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**[The Czech Republic and the UK, a Eurosceptic  
comparison]**

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### **Abstract**

**Euroscepticism has recently started to enjoy a renaissance, boasting many different works in different formats whether it be a comparative study of two European countries or, investigating Euroscepticism in different national contexts to account for possible variations of Euroscepticism. This work aims to show the contrary. Using country case studies of the Czech Republic and the UK this paper shows that regardless of temporal differences and differences in national contexts, Euroscepticism is intrinsically linked to some lines of argument concerning economy and democracy.**

### **Abstrakt**

**Euroskepticismus se nedávno začal těšit renesanci, která se může pochlubit mnoha různými pracemi v různých formátech, ať už se jedná o srovnávací studii dvou evropských zemí nebo o vyšetřování euroskepticismu v různých národních kontextech, aby se zohlednily případné variace euroskepticismu. Cílem této práce je ukázat opak. S využitím euroskepticismu tento dokument ukazuje, že bez ohledu na časové rozdíly a rozdíly ve vnitrostátních souvislostech je euroskepticismus vnitřně spojen s některými argumenty vztahujícími se k ekonomice a demokracii.**

**Key words:** Euroscepticism, Eurorealist, Sovereignty, National context, Vaclav Klaus, Civic Democrats

**Klíčová slova:** Euroskepticismus, eurorealismus, suverenita, národní kontext, Václav Klaus, Občanská demokratická strana

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## **Declaration of Authorship**

**1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.**

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**Prague ... 26.05.2017**

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## Introduction

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Over the course of the past few years or so, Euroscepticism has been a prominent feature in contemporary politics. Since the UK's referendum on whether or not to leave the European Union, this has prompted a wave of populist hysteria regarding the unravelling of the European Union as we know it, leading some academic political commentators to contemplate and evaluate the potential for a 'Czexit', or a 'Frexit'<sup>1</sup> following on from 'Brexit'. Some may argue the following work about to be presented is part of this 'wave'. However, Euroscepticism in the lexicological sense, is used widely in modern public debate, dating back to the early 1980's in British political discourse. However, Euroscepticism is a relatively new phenomenon in the academic sphere, where the state of art attempting to theorise the phenomenon starts around the mid 1990's. Since then, Euroscepticism is almost, depending whom you may ask, a field of study in its' own right, enjoying almost a *renaissance*, prompting different varieties of studies to be had in the field. The following work is one of those different studies. The research question for which this thesis addresses is:

*'When observing the Czech Republic and the UK over two time periods, the accession for both countries and contemporary times, are there similarities in the way Eurosceptic political parties/politicians invoke democracy and economy-related arguments?'*

The research question aims to present the notion, that despite the diametrically opposite size, geographical position, wealth, population, geopolitical orientation, economic, historic and societal differences of the Czech Republic and the UK, when the Eurosceptic language is used in political discourse, it can be intrinsically linked to lines of argument concerning economy and democracy. In order to show this I have chosen to single out the accession periods for both countries, and by using a case study approach, I intend to show that not only is party-based Euroscepticism intrinsically linked to certain lines of democratic and economic arguments, but the ideological nature of anti-EU sentiment *amongst* the party system can have similar effects *to* party systems, regardless of the differences in the international context of both countries. Hence why I have chosen both the UK and the Czech Republic. The first case study deals with the Czech Accession into the EU, and the second case study the British accession to the EC. At the time of accession for both countries, the European Union was at completely different stages of development. Now while this seems an obvious obstacle to the following work, it does the opposite. The EU or the EC, depending on which period of time is in discussion, is still a separate entity to a country not a member of it, prompting discourse that rests or relies on othering the political/economic entity that it may be at that

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<sup>1</sup> Sean Hanley, 'Could Brexit lead to Frexit – or Czexit?' (Dr Sean's Diary, 2016)  
<<https://drseansdiary.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/could-brexit-lead-to-frexit-or-czexit/>> accessed 20<sup>th</sup> May 2017

time. In displaying this discourse, I intend to show the similarities that occur when Eurosceptic language is used in relation to democratic and economic arguments

Therefore, in order to flesh out this hypothesis, I will analyse the party-based Euroscepticism during the Czech accession spanning from 2002 until their eventual accession. For the UK case, it shall span between 1970 and 1975. In the attempt to validate the hypothesis, an overview of the development of debate surrounding Europe, before the accession, will be outlined to give context to the period in question. When analysing the domestic Eurosceptic debate, only the principle political parties of the left and right side of the political spectrum will be analysed for both the UK and the Czech Republic accession periods. During the accession period for both countries, I also intend to show how, for the most part, public or populist Euroscepticism does little to affect party based Euroscepticism. The Czech accession will start by focussing on the development of the main political parties' issues on Europe, to be eventually confronted in the parliamentary elections and subsequent accession referendums. When looking at the UK accession case study, I will also give a, brief, account of the series of major events leading up to the case study period. After both of these have been concluded I will focus on the contemporary party-based Eurosceptical nature of both countries respectively, as they are then able, at this stage, to be comparable on an even playing field. This are will once again focus on purely the Eurosceptical language used by either Eurosceptic parties, or Eurosceptic members of certain political parties. For the final two case studies of both countries, the party based Euroscepticism will not be confined to solitarily the mains tram parties of the right and left.

## Conceptualisation

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Euroscepticism, or as it was known in its original form EU-scepticism, is a relatively new field that has been embarked upon to be conceptualised. Since the initiation of the European project, the EU has developed from what was originally a trading union to a political union, and with the constant shifting/expanding of borders and the creation of multi-layered institutions with different responsibilities, the emergence of critiquing has been until recently, loosely defined. Susan Milner points towards the roots of the term, Euroscepticism, arising in British political discourse.<sup>2</sup>

Milner goes on to quote the Oxford Dictionary definition as a person who is opposed to increasing the powers of the European Union.<sup>3</sup> However, Euroscepticism in broad terms can mean anything from outright principled opposition against the European project as a whole, to embracing the EU and the values it represents however having slight criticisms of how the union can or could be improved. Euroscepticism can be multifaceted and it is this grey area that lies between the two positions that Taggart describes as ‘opposition to and support for the EU are rarely either binary or absolute’.<sup>4</sup> It is worth making explicit that it may be binary or absolute in some instances, for example where one may share a close affinity with the core values of the EU and actively advocate for deeper and wider integration. This position may lie closer towards a Europhilic definition. On the other hand, one may also be entirely hostile to the whole idea of an eventual United States of the European Union and any steps of deepening and widening towards it. This is closer towards a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic stance, explained further along. Further ambiguity lies with defining Euroscepticism for example Susan Milner describes Euroscepticism as ‘a person who is opposed to increasing powers to the European Union’<sup>5</sup> though she is using an English Oxford Dictionary definition in a work published in 2000, albeit by this point there existed a more refined formulation posed by Taggart, stating ‘Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’.<sup>6</sup> Catharina Sørensen gives broad definition stating that Euroscepticism is ‘a sentiment of disapproval – reaching a certain degree and durability – directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular policy areas or developments’.<sup>7</sup> Whilst Sørensen, gives a definition in the context of public Euroscepticism, all definitions in the field, Milner’s not included, contain three common denominators. The first is opposition to the EU, the second is

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<sup>2</sup> Susan Milner, ‘Introduction: A Healthy Scepticism?’ [2000] JEI 1

<sup>3</sup> (Milner, 2000)

<sup>4</sup> Paul Taggart, ‘A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems’ [1998] EJPR 363

<sup>5</sup> (Milner, 2000)

<sup>6</sup> (Taggart, 1998)

<sup>7</sup> Catharina Sørensen, ‘Love me Love me not a typology of public Euroscepticism’ [2008] SEI 4



the context of this opposition being entirely against the EU as a whole and the third is the context of opposition towards certain aspects of the EU with an element of degree-sim relating between the last two.

One of the first works in the field aiming to conceptualise the term Eurosceptic, is produced by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. Their work starts with a presupposition that with the development of Europe and the creation novel institutions and complex processes *inter alia*, there can lie debate, discourse and division giving rise to contestation and opposition.<sup>8</sup> In an attempt to nuance the understanding of different varieties of opposition, Euroscepticism is divided into two camps. The first being **Hard Eurosceptic**. This consists of maintaining a hard-line approach to Euroscepticism, that is, having principled objection to European integration into the EU based on a conflict of deeply held values. The description given is that the EU is counter to certain values held by hard Eurosceptics, such as the EU being too capitalist or socialist.<sup>9</sup> The second is classified as **Soft Eurosceptic**. Soft Euroscepticism is compatible with expressing support for the union, however still having constructive feedback on the way in which the union operates. This is then manifested into a further two classifications. Policy Euroscepticism and National interest Euroscepticism. The former consists of opposition to measures designed to deepen the union, the introduction of the Euro for example. The latter involves defending national interests in the context of the EU.<sup>10</sup> The negotiation of the UK rebate due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) having a disproportionate negative effect on British farmers could be an example. The differentiation between hard and soft Euroscepticism posed by Szczerbiak and Taggart is widely used in Eurosceptic literature however it is contested for its vagueness. Cass Mudde and Petr Kopecky contest that the two-dimensional formulation as too broad. They argue that any disagreement with the EU can be included as well as a blurring between hard and soft should hard Eurosceptics be identified by their principled opposition to the EU in its *current form*.<sup>11</sup> This is also concurred by Chris Flood as he expands,

‘For example, the hard category blurs the important distinction between groups which argue that their country should be (more or less) outside the EU and those which argue for a return to the status quo ante of treaty provisions which pertained prior to some modification which the groups find unacceptable. It does not follow that the latter will join the former if they do not succeed in their campaign for revision.’<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Aleks Szczerbiak & Paul Taggart, ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’ [2001] SEI

<sup>9</sup> (Aleks Szczerbiak, 2001)

<sup>10</sup> (Aleks Szczerbiak, 2001)

<sup>11</sup> Cas Mudde and Petr Kopecky, ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’ [2002] EUP 297

<sup>12</sup> Chris Flood, ‘Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept’ (UACES 32<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference, Belfast, 2<sup>nd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> September)

Kopecky and Mudde provide an alternative two-dimensional model, specific and diffuse support. Diffuse support relates to being in support of the general ideas of European integration. Specific support relates to the general practice of European integration.<sup>13</sup> These two terms are then contrasted with another two-dimensional formation, EU-optimist and EU-pessimist. EU-optimists are anywhere from satisfied to optimistic about the development of the EU, yet it is still possible to be an optimist whilst having a disagreement with a certain policy. EU-pessimists see the direction of EU development as negative due to its major deviation from its founding ideas, but as they still maintain an affinity with the core principles, they can still hope the EU changes in line with their ideas.<sup>14</sup> Both of these two-dimensional models are then formulated into a table as seen below.

Support for European Integration			
Support		EUROPHILE	EUROPHOBE
For	<b>EU-OPTIMIST</b>	Euroenthusiast	Europragmatist
EU	<b>EU-PESSIMIST</b>	Euroscptic	Eurorejects <sup>15</sup>

Flood critiques the model the treating the ideology in a reductive way which is an interesting criticism he has used for this formulation, yet not for the hard/soft formulation which accounts for nuance arguably much less than that of Kopecky and Mudde. Flood constructs his own typology which has six formulations that give a tighter specification of positions<sup>16</sup> as opposed to the fluidity of the previous two mentioned. The first is an EU rejectionist. This constitutes positions opposed to either membership or participation in an institution or policy. EU revisionist is the second type. This is a position that advocates for the return to the state of affairs of before major treaty revisions regarding the entire EU or certain policies. The minimalist approach encapsulates the position of accepting the current for the EU is in however resistant to further integration of the structure or a particular policy area. Gradualists take the position of supporting further integration, overall or, in specific policy areas, however this must be done incrementally in a well thought out manner. Reformists, as described, are proponents of reform in a constructive fashion emphasising the need to particular improvements in specific areas. Finally, maximalists favour the continuation of integration at a quick rate, of the overall structure or specific policy areas.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> (Mudde & Kopecky, 2002)

<sup>14</sup> (Mudde & Kopecky, 2002)

<sup>15</sup> (Mudde & Kopecky, 2002)

<sup>16</sup> (Flood, 2002)

<sup>17</sup> (Flood, 2002)

Vasilopoulou also provides a formulation in respect to variations of right wing opposition to the EU, based on a three-part model of ideology towards the European Union. The first of these is labelled as a rejecting Eurosceptic, which constitutes as someone who is principledly against European integration arguing that all policies should be handled domestically. The second term, conditional Euroscepticism, covers parties who regard multilateral cooperation for Europe as beneficial to nation states however, are against any formation towards a unified union. National sovereignty, for ‘conditionals’ is the tipping point which is considered as a step too far. There is an acceptance of a confederal approach to cooperation however oppose the idea of integration and advocate for an intergovernmental approach, implying a somewhat reformist attitude underlying the conditional approach. The final typology in reference to right wing EU opposition is the compromising approach. Contrasting with the previous two approached described, compromisers are in favour of integration and concede that certain powers must be absolved to the EU, at the EU level.<sup>18</sup> All types are based and differentiated on a threefold model of principle, practice and future displayed in a table identical to that constructed by Vasilopoulou.

**PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION<sup>19</sup>**

	Rejecting	Conditional	Compromising
<b>PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRATION/COOPERATION (WILLINGNESS OF COOPERATION AT EU MULTILATERAL LEVEL)</b>	Against	In favour	In favour
<b>PRACTICE OF INTEGRATION/COOPERATION (INSTITUTIONAL POLICY + STATUS QUO)</b>	Against	Against	In favour
<b>FUTURE OF INTEGRATION/COOPERATION (DEEPENING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION)</b>	Against	Against	Against

<sup>18</sup> Sofia Vasilpoulou, ‘Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right’ [2009] JCER 3

<sup>19</sup> (Vasilopoulou, 2009)

The evolving of typologies originating from the two-dimensional approach proposed and used by Szczerbiak and Taggart have seen to account for the grey area between the hard and soft formulation. This sliding scale in the grey area to account for nuances is visualised best in the table presented above. 3

Therefore, as Vasilopoulou states, a vagueness exists regarding the term Euroscepticism as scholars as of yet are to concur on an agreed definition, as trying to pin down an absolute definition on a fluid-like phenomenon is troublesome. The problems encountered when broadly defining the phenomenon have seen misclassifications of Eurosceptic positions and definitions narrow in nature may see certain Eurosceptics not Eurosceptic enough. For the following work, the agreed definition of Euroscepticism will be adapted from the reformulation that Taggart and Szczerbiak had refined, following the shortcomings of their original definition where Euroscepticism included EU membership. Therefore, hard Euroscepticism is classified as ‘principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, based on the ceding or transfers of powers to supranational institutions like that of the EU’.<sup>20</sup> Soft Euroscepticism shall be taken to mean where there is not a principled objection to EU integration or the transferring of powers to a supranational body such as the EU, however there is opposition to EU’s current or future planned trajectory, based on a further extension of powers that the EU is planning to make.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Petr Kaniok and Vlastimil Havlik, ‘Populism and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic: Meeting Friends or Passing By?’ (RJE, 2016) 20

<sup>21</sup> (Kaniok & Havlík, 2016)

## 1. Czech Accession Case study

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### **‘Czech Republic and the EU: The Marriage of Convenience, Not of Love’<sup>22</sup>**

The following case study is centred around the Czech accession into the EU. The time frame for which this analysis will examine spans between 2001 and until the referendum on accession, paying special attention to the preamble of the Czech accession. The lens through which this time period is analysed will focus on a party-based approach specifying on certain political actors where it is deemed necessary.

Opposition to Europe as a phenomenon in the Czech Republic is, compared with other European states such as the UK, a relatively young issue. This is largely in part due to the Czech Republic’s recent relatively young affiliation with Europe given its independence in 1993 and accession negotiations beginning on 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1996, merely two decades ago. Interestingly enough, since the Czech Republic’s gaining of independence as a sovereign state in 1993, the Klaus led government gave priority to joining the OECD after the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josef Zieleniec, signed a pact on the 28<sup>th</sup> November 1995 in Paris with OECD general secretary Jean-Claude Paye<sup>23</sup> giving the Czech Republic the status as the first post-communist country to join the OECD, which took effect on the 21<sup>st</sup> December 1995.<sup>24</sup> The reasoning behind bringing to light the issue of OECD accession is not to illustrate the importance of an OECD membership in the Czech Republic, but to convey the lack of urgency regarding their future membership of the EU by the governing elite at that time, the centre-right Civic Democrats.

The 2002 Czech parliamentary elections were the last elections before EU accession and saw the election, by majority, of the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD) to government having to form a coalition with the liberal-Christian Democrat and Freedom Union coalition.<sup>25</sup> Klaus’s Civic Democrats did achieve the second highest vote share achieving 41 seats in the parliament, maintaining a Eurosceptic chance in their manifesto. Of all the political parties campaigning for the highest vote share, two parties in particular stick out of the woodwork regarding the issue of Europe, the Civic Democrats and the Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia. The former on the right side of the political spectrum and the latter towards the far left.

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<sup>22</sup> Vaclav Klaus, ‘Czech Republic and the EU: The Marriage of Convenience, Not of Love’ (Vaclav Klaus) <<https://www.klaus.cz/clanky/567>> accessed 1<sup>st</sup> May 2017

<sup>23</sup> Permanent Delegation of the Czech Republic to the OECD in Paris, ‘Accession of the Czech Republic to OECD’ (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic*, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2015) <[http://www.mzv.cz/oecd.paris/en/the\\_czech\\_republic\\_in\\_the\\_oecd/accession\\_of\\_the\\_czech\\_republic\\_to\\_the.html](http://www.mzv.cz/oecd.paris/en/the_czech_republic_in_the_oecd/accession_of_the_czech_republic_to_the.html)> accessed 30<sup>th</sup> April 2017

<sup>24</sup> OECD, ‘Czech Republic and the OECD’ (OECD) <<http://www.oecd.org/czech/czech-republic-and-oecd.htm>> Accessed 30<sup>th</sup> April 2017

<sup>25</sup> Sean Hanley, ‘Europe and the Czech Parliament Elections of June 2002’ (EPERN, 2002)

## 1.1 ODS - The Civic Democrats

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The Civic Democrats occupy the centre-right position in the Czech party system. Comparisons have been made likening the Civic Democrats to the British Conservative party. Klaus' admiration of the Western right wing party lead him experiment with the idea of creating a Czech equivalent, at least in name. However, amongst lower echelons of the party, the name wasn't received whole heartedly, and as a result was the birth of the Civic Democrats, representing Czech conservatism.<sup>26</sup> Since their inception, the Civic Democrats have consistently affirmed their position towards joining the EU, however have not shied away from a constructive critique of how certain aspects of the EU could be streamlined.

ODS during the early 1990's construct anti-integrationist rhetoric of the European Union, doing so, within an overall willingness of acceptance to the EU. The leader described the EU as overregulated and inefficient however the party still maintained a viewpoint of supporting accession as a key priority for foreign policy.<sup>27</sup> Specifically Klaus referred to EU institutions as too bureaucratic, and too economically interventionist and Klaus' evaluation stated that the EU had departed from its original economic goals in an attempt to develop 'unrealistic political ambitions.'<sup>28</sup> This stance was declared early on in the premiership of the Civic Democrats however it is from this starting position that the party's' position on Europe started to develop and evolve into a *Eurorealist* position by the time of the 2002 parliamentary elections.

Gregor and Mackova give an analysis of Klaus' speeches, and similarly to Hanley, they refer to his critique regarding the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, or as referred to by Klaus, the 'Maastricht Stew'.<sup>29</sup> Hanley notes that Klaus' critique referred to the developing dominating nature of the European Union and its perceived ambitions to engulf the whole of the continent by creating a federalised 'United States of the European Union' super-state, rivalling that of the Unites States of America (USA).<sup>30</sup> As previously mentioned, in spite of the critique about the structure of the EU, the Civic Democrats were still an advocate for membership. This was premised on two perceived advantages for the Czech Republic's accession, the first related to the economic advantages that came with membership. The second was the contention that the EU was symbolic of a standard held by developed countries. However, this was a position shared by all

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<sup>26</sup> Sean Hanley, 'The New Right in the New Europe? Unravelling The Ideology of "Czech Thatcherism"' (JPI, 1998)

<sup>27</sup>Sean Hanley, 'Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic' in Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiaks (eds), *Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism : Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys* (OUP, 2008)

<sup>28</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>29</sup> Gregor and Mackova, 'Euroscepticism the Czech way: An analysis of Václav Klaus' speeches' (EJC, 2015) 404

<sup>30</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

the political parties during that period, bar the Communist Party. Mackova and Gregor elaborate regarding the context of a Klaus speech and how he often would use the phrases ‘we must’ and ‘we must not’ to personify his own position on the EU in the context of the Czech Republic as a whole. For example, ‘We must not allow itself to dissolve in Europe like a sugar cube in a teacup,’<sup>31</sup> or, recycling the same analogy, to describe the EU as a dilemma of ‘how to be European without dissolving like a lump of sugar in a cup of coffee.’<sup>32</sup> *Prima facie*, the main differentiation between the quotes is the choice of hot beverage, however, when the quote is analysed in the context of how it is framed there is a clear distinction. Both of the quotes appear to have an implicit wanting of the nation as a sovereign state when the mention of a dissolving sugar cube is referenced, however the usage of the phrase ‘we must not allow’ in the first quotation is closer towards the absolute of maintaining sovereignty, a zero-sum game if you will. The second quote on the other hand propounds more of a cautionary tone in the sense that the ‘sugar cube’ can be insoluble when dropped into the coffee, it is tacitly suggesting that slight adjustments may be made to the coffee to accommodate for the sugar cube. Withdrawing from beverage analogies, the first quote dates from 1994 whereas the second, slightly modified analogy, dates from 1998. The subtleties regarding the language used in the four-year gap between the speeches points towards a hardening of a Eurosceptic position, from an originally soft Eurosceptic stance. The main difference in Klaus’s standing as a politician between these two-time periods is that the first quote is referenced at a time where Klaus was in office and the second quote relates to Klaus after he left office. Whilst this is one example showing the hardening of Klaus’s Eurosceptic position, the quotes demonstrate the shift of position that occurred as Klaus left office, perhaps giving him agency to lean further towards his actual stance on European integration among member states. It poses difficulty to label Klaus as a hard Eurosceptic when given the context of the above quotations, yet he steers away from the label by advocating the attractiveness of Europe overall.<sup>33</sup>

Hanley also observes the considerably more vociferous change of position after the 1997 election which saw the Civic Democrats lose office.<sup>34</sup> Hanley outlines the change of position as originally ODS’s programmatic documents were consistently favourable towards accession into the EU yet still managed to incorporate mild criticism on three fronts.<sup>35</sup> The first relates to the changed composition of the EU, that is, the novel political ambitions instigated by the EU undermining the economic basis for which the European project initially intended to serve. Grouped with this critique is the collectivist nature that the EU represents

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<sup>31</sup> (Gregor & Macková , 2015)

<sup>32</sup> Mats Braun, ‘Understanding Klaus The Story of Czech Eurorealism’ (EPIN, 2009)

<sup>33</sup> (Gregor & Macková , 2015)

<sup>34</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008) 256

<sup>35</sup> Sean Hanley, ‘From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right’ (EEPS, 2004) 513, 518

with its socialist structure dominated by political elites.<sup>36</sup> The second critique, is as mentioned before, the direct threat to national sovereignty and any further integration that can or may arise. This point is also tangential to the critique of the European project being a reflection of German domination.<sup>37</sup> Predicting Klaus's Euroscepticism may have been possible as the proposition for a Visegrad group was also rejected by the ODS and Klaus, as both saw the Visegrad Group as an interval society to bridge the East/West gap. There is also a historical aspect of the Czech experience that can be drawn on as Hanley states:

Klaus additionally argued, the historical experience of Central European societies of repeated domination by larger, centralised, supranational bureaucratic regimes - first under the multi-national dynastic empires and later under Nazi rule and Soviet hegemony – had left them acutely sensitive to the dangers of such over-centralisation inherent in the current European project.<sup>38</sup>

It is argued that these historical legacies are something that the Czech Republic as well as other countries in the region, Poland and Slovakia for example, have to reconcile with as they strive for European inclusion. The time between the separation of Czechoslovakia and the accession process for both countries to the European Union had been very brief. The conflict of interest arises when the Czech nationals attempt at rediscovering their national identity yet participating in European integration. In trying to maintain this historical balance, the Europeanisation of the Benes Decrees occurred during the 2002 election, however this is to be elaborated further along.

Klaus's unapologetic nature of an increasingly gradualist strident opposition to European integration was not met without disapproval as Hanley enunciates the internal division that had developed within the party manifesting in issues such as 'the ODS position, including its European policy, and aggravated tensions with its junior coalition partners, the social-market oriented Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the free market Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). Discontent with Klaus's leadership grew within his own party'.<sup>39</sup> Continuing on, until November 1997, a division in the party occurred due the growing tensions finally germinating in the form of a party financing scandal leading towards a collapse in the Klaus government. The junior coalition partners of the Christian Democrats and the Civic Democratic Alliance sought to withdraw their minority partnership in government as a result. Subsequently, this led to a split within the Civic Democrats causing members who left who form a new party called the Freedom Union. Klaus, then

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<sup>36</sup> (Hanley, From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right, 2004)

<sup>37</sup> (Hanley, From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right, 2004)

<sup>38</sup> (Hanley, From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right, 2004)

<sup>39</sup> (Hanley, From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right, 2004)



on the defensive, claimed to have no knowledge of the activities occurring. Klaus, using his stature within the party, was able to mobilise ODS activists, which resulted in them resisting pressure for his dismissal.

The 1998 elections the subsequent year saw the Social Democrats achieve the largest vote share in the country of 32.31% whereas the Civic Democrats came second, achieving 27.75%.<sup>40</sup> Although there was a small majority, Klaus allowed the Social Democrats to form a minority government based on a written ‘Opposition Agreement’ which detailed that domestic political instability wouldn’t affect preparations for accession.<sup>41</sup>

## 1.2 KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

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The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia represents the (far) left Eurosceptic party in the political landscape in the Czech Republic. Unlike the majority of former Communist Parties in Europe, after the dissolution of communism, the Communist Party did not reform themselves into a Social Democratic political party like many other communist transformation parties, as there was internal party debate surrounding the issue of name change. The conflict arising of whether or not to change the name of the party was subject to a referendum within the party held in 1992. Progressive factions within the party, namely the Democratic Left, consisting of a younger demographic, called for a referendum to decide on the party keeping its name or to change it. This was due to escalating inner conflicts amongst factions within the party as reformers encountered friction from the older, more conservative, communists who had decided to rail against the progressive agenda by becoming even more dogmatic in their views. The Democratic Left faction that called for the referendum were defeated in the election as an overwhelming majority vote of 75.94% decided to uphold the Communist Party name. The resistance to name change is one of the legacies the Communist Party holds that differentiates itself from other reformed post-communist successor political parties in the region. The Communist Party, after 1989, decided to opt against an ideological reform and took the approach of ‘leftist retreat’, also described as orthodox communism.<sup>42</sup> The party maintained a dogmatic approach or some regard as becoming even more entrenched in their beliefs radiating a perception of a radical or extremist party. The party also maintains some party traditions, for example the publishing of a Communist Party newspaper to its loyal membership base.

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<sup>40</sup> Volby, ‘Elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament held on 19 - 20 June 1998’ (1998)

<sup>41</sup> (Hanley, *From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right*, 2004)

<sup>42</sup> Dan Hough and Vladimír Handl, ‘The post-communist left and the European Union: The Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)’ (CPCS, 2004) 319, 325

Throughout the 1990's polling shows that KSCM support fluctuated from 10% to 14% of the electorate.<sup>43</sup> Electorally, the Communist Party is considered relatively successful as gaining seats in the parliament and retaining them is a positive, considering the decision not to enact major reforms of the party and maintaining a consistency in their orthodox communist ideology led to the membership base shrinking considerably. However, it is this membership base that signals a main threat to the relevance, and existence of the Communist Party. The KSCM is posed with the problem of an aging voter base, as the party appeals to the older generation whose golden years may reside in the communist area. Handl and Hough point out that:

The electoral successes of the KSCM have not prevented considerable discussion on the party's future political strategy within the EU. The KSCM badly needs to develop a political agenda that can appeal to younger sections of the electorate— and the accession of the Czech Republic offers clear opportunities for a programmatic transformation that may facilitate this. This is not, however, a strategy that finds acceptance with all KSCM members.<sup>44</sup>

The authors go on to explain how debate has fostered around using the loyal membership base to spread the traditional message of the party to mobilise support. However, factions of the party realise this may not be enough, or even the right approach in attempt to generate electoral success. Zuzka Rujbrova, the Deputy Chairman advocated for changes in the stereotype, the image and the language, all of which have been identified with their history.<sup>45</sup> An internal struggle may develop here as one of the party's main priorities was to preserve a similar ideological and social communist set of ideals and convictions, although they both don't necessarily imply mutual exclusivity. Regardless, this can pose quite a challenge for the Communist Party as the party maintains relative homogeneity. The party is underrepresented in the field of female representation and ethnic minorities, which does not showcase the party in the best light in terms of diversity. The main shortcoming of the party, and the potential reason for its possible future demise, is the failure to conjure up grassroots support to appeal the younger electorate. Playing to the tune of EU sensitivities is something that could mobilise support for the party amongst younger voters in the electorate. However, the party is in a constant state of flux which makes it hard to come to an agreed position on particular issues and larger issues affecting society. Cosying towards the EU by giving credence to policies the party is aligned with could have been one potential avenue to appeal to the younger electorate, although the party took a different approach towards the European Union in the initial stages on an independent Czech Republic. Their approach left much room for ambiguity. For example, the programme used by the Communist Party in the 1996 parliamentary elections labelled 'Socialism – A Chance for the future'

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<sup>43</sup> (Handl & Hough, 2004)

<sup>44</sup> (Handl & Hough, 2004)

<sup>45</sup> (Handl & Hough, 2004)

consisted of ten chapters. The issue of the European union did feature in the white paper. Though, it was reduced to a dedicated paragraph under the chapter labelled ‘Peace and Co-operation’. Havlik and Vykoupilova are able to summarise the KSCM’s stance towards Europe.

‘The Communists made very general statements about their position on the form of European integration and the European Union, stating their demands for “a balanced and Democratic European integration” while rejecting any definition of integration which would lead to “subjugation to the interests of supranational capital and world powers, loss of national sovereignty and the social victimization of citizens.”<sup>46</sup>

Three years later in 1999, another leaflet was published labelled ‘Program obnovy’, translating to ‘Recovery program’. Instead of confining the European rhetoric to a single paragraph, on this occasion the issue of Europe is mentioned throughout the leaflet nine times. The white paper advocates for a strong social policy based on requirements of the European Social Charter, a fear of the dissolution of the national culture in the greater context of the ever-growing multicultural European Union, aspirations of modifying local and municipal governments in line with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, developing collective security within the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) to promote peaceful and diplomatic resolutions as a means of preventative measures.<sup>47</sup>

As presented above, both sources show neither a strong opposition to European integration nor an advocacy for integration as a whole, they are presented as general, left-leaning, concerns for national interests which are not, for the most part, disagreeable. When searching for an explicit stance regarding Europe, from 1992 until 1999 it is fairly difficult to find anything that is indicative of the Communist Party’s stance on European integration. Hanley concurs that there has been an absence of up-to-date policy documents for the KSCM’s standpoint on European integration,<sup>48</sup> as a result the views of the party are visible in general statements reflecting something close to a party line. For example, in a discussion paper prepared by a KSCM expert group on European integration, the view is that there is no objection to European integration as the Communist Party views the loss of sovereignty as an inevitability, there is a fear that arises out of the small landlocked state of the Czech Republic within a growing EU.<sup>49</sup>The Communist Party published a

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<sup>46</sup> Vlastimil Havlík and Hana Vykoupilova, ‘Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic’ (2008) 41 CPCS < [http://ac.els-cdn.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/S0967067X08000202/1-s2.0-S0967067X08000202-main.pdf?\\_tid=f6b46cbc-3ef4-11e7-adcb-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1495460929\\_c3f9fdbca49e44ab747bb091db7af90a](http://ac.els-cdn.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/S0967067X08000202/1-s2.0-S0967067X08000202-main.pdf?_tid=f6b46cbc-3ef4-11e7-adcb-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1495460929_c3f9fdbca49e44ab747bb091db7af90a) > accessed 1<sup>st</sup> May 2017

<sup>47</sup> KSCM, ‘Program obnovy’ 5<sup>th</sup> Congress (KSCM, December 1999) <[https://www.kscm.cz/sites/default/files/soubory/Program%20KS%C4%8CM/Program\\_obnovy%20%281999%29%28.pdf](https://www.kscm.cz/sites/default/files/soubory/Program%20KS%C4%8CM/Program_obnovy%20%281999%29%28.pdf)> accessed 1<sup>st</sup> May 2017

<sup>48</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>49</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

manifesto called ‘A better path for our country’ at a December 1999 congress which encapsulates the position of the Communist Party regarding the EU. The manifesto states that the party rejects the current form of the EU, and that Czech membership should be formulated on equitable grounds for the Czech Republic.<sup>50</sup> Further criticisms are also developed by the KSCM of how the EU could represent something closer towards what the communists would consider ideal. These critiques are somewhat more detailed than those mentioned previously. They involve democratising the EU. An example of one of the measures proposed by the party is, a strengthening of the parliament as a means of making the union more democratic in the eyes of the voter. Another example of a KSCM critique is also as similarly idealistic whereby the party would like to see a reduction in the powers of the commission,<sup>51</sup> echoing that of Flood’s EU-reformist conceptualisation.

### 1.3 2002 Parliamentary Elections

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To give an overview of the 2002 elections, the Social Democrats won by achieving 30.20% of the electorate, a drop in support compared with the last election where they achieved 32.32% and have seen their seats reduced from 74 to 70. Whereas ODS achieved 24.47% of the vote,<sup>52</sup> in the previous election ODS achieved 27.74% of the votes and saw a reduction in the number of seats from 63 to 58. The Social Democrats formed a coalition government with the ‘Liberal/Christian-Democratic’ coalition grouping, which had seen a majority government be voted into power, occurring for the first time since 1992. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia saw their highest amount of representation in government, reaching a share of the votes amounting to 18.51% and having 41 seats in parliament out of 200. In comparison with the previous 1998 election that saw the KSCM achieve 24 seats and achieving 11.03% of the electorate, this parliamentary election had been their most successful since the beginning of an independent, democratic Czech Republic. To contrast with ODS, since the first Czech elections of 1992, this had been their least successful election, which begs the question of what had changed between 1998 and 2002 for the Civic Democrats to suffer their worst loss since the inception of the Czech Republic.

As has been previously noted above, Klaus was outspoken with his ideological views of the European Union and this was a position that had become increasingly stringent throughout the course of the 1990’s. Klaus’s candid opinions of the European Union and integration were a reflection on his views and the party’s views, though, as time progressed and Klaus became progressively more critical of the EU, there seems to have developed an ideological gulf between his own views and that of the party’s. Klaus was more

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<sup>50</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>51</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>52</sup> Volby, ‘Election for the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic held on 14. - 15.6.2002’ (2002)

critical and vocal of the European Union than the official party position. The party financing scandal that occurred in 1997 saw the party dynamic slightly altered. Rivalling internal pro-European party members left the party<sup>53</sup> to form the Freedom Union, who decided to embrace the federal governing style of the EU so as to distance themselves from Klaus.<sup>54</sup> The Euroscepticism within the party was coined in a different wording, instead of scepticism, this was replaced by the term ‘realism’. The ‘Eurorealistic’ stance of the party had its foundations laid by Klaus, however the architect of this stance was the Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Jan Zahradil of the Civic Democrats, who was responsible for drafting a white paper named ‘*Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism*’ in 2001 just prior to the election. The notions or critiques presented were adopted into the 2002 election manifesto, albeit in a condensed format.<sup>55</sup>

The ODS manifesto is 23 pages long and addresses ten issues, dedicating two pages to each one. Due to each section being equal in length, there is a suggestion that equal weight is given to each of the ten issues. However, the European Union is confronted as the first issue to be outlined, possibly inferring how important the issue of accession is in relation to the time of when the election is taking place. Concurring with the approved prospect of EU accession and integration, the manifesto starts with the proclamation of membership being an achievable goal, coinciding with the soft Eurosceptic stance of ODS laid out by Klaus previously.

The ODS manifesto states the ‘European Union we see realistically - as a mixture of liberalizing and regulating elements such as a mixture of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making, as a mixture of cooperation, but also a ruthless conflict of interest.’<sup>56</sup> The election manifesto stresses the need for the Czech Republic to have an active role in participation in the future of European integration, explicitly rejecting the formulation of a European superstate. In the same ‘superstate’ vein, the manifesto claims that Eurofederalists make no bones about the direction of the EU moving towards a transnational polity.<sup>57</sup> The manifesto goes on illustrate the dissatisfaction ODS has with domestic debate surrounding the EU before touching on sovereignty, where the manifesto comments on the future European integration as an alignment of all the member states into one legal, political, economic and institutional framework, which has no regard for the distinct differences in identity and national traditions among member states.<sup>58</sup> The manifesto also makes reference to the ODS position on the European Commission and the European Parliament, for which it objects to any measures strengthening the powers of both bodies.<sup>59</sup> Euro adoption in the Czech Republic

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<sup>53</sup> (Braun, Durr, Marek, & Saradin, 2009)

<sup>54</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>55</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>56</sup> (ODS, Program 2002, 2002)

<sup>57</sup> (ODS, Program 2002, 2002)

<sup>58</sup> (ODS, 2002 Programme, 2002)

<sup>59</sup> (ODS, Program 2002, 2002)

is also a topic of conversation as ODS believe that this is a process that needs to be delayed as the Czech Republic is still relatively premature<sup>60</sup> as an independent nation, should the Euro be introduced in the short term. The party go on to delineate in the manifesto a complete rejection of any tax harmonisation plan by the EU. The idea is that countries with higher labour costs and richer social systems could use the tax unification as a means of eliminating competition by forcing countries that aren't currently as prosperous to their level. Further criticisms are also directed towards NATO, as the party manifesto outlines that any efforts to form something resembling a European Defence army would, on the one hand, ultimately lead to the weakening of NATO, and on the other, a weakening of transatlantic ties with the U.S.A.<sup>61</sup> The two-page spread dedicated to the EU concludes with the points that the EU is a vehicle for its' member states to realise their own goals and national interests. These include political sovereignty, a clearly defined national identity, independence, security of the Czech Republic and reduced red tape on trade *inter alia*. The section regarding the EU is rounded off with accusations of protectionism referring to Europe as a 'Fortress', and that it seeks to be defined alongside other economic trading blocs, such as the U.S.A.<sup>62</sup>

Where ODS had experienced the worst decline in support of any major party since the formulation of the Czech Republic, the KSCM, a far left fringe party to an extent, had seen its most successful election since 1992 reaching 18.51% of the vote. Be that as it may, this can be hypothesised in terms of the domestic context. Sean Hanley synthesises this in terms of popular dissatisfaction with the political hierarchy due to the two main parties, supposed adversaries, having cartel-like behaviour due to the 'Opposition Agreement' signed by both parties. Therefore, the success of the Communist Party is defined in terms of protest votes<sup>63</sup> coming from both left and right sides of the political spectrum due to the opposition agreement.

Turning the attention towards the Communist Party, there is a stark contrast with that of ODS regarding their 2002 parliamentary election manifesto. The first contrast between the two Eurosceptic parties is regarding the difficulty entailed when trying to obtain the KSCM manifesto. Where it has been used and referenced by previous academic articles, it is no longer available on the party website whereas ODS's manifesto was retrieved with relative ease. The second difference, in relation to Europe, is the lack of any coherent passages in relation to Europe. The manifesto, labelled, '*With the People, for the people*',<sup>64</sup> did not confront the issue of Europe as ODS had done so with a heavy hand. Havlik and Vykoupilova expand by stating:

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<sup>60</sup> (ODS, 2002 Programme, 2002)

<sup>61</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>62</sup> (ODS, Program 2002, 2002)

<sup>63</sup> (Hanley, Europe and the Czech Parliamentary Elections of June 2002, 2002)

<sup>64</sup> (Vlastimil Havlik, 2008)

The question of entry and future role of the Czech Republic in the European Union received only five paragraphs in the subchapter titled “We Support the National Interest Only in a Secure World”, which is part of the chapter “There Is No Freedom, Justice or Security Without a Deepening of Democracy and Autonomy”. KSCM goes into more detail about its demands for possible admission, including the rejection of a transition period.<sup>65</sup>

The issue of Europe was downplayed in the white paper and instead the election manifesto centred around, some may say unsurprisingly, increasing the role of government in society. Issues brought to the forefront were focussing on the need to increase social spending coupled with the position of expanding public services.<sup>66</sup> The five paragraphs devoted to Europe were far from wholesome as they were squeezed into half a page.<sup>67</sup> Given that between the years of 1997 and 2002 the party failed to publish any extensive papers or documents in relation to their position on the EU, it is hard to pinpoint where the party, as a whole, stands in relation, not just to the EU and integration, but specifically on certain aspects of integration, the adoption of the Euro for example. Due to the lack of materials, the stance of the KSCM has had to be drawn from meticulous statement made by party members.<sup>68</sup>

#### 1.4 2003 Accession Referendum

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The Czech accession referendum, would see for the first time since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a Czech reaffirmation towards the western sphere by joining the European Union. Below is a table showing the results of the referendum, obtained from the election statistics webpage situated on the Czech Statistical Office website.

<b>People Entitled to vote<sup>69</sup></b>	<b>Envelopes Distributed</b>	<b>Turnout as a percentage</b>	<b>Envelopes Cast</b>	<b>Valid votes total</b>	<b>Number of YES votes</b>	<b>Number of NO votes</b>
8 259 525	4 560 399	55.21	4 557 960	4 457 206	3 446 758	1 010 448

As is easily discernible, the voter turnout represents just over half of the people, who are eligible to vote in the Czech Republic, 55.21%, which doesn't boast an overwhelming majority keen on European integration. Even though those who voted won by an overwhelming majority of 77.33%. The low voter turnout may allude to a disillusionment between the public and the political party. To further elaborate, the low voter

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<sup>65</sup> (Vlastimil Havlik, 2008)

<sup>66</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>67</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>68</sup> (Hanley, Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, 2008)

<sup>69</sup> Czech Statistical Office, 'Referendum on Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union held on 13-14 June 2003' (Volby, 2003) <<http://www.volby.cz/pls/ref2003/re13?xjazyk=EN>> accessed 7<sup>th</sup> May

turnout signifies the Eurosceptic discourse that political parties engage in, falls on deaf ears. This is almost close to a confirmation to signify that debate surrounding Euroscepticism and European integration, in the Czech Republic, is not a response to any populist movement. Furthermore, it can provide an inclination that the Eurosceptic discourse is for the most part an ideological phenomenon, invoked by political parties. Whether their arguments/rhetoric is absorbed by the public can be difficult to prove, though higher voter turnout in the accession referendum would at least provide a signpost towards the right direction.

### *The public*

To put the referendum into context between the public and the polity, a Eurobarometer survey was conducted around June and July of 2003 and sampled 1000 people within the Czech Republic. Regarding the Czech Republic, the data is somewhat varied amongst the sample data. For example, the Czech Republic recorded a 15% increase in the amount of people willing to adopt the single currency as a fully-fledged member of the European Union (68% for, 21% against and 11% undecided).<sup>71</sup> Contrasting the adoption of the Euro with ‘The perceived role the EU in people’s daily life in five years’, the amount of people who think the EU will play a less important role or the same role in their life is higher than the proportion of those who expect a more important role for the EU, that being 45% versus 44%.<sup>72</sup> When confronted with the question of ‘what would be the desired role of the EU in their daily life in five years (answers either: more important, same role, less important) the Czech respondents were 48% in favour of the EU to play a more important role in their lives, ranking 12<sup>th</sup> out of 13 countries asked, with Romanian respondents topping the poll voting 79% in favour of EU involvement.<sup>73</sup> The table below depicts fluctuations in polling data regarding the Czech Republic over the course of two Eurobarometer polls, the first column is from the latest survey and the second column is to show the percentage change from a previous Eurobarometer survey. As is apparent, each aspect asked about the Europe delineated in the rows below, has shown a

	Czech Republic	
One Single Currency <sup>70</sup>	68	+15
Common and Foreign Policy	60	+4
Common Defence Policy	79	+3
Enlargement of the EU	70	+4
EU Solves unhandled matters	62	+9
Resignation of Commissioners	69	+13
Teaching children how the EU works	74	+10

systematic increase in every area, ranging from an increase of 3% to 15%. Whilst the polling data only sampled 1000 people, the impression given is that Czech citizens are seemingly more favourable towards the European Union and further integration

<sup>70</sup> Eurobarometer 2003.3 Public Opinion Survey B22

<sup>71</sup> (Union, 2003) P10

<sup>72</sup> (Union, 2003)

<sup>73</sup> (Union, 2003)P19



towards the union, to the extent that Czechs want to see it implemented in schools.

### *The parties*

The 2003 referendum campaign on accession to the EU was an opportunity for parties to adopt increasingly better defined stances on the question of EU membership, as well as the future development of the EU and the Czech Republic's role in it.<sup>74</sup> The campaign itself was, to an extent, fragmented. The official 'Yes' campaign was run by the Communication Strategy Section (OKS) of the Czech Foreign Ministry. Whilst the Civic Democrats are classified in the state of art as soft Eurosceptics, the underlying implication is that whilst you maintain criticisms of the structures of the European Union, the bottom line is that the position is pro-accession, whilst still holding critical beliefs. This description is consistent with the 'Eurorealist' position developed by the party. The party leaflet for the campaign, 'Když do EU tak s ODS', roughly translates into 'When in the EU, with the ODS'. The leaflet as whole has an undertone similar to, 'we should join, but...'. For example, the leaflet starts off with the phrase that the EU is not a ticket to paradise. The ODS's leaflet denounces the CSSD, and accuses them of obscuring negative aspects of EU membership such as the initial years of membership would have the Czech Republic paying more to the EU than it would receive.<sup>75</sup> The ODS also pre-emptively lays blame on the coalition already should the accession be rejected. The leaflet refers to the signature 'threat to nation and statehood' ODS critique that they have characterised for themselves. This is linked with a criticism that it may be sufficient for larger European countries to absolve decision making and responsibilities to the centralised EU, however this is not acting in the interest of smaller countries.<sup>76</sup> Other familiar criticisms are reiterated such as the EU being in competition with the U.S.A which would have all diverse member states aligned in a single political union to rival the U.S.A. Despite the two-paged leaflet dedicated to criticising the EU, it concludes by stating 'That's why we want to join the EU. We want to be active co-creators of the future form of European integration, not passive recipients of what we invent for others'<sup>77</sup> avoiding the categorization as hard Eurosceptic party.

The leader at the time, Miroslav Topolánek stated during the campaign that the arguments in favour of accession only narrowly outweigh the arguments against.<sup>78</sup> The campaign itself was also unconventional as there was no organised national or regional campaigning aimed at the voters.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore ODS did not

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<sup>74</sup> Michael Baun and others, 'The Europeanization of Czech Politics: The Political Parties and the EU Referendum' (JCMS 2006) <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00622.x/epdf>> accessed 7<sup>th</sup> May

<sup>75</sup> ODS, 'Když do EU tak s ODS' (2003) <[http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/leaflet\\_EU.pdf](http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/leaflet_EU.pdf)> accessed 15<sup>th</sup> May 2017

<sup>76</sup> (ODS, EU Leaflet, 2003)

<sup>77</sup> (ODS, EU Leaflet, 2003)

<sup>78</sup> Sean Hanley, 'A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003' (WEP, 2004) <<http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/15031/1/15031.pdf>> accessed 18<sup>th</sup> April

<sup>79</sup> (Hanley, A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003, 2004)

explicitly endorse voting yes in the referendum until two hours before polling had started on the 13<sup>th</sup> June where the architect behind the Eurorealist doctrine adopted by the Civic Democrats, Jan Zahradil, had issued a press release in an attempt to influence voters by stating that the Czech Republic could only defend their national interests when inside the EU.<sup>80</sup> The ODS logic was that, as described above, its voter base was overwhelmingly in favour of joining the European Union, and that the ‘Yes’ campaigners were framing the EU in objective terms, not to the current form and how it could adversely affect the Czech Republic. Furthermore, internal ODS figures, publicly opposed accession which seemed to have been acquiesced by the Topolanek. Similarly, Klaus, the newly elected President, continued his flirtation with the line separating hard and soft Eurosceptics by never advocating to vote Yes and not stating his position of how he would vote.<sup>81</sup> Making comments such as there being no alternative, and when interviewed by German press, stating the metaphor of a mutually beneficial arranged marriage, not predicated on love. Klaus also echoed the distress regarding the surrendering of national sovereignty.<sup>82</sup>

Turning the attention towards the left side of the political spectrum, the Communist Party, whilst uniform on their vehement opposition of NATO, the referendum did not seem to aid the party in coming to a unified position for Europe. Some party members viewed the EU as a tool for German big business to dominate into new markets whereas other party members stated that the EU had favourable socialist and regulatory policies.<sup>83</sup> The KSCM manifesto was named ‘In Support of a Democratic Europe’. Braun *et al* summarise the document by stating that it

Presented the model of an ideal socialist European society while declaring that the actual EU, based on the Maastricht criteria, is far from ideal. The manifesto was full of emotional appeals, clichés and statements such as: ‘we seek – as heirs of the great Teacher of Nations, Jan Amos Comenius to offer his heritage to other nations, the heritage that unites the universal character of culture with the uniqueness and beauty of national specifics and the highest ethical values’<sup>84</sup>

As for the campaigning during the referendum, divisions were witnessed on the public stage where KSCM leaders publicly argued, illustrating the internal divisions the party had during the referendum. As a result, the party delayed an official party position until 8<sup>th</sup> March, where they held a ‘moderate no’ position that was founded in the scrutiny of the CSSD negotiating unfavourable terms, and predicting that the Czech

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<sup>80</sup> (Hanley, A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003, 2004)

<sup>81</sup> (Hanley, A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003, 2004)

<sup>82</sup> (Hanley, A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003, 2004)

<sup>83</sup> (Hanley, A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003, 2004)

<sup>84</sup> (Braun, Durr, Marek, & Saradin, 2009)

Republic was not ready to participate in a single market as well as the fluid unpredictable nature of EU borders.<sup>85</sup>

## 2. British accession case study

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The United Kingdom is the epicentre of the following case study and is limited to the time frame between 1970 and 1975. Similarly to the previous chapter, the following section will analyse the Eurosceptic positions of the two major parties on both sides of the political spectrum, the Conservative party and the Labour party. The previous case study acutely focussed on the Eurosceptic critique being invoked by the ‘the most’ Eurosceptic parties on the left and right. The following case study intends to do the same in relation to the Conservative Party and the Labour Party.

When the UK finally joined the European Community (EC) in 1973 under the Conservative Edward Heath government, this represented another, albeit successful, third attempt to join the EC/ Common Market as it was known then. The first attempt was during 1961 under the Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan and the second attempt under the Labour Prime minister, Harold Wilson during his 1964-1970 stint as Prime Minister. Both applications failed until 1973 under the Edward Heath Conservative government where accession finally occurred. Britain participated in the initial negotiations regarding the EC, however, was then asked to step away when it became clear the UK was not in understanding in relation to the aims of the project. The Treaty of Rome 1957, taking effect in 1958, consisted of originally six members, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Britain was involved in the initial discussion regarding the EC but then had to withdraw from discussions due to a misalignment of ambitions. During the first attempt to join the EC under Macmillan, much emphasis was placed on the fact that it was more of an investigative procedure, to see the potential terms on which Britain *might* join.<sup>86</sup> The second attempt under Labour’s Wilson failed due to Charles De Gaulle’s veto in 1967<sup>87</sup> as he accused Britain of a deep-seated hostility towards European construction and further stated that London had shown a lack of interest in the Common Market and would require a radical transformation.<sup>88</sup>

Harold Wilson’s approach to the second attempt at EC accession before the 1970 election, contrasted greatly than that of Edward Heath’s approach following Heath’s election victory.

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<sup>85</sup> (Hanley, *A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003*, 2004)

<sup>86</sup> Paul Gliddon, ‘The British Foreign Office and Domestic Propaganda on the European Community, 1960-1972’ (CBH 2009) <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13619460802636383>> accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2017

<sup>87</sup> (Gliddon, 2009)

<sup>88</sup> BBC, ‘1967: De Gaulle says ‘non’ to Britain - again’ *BBC* (London, 27<sup>th</sup> November 1967) <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/27/newsid\\_4187000/4187714.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/27/newsid_4187000/4187714.stm)> accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2017

## 2.1 General Election 1970

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Previously mentioned above, this election follows Harold Wilson's failed attempt to start Britain's journey to join the EC. The 1970 general election would see the Conservative Party win the election, achieving a voter share of 46.4% whereas the Labour Party achieved 43% which would see Edward Heath enter Government.

### *The Conservative Manifesto*

When observing the Conservative Party manifesto, paying special attention to the issue of Europe, it appears, on the face of the manifesto that Europe, while still a contentious issue, is not given any great weight. For a lengthy manifesto containing 25 headings divided amongst two sections in the manifesto, Europe is referred to six times, however the penultimate section of the manifesto deals with the EC directly. Of the six mentions, exactly half are in relation to the EC whereas the other three uses of the word 'Europe' are to address different issues in the manifesto. For example, the first non-EC Europe mention, is in a comparative element where the Conservative manifesto is addressing the rate of growth regarding Western Europe, where the manifesto claims that the UK has expanded much more slowly 'than that of any other comparable country in the world.'<sup>89</sup> The second non-EC mention of Europe is in relation to value-added tax (VAT) comparing themselves with Western Europe (again) and Scandinavia. The third and final mention is in relation to the Conservative Party having comparatively the best record in Europe for rising wages and rising living standards.<sup>90</sup>

When finally mentioning the European Economic Community, under the heading 'Programme for a Parliament,' there are several aspirations the manifesto confesses such as: more jobs and higher wages, increased opportunity for men and women to train for better jobs, increasing agriculture production, stopping further nationalisation, reducing income taxes and introducing regional development policies. Finally concluding with a passage stating that 'These policies will strengthen Britain so that we can negotiate with the European Community confident in the knowledge that we can stand on our own if the price is too high.'<sup>91</sup> The implication of the previous quote infers the policies being advocated would help, or at least enhance Britain's' prospects for joining the EU.

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<sup>89</sup> Conservative 1970 election manifesto, 'A Better Tomorrow' (The Conservative Party, 1970) < <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con70.htm> > accessed 25<sup>th</sup> April 2017

<sup>90</sup> (Party, 1970)

<sup>91</sup> (Party, 1970)

However, should the barriers to entry be too high, Heath implies with the statement relating to standing alone, that the UK is willing to not play, an integral part of the European Union, whilst enjoying the benefits in society that his government will achieve, advocated in the manifesto. There is no implication of EC-sceptic rhetoric, but more of a resilience of bargaining position to the soon-to-be-union preceding accession negotiations.

The final two mentions of the European Economic Community are situated within a subheading labelled, 'A Stronger Britain in the world' which rounds off the manifesto before making concluding remarks by disparaging the Labour Party as tax heavy, controlling and restricting. The penultimate section makes the case, that, on the right terms of entry, being a member of the EC would provide immense opportunities.<sup>92</sup> These being economic growth, higher living standards and greater prosperity would occur, when having a larger market.<sup>93</sup> The ensuing paragraph pivots in relation to the Europhilic language of the previous, articulating that the UK

must also recognise the obstacles. There would be short-term disadvantages in Britain going into the European Economic Community which must be weighed against the long-term benefits. Obviously there is a price we would not be prepared to pay. Only when we negotiate will it be possible to determine whether the balance is a fair one, and in the interests of Britain.<sup>94</sup>

From this paragraph onwards, the section within the manifesto continues this cautionary rhetoric by stating that the Conservative Party would only make a commitment to negotiating, and that the party would not finalise any accession discussions that would result in an unfair pairing with the EC. Paying specific attention to the manifesto quote above, it may be construed as a soft Eurosceptic critique for two reasons. The acknowledgement of short term disadvantages and the allusion to a price needing to be paid by the UK.

### *The Labour Manifesto*

The labour manifesto, labelled 'Now Britain's Strong – Let's Make It Great to Live in' is divided into two parts with eight sections/subheadings. Once again, paying attention to the language, Europe, is referred to 15 times, more than double than that of the Conservatives. Many of the references to Europe are in keeping

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<sup>92</sup> (Party, 1970)

<sup>93</sup> (Party, 1970)

<sup>94</sup> (Party, 1970)

with security arguments and need for a more secure, prosperous and united Europe.<sup>95</sup> For example, ‘The Government believes that the members of NATO should work towards a well-prepared conference on European Security, in which balanced reduction of forces and the key problems now creating tension in Europe could be discussed’.<sup>96</sup> Throughout the manifesto the word ‘Europe’ is attached to a context of keeping Europe safe. Similarly, with the Conservatives, the accession into the European Economic Community is savoured until the end of the manifesto, where the topic is addressed in the penultimate sub section labelled, ‘The World Economy’. The manifesto denotes that

We have applied for membership of the European Economic Community and negotiations are due to start in a few weeks' time.... Britain's strength means that we shall be able to meet the challenges and realise the opportunities of joining an enlarged Community. But it means, too, that if satisfactory terms cannot be secured in the negotiations Britain will be able to stand on her own 'feet outside the Community'.<sup>97</sup>

The subsection concludes by stating, ‘Labour Government will not be prepared to pay part of the price of entry in advance of entry and irrespective of entry by accepting the policies, on which the Conservative Party are insisting, for levies on food prices, the scrapping of our food subsidies and the introduction of the Value-Added Tax (VAT).’<sup>98</sup> The first quotation, regarding satisfactory terms of entry, is similar to that used in the Conservative manifesto, albeit differentiated by the wording used in the manifesto. Labour advocate, like that of the Conservatives, they are willing to walk away if terms are not met. The second quotation refers to the entry fee. When analysing the language used concerning the entry fee payments, Labour pays particular attention to the timing of when the payment should be made, whereas the Conservatives deal with the amount to be paid to the EC. However, the second half of the latter quotation pays specific attention to certain policies, namely food prices and subsidies and the introduction of VAT. Referencing specific areas of policy, and due to the obvious backdrop of EC accession, it may be classified as a policy-based soft Eurosceptic critique.

### *Public Opinion*

As seen with the with the Czech case study laid out previously, the observation was that there was a gap between the opinion of the public and politicians, manifesting in the Euroscepticism being ideological, opposed to populist. However, let us examine the case for the UK.

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<sup>95</sup> Labour 1970 election manifesto, ‘NOW BRITAIN'S STRONG -LET'S MAKE IT GREAT TO LIVE IN’ (The Labour Party, 1970) < <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab70.htm> > accessed 25<sup>th</sup> April 2017

<sup>96</sup> (Party L. , NOW BRITAIN'S STRONG - LET'S MAKE IT GREAT TO LIVE IN, 1970)

<sup>97</sup> (Party L. , 1970)

<sup>98</sup> (Party L. , 1970)

Dov Zakheim outlines how major public opinion polls in the UK, during period between 1970-1972 had ‘at times almost weekly, attempted to assess public feeling on the question of entry and its attendant ramifications’.<sup>99</sup>

The Gallup opinion poll posed the question to the British Public, ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the government applying for membership of the European Common Market?’ This was asked in January of 1970 after France had made comments at The Hague which implied Britain’s prospects may have had a serious chance of whether or not the talks would end successfully.

The Gallup poll posed the following question. On the facts as you know them present, are you for or against Britain joining the Common Market?

<b>Gallup</b>	<b>For %</b>	<b>Against %</b>	<b>Don’t Know %</b>
<b>July 1971<sup>100</sup></b>	25	57	18
<b>July 1971</b>	33	49	17
<b>July 1971</b>	33	46	20
<b>August 1971</b>	39	43	17
<b>September 1971</b>	35	47	18
<b>September 1971</b>	31	52	17
<b>October 1971</b>	51	51	17
<b>December 1971</b>	47	47	16
<b>February 1972 1972</b>	42	41	17
<b>April 1972</b>	43	43	14
<b>May 1972</b>	41	45	14

Harris poll: Are you for or against Britain joining the European Common Market?

<b>Harris<sup>101</sup></b>	<b>For %</b>	<b>Against %</b>	<b>Don’t know %</b>
<b>February 1970</b>	19	63	18
<b>February 1971</b>	18	60	21
<b>April 1971</b>	17	63	20

<sup>99</sup> Dov Zakheim, ‘BRITAIN AND THE EEC-OPINION POLL DATA 1970-72’ (JCMS, 2008) <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1973.tb00912.x/pdf>> accessed 10<sup>th</sup> May

<sup>100</sup> (Zakheim, 2008)

<sup>101</sup> (Zakheim, 2008)

<b>May 1971</b>	20	62	18
<b>June 1971</b>	20	57	23
<b>August 1971</b>	36	39	25
<b>September 1971</b>	35	44	21
<b>October 1971</b>	30	49	21
<b>November 1971</b>	40	44	16
<b>December 1971</b>	42	48	10
<b>February 1972</b>	36	43	21
<b>March 1972</b>	39	39	22
<b>April 1972</b>	40	38	22
<b>May 1972</b>	43	36	21

NOP poll: Do you approve or disapprove of Britain joining the Common Market?

<b>NOP<sup>102</sup></b>	<b>Approve</b>	<b>Disapprove</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	
<b>March 1970</b>	22	64	14	
<b>October 1970</b>	24	61	15	
<b>March 1971</b>	22	66	12	
<b>June 1971</b>	26	58	16	
<b>July 1971</b>	34	44	22	
<b>September 1971</b>	36	46	18	
<b>February 1972</b>	40	43	17	
<b>March 1972</b>	42	44	14	
<b>April 1972</b>	42	43	15	
<b>May 1972</b>	40	42	18	
<b>ORC<sup>103</sup></b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>In favour</b>	<b>Against</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
		<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>February</b>	1970	18	72	10
<b>November</b>	1970	29	64	7
<b>February 17<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup></b>	1971	18	40	12
<b>April 28<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	30	56	14
<b>May 19<sup>th</sup>-23<sup>rd</sup></b>	1971	26	59	15

<sup>102</sup> (Zakheim, 2008)

<sup>103</sup> (Zakheim, 2008)



<b>June 23<sup>rd</sup>-27<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	27	55	18
<b>July 7<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	37	44	18
<b>July 21<sup>st</sup>-25<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	45	41	15
<b>August 4<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	40	46	14
<b>August 18<sup>th</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup></b>	1971	47	45	8
<b>September 1<sup>st</sup>-5<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	44	41	14
<b>September 15<sup>th</sup>- 19<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	37	47	16
<b>September 24<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	45	51	5
<b>September 22<sup>nd</sup>- 26<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	39	43	17
<b>September 29<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	39	50	11
<b>October 6<sup>th</sup>-10<sup>th</sup></b>	1971	37	47	15
<b>October 13<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup></b>	1972	38	55	12
<b>February 2<sup>nd</sup>-6<sup>th</sup></b>	1972	42	39	18
<b>March 1<sup>st</sup>-5<sup>th</sup></b>	1972	39	43	18
<b>April 5<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup></b>	1972	45	39	15
<b>May 3<sup>rd</sup>-7<sup>th</sup></b>	1972	43	38	15
<b>September 13<sup>th</sup>- 17<sup>th</sup></b>	1972	36	45	19

ORC poll: Do you approve or disapprove of Britain joining the Common Market?

What is evident from objectively looking at the polling data of the period is that, though there is inevitable fluctuation amongst support for joining the common market and against joining, for the most part the British electorate appear to be wholly sceptical of joining the European Economic Community. The polls suggested that, at worst, the electorate was against entry; at best, apathetic.<sup>104</sup> What can be learned from the data is that the British public, on average, tend to be sceptical of joining the European Community. British politicians, as seen in the overview of the 1970 general election manifestos, are advocating for membership of the EC. Here lies a gap between public opinion and party opinion, which show that the quest to join the EC is an ideological mission of the political parties. The reason for the political will to join the EC is geopolitical and economic in nature, as there was a fear amongst the party system of countries such as

<sup>104</sup> N J Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945* (Routledge, 2007)

France and Germany dominating the future union as well as the 'special relationship' that Britain enjoyed with the U.S.A being under threat.

### *1973 Eurosceptic divisions surrounding Accession to EEC*

The Conservative manifesto of 1970 was for accession, however their position described in the manifesto was scaled back from a purely Europhilic position. Whilst the party did describe in the manifesto that they would offer a commitment to 'negotiate, no more no less', this was not a representation of the whole of the party as ideological divisions within the party developed in relation to Europe. Though, the leader at the time, Edward Heath, was all for playing an active role in Europe, this was not representative of the Conservative party as a whole during their time in government. Anthony Forster points out that almost one tenth of the party publicly stated their reservations, and in some cases, outright opposition to Britain joining the EC.<sup>105</sup> One of the more famous outspoken critics of joining the European Community being Enoch Powell. Whilst having Eurosceptics in his own party, Heath employed a strategy of excluding sceptics from his government. Instead, Heath kept these party members at arm's length from negotiations demoting them to backbench positions as opposed to the cabinet. Euroscepticism was rife within the party. A figure of 44 MP's opposed the accession, to the point that a motion was signed by all 44 MP's rejecting the common market. The Euroscepticism within the party at this time was not an internal populist-party movement, as the formulation of the Anti-Common Market League (ACML) was formed during the first attempt of accession under Harold Macmillan. When the 1970 general election was won and negotiations were started with the EC, members of the ACML would not hesitate to ask probing questions during events such as Prime Ministers Questions.<sup>106</sup>

Labour Euroscepticism was also much more prevalent in a multifaceted nature. Labour Eurosceptics tended to migrate over the border of party and non-party alliances. Example of these are described in a passage by Forster:

A longstanding force outside Parliament was the Forward Britain Movement (FBM), created by Richard Briginshaw in 1961. The Labour Safeguards Committee founded in 1967 eventually transformed into the Labour Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market (CSCM)... A further indication of the strength of Labour anti-Market feeling in Parliament was a statement in the left-wing Tribune weekly paper of seventy-four Labour MPs opposing Common Market membership on any grounds, organised by John Stonehouse and William Blyton... Other groups

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<sup>105</sup> Anthony Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945* (Routledge, 2002)

<sup>106</sup> (Forster, 2002)

broadly on the left of the party supported these Labour anti-Marketeers. The Tribune Group, which gained significantly in numerical strength after the 1970 and 1974 general elections, was resolutely opposed to EC membership.<sup>107</sup>

Other groups railing against joining the EC were Trades Unions Against the Common Market (TUACM), Women Against the Common Market (WACM) founded by Ann Kerr who highlighted increases in certain food prices, such as tea and coffee, really hitting home to the British Public, and the Trades Unions Against the Common Market (TUACM).<sup>108</sup> Regardless of critics opposing Heath's opening of negotiations, concerns arising from the Labour Party and the Conservative Party of membership becoming a reality. Forster goes on to elaborate:

Anti-Marketeers in both parties initially hoped that their respective groups, the Conservative Anti-Common Market League and the Labour Safeguards Committee, might move to incorporate the other. This gave way to a feeling that what was really needed was an umbrella inter-party organisation which would allow the partisan groups in each of the main parties to co-exist, yet unify them in a common cause against membership. This would dampen the criticism of disloyalty to the party, since the Conservative and Labour sceptic groups would continue as distinct entities inside and outside Parliament.... The result was the creation of the first all-party sceptic group, the Common Market Safeguards Campaign (CMSC).

The CMSC comprised of 38 Labour MP's and 22 Conservative MP's however the group suffered from being able to accumulate sufficient resources from fundraisers to give the group a loud enough public voice. Internal struggles were manifested in the form of a dilemma, should the group focus on the lobbying parliamentary support, or mobilising the electorate to persuade that joining the European Community was detrimental to the UK. When trying to tackle the parliamentary sphere, resources were invested into three clusters. The first being the executive in order to secure conditions on the terms of membership, the Labour opposition to convince them to rail against membership and the back benchers from both parties to generate anti-market votes.<sup>109</sup>

Some of the groups listed above, were founded during the UK's first and second application to the EC during the 1960's. This mean that by the time of the third application to the EC, the developed arguments were robust and sophisticated. Right wing attention was paid to promoting the commonwealth as a better alternative, couples with the bureaucratic nightmare that was Brussels.<sup>110</sup> Left leaning critiques were

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<sup>107</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>108</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>109</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>110</sup> (Forster, 2002)

focused on everyday public issues, such as the increase in the prices of kitchen cupboard amenities mentioned before such as tea and coffee. Also, due to the capitalist nature of the common market, it was argued that it could harm working class interests.<sup>111</sup>

Reverting back to the right side of the political spectrum, one of the more famous or infamous people to criticise the joining the EC was a Conservative party member, Enoch Powell, a member of the shadow cabinet who later resigned in 1974 due to the issue of Europe. Standing out from Powell's legacy was the 'Rivers of Blood Speech' he delivered at the Conservative Association meeting. Powell's concerns regarding Europe were economically based, namely the cost of membership, bringing to attention the issue of the cost of membership, rise in food prices, the eventual imbalance to the balance of payments. However, his main gripe was that of sovereignty as he felt the issue of the nation state as he argued that 'the nation state was not just something, but everything.'<sup>112</sup> He elaborated further by stating that being a member of the Common Market would bring self-governance to an end and paramount to anything else, the parliamentary democracy. Sovereignty and nationhood were the core of his critique.<sup>113</sup>

## 2.2 General Election 1974 (February)

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### *The Conservative Manifesto*

Starting with the conservative election manifesto, labelled 'Firm action for a fair Britain.'<sup>114</sup> In contrast with the election manifesto on 1970 where the word Europe was mentioned six times, the 1974 February election manifesto triples that of the previous using 'Europe' or a conjunction of 'Europe', 18 times throughout the manifesto. Europe is referred to in brief, at the beginning of the manifesto under the subsection, 'Industry, Agriculture, and the Regions',<sup>115</sup> and then the penultimate subheading of the manifesto is labelled, 'Britain, Europe and the world.' The subsection on Europe, given the context of already being in Europe, is relatively Europe-friendly, delineating benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy providing expansionary benefits to British farmers and boasting the UK's role in establishing the European Regional and Development Fund (ERDF) as it states the UK has been integral 'in securing a decision in principle to set up a European Regional Development Fund, a considerable proportion of which will be devoted to helping the less prosperous regions of Britain. We have been pressing hard within the Community for a sizeable fund, and a decision is to be taken early this year.'<sup>116</sup> Conversely the manifesto

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<sup>111</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>112</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>113</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>114</sup> Conservative Party, 'Firm action for a fair Britain' (Conservative Party, 1974)

<<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con74feb.htm>> accessed

<sup>115</sup> (Party C. , The Conservative Party: 'Firm Action for a fair Britain', 1974)

<sup>116</sup> (Party C. , The Conservative Party: 'Firm Action for a fair Britain', 1974)

also notes that the Community continues to develop and evolve. In particular, just as Britain has to adapt to the Community, so the Community has to adapt to Britain.<sup>117</sup> The Conservative manifesto elaborates further by stating the continuous process involved in redefining Britain's place within it, but labels any attempt to negotiate a withdrawal, a 'disaster'. Whilst the manifesto acknowledges the need to reform the Community for the benefit of the UK, it makes no specific example as to what aspects need to be modified to ensure greater prosperity for the UK within the future Union.

### *The Labour Manifesto*

Where the previous labour manifesto mentioned the issue of Europe 15 times, the 1974 February manifesto labelled 'Let us work together - Labour's way out of the crisis', mentions Europe nine times throughout the manifesto. The subsection labelled 'The Common Market' is situated almost halfway throughout the manifesto and begins almost immediately criticising the terms of entry to the Common Market negotiated by the Conservatives as a 'political mistake.'<sup>118</sup> Maintaining a soft Eurosceptic approach, the Labour Party details how it would seek to renegotiate the terms of British entry into the Common Market. An economic criticism of the Market that Labour pinpoints as an area of renegotiation is the CAP, accusing the policy of protectionism as the CAP poses a threat to world trade in food products so low-cost produces outside of the Market can still have access to British produce. The manifesto also touches on the proposals for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and states that it can lead to increased unemployment as a means of fixed parity, which the manifesto flat out rejects. The manifesto also outlines hostility towards a harmonised VAT which would lead the UK to place VAT in necessities. The party proposes two scenarios in the event of a successful renegotiation and unsuccessful renegotiation. Should the renegotiation process be successful the party states

that, in view of the unique importance of the decision, the people should have the right to decide the issue through a General Election or a Consultative Referendum. If these two tests are passed, a successful renegotiation and the expressed approval of the majority of the British people, then we shall be ready to play our full part in developing a new and wider Europe.<sup>119</sup>

Should re-negotiations be unsuccessful the party denounces any Treaty obligations as not applicable to the UK, and consequently, will seek to negotiate a withdrawal from the Community. A further commitment the manifesto pledges to stand by is to stop any subsequent attempts towards further integration as it directly

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<sup>117</sup> (Party C. , The Conservative Party: 'Firm Action for a fair Britain', 1974)

<sup>118</sup> Labour Party, 'Let us work together - Labour's way out of the crisis' (Labour Party, 1974)  
<<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab74feb.htm> > accessed 15<sup>th</sup> May 2017

<sup>119</sup> (Party L. , Let us work together - Labour's way out of the crisis, 1974)

affects taxes and food.<sup>120</sup> The Eurosceptic arguments used in the manifesto are underlined by economic concerns. Sovereignty is indirectly mentioned, as the manifesto denotes that the retention of the powers of parliament are needed in order to protect the balance of payments and employment policies however the notion of the Nation State is absent.

### 2.3 General Election 1974 October

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#### *The Conservative manifesto*

The October manifesto of the same year is named 'Putting Britain First', implying the need for putting the national interest first. Similarly, with the last Conservative manifesto of the same year, 'Europe' is referred to 18 times again over the course of the whole document. Early in the manifesto are proclamation of the Conservatives aims to press for improvements in the CAP to safeguard the interest of specialist producers, horticulturists are given as an example. When addressing the Common Market, the rhetoric used is wholly favourable towards the EC. The manifesto rails against any notion of withdrawal from the Community as it describes the EC as the biggest trading bloc in the world and an attempt to leave would be reduce power, influence, and economical and political allies. The manifesto states how membership is a continuous process of negotiation to account for British interests. The manifesto is relatively Europhilic and provides no examples as a base when mentioning issues of negotiation and reform and when it does address issues of the Common Market, the points are inherently vague. Take instances where the language is unequivocally pro-European for example by stating that 'Membership of the EEC brings us great economic advantages, but the European Community is not a matter of accountancy.'<sup>121</sup>

#### *The Labour manifesto*

The manifesto is labelled 'Britain Will Win With Labour'. The manifesto makes little reference to Europe, containing only seven mentions throughout the manifesto however confront real aspects of European integration more specifically than their Conservative adversaries. The Common Market subsection refers to the familiar protectionist critique Labour associates with the EC, the manifesto notes 'Labour is an internationalist party and Britain is a European nation. But if the Common Market were to mean the creation of a new protectionist bloc, or if British membership threatened to impoverish our working people or to destroy the authority of Parliament, then Labour could not agree.'<sup>122</sup> The manifesto outlines that the Labour Party has already started renegotiations with the EC, however the manifesto fails to explain which areas it

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<sup>120</sup> (Party L. , Let us work together - Labour's way out of the crisis, 1974)

<sup>121</sup> Conservative Party, 'Putting Britain First' (Conservative Party, 1974)  
<<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con74oct.htm>> accessed 15<sup>th</sup> May 2017

<sup>122</sup> Labour Party, 'Britain Will Win With Labour' (Labour Party, 1974)  
<<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab74oct.htm> > accessed 15<sup>th</sup> May

is in the process of renegotiating, or at least the policy areas it intends to reform in relation to the UK however the manifesto touches on the efforts made to reduce the protectionist attitude the EC propounds. The manifesto describes ‘In recent negotiations between the European Economic Community and the African, Pacific and Caribbean countries we have sought, with some success, to establish a more generous and liberal trading pattern to meet their needs.’<sup>123</sup>

## 2.4 Referendum on Britain’s continued membership of the European Community 1975

The 1975 referendum campaign on the continued membership of Britain to the European Community saw the Eurosceptic interparty alliances defeated, essentially by two votes to one, by seventeen million in favour of continued membership with the EC, against eight million in favour of leaving the Common Market<sup>124</sup> achieving a voter turnout of roughly two thirds of those eligible to vote.<sup>125</sup> The referendum campaign saw two cross party alliances formed, Britain In Europe (BIE) and the National Referendum Campaign (NRC). The former campaigning for a ‘yes’ vote and the latter, a ‘no’ vote. Special attention will be paid to the latter.

The referendum campaign saw the NRC find itself in a precarious position due to its many conflicting internal dynamics. Forster summarises this point neatly by stating

The eclectic nature of the sceptics ensured they could not agree on a collective approach in terms of the arguments to be deployed or the strategy to be adopted. The dilemma was that the NRC wanted all possible votes, but that the main contribution to its organisation came from the left. The Labourites wanted to campaign against the Common Market on the basis that it was the product of a capitalist conspiracy, and the Conservatives on the grounds that it was opposed to free trade and was protectionist.<sup>126</sup>

Due to the many conflicting ideologies, as to why the EC was not fit for purpose, this meant that there was not a clear and coherent line of argumentation that the NRC could convincingly portray to the electorate. Polling at the time seemed to suggest that the electorate were concerned with factors that would directly interfere or affect their everyday lives. The A-list issue being food prices. Sovereignty did not play as integral part to the NRC line of argumentation that they would have liked. However, using the economically related argument for food prices, this gave way for NRC campaigners to pander to the populist issues of

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<sup>123</sup> (Party L. , BRITAIN WILL WIN WITH LABOR, 1974)

<sup>124</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>125</sup> Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Learning from History? The 1975 Referendum on Europe Transcript ’ (Gresham College, 2016)

<sup>126</sup> (Forster, 2002)

food pricing. NRC campaigner Douglas Jay and Barbara Castle chose to sing to that tune during their campaigning.<sup>127</sup>

When observing the NRC booklet advocating for a ‘no’ vote one of the first, main, arguments is a on the third page in bold writing, stating that voting no is a vote towards ‘The Right to Rule Ourselves’<sup>128</sup> implicitly referring to conflicting issues of the EC and sovereignty. The next page makes reference to argument of rising food costs and states,

‘Before we could buy our food at the lowest cost from the most efficient producers in the world. Since we joined we are no longer allowed to buy all our food where it suits us best. Inside the Common Market, taxes are imposed on food imported from outside countries. For instance we now have to pay a tax of over £300 a ton on butter imported from outside the Market and over £350 a ton on cheese.’<sup>129</sup>

The protectionist argument here, previously seen in the Labour manifestos, gives a tangible anecdote easily attachable to a voter in the referendum. On the same double page spread is the argument relating to employment and this states that the UK will not be able to stop certain occupations drifting away from Britain and would do particular damage to Scotland, Wales and Northern Island as well as the North West of England. When the argumentation turns back to food, specifically production, the tax argument is incorporated by using the ‘classic example’ of the British housewife having to pay more for her food as well as the effect on British tax payers ‘paying many hundreds of millions of pounds a year to the Brussels budget. When the attention is turned to agriculture, democratic sovereignty is inferred again as the leaflet states that the UK should have its’ own agricultural policy tailoring prices to domestic farmers. the page is then concluded with a national/sovereignty bases argument. The leaflet reinforces the point to Britain being demoted to the status of a province, and that the near future of the Common Market would see a Common Market parliament introduced, as well as subsequent laws passed by that parliament which would be binding in the UK, and the fact that no parliament elected by British people could alter that law. The penultimate page rails against the BIA, in particular for scare mongering in relation to unemployment, before dangling the carrot of the North Sea oil that the UK would have free reign to use in the near future.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> (Forster, 2002)

<sup>128</sup> Peter Hitchens, ‘The 1975 Common Market Referendum Campaign Documents’ (Mail on Sunday, 2015)

<sup>129</sup> (Hitchens, 2015)

<sup>130</sup> (Hitchens, 2015)



### 3. Contemporary Eurosceptical parties and politicians in the Czech Republic

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The following chapter will give an overview of current Eurosceptical trends in the party system of the Czech Republic, focussing on the language used regarding debate surround opposition to the EU and EU integration maintaining the party based approach, and where necessary paying specific attention to prominent political actors involved in anti-European debate. This side of the work will focus the attention outside of the two-party dimensional model used in the previous chapters.

The Civic Democrats, the architects of Czech Eurorealism well after Vaclav Klaus had left the government, from both posts of Prime Minister and President, have managed to maintain the soft Eurosceptic tradition originally laid out for them by their founder, Klaus. Kaniok and Havlik outline that

The majority of the MEPs representing ODS (including their leader Jan Zahradil) and a substantial amount of ODS Senators profiled themselves as Eurosceptics. Concerning concrete arguments, ODS Euroscepticism was always inspired by the British tradition - ODS emphasized economic arguments, criticized further transfer of competencies from nation states towards the EU etc. On the other hand, the party never contested the general principles of the European integration and has never seriously considered the possible withdrawal of the Czech Republic from the EU.<sup>131</sup>

The Civic Democrats in 2014 published a white paper named 'The 14 theses of ODS'. This two paged document gives an overview of the Civic Democrats position in relation to certain issues affecting Czech citizens. These being welfare policies, references to pension systems, transportation etc. Whilst, in terms of Eurosceptic language, ODS has toned down the heat on European issues since its initial period as an independent nation state and during the Czech accession, there is still a soft Eurosceptic critique that exists in policy areas. Namely one area, concerning closer integration with the EU, that being the adoption of the Euro. The last of the 14 theses, titled 'A Proud Nation Safe in Europe' is a vast departure from their original position laid out by Klaus as the term, safe in Europe brings about sentiment of security within the Union, which during the Klaus era was a sentiment of the party, however, a sentiment not worded so forgivingly towards the Union. The document advocates for 'Active economic diplomacy and effective defence of national interests / negotiation of a permanent exemption from the adoption of the euro / responsible immigration policy / support for a flexible, multi-speed European Union'.<sup>132</sup> The language used is less abrasive than the party's initial days. The party policy appears to have changed to try and affect change as

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<sup>131</sup> (Kaniok & Havlík, 2016)

<sup>132</sup> ODS, 'ČTRNÁCT TEZÍ OBČANSKÝCH DEMOKRATŮ' (ODS, 2014) <  
<http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/14tezi-ods.pdf>> accessed 18<sup>th</sup> May 2017

a player within Europe for the benefit of the Czech Republic. The party continues the ODS tradition of soft Euroscepticism with the inclusion of the policy relating to the Euro, the exemption. Furthering the Eurosceptic philosophy of the party is the policy to advocate for change in the European Union, that being a move towards a 'multi-speed European Union'. This is undeniably a Eurosceptic stance as this policy observes the way the EU can be improved from its current standing.

Switching the attention to a political party that doesn't have such influence and embedded roots in contemporary Czech democracy is the Free Citizens Party (SSO), founded in 2009. Ladislav introduces them as follows, 'Last but not least, we should mention Petr Mach, the chairman of the "new" ultra-liberal and anti-EU Party of Free Citizens'<sup>133</sup> To give context of their anti-EU position, the below quote was included in an article published on the party website in 2011 by Bednar. The article is written ten years on from the publishing of the Eurorealist manifesto by Zahradil under Klaus time in government. The passage roughly translates to

'The current state of the European Union confirms and enhances the legitimacy and validity of critical objections and warnings raised in the 2001 manifesto of the Czech Eurorealism towards the European Union. These can be attributed into four display areas: The undemocratic nature of the European Union and its decision-making, severe economic, monetary and fiscal incompetence of the European Union, contradiction of the main ideological and political mainstream of the European Union Czech democratic and pro-European tradition. Severe undermining of the transatlantic ties. Especially NATO, the main ideological and political stream of the European Union'

The rose-tinted glasses through which this article views the Zahradil Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism is no surprise given the foundations of the party as primarily anti-EU. Their Eurosceptic language that is used in the above quote for example is indicative of their hard-line approach to the EU and integration of the member states. A section on the party website entitled 'Freedom' advocates for certain rights that it believes is in contradiction with the EU. For example, they state that they advocate for free speech and reject laws that restrict an individual's right to criticise anything in society especially public policy. A subsequent point advocates for the role of smaller government in people's lives as they state that Czechs are not citizens of a slave state, and their fourth and final point deals directly with the EU. The party website states, 'The EU is not a guarantee of a free Czech Republic, it restricts the freedoms of the individual, denies freedom

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<sup>133</sup> Ladislav Cabada, 'PARTY OF FREE CITIZENS AND THE GENESIS OF THE CZECH LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE "ANTI-EU" STREAM IN CZECH POLITICS' (PQIA, 2015) 8-34

of speech and expression, and money support all opinions that suit it'.<sup>134</sup> The hostile language used seems to be integral to the party identity. The party leader, Petr Mach, has taken the mantle of Eurosceptic in chief from Klaus, though this is not alarming as both Petr Mach and Vaclav Klaus have co-published a paper with the title 'What is Europeism, or What Should Not Be The Future For Europe.' The paper summarises that Europeism is based on an 'explicit refusal of liberal doctrine of the functioning of the economy (and of society) and the belief in the government capacity to be "a productive" factor even in the activities which go above its minimal (classic liberal) concept.'<sup>135</sup> The previous quote is from Klaus, as he goes on to make the claim that Europeism doesn't want to, or intend to, learn the lessons from the 'tragic episode of communism, and other, not less evil, variants of centrally administered society and economy.'<sup>136</sup> An extract from Mach's chapter is as follows,

The main objective of the Lisbon agenda, that Europe should become "the most competitive and most dynamic economy in the world by 2010," might sound like an innocent or even a good idea to the people who have been living in the West for decades. But to those who used to live under the Communist rule in Central Europe, such slogans about catching up with the United States sound all too familiar. The difference is that instead of promoting information technology, the communist planners put more emphasis on heavy industry. Whereas coal and steel used to be the fashion fifty years ago, now it is computers.<sup>137</sup>

The Free Citizens Party (SSO) after its inception, was not successful in its initial elections. Cabada outlines that 'the party got only 0.74% of votes, it gained 2.46% three years later in the extraordinary elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Although this result did not take the party beyond the 5% threshold, it was nevertheless enough (more than 1.5%) to secure the right to financial support from the state budget, therefore allowing the SSO to organise more effective electoral campaigns.'<sup>138</sup>

Fast forwarding to the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, the party achieved success, relative to the party's young standing and hard Eurosceptic rhetoric, gaining 5.4% of vote in the Czech Republic and achieving one seat in the EP, however, the voter turnout was only 18.2% of the electorate, anointing the Czech Republic with one of the lowest turnouts in the EU.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Free Citizens Party, 'Freedom' (Svobodni) < <https://www.svobodni.cz/programove-pilire/svoboda/> > accessed 18<sup>th</sup> May 2017

<sup>135</sup> Vaclav Klaus and others, 'What is EUROPEISM or What Should Not Be The Future For Europe' (CEP) 2006

<sup>136</sup> (Klaus, Weigl, Mach, Loužek, & Brodský, 2006)

<sup>137</sup> (Klaus, Weigl, Mach, Loužek, & Brodský, 2006)

<sup>138</sup> Ladislav Cabada, 'From Eurogovernmentalism to Hard Euroscepticism -Genesis of the Czech Liberal-Conservative "Anti-EU" Stream"' (PQIA 2015)

<sup>139</sup> (Cabada, 2016)

A key issue for the Eurosceptically-hard SSO is sovereignty, and the preservation of it and this has been a key theme from the party's inception. It would be a safe recommendation to make that the Free Citizens Party is predicating their Eurosceptic beliefs, from an ideological standpoint, given their poor electoral performance in their first and second elections. They achieved one seat in the European Parliament, however did not mobilise enough support for it to be classified as populist party, and given the history of their chairman, Petr Mach as Cabada explains,

From 2003 he [Mach] started to co-work as an external advisor to Klaus, the newly elected president, and at the same time was acting chairman of the pro-Klausian and Eurosceptic think tank the Centre for Economics and Politics (CEP), established by Klaus in 1998. The CEP is one of the most visible and active Eurosceptic players, organising sets of conferences and workshops and publishing dozens of books and volumes, all of which share a common theme of Euroscepticism.

#### 4. Contemporary Eurosceptical parties and politicians in the UK

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The following case study will give an overview of some of the Eurosceptic political parties found in the British party system. Euroscepticism in Britain has been a hot-button topic, ever since joining the, then, EC, until leaving the, now, EU. The UK 2016 referendum will be mentioned however in relation to the policies and Eurosceptic arguments made.

The UK party system, in recent times, seems to have become increasingly more Eurosceptic as time has gone on. From the formation of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in 1993, to Conservative Party divisions manifesting in the UK referendum, 2016.

During the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, the UK, and other member states, saw a stark rise in the support for Eurosceptic parties gaining seats in the European Parliament. The UK version of these anti-EU parties across Europe is UKIP. UKIP is a party extremely hostile to EU membership. Intriguingly, despite the success of UKIP across the country in the 2014 elections, UKIP has failed to translate this onto the national UK stage in the 2015 general elections they achieved only one seat in parliament<sup>140</sup> however this has not affected their anti-EU stance. Despite their inability to perform at election at the local level, they have received a relatively high amount of publicity. This may be in part due to their politics or the outspoken 2009 leader Nigel Farage. UKIP is a hard line Eurosceptic Party as they state in their manifesto,

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<sup>140</sup> Mark Townsend, 'Five million votes, two seats: smaller parties demand a change in the rules' *The Guardian* (London 9<sup>th</sup> May 2015)

‘While withdrawal from the European Union (EU) political superstate is central to UKIP’s message’<sup>141</sup> their election manifesto rhetoric is perceived to be quite abrasive as they make statement such as, ‘Europhile propagandists say that 60% of our trade and three million British jobs depend on our EU membership. This is untrue. European companies sell us more than we sell them; we are their largest client. So our trade and jobs would continue if we left the European Union, and we would benefit by escaping from its crippling over-regulation.’<sup>142</sup> In the most recent general election in 2015, the manifesto makes claims that the UK would save 9 billion pounds per year should we leave the European Union.<sup>143</sup> Many issues in the manifesto are linked to the EU for example, a heading starting with, ‘We Can never control immigration while we continue to be members of the European Union’.<sup>144</sup> Everything about UKIP is quintessentially hard-line Eurosceptic, their critique of the EU could almost set a model for other anti-European parties. Petr Mach, in 2014, gave a speech at the UKIP conference, describing Nigel Farage as a ‘role model politician for us in the Czech Republic.’ Petr Mach goes on to describe how the two Eurosceptic parties share similar values of limited government and national sovereignty.<sup>145</sup> However these are not just views shared and held by political actors in narrowly defined anti-EU parties. For example, it is a handful of these reasons why David Cameron sought for a renegotiation, or to try and help implement reforms to make Europe accountable. However, here lies the difference (one of many) between the two.

David Cameron, in what has become to be known as the ‘Bloomberg Speech’ made a speech where he announced that he would hold an in / out referendum on British membership to the European Union. David Cameron, the former Conservative Party leader could be classified as a soft-Eurosceptic. Despite campaigning in the referendum to stay in the EU, the reason for having the referendum was that he attempted to seek negotiations for treaty change, to which he had no avail. In his Bloomberg speech, he stated that ‘There is, indeed, much more that needs to be done on this front. But people also feel that the EU is now heading for a level of political integration that is far outside Britain’s comfort zone.’ Another quote taken from his speech that embodies his soft-Eurosceptic position is ‘At some stage in the next few

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<sup>141</sup> UKIP, ‘UKIP Manifesto Empowering the people’ (UKIP, 2010)

<sup>142</sup> (UKIP, 2010)

<sup>143</sup> UKIP, ‘Believe in Britain, UKIP 2015 manifesto’ (UKIP, 2015) <<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/1103/attachments/original/1429295050/UKIPManifesto2015.pdf?1429295050> > accessed 20<sup>th</sup> May 2017

<sup>144</sup> (UKIP, Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto 2015, 2015)

<sup>145</sup> YouTube, ‘Czech MEP Petr Mach Speaking At The 2014 UKIP Conference’ (Vote UKIP, 2014) <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eq88tz4pCko> > accesses 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2017

years the EU will need to agree on Treaty change to make the changes needed for the long-term future of the Euro and to entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically accountable Europe that we seek.<sup>146</sup>

When the attention is turned towards the Conservative 2015 election manifesto. Europe, for the most part is mentioned in accordance with Britain being the hub, or the best place to do business in Europe, or the aspirations of making Britain the technology epicentre in Europe. The manifesto as a whole leans very favourably towards Europe. The EU however is a slightly different story. The manifesto states that the Conservative Party aims to control migration from the EU, and curtail the effect of the European Court of Human Rights (in a bid to make the deportation of foreign criminals easier) by introducing a British Bill of Rights. The manifesto also makes claims to stay out of the Eurozone, as well as reforming elements of the EU because the EU is too big and too bossy, and too bureaucratic. This statement is then followed by another statement to ‘reclaim power from Brussels’<sup>147</sup> Many more examples could be listed, however the Conservative Party gripe that runs through the whole manifesto plays to the tune of reclaiming the centralised power that has been already taken away from the nation. Whilst it is mentioned only once in the manifesto, the issue of sovereignty is constantly being alluded to, without actually mentioning the term, sovereignty. The bug bear it seems for the Conservatives, is the loss of political independence, however still want to enjoy the economic benefits of the EU.

The Labour Party 2015 manifesto is much more sympathetic towards Europe, but does also advocate the need for reform within Europe, for example, the manifesto does state that the Labour Party wishes to reform the EU so it works for Britain, one of the way that Labour enlists in their party manifesto that it will do this, is by making the Commission more accountable as the manifesto states that

People who live in this country know that too much power is concentrated in too few hands. Those who make decisions on behalf of others, whether they are in Westminster, the European Union, in business, the media, or the public sector, are too often unaccountable. Our over-centralised system of government has prevented our nations, cities, county regions and towns from being able to take control and change things for themselves. We will end a century of centralisation.<sup>148</sup>

The Labour manifesto also pledges that it will legislate for a lock on guarantees that there can be no transfer of powers to the EU without the consent of the British public in an in/out referendum, like that of the

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<sup>146</sup> Oliver Wright and Charlie Cooper, ‘The speech that was the start of the end of David Cameron’ *The Independent* (24<sup>th</sup> June 2017) <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron-resignation-announcement-2013-a7101281.html>> date accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2017

<sup>147</sup> Conservative Party, ‘The Conservative Party Manifesto’ (2015) <<https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf>> accessed 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2017

<sup>148</sup> Labour Party, ‘Britain can be better, The Labour Party Manifesto 2015’ (Labour Party, 2015) <<http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/BritainCanBeBetter-TheLabourPartyManifesto2015.pdf>> accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> May

Conservatives. When looking further throughout the manifesto of the Labour party it becomes apparent that the policies, in relation to Europe in this context, are very similar. Both advocate towards a reformist attitude that the EU needs to adopt, which would put them into the same category as soft Eurosceptics that the Conservatives already occupy. When the attention is turned to the Liberal Democrats manifesto, they also sing the same tune of reform by stating ‘that does not mean that the institutions and policies of the European Union are perfect and do not need reform. Liberal Democrats are the party of reform whether that is in Westminster, Holyrood, the Senedd or in local Councils and the EU is no exception.’<sup>149</sup>

2015 saw the re-election of the Conservative Party, this time without a Liberal Democrat coalition, and subsequently David Cameron did make efforts to renegotiate terms with the EU again. Cameron managed to agree terms on for areas, immigration, sovereignty, the euro and competitiveness.<sup>150</sup> These renegotiated terms, whilst alarming that the EU made such concessions, were largely ignored and Conservative Party cabinet became split on the issue and then the referendum campaign ensued. The leave campaign was a cross party campaign and consisted of politicians from the Labour and Conservative parties such as Kate Hoey, Boris Johnson from the Labour and Conservative party respectively. The official leave campaign, previously mentioned predicated their Eurosceptic arguments on two reasons. The first was the issue of controlling immigration into the UK, and the second was the issue of sovereignty<sup>151</sup> Other leave campaigns were also established, take for example the ‘Labour Leave’ campaign. The Eurosceptic Labour Leave campaign argue that being a part of the single market, with the implication of accepting regulations and directives, the tacit acceptance of EU law was hurting UK business.

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<sup>149</sup> Liberal Democrats, ‘Manifesto 2015, Stronger Economy. Fairer Society. Opportunity for Everyone’ (Liberal Democrats 2015)

<[https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/libdems/pages/8907/attachments/original/1429028133/Liberal\\_Democrat\\_General\\_Election\\_Manifesto\\_2015.pdf?1429028133](https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/libdems/pages/8907/attachments/original/1429028133/Liberal_Democrat_General_Election_Manifesto_2015.pdf?1429028133) > accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2017

<sup>150</sup> Michael Gordon, ‘Brexit: a challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?’ (ECLR,2016)

<[https://www-cambridge-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/9AAFF18130B17F93006713C41463C1C7/S1574019616000341a.pdf/brexit\\_a\\_challenge\\_for\\_the\\_uk\\_constitution\\_of\\_the\\_uk\\_constitution.pdf](https://www-cambridge-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/9AAFF18130B17F93006713C41463C1C7/S1574019616000341a.pdf/brexit_a_challenge_for_the_uk_constitution_of_the_uk_constitution.pdf)> accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2017

<sup>151</sup> (Gordon, 2016)

## 5. Conclusion

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The following work has given an account of the Eurosceptic rhetoric that has been used during both periods of accession for the Czech Republic and the UK. The aim of the thesis was to show how in different European countries, when confronted with the prospects of joining Europe, the Eurosceptic discourse involved is inherently linked to issues (in this case) of democracy and economy. The UK and the Czech Republic during accession both involved dissident elites who had deep rooted concerns about integration that stemmed from their ideology, not as a means to drum up populist support. Klaus, though not technically a political dissident, was vehemently against various aspects of the EU, as was the case concerning Enoch Powell. During the accession referendum, Klaus never publicly recommended a yes vote while at the same time did not disclose the way in which he would be voting. Regarding the case of Enoch Powell, whilst he was also ideologically against joining the European Community, he also purposely advocated for the public not to join the EC, by saying, in not so many words, that the electorate should have voted Labour. Both leading politicians at the time were reluctant to advocate for such events, leaving them both in precarious positions. Regarding the way in which Eurosceptic debate manifested in both domestic situations there are also similarities. The ideological rooting of the opposition to the European Union had cause party unrest and splintering. For Powell, he was the one who had to leave the Conservative Party, whereas in the Czech Republic, it was colleagues of Klaus who decided they could not continue being members of the Civic Democrats. Due to the ideological rooting of the opposition to join the EU, in both situations there was a distance between the public opinion and that amongst political parties. Concerns that were raised about joining were centred around the issue of sovereignty, and the dissolving of the nation state which featured on the right side of the political spectrum in both countries. When the attention is turned to the left side of the political spectrum however, further similarities arise, mainly the lack of ability to form a unified position. The internal disputes in the Communist party came to affect how long it would for the KSCM to come to an agreed position. In the case of the UK, there were different Labour MP's aligned with different non-political entities that opposed the membership. In both countries, there lied a reformist undertone as the attitude was that countries could only affect change once they were inside the Union, from which would be in a better position to advocate for certain renegotiations, as was the case for Harold Wilson which was advocated in various Labour manifestos.

However, are there similarities in the way in which Eurosceptic politicians and parties invoke Eurosceptic arguments in relation to democracy and economy? Well, there are definitely similarities in the issues that took precedent for both countries, namely being the issue of losing the right to independence and sovereignty as well as economic drawbacks highlighted in both contexts regarding an increase in food pricing. However, the way in which Eurosceptic politicians invoked Eurosceptic arguments does not align



across such vast situational differences as originally thought. The contention was that, casting aside certain geopolitical, economic and even temporal factors, that this would see almost a symmetry in debate amongst both left and right sides of the spectrum in different countries. Whilst there are similarities to the objections people hold whether they are right or left leaning, the character, context, and national tradition of the respective countries, was an issue that more credence should have been paid to. To an extent there are similarities in the Eurosceptic discourse irrespective of time, as issues of prominence during the early 1970's were still salient during the late 1990's and early 2000's such as sovereignty / the loss of the nation state.

When the attention is brought to the current day, the playing field levels out and similarities that do arise are easily comparable. For example, it was 20 years after accession of the UK for a political party to develop that was principled in their opposition against the EU, UKIP. For the Czech Republic, it took merely five years. However, what is seemingly clear is that, when a country does join the EU, the status quo is usually to be for integration, and when this position is taken, this leaves space, big or small, in the political landscape for principled hard-line opposition against such line of thinking.

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