stigma message constructing a deviant image of India breaking the universal non-proliferation norms was joined by the actual norm enforcement through sanctions and demands for Indian normalization. Ever since the 1974 Smiling Buddha test, India has already

been subject to sanctions related to its nuclear program. Furthermore, since 1992, India had been excluded from the mainstream of global nuclear trade, as its NPT-outsider status prohibited NSG states to supply New Delhi with nuclear and dual-use materials (cf. Abraham 2007). The new round of sanctions, that was imposed on India in the wake of the 1998 tests, targeted primarily trade in technologies, military trade, and foreign aid – mainly exercised by the United States, Japan, and Canada.[147] In the case of the United States, the immediate norm enforcement was tied to earlier piece of domestic legislation, the so-called Glenn Amendment, that required the government to impose an array of sanctions towards proliferating states. China, for its part, pushed for strong international sanctions and urged the United States to differentiate between India as "the original sinner" and Pakistan as a state merely following suit due to understandable security concerns (cf. Garver 2001, pp.871–872).

The multilateralization of norm enforcement through sanctions nevertheless proved to be rather problematic. Whereas the G-8 meeting condemned the tests, the United States failed to convince the broader membership to impose stronger measures beyond verbal shaming. It was not until the following meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers in London that the countries agreed to "work for a postponement in consideration of other loans in the World Bank and other international financial institutions", except for loans to "meet basic human needs" (G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting 1998). The UNSC Resolution 1172 adopted in June 1998 likewise condemned the tests, recognizing that they "constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and encouraging "all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons" (S/RES/1172 (1998) 1998).

In one of the press briefings dealing with the aftermath of India's nuclear tests, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott explained that the United States is "not trying to engage in punishment for its own sake"; instead, these efforts "have been intended to persuade [India and Pakistan] to take the steps that [would] bring [them] in accord with broadly accepted international norms" (Talbott 1998). In general, the disciplining message that accompanied the public shaming and sanctions followed two normalizing frames with regards to India's behavior: first, an exercise of *restraint*, in the form of specific normalizing steps in Indian nuclear posture;

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[147] For a detailed overview of sanctions imposed on India and the discussion on their impact, see Morrow & Carriere (1999), Mistry (1999), Rennack (2003), or Wagner (2001).

and second, a *reversal* of the Indian current status, mostly expressed implicitly in the context of NPT membership.

The calls for restraint have been regularly reproduced in the statements of individual countries, as well as in the various multilateral settings and UNSC Resolution 1172. The image of restrained India mostly involved a series of steps originally outlined in the June 1998 Joint Communiqué issued by the P-5 in Geneva, specifically the cessation of nuclear testing; forgoing nuclear weaponization and deployment, testing and deployment of nuclear delivery systems; cessation of fissile material production; restraint on potentially provocative actions in the context of possible military conflict with Pakistan; implementation of export controls to prevent further dissemination; adherence to the CTBT; and participation of the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) (P-5 Meeting 1998).[148] The reversal of the current Indian status – or the "full normalization", in accordance with the NPT norms – was expressed in the calls for India (and other NPT outsiders) to join the NPT club as NNWS, something that is legally possible only in the context of full Indian nuclear disarmament (as in the case of South Africa, for example).

The calls for India's unconditional entry to the NPT have been continuously reproduced in the NPT Review setting, reconstructing India as a "deviant outsider" in breach of the universal non-proliferation norms. However, from an early stage, the United States and some other countries have been differentiating between India's potential *restraint* and *reversal* as two qualitative stages of normalcy. The "unrestrained" India represented a threat to regional and international security, a deviant behavior that had to be disciplined using the special sanctions. However, the "restrained" (but still nuclear) India would justify lifting those sanctions and bringing India from the international isolation, although yet not deserving "all the benefits of what might be called good citizenship and full membership under the non-proliferation regime" (Talbott 1998). This led to the early construction of two deviant images of India, implying different actions to be taken in response by the international community: "unrestrained" nuclear India as a "dangerous" deviant in the international order, and a "restrained" deviant juxtaposed to the "normal" NPT members in the nuclear order. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, the United States eventually later engaged in a further reconstruction of these images, destigmatizing India as a special case of a "responsible" unrecognized nuclear weapon state.

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[148] These steps later became known as 'non-proliferation benchmarks' in the US-Indian negotiations over lifting of sanctions. See Mistry (2014, p.36).

Stigma Management

Daase & Deitelhoff (2014, pp.13–19) recently claimed that in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, India's attitude towards the non-proliferation regime shifted from mere oppositional conduct to "nuclear dissidence", a more radical resistance to non-proliferation rules. I arguesthat this reading does not correspond to the stigma management discourses and practices that India employed in response to the stigma message conveyed by the norm enforcers. It is a correct observation that India maintained its regular nuclear disarmament discourse with strong anti-colonial and anti-discriminatory sentiments. However, after the tests, India in fact sought to neutralize the guilt and eventually embarked on a journey to normalize its nuclear identity as a "responsible" nuclear power that plays by the non-proliferation rules even though it remains out of the NPT club.

To neutralize the international impact of India's nuclear tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee sent a letter to the U.S. President Clinton and the leaders of the rest of G-8 countries. The letter justified India's norm-violating behavior with "the appeal to higher loyalties" (cf. Sykes & Matza 1957, p.669), pointing to the "deterioriating security environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past" (Vajpayee 1998). The national security justification referred to the three security threats that India was allegedly facing at the time: China ("an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders"), Pakistan ("a covert nuclear weapons state"), and the non-state actors ("unremitting terrorism and militancy"). Vajpayee also asserted that "the series of tests [was] limited in number and pose[d] no danger to any country which has no inimical intentions towards India", portraying India as exercising restraint in its behavior, and "denying the injury" inflicted upon others in consequence to the transgression (except for the states with "inimical intentions", in which case the injury would be rightly due; cf. Sykes & Matza 1957, p.667-668). Finally, Vajpayee reaffirmed India's normative stance towards global nuclear disarmament and the intention to participate in the entrepreneurship of a new norm that would prohibit fissile material production (Vajpayee 1998).

India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh also engaged with the broader international audience by justifying Indian tests in the famous article in *Foreign Affairs* titled "Against Nuclear Apartheid". Singh justified India's conduct in the context of the end of the Cold War that "did little to ameliorate India's security concerns" with respect to three major threats: rising China; "continued strains with Pakistan"; and the issue of nuclear weapons in the global context,

whereas "nuclear weapons states showed no signs of moving decisively toward a world free of atomic danger" (Singh 1998a, p.41). He pointed to the flaws of the non-proliferation regime, its disconnection from the goal of nuclear disarmament, and its discriminatory character, reaffirming the consistent Indian discourse on (in-)justice and (in-)equality in global nuclear order. Singh also linked the tests with two recent norm-breaching events that would justify the Indian behavior as legitimate: the 1995 extension of the NPT, that formally legitimized nuclear weapons, in contradiction to the (India's interpretation of) nuclear disarmament norm; and the Sino-Pakistani nuclear collaboration, in violation of the non-proliferation norm (Singh 1998a, pp.43–46).

The connection between the discourse on (primarily regional) security concerns and the discourse on justice and equality in the nuclear order, or "the dichotomy between [...] sovereign security needs and global disarmament instincts", was reflected in the claim of the new shift in India's identity: a shift from India "being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic" (Singh 1998a, p.47). From the perspective of India, this would also represent a shift towards normalcy in post-Cold War international order. As noted by one Indian scholar, "fifty years after independence, India now wanted to become a normal nation—placing considerations of realpolitik and national security above its recently dominant focus on liberal internationalism, morality and normative approaches to international politics" (Mohan 2004, p.7).

This path towards normalcy also involved the normalization of India's deviant identity in the global nuclear order. Following the tests, India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh visited Washington to explain his country's deviant behavior to his American counterparts and discuss the possibility of lifting the U.S. sanctions. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recalls Singh's remark that "India's strategy was to play for the day when the United States would get over its huffing and puffing, and with a sign of exhaustion or a shrug of resignation, accept a nuclear-armed India as a fully responsible and fully entitled member of the international community" (Talbott 2004, p.5; cf. Narlikar 2011). This normalization strategy has been based on the reconstruction of India's external image from a "nuclear deviant" to a "responsible nuclear weapons state": a nuclear-armed power that remains outside of the NPT while, at the same time, is adhering to the key non-proliferation norms and practices, and even excels in some aspects over the original NWS (cf. Kienzle 2014b; Basrur 2016).

One of the key steps in this respect has been the normalization of India's position towards the norm of nuclear non-testing. A mere eight days after the second round of India's

tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee announced a moratorium on further testing, that has been upheld and continuously reaffirmed by India ever since (BBC 1998; Krishna 2010). On several occasions, India also expressed a new willingness to formalize its non-testing posture by joining the CTBT (Vajpayee 1998; Talbott 2004, pp.86, 121–123).

Another important aspect of India's normalization relates to the development of nuclear doctrine. Whereas the previous Indian leaders referred to the practice of nuclear deterrence as "abhorrent" and "morally repugnant" (Bidwai & Vanaik 2000, p.129), India aimed at constructing its posture as a responsible approach to nuclear strategy in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. This responsible image of nuclear doctrine has relied on five pillars that imply India's motives were strictly defensive, acting according to "self-restraint" and "caution": the declaration of no-first-use policy; the embrace of a minimum credible deterrent; maintenance of a non-deployed strategic posture; and the notion of non-engagement in arms races (cf. A.B. Vajpayee 1998; Singh 2000b).[149]

In some of these aspects, India in fact portrays itself as even "more normal" than some of the original NWS with respect to the disarmament norm. For example, the declaration of no-first-use policy has been discursively linked by India to the explicit promise of nuclear non-use against non-nuclear states, one of the continuously contested norms in the NPT context, in which most NWS still express some reservations and conditions under which the norm wouldn't apply – to the dismay of majority of NNWS (cf. Bunn & Timerbaev 1993). Minimum credible deterrent and non-deployed strategic posture also correspond to the organizing principles of disarmament that would prescribe quantitative limitations and reductions of NWS arsenals, as well as the relaxation of alert rates in respective nuclear postures (cf. UNODA 2000, pp.14–15). Finally, non-engagement in arms races corresponds to the letter of the disarmament Article VI. of the NPT, which prescribes "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date" (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 1968). In practice, however, India simultaneously aims to build an image of a "normal nuclear power", with diversified and continuously modernizing arsenal in the form of a nuclear triad of air, land, and sea forces (see Kristensen & Norris 2015).

India has also aimed to normalize its position as a responsible nuclear power in global nuclear order with respect to the non-proliferation norm. India has been gradually harmonizing

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[149] On the development of Indian nuclear doctrine, see for example Sagan (2009b), Pant (2005; 2007a), Chari (2000), Kanwal (2001), Dasgupta & Cohen (2011), Narang (2013), or Liebl (2009).

its export control legislation with the requirements of export control clubs (cf. Rajen 2008; Bruneau 2006) and has been repeatedly highlighting its "impeccable record on nuclear non-proliferation" (e.g., Singh 2005). In this respect, India has contrasted itself with Pakistan as a state that crossed the nuclear threshold at the same time as India, yet does not deserve the same standing in the nuclear order due to its "irresponsibility" and "immaturity", as demonstrated in the A.Q. Khan revelations (cf. Kampani 2002). Furthermore, India has engaged with the post-9/11 "nuclear security" discourse related to the threat of WMD proliferation to non-state actors, including active participation at Nuclear Security Summits (Government of India 2013). Moreover, India lined in support of the UNSC non-proliferation Resolution 1540, and in 2005 passed the "WMD Act" in order to "effectively translate at the operational level India's commitment to prevent proliferation" (INFCIRC/647 2005).

A critical test of India's stigma management strategy vis-à-vis the global non-proliferation regime has been its behavior towards the NPT "in-group deviant": Iran. As noted by Squassoni (2006, p.6), India's position in the NAM and the growing strategic relationship between the two countries made the issue of punishing Iran a rather sensitive issue for Indian government. To the content of U.S. administration (and the discontent of left-wing domestic opposition), India surprisingly voted in line with the Western countries on the IAEA resolutions against Iran, including the resolution to declare Iran in non-compliance with IAEA safeguards (GOV/2005/77 2005), and also for the resolution deferring the Iran case to the UNSC (IAEA Board of Governors 2006; cf. Pant 2007; 2011). Whereas India maintained the traditional NAM position supporting the inalienable right for peaceful use of nuclear energy, Indian Prime Minister Singh also noted that "there is no question of supporting nuclear weapon ambitions of Iran" and that "as a NPT signatory [Iran] must also undertake all the obligations that go with it" (The Economic Times 2008; cf. Onderco 2015b, p.31).

Notwithstanding the discourse on the discriminatory nature of the NPT-based non-proliferation regime, India therefore emerged as an actor that accepts responsibilities of the NWS, and aims to largely comply with the rules of the regime; and, in the case of Iran, even assists in the enforcement of the NPT norms. In response to the condemnations expressed by the parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Indian Minister of External Affairs Singh stated that

the NPT community needs to understand that India cannot join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state […] India is a nuclear-weapon state. Though not a party to the NPT, India's policies have been consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to nuclear-weapon states. These provisions are contained in Articles I, III and VI. Article I obliges a nuclear-weapon state not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other country or assist any other country to acquire them and India's record on non-proliferation has been impeccable. Article III requires a party to the treaty to provide nuclear materials and related equipment to any other country only under safeguards; India's exports of such materials have always been under safeguards. Article VI commits the parties to pursue negotiations to bring about eventual global nuclear disarmament. It needs to be emphasised that India today is the only nuclear-weapon state that remains committed to commencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in order to bring about a nuclear-weapons-free world, the very objective envisaged in Article VI of the NPT (Singh 2000b).

In line with this statement, India has pursued the gradual strategy of normalization of its deviant image after the 1998 tests. This path involved a revision of many of its policies and rhetoric towards the rules of the global nonproliferation game, in which India has sought to play an increasingly bigger role. As such, Kienzle suggests that "although historically India tended to advocate the replacement of the entire nuclear regime, in recent years, it has become an outspoken entrepreneur in favor of norm change rather than norm replacement; […] the idealism and the realpolitik of previous decades have been replaced by a more pragmatic approach" (Kienzle 2014a, p.38; cf. Fey, Hellmann, et al. 2014, p.188). However, as I demonstrate in the following section, this pragmatic normalization of India's nuclear deviance has also been tightly coupled with the de-stigmatizing policies of the other actors in nuclear order, the United States in particular.

Stigma Reversal

Stigma reversal involves the attempts of other actors to (partially) de-stigmatize and re-integrate India to the "normal international society". Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the post-1998 social construction of two deviant images of India: an "unrestrained" nuclear-armed

India as a "dangerous" deviant in the broader international order; and a "restrained", outgroup deviant juxtaposed to the "normal", in-group NPT signatories. I argue that whereas India managed to (partially) deconstruct the first deviant image by its normalizing stigma management strategy, the stigma reversal policies of the United States aimed at reconstructing also the second image by destigmatizing India as a special case of an unrecognized nuclear weapon state that should be integrated into the global non-proliferation architecture.

It is worth stressing that some of the key players in nuclear order, such as France or Russia, only lukewarmly condemned the 1998 Indian tests, and, in actual practice, largely continued their business as usual vis-à-vis New Delhi. For example, military exports from Russia to India continued even after Pokhran-II, including equipment related to New Delhi's nuclear weapons program, such as nuclear-capable bombers or submarines (Pikayev et al. 1998, p.71; Conley 2001; Orlov 1999, p.142). Despite the U.S. criticism, Russia also invoked the "grandfather clause" of the NSG, allowing states to execute commitments made prior its NSG accession, to continue negotiations over the supply of VVER nuclear power reactors (see Rai 2009, chap.4).

Whereas the full scope of stigma reversal policies on the side of the United States took place under the Bush administration, this approach had in fact started already under Clinton. Despite the continuing criticism of the tests, many U.S. sanctions imposed on India for its nuclear transgressions were lifted within the same year. In October 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the first of the Brownback Amendments, grating the U.S. president authority to temporarily lift some of the economic sanctions under the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (cf. Rajagopalan & Mishra 2015, p.85; Morrow & Carriere 1999). The second Brownback Amendment of 1999 then extended the waiver authority to *all* sanctions against India and Pakistan, also noting that "'broad applications' of export controls were detrimental to U.S. interests" (Bhatia 2013, p.269). In 2000, Clinton paid an official visit to New Delhi, calling for "a genuine partnership against proliferation", with a note that "if India's nuclear test shook the world, India's leadership for nonproliferation can certainly move the world" (Clinton 2000).

In the wake of the support received from the two South Asian countries after 9/11, the new administration of President Bush used the waiver authority granted by the U.S. Congress to lift the remaining sanctions against both India and Pakistan, with reference to "the national security interests of the United States" (CNN 2001; see also Wagner 2001). The U.S. National Security Strategy was adopted in the following year and noted that "while in the past [the

concerns over India's nuclear and missile programs] may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests" (The White House 2002, p.27). The need to transform the mutual relationship was soon translated into the practice of bilateral initiatives. In 2004, the two countries made a joint statement on the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP), an initiative that would be dealing with trade in areas of high sensitivity as well as strategic importance, such as peaceful nuclear activities, space program, and trade in high-technologies (U.S. Department of State 2004).

Both symbolically and substantively, the NSSP launched the new phase of the de-stigmatization process that was intended to bring India "into the international nuclear nonproliferation mainstream" (Burns 2007). In July 2005, U.S. President Bush and India's Prime Minister Singh made a joint statement on nuclear cooperation that would discursively reframe some of the key features of the Indian deviant image in nuclear order. With reference to the "growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner" and "India's strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation", President Bush stated "that as a *responsible* state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states" (The White House 2005, *emphasis added*). Bush also suggested that "international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India's central and growing role" and made a corresponding pledge to "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India" (The White House 2005).

The U.S.-India nuclear deal involved changing U.S. domestic legislation as well as reconstructing the rules of the nonproliferation game. Additionally, the deal required *further* progress in India's normalization vis-à-vis nuclear order.[150] In a statement, Indian Prime Minister expressed readiness "to assume the same responsibilities and practices [...] as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology" (The White House 2005). The implementation of the deal from rhetoric into specific practices required (on the side of India):

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[150] For the scholarly debate on the desirability and the (expected) impacts of the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, see for example Pant (2011), Kapur & Ganguly (2007), Fitzpatrick (2008) , Perkovich (2010), Kienzle (2014a), Abraham (2007), Ganguly & Mistry (2006), Paul (2006), Carranza (2008), Warburg (2012), or Paul & Shankar (2007). For the meta-analysis of this debate, see Bhatia (2012).

identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines (The White House 2005)

The application of the IAEA safeguards on nuclear facilities has been the norm for states that signed the NPT, whereas the NNWS had to put *all* of their nuclear facilities under IAEA monitoring; the five NWS eventually accepted application of safeguards on some of their civilian facilities through Voluntary Offer Agreements, to somehow balance the unequal treatment in the original agreement (cf. Baeckmann 1988). The efforts to bring India into this system required the separation of Indian nuclear facilities and their designation as either military or civilian, whereas for the latter, an *ad hoc* safeguards agreement would be negotiated between India and the IAEA (see INFCIRC/754 2009). This military-civilian separation for monitoring purposes arguably brought India closer to the NWS practice in the global non-proliferation regime, although unlike them India would forgo an option to withdraw the designated civilian reactors and materials from safeguards in the future (Pant 2007, p.466). Furthermore, India was obliged to agree to the most intrusive norms of transparency devised for the non-proliferation regime by implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol (IAEA 2014). The IAEA Director-General ElBaradei endorsed the agreement with India and elsewhere suggested that this approach represents "a creative break with the past", whereas the "traditional strategy – of treating such states as outsiders – is no longer a realistic method of bringing these last few countries into the fold" (Mohamed ElBaradei 2006). India later even expanded the cooperation by establishing training facilities for the IAEA through the Indian

Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, receiving praise as "a reliable partner of the IAEA in fulfilling its mandate" (IAEA 2017).

The normalization of Indian nuclear trade practices vis-à-vis export control groups such as the NSG has proved to be a more contentious issue with a rather paradoxical symbolism: it was the response to Indian nuclear deviance in 1974 that brought the NSG and its export control rules into existence in the first place. The possibility for India to engage in nuclear trade with NSG members required a negotiation of a specific waiver that would confer an exceptional status upon India with respect to the established export rules. Most NSG states eventually accepted the U.S. argumentation and discourse of India's "responsible" and "democratic" identity that deserves a different treatment than other outsiders such as Pakistan, and granted the waiver exception (cf. Kienzle 2014a, pp.46–47; Wastler 2010). The huge symbolic importance of the waiver was sufficiently reflected in the statements of Indian politicians and in the media, with one newspaper suggesting that "if the Beijing Olympics was China's coming-out party, the NSG waiver was India's" (cited in The Economist 2008).

The exception granted by the NSG opened the door for the implementation of the agreement with India in U.S. domestic legislation (see Weiss 2010, p.267). India has subsequently continued its integration in the global non-proliferation architecture through accessing extra-NPT "non-proliferation clubs". In 2016, New Delhi joined the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Government of India 2016) and the Missile Technology Control Regime in order to further "international non-proliferation objectives" (BBC 2016). One of the Indian officials explicitly suggested the link between the accession to these missile control clubs and the New Delhi's aims to join the NSG, by strengthening its image of a "responsible member of the international community committed to countering proliferation" (cited in Davenport 2016). Although the long-sought Indian membership in the NSG has not yet materialized as of 2017, the United States alongside Russia, France, and the United Kingdom has been consistently pushing the issue in the group, despite strong opposition from the Chinese (cf. The Hindu 2017; Thränert & Bieri 2013). In respect to the Indian bid for NSG membership, Basrur (2016) notes that the "issue is not so much about nuclear commerce as about status. It is about being treated with respect and not as an outcast in the global non-proliferation regime, which – as a non-signatory to the NPT – India has long experienced."

The joint U.S. and Indian efforts to reconstruct India's deviant image and reverse its stigma in nuclear order can hardly be called *fully* successful at this point. In the NPT review

context, for example, India is still rhetorically treated as an outsider in the same category as Pakistan and Israel, regularly called "to accede to [the NPT] without further delay and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States" (NPT/CONFZ.2015/R.3 2015, p.24). The integratory discourses portraying India as a "responsible", "normal", and "democratic" major power nevertheless succeeded in granting India an exceptional status in the nonproliferation game, justifying a different treatment of India in practice (cf. Das 2012b; 2012a; Hayes 2009). In terms of Indian self-reflection, the implementation of the U.S.-India nuclear deal has been domestically interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons program, that offers the "possibility of decades-old restrictions being set aside to create space for India's emergence as a full member of a new nuclear world order" (Singh 2006; cf. Abraham 2007, p.2).

Stigma Power

In this section, I aim to sketch the picture of power-laden factors that have been relevant to the reconstruction of India's deviant image after the 1998 tests. I highlight several trends that arguably allow for a deeper understanding of how the operations of stigma politics have unfolded in this specific case. First, I point to the shift in India's structural position in international order after the end of the Cold War, and how this shift influenced the behavior of the United States, especially in the context of U.S. economic interests and the power balancing strategy vis-à-vis China. Second, I discuss the limits of compulsive power in India's case with respect to the economic sanctions imposed in the aftermath of Pokhran-II. Third, I unpack the power dimension of rule change after the U.S.-Indian deal, and how this process reproduced the hierarchies of nuclear order. Finally, I explore the process of Indian domestic empowerment in the wake of the tests.

The reconstruction of India's deviance vis-à-vis nuclear order needs to be understood in the broader context of India's structural positioning in the post-Cold War international order. Despite its enormous land-mass and population, India had the mark of a post-colonial, developing country, situated on a rather low rank in the social stratification of international hierarchy of the Cold War era. However, this image began to change with the end of the bipolar structure of world politics, with India gradually assuming the role of the most populous democracy and a rising power in world order. Increasingly, India has no longer been seen as a

country "neither rich enough to bribe, powerful enough to bully, nor principled enough to inspire" (Thakur 1997, p.15).

Despite the temporary setbacks connected to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India's major trading partner (cf. Thakur 1993), India underwent a spectacular rise in economic power during the 1990s. It managed to implement liberal economic reforms and experienced high economic growth, a substantial increase in foreign direct investments, a revolution in information technologies, and an expanding middle class (cf. Panagariya 2004). In India's own self-reflection, nuclear technology has become a symbol of the India's empowerment in the globalized world. Whereas the civilian side of nuclear technology has become a symbol of sustainable economic development (cf. Kienzle 2014a, p.41), the military side of nuclear technology began to be reinterpreted by Indian representatives as a "currency of force and power" that corresponds to the emergence of India as one of the key players in international politics (see Singh 1998b, pp.43–44).

For the United States, the Indian power-surge in the 1990s was arguably the key factor in its decision to reverse its previous stigmatizing policies, and instead integrate India into the global non-proliferation architecture. As suggested by Abraham (2007, pp.14–15), it was the convergence of the two structural factors behind the transformation of mutual relations: first, the Indian economic globalization, that, combined with the external image of democratic and stable country, made India attractive for U.S. foreign investments; and second, the idea of the U.S. need to balance rising China in Asian the theater. In this latter context, India's growing military power capabilities turned New Delhi into a potential strategic partner in the region, a consideration deserving a substantive reconstruction of the "nuclear problem" in mutual relations (cf. Paul 2003, p.151).

The rise of India also corresponds to the limits of compulsive power that took place in the form of sanctions imposed on India in response to the 1998 tests. As shown by Morrow and Carriere (1999), the comparative impact of essentially the same set of sanctions was significantly milder on (economically stronger) India than (weaker) Pakistan.[151] Furthermore, the new position of India as an attractive 'emerging market' significantly influenced the U.S. will to carry on with sanctions that are costly for both sides and unpopular with domestic stakeholders (cf. Bhatia 2013, pp.267–270). As suggested by Hathaway (2000), the U.S.

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[151] Kapur (2002) even highlights some small indirect positive economic effects on sanctions, as they facilitated political agreement on economic reforms within the ruling coalition at the time.

"Congress appear[ed] to have little stomach for maintaining sanctions against India or Pakistan, either to punish them for their tests, to coerce them into reversing the direction of their nuclear programs, or more generally, to send a message to other nuclear threshold states that may be tempted to emulate the Indian and Pakistani examples." Business-related interests were also in the forefront of Russian and French reasoning to take a softer course of action against India in order to preserve the economic relationship with the rising power (see Krepon 2008).

As I noted in the chapter 2 of this dissertation, power is also required to change the rules that separate "normal" behavior from "deviant". In this respect, the United States – and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, France, and India itself – had to resort to "strong-arm tactics" to persuade the resisting states and successfully push India's case through the IAEA and NSG (Kienzle 2014a, pp.46–49). In this case, the key to the successful norm change, that had been opposed by the majority of states in the nuclear order, was the agreement among major powers (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Germany, with only China opposing the deal among the major players) that shared commercial interest in granting the exception to New Delhi (Pant 2007, pp.469–470). As proposed by Wayne Sandholtz, "when most of the major states agree on an international rule, the rule is likely to be established" (Sandholtz 2007, p.267).

In the bigger picture, this process also represents the further reproduction of the hierarchical system of global nuclear order. The decision to grant India an exception from the IAEA and NSG rules – that are otherwise applicable to *all* states in the nuclear order – was decided by a small minority of states in the IAEA Board of Governors and the NSG. However, the legitimacy of these institutions and the procedural justice of their decision-making processes has been highly contested in the global nuclear order, as the "developed", industrialized states interested in expansion of their nuclear export industries are arguably overrepresented in these bodies on the expense of "developing" NNWS (cf. Müller et al. 2013, pp.58–59).

Finally, the attempts to stigmatize India in the wake of the 1998 tests led to the certain empowerment on the domestic level. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that made the decision to cross the nuclear threshold managed to significantly improve its domestic position, with almost 80 percent of the Indian population approving the tests, a support that did not waive even in the face of the sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries (see Mehta 1998, p.403). As such, some observers noted that "the nearly universal Indian domestic

approval and the surge of nationalist sentiment" consequently "strengthened the BJP's otherwise tenuous hold on power" (Diamond 1998; cf. R. Thakur 1998, p.613).

Game & Rules

The 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia have been almost universally condemned as some of the most serious breaches of the norms of nuclear order since the NPT inception. As such, the aftermath of these tests also opened a window of opportunity to (re)affirm or change the rules that the actors of nonproliferation game play by. I argue that the dynamics of nuclear rules in the aftermath of the tests took place in two distinct phases. The first phase, immediately following the tests, involved a substantial reaffirmation of nuclear norms by the NPT community, especially with respect to the universality of the non-proliferation norm and the norm against nuclear testing. In the second phase, the reversal of U.S. policy and the resulting U.S.-Indian nuclear deal led to the major change in the global nuclear order, in particular with respect to the treatment of non-NPT members.

In spite of the fact that India was not a member of the NPT, and therefore was not bounded by any legal obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons, the demonstration of India's nuclear capability through testing has been near-universally condemned by the international community. As such, the international community also almost unanimously reaffirmed one of the key norms of non-proliferation regime: universality, or a principle that the NPT rules should be universally adhered to in the international order, and therefore they are applicable to both members and non-members. India's attempts to justify its conduct with reference to the "higher loyalties" – regional security concerns – were generally dismissed as illegitimate (e.g., Clinton 1998; Parliament of Canada 1998).

In a similar fashion, the international community considered India's (and Pakistan's) behavior to be in violation of the non-testing norm formally validated in the 1996 CTBT, despite the fact that the two South Asian countries were not among its signatories (and the Treaty itself had not yet entered in force). The existence and universally binding nature of the non-testing norm was again reaffirmed in the UNSC Resolution 1172 that demanded "that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all states not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the [CTBT]" (S/RES/1172 (1998) 1998; cf. Bunn 1999, pp.25–27). The immediate declaration of moratoria against further nuclear testing symbolically reaffirmed the deviant

status of nuclear testing practice in comparison with other "normal" practices of nuclear-armed states. Both India and Pakistan have upheld the moratoria ever since, although they both engaged other practices with respect to the development of their arsenals, such as fissile material production, qualitative modernization, or ballistic missile testing (cf. Kristensen & Norris 2015; Kristensen 2015).

The 2000 NPT Review Conference clearly demonstrated the interactionist observation that communities tend to stick together in the face of deviance, reaffirming their common values, and strictly delineating the normal selves from deviant others. As noted by Rebecca Johnson, "paradoxically, the success of the Sixth Review Conference may have been due in part to the fact that even the weapon states feared that a shambles (or worse still, an acrimonious failure) would seriously weaken the credibility of the Treaty and play into the hands of proliferators, including India and Pakistan. There was a widely shared sense that the non-proliferation regime needed to be seen to be strong enough to withstand the challenges from the South Asian tests" (Johnson 2000). In consequence, the unanimously adopted Final Document stated that the NPT community "deplores the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in 1998" and "declares that such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon-State status or any special status whatsoever" (NPT/CONF.2000/28 2000b).

Nevertheless, the reversal of U.S. policy towards India's proliferation, which started under Clinton and was fully materialized under Bush administration, also changed the course of this normative development. As claimed by Pant, "the Indo-US nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order" (Pant 2007, p.455). The NSG rules that had prohibited sensitive nuclear exports to non-NPT countries had to be adjusted to allow an exception for India on the base of its "responsible" behavior and partial compliance with NPT norms. Another rule change had to be implemented to the IAEA safeguards system that would be applied on *part* of Indian facilities designated "civilian" and thereby distinguished from military counterparts.

Although the United States would frequently stress that the India's case is exceptional and does not set any precedent, the deal in fact represents a major attempt at the reconstruction of the norms related to the relations between the NPT in-group and the outsiders in the broader nuclear order. In the U.S. discourse, there has been a recognizable shift towards establishing normalcy for the export control criteria based on specific nuclear

responsibility and restraint rather than NPT membership. Such responsibility would be based on compliance with IAEA safeguards and the acceptance of (voluntary) Additional Protocol, which should now be recognized as "a standard part of the international safeguards system" (Davies 2010, p.2). Another feature of such "responsible states" would be implementation of good practices that prevent further dissemination of sensitive technologies beyond other "responsible states". As such, Weiss (2010, p.269) suggests that the arrangement with India comes close to one of the alternative proposals how to deal with the remaining NPT outsiders, in which the NPT community "would formally recognise the nuclear programmes of the outliers of the NPT without admitting them to the treaty as weapon states, but committing them to act like NPT weapon states on non-proliferation matters."

In the NPT context, however, this issue negatively resonates in particular with the justice-laden concerns over the illegitimate application of double standards by the powerful countries in nuclear order. In this view, the NWS often use the differentiations between "good" and "bad" proliferators in their export policies on the base of parochial interests and individual ties rather than broadly accepted legitimate criteria. Many NNWS are thereby sympathetic to the claim that it is "the political character of the particular state and its closeness to the western countries matter immensely in determining whether it is allowed to gain particular sensitive technologies that may have dual use potential" (Paul 2007, p.850; cf. Gahlaut 2006). The reconstruction of India as a "democratic" country, and therefore a *more responsible* nuclear-armed state than the "autocratic" Pakistan, has indeed been a dominant theme in U.S. discourse with regard to the Indian deal (cf. Hayes 2009). In this context, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked whether Pakistan also qualifies for the same treatment, she asserted that "Pakistan is not in the same place as India. I think everybody understands that" (The White House 2006). With respect to the closeness to the Western countries, Nicholas Burns, U.S. Undersecretary of State, further commented on the Indian deal that the United States is "happy to treat a friendly country differently than […] Iran or North Korea" (cited in Behal 2006).

As such, some scholars suggest that the U.S.-India deal "undermined the core principle that proliferation is bad. Instead, it signaled that *some* proliferation is acceptable" (Tannenwald 2013, p.310, *emphasis added*). This normative development has been a subject to continued contestation in the NPT context, both as a matter of principle (tied to the meta-norms of justice and fairness) and of practical justification, suggesting that this practice may open doors for

further proliferation based on the aforementioned criteria. Therefore, many NNWS, as well as China, strongly oppose any further legitimization of India's nuclear program and its closer integration to the non-proliferation regime, for example via their membership in the NSG. In fact, some NNWS as well as pro-disarmament NGOs attempt to stigmatize the United States and the NSG as such, and reconstruct their behavior as an unjustifiable violation of not just the universality norm, but also of the non-dissemination rules enshrined in the first article of the NPT (cf. Dhanapala 2010, p.7; Johnson 2010, pp.7–8; Kuppuswamy 2006, p.145).

Conclusion

In this chapter, my aim was to conduct a case study of the operations of stigma politics that took place in the context of India's 1998 nuclear tests. Although India had been an outsider to both the NPT and the CTBT and therefore did not explicitly violate any international obligation, the international community broadly condemned Indian behavior, constructing it as a violation of universally applicable non-proliferation and nuclear non-testing norms. Among the international audiences, the United States, and to some extent also China, acted as rule enforcers, mobilizing the "normals" among the G-8 and the U.S. allies, primarily the Japan, Canada, Australia, and selected European states, such as Denmark or Sweden. Besides the verbal shaming, India was also subject to economic sanctions for a limited period of time.

To deal with the imposition of stigma, India opted for stigma management strategies that would involve attempts to neutralize its guilt by regional security justifications, and normalize its deviant image towards a responsible, non-NPT nuclear weapon state. Although the NPT community initially opposed any form of legitimization of India's position in the global nuclear order, the United States soon reversed its earlier rule-enforcing position and engaged in efforts to de-stigmatize India and integrate it into the broader non-proliferation architecture. On the India's side, this process of stigma reversal required partial acceptance of some of the NPT rules and practices, such as the separation of its military and civilian nuclear facilities and the application of IAEA safeguards on the latter, or the implementation of the Additional Protocol. Although the special treatment of India has been contested by many NNWS, the integratory discourses portraying India as a "responsible", "normal", and "democratic" major power nevertheless succeeded in granting India an exceptional status in the nonproliferation game.

In the period immediately following the Indian tests, the reconstruction of India's deviant image involved also a substantial reaffirmation of the norms of nuclear order by the NPT community, especially with respect to the universality of the non-proliferation norm and the norm against nuclear testing. However, after the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, the reversal of U.S. earlier policy led to the major rewriting of the non-proliferation rules, in particular with respect to the treatment of the NPT outsiders. This primarily involved change in the organizing principles for nuclear trade: the NSG rules, that had prohibited sensitive nuclear exports to non-NPT countries, had to be adjusted to allow an exception for India on the base of its "responsible behavior" and partial compliance with NPT norms. The implementation of this principle that differentiates between "good" (responsible and democratic) and "bad" (irresponsible and autocratic) proliferation has been resisted by many NPT parties. However, the India's power surge after the end of the Cold War together with the conviction of major powers that India is entitled to a special treatment resulted in *de facto* legitimization of India's position of nuclear-armed state in the global nuclear order.

8. Shades of Deviance: Analytical Synthesis and Conclusions

As I was writing this concluding chapter, the U.S. Navy just launched 59 Tomahawk missiles against a Syrian airbase, in response to what President Trump called the "barbaric", "horrible chemical weapon attack on innocent civilians" (Trump 2017). Although the dozen deaths of the April 2017 gas attack were a mere fraction of civilian casualties in one of the deadliest conflicts of the 21st century, the violation of chemical weapons "taboo" suddenly invited the most forceful response from the United States since the beginning of the Syrian war. Perhaps for the first time, Trump was widely praised for his foreign policy by both Republicans and Democrats, mainstream U.S. media, and also most of U.S. allies. Russian government nevertheless condemned the U.S. action itself as the "violation of international norms", invoking international law and the fundamental institution of state sovereignty (Reuters 2017b). There is no doubt that in these turbulent times, the problem of international norms and their violations remains in the forefront of world politics.

My aim in this dissertation was to unpack the relationship between deviance and normative change in international affairs. I approached this problem with an argument that in order to understand "appropriate", norm-following behavior in international politics, we also need to observe "inappropriate" behavior that conflicts with the norm. In IR, this is still a largely uncharted territory; we already know a great deal about how norms change, yet we know much less about the actual role norm violations play in this process. This dissertation aims to partly fill this gap by bringing the "outsiders" to the forefront of norm dynamics research.

This concluding chapter synthesizes and discusses findings of my dissertation. First, I conduct a cross-case comparison of operations of stigma politics in the empirical chapters 5, 6, and 7 and highlight several empirical observations as they emerged throughout the cases. Third, I discuss theoretical contribution of my dissertation. Fourth, I point to the limits and caveats of my study. Fifth, I propose avenues for future research.

Cross-case Comparisons and Empirical Observations

One must realize inherent limits of generalizing from three empirical cases. However, the cross-case comparison of operations of stigma politics involving Iran, North Korea, and India provides some intriguing observations, which I will try to discuss in the context of interactionist literature and the broader normative development in nuclear order.

Throughout the second part of my dissertation, I developed an argument about the contestedness of the normal and the deviant conduct in nuclear politics. Drawing on the interactionist approach to deviance, I worked with an assumption that as nuclear order itself is built upon ill-defined, contestable, and contested normative structures, so are the categories of what constitutes a "normal" ("good", "responsible", "orderly"…) or "deviant" ("bad", "irresponsible", "disorderly"…) conduct in nuclear affairs. One cannot escape the conclusion that "the character and recent history of a state will strongly influence responses to its nuclear activities" (Walker 2012, p.68). Whether certain behavior is labeled a serious norm violation, a "proliferation", and indeed a threat to international peace and security, is often an inherently political decision that always must be understood in the context of interstate amity and enmity, broader normative conceptions, images of "good" and "bad" states, geopolitical and strategic interests, power relationships in international politics, and also the level of the deviant state's cooperation with institutions of nuclear order after the violation takes place.

Moreover, the position of the state in the broader international order is highly relevant for the positioning of this state in the nuclear order and has a deep impact on the way such a state is perceived and treated by others. This also holds true vice versa: the exceptional position of nuclear weapons in global politics makes the cases of deviance in nuclear order highly prominent cases of deviance in international order, too. This connection has been especially relevant in the discourse over the "rogue states" in international politics. What was sometimes perceived as an "inherent rogueness" of Iran and North Korea made the two states the "usual suspects" also with respect to the NPT rules. At the same time, the intention to pursue nuclear weapons has become one of the defining features of the prototypical rogue in world order (cf. Klare 1996, p.26; Tanter 1998; Mutimer 2000).

In fact, the "rogue state" label has been explicitly or implicitly in the forefront of the stigma politics with respect to the construction of serious cases of deviance in the nonproliferation game. The transgressive linkage connecting the different aspects of Iran's and

North Korea's "deviant nature", such as human rights violations or sponsorship of terrorist groups, also underpinned the threat linkage, securitizing nuclear deviance of rogues as major threats to regional or international peace, security, and stability. This idea was further supported by the notion of proliferation "nexus" (Fitzpatrick 2006a) and "rings" (Braun & Chyba 2004), highlighting clandestine cooperation in nuclear dimension among rogues and frequently also non-state actors such as the A.Q. Khan network. The construction of the rogue image in international politics also allowed for the discursive separation of rogue states as "enemies of civilization" that operate on the edge of international society (The White House 2002, p.iv; cf. Krause & Latham 1998, p.37; Walker 2007b, p.444; Saunders 2006). Despite the differences in their attitude towards nuclear weapons and the seriousness of their violations of NPT norms, Iran and North Korea have been frequently stereotyped together as a specific category of nuclear rogueness.[152] In fact, as Wagner & Onderco (2012, p. 177) also observed, "despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries."

The inherently political character of stigma politics necessarily brings about the issue of double standards and divergent treatment of different actors in nuclear order. Besides the well-known cases of Iran and North Korea, the IAEA also identified violations of NPT rules in Egypt, South Korea, Libya, Japan, and Syria, each with fairly different political implications (cf. James M. Acton 2009; Wan 2014; Goldschmidt 2009).[153] The issue of double standards is also salient with respect to the debates over favorable treatment of NPT outsiders, as was the case of India examined in chapter 7. Nina Tannenwald argues that

> the nonnuclear states perceive that some countries — India and Israel, for
>
> example, both of which are nuclear powers outside the NPT regime — get
>
> favorable treatment, while Iran, an NPT member, is treated harshly for trying to
>
> do more or less what Israel and India have done. These cases of "nuclear

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[152] This holds true not just for the Western anti-rogue discourse, but also for much of the academic literature (see e.g., Paul 2003; Huntley 2006). Many nuclear scholars also automatically worked with an assumption that Iran actually aspires to become a new de facto nuclear weapon state (e.g., Roth 2007; Sherrill 2012).

[153] For example, despite the revelation of clandestine experiments with uranium enrichment, the South Korea's case was not reported to the UNSC by the IAEA Board of Governors, largely due to the U.S. intervention in the matter (cf. Kang et al. 2005; James M. Acton 2009, pp.135–137; Dalton et al. 2016, p.60). Japan also experienced a problem with about 200 kg of plutonium technically missing (Barnabie & Burnie 2005; Ogilvie-White 2007 fn 25), and maintains a nuclear capability that makes it closer to nuclear weapon threshold than Iran ever was (cf. Rublee 2010; Hughes 2007; Hymans & Matthew S Gratias 2013, p.16).

exceptionalism" undermine the ability of the regime to deal with noncompliance, sending the message that different rules apply to different states. It also suggests that there are benefits to staying outside the regime— not the message supporters of the NPT should want to send (Tannenwald 2013, p.305).

This development contests the normative idea that the only legitimate possibility to achieve the full universalization of nuclear norms is by the disarmament of the remaining nuclear holdouts and their accession to the NPT as NNWS. It is underpinned by the anti-universalistic claim that there is a difference between "good" and "bad" proliferators, whereas the "goodness" of the former is measured by the extent to which they are "stable, democratic, status quo powers" (Carpenter 2004).[154] This good/bad differentiation frequently appeared in the discourse of the U.S. administration under President Bush (Müller 2017, p.3) and it seems to make a comeback under current President Trump, who suggested during his presidential campaign that whereas nuclear proliferation is the "biggest problem […] in the world", nuclear-armed Japan would not be a necessarily "bad thing" (New York Times 2016; cf. Michaels & Williams 2017). A similar argument also appears in the scholarly literature. Joachim Krause, for example, argues that "nuclear weapons in the hands of long-established democratic governments with a tradition of restraint and responsibility concerning international order are usually not a problem […] The issue is, however, how to keep problematic actors from getting control over nuclear weapons" (Krause 2007b, p.498). Such (re)interpretation of NPT universality norm has been strongly resisted by most NNWS, which are often contesting it as an illegitimate, hypocritical double standard, based on the amicable relationships of powerful states in nuclear order towards their allies, rather than some objective, universal, and legitimate criteria (cf. Mathur 2015, p.9; Walker 2007b, p.450).

The findings of this dissertation therefore also highlight the importance of power and social stratification in the dynamics of deviance (re)construction. Many prominent interactionist accounts of deviance point out that the successful construction of deviant categories largely relies on the power configurations in respective social orders. The individual empirical cases of nuclear deviance demonstrate, *inter alia*, the differences in structural positions of actors in nuclear hierarchy that make the individual stigma contests a principally

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[154] Ironically, two out of five NWS can hardly be called "democratic states".

unequal fight. For example, the five NWS enjoy a privileged position in the single legally recognized rule enforcement institution of the global nuclear order: the UNSC, with authority to label, sanction, and discipline alleged deviants and their behavior. Whereas the UNSC was able and willing to formally designate Iran's and North Korea's behavior a violation of international norms, the same procedure is de facto unavailable in case of deviance of NWS with their exclusive veto powers in the UNSC. The case of India also demonstrates the ability of major powers in the system to rewrite rules whose infraction constitutes deviance. The reversal of earlier U.S. position towards India's nuclear acquisition led to the major change in the rules of non-proliferation, allowing India's integration to global nonproliferation architecture as an "exceptional case", despite the resistance of a large part of the NPT membership.

The empirical cases examined in this dissertation also reveal the importance of stigma management strategies for limiting the impact of stigmatization on the deviant's identity. Iran, to some extent, succeeded in promotion of its counter-narrative, framing the nuclear confrontation as an issue of technology denial from the side of Western states towards developing countries and of an inalienable right for peaceful nuclear program, including uranium enrichment. The ability to discursively link the problem to the more general normative conceptions of justice, fairness, sovereignty, and economic development attracted sympathies to Iran's claims from many NNWS and pro-disarmament NGOs. North Korea, on the other hand, maintained its "quasi-autistic" (Wunderlich et al. 2013, p.280) approach to normative argumentation. Pyongyang's anti-hegemonic rhetoric and the justifications related to U.S. nuclear threats could, potentially, resonate with long-standing NAM position. However, North Korea has been exclusively framing the issue in the context of its bilateral relationship with the United States, without any meaningful efforts to build broader normative coalitions that would give Pyongyang's claims a semblance of credibility. India, while also employing justice-laden discourses, instead heavily relies on the pragmatic normalization strategy vis-à-vis the rules of the nonproliferation game. After the 1998 nuclear tests, New Delhi aimed at reconstructing India's image towards a responsible, extra-NPT nuclear-armed state, which largely complies with the core NPT norms and is therefore a legitimate partner in both nuclear trade and global efforts to halt the further spread of WMDs.

The employment of stigma strategies is also related to the different impact on the normative dynamics in nuclear order. Iran's consistent stance with respect to its interpretation of the peaceful use norm, for example, eventually led to the formal codification of the right for

uranium enrichment in the JCPOA, despite the initial U.S. opposition. While the agreement was adopted to provide solution specifically to the Iran's case, the broader implications go beyond the Iranian crisis. North Korea, on the other hand, has sought to have the rules of the nonproliferation game rewritten *specifically* for itself, as it happened in the case of India (cf. Cha 2009, p. 124). Unlike New Delhi, however, Pyongyang so far failed to achieve this level of recognition.

What is perhaps not entirely surprising – yet still intriguing in the broader perspective – is the key importance of the United States in the initiation, course, as well as the outcome of the process of deviance (re)construction. In all three empirical cases, Washington was always playing a prominent role in the process of rule enforcement, sanctioning, and disciplining the deviants and their behavior. Once the United States changed its stance towards India's nuclear program, it made it possible to significantly reconstruct the position of New Delhi in nuclear order. Similarly, in the case of Iran, the U.S. reversal of its earlier position towards uranium enrichment was critically important to the solution of the crisis (obviously, the EU efforts and Iran's concessions were also indispensable for the agreement between E3+3 and Iran). In a similar fashion, the resolution of North Korea's position vis-à-vis nuclear order seems now largely contingent on the U.S. policy. If we are now heading towards a "post-American world" (Zakaria 2012), who will assume the role of the main rule enforcer in the nonproliferation game remains an open question.

Another empirical observation in this dissertation is related to the ability of political orders to adapt to serious violations of shared norms and rules. In international regimes, norm violations frequently spur crises of confidence and elevate concerns about the viability of future cooperation in the given issue-area – especially if such issue-area is related to the matters of (inter)national security. In case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, nuclear scholarship frequently refers to the crisis of compliance and suggests that in consequence, the regime might fall apart.

However, the study of nuclear deviance reveals a more complex picture of this dynamic. The prominent deviant events, such as the discovery of Iraq's secret nuclear facilities in early 1990s, had a significant impact on the normative landscape of global nuclear politics. The events provided relevant stakeholders with window of opportunity to propose new measures that would strengthen the violated norms, improve the social control over non-compliance, and facilitate rule enforcement in future cases of deviance. Instead of the collapse of non-

proliferation order and the cascade of norm violations, we could observe the tendency among NPT parties to stick together at the following subsequent Review conferences, adapt the regime rules to the situation, and thereby prevent the future instances of deviance. Although Iraq's revelations has been frequently interpreted in the context of the broader "crisis of NPT noncompliance" (e.g., Bolton 2004), the ability of NPT states to agree on the implementation of new measures of social control in face of in-group deviance actually made the 1990s' nuclear order appear stronger rather than weaker (cf. Walker 2007b, p.438). As noted by Jim Walsh, "the system's response to crisis was the development of new strength rather than collapse" (Walsh 2005, p.17).

The resolute response took place also in the case of India in the period immediately following the nuclear tests of 1998. Although India was not legally bound by neither the NPT nor the CTBT, the tests were near-universally condemned as a violation of both non-proliferation and non-testing norms. As such, the international community also reaffirmed one of the core norms of the non-proliferation regime: universality, or a principle that the NPT rules should be universally adhered to in the international order, and therefore their violation is considered a serious issue also in case of NPT outsiders. The 2000 NPT Review Conference clearly supported the interactionist claim that communities tend to stick together in the face of deviance, reaffirming their common values, and strictly delineating the "normal" selves from "deviant" others. However, the following reversal of U.S. policy towards re-integration of India to the broader non-proliferation architecture caused a rupture in the prevailing normative consensus. While some parties welcome the India's normalization as an appropriate pragmatic step towards a responsible, democratic, and economically attractive rising power, many others see U.S.-India nuclear deal as a dangerous precedent for the future cases of nuclear proliferation.

In response to the North Korea's and Iran's case, several moral entrepreneurs, primarily the United States and its allies, also used the window of opportunity to put forward new initiatives that would strengthen the non-proliferation norm vis-à-vis future cases of deviance. These non-proliferation measures included for example the multilateralization of nuclear fuel cycle, promotion of the Additional Protocol as a new verification standard, or the clarification of the rules of withdrawal from the NPT under article X. Their implementation as obligatory standard, however, was mostly blocked by the NNWS with reference to the resulting limitations on sovereignty and the equity/justice concerns with respect to the NWS refusal to accept new

measures regarding their disarmament obligations. At the same time, some new non-proliferation rules were successfully implemented on the sidelines of the NPT regime, primarily in the NSG that managed to find a consensus on how to adapt the rules in the light of NPT non-compliance.

These dynamics fit the broader trend of norm polarization in the nuclear order, which, to some extent, also cut through the North–South divide in the broader international order. On one side, there are United States and its allies in Western Europe, Japan, or Australia, which are largely in favor of strengthening of non-proliferation norm through ever more intrusive measures of compliance-control. One the other side, there are states of Global South that are more concerned about the fundamental norms of states' sovereignty, economic development, and the issues of justice and fairness with respect to the rights and obligations of states in the nuclear order. These issues will likely remain relevant in the context of the global decline in social recognition of liberal norms (cf. Wiener 2017, p.15), and the likely transformation of global governance to a "post-Western international society" (Adler-Nissen 2014b, p.172).

The empirical inquiry in this dissertation also confirms one interesting macro trend: the shift towards denser and more specific normative structure of the global nuclear order. In the big picture, the originally vague and ambiguous NPT rules become increasingly more precise and in fact more constraining in states' behavior in connection the interactive process of deviance (re)construction. This dynamic can be empirically demonstrated throughout the historical development of nuclear order. For example, Iraq's case in the early 1990s led to the stricter interpretation of standards of nuclear transparency. India's PNE resulted in significant re-interpretation of, originally very benevolent, rules of peaceful nuclear use. The pressure on NWS with respect to their Article VI. obligations made the disarmament rules gradually more specific throughout the 1995, 2000, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. This general tendency appears to continue in the aftermath of cases of Iran, North Korea, and India, and the overarching logic arguably holds despite the frequent resistance of some states against attempts to clarify the meaning of the nuclear norms towards stricter interpretations. The range of behavior considered deviant in global nuclear politics, consequently, has become significantly wider since the nuclear non-proliferation regime's inception in the early 1970s. This is visible, in particular, in the areas of nuclear transparency, nuclear testing, vertical proliferation, and the civilian, peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Finally, the empirical cases in my dissertation also elevate the domestic dimension of stigmatization in global nuclear order. Although the space constrains did not allow me to properly engage with the domestic debates in individual states, all three cases demonstrate the domestic "rally-around-the-flag" empowerment of respective governments in the face of international sanctions. Differences on other issues notwithstanding, the Iranian public increasingly supported the indigenous nuclear program, and during the crisis strongly opposed Western attempts to restrict on Iran's ability to master full nuclear fuel cycle. The India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that made the decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 also managed to significantly elevate its domestic position in the wake of sanctions, with almost 80 percent of the Indian population approving the tests and the BJP policy in nuclear affairs. While the North Korea's case is rather specific in terms of domestic public and does not provide us with enough reliable data to examine the domestic level of analysis, Pyongyang has certainly succeeded in turning its nuclear arsenal into a symbol of self-reliance, strength, and pride in its domestic propaganda. The interplay of international and domestic levels in the dynamics of deviance (re)construction arguably provides a promising area for further research.

Theoretical Contribution

The general theoretical aim of my dissertation was to unpack the problem of deviance in international politics and its relationship to the dynamics of international norms. I reached to the interactionist approach in sociology as a theoretical anchor to my claims about the contingency and inherent contestedness of normative deviance in society. I argue that the interactionist approach provides several observations that are highly relevant for the study of identities, norms, and order in world politics:

1. The theory highlights the socially constructed nature of deviance. This key ontological claim implies the epistemological possibility to study social construction of deviance as an intersubjective phenomenon in (international) society through discourse and practices, as they develop in the course of time.
2. Interactionist researchers further devote their attention to the "audiences" that co-construct deviance by labeling certain behavior "deviant". This assumption is important for the identification of relevant actors in the deviance-making process in world politics.

3. The same researchers also argue that there are different options available for the alleged deviant to accept or challenge the deviant label. This possibility opens the door for studying the agency of the alleged deviants in world politics and their role in the deviance construction – something that the earlier IR literature largely omitted in its analysis.

4. Another relevant insight is the conception of deviance as an interactive *process* rather than some stable entity. This observation provides IR researchers with the possibility to study deviance as a meaning-making process that contributes to the social constitution of agents and structure in international politics.

5. Interactionist approaches highlight the importance of power and social stratification in deviance (re)construction. This assumption connects the problem deviance in international realm with broader IR debates about hierarchies and operations of power in world politics.

6. Finally, the theory claims that deviance is not an *a priori* pathological element in the society but rather a natural part of all social orders where it functions as a source of both social stability and change. This logic opens the possibility to study (re)constructions of deviance as a driving force behind normative stasis and dynamics in international realm.

In this dissertation, I elaborated my concept of "stigma politics" as an interpretive tool to study the dynamic, interactive, and layered process of deviance (re)construction in international politics. I introduced and operationalized components of stigma politics that interact across five dimensions: (1) stigma nexus; (2) stigma imposition; (3) stigma management; (4) stigma reversal; and (5) stigma power. I believe that there are several reasons why my conceptualization of deviance-making process represents a valuable contribution to the literature. First, I integrate insights from sociology, communication studies, and political science/IR into a coherent conceptual frame. Second, I provide an explicit conceptualization of the link between stigma and deviance, which is mostly omitted even in the original interactionist literature. Third, my conceptualization is concerned with the full cycle of deviance (re)construction, including attempts to de-stigmatize deviant actors and (re)integrate them into "normal" society. Fourth, I explicitly and systematically conceptualize power as one of the dimensions of stigmatization process. Fifth, I believe I provide a conceptual framework that is analytically useful to be directly applied to empirical cases in international politics.

To theorize the link between reconstructions of deviance and the dynamics of international norms. I opted for a theoretical eclecticism and combined interactionist insights

on deviance with the discursive approaches to norm contestation and change in IR. I proposed three types of actions in stigma politics that reconstruct norms in international realm: (1) *applicatory* contestation and affirmation, reconstructing the meanings of international norms through applicatory discourses; (2) *justificatory* contestation and affirmation, challenging and reaffirming the legitimacy of international norms through justificatory discourses; and (3) *hierarchical* contestation and affirmation, contesting and reaffirming the relative value and importance of competing international norms through ordering discourses. I also linked these three types of action with the previously introduced five dimensions of stigma politics, and integrated these concepts into a coherent analytical frame. Finally, I demonstrated how these processes operate on different levels of normative structure(s) of world politics, with respect to fundamental norms, organizing principles, and standardized procedures.

My theorization of the deviance–normative change relationship represents an original theoretical contribution to the discipline of IR in several aspects. First, while the interactionist literature has long claimed that there is a connection between deviance and the dynamics of social orders, I provide an explicit theorization of the mechanisms that lead to normative stasis or change. Second, I extended Deitelhoff & Zimmermann's (2013) typology of norm contestation through inclusion of hierarchical contestation and the notion of ordering discourses. Third, I conceptualized a link between the aforementioned typology of norm contestation and Wiener's (2014) vertical taxonomy of international norms. I proposed a logic of different intensity of individual types of contestation: while the macro-level norms are least likely to be object of justificatory contestation and most likely to be object of applicatory contestation, micro-level norms are least likely to be object of applicatory contestation, but most likely to be object of justificatory contestation. Fourth, I elaborated on the logic of window of opportunity that opens in the context of "deviant events", and provides norm entrepreneurs with favorable circumstances to propose new laws, institutions, or initiatives that establish new rules or strengthen the old ones. Whereas my theoretical and conceptual framework was originally devised to study the reconstructions of deviance and norm change in nuclear non-proliferation regime, I believe that it is in principle applicable in any area of social interaction in international order.

Limits and Caveats

Perhaps the biggest limit of my dissertation is the amount of cases I could explore in the empirical part of my research. Ideally, I would also employ my theoretical framework to conduct an in-depth study of stigma politics towards Pakistan, Israel, and the NWS, and perhaps dig deeper into the past cases of nuclear deviance (Iraq in the 1990s, India after 1974 etc.). This would allow me to engage in a more comprehensive comparison between and across the individual cases of nuclear deviance, and thereby provide more generalizable findings. At the same time, the decision to limit my inquiry to three full case studies can be justified the following two factors. First, there are space constrains with regard to the length of my dissertation. A large part of my text deals with the theory and concepts behind deviance–norms relationship – since this issue is still under-researched in the IR field, I believe my theoretical and conceptual contribution justifies the limitation of empirical inquiry. To make sense of the complex normative environment and the development of deviance phenomenon in global nuclear order, I also had to devote a proper part of my dissertation to the macro-analysis of these issues in the broader context of nuclear non-proliferation regime development in the last decades. Second, the proper study of deviance (re)construction in its complexity requires a very "thick" inquiry into the different aspects of stigmatization process, as well as collection and of a large amount of textual data – in the case of my dissertation, I have been working with at least 150 primary documents plus countless secondary sources per one case study. Although I also considered an option to instead conduct a series of smaller-scale case studies, I believe my approach eventually yielded more valuable results.

The potential caveat of my dissertation is my reliance on almost exclusively openly available data. Although this approach is corresponds to the research strategies of authors that employ a similar theoretical perspective (cf. Adler-Nissen 2014b; Chwieroth 2015), an inclusion of in-depth interviews with individual participants of stigma contests could also provide some interesting additional findings. For example, the interview can help to uncover how individual diplomats interpret and assign meaning to specific issues in deviance (re)construction. This approach would be also in accord with the original studies of Chicago School scholars, which studied deviance in smaller communities in domestic societies rather than states in international society.

Avenues for Further Inquiry

Throughout this chapter, I have already discussed several intriguing findings that arguably warrant further research. In this last section, I would like to highlight two alternative avenues for IR research on deviance in international politics: the study of emotional dimension of deviance, and the focus on micro-practices of deviance (re)construction.

In chapter 3, I highlighted a trend in international norm research that is concerned with emotions. I noted that these "sentimental" approaches to norm research (see Widmaier & Park 2012) sometimes highlight strong emotional reactions that are connected with violations of internalized norms, as well as absence of these emotional reactions when the norms in question were not fully internalized (cf. Mercer 2006, pp.298–299; Crawford 2000, p.154). Non-IR researchers in cognition and emotion also point to the emotional feelings of disgust, fear, anger, and contempt in response to violations of social norms (Keltner & Haidt 1999; Smith 2007). Interactionist researchers likewise note that the interaction within social orders generates emotions that provide us with further understanding of human behaviour (Goffman 1967). With respect to the issue of stigma, Link et al. (2004) recently even included emotional reactions among the main components of the stigmatization process (cf. Yang et al. 2007). With the flourishing IR literature on emotions in world politics (see, for example, Crawford 2000; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006; Sasley 2010; Jeffery 2011; Hutchison & Bleiker 2014; Renshon et al. 2017b), there is strong potential to devise research designs that would include emotions in the study of deviance and norm dynamics, particularly in the context of the new behavioral revolution in social sciences (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).

Moreover, in chapter 2, I referred to Adler-Nissen (2014b, p.162) in my claim that patterns of discrimination in stigma politics are recognizable not merely in the macro-level social practices, but the stigma frequently becomes embodied in various micro-practices of social interaction. The focus on micro-practices of stigma politics can be a great addition to the IR literature on micro-level hierarchies in diplomatic interaction, such as the concept of "international pecking orders" (Pouliot 2016b; 2016a). In the context of global nuclear politics, the micro-study of diplomatic interactions at NPT Review Conference can shed further light on the process in which the deviant categories are continuously re-enacted and embodied in specific discourses and practices of individual representatives of states as well as non-state actors.

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