

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Master thesis

2016

Sebastian Baetz

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Sebastian Baetz

**The EU Counter-terrorism policy from an
European integration perspective**

Master thesis

Prague 2016

Author: Sebastian Baetz

Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, M.A., Ph.D.

Academic Year: 2015/2016

Bibliographic note

Baetz, Sebastian. *The EU Counter-terrorism policy from an European integration perspective*. 119 p. Master thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Supervisor doc. Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, M.A., Ph.D.

Abstract

The EU counter-terrorism policy is an example of differentiated integration with horizontal and vertical differentiation that can be analyzed with differentiated integration theory. Given the high importance of securing EU citizens' lives and given the uniform integration in other policy fields, this thesis investigates why the counter-terrorism field has not been integrated yet. The method used is a case study of the entire field within the framework of a convergence analysis of differentiated integration theory. The theory suggests that high and asymmetric politicization, asymmetrical interdependence, low preference convergence and weak supranational actors lead to differentiated integration in this field. The analysis can only partly confirm this theory. Politicization is influential but the causal mechanism needs to be specified. The other factors preference convergence, interdependence and supranational actors widely act as expected. Other results of the thesis are that differentiated integration theory is applicable to the field if other factors such as the legal dimension or practitioners preferences are included. However, the thesis also showed that an analysis using differentiated integration theory in this field should center on each specific integration project.

Keywords

Differentiated integration, counter-terrorism, European Union, politicization, interdependence, preference, supranational actors, delegation, European Arrest Warrant, Europol

Range of thesis: 83 pages of content, 36 pages of appendix and bibliography

Abstrakt

Protiteroristická politika EU je příkladem diferencované integrace s horizontální a vertikální rozdílností, kterou lze analyzovat pomocí teorie diferencované integrace. Vzhledem k vysoké důležitosti zachování bezpečnosti občanů EU a vzhledem k jednotné integraci ostatních oblastí politiky EU, zkoumá tato práce důvody, proč oblast protiteroristické politiky nebyla doposud integrována. V této práci je využita metoda případové studie zaměřené na oblast protiteroristické politiky v rámci analýzy konvergence použité pro zkoumání teorie diferencované integrace.

Tato teorie tvrdí, že vysoké a zároveň nesouměrné zpolitizování, nesouměrná vzájemná závislost, nízká shoda preferencí a slabí nadnárodní činitelé vedou k rozdílné integraci v této oblasti. Použitá analýza může zčásti tuto teorii potvrdit. Zpolitizování má velký vliv, ale je zapotřebí specifikovat kauzální mechanismy. Další faktory, kterými jsou: shoda preferencí, vzájemná závislost a nadnárodní činitelé jednají především podle očekávání.

Dalším výsledkem této práce je zjištění, že teorie diferencované integrace je na tuto oblast aplikovatelná, pokud budou zahrnuty i ostatní faktory, jako je právní rozměr nebo preference praktiků. Avšak tato práce také ukázala, že by se analýza s využitím teorie diferencované integrace měla soustředit na jednotlivé integrační projekty.

Klíčová slova

Diferencovaná integrace, Protiteroristická politika, Evropská unie, Zpolitizování, Vzájemná závislost, Preference, Nadnárodní činitelé, Pověření, Evropský zatykač, Europol

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 28th of July 2016.

Sebastian Baetz

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the guidance and outstanding expertise given to him by the supervisors Dr. Bureš and Prof. Dr. Leuffen. The author is also grateful for the coordination of the study programs by Dr. Střítecký and Mr. Palz.

The deepest gratitude belongs to my family and Tereza for their sacrifices and support.

Topic: The EU Counter-terrorism policy from an European Integration perspective

Research question: What are the key explanations for a lack of horizontal and vertical integration in the EU's counter-terrorism policy?

Thesis: The mechanism proposed by differentiated integration theory is valid for EU's CT policy. The concept of high interdependence can explain why the EU is seeking a common policy approach, a high politicization can explain the differentiated integration in this policy field.

Classical integration theories cannot explain the development of EU's counter-terrorism policy sufficiently. Neofunctionalism, for instance, expects a functional spill-over created by integration in related policy fields. The free movement of people within the European Union established in the Schengen agreement, integrated into the treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, creates functional pressure for more integration. This pressure is increased by terrorist attacks in the European Union. To illustrate, the chief planner of the November 2015 attacks in Paris traveled undetected within and to the EU even though he was listed as terrorist suspect (The Guardian, 2015). However, despite this functional pressure, the EU counter-terrorism policy follows a flexible approach, that can be explained by differentiated integration theory.

Choice of topic: The European Union still presents an innovative approach of governance, a system "sui generis". To explain this topic, a lot of theories have emerged to reveal the drivers and blockades of integration in various policy fields. The policy field of counter-terrorism receives high public attention in the light of terrorist attacks, but is not examined adequately by European Integration scholars. Argomaniz describes this problem as an "absence of theorization" and an "under-theorized" field (Argomaniz, 2012, 8). This thesis uses the theoretical approach of differentiated integration to gain new insights into this topic from a theoretical standpoint.

Outline with comments:

1. Introduction

"Osama bin Laden has done more for European integration than anyone since Jacques Delors"
MdEP Graham Watson cited as in The Telegraph, 2008.

The first chapter of this thesis will introduce the topic of EU counter-terrorism policy and will show the relevance of the policy field with the example of the November 2015 Paris attacks and will also show the relevance of the topic with regard to the theoretical framework. A potential research desideratum will be identified at this point. The view that research in this field suffers from a lack of theorization is presented and the benefits of taking such a perspective are shown. Following this, the research interest will be specified and the research question is pointed out. The choice for the theory used will be shortly addressed. Then, the case selection and method used will be presented. The introduction also points out the limits of this thesis, for

instance that the question of effectiveness will not be the focus of this analysis. After presenting the structure of the thesis in the introduction, the results of the empirical testing will be presented.

2. Literature Review

Numerous studies looking at the EU integration of counter-terrorism exist. In this chapter, these different strands of research will be presented, compared and weighed. Gaps of the previously existing research will be identified. Among the perspectives compared are the explanations related to social constructivism that use mistrust and threat perceptions as explanatory variables (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012; Bures, 2008; Monar, 2007, Kaunert et al., 2012). Further approaches are public good explanations (Bossong, 2013), security governance advances (Hegemann, 2012, 2014) and historic institutionalist views (Argomaniz, 2012). Ideally, this chapter will already show gaps of research or consensus of research with regard to the theory of differentiated integration (such as that previously mentioned studies acknowledge high levels of interdependence or politicization).

3. Theoretical framework

The theory to be used in this thesis is differentiated integration. The advantage of this theory compared to other European Integration theories is the acceptance of a lack of integration not just as a divergent phenomenon but as a constant characteristic of the EU's political system. Differentiated integration conceptualizes the EU as a system of differentiated integration with vertical variation across policy fields (levels of centralization) and horizontal variation (variation in territorial extension). In this chapter the theory will be presented, using not only the main drafters of the theory (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfennig, 2012) but also different scholars to present a comprehensive picture of the theory (Tekin, 2012; Dyson 2010, Leruth 2015). In the chapter the hypothesis will be presented and operationalized. The choice for the theory will be extensively justified.

4. History

Despite this thesis is not conceptualized as a historical description but as an analysis guided by theory, presenting the evolution of arrangements and treaty changes is necessary in understanding this field of policy. The mapping of EU CT efforts over time will show that the preference for differentiated, horizontal integration was already present before 9/11 (Den Boer, 2008; Bures, 2012, 1). Hence, the argument of path dependency will be introduced. Other papers used to explain the historical evolution are Bossong, 2008; 2012.

5. Empirical analysis

In at least three case studies of EU counter-terrorism policies it will be analyzed what the influence of the variables presented by the theory were/are in making or executing these policies. The specific case selection will be dependent upon the data available. A possible selection could include the EU Counterterrorism coordinator or Europol as examples for a lack of vertical integration, the G6, Club of Berne or Schengen Information System as an example of horizontal differentiation. Interviews can be included if a significant number of them is

possible. When possible, the claims will be supported also by data such as Eurobarometer data (for example in the case of politicization). Aim of this chapter is a thorough test of the theory.

6. *Evaluation of Theory*

After the empirical analysis, most likely, several shortcomings of the theory will be visible as no theory can explain it all. Thus, in this chapter, the theory will be evaluated with regard to the analysis. It will be pointed out what the theory can explain well and what not. Possible improvements to the theory can be presented at this point.

7. *Conclusion*

The conclusion will summarize the results of the analysis and present perspectives for further research.

Literature:

Argomaniz, J. (2012). *The EU and counter-terrorism: politics, polity and policies after 9/11*. Routledge.

Balzacq, T., & Hadfield, A. (2012). Differentiation and trust: Prüm and the institutional design of EU internal security. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(4), 539-561.

Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The new intergovernmentalism: European integration in the post-maastricht era. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(4), 703-722.

Boer, M. D., Hillebrand, C., & Nölke, A. (2008). Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(1), 101-124.

Bossong, R. (2008). The EU's Mature Counterterrorism Policy—A Critical Historical and Functional Assessment. *LSE Challenge Working Paper*.

Bossong, R. (2012). *The evolution of EU counter-terrorism: European security policy after 9/11*. Routledge.

Bossong, R. (2013). Public good theory and the 'added value' of the EU's anti-terrorism policy. *European security*, 22(2), 165-184.

Bureš, O. (2008). Perceptions of the terrorist threat among EU member states. Conference Paper.

Bureš, O. (2012). Informal counterterrorism arrangements in Europe: Beauty by variety or duplicity by abundance?. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(4), 495-518.

Bureš, O. (2013). *EU counterterrorism policy: a paper tiger?*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd..

Dyson, K., & Sepos, A. (2010). *Differentiation as design principle and as tool in the political management of European integration*. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Ehrhart, H. G., Hegemann, H., & Kahl, M. (2014). Putting security governance to the test: conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges. *European Security*, 23(2), 119-125.

Hegemann, H. (2012). "Between Great Transformation and Politics as Usual. Formal and Informal Security Governance in EU Counterterrorism Policy". *Economics of Security Working Paper 61*, Berlin: Economics of Security.

Kaunert, C., Léonard, S., & MacKenzie, A. (2012). The social construction of an EU interest in counter-terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases of PNR and SWIFT. *European security*, 21(4), 474-496.

Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Leruth, B. (2015). Operationalizing national preferences on Europe and differentiated integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(6), 816-835.

Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. *Government and opposition*, 42(3), 292-313.

Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., & Rittberger, B. (2015). The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(6), 764-782.

Tekin, F. (2012). *Differentiated integration at Work. Baden-Baden: Nomos*.

The Guardian (2015). Movements of Isis extremist prior to Paris attack raise EU security questions. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/19/movements-of-isis-extremist-prior-to-paris-attack-raises-eu-security-questions> [10.03.2016].

The Telegraph (2012). EU extradition on demand undermines justice. Available online at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562149/EU-extradition-on-demand-undermines-justice.html> [10.03.2016].

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Literature Review	5
2.1. <i>Public good theory</i>	5
2.2. <i>Supranational policy entrepreneurship</i>	6
2.3. <i>Social constructivism</i>	7
2.4. <i>Historic institutionalism</i>	11
2.5. <i>Synergy</i>	14
3. Theoretical Framework	15
3.1. <i>Classical integration theories and differentiated integration</i>	15
3.1.1. Intergovernmentalism	15
3.1.2. Supranationalism and neo-functionalism	16
3.1.3. Social constructivism	17
3.1.4. Intermediate result of classic integration theories	18
3.2. <i>Differentiated integration theory</i>	18
3.3. <i>Differentiated integration of core state powers</i>	22
3.4. <i>Research Design</i>	24
3.4.1. Hypothesis and units of analysis	25
3.4.2. Concept specification and operationalization	26
3.4.2.1. Dependent variable: differentiated integration of the EU's counter-terrorism approach	26
3.4.2.2. Independent variable: politicization	27
3.4.2.3. Independent variable: interdependence	30
3.4.2.4. Independent variable: preference convergence	31
3.4.2.5. Independent variable: weak supranational actors	33
3.4.2.6. Operationalization: case studies of specific policy projects	34
4. Delineation of the counter-terrorism approach of the EU	35
4.1. <i>Counter-terrorism in the EU before 9/11</i>	35
4.2. <i>Counter-terrorism in the EU after 9/11</i>	37
4.3. <i>Counter-terrorism in the EU after the attacks of Madrid 2004</i>	40
4.4. <i>Recent initiatives after the attacks in 2015 and 2016</i>	41
4.5. <i>The current state of EU counter-terrorism – mapping of differentiated integration</i>	42
5. Empirical analysis	49
5.1. <i>Politicization</i>	49
5.1.1. Engagement of audience	49

5.1.2. Salience of the issue	53
5.1.3. Polarization of opinion	58
5.1.4. Intermediate result and secondary literature on politicization	63
<i>5.2. Interdependence</i>	65
<i>5.3. Preference convergence</i>	70
<i>5.4. Supranational actors</i>	72
5.4.1. De jure role	72
5.4.2. De facto role	73
<i>5.5. Case Study of the emergence of the European Arrest Warrant</i>	74
5.5.1. Politicization	75
5.5.2. Interdependence	75
5.5.3. Preference convergence	76
5.5.4. The role of supranational actors	77
5.5.5. Intermediate result of the case study	78
<i>5.6. Case study of the emergence of Europol's counter-terrorism role</i>	78
5.6.1. Politicization	78
5.6.2. Interdependence	79
5.6.3. Preference convergence	79
5.6.4. Supranational actors	80
5.6.5. Intermediate result	81
6. Conclusion	82
<i>6.1. Summary</i>	82
<i>6.2. Evaluation of Theory</i>	83
<i>6.3. Outlook</i>	85
Annex	86
Bibliography	108

List of graphs

Graph 1: Map of differentiated integration in counter-terrorism	43
Graph 2: Share of knowledgeable EU citizens from 2004 to 2015	50
Graph 3: Share of respondents that tend to agree that their voice matters in their member state from 2008 to 2015	51
Graph 4: Perception of influence of member states on the EU level by national citizens from 2004 to 2010	52
Graph 5: EU wide average of respondents that state terrorism as one of the most important issues facing their country	53
Graph 6: Balance of citizens' trust in the EU across member states from 2003-2015	59
Graph 7: Share of respondents in member states that answered that decisions on the fight against international terrorism should be made jointly with the EU	61
Graph 8: Average number of terrorist incidents between 2001 and 2005 in EU member states compared to the EU average	66
Graph 9: Average number of terrorist incidents between 2006 and 2014 in EU member states compared to the EU average	66
Graph 10: Average number of arrested terrorism suspects between 2007 and 2014	67
Graph 11: Average number of convicted terrorism suspects between 2007 and 2014	67
Graph 12: Count of counter-terrorism preferences across member states	70

List of tables

Table 1: Classic integration theories and differentiated integration	18
Table 2: Indicators for the engagement of the audience	28
Table 3: Indicators for salience of an issue	29
Table 4: Indicators for polarization of an issue	29
Table 5: Indicators of interdependence	31
Table 6: Categorizations of preferences on counter-terrorism	32
Table 7: Salience of terrorism in EU member states compared to the EU average	54
Table 8: Share of respondents that state terrorism as one of the three challenges to the security of EU citizens	56
Table 9: Intermediate results of the salience of terrorism across member states	57
Table 10: Perceived role of the European Union in securing citizens in member states in 2015	60
Table 11: Likelihood of member states' polarized opinion towards EU projects	62
Table 12: Comparison of politicization criteria between member states	64
Table 13: Asymmetrical interdependence of terrorism across the EU	68
Table 14: Results of the analyses of this thesis	82

List of abbreviations

CODEXTER	Committee of Experts on Terrorism
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CTG	Counter-Terrorism Group
EAW	European Arrest Warrant
EEAS	European External Action Service
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
EU INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analyst Centre
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
PWGT	Police Working Group on Terrorism
RDWTI	Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
SIS	Schengen Information System
SITCEN	EU Joint Situation Centre
TE-SAT	EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report
TREVI	Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme and Violence Internationale
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nation
US	United States of America

1. Introduction

“Osama bin Laden has done more for European integration than anyone since Jacques Delors” (Graham Watson, Member of European Parliament, in 2008, cited as in The Telegraph, 2012)

The terrorist attacks of Brussels in March 2016 sparked a joint statement by EU heads of state and leaders of EU institutions: “We will be united and firm in the fight against hatred, violent extremism and terrorism” (European Council, 2016). However, despite the public announcements and contrasting Graham Watson’s claim, the track record is marginal and the EU’s anti-terror approach is internally fragmented. The EU is discussed to be more of a “paper tiger” than an effective counter-terrorism actor (Bureš, 2011, 2). From an EU integration perspective, the EU’s counter-terrorism approach is characterized by a low degree of delegation to the EU level but a high degree of variable membership (Bossong, 2013, 176; Den Boer et al., 2008, 101; Monar, 2007, 309; Monar, 2015, 333, 337). This is described by differentiated integration theory as an example of vertical and horizontal differentiation¹ (Den Boer et al., 2008, 103; Dyson, 2010, 4; Rittberger et al., 2014, 194; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 764). Thus, the research question is:

What are the key explanations for a lack of horizontal and vertical integration in the EU’s counter-terrorism policy?

In line with previous research on counter-terrorism, this approach does not presume that more integration means more effectiveness (Bureš, 2011, 3; Monar, 2007, 310). However, it is not yet clear why delegation to the supranational level is not seen as a solution in this field. Despite various studies on the effectiveness of the EU’s counter-terrorism field exist, these reasons for the continuing trend of intergovernmentalism in this field have not been analyzed from an EU integration perspective. By doing so in this paper with differentiated integration theory, two goals are reached.

Firstly, it is desirable to use an integration theory at the level of specific policies of the European Union (Leuffen, 2012, Foreword XII). The research on the EU cannot stop at the point of explaining integration or no integration, but has to explain the differentiated integration of certain individual policies as well (Leuffen, 2012, 22, 34). As it will be shown, differentiated integration theory meets this specific requirement, since it can explain the deviate form of integration better than classical integration theories (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 541; Dyson,

¹ The exact meaning of these theoretical terms is outlined in section 3.2.

2010, 17, 19; Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 297). However, differentiated integration theory itself is not fully sophisticated yet (Dyson, 2010, 5). Especially, theoretical arguments on the causes of differentiation are considered to be scarce (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 292; Dyson, 2010, 348). Moreover, the field of research on differentiation suffers from a misfocus on conceptualization and scholars in the field wrongly ascribe enlargement as the main reason of differentiation (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 297, 299, 302). Hence, this thesis aspires to provide and test a theoretical approach that moves beyond this “folk theorem” (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 299) of explanation (Schneider, 2014, 699). The test of the theory ideally will provide further chances to ameliorate the theory.

Secondly, despite the high public attention on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the field of the EU’s counter-terrorism approach is considered to be “under-theorized” (Argomaniz, 2012, 8). To scholars of the field, it is evident that the underlying logic of the choices made by decision-makers in this field has not been systematically analyzed (Bureš, 2008, 51; Hegemann et al., 2011, 284). Kaunert ascribes this to other scholars’ presupposition of an EU that does not take over core responsibilities (Kaunert, 2010, 9). Hence, some of the previous research in this field is biased due to the non-consideration of a possible supranational EU approach on terrorism. By using this innovative theoretical frame of differentiated integration and the subsequent closing of this research gap, important insights into the practical implications of the EU’s counter-terror approach can be provided. It will be easier to understand why certain states pursue integration whereas others do not and in what way the field will develop.

The focus of this thesis is on the internal measures of the EU’s counter-terrorism approach that take place within or are related to the area of freedom, security and justice. This is based on the well-acknowledged notion that counter-terrorism in the EU follows the criminal model (Argomaniz, 2012, 95; Bureš, 2011, 56; Monar, 2015, 337). Hence, terrorism in the EU is seen as a criminal offense that can best be prevented by internal security policies within the member states and within the European Union. Obviously, some measures against terrorism by the member states and the EU also take place outside of Europe and would be subject to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since it is expected that the policy area of foreign policy of the member states and the EU may encompass different mechanisms than the internal dealing with terrorism, these external measures are not the main focus of this analysis to achieve a higher analytical clarity. The policies under investigation in the internal EU area are legal and operational measures and they are either formal EU institutions or informal. All of these instances are included since they belong to the general counter-terrorism area which is our field

of interest. Instead, questions about legitimacy, effectiveness or citizens' freedom rights are excluded from the analysis, since the focus the analysis takes place from an EU integration approach.² Excluded of the examination are also the exact determinants of the variables, for instance why the public may see terrorism as more salient than other crimes or for which exact reasons some states are more affected by terrorism than others. It is expected that these determinants that may be seen as independent variables by other studies are included in the independent variables of this analysis.³

The chosen theoretical approach, differentiated integration theory, has usually been limited to the analysis of EU primary law which mainly consist of the EU Treaties (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 353). Secondary law that encompasses unilateral acts and international agreements (EUR-Lex, 2010) are often excluded from the analysis. As recommended by scholars of the theory, this thesis takes one step ahead and includes primary law, secondary law and institutional aspects into its analysis (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 292, 302). It remains to be seen if the theoretical framework is able to accommodate the entire counter-terrorism approach with its full complexity. The focus will not be on the entire policy area of freedom, security and justice but with counter-terrorism on one specific, policy field and its respective policy projects.⁴

The case of counter-terrorism is selected because of its high importance to the public, visible with the striking public attention on this policy field following terrorist attacks, and because of the EU's self-proclaimed task to contribute to the safety of its citizens (Bureš, 2011, 1; Argomaniz et al., 2015, 191). Moreover, the case possesses aspects of various sectors such as criminal law, criminal prosecution, police and intelligence cooperation which makes it "highly relevant" (Argomaniz, 2012, 1) for case studies (Argomaniz, 2012, 103; Bureš, 2011, 1). The field is, as previously mentioned, a prime example with horizontal (variation in participation of member states) and vertical differentiation (variation in the degree of delegation) and encompasses formal and informal policies.⁵ The case is thus selected as an influential case

² For studies concerning the legitimacy, consult Den Boer et al. 2008. For studies examining the question of effectiveness see the sections on effectiveness in Bureš, 2011.

³ For instance, salience is included in the variable of politicization and the differing occurrence of terrorism is included in the interdependence variable.

⁴ This thesis uses the term policy area for the entire area of freedom, security and justice. A policy field is composed of various policies on the same topic or with the same goal, in this case the EU counter-terrorism field. The term policy project describes specific policies such as the European Arrest Warrant or the EU counter-terrorism coordinator.

⁵ Horizontal differentiation describes a variation in member states' participation on certain policy projects and vertical differentiation represents a variation in the degree of delegation towards the supranational EU-level. Formal and informal policies differ with regard to the fact whether a policy was included into the EU treaty or whether it is just a bilateral or multilateral agreement.

because of theoretical reasoning and high political and public relevance (Seawright/Gerring, 2008, 294).

The method used for the analysis of this case is a congruence analysis case study. It tests the implications derived from the theory with the empirics. The counter-terrorism policy is assumed to be a single, coherent case. This is an assumption made by this thesis and is based on the notion that every measure within this field at least partly serves the purpose of fighting terrorism. Hence, the underlying mechanism of each measure is considered to be sufficiently similar because all of the projects aim with the provision of security at the similar goal. However, this assumption is tested in the empirical analysis of this thesis.

The analysis will center on the time-frame from September 11, 2001 until today. Non-EU member states and consequently external differentiation is not included into the analysis which is in line with most of the literature on this topic. This thesis starts with a Literature Review that elaborates on previous attempts of explanation. In the next and third step, the theoretical framework is outlined together with an outline of the research design, hypothesis and operationalization. Fourth, the paper will present a historic delineation of the counter-terrorism approach and map the field from a differentiated integration perspective. In the fifth step, the theoretical implications are empirically tested and evaluated in case studies. At the end of the paper, the explanatory power of the theory is evaluated.

The results of this thesis show that differentiated integration theory is applicable to the field of counter-terrorism and the variables can explain the outcomes of integration projects in this field when they are properly specified and used in researching specific policy projects. In addition to that, the assumption made by this thesis that the counter-terrorism policy of the EU presents one single, coherent case in terms of integration has to be reconsidered. Rather, every specific policy project presents one case worthy of analysis with regard to differentiated integration theory. The theoretical goal to test the theory is achieved in this thesis and the congruence analysis shows that the differentiated integration theory is applicable and relevant for explaining this field. Additionally, the understanding of states' motivations is enhanced. For instance the variable politicization does not universally work as an obstacle for integration but can also be turned into an impetus of integration.

2. Literature Review

As it was mentioned in the introduction, when reviewing the research literature on counter-terrorism efforts of the EU, it becomes apparent that scholars attest to an increasingly active role to the EU and agree on its differentiated form (Argomaniz, 2012, foreword). The assessment of the form of this effort is coinciding despite the usage of different terms. Authors refer to the EU counterterrorism policy as a “composite policy” (Argomaniz, 2012, 96), a form of “flexible integration” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 539), attest a “subsidiary” (Monar, 2015, 333) role, or even describe the EU as a “coordinator of efforts at most” (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 202). Hence, authors agree that the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism is far from a supranational, integrated policy, but instead often lacks coherence and a prompt implementation of policies at the level of the member states. The reasons for this lack of coherence have been contested in the literature and will be the topic of this literature review. These explanations can shed light on the reasons why there is no integration but differentiation, a topic that has not been covered nearly as frequently. All studies mentioned in this review aim at explaining instances of the EU’s counter-terrorism approach by using different independent variables or theories. By comparing the argumentations, it will be shown that political decisions were at the core of the EU’s answer to terrorism and the determinants for these decisions need to be further analyzed with an EU integration theory.

2.1. Public good theory

Using public good theory to point out incentives and restraints for integration, Bossong and Gaisbauer model the fight against terrorism and the resulting provision of security as a public good (Bossong, 2013, 166; Gaisbauer, 2013, 185). Bossong argues in his article that concerns about free-riding and overcrowding⁶ are outweighing the weakest-link stimulus for cooperation (Bossong, 2013, 166). In principle, the EU can be described as a system of weaker links, where the extensive counter-terrorism efforts by some member states are offset by other states, investing less into the public good of security (Bossong, 2013, 168). The provision of the good security depends mostly on “coordinated national efforts” (Bossong, 2013, 170). But despite some examples like the European Arrest Warrant or aviation security where weaker links were eliminated (Bossong, 2013, 175), member states continued to resist integration. In areas of intelligence or counter-radicalization, weaker links persist. According to the author, this is due

⁶ Free-riding describes the phenomenon that when a good is non-excludable and/or some states have a bigger interest than other states in a certain good, some states may choose to free-ride meaning that they benefit of the good but do not contribute at all to the provision of the good (Andreoni, 1988, 293). Overcrowding means that the value or extent of the good is decreased when more users consume it.

to concerns about free-riding and a degradation of security because of overcrowding (Bossong, 2013, 166). Yet, the author fails to mention that supranational integration and the delegation of this public good provision to the EU level provides a possibility to ensure reliability, confidentiality and adequate contributions by all participants. Hence, member states would face a choice of either delegation and supranational integration or smaller, regional clubs and bilateral agreements. Member states prefer in most cases the use of small clubs or bilateral agreements outside of the EU framework (informal counter-terrorism networks) instead of integration projects (Bossong, 2013, 176; Bureš, 2012, 495) and are even seen as “optimal solutions” (Gaisbauer, 2013, 187) by politicians. This choice is not thoroughly explained by Bossong. He only hints at member states’ threat perceptions (Bossong, 2013, 176) and political intervention (Bossong, 2013, 169). Gaisbauer refers vaguely to the “political context” (Gaisbauer, 2013, 189) Further work on putting the political influence on the provision of security into a theoretical context is needed.

2.2. Supranational policy entrepreneurship

Kaunert and Occhipinti argue that supranational EU actors are crucial in the development of EU’s counter-terrorism policy (Kaunert, 2010, 10; Occhipinti, 2015, 234). This phenomenon is seen as proof that the EU is moving “towards supranational governance” in counter-terrorism (Kaunert, 2010, 8). According to the authors, the Commission and the Council secretariat were crucial in the establishment of the European Arrest Warrant, the rules against terrorist financing and the institutionalized police cooperation through Europol (Kaunert, 2010, 10; Occhipinti, 2015, 234). This process is coined as policy entrepreneurship. Policy entrepreneurship describes that actors are investing resources into a specific proposal and lobby for its acceptance (Kaunert, 2010, 12). In this case, the supranational actors are expected to lobby for a more integrated approach to counter-terrorism and subsequently change the preferences of the member states towards more integration (Kaunert, 2010, 24). For instance, the Commission is expected to argue for more integration because they are aware of the functional spill-over of free movement within the EU and following a path dependency logic, in other policy fields more interdependence meant more integration in the past (Occhipinti, 2015, 243; 249).

While the supranational actors’ preferences are perceived accurately, it does not change the fact that the focus of analysis remains on the EU member states since they are decisive in policy-making in the intergovernmental area for freedom, security and justice (Occhipinti, 2015, 242). Hence, the motivations of the member states are still crucial and are influenced by many variables such as national interests but also the lobbying of supranational actors. However,

attributing the integration in this field of high politics mainly to supranational policy entrepreneurship is certainly an overestimation and both authors are inadvertently admitting that. The adoption of legislation against terrorist financing can largely be attributed to the UN Security Council resolution 1373 (Kaunert, 2010, 20). Moreover, the European Arrest Warrant is partly associated with the reluctance of EU member states to join the US led *War on Terror* and releasing the political pressure through European solutions such as the European Arrest Warrant (Kaunert, 2010, 22).

Consequentially, both authors fall short on explaining in a more specific way the “significant” (Kaunert, 2010, 23) influence of the supranational actors on the decisions of the member states. While both authors refer to a functional spill-over expanding into sensitive areas of state sovereignty, they fail to substitute their claim why supranational policy entrepreneurship has weakened member states’ concerns about sovereignty (Occhipinti, 2015, 248). I argue that especially in counter-terrorism areas that are connected strongly to core areas of a member state, this assessment is an overestimation. This is again visible as the Commission itself was “cautious to avoid supranational recipes” (Argomaniz, 2012, 25) after the attacks of Madrid. Moreover, because of the lack of capacity at the EU level, national security agencies are highly skeptical of proposals coming from supranational actors because of concerns about their own sovereignty but also about the efficiency of the institutions at the EU level (Bureš, 2011, 85). This “bureaucratic resistance” (Occhipinti, 2015, 247) by national agencies is then transmitted to the national decision-makers and reinforces concerns of national politicians about supranational proposals.

2.3. Social constructivism

Applying social constructivism and its notion of the intersubjective construction of reality is used to explain the EU’s counter-terrorism approach in two different ways. First, Bureš (2008), Edwards/Meyer (2008), Meyer (2009) and Monar (2007; 2015) emphasize that divergences in threat perceptions are responsible for a lack of comprehensiveness in EU’s counter-terrorism policy. Second, Balzacq/Hadfield (2012) stress mistrust as the decisive independent variable for the flexible integration in this policy field. I argue that both groups of research provide valuable insights and can be merged fruitfully into the argument that *national* perceptions of either threat or trust are decisive.

First, all scholars studying the threat perception acknowledge that EU’s counter-terrorism policy is lacking coherence and that more cooperation and common instruments are needed for

better effectiveness (Bureš, 2008, 70; Monar, 2007, 306; Monar, 2015, 333; Meyer, 2009, 661; Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 9). Thus by emphasizing the need for cooperation, the authors recognize a high interdependence, meaning that the actors are to a high extent interconnected. However, member states are not willing to centralize core competences at the supranational EU level (Bureš, 2008, 73; Monar, 2015, 333; Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 9). According to this strand of literature, this is due to diverging threat perceptions. Meyer lays out two different ways of perceiving the terrorist threat to Europe. One perception is that terrorism targets the security of the entire West, which would be in this case the entire European Union (Meyer, 2009, 648). Thus, the threat perception would be equally high in all Western countries, which is unlikely given the cultural and political differences even within the EU. The other outlook states that terrorism is a threat against only some countries, as they have exposed themselves through, for instance, foreign or domestic policies (Meyer, 2009, 648). Hence, the threat perceptions within the EU would differ. The latter view is utilized more often in the reviewed articles.

Referring to Bureš, the different threat perceptions root mainly in four aspects. These are the different historical backgrounds of terrorism in the EU countries (Bureš, 2008, 73), the dominant proposition of the roots of terrorism as either domestic or external matter (Bureš, 2008, 51), differing demographic features (Bureš, 2008, 63) and the absence of a common threat assessment mechanism by the EU (Bureš, 2008, 69; 73). As EU member states differ in these regards, consequentially, public perceptions of the threats vary. This is shown in Eurobarometer polls. Looking at the time span 2003 to 2007, in Spain 43 percent of respondents named terrorism as one of the most important issues facing their country compared to an EU average of 12 percent (Bureš, 2008, 77).

Despite national differences in threat perception exist, Meyer and Bureš argue that the overall perception of threat is important for policy-making in this field as well. The high level of perceiving terrorism as a threat across Europe after the attacks of 9/11 is seen as conducive for EU-wide measures against terrorism (Bureš, 2008, 66; Meyer, 2009, 649). Meyer's argument goes one step further and refers to the degree of threat convergence as "important for understanding policy responses" (Meyer, 2009, 650). Hence, the two conclusions from the literature are that an overall high perception of terrorism as a threat enables policy responses by the EU and a high accordance of member states' threat perceptions leads to coherent policy responses.

However, certain concerns remain. For instance, Meyer points out that the direction of causality of this variable remains unknown and depends on the "lessons learnt" (Meyer, 2009, 653). Thus,

even though a higher threat perception in some countries may exist, the preference for specific policy paths depends on the past handling of terrorism in the specific country. As a result, no emergency measures could be justified to the public as terrorism is rather seen as “normal politics” (Meyer, 2009, 662). In this case, it would be harder for decision-makers to justify emergency measures. Moreover, threat perceptions can be influenced by politicians to procreate political support for certain policies (Meyer, 2009, 652). Consequently, from a policy-making perspective, one would need to reconsider what the impact of the threat perception in each country is. If terrorism is only perceived as a threat to a low amount, this could mean little public attention for the issue of terrorism. Following this lack of attention, other issues are higher on the policy agenda, receive more attention and the public does not accept the distribution of resources to counter-terrorism (Monar, 2007, 301). This would lower the probability of a state to divert resources to the supranational EU level or to accept the delegation of state competencies (Monar, 2007, 301). On the other hand, a low level of threat perception may mean that the policy field is less politically salient, giving politicians a free hand to delegate competencies as these decisions are not part of the public debate. Hence, the exact consequences of threat perceptions for policy-making can be seen as country-specific.

Another caveat is that we can assume that policy-makers (especially in the Justice and Home affairs domain) have a better access to information concerning the terrorism threat in Europe. Even though this information remains mainly to be created by national authorities and a common EU threat assessment is lacking, we can assume that policy-makers will have a different threat perception than the public because of this information asymmetry (Monar, 2007, 301). Thus, it has to be specified whether politicians decide upon policy measures because of their own or their better-informed assessment of the threat, or whether they respond as office-seekers to the pressures of the public.

The concerns mentioned here show that the exact policy consequences of differing threat perceptions remain unknown. The notion that, next to the differences in EU member states’ legal systems, differences in threat perception “prevented [...] and account for the slow process of establishing the area for justice, freedom and security” (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 9) is an overestimation as the dynamics and direction of causality of this link are not established yet. Instead, the literature in this field highlights that impressions of threat continue to be national and that they do vary considerably for various reasons (Monar, 2007, 302). Bureš forecasted correctly that, as of now, differences in threat perception continue to exist, as there is no common EU threat assessment (Bureš, 2008, 69).

In the other strand of literature, Balzacq and Hadfield use trust as an explanation for EU policies. Applying their argument to the example of the Treaty of Prüm⁷, they argue that mistrust causes differentiated integration (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 539). The authors and an interviewed Commission official claim that the envisioned removal of national sovereignty on data⁸ was “buried in the Treaty of Prüm” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 556). According to their article, this development was due to mistrust between the EU member states, especially amid the group of member states that have already been long-time members of the EU and the group of upcoming members (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 554). The determinants of this mistrust are named as power and interests by the author but not further specified (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 539). Moreover, the exact link of mistrust to a lack of integration is not substantiated as the authors solely state that mistrust “mobilizes defensive attitudes and affects political creativity” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 551). It further remains to be specified at what level mistrust is relevant. It is imaginable that decision-makers themselves do not trust each other or that the national constituencies are mistrusting other nations. The trust between the different national agencies that work on counter-terrorism may also be crucial when their opinions on cooperation are heard by national politicians or even the public. However, by framing views on deepening integration the authors inadvertently mention the missing link: political costs. Integration is unlikely because “the level of trust is low, and any attempt to initiate a project that affects a state’s sovereignty or identity is strongly resisted” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 552). Hence, mistrust does not lead directly to differentiated integration but only via the intervening variable of public resistance or resistance by security authorities. The exact working mechanism of this needs to be specified.

The theory of constitutional calculus frames this. A decision-maker has to weigh between “decision-making costs” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 549), costs caused by refraining from taking the necessary measures and “external costs” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 549) caused by undertaking the measure. In the case of the envisioned removal of national supremacy on data, the external costs would most likely stem from the public and actors of the security services. In taking the rational-choice decision whether the decision-maker accepts the persistence of

⁷ The Treaty of Prüm is a convention signed by currently 14 EU member states about cross-border cooperation in crime and terrorism. For an extensive portrayal see chapter 4.3. It was first outside of the EU framework so that the founding members could accomplish their policy goals but a less controversial version was later included into the EU framework.

⁸ With the adoption of the principle of availability, the national provisions on the “collection, retention and manipulation of data expressed in national constitutions is transformed into an EU-wide right of use of data” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 554).

interdependence costs of EU membership⁹ (Treaty of Prüm) or the political costs (principle of availability), the decision-makers decided for accepting the cost of interdependence. Hence, mistrust leads to a higher political price and the usage of the Treaty of Prüm was used to prevent this cost and consequentially the full integration of this policy.

The two different strands of social constructivism arguments showed that different threat perceptions and mistrust within the EU exist and are certainly relevant for policy-making in the EU. However, the exact link of these variables to differentiated integration is yet to be developed. As it was shown, if mistrust and divergent threat perceptions exist within the nation states, the corresponding national decision-makers may be reluctant to delegate core competences to the EU as they would face costly political resistance from their domestic constituencies.

2.4. Historic institutionalism

Using the theories of new institutionalism and historic institutionalism, Argomaniz looks at the “process of institutionalization” (Argomaniz, 2012, 2) of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy (Argomaniz, 2012, 2, 18). He identifies path dependency, the institutional setting of the EU and critical junctures as the decisive, intertwined factors for the EU’s form of policy.

First, by providing a historical account of the counter-terrorism field before the first critical juncture of 9/11, Argomaniz is providing support for his argument of path dependency. As he convincingly argues, the shape of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy was already predetermined by the approaches to cooperation that emerged in the 1970s. During this time, a heightened terrorism activity in Europe and ties of this terrorism to the Middle East, “persuaded governments of the limitations of unilateral action” (Argomaniz, 2012, 5). However, EU member states were reluctant in emitting core competences to the community and a harmonization of European extradition procedures was blocked (Argomaniz, 2012, 5). Instead, member states established in 1976 the intergovernmental TREVI¹⁰ framework, that followed an idea of informal cooperation and did not have an own secretariat (Argomaniz, 2012, 5). This path of rather informal cooperation was continued with the, in 1983 introduced, Police Working Group on Terrorism that aimed at enhancing police cooperation (Argomaniz, 2012, 6). The TREVI forum was subsequently subsumed under the third, intergovernmental pillar in the 1992 Maastricht treaty and thereby clinched the intergovernmental approach of dealing with

⁹ Because of its flexible structure and the exclusion of some member states at that time, the costs of interdependence of a continuing lack of data for other member states were apparent.

¹⁰ TREVI stands for “Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme and Violence Internationale” (Argomaniz, 2012, 5).

terrorism (Argomaniz, 2012, 6). This was reinstated in the 1997 concluded Treaty of Amsterdam (Argomaniz, 2012, 6). Following this path, the 1999 Tampere Council, almost exclusively dedicated to Justice and Home Affairs, did not change the path of a focus on voluntary cooperation rather than integration (Argomaniz, 2012, 7). Hence, before 9/11, the European member states had already set a path for informal cooperation rather than supranational oversight and delegation. As the dealing of the EU with the critical junctures of 9/11 and the attacks of Madrid, the second explanation by Argomaniz, will show, this path dependency was high throughout the critical junctures.

Before coming to the argument of critical junctures, the factor of institutional settings that affects policy outcomes needs to be laid out (Argomaniz, 2012, 2). The institutional settings of EU are relevant because counter-terrorism is more often seen as a “multi-faceted issue” (Argomaniz, 2012, 103). Counter-terrorism therefore ranges across various policies and, in the case of the EU, this means that counter-terrorism policies are based upon a cross-pillar design (Argomaniz, 2012, 104). This is also based in the treaties of the EU. The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam shifted important topics for counter-terrorism such as asylum, immigration and border control into the first pillar, which is based on the community method (Argomaniz, 2012, 6). Following Argomaniz, this has various consequences for policy-making in the EU. The efforts for a coherent policy and the political responsibilities are dispersed because of the pillar structure (Argomaniz, 2012, 68). Considering an area of counter-radicalization, this is managed by a multitude of committees in the Council (Argomaniz, 2012, 61). Several interviews with EU officials conducted by Argomaniz confirm this argument. A commission official describes the Council dealing with counter-terrorism policies as a “mess” (Argomaniz, 2012, 68), the EU counter-terrorism coordinator states that sometimes lawyers and police forces discuss the same problem leading to less consistency (Argomaniz, 2012, 68). Hence, the fragmented institutional setting prevents further advances in this policy field, as will be shown by looking at the critical junctures.

Argomaniz describes the events of 9/11, the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and the attacks of London in 2005 as critical junctures for EU’s counter-terrorism policy development (Argomaniz, 2012, 18-26). Those external crises are seen by Argomaniz as events punctuating the “existing institutional equilibrium” (Argomaniz, 2012, 19). The first critical juncture of 9/11 led to immediate political salience of terrorism in the public debate in Europe but also on the international level with the US pushing for a strong response to the attacks (Argomaniz, 2012, 20). Hence, the EU needed to act quickly. A number of policies that were suggested but not

carried out before, were now adopted. These policies mostly stemmed from the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere Council (Argomaniz, 2012, 20). The aspect of terrorism was paradoxically rarely mentioned in these 1999 conclusions (Argomaniz, 2012, 7). Even though the measures were not aimed at terrorism, they were adopted, which indicates the pressure on the decision-makers and their use of previously rejected measures, following the garbage-can model of organizational choice (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 15). Consequentially, one can say that the EU's policy response was highly path dependent on the use of these measures that were previously not adopted and that were primarily focused on international crime (Argomaniz, 2012, 22).

The second critical juncture, the 2004 attacks in Madrid, is in the eyes of Argomaniz the decisive moment when “counter-terrorism started becoming a truly differentiated policy space” (Argomaniz, 2012, 24). After the attack, the Commission enhanced its role as policy entrepreneur in fields that were covered by the community pillar (Argomaniz, 2012, 25). However, the “impetus for change would not go as far as to force the supranationalization” (Argomaniz, 2012, 26) and the joint initiative by Belgium and Austria to create a European Intelligence Agency was rejected by large member states (Argomaniz, 2012, 25). Argomaniz sees institutional lock-ins, resulting out of the pillar structure, as the reason that the previously established structures that followed a path dependency model were not dismantled (Argomaniz, 2012, 26). The attacks in London, as a third critical juncture, did not have the grave impact like 9/11 or Madrid but merely led to more implementation, and will therefore not be further explained at this point (Argomaniz, 2012, 26)

When combing these different factors, Argomaniz correctly concludes that the mostly path dependent “political choices by national governments made at critical junctures have shaped the development of the counter-terrorism field and explain in large part the consistency problematic [...]. Member states have generally avoided the formulas of supranationalization and legal harmonization [...]” (Argomaniz, 2012, 138-139). Thus, even though the factors of critical junctures, institutional setting and path dependency have effects, the “political choices made by national governments at key moments of the institutionalization process” (Argomaniz, 2012, 34) are decisive. These decisions are according to Argomaniz “wholly predictable due to the high political sensibility of terrorism and the significance of internal security for the sovereignty of the state” (Argomaniz, 2012, 139). It will be seen in the analysis if this holds.

2.5. Synergy

Although the four strands of literature presented in this review use different perspectives, they accentuate that the EU's answer to terrorism is mostly based on the decisions by the member states. The public good approaches refer to "political intervention" (Bossong, 2013, 176) and the "political context" (Gaisbauer, 2013, 189) when explaining why security as public good is often provided in small clubs. Supranational policy entrepreneurship approaches claim that supranational actors influence the preferences of member states in policy-making. However, the member states' actions remain decisive, especially in questions of national sovereignty (Occhipinti, 2015, 242). Historic institutionalism, articulating the importance of path dependency, institutional setting and critical junctures, also points to the relevance of political decisions at specific moments in time (Argomaniz, 2012, 138-139). Looking at threat perceptions and trust, social constructivists argue that divergences in these variables lead to a differentiation of policy. While establishing a direct link may be an overstatement, this kind of literature underlines the national cues argument. It states that national constituencies tend to simplify issues and mostly judge policy-making according to the national performance (Armingeon/Ceka, 2014, 85). Hence, the national performance against terrorism is more important than the EU performance which is linked to threat perceptions and trust. As all of the literature presented declares political incentives as relevant, the works of Hegemann et al. (2011), Balzacq (2008) and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2007), are considered.

These authors describe incentives in counter-terrorism policy-making to decision-makers, yet they do this mostly absent from the EU context. However, it could be argued that the incentives to decision-makers of nation states remain the same even with the presence of the EU. De Mesquita argues that electoral pressure leads politicians to the use of observable countermeasures rather than unobservable tactics, even if unobservable tactics are considered to be more effective (de Mesquita, 2007, 9). Balzacq states that the choice for specific instruments against terror cannot be reduced to technical questions but the choice depends on political factors (Balzacq, 2008, 80-81). Eventually, Hegemann et al. see policy measures as initiatives taken from a culturally and politically constrained area of possibilities that fulfill signaling effects to the public (Hegemann et. al, 2011, 289-290). Knowing those insights from all strands of literature, the next step of this paper will be to substantiate these within a European integration theory and making them applicable for empirical analysis of the European context.

3. Theoretical Framework

To analyze the EU integration of a specific policy field and being aware of the just mentioned shortcomings of other explanations, a theoretical framework based on an EU Integration theory is needed. The theoretical framework is based on differentiated integration theory, which is, compared to the classical integration theories, highly adequate for the endeavor of this thesis. This claim is substantiated with the following subchapters on the classical integration theories focusing on the explanatory value of each theory with regard to differentiated integration. It will be shown that a specific theory on differentiated integration is needed, however important elements of the classical theories can be incorporated into the analysis. Thus, the theoretical framework of this thesis will present the classical integration theories, then outline differentiated integration and further specify it to the specific policy field. In the end of this section, the research design and the operationalization are described.

3.1. Classical Integration theories and differentiated integration

3.1.1. Intergovernmentalism

The first prominent integration theory is intergovernmentalism with its variation of liberal and realist intergovernmentalism. In this paper, it is not in the interest to outline the whole theory in detail but to show the explanatory value of the theory in relation to differentiated integration. In intergovernmentalism theory, national governments are the dominant actors that decide on European integration (Leuffen et al., 2012, 38-40). In its liberal variant, the preferences that are articulated by the governments stem from domestic interest groups (Cini, 2016, 76; Leuffen et al., 2012, 40) and in its realist variant the positions are derived from the thinking of the governments on national autonomy (Leuffen et al., 2012, 46; Schimmelfennig/Rittberger, 2006, 81). The initial stimulus for integration, however, stems from international interdependence, resulting in the desire of states to deal with this interdependence and to maximize the states' utility at the same time (Moravcsik/Katzenstein, 1998, 60; Leuffen et al., 2012, 43). The specific form of the integration project is dependent on negotiations between the member states that is determined by bargaining power and domestic constraints as well as by collective action problems (Leuffen et al., 2012, 50-52). Hence, to summarize,

“[...] intergovernmentalism explains differentiated integration by differences in interdependence and cooperation problems, state preferences, bargaining power, domestic ratification constraints, and – in the case of RI – autonomy costs and benefits.” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 54).

A state, thus, is willing to delegate its competences to the EU level, if the state's preferences and level of interdependence converges with the other member states. The state is not willing to delegate its competences if the state faces domestic resistance, autonomy constraints (reinforced by state size) and cooperation problems (Leuffen et al., 2012, 60). The recent theoretical innovation named new intergovernmentalism, describes the differentiated integration as a “distinct phase [...] [that is due to] transformations in Europe's political economy, changes in preference formation and the decline of the permissive consensus” (Bickerton et al., 2015, 703).

Intergovernmentalism theory, however, falls short in explaining why in some policy areas side payments and issue-linkage¹¹ helped states to overcome these just mentioned caveats and in others not (Schneider, 2014, 700). Possible explanation for this refers to the “externality structure of the goods under consideration” (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 353) and to autonomy constraints (Leuffen et al., 2012, 60). However, it remains to be seen why states are able to compensate other states in some negotiations but not in others. Moreover, it has to be specified why in certain policy fields the threat of exclusion from an integration project and the resulting negative externalities does not create enough incentives to make states join the integration project (Dyson, 2010, 18). In addition to that, intergovernmentalism does not provide an explanation which factors influence the form of differentiated integration that result out of the bargaining with different national preferences. Yet, the theory sheds light on national governments, their preferences and constraints which are essential for explaining integration projects.

3.1.2. Supranationalism and neo-functionalism

Supranationalism attributes a crucial role to the transnational society and supranational organizations in the integration process (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz, 1997, 297; Leuffen et al., 2012, 62). According to this theory and neo-functionalism, every previous integration project creates momentum for further integration and highlights gaps or costs that are hindering the achievement of a political or functional goal (Jensen, 2016, 57; Leuffen et al., 2012, 7, 65-66). Because of this accordance, they are treated together in this section. These gaps were termed functional spill-over by neo-functionalists if the negative externalities of the integration in one policy sector created an integration demand in another policy sector (Leuffen et al., 2012, 70).

¹¹ Side payments describe the exchange of money or compensations for the approval of a policy to an actor that would lose from this policy (Kolb, 2007, 1924). Issue-linkage describes the process that previously separated issues or policies are linked to achieve the approval of a policy by states (Haas, 1980, 370).

The momentum for integration created by transnational interest groups in domestic constituencies can be phrased as political spill-over (Jensen, 2016, 57; Leuffen et al., 2012, 70). If the supranational actors of the EU recognize a functional or political spill-over, these actors initiate further integration projects and lobby for them. This is called institutional (Leuffen et al., 2012, 71) or cultivated spill-over (Jensen, 2016, 57). Using this perspective, integration is path dependent and previous steps determine future European policies (Leuffen et al., 2012, 64, 69).

The theoretical perspective of supranationalism thus expects, when through transnational exchange and previous integration a demand for integration exists, that supranational actors can help advance further integration (Leuffen et al., 2012, 82). An important precondition for this conjecture is that the respective supranational actor needs to have the capacity for this in this specific policy field (Moravcsik, 1999, 267; Leuffen et al., 2012, 80). By looking at differentiated integration just from a supranationalist or neo-functionalist perspective, it becomes obvious that the theory has certain shortcomings. It cannot explain why in certain policy areas, flexibility and not integration is increasing or why cooperation is even sought outside the institutional framework provided by supranational actors (Dyson, 2010, 18). Supranationalism expects a general momentum towards more integration but this is in certain policy fields not the case. Hence, the lack of integration in certain policies, despite an integration demand posited by some member states and supranational actors, remains unexplained. However, the theory highlights the relevance of supranational actors in the process of integration. Nevertheless, this variable is not universal, the power of supranational actors to push integration is dependent on policy fields. The relevance of transnational actors or the transnational society needs to be evaluated with regard to the specific integration project.

3.1.3. Social constructivism

The third theoretical approach of a European integration theory is social constructivism. In short, the theory argues that ideas influence how actors view interdependence and how they see integration as a possibility for problem-solving (Leuffen et al., 2012, 85-86). Hence, the responses of a member state to a demand of integration depend on the logic of appropriateness and instrumental, intersubjective ideas of states in specific policy fields (Rosamond, 2016, 87; Leuffen et al., 2012, 85, 91). Contrasting the presumed pro-integration idea of neo-functionalist, social constructivism demands for an investigation of the idea or identities at hand (Christiansen et al., 1999, 528; Leuffen et al., 2012, 86). It needs to be specified which

ideas matter, those at the domestic constituency, in the bureaucracy or at the level of the decision-maker.

Following this argument, differentiated integration is likely, if an “ideational heterogeneity” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 99) within the EU exists and thus, different appropriate policy projects are preferred. If national values or well-known instrumental ideas of the states are contested by European integration, these may be resisted by some states and the integration process results in differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2012, 99). Hence, despite social constructivism cannot make statements which instrumental idea leads to which differentiation, it provides the important insight that ideas, identities and values matter on the national level (Leuffen et al., 2012, 101). As it is expected by the theory that these ideas differ from policy field to policy field (Leuffen et al., 2012, 91), it is once again shown that the constructivist ideas need to be investigated on the level of policies.

3.1.4. Intermediate result of classic integration theories

After assessing differentiated integration from these three major theoretical perspectives, an overview of all the factors that may explain differentiated integration is provided below in Table 1. In general, all groups acknowledge the importance of national governments’ decisions in the integration process and, as it will be seen in the following, major elements of these classic integration projects are included in differentiated integration theory.

Table 1: Classic integration theories and differentiated integration

	Intergovernmentalism	Supranationalism/ Neo-functionalism	Social Constructivism
<i>Main actors</i>	national governments	transnational interest groups and supranational actors	national governments
<i>Inter-dependence</i>	initial stimulus for integration	through spill-over, externalities	creates demands for integration
<i>Determinants of the integration outcome</i>	domestic resistance and autonomy constraints, bargaining power and cooperation problems	capacity of supranational actors, relevance of transnational actors	(instrumental) ideas at various levels, national identities and values

3.2. Differentiated integration theory

As it was shown in the previous chapter, classic integration theories provide different approaches to explain differentiated integration in Europe. However, each theory only provides

an initial explanation on differentiation as a byproduct of the pro-integration theory. Overall, this thesis agrees with previous assessments that the well-established theories of EU integration face large complications in resolving the puzzle of differentiated integration (Dyson, 2010, 17; Tekin, 2012a, 22).

As differentiation is a persistent feature of the EU (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 292) and has increased over time rather than decreased (Leuffen et al., 2012, 26), a theoretical model that explicitly focuses on this phenomenon is needed (Dyson, 2010, 19). When using this theoretical approach, one has to be aware that there is not *the* specific, full-fledged theory of differentiated integration theory (Dyson, Preface VII). Instead, it takes many different forms and most of them are not yet applicable for empirical studies (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 297). In this paper, the most developed form, that is mainly oriented on Leuffen et al.'s (2012) conceptualization, is outlined, further concretized and operationalized.

When theorizing about differentiated integration, it is necessary to define what integration means. Integration in the European Union describes a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national states” (Haas, 1961, 366-367). Integration is thus different from cooperation and intergovernmentalism that describe phenomena where member states work together without delegating their competencies to a supranational level (Nugent, 2006, 558).

Differentiated integration theory starts with the assumption that there is no uniformly integrated EU. Some policy-fields are integrated whereas others are mainly based on cooperation. This phenomenon has been termed with various titles such as Europe à la Carte, European Onion or core Europe, but these terms lack a proper concept definition (Tekin, 2012b, 237-238; Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 544). The concept of differentiated integration instead avoids such an instance of concept-stretching. Differentiated integration theory conceptualizes the EU as a system in which “the level of centralization and territorial extension [...] var[ies] by function” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 10). Hence, the three categories that measure differentiated integration are “the level of centralization, the functional scope and the territorial extension” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 1). If the EU would be a fully integrated political system, there would be a maximum level of centralization and extension in every functional policy field. However, this is certainly not the case and policy areas differ with regard to integration. The EU integration, thus, differs across policy areas and fields.

To further conceptualize the differences between the different functions of the EU, it is necessary to further clarify the concepts of centralization and territorial extension. In differentiated integration theory, centralization is termed as “vertical integration” describing “the level of centralization of EU decision-making in different policy areas” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 12). If a policy is not uniformly integrated but certain competences remain at the level of the member states, one speaks of a "vertical differentiation" (Leuffen et al., 2012, 1). The other category, referring to territorial extension, is named “horizontal integration” and looks at the “territorial extension of the EU’s jurisdiction in each policy area” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 12). A policy is thus horizontally differentiated, if not all members partake or if outsiders join a specific policy project (Leuffen et al., 2012, 1) Horizontal differentiation can be further discriminated into certain forms. The absence of European member states in an integration project is termed as internal differentiation, the participation of non-EU member states is called external differentiation (Leuffen et al., 2012, 17). Cases in which non-members participate and insiders opt-out are thus characterized as cases of internal and external horizontal differentiation (Leuffen et al., 2012, 17). In terms of vertical differentiation, it is looked at the level of commitment and execution in decision-making that states give to the EU in a certain policy area (Leuffen et al., 2012, 12).

Even though conceptualizations as presented by the theory are an important first step in explaining European integration, differentiated integration theory has the ambition to take one step ahead and explain why some policies are less integrated than others (Tekin, 2012b, 239; Leuffen et al., 2012, 34). The analytical framework to examine this question from this theoretical perspective starts with a view on the demand and supply side of integration. The demand side describes the “needs and preferences” (Leuffen et al., 2012, 34) of the governments. It is expected that governments, facing policy problems, interdependences or even negative externalities, form their preferences on integration based on their interests and ideas (Leuffen et al., 2012, 34). The preferences can stem out of different arenas, they can stem out of the domestic arena, but also from transnational interest groups or supranational actors (Leuffen et al., 2012, 35). These preferences can be instrumental ideas and result endogenously out of the integration process or exogenously from the outside (Leuffen et al., 2012, 35-36). Hence, many aspects of the classic integration theories such as the constructivist spotlight on ideas and the importance of interdependence are included. In short, the demand side thus helps in conceptualizing the needs of an actor and the actor’s preferences on integration (Leuffen et al., 2012, 249).

The supply side looks at the constellation of these preferences, actors' constraints, institutional context and negotiations. This side of the phenomenon is central for the actual realization of an integration project (Leuffen et al., 2012, 36). Matching preferences pose the core variable of the supply side. Since negotiations and the context of them are important, it is reasonable to look whether the negotiations are done in an intergovernmental or supranational sphere, whether actors are able to make concessions or whether they need to bargain hard and how the actors are constrained (Leuffen et al., 2012, 36). In brief, the supply side treats the constellation of preferences, the constraints of the actors and the institutional context (Leuffen et al., 2012, 249). If the actors are constrained by the public, one speaks of a concept called politicization which will be further defined in the following.

This demand and supply side argumentation is inherently also used by Dyson who speaks of a "will and capability" (Dyson, 2010, 10) of states to integrate. The will of states would thus signify the demand for or against integration and the capability represents the supply side of integration, meaning that even if a state is willing to delegate its competences in one policy area to the EU level, he might not be capable to do so because other member states are too constrained to make the integration project happen.

The outline of the theory until this point highlights an important feature of the theory that coincides with the previously presented integration theories. The focus is on states and their governments as the relevant actors in the integration process (Dyson, 2010, 4). Another relevant focus is, as mentioned in the initial definition of differentiated integration, the functional dimension of the integration project. Thus, it is not only relevant to account for the preferences of the actors, their constraints and the negotiations but also for the "properties of the functional dimension" (Dyson, 2010, 40). This analytical spotlight on policy areas allows to gain further knowledge on questions on differentiated integration in certain policy fields, which is not being done by the traditional integration theories (Leuffen et al., 2012, 246). The long-neglected argument by Theodore Lowi that "policies determine politics" (Lowi, 1972, 299) is therefore included in this theoretical framework. Including the introduced aspects of demand and supply which are the need for integration that can result out of policy problems or negative externalities on the demand side and the convergence of preferences and the politicization as actors' constraint on the supply side, a hypothetical causal link is suggested by the authors of the theory, which is "conditional on preference convergence and low politicization, interdependence promotes integration (Leuffen et al., 2012, 261, 265)."

The theoretical mechanism accommodates the aspects of demand and supply and through this also the aspects raised by classical integration theories. The need for integration of the demand side emphasized by neo-functionalism that can result out of policy problems or negative externalities is integrated in the variable of interdependence. Preference convergence, raised by intergovernmentalism, covers the preferences of the member states that are raised on the demand side and then compared with each other on the supply side. Depending on the policy field, it would be thinkable that governments can convince other states to adopt their preferences with side payments and issue-linkage (Dyson, 2010, 349). However, this ability may be constrained. Politicization as the main constraint assumes that the actor's leverage for concessions is lower when the policy field or the integration project is highly politicized (Leuffen et al., 2012, 252). This politicization has also been found in some of the parts of the literature review, when, for instance, Gaisbauer referred to the "political context" (Gaisbauer, 2013, 189). The merging of the broad concept of actor's constraints into politicization is fully justifiable, because it is widely assumed that the pro-integrationist permissive consensus that has allowed for an integration of various, mostly technical policies has passed away and was replaced with a more politicized, national thinking about Europe (Leuffen et al., 2012, 265; Dyson, 2010, 348). Obviously, this hypothesized mechanism works differently in each distinct policy field, as preferences, politicization and interdependence changes from policy field to policy field.

3.3. Differentiated integration of core state powers

As it was outlined, the reasons for differentiated integration are dependent on the policy area. More specifically, differentiated integration "results from an interaction of the relative depth of integration [that was already achieved in the policy area] and the attributes of a policy area" (Rittberger et al., 2014, 190). To gain further theoretical insights into those policy area features, Rittberger et al. distinguish between non-core state powers and core state powers (Rittberger et al., 2014, 189).

According to the distinction made in their article, non-core state powers address mostly "regulatory [...] and expenditure policies" (Rittberger et al., 2014, 192). Instances of these non-core state powers are the regulation of the internal market of the EU or expenditures on the common agricultural policy and cohesion funds. Contrasting this, core state powers are considered to be the foundation of the modern, sovereign state and consist of policies on external security, international relations, internal security and fiscal, economical, monetary and tax policies (Rittberger et al., 2014, 192). This widely accepted distinction (Leuffen et al., 2012,

253) and the records of European integration lead to the expectation that differentiation is higher in areas of core state powers. The reasons for this need to be examined, especially because some core state powers are integrated whereas others remain purely national or are differentiated (Rittberger et al., 2014, 194). An example of high integration despite horizontal differentiation is the integration of the national currencies into the common Euro project. By distinguishing between these policy areas, Rittberger et al. provide an important clarification for the variables proposed by Leuffen et al., which are preference convergence, interdependence and politicization, and they add with the capabilities of supranational actors another variable.

First, core state powers distinguish themselves mainly by a high politicization from non-core state powers with a low politicization. The higher politicization is due to the fact that core state powers are seen as crucial for autonomy, sovereignty, identity and even survival of the own state and its citizens (Rittberger et al., 2014, 196). Following this notion, politicization translates into the constraints that member states face in the integration process. Hence, integration “is more likely to be differentiated, the more politicized the policy area is” (Rittberger et al., 2014, 195). However, despite the theoretically reaffirmed importance of the variable of politicization for the outcome, it remains to be analyzed how politicized each specific policy field is.

Second, resulting from the insights of Rittberger et al. on politicization, the necessity for the variable of preference convergence is reinforced. This is visible when the case of monetary integration is investigated. Even in the case of politicized core state powers like currency and monetary politics, integration was attained since preferences between main states were in line (Rittberger et al., 2014, 202). Hence, the constellation of preferences is crucial since member states on questions of core state powers are expected to have strong, firm preferences that are not that easily to alter with side payments (Rittberger et al., 2014, 199). Accordingly, the constellation of each set of preferences in each policy field need to be examined.

Third, in line with supranationalism theory and in contrast to Leuffen et al.’s hypothesis, Rittberger et al. point to the relevance of supranational actors in the integration process (Rittberger et al., 2014, 195). One could assume in advance that in core state powers, the institutional context of the EU is weak and supranational actors do not have considerable capabilities (Rittberger et al., 2014, 205). However, this is an inaccurate generalization, because the capabilities of the actors on the EU level have increased, latest with the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, it needs to be evaluated what the capabilities of supranational actors in the specific policy field, even in core-state policies are. If they are considered to be weak, the field is more likely to be differentiated (Rittberger et al., 2014, 195).

Fourth, just like Leuffen et al., Rittberger et al. acknowledge the influence of interdependence on the integration outcome and point out that the differences of interdependence across member states need to be examined (Rittberger et al., 2014, 194). They argue that interdependences should be closely evaluated, because states can be affected asymmetrically and interdependences in core-state powers are likely to be solved slower because the stakes are higher for the member states (Rittberger et al., 2014, 194-195). Thus, in line with the politicization argument, an asymmetric interdependence in a core-state power may create less of an impetus for integration than symmetric interdependence in a non-core state power.

All factors that were presented here taken into account together, one can expect that “core state powers are less often supranationally integrated, and if they are integrated it will be with less delegation and centralization than non-core state powers” (Rittberger et al., 2014, 196). However, this cannot be seen as a natural law but needs to be evaluated in case studies of specific policy fields since in the past several core state powers have already been partly integrated, such as monetary integration (Rittberger et al., 2014, 197). The research design, including the hypothesis derived from the theory, will be outlined in the next chapter.

3.4. Research design

The design of the study is a case study of the EU’s counter-terrorism approach as the single case under investigation. Even though the EU policy in this field is very multifaceted, it is treated as one case with many empirical observations. This assumption is based on the idea that every policy in this field has at least to a certain extent the goal to diminish the threat of terrorism to the citizens of the EU. Hence, the same logic should come into play in each instrument that is introduced in this field and the core characteristics are also the same. It will be seen over the course of this empirical analysis if the assumption holds.

As the outcome of the dependent variable is known and the field is already described as differentiated, this thesis aims at explaining the mechanism that led to this outcome through the variables deduced from a theory. Hence, this research is a congruence analysis case study. According to Blatter and Blume, this type of study is used to find “(mis-) matches between empirical findings and concrete expectations deduced from core elements of theories” (Blatter/Blume, 2008, 319) which is exactly the goal of this study. As methodically demanded, the study will contain a test of assumptions made in the subsequent hypothesis about the reasons and motivations for the outcome (Blatter/Blume, 2008, 326). However, the line drawn to causal-process tracing is thin and causal process observations need to be included to either falsify or

confirm the theory (Blatter/Blume, 2008, 326). This will be done through case studies of certain aspects of counter-terrorism policies in the EU. However, instead of comparing various completely different theory schools which is done in most of the convergence analyses, this paper innovatively includes theoretical propositions derived from differentiated integration theory into its hypothesis.

3.4.1. Hypothesis and units of analysis

The introduced, theoretical factors that determine integration in core state policies apply to the policy field of counter-terrorism that is mostly included in the area of freedom, security and justice. Indisputably, this field involves “core state powers par excellence” (Rittberger et al., 2014, 203). Using the factors that were introduced by the theory on differentiated integration by Leuffen et al. (2012) and Rittberger et al.’s (2014) additions, this paper hypothesizes:

H1: The differentiated integration in the EU’s counter-terrorism approach is the result of little preference convergence between European member states, high and asymmetric politicization across member states, asymmetrical interdependence and weak supranational actors.

Following the advice of King et al. to make sure that the theoretical prediction is falsifiable (King et al., 1994, 19-20), a counterfactual zero hypothesis is presented.

H0: Uniform integration in the EU’s counter-terrorism approach is the result of high preference convergence between European member states, low politicization across member states, symmetrical interdependence and strong, capable supranational actors.

Hence, this study is a theoretical test of the causal theory of differentiated integration that provides conditions and explanations for differentiated integration. The hypothesis is probabilistic. Since the hypothesis suggests a multivariate explanation, Goertz and Levy rightfully pointed to the need to specify the interaction of the variables in case studies (Goertz/Levy, 2007, 9). This thesis expects the variable of preference convergence and politicization to be sufficient conditions, because preferences are the main demand for integration in intergovernmentalism and politicization as the main constraint. They are also the only two variables that states can directly influence themselves, whereas interdependence and the role of supranational actors is exogenous to the states’ behaviour. Hence, a low preference convergence between member states or high politicization across member states lead most likely to the outcome of differentiated integration. The variables of asymmetrical interdependence and supranational actors are necessary conditions that most likely need to be

present to enable the occurrence of differentiated integration as an outcome. The empirical analysis and the case studies will look at whether this conception of causation is appropriate.

The units of analysis remain the member states. Even though it would also be thinkable look at the politicization of the whole European population, this thesis coincides with intergovernmentalism and argues that the variables matter at the member state level. This will further be specified in the next step when each variable is conceptually specified and operationalized.

3.4.2. Concept specification and operationalization

According to the rules of Goertz' three level concept (Goertz, 2006, 50), an operationalization and concept specification takes place in three steps. After presenting the terms of the concept on the basic level, the secondary level illustrates the components of the concepts, while the third and final level describes the indicators that are used for measuring the concept (Goertz, 2006, 6). This will be done in the following, starting with the dependent variable of differentiated integration and will be followed with the four independent variables. The analysis of the variables is exactly in line with the demand by Rittberger et al. that called for an investigation of policy area attributes to explain differentiated integration (Rittberger et al., 2014, 190).

3.4.2.1. Dependent variable: differentiated integration of the EU's Counter-terrorism approach

The first step in explaining differentiated integration is to assess more accurately than previous studies whether the field of counter-terrorism, our dependent variable, is a field of differentiated integration. Hence, the concept of differentiated integration needs to be operationalized. On the second level of that term, it contains three dimensions derived from Leuffen et al. and Schimmelfennig that are the level of centralization, the functional scope and the territorial extension (Leuffen et al., 2012, 8; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 765-766). Since our focus is to analyze the differentiated integration of one specific policy field, the dimension of functional scope is already predetermined. Obviously, the counter-terrorism policy of the EU has different functions and it will be seen how for instance the operational dimension of the policy distinguishes itself from the legal dimension. However, the functional scope is not a variable in determining the level of differentiated integration. Instead, the level of centralization, describing the vertical differentiation, is the first variable in assessing the differentiated integration of the EU's anti-terror approach (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 766). This dimension looks at whether the center makes authoritative decisions and four indicators (third level of Goertz) can be derived to describe the current state of integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015,

775). These are, ascending in terms of integration, no coordination on the EU level, intergovernmental coordination, supranational integration and uniform integration.

A policy is thus vertically differentiated, if “at least one member state fails to participate at the highest level of vertical integration in the policy area” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 775) and if the initiatives in the policy field mainly take place on an intergovernmental level. Following the article of Zhelyazkova, this dimension not only looks at the legal provisions but also at practical execution of these arrangements (Zhelyazkova, 2014, 728).

The second level component of territorial extension looks at the geographical extension of a policy (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 766). A policy is thus horizontally differentiated if some member states do not participate (internal differentiation) and/or outsiders are included (external differentiation).

3.4.2.2. Independent variable: politicization

The concept of politicization as the first variable that influences EU’s answer to terrorism is specified at this point. Politicization consists out of three parts that are the salience of an issue, the polarization of opinion and the engagement of audiences in the EU (De Wilde et al., 2016, 5). The chain of events would be that, firstly, the public needs to be engaged with European affairs to recognize EU integration projects, then sees an issue as salient and then develops a polarized opinion. This theoretical link is also used in Schimmelfennig et al.’s recent article on differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 771). Politicization is measured on the national level, because it is evident that the public in Europe still evaluates politics based on national cues and proxies (Armingeon/Ceka, 2014, 85). From an institutional perspective, the EU is still more similar to an international organization than to a state and the overall European identity is still considered to be weak (Leuffen et al., 2012, 6). Accordingly, it makes sense to look at politicization on the level of the nation states and the analysis follows this perception.

Hence, firstly, it needs to be investigated whether the public is sufficiently engaged in European affairs, which is the necessary dimension of politicization. This engagement follows the causal mechanism of a public that is, first of all, knowledgeable about the EU and then believes that it can influence policies of the EU via the member state level. Speaking in dimensions, this variable involves, first, the involvement and knowledge about the EU and, secondly, the belief by the audience that they can influence their country’s position on any stance. Lastly, it is investigated whether the national public believes that their member state has an influence on

the decision-making on the EU level. On the indicator level, this is measured with the following Eurobarometer questions:

Table 2: Indicators for the engagement of the audience

Eurobarometer question	Data available for	Source
<p><u>Involvement and Knowledge</u> For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false. – The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each member state.</p>	2004-2015 (except 2008, 2009)	Eurobarometer (62), 2004; (64) 2005; (66) 2006; (67) 2007; (73) 2010; (75) 2011; (78) 2012; (80) 2013; (82) 2014; (84) 2015
<p><u>Power to influence</u> Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree – My voice counts in (Our country)</p>	2008-2015 (except 2011)	Eurobarometer Interactive (a), 2016
<p><u>Power to influence</u> Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree. – (Our country)'s voice counts in the European Union.</p>	2004-2010	Eurobarometer Interactive (b), 2016

Out of many possible questions to test the knowledge of citizens, the European Parliament question is selected because of its repeated occurrence in the Eurobarometer survey and follows Armingeon/Ceka in this selection (Armingeon/Ceka, 2014, 105). Therefore the question whether the citizens' opinions directly matter at the EU-level are excluded from the analysis because the national proxy is still more important to citizens. Hence, especially in deciding about further integration in an intergovernmental field, the focus of the citizen's engagement remains on the national level and this will then aggregate to the EU level.

Salience as the second part of politicization has two dimensions. The first one is how afraid the public is of a certain issue. It can be expected that if one is afraid of something that the handling of this threat has a high salience. Secondly, the importance given to a topic is the other dimension. Since we look at the internal security of Europe, the question of fear would be more ideal to measure salience, however only very limited data is available in this field. Hence, on the indicator level both dimensions are considered with Eurobarometer questions. The focus of analysis remains on the level of member states. The third question deviates from this since it asks for security challenges on EU citizens and despite the limited range of data it will be interesting to assess from this question whether a common EU salience exists.

Table 3: Indicators for salience of an issue

Eurobarometer question	Data available for	Source
<u>Fear</u> Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me, if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?	2001-2002	Eurobarometer (56), 2001, Eurobarometer (58), 2002,
<u>Importance</u> What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment?	2003-2015 (except for 2011)	2003-2004: Eurobarometer (60), 2003; (62), 2004 2005-2015: Eurobarometer Interactive (c), 2016
<u>Importance/Fear</u> What do you think are the most important challenges to the security of EU citizens at the moment?	2011/2015	Special Eurobarometer (371), 2011 Special Eurobarometer (432), 2015

The third and final part of politicization is the polarization of opinion. It looks at two dimensions, the polarization within a member state and comparison of member states are compared (De Wilde et al., 2016, 5). On the indicator level this is measured with the questions of general trust to the institution of the EU and what role the EU should play and is investigating once more the level of member states. This thesis speaks of a polarized opinion when either citizens or member states are split on the topic of the EU or if they strongly oppose the EU.

Unfortunately, the more precise question for our endeavor, namely what role the EU should play in terms of security provision was only asked one time. Another question that is considered is the question whether decisions on terrorism should be done by the member state or jointly with the European Union.

Table 4: Indicators for polarization of an issue

Eurobarometer question	Data available for	Source
For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not: The European Union	2003-2015	Eurobarometer Interactive (d), 2016
In your view, what role should each of the following play in ensuring the security of citizens in (our country): The EU's institutions	2015	Special Eurobarometer (432), 2015
For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the national government or jointly with the EU?	2001-2011	Eurobarometer Interactive (e), 2016

According to De Wilde, all three criteria (engagement, salience, polarization) have to be fulfilled to speak of a high politicization (de Wilde et al., 2016, 3). However, there are no pre-set borders to determine when one speaks of a high or low politicization and this is thus up for interpretation. This paper sees it as a politicized if it is above the EU average or if the public is split or mainly eurosceptic.

The causal mechanism suggested in this thesis works in the way that a high politicization works as a constraint for integration since the public desires a dealing of terrorism by the traditional and well-known form of unilateral or bilateral state action. Additionally, and as it has been shown in the literature review, the public desires visible counter-terrorism measures and usually measures on the state level are more visible. Hence, a politicized public will refuse a delegation to the less noticeable EU level. Consequently, this paper sees a delegation to the EU level as an action that is portrayed as exceptional and less visible to the public. Thus, the constrained governments are not able to carry out the delegation if the issue is politicized. If this politicization is also asymmetrical, the differences between member states increase and differentiation becomes more likely.

3.4.2.3. Independent variable: interdependence

One of the variables that was suggested by the theory for an explanation of differentiated integration is interdependence. Interdependence is generally seen as the impetus for integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 771) and consists out of two dimensions. When, firstly, “negative externalities” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 771) between all member states exist, one can speak of a high, symmetrical interdependence. This would lead to an impetus of integration and is conceptualized by Keohane and Nye with their concepts of sensitivity (describing the costs on a country with a stable policy framework) and vulnerability (describing the costs of a change of policy because of interdependence) (Keohane/Nye, 1977, 12). Secondly, from a more economical perspective, if welfare gains across all member states can be made by collaboration there is symmetric interdependence as well. This symmetric interdependence should lead to an impetus for integration, but once member states are affected differently by the two aspects mentioned above, this leads to asymmetric interdependence and, thus, to differentiation.

The two dimensions do not exclude themselves in the case of counter-terrorism but are connected. When terrorism is occurring across all EU member states there are negative externalities felt by all member states. Several studies expect a priori that the abolition of internal border controls created a terrorism-conducive environment and subsequently

interdependence is increased (Argomaniz, 2012, 31; Bureš, 2011, 245). However, this needs to be investigated whether this holds true across member states. Hence, these two dimensions of the second level can be measured with the indicator how terrorism is occurring across member states of the EU. The indicator level therefore looks mainly at terrorist incidents across EU member states between 2001 and 2014. This is done with three types of data, in which the first one has an imminent position:

Table 5: Indicators of interdependence

Data type	Timeframe	Source
Failed, foiled or successful terrorist incidents across EU member states	2001-2005 2006-2014	2001-2005: Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2016) ¹² 2006-2014: TE-SAT reports
Arrested terrorism suspects per year per member state	2006-2014	TE-SAT reports
Convicted terrorist suspects per year per member state	2006-2014	TE-SAT reports

3.4.2.4. Independent variable: preference convergence

Another variable that influences the field of EU's counter-terrorism policy is the convergence of preferences. Preferences in this field are conceptualized as how member states' governments think about fighting terrorism in general. This paper looks at government preferences since ultimately, the governments decide on EU integration and societal or ideational preferences may consequently be less important (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 299; Rittberger et al., 2014, 205). Certainly, there exist preferences on specific EU-measures, however these could not be retrieved with the data available and because of the secrecy of negotiations. Because of this, preferences look at the more general counter-terrorism strategy and not only within the context of the EU. Preferences on counter-terrorism are thus operationalized with the dimensions of action against terrorism on a global level, a European level, a regional level or a national level. As such categorizations of preferences do not exist yet, a set of preferences and its indicators has to be introduced. It is derived from the aforementioned dimensions and is outlined in the following table:

¹² The GTD data is chosen over the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) since the GTD includes over 140 000 incidents whereas the RDTWI only includes 40 000 incidents (Empirical Studies of Conflict, 2016; GTD, 2016).

Table 6: Categorizations of preferences on counter-terrorism

Preference of the member state	Indicators in content analysis
Global action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong emphasis on international action • Military interventions • Ministries of Foreign Affairs in charge
Delegation of competences to the EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Give enforcement rights to the EU level • Creating supranational organizations on counter-terrorism at the EU level
Implementation of existing EU measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen existing EU approaches • Increase effectiveness on the EU level
Non-EU regional solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowering regional organizations outside of the EU for the fight against terrorism • Creation of new regional organizations
Address root causes and empower the civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term approach on root causes domestically and internationally • Including actors of the civil society in fight against terrorism
(Strict) Domestic measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extraordinary legal measures justified • Policy of no mercy for terrorist
Increase of social equality and freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on measures that increase the social peace such as social measures • Increase of fairness between religious or social groups
Focus on civil rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on fair trials • Rights of terrorism suspects are stressed • Conviction that threat of terrorism does not justify constraints on civil rights

Since such a comprehensive identification of preferences across member states does not exist, the above mentioned indicators and preferences have to be evaluated with regard to each member state. This is done with a qualitative content analysis based on Schreier that takes into account the latent meaning (Schreier, 2014, 173). The data sources are two types of document. Firstly, the country reports provided by an expert group, initiated by the Council of Europe, named the Committee of Experts on Terrorism (short: CODEXTER), is the starting point of this analysis. These expert reports line out the “standards and capacity” (Council of Europe, 2014) of member states counter-terrorist activity based on multiple sources and a fixed methodology. However, the profiles are updated for some countries and for others they are not. Hence, secondly, national action plans on terrorism, strategies published on government websites or outlined in speeches, newspaper reports and experts’ opinions are also analyzed with a content analysis. After the examination of these two sources, short country profiles listing the most important preferences are compiled.

Several restrictions apply to this operationalization. Firstly, because of the language diversity within the European Union, most of the national action plans that were considered for the analysis are in English. Hence, it needs to be kept in mind that these may have an international orientation because they are written for a non-national audience. Secondly, the time frame of the documents does not match the large time focus of this study. It was not possible to analyze strategic documents from 2001 until now. However, the CODEXTER reports and also some of the national releases point to changes in their strategies. Other than that, it was presumed by this analysis that the preferences remain stable over time and are largely unaffected of effects of party politics. Thirdly, it is also conceivable that despite the judgement of the experts and the release of a strategy, different preferences would be pursued by member states in EU negotiations on counter-terrorism approaches. However, as these negotiations are secret and even other sources such as Council Minutes do not provide specific information on this topic, the preferences of member states voiced in negotiations may differ from the ones outlined in this paper. Hence, acknowledging these restrictions, it would be an improvement of this initial data to verify it with national experts from each member state. However, this is not feasible within this thesis and therefore additionally to the data retrieved from the content analysis this paper also reviews the existing literature on the EU's approach for further indications on the variable of preference convergence.

Despite these restrictions, this operationalization still presents the best solution possible. Other ways of operationalization such as the differences in the speed of implementation of counter-terrorist regulations across member states are not informative enough. This is because the differences may stem from domestic characteristics that are not specific to counter-terrorism (Bureš, 2011, 82).

3.4.2.5. Independent variable: weak supranational actors

One of the variables suggested by the theory and also the literature review (Argomaniz, 2012, 68) to explain the differentiated integration in this field is the power of supranational actors. Since they are expected to lobby for further integration (Leuffen et al., 2012, 71), their extent of influence has to be evaluated. In some projects supranational actors may have had a considerable influence on the policy-making process. However, differentiated integration theory expects, generally, that weak supranational actors cannot push for more integration because of their limited influence. This will be empirically evaluated in this section. In terms of operationalization, the role of supranational actors consists of two dimensions, which are the *de jure* role and the *de facto* role. The *de jure* role looks at the legal role ascribed to the

supranational actors. This is measured with the indicators of the legal provisions given to the EU's supranational political actors in the area of freedom, security and justice and the legal interpretations made by experts of the field. The *de facto* dimension looks at the self-perceived role of the supranational actors in the area of freedom, security and justice and is measured with statements made by officials and expert assessments on the indicator level. If supranational actors in the field of counter-terrorism are lacking power in one of these two dimensions, they are considered to be weak in the sense of the differentiated integration theory.

3.4.2.6. Operationalization: case studies of specific policy projects

To further gain insights into specific policy projects in the field of the EU approach on terrorism, two case studies are provided to complement the empirical analysis. The two cases selected are the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and Europol. These cases are selected because they cover a wide variety of the EU approach with the EAW as a legal example and Europol as an operational example. Hence, they cover both important dimensions (Bureš, 2011, 149). Moreover, these two measures are highly relevant because they either have a considerable mandate (Europol) or have a large influence on member states' legal system and core state competences (European Arrest Warrant). It is important to clarify that the case studies analyze the establishment of the measures and a possible subsequent mandate extension. It is not analyzed how appropriate or effective the measure is. The cases will be analyzed mainly with secondary literature and with regard to the variables of theory that are politicization, supranational actors, preference convergence, and interdependence.

4. Delineation of the Counter-terrorism Approach of the EU

In the following chapters on the historical evolution of the EU counter-terrorism field, the general trends of the field will be outlined. Providing a full account, in the style of process-tracing, of all the reasons for an institution and its changes over time is not feasible due to the large diversity and number of initiatives (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 195). Additionally, the current state of differentiated integration of the field will be assessed and mapped. The focus will be on the main legal and operational measures within Europe. Since only the EU counter-terrorism coordinator has a mandate that is solely focused on terrorism, most of the institutions mentioned cover different purposes (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 194). Their inclusion is justified because of the assumption that if they work substantially in the counter-terrorism domain, they are substantially similar (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 194). Considering that the EU strategies against terrorism were not taken seriously by member states because of their lack of binding requirement, their implementation was slow and incomplete (Bureš, 2011, 71, 73, 80, 82). This chapter will not concentrate on them but solely provide a list of the strategies (see footnote).¹³ The description of the history of EU's counter-terrorism is divided into subchapters modeled to the occurrence of major terrorist attacks that are also used by Argomaniz and these are pre 9/11, post 9/11 and post Madrid 2004 (Argomaniz, 2012, 18).¹⁴ The recent developments will be summarized in the section on the EU efforts after the attacks in Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016.

4.1. Counter-terrorism in the EU before 9/11

Despite the increased focus on EU's role in counter-terrorism after 9/11 (Argomaniz, 2012, 8), it has to be taken into account that there were already common initiatives for a fight against terrorism present in Europe before (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 8-9; Bureš, 2011, 59). Overall, the form of the approach of the European Community on counter-terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s can be characterized as "purely intergovernmental cooperation" (Bureš, 2011, 229). Furthermore, scholars attest a lack of EU-wide prioritization of terrorism for the time before 9/11 (Argomaniz, 2012, 7; Bureš, 2011, 62).

Starting in the 1970s, two different strings of policy emerged. The European Political Cooperation that mainly focused on the exterior dimensions of Europe and the interior

¹³ Among these strategies are the EU counter-terrorism strategy from 2005 and the, in 2014, revised EU strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. Others are the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism of 2001 and the 2003 European Security Strategy (updated in 2008) (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 196).

¹⁴ The 2005 attacks in London are not considered as a subchapter because of the temporal proximity to the Madrid 2004 attacks and there were not enough new initiatives after the bombings in London but rather a hastening of implementation (Argomaniz, 2012, 27).

dimension covered by the TREVI initiative¹⁵ and other informal arrangement such as the Club of Berne and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (Bureš, 2011, 59-60). The focus here will be on the interior dimension. TREVI stemmed out of the policy idea by European member states that regional approaches to fight terrorism might be more effective than international policies (Bureš, 2011, 60). Therefore the initiative consisted of police officials that exchanged data and assisted each other on terrorism and other crimes through TREVI's own communicative system (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 8-9). The TREVI group did not possess an institutional framework or a secretariat (Argomaniz, 2012, 5; Monar, 2001, 750). Additionally, in 1979, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany created the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) to further improve the dissemination of information in cases of terror in Europe (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 1-2).¹⁶ The architecture of PWGT is informal and intergovernmental and since 1999/2000 it possesses its own information exchange system (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 4). Another informal group outside of the EU framework is the Club of Berne or Berne Group, already established in 1971¹⁷, between nine states that were the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Great-Britain and France (Guttmann, 2016). It focused from the start on operational coordination by bringing together security services in order to share best practices and top-secret information (Bureš, 2011, 96; Bureš, 2012, 501; Walsh, 2006, 625, 634). The Club of Berne was and still is characterized by a very secretive nature and the lack of a stated, public commitment (Walsh, 2006, 631).

The intergovernmental nature of cooperation on terrorism was then solidified with the 1992 Maastricht treaty in which counter-terrorism and the TREVI initiative was put under the EU framework and allocated to the third, intergovernmental pillar (Bureš, 2011, 61; Argomaniz, 2012, 6). The incorporation into the EU framework shows that terrorism was increasingly seen as an "internal security problem of the Union" (Chalk, 2000, 175). However the member states retained control over the Union's conduct in this area. The failure of the 1979 Dublin Agreement that aimed at judicial integration has to be viewed as the first of many signs that member state countries were sensitive towards their sovereignty and resisted integration (Argomaniz, 2012, 5). In terms of operational work against terrorism, the formation of the

¹⁵ TREVI stands for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Political Violence (Bureš, 2011, 60).

¹⁶ Argomaniz states in his book that the PWGT was introduced in 1983 (Argomaniz, 2012, 6). However, in an extensive answer by the German government to members of parliament, the start date is declared as 25th and 26th of April 1979 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 1-2). The document also articulated that the exact constellations of this group over the years cannot be reconstructed (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 2).

¹⁷ Newest research by a Swiss Ph.D. thesis on the Club of Berne contests this date of foundation and mentions 1969 as the year of establishment, based on the access to secret sources (Guttmann, 2016). As this cannot be verified in this thesis, the usually acknowledged founding year of 1971 is used. The controversy about the founding year shows one more time the secretive and informal nature of the Club of Berne.

Europol Drug Unit in 1993, which would later become Europol, and the ensuing expansion of its mandate to terrorism, for instance in 1999, was another step forward in taking terrorism seriously on the EU level. However, the role was limited to coordination initially and this general trend continues (Europol, 2016). This can be seen at the 1999 Tampere European Council, when various internal security measures on police cooperation, border security and immigration as well as the establishment of Eurojust were proposed together with a deadline for implementation (Bureš, 2011, 62, 113). However, these proposed measures were not specifically designed against terrorism and they were either tabled or slowly implemented (Argomaniz, 2012, 7).

The 1999 Tampere conclusions were mainly based on the establishment of the Schengen area. The Schengen agreement, initially outside of the EU framework but then included into EU law in 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam created the need for internal, compensatory security measures such as the Tampere measures or the Schengen Information System (SIS) (Dyson, 2010, 290). The SIS is an information system to help law enforcement cooperation with a broad functional scope (hence terrorism is just one of many instances where it can be used) within Schengen (Balzacq, 2008, 84). However, at-that-time, counter-terrorism was less relevant than other themes such as immigration or other forms of cross-border criminality. Hence, the SIS was predominantly a database of individuals that were not allowed to enter the Schengen area (Balzacq, 2008, 84)

This subchapter showed that pre-9/11 measures on terrorism on the European level followed with intergovernmentalism the dominant trend of that time in Europe. Counter-terrorism was still seen as a “national issue” (Bureš, 2011, 63) and in very sensitive parts such as intelligence sharing and police assistance, cooperation was informal and intergovernmental (Argomaniz, 2012, 7). Moreover, membership to initiatives such as the Club of Berne or PWGT was restricted to a few European states.

4.2. Counter-terrorism in the EU after 9/11

It is undisputable that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a grave impact on the counter-terrorism policy of the EU (Argomaniz, 2012, 19). The lurid statement used as an opener of this thesis by the member of European Parliament Graham Watson in 2008 that “Osama bin Laden has done more for European integration than anyone since Jacques Delors” (cited as in The Telegraph, 2012) is certainly an overstatement which will also come to light in this and the next subsection.

The initial reactions by the EU were based on path-dependency and the continuing trend of intergovernmentalism (Argomaniz, 2012, 22). At an exceptional European Council meeting two weeks after the attack, the heads of states decided to assign once more the lead to the interior ministers and the clearly intergovernmental Justice and Home Affairs Council (Meyer, 2009, 662). The government leaders also agreed on the need for a comprehensive European policy against terrorism which should benefit EU citizens with more security against terrorist attacks (Bureš, 2011, 55; 64). The corresponding policies were mainly based on the garbage-can model (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 15), meaning that previously rejected policies of the 1999 Tampere Council were now adopted in a quick manner (Argomaniz, 2012, 20). Among these measures were prominently the European Arrest Warrant, the European Council Framework Decision on Terrorism and Eurojust. Thus, the attacks in the US then created a window of opportunity for the adoption of these three predominantly legal measures in 2002 (Bureš, 2011, 63-64) and the European Commission relentlessly pushed for its adoption (Kaunert, 2010, 8). Of these three measures, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) will be analyzed extensively in a case study in the empirical analysis section.

With the Framework Decision on Terrorism, a common European definition of terrorism was established (Argomaniz, 2012, 85). Although this is considered a major achievement on the supranational level by scholars (Monar, 2007, 293), one cannot identify a complete supranationalization of counter-terrorism law in the EU. It still remains the national prerogative to convict and judge terrorists, however the successful definition of minimum laws on terrorist offences is crucial for the fight against terrorism. Before 9/11 only six European member states had terrorism as a crime explicitly in their national law (Argomaniz, 2012, 20). With the entry into force of the 2002 Framework decision this then changed gradually (Bureš, 2011, 7; Argomaniz, 2012, 21).

The other legal policy stemming from that time is Eurojust. Eurojust, established in 2002 and already envisioned in 1999, was not established in a manner of consensus. Instead, in 2000, Portugal, Sweden, France and Belgium created the provisional Pro-Eurojust that competed with an idea of Germany (Bureš, 2011, 133). The establishment of Eurojust can be traced back to the policy pressure after 9/11 and the reluctance of the member states to allow a more supranational European Chief Public Prosecutor (Bureš, 2011, 113) Eurojust, following a more intergovernmental approach, was preferred by the member states (Bureš, 2011, 113).

Next to the legal projects, institutions focusing on the operational dimension were established, such as the Situation Centre. Established in 2003 as formal EU institution, the SITCEN¹⁸, in which analysts of the member states produce reports based on data that is provided by national states on a voluntary basis is another creation of a formal EU institution (Bureš, 2011, 68, 104; Bureš, 2012, 498). Anti-terrorism was part of its mandate from the start (European External Action Service, 2015). As contributions remain voluntary and the EU has no own sources to generate intelligence, the immediate impact of this institution has considered to be limited and is characterized by a lack of vertical integration. The sharing of intelligence, especially counter-terrorism intelligence was and still is done primarily in a bilateral and multilateral manner between member states outside of the EU framework.

This can be seen in the other informal institutions that were founded during that period. These are the 2001 established Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) as an off-shoot from the Club of Berne that coordinates national anti-terror experts (Bureš, 2012, 502). The distant nature to the EU and EU institutions held by the CTG is intentional (Bureš, 2012, 503). Moreover, in 2003, the at-that-time five largest EU member states created the G5 (G6 since the joining of Poland in 2006) to have an additional counter-terrorism forum. It is used for intelligence sharing and to reach agreements between the largest member states first, before taking it to the EU level (Bureš, 2012, 503). The wishes for participation in this forum by other member states like the Netherlands were denied (Den Boer et al., 2008, 117). Keohane assessed that an increased intelligence cooperation, similar to the model of the Five Eyes¹⁹, is more likely between these six states than between the whole EU (Keohane, 2008, 128). Hence, the informal nature and the intended exclusion of smaller EU states are prove of a preference for an informal, intergovernmental dealing with operational counter-terrorism. Another example for this is the adding of terrorism to the mandate of Europol in 2002 while simultaneously the capabilities of Europol were not increased (European Council, 2002; Europol, 2016).

The analysis of EU's counter-terrorism approach after 9/11 showed two major developments. One, three major legal projects that were previously rejected were adopted on the European level with a high participation rate by the member states. Two, various informal operational arrangements came into place with a varying territorial extension. Overall,

¹⁸ The institution was renamed to EU Intelligence Analyst Centre (EU IntCen) in 2012 (European External Action Service, 2015, 1).

¹⁹ The Five Eyes, or formally the UKUSA agreement, is an understanding to cooperate in signals intelligence between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US.

intergovernmentalism remained the dominating principle. Consequently, the assessment made by Watson on bin Laden's impact on the EU are an overstatement.

4.3. Counter-terrorism in the EU after the attacks of Madrid 2004

The gravest attacks on Europe since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing did not change the set course in counter-terrorism efforts in the EU. After the attacks, the EU Commission proposed policies in the areas of terrorist financing, infrastructure protection and response management (Bureš, 2011, 67). Notably, these areas already belonged to the first pillar and this shows that the Commission also followed the trend “to avoid supranational recipes” (Argomaniz, 2012, 103) in areas that are core state powers. The issue of homegrown terrorism, a topic that gained relevance after the London attacks, remained mainly in the hands of the member states. The trend of integration-reluctant member states continued with the installation of a Counterterrorism Coordinator (European Council, 2004, 13). His mandate of surveying the efforts of the member states and the external representation of the EU has attributes of supranationalism. However, since the powers of the coordinator remain extremely limited (Bureš, 2011, 137), the creation of such a position is not prove of a fundamental shift towards a supranational integration in this field. The establishment of the post remained controversial but the first coordinator, Gijs de Vries, already took office in 2004.

Another legal measure that was introduced is the Fight against Terrorist Finances. Its introduction in 2007 is mainly due to international initiatives by the UN and the Financial Action Task Force (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 198; Bureš, 2011, 179). The establishment of these financial measures on the EU level, even though the operational dimensions remains on the member states level, has not be seen as a shift of the dominant intergovernmental paradigm. It was rather due to a division of labor since the EU member states had to ratify the International UN provisions anyway, whether at the EU level or at the national level (Kaunert, 2010, 20). Furthermore, on the EU level, the mandate of several existing institutions such as Europol, the SIS and Eurojust was extended to counter-terrorism (Balzacq, 2008, 86). However, there were still no significant powers delegated to these institutions after Madrid.

The treaty of Prüm, however, shows the continuous preference for informal and intergovernmental cooperation. In 2005, the EU member states Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany, France, Austria and Spain aimed at increasing cross-border cooperation and data exchange via for instance a DNA database and vehicle owner database (Bureš, 2011, 97). The agreement has to be seen as the circumvention of the Commission's suggestion of an

unlimited data exchange between the law enforcement agencies, following the principle of availability (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 367; Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 541). Hence, to maintain the national prerogative on criminal data in view of EU enlargement, various member states realized their own preferences with the Treaty of Prüm (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 554). The planned move for more integration at the EU level in this regard was “buried in the Treaty of Prüm” (Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 554). Its incorporation into EU law in 2007 does not change this preference for intergovernmental, informal cooperation, especially since several, potentially controversial provisions were not transferred to the EU level. Among them are directives about cross-border chases (Luif, 2007, 14).

The episode after the Madrid attacks showed that some new elements on the EU level were created, however their powers remain limited. There is a continuing reluctance for supranational delegation. Cooperation in terms of data exchange remains on the intergovernmental, informal level. The main continuous pattern of intergovernmentalism across times and even across critical junctures shows that the assumption of treating the field and its projects as one unit of analysis is justified.

4.4. Recent initiatives after the attacks in 2015 and 2016


The terrorist attacks of November 2015 in Paris brought some changes to the European security structure as well and a shift of focus on returning fighters from Syria. Moreover, the most recent attacks in Germany in July 2016 by radicalized individuals further emphasize the spotlight on individuals. However, the modus of cooperation instead of integration remains despite some successful integration projects such as the EU passenger name record directive. For instance, the establishment of Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre shows that member states acknowledge interdependence but act to further European cooperation instead of integration on terrorism (Europol Press Release (January, 25), 2016). However, the rather informal design of this newest addition does not confront the preference for informal agreements. This is seen in another newest counter-terrorism project. After the attacks of Paris in 2015, the members of the informal Counterterrorism Group (CTG), envisioned for July 2016 the establishment of a “counter-terror center” accessible to all CTG members to further ameliorate information exchange on terrorism between the intelligence agencies (Spiegel Online, 2016). Its distance to the European agencies is shown by its projected location at the Dutch intelligence agency in Den Haag (Spiegel Online, 2016). The impact of the Paris attack and the origin of the attack in Belgium may have led France to shift their preferences towards more cooperation for instance with the Taskforce Fraternité that will be treated in section 5.6.3.

After the attacks in Brussels in March 2016, state representatives were once again quick to call for European solutions against terrorism. Interior Ministers called for a more extensive use of Joint Investigation Teams in Europe (Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2016). Concerning intelligence and criminal data, the German interior minister publicly complained that 90% of the data at Europol is only provided by five member states (Becker/Niesen (Spiegel Online), 2016), other interior ministers called for new mechanisms to exchange data. Austria's interior minister Mikl-Leitner said she is "convinced that one could establish such a European common federation within weeks (Mikl-Leitner cited as in Newsblog (Spiegel Online), 2016). However, there have not been visible changes when this thesis was written. The pattern of informal, non-binding cooperation outside of the EU framework remains.

4.5. The current state of EU counter-terrorism – mapping differentiated integration

Generally speaking, it is not surprising and well acknowledged by scholars that a lack of integration and thereby a higher differentiation is more often in areas of high politics (Dyson, 2010, 45). The counter-terrorism policy field and the area of freedom, security and justice in which the counter-terrorism policy is located are not only "rapidly expanding" (Dyson, 2010, 279) but also show a high level of differentiation (Dyson, 2010, 279). However, the exact mapping of the differentiation in the field of counter-terrorism policy has not been done yet and will consequently be the topic of this chapter. The following mapping has three dimensions to distinguish the specific policy projects. First and secondly, it is discriminated between horizontal and vertical differentiation. Thirdly, there is a distinction made between informal arrangements, a set of states without an EU treaty foundation or a standing structure, and formal structures, included in the EU treaty (Bureš, 2012, 498). All of the aforementioned institutions and their characteristics in terms of differentiated integration are summarized in the following Graph 1.

Graph 1: Map of differentiated integration in counter-terrorism²⁰



From the illustrative mapping excluded are the Schengen Information System, the European Police Chiefs Task Force (Den Boer, 2008, 114), the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network, the European Bomb Data System, Aviation and Maritime Security (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 202), the Joint Investigation Teams, the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Schroeder, 2013, 93) and the European Explosive Ordinance Disposal Network (Bureš, 2011, 77, 79). Their exclusion is justified because they are designated against various threats, even natural disasters, and not mainly to terrorism (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 194). This does not mean that they do have at a times a value for the EU’s fight against terrorism, like the Joint Investigation Teams in the case of the Paris attacks.

²⁰ Annotation to Graph 1: Dashed boxes indicate institutions outside of EU framework, firm boxes indicate institutions inside the EU framework. The order within the categories of vertical integration (attributes of supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism) is due to the year that each initiative went into force from oldest (bottom) to top (youngest)

First, the policies of the EU that possess attributes of supranationalism are outlined. The common definition of terrorism, established in the 2002 binding Council Framework Decision on terrorism (Bureš, 2011, 7) is an example of a policy that does not have horizontal differentiation but is at the same time highly vertically integrated because of its binding legal character (Bureš, 2011, 9). All European member states participate in this, hence there is no horizontal differentiation.

The second example of an institution created by the EU with supranational elements is the EU's counter-terrorism coordinator. The counter-terrorism coordinator works for all the member states (no horizontal differentiation) and has supranational powers, although they are strictly limited (Bureš, 2011, 140). Some of these powers are that the coordinator audits the implementation of EU strategies against terrorism and represents the counter-terrorism capacity of the EU externally (Bureš, 2011, 138). However, his position remains weak as he cannot obligate member states to actions, has a small office and has no agenda-setting competences in EU meetings (Bureš, 2011, 139-140). Thus, the position is an example of vertical integration, albeit of a low level.

Another example of this kind of legal approach by the EU on the fight against terrorism is the European Arrest Warrant that came into force in 2005. This instance of EU's counter-terrorism is a highly vertically and horizontally integrated phenomenon. The reason for this is that the Arrest Warrant is now ratified and valid in all member States and contains the principle of mutual recognition. This means in practice that extradition requests are automatically approved and the community method of the first pillar is applied to this area (Bureš, 2011, 152-153). Hence, the assessment that the EAW is, a supranational and integrated policy (Bureš, 2011, 167, 169; Jasinski, 2002, 44; Marin, 2008, 269) can be supported, despite the member states use it differently but this may be due to differing crime rates. The same statement also holds for the third money laundering directive, coming into force in 2007, in which member states were asked to include several compulsive legislative measures against terrorist's finances in their national laws (Bureš, 2011, 179). However, despite this supranational impetus, most of the work and the actual freezing of the assets remains on the national level (Bureš, 2011, 180).

The majority of measures against terrorism, however, take place at a low level of vertical integration and a high level of horizontal differentiation and outside of the formal EU framework. However, they contribute to the security of the EU and are heavily used by its member states and this is the reason they are included into this analysis. The first and earliest example of this is the Club de Berne or also named Berne Group. The group is characterized

by an informational agreement between interior ministers and does not have a standing institutional arrangement or legal basis (Dyson, 2010, 284). Hence, there is no vertical integration. Moreover, the arrangement is identified by an external horizontal differentiation as not only all EU member states take part but also two external states with Switzerland and Norway (Guttman, 2016; Bureš, 2011, 96). Out of this, already 1971 established, highly secretive institution, the Counter Terrorist Group evolved in 2001. It follows the same pattern of no vertical integration and includes the same member countries as the Club of Berne (Harvard Law School, 2016). Its tasks are the sharing of intelligence for counterterrorism and the facilitation of cooperation (Bureš, 2011, 96; Harvard Law School, 2016). As mentioned above, the planned “counter-terror center” is the newest institutional idea. It is notable that this newest institutional idea in response to the attacks in Paris and Brussels takes, once more, the form of horizontally differentiation (non EU-members of the CTG will participate) and a low vertical integration (Spiegel Online 2016).

The Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) was also established about twenty years before 9/11. It is characterized by horizontal, external differentiation and a low vertical integration. It comprises all European member states plus the non-members Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 2). Hence, it has with 31 members the largest horizontal extension. However, the form of the initiative is an informal forum of practitioners (Bureš, 2011, 95). Just like the Club of Berne it does not have a standing structure or secretariat and is situated outside of the EU framework (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 2). Other than Europol having an observer status at the meetings of PWGT, there is no collaboration with EU institutions (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, 4).

An example for operational cooperation within the EU framework is Europol. The establishment of Europol can be dated to 1998, when the Europol convention came into force (Europol 2016).²¹ Despite Europol was at the start outside of the EU framework, it became an official EU agency in 2010 (Europol 2016). There is no horizontal differentiation as all EU member states take part in the agency. Europol presents an interesting case because despite its recent (2010) status of an official EU agency, it does not have major supranational attributes and control remains on the level of the member states (Den Boer et al., 2008, 111). This especially holds for counter-terrorism (Occhipinti, 2015, 240). From a *de jure* perspective, its members have not given major supranational competences to Europol (Bureš, 2011, 85) and it is “not an executive police force with autonomous supranational authority to conduct its own

²¹ It existed already before, from 1994 on, as Europol Drugs unit (Bureš, 2016, 2).

investigations” (Bureš, 2011, 86). *De facto*, the lack of trust from national enforcement agencies for Europol and the lack of data and intelligence at Europol, give Europol a weak mandate in combatting terrorism (Bureš, 2011, 85, 87, 93). Additionally, even though all members of the EU are present at Europol, information-sharing is usually not done at Europol but in a bilateral or limited multilateral way and Europol has no means to force members to share their data with other members or Europol (Bureš, 2011, 94). The newest addition of Europol, the European Counter Terrorism Centre, launched in January 2016, remains in the same tradition (Europol Press Release, 2016). Europol, thus, is an example of vertical differentiation because of the lack of supranational delegation. Notwithstanding the introduction of Europol as an EU agency, in essence and especially in the field of counter-terrorism, Europol remains intergovernmental (Bureš, 2011, 107).

Eurojust, established in 2002 (Eurojust, 2016), follows the same intergovernmental mode of cooperation on the EU level (Den Boer, 2008, 112). For instance, it does not have major own competences (Bureš, 2011, 120, 164). Undoubtedly, Eurojust has the “potential [...] [for] a decisive shift toward integration” (Monar, 2013, 339), but this has not been realized yet. Thus, Eurojust is an instance of vertical differentiation in the policy field of counter-terrorism. It is often stated that Eurojust lacks a sufficient legal authority and trails Europol also in operational terms because of a lack of data, competences and operational capacity (Bureš, 2011, 114-115). Although counter-terrorism was a topic for Eurojust from the start, the number of cases on this issue is low (Bureš, 2011, 115, 117). The pattern of Eurojust and Europol as official EU agencies is that they are not horizontally differentiated but vertically and do not have considerable supranational powers in EU’s counter-terrorism approach.

The next instance of the EU’s counter-terrorism field is the former EU Situation Centre (SitCen), now named EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) (European External Action Service, 2015). Its official basis (Council Decision 2010/427/EU), its mission to provide analyses for several EU actors, such as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the European External Action Service and its self-description as “the exclusive civilian intelligence function” (European External Action Service, 2015) may imply a high level of vertical integration, but this is not the case. It does not have a formal legal basis (Den Boer, 2008, 115). Moreover, the operational capacity and intelligence collection belongs to the member states and the EUINTCEN is, except for open-source material, fully dependent on the member states (European External Action Service, 2015). From a differentiated integration perspective, the intergovernmental nature of this institution and

thereby the lack of vertical integration is apparent. However, there is no horizontal differentiation.

The G6 Group, an initiative outside of the EU framework, is based intentionally on the principle of limited membership and has not extended membership to others than the initial six members. Hence, the institution is an example of internal horizontal differentiation within Europe and sees this as an advantage to skip lengthy negotiations at the EU level when all member states are included (Den Boer et al., 2008, 117). Because of its informal nature, there is no delegation of powers to it by the member states and no vertical integration. However it is astonishing that between these six countries also the “Rapid Reaction European Anti Terrorist Police Force” as an operational capacity was established (Argomaniz, 2012, 51; Den Boer et al., 2008, 117). Interestingly, the European Council answered to a question of a Member of the European Parliament that this is “not aimed at setting up a European anti-terrorist police force” (European Parliament, 2006), anticipating concerns about national sovereignty.

In the same line of design is the Treaty of Prüm that was established in 2005 (Chopin/Lequesne, 2016, 539). Despite its acceptance into the EU framework already in 2007, only 14 member states have currently signed the convention (Chopin/Lequesne, 2016, 539). It is thus another example of internal horizontal differentiation within the EU (Dyson, 2010, 284). The convention is once more showing the characteristics of a low vertical integration. Instead, the Prüm convention has to be interpreted as an example of hindering delegation to the supranational level that would have been established with the principle of availability (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 367; Balzacq/Hadfield, 2012, 541). Thus, it serves as a prime example for the preference of differentiated integration vis-à-vis a possible supranational delegation. Since it is not primarily an EU agreement and it was not included with all provisions into the EU framework it is depicted as an institution outside the EU framework (dashed lines).

Considering this analysis, several developments can be outlined. First, the clues for the argument of path dependency are visible (Argomaniz, 2012, 23). Among them are the long past of preference for informal initiatives and networks already before 9/11 and after 9/11 (Bureš, 2011, 2; Bureš, 2012, 503-504; Den Boer et al., 2008, 101) and the continuous weak mandate of formal institutions (Bureš, 2012, 511). Secondly, a distinction between operational and legal/political domain in counter-terrorism can be made. Whereas intelligence sharing and police cooperation takes place in an informal nature with limited membership, the legal and political measures (common definition/EAW/CT coordinator) are the only ones that have some supranational attributes. Hence, intergovernmentalism and most often informal

intergovernmentalism is the dominant operational mode in EU's counter-terrorism approach (Bossong, 2013, 176).

Looking at the mapping strictly from a differentiated integration perspective, it becomes clear that the EU Counter-terrorism policy is indeed an example of differentiated integration. It is “based on cooperation and coordination rather than on any form of integration [and member states] [...] have not transferred any competences to the EU” (Bureš, 2011, 255). The policy is thus vertically differentiated because of its focus on intergovernmental cooperation (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 775). It is also horizontally differentiated because internal EU members do not take part in certain initiatives but outsiders do. Hence, it fulfills the criteria for lack of integration and variable territorial extension and can be considered an example of differentiated integration. (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 765-766).


5. Empirical Analysis

5.1. Politicization

5.1.1. Engagement of audience

As it was outlined in the operationalization, the first part of politicization is the engagement of the audience. This is tested in this thesis with Eurobarometer questions centering on the knowledge of the citizens about the EU and the subsequent identifiable conviction of the public that they can voice their preferences on the EU via their member state. Therefore, the first indicator is how knowledgeable EU citizens are. When citizens are informed to a certain amount about the EU, they can detect integration projects that take place on the European level and either lobby for or against them. The following graph shows that, on average over ten years, 60 percent of the EU citizens are aware that the Members of European Parliament are elected directly. Moreover, the average of right answers by the respondents in each year never goes below 50 percent and is generally stable over time (see Annex A1). This proxy data suggests that, in general across the EU, citizens are informed enough to observe projects on the European level. Certainly, it can be argued that the European Parliament is the most visible European actor because of the election and the numbers presented here may present an overestimation. However, the issues of counter-terrorism and citizen's rights in fair balance to security are often discussed in the European Parliament and citizens can be expected to be informed about such issues. Thus, this data can serve as a general proxy.

Graph 2: Share of knowledgeable EU citizens from 2004 to 2015²²




A differing range of knowledge between countries is visible but the lower levels of knowledge are still close to 50 percent. On average, Germany (around 45 %) and the Netherlands (49 %) are the countries with the smallest rates of knowledgeable respondents, whereas Malta (84 %) and Greece (82%) do have a high share of correct answers. In connection to the variable of politicization, one can assume that in every EU country a sufficiently large amount of knowledgeable citizens that are able to judge on European issues exist. This also proves that, on average, 60 percent have already been involved with the EU and have been or have informed themselves about the EU. One could therefore assume that this informed and involved amount of people is ready to engage in certain issues that are proposed on the EU level. The perception based on this available data is a modest estimation, since it can be expected that also uninformed or previously uninvolved citizens may voice their opinion.

The next dimension looks at whether citizens in the member states perceive that their voice counts in their country. This follows the theoretical presumption that member states decide about the delegation of competences to the national level. Hence, it has to be evaluated how many people are believing that they can influence their country's position on this issue. The analysis of Eurobarometer data from 2008 to 2015 shows that, on average across member states

²² Own portrayal based on data provided by Eurobarometer (62), 2004; (64) 2005; (66) 2006; (67) 2007; (73) 2010 (75) 2011; (78) 2012; (80) 2013; (82) 2014; (84) 2015. The question used is: For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false. – The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each member state -. There was no data available for 2008 and 2009. When two Eurobarometer surveys in the same year are available, this thesis uses the autumn editions for better comparability. When the EU member state has not been a member of the EU during the entire period of investigation, it is only the average of the years the country has been a member in the EU. Full Table see Annex A1, 84.

and time, 52 percent of respondents agree that their voice counts in their country, which is shown in the following graph.

Graph 3: Share of respondents that tend to agree that their voice matters in their member state from 2008 to 2015²³




Consequently, these 52 percent are willing to engage in the domestic decision-making process on various issues which is a considerable and sufficient amount to influence member states in general. However, this indicator varies to a larger extent than the knowledge question. For instance, on average over the membership years, the conviction that their voice counts is very high in Denmark (92%), Sweden (92%) and the Netherlands (79%). It is very low in the member states of Lithuania (22%), Greece (23%) and Italy (24%). This means that the politicization of an issue is more likely in a country where citizens perceive that they have a voice. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer data did not ask specifically for policy fields in which citizens perceive that their influence is more meaningful than in others. However, one can assume that this general trend outlined above is also valid for issues on the EU and the differences between member states are significant. They will be outlined in greater detail at the end of this subchapter.

The third indicator investigates whether national citizens see their country as a meaningful actor in European policy-making. It is indicated by the perception whether their country has a voice

²³ Own portrayal based on yearly data from 2008 to 2015 provided by Eurobarometer Interactive (a), 2016 for all years except for 2011. The data for 2011 could not be retrieved. The question used is: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree – My voice counts in (Our country). When two Eurobarometer surveys in the same year are available, this thesis uses the autumn editions for better comparability or the survey of the year where the data for the member state is provided. When the EU member state has not been in the EU for the full time under investigation, it is only the average of the years the country has been a member in the EU. For the basis of calculation and the full table see the Annex A2, 85.

in the EU. Unfortunately, the data on the question whether citizens tend to agree with the notion that their country’s voice counts in the EU is fragmentary. The country-level data is only available for the period between 2004 and 2010, with missing data in 2005 and 2006. However, the trends are generally stable over time (see Annex A3) and therefore can be presented as evidence. The data is shown in the following graph.

Graph 4: Perception of influence of member states on the EU level by national citizens from 2004 to 2010²⁴



On average, across membership years, 59 percent of the respondents in the member states perceive that their country’s voice counts in the EU. Moreover, the differences between member states are not as big as in the previous indicator. The member states with most respondents convinced that their member state has a voice in the EU are France (83%), Sweden (81%), Germany (80%), Denmark (80%) and Luxembourg (78%). On the bottom level of this indicator are Romania (37%), Bulgaria (38%), Latvia (38%), Czech Republic (39%) and Greece (43%). Hence, overall, one can assess that enough citizens in all member states are confident that by influencing their country’s position they can also influence the EU’s politics. The engagement of audiences as necessary condition for politicization is thus fulfilled.


²⁴ Own portrayal based on yearly data from 2004 to 2010 provided by Eurobarometer Interactive (b), 2016 for all years except for 2005 and 2006. This data could not be retrieved on the country-level. The question used is: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree – (Our country’s) voice counts in the European Union. When two Eurobarometer surveys in the same year are available, this thesis uses the autumn editions for better comparability. When the EU member state has not been in the EU for the time under investigation, it is only the average of the years the country has been a member in the EU or has been excluded if it has not been a member at that time (Croatia) For the basis of calculation and the full table see the Annex A3, 86.

5.1.2. Salience of the issue

After it became obvious that the European Public is in general engaged in politics on the European level, the analysis now takes the next step and looks at the salience of certain issues. As terrorism and counter-terrorism is the topic of this analysis, it will now be looked at how pressing citizens in the EU member states see this issue. Unfortunately, as it was shown in the operationalization, some of the indicator questions were not asked each year from 2001 until 2015. The most comprehensive indicator, asking the general question of issues facing the country of the respondent (asked from 2003 until 2015 except for 2011) is therefore our main basis for the analysis of salience.

In this open question (respondents were not given a set of predefined answers) it has to be considered that respondents mostly answered issues that are not seen as traditional security challenges such as unemployment. Therefore the share of respondents that answer terrorism as an important issue is low, if compared to the 2011 and 2015 answered question of explicit security challenges to the EU or the in 2001 to 2002 asked question for people's fear. In the following graph, the EU average of the share of respondents that see terrorism as one of the most important issues is depicted.

Graph 5: EU wide average of respondents that state terrorism as one of the two most important issues facing their country, numbers in percent²⁵



Two conclusions can be drawn from this graph. First, the salience of terrorism across time is volatile and has decreased between 2006 and 2013. Secondly, the salience follows the pattern of major terrorist attacks in Europe and other countries that Europeans feel affiliated with. As

²⁵ Own illustration based on data provided by Eurobarometer (60), 2003; (62), 2004 and Eurobarometer Interactive (c), 2016 for the years of 2005-2015. Question that were asked to respondents is “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment.” Data for 2011 is not available. For the full table see Annex A4, 87.

the salience of terrorism over time is volatile, it is more accurate to compare the salience within each year instead of over the whole time of analysis. One cannot compare the EU average level of salience over time with the average of each member state. Instead, each level of terrorism salience is compared to the EU average and EU median in the specific year. To do so with the largest possible time frame, the country-level data from 2001 to 2002, even though a different Eurobarometer question was asked, is included. However, since we are interested in the intra-European differences, the data can be used since the same question was asked in every country at the same point of time. To achieve such a comparison the EU average and EU median of every year from 2001 to 2015 is calculated and then it is asserted how many times the country is above the average or median. Since with the enlargement rounds some countries were longer member states than others a single count is not sufficient for a comparison. Therefore, this table looks at the share how many times the country in its period of membership was above the EU average or median. This leads to the following table (consider that since the 2011 data was missing, the most membership years with Eurobarometer data are 14).

Table 7: Salience of terrorism in EU member states compared to the EU average²⁶

EU member state (Membership years with Eurobarometer data)	Share of membership years with salience above EU average in percent	Share of membership years with salience above EU median in percent
Austria (14)	0,43	0,50
Belgium (14)	0,29	0,64
Bulgaria (8)	0	0
Croatia (3)	0	0
Cyprus (11)	0	0
Czech Republic (11)	0,09	0,27
Denmark (14)	0,79	0,79
Estonia (11)	0,09	0,09
Finland (14)	0	0,07
France (14)	0,71	0,93
Germany (14)	0,57	0,71
Greece (14)	0,29	0,36
Hungary (11)	0,09	0,09
Ireland (14)	0,07	0,36
Italy (14)	0,79	0,86
Latvia (11)	0	0

²⁶ Values in table based on calculations made with data based on Eurobarometer (56), 2001, Eurobarometer (58), 2002, Eurobarometer (60), 2003; (62), 2004 and Eurobarometer Interactive (c), 2016 for the years of 2005-2015. Questions that were asked to respondents are for 2001 to 2002: “Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me, if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not” and for 2003-2015: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment?”. There was no data available for 2011. For the tables used for calculation, see Annex A5, 88.

Lithuania (11)	0	0
Luxembourg (14)	0,36	0,71
Malta (11)	0,09	0,09
Netherlands (14)	0,64	0,64
Poland (11)	0	0,18
Portugal (14)	0,21	0,29
Romania (9)	0,11	0,25
Slovakia (11)	0	0,36
Slovenia (11)	0	0
Spain (14)	0,71	0,71
Sweden (14)	0	0,21
United Kingdom (14)	0,93	0,93

The red-marked fields show that, depending on the measurement used, only in 8 out of 28 (average) or in 10 out of 28 (median), member states' salience of threat was higher than the EU average or median. It also becomes obvious that only three respectively four member states are in at least 75% of membership years above the EU average (Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom) and median (Denmark, France, Italy, United Kingdom). It is also striking that in many member states, the average (10 countries) or median (6 countries) was not once higher than in the EU. It is also striking that the new member states to the EU have in general a lower salience of terrorism. Hence, from this large and instructive data set, it is visible that salience is asymmetric.

On the European level, however, it can be shown with limited data that respondents across the EU rank terrorism predominantly as the number 1 security threat to European citizens. When asked about the security challenges to European citizens and not just to their country, the asymmetries are lower. This is shown with the following table.

Table 8: Share of respondents that state terrorism as one of three challenges to the security of EU citizens²⁷

EU MS	2011		2015		Change of Shares
	Share	Rank	Share	Rank	
EU average	33	1	49	1	+16
Austria	18	3	31	3	+13
Belgium	41	1	56	1	+15
Bulgaria	41	1	40	1	-1
Croatia			34	3	
Cyprus	16	2	50	1	+34
Czech Rep.	40	1	50	1	+10
Denmark	53	1	60	1	+7
Estonia	32	1	35	2	+3
Finland	33	1	30	2	-3
France	23	1	60	1	+37
Germany	39	1	49	1	+10
Greece	17	3	29	4	+12
Hungary	23	1	34	2	+11
Ireland	28	2	44	1	+16
Italy	33	1	55	1	+22
Latvia	28	1	22	1	-6
Lithuania	27	1	32	2	+5
Luxembourg	18	2	49	1	+31
Malta	27	1	62	1	+35
Netherlands	33	1	57	1	+24
Poland	18	1	45	1	+27
Portugal	23	2	43	2	+20
Romania	38	1	39	2	+1
Slovakia	38	1	36	1	-2
Slovenia	24	3	25	3	+1
Spain	39	1	49	2	+10
Sweden	38	1	48	1	+10
UK	41	1	51	1	+10

The EU average indicates that with 33 percent of respondents naming terrorism as one of the three important challenges in 2011 and 49% in 2015, the salience is in general high. Moreover, the rank among the other answers such as organized crime, natural and nuclear disasters, is that terrorism is the number 1 threat in 2011 and 2015. In exactly the half of the EU member states

²⁷ Data based on Special Eurobarometer (371), 2011 and Special Eurobarometer (432), 2015. Share indicates the percentage of respondents that named terrorism as one of three important challenges to the security of EU citizens at the moment. Rank indicates the position of terrorism among the other answers (Organized Crime, Cybercrime, External Border security, Natural Disasters, Corruption, Economic Crises, Illegal Immigration, Nuclear Disasters, Climate Change, Religious Extremism, Poverty, Wars, Petty Crime). The question was pre-coded and open-ended. Data for Croatia in 2011 is not included as it was not a member of the EU at that time.

terrorism was perceived both the number 1 challenge in 2011 and 2015. Only in four countries (Austria, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia), terrorism was not the number 1 ranked threat in 2011 or 2015. In contrast in the other half of member states, terrorism is only the number 2 challenge to EU security in either 2011 or 2015. In some countries like Greece (2015) and Slovenia (2011/2015), terrorism is viewed as the fourth-ranked (Greece) or third-ranked security challenge (Slovenia). Hence, from this data with a limited time frame, one could assume a high and pretty uniform salience.

However, the data just looks at national citizens' perception of the threat on EU citizens. Hence, this level of threat may be exaggerated when some citizens think of their fellow EU citizens in countries that are more exposed to terrorism and does not portray the national level that we are interested in. Following this argument, it would go too far to speak of a high politicization across EU member states. It is evident that in some times politicization is high across the EU but still differs across member states. This is shown with this table, summarizing the results on the country-level.

Table 9: Intermediate results of the salience of terrorism across member states

	EU threat level either above average or median	Terrorism as number one challenge in 2011 and 2015	Salience of terrorism in the member state
Belgium	Yes	Yes	High
Denmark	Yes	Yes	High
France	Yes	Yes	High
Germany	Yes	Yes	High
Italy	Yes	Yes	High
Netherlands	Yes	Yes	High
UK	Yes	Yes	High
Austria	Yes	No	Inconclusive
Bulgaria	No	Yes	Inconclusive
Czech Rep.	No	Yes	Inconclusive
Latvia	No	Yes	Inconclusive
Luxembourg	Yes	No	Inconclusive
Malta	No	Yes	Inconclusive
Poland	No	Yes	Inconclusive
Slovakia	No	Yes	Inconclusive
Spain	Yes	No	Inconclusive
Croatia	No	No	Low
Cyprus	No	No	Low
Estonia	No	No	Low
Finland	No	No	Low
Greece	No	No	Low
Hungary	No	No	Low
Ireland	No	No	Low

Lithuania	No	No	Low
Portugal	No	No	Low
Romania	No	No	Low
Slovenia	No	No	Low
Sweden	No	Yes	Low


The conclusions from this empirical analysis of the salience dimension of politicization is three-fold. When Eurobarometer data is available that explicitly looks at terrorism as a security problems of citizens or the EU, in this data the salience of terrorism is high. Terrorism is considered as number 1 threat in this data in 2001 to 2002 and 2011 to 2015. When this data is not available and it is asked what issues each state has, terrorism is not as important. This may be due that interviewees consider their immediate vicinity first. Secondly, as other researchers have already shown the salience is volatile and dependent on the occurrence of terror attacks. Thirdly, and due to the data availability, the most reliant finding is that salience differs to a high extent between member states with Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK as examples of high politicization.

5.1.3 Polarization of opinion

After the analysis has detected a substantial engagement of the public in the EU and thereby the possibility for politicization is given, a considerable salience of the issue of terrorism has been shown. It now remains to be seen how polarized opinions are on the dealing of the EU with this issue. Unfortunately, there are no cross-country public opinion surveys on specific EU anti-terrorism measures such as for instance Europol. Hence, similar Eurobarometer questions are used as proxy for a possible polarization of opinion among the European public on the dealing with terrorism.

First, and being the main basis of this variable, is the question whether citizens tend to trust the EU. This is crucial if member states plan to delegate competences in counter-terrorism competences to the EU level, citizens will evaluate this based on their trust to the EU. The corresponding mechanism suggests that citizens that tend not to trust the EU strongly oppose the project which leads to a polarization of opinion. It is also a polarized opinion when the trust against mistrust comparison is balanced, because then the public is nearly exactly divided into two halves that are opposing each other.

Graph 6: Balance of citizens' trust in the EU across member states from 2003-2015²⁸



The data on citizens' trust in the EU has several implications for our analysis of politicization. First of all, above membership years the EU average is about five percent. This means that on average, across years from 2003 to 2015, about 5 percent of respondents tend to trust the EU more than they tend not to trust. However, this value is a strong sign of polarization of opinion because it also signifies that the respondents are nearly equally divided. Shortly speaking, this means that nearly as much people do not trust the EU as people trust the EU. Hence, in terms of integration projects, overall in the European Union, public opinion is polarized.

Moreover, when one compares member states, there are disparities among member states visible. In several important member countries of the EU, the public either strongly does not trust the EU (UK) or tend not trust the EU (Germany and France). New member states tend to trust the EU more (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia). Hence, member states themselves are polarized themselves if they follow their public.

In the same line of reasoning are the answers of respondents to the question which role certain institutions should play in the provision of security to the citizens of their country. Among the possible answers are state actors like the police, the army and the judicial system as well as the answers "citizens' associations", "citizens themselves" and our topic of interest "EU's

²⁸ Own illustration based on Eurobarometer Interactive (d), 2016. Values are based on the difference between the values "tend to trust" and "tend not to trust". The full Eurobarometer question is: "For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not: The European Union." If the value is negative, more respondents in the specific country over years answered that they tend not to trust. If the value is positive a larger share of respondents in the country answered that they tend not to trust. Do not knows are not included. Full Table see Annex A6, 89.

institutions and agencies”. Unfortunately, the question was only asked once in 2015 so it is not fully applicable to our time frame of the study.

Table 10: Perceived role of the European Union in securing citizens in member states in 2015²⁹

	Share of respondents that assign a overall important role to EU institutions and agencies	Rank among the six possible answers
EU average	69	5
Austria	59	6
Belgium	71	5
Bulgaria	85	4
Croatia	68	5
Cyprus	88	4
Czech Republic	62	5
Denmark	63	5
Estonia	66	6
Finland	53	5
France	67	5
Germany	59	5
Greece	76	5
Hungary	78	5
Ireland	76	5
Italy	80	4
Latvia	63	5
Lithuania	72	5
Luxembourg	69	4
Malta	83	5
Netherlands	57	5
Poland	74	5
Portugal	66	5
Romania	80	5
Slovakia	77	5
Slovenia	69	4
Spain	75	4
Sweden	62	5
United Kingdom	68	5


Despite the European public generally assigns an important role to the EU in securing citizens (69%), it is ranked overall only in fifth position. On the country level, the highest rank of importance the EU reaches is the fourth rank and in some countries the answer of EU’s

²⁹ Values in Table based on Special Eurobarometer (432), 2015, T33-T38. The question asked was: “In your view what role should each of the following play in ensuring the citizens in (our country)?” The values indicated in the table are the share of respondents that assigned a very important role or a fairly important role to the EU’s institutions and agencies. Rank indicates the position of importance among the given answers: “the police, the army, the judicial system, the EU’s institutions and agencies, citizens’ associations, citizens themselves”. Multiple answers were possible so each respondent could indicate that all six institutions are responsible for security. For full table, see Annex A7, 90.

institution is ranked on the last place (Austria, Estonia). Overall, this means that citizens not only see the traditional state actors (police, army, judicial system) as more important but also at least one of the answers related to citizens. In Austria and Estonia, respondents even see citizen’s associations and citizens themselves as more important. This public opinion data shows that EU citizens generally assign a greater role to the traditional actors in the provision of security and their own commitment than to the EU. Hence, only speaking for the year of 2015 since this question has not yet been asked in other years, a delegation of competences in protecting citizens from terrorism to the EU level would be resisted by a polarized public.

Thus far, the picture on polarization suggests that delegation to the EU is a topic of high polarization of opinion and is likely to be resisted by the public. However, data on the question asked to citizens whether they believe that decisions on the fight against international terrorism should be made by the national government or jointly by the EU conveys a different message, as can be seen in the graph below.

Graph 7: Share of respondents in member states that answered that decisions on the fight against international terrorism should be made jointly with the EU (2001-2011)³⁰



Based on this question asked in 2001 and between 2003 and 2011, across members of the EU and across membership years, more than 83 percent of respondents agree that decision on international terrorism should be made jointly by the national government and the EU. The

³⁰ Own graph based on data provided by Eurobarometer Interactive (e), 2016. Croatia is not mentioned as it was not a member of the EU at that time. “Do not know” respondents are excluded. Values indicate the average share of respondents that responded that decisions on international terrorism should be made jointly with the EU. Full Table see Annex A8, 91. There was no data available for 2002.

differences across member states are not as large as in previous indicators and only Austria, Greece, Portugal, Spain and the UK are more resistant than others about this notion. Two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, some countries (Austria, Greece, Portugal, Spain and the UK) seem to be more resistant to the idea of joint decision-making than others. Secondly, the public seems to be less polarized if they consider international terrorism and speak just of a joint decision-making and not delegation. This is also in line with a Eurobarometer question solely asked between 2003 and 2006 in which the current role of the EU was mainly perceived as positive (Bureš, 2008, 79). Since the public evaluated the current role which was clearly intergovernmental at that time, it is not included into the analysis because it does not answer our research question of further integration projects. However, it is in line with the previous data on the joint decision-making and shows that citizens are not visibly skeptical towards an intergovernmental EU in counter-terrorism, but more towards a supranational EU.

However, this question has to be interpreted with a little caution, since the question explicitly refers to international terrorism and not just to terrorism where respondents may primarily include domestic terrorism into their evaluation. Moreover, the type of answers solely refer to joint decision-making and not to a strengthening of the EU or the sharing of competences. The data is nonetheless included to achieve more analytical clarity and since it is one of the best available for that time frame.

After having examined the public opinion data, each country's polarized opinion towards EU projects can be assessed. In this estimate, the question of the perceived role of the EU in securing citizens is excluded, since it was only asked in 2015 and the results may thus be biased by time-specific events of the year 2015. The results of the other indicators are summarized in the following table.

Table 11: Likelihood of member states' polarized opinion towards EU projects³¹

	Balance of trust in the EU	Approval of joint-decision making on int. terrorism	Polarized opinion towards EU projects
Austria	Negative	Below Average	Highly likely
Greece	Negative	Below average	Highly likely
United Kingdom	Negative	Below Average	Highly likely

³¹ Own assessment based on data in Graph 6 and 7. Polarized opinion is seen as highly likely if the balance of trust in the EU is negative AND the approval of joint-decision making is below average. If the balance of trust is negative OR the approval of joint-decision making is below average, polarization of opinion is seen as likely.

Croatia	Negative	No data	Likely
France	Negative	Average	Likely
Germany	Negative	Average	Likely
Ireland	Average	Below average	Likely
Italy	Average	Below average	Likely
Portugal	Average	Below average	Likely
Spain	Average	Below Average	Likely
Sweden	Negative	Average	Likely
Cyprus	Average	Average	Uncertain
Czech Republic	Average	Average	Uncertain
Finland	Average	Average	Uncertain
Latvia	Average	Average	Uncertain
Netherlands	Average	Average	Uncertain
Romania	Positive	Below average	Uncertain
Slovenia	Average	Average	Uncertain
Belgium	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Bulgaria	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Denmark	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Estonia	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Hungary	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Lithuania	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Luxembourg	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Malta	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Poland	Positive	Average	Unlikely
Slovakia	Positive	Average	Unlikely

From this table, it becomes evident that in around ten member countries a polarized opinion towards EU projects can be expected in Austria, Greece, United Kingdom (highly likely), Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (likely).

5.1.4. Intermediate result and secondary literature on politicization

After reviewing the indicators, it can now be assessed across all three criteria whether the EU overall and some member states are politicized when it comes to counter-terrorism. Therefore, it has already been evaluated that an adequate engagement of the public as the necessary condition exists across all member states. Moreover, it has been shown that terrorism is salient across the EU, especially in years with major attacks in Europe. Terrorism was seen as the first and pressing security challenge to citizens in 2011 and 2015. The salience of terrorism across the EU can thus be considered as sufficient. In the next step, it has been shown that a polarized opinion on the EU exists, with on average just five percent of respondents that trust the EU more than other respondents that do not trust. Despite this overall high politicization, differences between member states are visible and are portrayed in the following table.

Table 12: Comparison of politicization criteria between member states

	Salience of terrorism in the member state	Polarized opinion towards EU projects	Politicization of EU counter-terrorism
France	High	Likely	High
Germany	High	Likely	High
Italy	High	Likely	High
United Kingdom	High	Highly likely	High
Austria	Inconclusive	Highly likely	Inconclusive
Belgium	High	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Bulgaria	Inconclusive	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Croatia	Low	Likely	Inconclusive
Cyprus	Low	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Czech Rep.	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Denmark	High	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Finland	Low	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Greece	Low	Highly likely	Inconclusive
Ireland	Low	Likely	Inconclusive
Latvia	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Luxembourg	Inconclusive	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Malta	Inconclusive	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Netherlands	High	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Poland	Inconclusive	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Portugal	Low	Likely	Inconclusive
Romania	Low	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Slovakia	Inconclusive	Unlikely	Inconclusive
Slovenia	Low	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Spain	Inconclusive	Likely	Inconclusive
Sweden	Low	Likely	Inconclusive
Estonia	Low	Unlikely	Low
Hungary	Low	Unlikely	Low
Lithuania	Low	Unlikely	Low

The country-level data shows that mainly the data is inconclusive because according to the operationalization both criteria need to point in the same direction. However, this is rarely the case since either one of the indicators is inconclusive or they are contradicting each other. Despite this, a strong argument is still visible. In four of the member states the politicization of counter-terrorism is high (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) and in three others it is low (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania). Hence, referring to the hypothesis, an overall high politicization is confirmed but the data is not specific and explicit enough to speak of an asymmetric politicization.

This finding is also in line with other research that presumed a high politicization across the EU. It is widely acknowledged that terrorism creates “political urgency” (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 201), political “pressure” (Meyer, 2009, 654) and is “political[ly] sensitive[e]” (Bureš,


2008, 73; see also Argomaniz, 2012, 74; Bureš, 2011, 257). Consequently scholars argue that because of the “high levels of public anxiety and political attention” (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 2) counter-terrorism is “widely contested” (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 3) and policies on counter-terrorism may entail high political costs (Hegemann et al., 2011, 282). This is also acknowledged by a quoted commission official that emphasized the difference to the less politicized internal market (Argomaniz, 2012, 133). The review of the literature also suggests this. Bureš and other scholars rightfully point to the varying threat perceptions by the public, a variable that was included in the salience criteria (Bureš, 2008, 52; Bureš, 2011, 31; Monar, 2007, 302). Other earlier studies already indicated these “cross-national differences” (Edwards/Meyer, 2008, 8) and they have been found once more in this study, although the verdict on some states remains inconclusive. Hence, the differences between member states are a persistent feature of the EU in the counter-terrorism field. Concordant to the findings to this study, not only the threat perception varies but also the sensitiveness and politicization of the public towards a possible delegation of competences to the supranational level (Occhipinti, 2015, 245). Bureš also suggests that the idea of an EU’s role in the fight against terrorism is not seen overly critical but rather positive (Bureš, 2008, 67; Bureš, 2011, 43). However, according to our data, this positive perception may mainly be due to the intergovernmental form of the EU approach. Other scholars assess that the security sensitivity remains mainly national and this has “kept the EU’s role under tight control and constraints” (Monar, 2015, 355). However, the data analysis of this study does not support the claim that the

“pragmatism [in the EU’s counter-terrorism] approach is wholly predictable due to the high political sensibility of terrorism and the significance of internal security for the sovereignty of the state” (Argomaniz, 2012, 139).


5.2. Interdependence

The first type of data looks at terrorist incidents across Europe. Unfortunately, the TE-SAT compilations of terrorism incidents did only start in 2006, which is already five years into our period of investigation. Hence, it is supplemented with data from the Global Terrorism Database from 2001 to 2005. The data is portrayed in the following two graphs.

Graph 8. Average number of terrorist incidents between 2001 and 2005 in EU member states compared to the EU average³²



Graph 9. Average number of terrorist incidents between 2006 and 2014 in EU member states compared to the EU average³³




Despite the different data sources on terrorism, the results are similar. On average, five terrorist incidents happened per year in EU member countries from 2001 to 2005 and about 11 incidents

³² Own Graph based on GTD, 2016. Incidents on all types of targets and by all types of perpetrators are included, if they fulfill the criterion that they are aimed at a political, economic, religious or social goal. Unsuccessful attacks and ambiguous cases are included. Full table see Annex A9, 92.


³³ Own Graph based on TE-SAT reports 2007-2015 (each report refers to the previous year). Incidents of all types of targets and all types of perpetrators are included if they fulfill they criteria for a terrorist offence as stated in the 2002 Council Framework Decision. Terrorist offences are therein defined as intentional acts with the aim of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. Included are foiled, failed and successfully executed attacks. Full Table see Annex A10, 93.

between 2006 and 2014. More importantly, only a few member states are affected by terrorism. Between 2001 and 2005, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK had more terrorist incidents than the EU average and between 2006 and 2014, France, Spain and the UK were above average in term of terrorist attacks. This is contrasted by a number of countries where terrorism rarely or did not occur at all. Further data is in line with this first assessment of terrorist incidents.

Graph 10. Average number of arrested terrorism suspects between 2007 and 2014³⁴



Graph 11: Average number of convicted terrorism suspects between 2007 and 2014³⁵



³⁴ Own Graph based on TE-SAT reports 2007-2015 (each report refers to the data of the previous year). Numbers indicate arrests because of terrorism-related charges as defined by the 2002 Council Framework Decision. Terrorist offences are therein defined as intentional acts with the aim of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. Full Table see Annex A11, 94.

³⁵ Own Graph based on TE-SAT reports 2007-2015 (each report refers to the data of the previous year). Numbers indicate convicted persons by national courts on terrorism-related offenses as defined by the 2002 Council Framework Decision. Terrorist offences are therein defined as intentional acts with the aim of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. Member states report the data to Eurojust and it is then portrayed in TE-SAT reports. Full Table see Annex A12, 95.

The data of arrested and convicted terrorists in EU member states shows that on average between 2006 and 2014, about 26 suspects were arrested on terrorist related charges and 10 convicted. Once more, only a few countries are above average in these two categories. In terms of arrested suspects, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are above average. Several other EU member states do rarely or never arrest suspects. In terms of convicted suspects, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK are above average.

Overall, the three types of data shows that terrorism is not a phenomenon that affects all member states equally. Terrorism mainly takes place in a few countries. Judging based on this data, there is no spill-over visible within the EU. Hence, the analysis at hand suggests that the negative externalities are not felt by a sufficient amount of member states. Since terrorism is a rare phenomenon in most of the countries, the mutual benefit dimension suggested by interdependence is not present. Hence, one can conclude that an asymmetrical interdependence in the EU exists in the following form.

Table 13: Asymmetrical interdependence of terrorism across the EU³⁶

	Terrorism incidents above EU average (2001-2014)	Terrorism below EU average (2001-2014)
Member states	France, Greece, Italy, Spain, UK	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden

However, several caveats exist because of the limited data available. To further investigate this question, one would need exact data where each terrorist incident was planned and whether it was realized crucially with the exploitation of the EU’s construct. However, such exact data is only accessible to law-enforcement authorities. Only in some recent, publicly discussed cases like the attacks in France 2015, it became visible that terrorists exploited the EU’s structures of open borders and different operational conduct. Hence, there is a need for specification of each attack whether it is purely domestic, supported by EU structures, or fully dependent on EU structures (with attackers attacking multiple countries at the same time by multiple nation attackers). One could assume that once this specific data is available that interdependence is

³⁶ Own table based on GTD, 2016 and TE-SAT, 2007-2015. Full Table see Annex A9, 92 and A10, 93. **Bold** countries have less than one terrorist attack per membership year on average.

found to be higher and more symmetrical if one could track the components of an attack across the EU. For instance, if the weapons are used stem from countries in East Europe, the attackers from several member states and are then conducted in a third, non-related European member state, the interdependence would be more visible. However, such verified data for a large number of cases is not available and it can be assumed that the main amount of attacks is mainly domestic and does not have negative externalities on other member states.

Secondly, the data presented does solely look at the number of incidents and not at casualties. Hence, the immediate impact of interdependence dependent on the number of victims or the origin of the victims could not be assessed.

Thirdly, the data given to TE-SAT stems from the member states. Despite a common and agreed methodology among Europol member states, it may be possible that certain member states group data differently (Bureš, 2011, 103-104). However, the data is still reliant and the best available.


This chapter with the data presented showed that, as expected by differentiated integration theory, there exist “differences in demand” (Rittberger et al., 2014, 194) across EU member states and consequently spill-overs do not affect all countries (Dyson, 2010, 44; Leuffen et al., 2012, 52). The form of this asymmetrical interdependence is that just a few countries (France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK) are affected to a large extent by the negative externality of terrorism in the EU.

In the secondary literature the assessment on interdependence is not clear-cut. Some scholars presuppose that the abolition of internal border controls generated an all-encompassing spill-over effect (Dyson, 2010, 286). This is supported by statements of officials that state a “general appreciation [...] that no one is entirely immune” (Bureš, 2011, 254) and acknowledge that in a case of failure in cooperation, “a partner country in the EU will fall victim to a terrorist attack (Bureš, 2011, 245). However, other scholars, as described in the literature review, concur with the findings of this analysis and refer to “different threat profiles” (Bossong, 2014, 74) or different threat perceptions (Bureš, 2008, 73) and contrasts the expectation by scholars that the abolition of internal border controls generated an all-encompassing spill-over effect (Dyson, 2010, 286). It is visible in the data that “only six EU member states (Spain, France, Greece, Germany, Italy and the UK) account for almost 90 percent of all terrorist attacks perpetrated on the territory of the EU since 1968 (Bureš, 2011, 32). One can thus speak of a stable trend of asymmetric interdependence that is visible in the data and in the secondary literature.

5.3. Preference convergence

The preferences of the member states in the fight against terrorism are not as easily visible. Hence they had to be compiled for this thesis. After the content analysis and the compilation of country profiles (see Annex A14, 96-103), there are three preferences outlined for each member state (see Annex A15, 104-105). If they are counted and compiled with disregard to the ranking in the specific country, the following graph can be presented.

Graph 12. Count of counter-terrorism preferences across member states



The Graph shows that overall there is a high convergence across member states that global action is one of the ways to fight terrorism. In 24 of 28 member states global action is one of the preferences. This is a striking finding which shows that the perception of terrorism is mainly focused on international instead of domestic terrorism and that the regional EU approach is not seen as the primary vehicle for counter-terrorism, but global action. The high preference for global action also implies that some member states that have not been exposed to terrorism as frequently as other states in the EU, see the fight against terrorism as a global task of the attacked nations around the world. Still, 19 of 28 member states emphasize the implementation of existing EU measures as one of their preferences and only three member states (Austria, Belgium and Malta) explicitly voice a preference for a delegation of competences to the EU. Hence, in this point, a large convergence of preferences for the implementation of the existing Status Quo is visible. The widest preference divergence can be found between countries that have strict domestic measures as one of their preference (Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Slovakia) and other countries that favor a more understanding approach that addresses domestic

and international root causes (Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, UK).

The reasons for these preferences are not the topic of this thesis and it can only be presumed that the specific preferences are certainly due to the exposure of the member state to a specific kind of terrorism, for instance whether it has been mainly domestic or international Islamic terrorism. The main finding of this thesis is a high convergence of preferences and also an agreement that the delegation of competences to the EU level is not preferred.

The finding of a high preference convergence and a lack of preferences for a delegation to the EU level is widely convergent with the secondary literature. Bossong, for instance, points to divergent national interests that have stalled the EU's counter-radicalization approach (Bossong, 2014, 74) which may be due to the attested differences between a strict domestic approach and a more understanding one. The findings of this paper on the preferences of Austria and Belgium as pro-integration actors is in agreement with the role of these states in reforms of Europol, where Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands favored a delegation of powers to Europol (Bureš, 2011, 106; Argomaniz, 2012, 83). Further findings that are in line with previous findings of the literature are the preference of smaller EU member (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia) states to prefer implementation instead of new and more deeper action on the EU (Bureš, 2011, 198). The finding of a convergence in favor of cooperation and networks instead of integration has also been expected before and matches these findings (Bureš, 2011, 232, 247-248; Den Boer et al., 2008, 101). This convergence of the preference for non-integration may also be due to the fact that almost all governments across the EU do not see an added-value from this (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 202). Some of the observations made by this analysis (for instance that EU solutions to terrorism are not part of the preferences for the fight against terrorism) are again congruent with previous analyses by scholars. The position of the UK that has the EU solutions not as part of their preferences is in line with Monar's finding that the UK does not refer in its strategic documents to the EU in the fight against terrorism (Monar, 2007, 302).

Despite this finding of a high convergence of preferences for approaches that do not include the delegation of competences to the EU, Kaunert rightfully points out that the preferences of EU member states can be altered by an active EU Commission (Kaunert, 2010, 11). Bossong emphasizes the influence of national protagonists' relations with each other below the minister level that would also lead to a change of preferences (Bossong, 2014, 73). Hence, every project would need to be investigated on the specific type of preference and actor constellations.

5.4. Supranational actors

5.4.1. *De jure* role

The constitutional treaties indicate that the field of justice and home affairs, later named the area of freedom, security and justice is clearly an area in which European institutions do not possess “exclusive competence” (Monar, 2015, 339). This is emphasized with the following legal provision in the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon:

“This Title shall not affect the exercise of responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, K 2.2., Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999, Article 731, Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, Article 61 E)

Despite the reoccurrence of the above mentioned provision, from a legal perspective, the role of supranational actors in the field of counter-terrorism has been enhanced since the Treaty of Maastricht until now. Before the treaty of Amsterdam, internal policies were entirely in the third intergovernmental pillar. With the treaty of Amsterdam, migration, asylum and external border controls were moved to the first pillar (Leuffen et al. 2012, 224). The Treaty of Lisbon then abolished the intergovernmental third pillar and transferred decision-making in this field to the community method (Leuffen et al., 2012, 226). Hence, the Lisbon Treaty changed the majority rule in the Justice and Home affairs council from two third to majority voting (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2009, 2). This also signifies that with the Lisbon treaty and its amendments of the previous treaties, the principle of co-decision was introduced into the field of area of freedom security and justice meaning that the European Parliament’s role has been enhanced to a partner at eye level of the Council (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 200, 204; Argomaniz, 2012, 42; Bureš, 2011, 240). The European Parliament now also possesses increased oversight over Europol (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 200). Furthermore, new powers were given to the European Court of Justice in judging on issues in the field of area of freedom, security and justice (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 204). *De jure*, this could lead to the Commission initiating an infringement procedure at the European Court of Justice against a member state (Bureš, 2011, 241). Lastly, new capacities were given to the supranational level in concluding agreements with third countries (Argomaniz et al., 2015, 197). Considering all these changes, a move into this supranational direction can be asserted.

Despite this change, the intergovernmental Justice and Home Affairs Council has been and still is the main decision-making body in this field (Monar, 2015, 341). Additionally, a Standing Committee on Internal Security within the Council was introduced and is once more, based on the principle of intergovernmentalism (Bureš, 2011, 241). Another still existing sign of intergovernmentalism is an “emergency brake” that exists for member states to circumvent minimum standards set by the EU (Bureš, 2011, 242). Accordingly, “a high degree of exceptionalism” (Carrera/Geyer, 2007, 7) in this field is also visible in the Treaty of Lisbon. It is also emphasized that in the field of counter-terrorism an “explicit legal personality and competence of the Union as such” (Monar, 2015, 339) is absent.

Because of the significant change to the community method in interior policies and the expectation that “in principle this decision would facilitate the production of integrated policies and streamline and accelerate policy-making” (Argomaniz, 2012, 113), *de jure*, supranational actors possess enough capabilities to push the field of counter-terrorism to more integration. It remains to be seen how the European Commission and the European Parliament interprets that new role and takes full use of its possibilities. This will be evaluated in the next chapter on the *de facto* role of supranational actors.

5.4.2. *De facto* role

The *de facto* role by supranational actors remains weak, because the supranational political actors themselves continue to perceive that they have to be “careful [...] as member states are remain wary of any potential encroachments on their powers” (Monar, 2006, 500). Other authors refer to a commission that is “generally cautious to avoid supranational recipes” (Argomaniz, 2012, 25). Another strong indicator is a quote made by a commission official that dismissed the Commission’s frequent use of infringements procedures as made possible with the Treaty of Lisbon:

“[W]e are not public prosecutors [...] I don’t believe in adversarial procedures; this is not internal market. I would advise against using infringement procedures too often after Lisbon” (Interview with Commission official, cited in Argomaniz, 2012, 133).

Occhipinti also acknowledges that, despite the *de jure* changes in the European Union, the careful observation of the field shows that the thinking based on the intergovernmental third pillar logic remains (Occhipinti, 2015, 238). Based on interviews with a Commission official and a Council secretariat official in 2011, Occhipinti assesses that “actors in the Commission or Council Secretariat may be sensitive to concerns for sovereignty as well or even share them

and, consequently, will not push for greater integration in some areas” (Occhipinti, 2015, 245). Consequently, the commission’s role in combatting radicalization is limited to research and exchange of knowledge (Bossong, 2014, 78). Even scholars arguing that some of the advancements of the EU counter-terrorism field such as the European Arrest Warrant have only been possible by supranational policy entrepreneurship admit that “counter-terrorism is a policy sector in which the EU institutions have rarely taken the lead” (Kaunert, 2010, 11). Furthermore, even the counter-terrorism coordinator that does not have an equal role in the decision-making process like the Council, the European Parliament or the Commission, he states that “the fight against terrorism is and will remain primarily the responsibility of national authorities. [...] The EU’s role is to support these national authorities not to replace them or duplicate their work” (cited as in Bureš, 2011, 108).

The enhanced *de jure* role of the European Parliament has not led to a specific *de facto* role. It remains to be seen whether the European Parliament is pro-integration in this field or whether its primary focus is the safeguarding of privacy rights and the principle of subsidiarity. This may also depend on the particular composition of the European Parliament and the number of EU-skeptic Members of European Parliament.

Hence, as shown by the evaluation of the *de facto* role, the role perceived by the supranational political actors did not alter enough to create an impetus for integration. It can be concluded that the “governments of the signatory states remain the key actors and hence the main suppliers of integration” (Rittberger et al., 2014, 205). Thus, the variable “supranational actors” is weak as perceived by differentiated integration theory and thus can partially explain the lack of integration. However, it remains to be seen how this plays out in each specific integration project in the field of counter-terrorism.

5.5. Case Study of the emergence of the European Arrest Warrant

The European Arrest Warrant is considered to be the counter-terrorism „flagship instrument of the EU“ (Kaunert, 2010, 9) and the “major advance for EU integration in criminal justice matters” (Kaunert, 2010, 14-15). According to Wagner, the significance of the EAW may be “similar [...] to the Cassis de Dijon judgement” (Wagner, 2003, 1038) and consequently may lead to an integrated judicial area. It has been shown in the mapping of the field that this outlook has not developed yet. However, using the case study of the EAW, it will be highly relevant for this analysis to see how the variables introduced by the theory can explain the introduction of the EAW. Before doing this, the contents of the EAW are shortly outlined. The EAW measure

replaces the previous extradition procedure with a “system of surrender between national judicial authorities” (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 367). It also includes that a European Arrest Warrant has to be fulfilled even when the offense may not be penalized in the surrendering state (Kaunert, 2010, 9-10). Moreover, the measure includes, next to terrorism. “virtually all crimes apart from petty crimes” (Kaunert, 2010, 10). Consequently, the EAW presents a case of uniform integration (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 357) and the question how such an advanced integration project was achieved, can be posed.

5.5.1. Politicization

In terms of politicization, Zimmermann presupposes that EU member states „were deeply suspicious of allowing any external organization to interfere in their politically sensitive internal security“(Zimmermann, 2006, 126). Hence, two expectations developed by the theory can be outlined. First, one could think that the EAW, because of its wide mandate and its intrusion in national legal system as indicated above, would either not have succeeded or become differentiated. The second proposition derived from the theory would be that the legal characteristic of this specific policy project is less controversial for the public than for instance projects on operational themes and would result in less controversy.

However, in this specific policy project, the mechanism worked differently. The measure was “presented as an anti-terrorist measure” (Kaunert, 2010, 17) to raise the issue above the level of normal politics and to show that the measure is essential for the future security of the EU. This was especially important since the policy project of the EAW had been thought of since 1999 but was initially stalled. The ensuing public pressure and the politicization did not work as a constraint but as impetus for action (Kaunert, 2010, 21-22) and this was also emphasized by the Commissioner at that time who emphasized that “it will be difficult to explain to the public why we failed” (cited as in Kaunert, 2010, 17). Accordingly, politicization helped in this case, together with other factors that will be presented, the introduction of such a measure by the creation of a window of opportunity (Argomaniz, 2009, 154). In this case politicization works as an impetus for integration and this has not been expected by the theory.

5.5.2. Interdependence

The high and symmetric interdependence that the measure received, since it was inherently a measure against crime and not only against terrorism, was conducive for the introduction of the EAW. Since the EAW did not only refer to terrorist offences but to all crimes, it can be assumed that member states are in general affected by all kind of crimes in a more symmetric way than

with respect to terrorism. Additionally, and more specific to the attributes of transnational terrorism which are mobility, transnationality and a network structure, it can be expected that no country in the EU is able to fight these challenges all by himself. This notion is also emphasized by the Commissioner of Justice and Home Affairs at that time, Antonio Vitorino. He stated that it is in the essence of terrorists to “exploit loopholes in the law” and to “take advantage of differences in legal treatment between States, in particular where the offence is not treated as such by national law” (cited as in Kaunert, 2010, 16). Hence, since all EU member states are self-conscious that there exist such loopholes either in their law or in a different state and are aware that terrorist danger may stem out of their country or they are affected by the danger resulting of other member states with loopholes, the interdependence can be considered high. Consequently, it is explicable from this argument that the EAW did not become differentiated.

5.5.3. Preference convergence

As it was introduced earlier in this thesis, the bargaining on the specific form of a counter-terrorism integration project is “dominated by member states’ preferences and interests” (Kaunert, 2010, 12). In the case of the EAW, Kaunert found that initially the national positions were “highly diverging” (Kaunert, 2010, 17). More specifically, Italy, France, Ireland, UK, Luxembourg and Belgium were opposing the introduction of such a measure (Kaunert, 2010, 17) and this would have led, according to the theory, to differentiated integration. Especially Italy strongly contested the wide scope of the project and because of the at-the-time unanimity need in judicial cooperation, this was crucial (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 366). However, at the end of the project, uniform integration emerged and the initially divergent preferences became convergent and enabled the introduction of the EAW (Kaunert, 2010, 12).

This convergence was achieved through two mechanisms. Firstly, additional to the role of supranational actors, the “policy norm of the war on terror” (Kaunert, 2010, 13) was instrumental in convincing member states to change their preferences (Bureš, 2011, 152). This norm emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 and created pressure on actors in the international arena to pick sides on terrorism and to act accordingly (Kaunert, 2010, 15-16). Since most of the member states did not want to join the US war on terror, common European action through measures such as the EAW presented an EU-specific middle way. It included “political merits” (Kaunert, 2010, 22) like the avoidance of the need to go to war and ultimately led to the member states preference building and ensuing preference convergence (Kaunert, 2010, 24). Secondly, Italy as the strongest adversary, changed its position due to peer pressure of other member states

with the mechanism of enhanced cooperation and due to the activities of the Commission which will be outlined later (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 366). Furthermore, domestic pressure for instance through the media in Italy led to the change of position in Italy (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 366).

The case of the EAW presents a strong argument for the importance of the variable of preference convergence. The project was only realized once the preferences were approximated enough.

5.5.4. The role of supranational actors

Despite its *de jure* weak role compared to the member states' competencies before the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission *de facto* had a considerable impact in the realization of the policy project (Kaunert, 2010, 10). In the case of this specific policy project, the commission became a "supranational policy entrepreneur" (Kaunert, 2010, 24). This means that in the "policy window" (Kaunert, 2010, 12) emerging after 9/11, the Commission used its resources to introduce such a measure (Kaunert, 2010, 12). It deployed various measures successfully.

First of all, the Commission proposed the project "by means of a framework decision" (Kaunert, 2010, 9), a measure of the at that time existing third pillar that left the member states with the competence to specify the means to achieve the result (Kaunert, 2010, 12). Hence, the Commission created initial pressure by setting an aim that had to be achieved and leaving the method to the member states. Secondly, the Commission not only set the frame but also shaped member states' preferences (Kaunert, 2010, 14). There are several traces of this. For instance, the Commission exploited a division in positions between the Belgian Prime Minister and the Belgian Justice Minister (Kaunert, 2010, 18). The Justice Minister's delegation was told to slow down the EAW project and the intervention of the Commissioner Vitorino towards the Belgian Prime Minister lifted this instruction (Kaunert, 2010, 18). Moreover, the Commission also changed the preferences of the member states indirectly through the US (Kaunert, 2010, 19). It cannot be traced back exactly whether the lobbying of the Commission or the strategy of the US themselves led to the letter by Bush who demanded for a facilitation of internal extradition procedures in the EU (Kaunert, 2010, 19). However, it remains clear that, the Commission's efforts were crucial in the making of the EAW. Hence, contrary to the expectation to the theory, the supranational actors in this case were strong and, consequently, the outcome was not differentiated.

5.5.5. Intermediate result of the case study

The case study of the EAW showed that one of the variables worked differently in this case. The high politicization did not block integration but help it. However, the convergence of preferences, the strong and symmetric interdependence and strong supranational actors led to the uniform integration as expected by the zero hypothesis of this paper (see section 3.4.1). A factor not treated by the theory that may have had a significant impact are the different constitutions of the member states and the corresponding legal cultures (Bureš, 2011, 150) or the opinions of law enforcement agencies and judges that would speak out of their practical experience.

5.6. Case study of the emergence of Europol's counter-terrorism role

In contrast to the supranational and uniform integration in the realm of the EAW, the role of Europol in counter-terrorism remains intergovernmental (Bureš, 2011, 107; Occhipinti, 2015, 234). The main advances such as the change of Europol's foundation to an official EU agency in 2010 did not enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities significantly to the role of a supranational actor (Occhipinti, 2015, 234, 237-238, 240). In line with the assessment made in section 4.5. of this thesis, despite all members of the EU are included in Europol and consequently there is no horizontal differentiation, Europol is an example of a lack of vertical integration, especially in counter-terrorism (Bureš, 2011, 107).

5.6.1. Politicization

In contrast to the European Arrest Warrant, the window of opportunity that existed after 9/11 did not enable Europol to substantially increase its competences or mandate to the extent of a supranational actor in counter-terrorism. One of the reasons for this is the reluctance of the member states to share police functions on the EU level because they compose traditional components of state sovereignty (Occhipinti, 2015, 245). Hence, a supranational integration is not considered because, on the one hand, decision-makers do not see this as a possibility because of the dominant perception of state sovereignty. On the other hand, if seen as a possibility, politicians fear the response of the public when deciding to delegate core competences to the supranational level. This is especially crucial when the public and even decision-makers have not seen a value-added from Europol (Bureš, 2011, 85). Hence, in this case a high politicization that was considered by the actors can be assessed. One more indicator for this is a quote by Europol Director Rob Wainwright in 2015, who stated that the extension of Europol is considered to be politically difficult (Bureš, 2016, 8).

In another recent study, Jansson also finds that the political nature of terrorism makes it hard for politicians to delegate competences to the more technical, supranational level (Jansson, 2016, 1). However, it is not explained why other less politicized domains such as cybercrime are also not supranationally integrated. Considering this, the political nature of terrorism and the ensuing politicization does not fully explain why Europol is not having supranational competences.

5.6.2. Interdependence

Counter-terrorism efforts and police cooperation are mainly dependent on data and generally require a transnational response (Occhipinti, 2015, 245). Since it is assumed that criminals and terrorists exploit the open borders within Europe, states are dependent on each other for this data (Gerspacher, 2010, 162). This is well acknowledged by the member states and after the attacks in Paris there were multiple calls for a more extensive and stable information exchange (Becker/Niesen (Spiegel Online), 2016). However, the pattern of an asymmetric contribution to Europol is consistent over years and seems to remain.

This may be due to several reasons. First of all, some states may be more interdependent than others for data on crime and terrorism. This is visible by differing crime rates within Europe and the differing number of attacks and arrests in countries as exemplified in chapter 5.2. of this thesis. Second, states may not recognize the interdependence as relevant for them. This may be due to their different proceedings against crime and terrorism with a stricter domestic approach. Hence, a common and maybe even supranational approach by Europol seems to be out of place for these countries. This is because these states trust their own approach more than the common approach, hence they do not acknowledge such an interdependence. Lastly, member states of the EU may acknowledge interdependence but do not see a value-added of an already existing police cooperation (Bureš, 2011, 85). Consequently, the existing interdependence is covered by the already existing mechanisms of informal cooperation (Bureš, 2011, 85). Hence, there is no spill-over to member states as expected by neo-functionalism.

5.6.3. Preference convergence

There is no convergence of preferences to give Europol a stronger role. Instead, firstly, there is a disagreement among member states about the role of Europol in counter-terrorism (Bureš, 2011, 106). The coalition of preferences can be traced back to Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands being in favor of delegating competences to Europol to create an institution similar to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (Bureš, 2011, 106). Other member states among them

Germany, France, Italy, Spain and UK want to keep Europol as a body subordinated to the national level (Bureš, 2011, 106). However, even between these groups variances are visible, for instance, the UK opposes the project more strongly than Germany (Occhipinti, 2015, 245).

However, the preferences of member states are not fixed. It is not possible to investigate every member states' position on the delegation of competences at Europol at this point, but the case of France presents an example of such a possible shift. As indicated above, France used to be skeptical about Europol. After the Paris attacks, however, the Taskforce *Fraternité*, founded by Europol, was heavily used by France (European Counter Terrorism Centre, 2016). The taskforce analyzed data provided by Belgium and France and came up with 799 intelligence leads for the authorities in France (European Counter Terrorism Centre, 2016).

Despite this change of preference in France after the attacks, the newly designed European Counter Terrorism Centre remains once more dependent on the voluntary contributions of the member states. This is illustrated by a statement of the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Migration and Citizenship at the introduction of this new institution. Avramopoulos requested the member states “to trust and support the European Counter Terrorism Centre to help it succeed in its important mission” (Europol Press Release, 2016). One can therefore assume that the preferences of the member states for a voluntary exchange of information and voluntary informal cooperation remain stable. Moreover, since across all EU member states the additional benefit of a stronger and supranational Europol is and remains to be questioned (Deflem, 2006, 339), these divergences in member state preferences are respected and no efforts are made to change these preferences (Occhipinti, 2015, 243).

5.6.4. Supranational actors

As it was outlined earlier in the section about the role of supranational actors, it has been the case that the extent of influence by these actors is limited (Occhipinti, 2015, 245). Moreover, especially in operational police cooperation it can be expected that the influence of the supranational actors is limited since no meaningful previous integration projects exist and the EU is intentionally excluded from some operational designs (Occhipinti, 2015, 238). Hence, it is evident that a major push into supranationalism cannot be presumed by supranational actors in this case.

Recent research rather sheds light on EU agencies such as Europol and their strong connection towards the supranational actors of the EU. The authors of this study describe that the “tight relationship between Commission departments and EU agencies signify a centralization of EU

executive power” (Egeberg et al., 2015, 609). Since it can be expected that member states are wary of such a development, the influence of supranational actors on the decision-making process towards more delegation of such agencies can be considered limited.

5.6.5. Intermediate result

It has been shown that in this specific policy project, the variables and mechanisms work as expected by the theory. A high politicization, low interdependence, low preference convergence and weak supranational actors lead to a lack of vertical integration in EU’s counter-terrorism role. However, there are also other aspects that come to light by an analysis of the establishment of Europol and these are not covered by the theory. First, the role of the security agencies needs to be considered. Often, the corresponding national security agencies do not comply with the ambitions made by politicians (Bureš, 2011, 108; Bureš, 2016, 1). This is visible in the case of Europol when despite plans for additional information-sharing at the EU level, security authorities were not willing to do so (Occhipinti, 2015, 241), because they do not trust the agencies of the EU enough (Bureš, 2011, 109). This phenomenon is termed “bureaucratic resistance” (Occhipinti, 2015, 247) and is in this case a strong factor of explanation because it also influences the preferences of the member states’ decision-makers as they anticipate the non-compliance of their security agencies. Secondly, it has also not been considered how legal limits prevent such a supranationalization for example through the “principle of proportionality” (Occhipinti, 2015, 245) that ensures that EU activity is only taken where needed. Other legal obstacles are the differences in the legal or administrative systems between member states (Bureš, 2016, 4). However, despite these instances that are not included in the theory, the case study of Europol showed a strong explanatory value of the four variables used by the theory. Since the form of the variables is likely to persist and the creation of Europol as political “top-down decision” (Bureš, 2016, 4) cannot be undone the development into a supranational EU intelligence capacity is highly unlikely (Bureš, 2016, 1).

6. Conclusion

6.1. Summary

This thesis introduced differentiated integration theory to the analysis of a specific policy field, in this case counter-terrorism policy. The delineation of the policy field showed that, indeed, this policy field is highly differentiated. Subsequently, the explicatory value of the theory was tested. The variables of politicization, interdependence, preference convergence and the role and capabilities of supranational actors not only cover many arguments by classic integration theories but also include some of the arguments made by scholars that have analyzed this field before. The hypothesis presented in this thesis is that differentiated integration is the result of high and asymmetric politicization, asymmetrical interdependence, little preference convergence and weak supranational actors. The results of the empirical analysis are not decisive enough to confirm the hypothesis in this thesis. However, they show that the variables do have an influence on the differentiated integration outcome in this field despite they do not act all the time as expected in the theory. To achieve more analytical clarity, the assumption made by this thesis that the counter-terrorism policy can be analyzed comprehensively with regard to differentiated integration has to be reconsidered. It has been shown that the mechanisms at work are different at every specific policy project. Hence, the presumed idea of the literature review and the theory of this thesis that country-specific factors are responsible for differentiated integration has to be altered to the understanding that country-specific and policy project specific factors matter to the same extent. A summary of the results of the analysis is shown in the following table.

Table 14: Results of the analyses of this thesis

Variable/Integration project	Expectation by the theory	General analysis of the field	EAW as an example of non-differentiation	Europol as an example of a lack of vertical integration
Politicization	High and asymmetric	High but symmetric	High and symmetric	High and symmetric
Interdependence	Asymmetric	Asymmetric	Symmetric	Asymmetric
Preference convergence	Little	High	High	Little
Supranational actors	Weak	Weak	Strong	Weak

Hence, in most of the cases, marked green in the table above, the variables functioned as expected. However, the specific evidence and data is insufficient to posit these variables as answers to the research question that asked for key explanations for the differentiated integration in this field. Considering each variable, the variables of interdependence and supranational actors conducted as expected in the general analysis as well as in the case studies. However, despite the explanatory value of politicization can be considered high in general and across the cases, it was not asymmetric as expected. In general and in the case of Europol, politicization worked as theoretically expected as a constraint for integration whereas in the case of the EAW, the high politicization did not work as a constraint but as an incentive for further integration. Thus, it has been shown that despite its high relevance for the field, the variable politicization and its causal relationship needs to be evaluated with regard to each integration project. The same holds for the variable of preference convergence that, looking at the entire policy field and not at specific policy projects, disconfirmed the theory since a common preference against a delegation of competences to the EU level was visible. However, in the specific policy projects that were investigated in this thesis, the sufficient variable of convergence of preferences was as expected by the theory. Hence, preference convergence seems to be the strongest key explanation. This also has the practical implication that the national convictions of how to fight terrorism are the most important factor. Lastly, in line with the theoretical framework and the literature review, the analysis showed that national governments are still the dominant actor in the decision about integration projects.

Because of the lack of specific data for instance about the exact public opinions on specific policy projects or the lack of evidence in the type of a “smoking gun”, none of the factors mentioned above can be postulated as verified key explanation of the differentiated integration in this field. One example of this is that there was no data available that laid out the possible exact exploitation of the EU’s borderless internal structure to prove interdependence and spill-over. Moreover, since exact values for each member state were also not attainable in all of the variables, the coalitions of member states in general and in each policy projects could not be retraced. One of the fundamental problems of political science that one cannot look into decision-makers preferences and their motivations could not be overcome.

6.2. Evaluation of Theory

Despite its difficulties in explaining differentiated integration in this specific policy field, the theory has proven valuable since it incorporates many aspects that apparently matter in the formation of such a policy field, despite the exact mechanism surely needs to be specified. It is,

frankly speaking, not the fault of the theory that specific data is not available. However, there are certain aspects that would need to be integrated into the theory.

Firstly, member states' different "legal and institutional provisions" (Bossong, 2014, 74) in general and with regard to the data protection or civil right laws of the member states are not considered despite they are considered to be highly relevant for the explanation of this field (Bureš, 2011, 122). Changing these laws and also changing the existing system of security would lead to massive costs that would need to be carried by the member states (Monar, 2006, 507). The case study of Europol pointed toward different data protection standards as one of the constraints for more intelligence sharing and ultimately as a constraint for a European intelligence agency (Bureš, 2016, 5). Moreover, the responsible institutions dealing with terrorism differ between member states, as in some of the member states intelligence agencies are more in charge than police agencies and the other way around in others (Bureš, 2016, 5). It could be argued that these considerations are already included in the member state preferences but then the mechanism leading to the preferences would need to be specified.

The same applies to the second element that are the preferences of the practitioners and the security agencies. It is widely expected that because of rivalries between these agencies (Bureš, 2011, 124) and the culture of autonomy preservation pursued by those agencies (Hegemann et al., 2011, 290), the preference of these agencies is to cooperate on a voluntary basis without a delegation to the EU level (Bureš, 2011, 250). Thus, it needs to be specified whether this is already included in the preferences voiced by the governments or whether these agencies have a specific way of influence.

Thirdly, the political nature of decision-making has not been considered enough. Even though politicization includes constraints on the government actors by the public, it has to be evaluated why politicians choose suboptimal measures even if they are not constrained by the public yet (de Mesquita, 2007, 12). This may be due to the self-conceptualization of politicians as office-seekers that use mostly counter-terrorism measures that are visible enough so that they either receive personal credit for them or avoid being blamed in the case of an attack (de Mesquita, 2007, 27). In line with this, it can be presumed that citizens recognize measures on the national level easier or more often than on the international level. Thus, politicians want to take credit for their national measures and shift the blame to the level of EU, as it is often done by politicians. Hence, the theory should consider that politicization does not only work as a constraint but the distinct political nature may lead to the introduction of measures that are either not effective or do not match the functional needs.

Lastly, in line with Kroll/Leuffen's article, "the externality structure of the good under consideration" (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 355) determines to a high extent the form of integration. However, in the initial explanatory value of this variable was indecisive in the case of the EAW and low in the case of the Treaty of Prüm (Kroll/Leuffen, 2015, 358). This would need to be reevaluated with regard to other integration projects such as the Club of Berne or the Police Working Group on Terrorism.

6.3. Outlook

In an article about the current state of the differentiated integration theory it is asserted that there only exist "few islands of positive theory" (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig, 2012, 302). This thesis aimed at increasing the size of the islands and connecting them. It has been partially been able to do so. The focus of the topic has been too broad to come to definite results. Hence, the next research would need to be focused on specific policy projects and would need to rely on more specific data such as interviews with decision-makers on the formation of their specific stances towards the integration project.

Despite this new avenue for further research, the impact of the public referendum in the UK may be enormous in the field of counter-terrorism and forestall future research. As it has been shown in the empirical analysis, the UK's absence of preferences for EU actions and the high politicization lead to the thought that with the UK leaving the EU in the subsequent years, the EU may move ahead in counter-terrorism. The initial statement of the introduction of this thesis, ironically made by a British Member of Parliament that attested Osama bin Laden unintended merits in terms of EU integration, could be revised to the UK's leave as the main instigator of EU integration in counter-terrorism.

Annex

A1: Share of knowledgeable EU citizens between 2004 and 2015³⁷

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average over membership years	Comparison to EU average
EU average	61	54	54	50	67	64	60	63	69	66	62	
Austria	52	42	50	40	53	47	47	55	57	47	49	Below average
Belgium	67	57	58	60	60	64	58	59	57	58	60	Below average
Bulgaria				48	74	75	73	79	88	86	75	Above average
Croatia								72	73	78	74	Above average
Cyprus	77	67	70	63	88	84	83	89	84	84	79	Above average
Czech Republic	52	46	41	37	56	49	52	55	65	60	51	Below average
Denmark	66	67	69	69	74	72	68	65	75	71	70	Above average
Estonia	50	46	37	36	60	61	52	56	62	57	52	Below average
Finland	69	63	58	59	77	73	64	73	76	72	68	Above average
France	53	44	43	38	45	45	41	44	47	45	45	Below average
Germany	58	51	44	42	53	47	43	47	60	52	50	Below average
Greece	85	74	77	75	87	85	85	83	86	86	82	Above average
Hungary	53	36	45	37	65	60	57	57	68	62	54	Below average
Ireland	63	63	65	63	71	67	64	64	68	71	66	Above average
Italy	57	53	47	41	58	56	50	47	58	54	52	Below average
Latvia	40	35	49	34	59	65	53	61	73	60	53	Below average
Lithuania	62	56	49	45	72	72	68	76	82	81	66	Above average
Luxembourg	75	65	62	62	67	63	61	54	65	62	64	Above average
Malta	77	80	79	78	88	85	85	91	89	88	84	Above average
Netherlands	61	46	50	42	54	51	41	44	53	43	49	Below average
Poland	60	53	56	52	71	65	68	69	73	67	63	Above average
Portugal	59	53	52	42	64	61	56	56	73	58	57	Below average
Romania				48	74	68	62	71	73	74	67	Above average
Slovakia	64	50	58	55	81	79	74	71	80	77	69	Above average
Slovenia	73	63	59	52	79	78	68	67	79	73	69	Above average
Spain	59	53	49	48	56	53	52	49	56	60	54	Below average
Sweden	51	47	42	40	63	59	53	66	78	69	57	Below average
UK	53	44	51	46	55	53	51	51	60	57	52	Below average

³⁷ Own portrayal and calculation based on data provided by Eurobarometer (62), 2004; (64) 2005; (66) 2006; (67) 2007; (73) 2010 (75) 2011; (78) 2012; (80) 2013; (82) 2014; (84) 2015. The question used is: For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false. – The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each member state -. There was no data available for 2008 and 2009. When two Eurobarometer surveys in the same year are available, this thesis uses the autumn editions for better comparability. When the EU member state is not in the EU, it is only the average of the years the country has been a member in the EU.

A2: Share of respondents that tend to agree that their voice counts in their member state³⁸

	2008	2009	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average over membership years	Comparison to EU average
EU average	48	51	51	50	48	56	56	52	
Austria	62	69	70	71	73	78	70	70	Above average
Belgium	61	63	61	59	65	60	66	62	Above average
Bulgaria	25	32	33	42	29	48	48	37	Below average
Croatia					69	73	80	74	Above average
Cyprus	44	43	43	28	22	25	20	32	Below average
Czech Republic	32	32	32	30	37	49	43	36	Below average
Denmark	90	93	93	92	92	91	92	92	Above average
Estonia	41	52	56	51	36	44	34	45	Below average
Finland	77	72	77	81	78	84	81	79	Above average
France	71	71	73	77	67	71	66	71	Above average
Germany	62	64	66	70	72	74	70	68	Above average
Greece	21	28	23	11	20	32	27	23	Below average
Hungary	29	33	49	37	44	54	42	41	Below average
Ireland	48	50	38	47	41	55	62	49	Below average
Italy	19	26	25	22	17	27	30	24	Below average
Latvia	17	16	24	30	27	36	38	27	Below average
Lithuania	21	18	15	22	19	26	32	22	Below average
Luxembourg	65	65	72	65	60	55	57	63	Above average
Malta	54	51	45	46	64	67	64	56	Above average
Netherlands	79	80	81	80	75	81	78	79	Above average
Poland	44	50	60	54	48	64	65	55	Above average
Portugal	34	46	37	33	32	41	49	39	Below average
Romania	19	25	18	18	20	47	49	28	Below average
Slovakia	41	47	50	46	45	64	55	50	Below average
Slovenia	74	62	64	60	42	49	51	57	Above average
Spain	48	56	50	35	23	35	40	41	Below average
Sweden	90	91	91	92	91	95	93	92	Above average
UK	36	38	45	49	44	53	53	44	Below average

³⁸ Own portrayal based on yearly data from 2008 to 2015 provided by Eurobarometer Interactive (a), 2016 for all years except for 2011. The data for 2011 could not be retrieved. The question used is: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree – My voice counts in (Our country). When two Eurobarometer surveys in the same year are available, this thesis uses the autumn editions for better comparability or the survey of the year where the data for the member state is provided. When the EU member state has not been in the EU for the time under investigation, it is only the average of the years the country has been a member in the EU.

A3: Share of respondents stating that their country's voice counts in the EU³⁹

	2004	2007	2008	2009	2010	Average over membership years	Comparison to EU average
EU average	64	58	58	58	58	59	
Austria	45	45	43	46	42	44	Below average
Belgium	77	72	73	69	70	72	Above average
Bulgaria		35	35	39	43	38	Below average
Cyprus	63	36	52	51	43	49	Below average
Czech Republic	31	37	44	45	40	39	Below average
Denmark	80	80	77	79	86	80	Above average
Estonia	57	60	56	56	64	59	Above average
Finland	62	63	69	68	72	67	Above average
France	87	86	83	81	79	83	Above average
Germany	81	79	79	78	81	80	Above average
Greece	60	45	40	37	33	43	Below average
Hungary	65	51	47	47	59	54	Below average
Ireland	70	60	59	62	56	61	Above average
Italy	56	41	41	46	50	47	Below average
Latvia	48	41	39	31	32	38	Below average
Lithuania	67	48	46	48	42	50	Below average
Luxembourg	81	79	77	73	78	78	Above average
Malta	69	72	62	66	61	66	Above average
Netherlands	75	73	81	76	77	76	Above average
Poland	67	66	62	64	67	65	Above average
Portugal	58	42	46	64	53	53	Below average
Romania		40	36	41	30	37	Below average
Slovakia	37	46	49	50	62	49	Below average
Slovenia	75	69	79	59	65	69	Above average
Spain	66	61	52	64	61	61	Above average
Sweden	76	79	83	83	84	81	Above average
UK	56	47	48	43	47	48	Below average

³⁹ Own portrayal and calculation based on yearly data from 2004 to 2010 provided by Eurobarometer Interactive (b), 2016 for all years except for 2005 and 2006. This data could not be retrieved on the country-level. The question used is: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree – (Our country's) voice counts in the European Union. When two Eurobarometer surveys in the same year are available, this thesis uses the autumn editions for better comparability or the survey of the year where the data for the member state is provided. When the EU member state has not been in the EU for the time under investigation, it is only the average of the years the country has been a member in the EU or has been excluded if it has not been a member at that time (Croatia).

A4: Share of respondents that see terrorism as one of two most important issues facing their country⁴⁰

	2001*	2002*	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015
EU average	83	79	9,1	9,1	8,7	8,9	5,6	2,9	2,3	2,0	0,9	1,1	2,9	6,5
EU Median	83	82	4	5	4	5	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	5,5
Austria	70	62	4	5	3	5	9	4	2	3	1	2	5	9
Belgium	78	76	4	6	5	9	4	2	2	3	1	2	2	9
Bulgaria							1	1	1	1	0	1	1	5
Croatia												0	0	2
Cyprus				3	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Czech Rep.				4	3	5	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	7
Denmark	79	77	12	20	32	36	17	11	9	3	1	2	6	11
Estonia				2	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
Finland	69	67	2	5	5	3	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	2
France	91	88	9	10	10	11	6	3	2	2	2	1	5	18
Germany	85	75	3	4	4	7	11	3	3	2	3	2	11	10
Greece	91	86	4	2	1	3	2	1	5	2	1	3	1	1
Hungary				5	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	8
Ireland	83	82	2	6	6	6	4	1	1	0	0	1	1	4
Italy	92	92	9	17	11	15	7	3	4	5	1	1	3	9
Latvia				2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Lithuania				3	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
Luxembourg	84	85	7	10	4	6	3	3	3	1	0	1	2	6
Malta				2	2	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	9
Netherlands	76	69	4	12	40	26	9	6	3	5	0	1	12	12
Poland				6	3	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	5
Portugal	90	85	3	4	1	3	2	2	1	2	2	1	0	2
Romania						4	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	6
Slovakia				4	5	6	5	2	1	1	1	1	1	6
Slovenia				3	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Spain	90	82	51	59	31	29	37	14	12	11	1	1	1	5
Sweden	83	78	6	6	6	5	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	3
UK	83	85	17	28	34	35	17	9	6	6	3	4	16	24

⁴⁰ Data for table provided by Eurobarometer (60), 2003; (62), 2004 and Eurobarometer Interactive (c), 2016 for the years of 2005-2015. Question that were asked to respondents is “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment.” (asked between 2005-2015) and “Please tell me, if, personally you are afraid of terrorism”. Data for 2011 is not available. If no values are in the table for a specific year, the country was not yet a member of the European Union.

A5: Basis of calculation for shares of salience above EU average or above EU median ⁴¹

Member state	Years above EU average/Membership years	Years above EU median/Membership years
Austria	6/14	7/14
Belgium	4/14	9/14
Bulgaria	0/8	0/8
Croatia	0/3	0/3
Cyprus	0/11	0/11
Czech Republic	1/11	3/11
Denmark	11/14	11/14
Estonia	1/11	1/11
Finland	0/14	1/14
France	10/14	13/14
Germany	8/14	10/14
Greece	4/14	5/14
Hungary	1/11	1/11
Ireland	1/14	5/14
Italy	11/14	12/14
Latvia	0/11	0/11
Lithuania	0/11	0/11
Luxembourg	5/14	10/14
Malta	1/11	1/11
Netherlands	9/14	9/14
Poland	0/11	2/11
Portugal	3/14	4/14
Romania	1/9	2/9
Slovakia	0/11	4/11
Slovenia	0/11	0/11
Spain	10/14	10/14
Sweden	0/14	3/14
United Kingdom	13/14	13/14

⁴¹ Values for table are read off Annex A4, 87.

A6: Balance of citizens' trust to the EU⁴²

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average over membership years
EU average	2,1	21,6	9,6	17,2	22,4	17,6	19,7	6,7	-9,1	-13,9	-14,6	-1,5	-12,9	5,1
Austria	-16	6	-8	-3	3	-7	2	-11	-25	-18	-13	-7	-39	-10,5
Belgium	-2	32	17	26	35	24	17	17	4	-5	0	-6	-15	11,1
Bulgaria					39	37	53	37	36	36	27	18	9	32,4
Croatia											-21	-12	-2	-11,7
Cyprus		30	19	26	22	28	27	-8	5	-33	-58	-44	-55	-3,4
Czech Republic		20	15	32	25	25	24	4	-17	-26	-27	-6	-36	2,8
Denmark	-7	1	0	7	27	24	25	26	8	2	-1	12	6	10,0
Estonia		30	17	40	48	46	48	46	12	9	23	34	11	30,3
Finland	-20	-5	-17	-5	-8	3	16	6	-6	-1	-1	20	5	-1,0
France	-12	10	-9	-8	17	0	-6	-12	-30	-22	-35	-16	-38	-12,4
Germany	-7	3	-14	-12	-8	2	1	-17	-27	-29	-31	-17	-35	-14,7
Greece	35	32	25	31	30	15	22	-15	-39	-64	-57	-53	-63	-7,8
Hungary		41	28	35	31	15	18	25	3	-8	0	5	-9	15,3
Ireland	26	38	27	30	33	15	12	1	-36	-28	-22	-10	-19	5,2
Italy	32	29	23	12	10	-6	19	1	-17	-22	-39	-24	-21	-0,2
Latvia		15	0	18	18	3	1	-11	-11	-9	-2	10	-10	1,8
Lithuania		53	27	38	38	28	28	24	14	12	18	34	34	29,0
Luxembourg	15	32	21	6	21	8	33	12	2	-10	-6	15	-1	11,4
Malta		31	27	28	30	36	24	22	5	12	20	26	15	23,0
Netherlands	-6	8	-10	-2	15	27	30	14	-9	-8	-17	1	-4	3,0
Poland		23	19	32	41	27	23	18	6	6	6	20	-2	18,3
Portugal	36	41	36	30	27	15	38	-2	-25	-24	-43	-11	-6	8,6
Romania					47	37	45	22	12	5	6	29	29	25,8
Slovakia		36	24	35	29	47	47	37	3	-3	-3	7	-12	20,6
Slovenia		32	17	46	37	27	5	-1	-18	-17	-21	-9	-32	5,5
Spain	28	34	17	21	32	24	21	-1	-32	-52	-50	-31	-36	-1,9
Sweden	-33	-21	-31	-8	-5	8	-1	-6	-9	-29	-14	8	4	-10,5
United Kingdom	-37	-12	-30	-26	-28	-32	-39	-48	-56	-50	-48	-35	-40	-37,0

⁴² Own illustration based on Eurobarometer Interactive (d), 2016. Values are based on the difference between the values “tend to trust” and “tend not to trust”. The full Eurobarometer question is: “For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not: The European Union.” If the value is negative, more respondents in the specific country over years answered that they tend not to trust. If the value is positive a larger share of respondents in the country answered that they tend not to trust. Empty cells indicate that the country has not been a member of the EU yet. Do not knows are not included.

A7: Role of security actors in the provision of security to citizens⁴³

Share of answers that assign an overall important role to → in %	Police	Army	Judicial system	EU's institutions and agencies	Citizens' associations	Citizens themselves
EU	93	77	89	69	64	79
Austria	94	72	89	59	61	73
Belgium	91	64	88	71	58	72
Bulgaria	98	88	96	85	76	85
Croatia	90	73	87	68	64	76
Cyprus	96	76	92	88	85	90
Czech Republic	97	90	93	62	53	78
Denmark	96	53	94	63	74	83
Estonia	94	85	86	66	72	85
Finland	95	81	90	53	46	73
France	93	82	90	67	64	78
Germany	93	64	90	59	48	76
Greece	94	70	91	76	79	85
Hungary	91	77	89	78	80	83
Ireland	95	75	90	76	78	91
Italy	91	82	90	80	72	74
Latvia	92	75	87	63	57	81
Lithuania	94	80	87	72	68	86
Luxembourg	93	45	87	69	55	70
Malta	96	95	90	83	78	88
Netherlands	97	56	95	57	67	89
Poland	91	93	88	74	67	77
Portugal	85	72	80	66	63	66
Romania	96	92	92	80	72	82
Slovakia	94	86	88	77	62	79
Slovenia	88	67	89	69	68	85
Spain	89	67	88	75	73	82
Sweden	95	69	98	62	61	90
United Kingdom	95	85	89	68	63	85

⁴³ Values in Table based on Special Eurobarometer (432), 2015, T33-T38. The question asked was: “In your view what role should each of the following play in ensuring the citizens in (our country)?” The values indicated in the table are the share of respondents that assigned a very important role or a fairly important role to the EU’s institutions and agencies. Rank indicates the position of importance among the given answers: “the police, the army, the judicial system, the EU’s institutions and agencies, citizens’ associations, citizens themselves”.

A8: Share of respondents asking for a joint-decision making with the EU on international terrorism⁴⁴

	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average across membership years
EU average	81,1	82,3	87,3	81,9	82,4	84,4	81,0	84,3	83,1	81,9	83,4
Austria	83	72	81	73	69	73	76	76	79	72	75,4
Belgium	90	88	92	87	87	89	85	83	87	86	87,4
Bulgaria						83	84	91	88	87	86,6
Cyprus			88	85	81	85	79	89	79	86	84,0
Czech Republic			91	88	89	90	88	88	88	87	88,6
Denmark	86	83	89	87	91	91	90	91	92	92	89,2
Estonia			93	88	89	90	88	88	91	87	89,3
Finland	83	83	90	83	82	87	86	85	84	79	84,2
France	86	87	90	81	84	86	82	86	85	85	85,2
Germany	85	87	86	82	88	92	87	88	87	85	86,7
Greece	35	80	90	73	74	82	77	79	68	69	72,7
Hungary			87	90	86	92	90	89	89	84	88,4
Ireland	82	80	84	76	76	76	72	79	78	73	77,6
Italy	90	86	78	72	73	77	70	76	71	73	76,6
Latvia			92	88	88	89	89	89	91	89	89,4
Lithuania			90	84	87	88	84	86	90	89	87,3
Luxembourg	88	79	83	86	84	87	89	91	91	92	87,0
Malta			87	86	85	87	85	91	88	86	86,9
Netherlands	85	90	90	88	88	90	89	87	86	89	88,2
Poland			92	88	90	87	85	84	85	82	86,6
Portugal	74	76	80	75	77	80	38	78	76	70	72,4
Romania						80	80	83	75	73	78,2
Slovakia			93	91	91	91	92	89	89	87	90,4
Slovenia			86	79	84	84	83	85	80	85	83,3
Spain	84	87	85	67	69	64	63	73	75	72	73,9
Sweden	88	84	88	87	88	90	90	90	89	90	88,4
United Kingdom	78	73	77	63	61	68	67	63	63	62	67,5

⁴⁴ Own table based on data provided by Eurobarometer Interactive (e), 2016. Croatia is not mentioned as it was not a member of the EU at that time. “Do not know” respondents are excluded. Values indicate the average share of respondents that responded that decisions on international terrorism should be made jointly with the EU. Missing values indicate that country has not been a member of the EU yet. Data for 2002 was not available as the question was not asked in this year. If the question was asked twice in the year, the autumn edition of the Eurobarometer was considered.

A9: Terrorist incidents in EU member states between 2001 and 2005⁴⁵

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Average of incidents over membership years
EU average	12,1	6,1	6,2	2,5	4,0	5,0
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	3	8	0	0	2,2
Cyprus	1	0	0	1	0	0,4
Czech Republic	1	0	1	0	0	0,4
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	21	32	34	11	33	26,2
Germany	8	3	1	3	3	3,6
Greece	14	11	12	4	6	9,4
Hungary				0	0	0
Ireland	2	0	1	0	0	0,6
Italy	10	7	16	3	6	8,4
Latvia				0	0	0
Lithuania				0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta				0	0	0
Netherlands	1	2	3	1	0	1,4
Poland	1	0	0	0	0	0,2
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia				0	0	0
Slovenia				0	0	0
Spain	79	38	20	31	24	38,4
Sweden	0	0	0	3	1	0,8
United Kingdom	92	20	21	5	26	32,8

⁴⁵ Own table based on GTD, 2016. Incidents on all types of targets and by all types of perpetrators are included, if they fulfill the criterion that they are aimed at a political, economic, religious or social goal. Unsuccessful attacks and ambiguous cases are included. Missing values in the table are due to non-membership in the EU in this year. Values in italic were used for the corresponding graph.

A10: Terrorist incidents in EU member states between 2006 and 2014⁴⁶

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	<i>Average of incidents over membership years</i>
EU average	19,9	21,6	19,1	11,3	9,2	6,4	8,1	5,4	7,1	<i>11,6</i>
Austria	1	1	6	6	2	0	0	0	0	<i>1,8</i>
Belgium	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	<i>0,4</i>
Bulgaria		0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	<i>0,3</i>
Croatia								0	0	<i>0</i>
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	<i>0,1</i>
Denmark	0	1	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	<i>0,8</i>
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
France	294	267	147	95	84	85	125	63	52	<i>134,7</i>
Germany	13	20	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	<i>3,8</i>
Greece	25	2	14	15	21	6	1	14	7	<i>11,7</i>
Hungary	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,4</i>
Ireland	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,3</i>
Italy	11	9	9	3	8	5	11	7	12	<i>8,3</i>
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Poland	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,1</i>
Portugal	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,3</i>
Romania		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0</i>
Spain	145	279	263	171	90	47	54	33	18	<i>122,2</i>
Sweden	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	<i>0,1</i>
United Kingdom	5	2	74		40	26	24	35	109	<i>39,3</i>

⁴⁶ Own table based on TE-SAT reports 2007-2015 (each report refers to the previous year). Incidents of all types of targets and all types of perpetrators are included if they fulfill they criteria for a terrorist offence as stated in the 2002 Council Framework Decision. Terrorist offences are therein defined as intentional acts with the aim of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. Included are foiled, failed and successfully executed attacks. Empty fields in the table are due to non-membership or lack of data submitted to Europol (as in the case of the UK in 2009). Values in italic were used for the corresponding graph.

A11: Terrorism-related suspects arrested between 2006 and 2014⁴⁷

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	<i>Average over membership years</i>
EU average	28,1	38,7	37,4	22,6	22,6	17,9	19,9	19,1	27,6	25,5
Austria	1	8	0	8	5	2	2	3	31	<i>6,7</i>
Belgium	14	10	22	4	20	4	8	20	72	<i>19,3</i>
Bulgaria		4	0	1	0	3	10	15	21	<i>6,8</i>
Croatia								1	0	<i>0,5</i>
Cyprus	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	<i>0,4</i>
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	1	1	<i>1,1</i>
Denmark	6	9	3	0	6	7	5	0	1	<i>4,1</i>
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,0</i>
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	4	<i>0,9</i>
France	342	409	402	315	219	172	186	225	238	<i>278,7</i>
Germany	20	15	12	5	25	30	8	11	18	<i>16,0</i>
Greece	0	0	0	5	18	15	3	23	13	<i>8,6</i>
Hungary	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	<i>1,8</i>
Ireland	4	24	52	31	62	69	66	41	27	<i>41,8</i>
Italy	59	44	53	29	29	30	43	14	39	<i>37,8</i>
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,0</i>
Lithuania	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,3</i>
Luxembourg	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	<i>0,2</i>
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<i>0,0</i>
Netherlands	6	16	4	2	39	3	62	6	17	<i>17,2</i>
Poland	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	14	<i>2,1</i>
Portugal	0	32	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	<i>4,2</i>
Romania		3	0	0	16	4	16	8	0	<i>5,9</i>
Slovakia	3	2	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	<i>1,1</i>
Slovenia	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	<i>0,3</i>
Spain	85	261	197	169	118	64	38	90	145	<i>129,7</i>
Sweden	3	2	3	0	4	4	0	0	0	<i>1,8</i>
United Kingdom	156	203	256		45	62	84	77	132	<i>126,9</i>

⁴⁷ Own table based on TE-SAT reports 2007-2015 (each report refers to the previous year). Numbers indicate arrests because of terrorism-related charges as defined by the 2002 Council Framework Decision. Terrorist offences are therein defined as intentional acts with the aim of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. Empty fields in the table are due to non-membership or lack of data submitted to Europol (as in the case of the UK in 2009). Values in italic were used for the corresponding graph.

A12: Terrorism-related convicted persons in EU member states between 2006 and 2014⁴⁸

	2006	2007	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	<i>Average over membership years</i>
EU average	11,2	11,8	10,1	8,9	8,9	11,0	9,2	12,3	10,0
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	0,6
Belgium	18	5	7	9	8	4	8	41	12,5
Bulgaria		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Croatia							0	1	0,5
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,1
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	1	1,3
Denmark	0	5	11	1	4	3	5	3	4,0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0,5
France	21	52	74	40	45	70	49	35	48,3
Germany	16	7	10	12	17	10	14	11	12,1
Greece	0	0	0	0	2	0	5	10	2,1
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Ireland	0	4	7	15	8	0	6	0	5,0
Italy	7	28	23	16	4	12	8	2	12,5
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0,4
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Netherlands	15	3	7	8	5	0	4	4	5,8
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0,1
Romania		0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,1
Slovakia		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,1
Slovenia		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Spain	172	181	87	122	137	167	95	114	134,4
Sweden	4	0	1	4	0	3	0	0	1,5
United Kingdom	4	33	45	14	8	25	52	115	37,0

⁴⁸ Own Graph based on TE-SAT reports 2007-2015 (each report refers to the data of the previous year). Numbers indicate convicted persons by national courts on terrorism-related offenses as defined by the 2002 Council Framework Decision. Terrorist offences are therein defined as intentional acts with the aim of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. Member states report the data to Eurojust and it is then portrayed in TE-SAT reports. The year 2009 is excluded because the data was not available (TE-SAT, 2010, 16)

A13: Country profiles on member states' counter-terrorism preferences

Austria:

Austria's counter-terrorism policy is mainly focused on an EU approach that is further strengthened. The EU is the "central framework for action of Austria's security policy" (Austrian Interior Ministry, 2013, 12). However, it is not the aim of Austria to use existing structures but rather to "gradually create and actively shape an architecture of internal security within the EU" (Austrian Interior Ministry, 2013, 13). Secondly, Austria envisions regional approaches to take a larger role, for instance with the planned Central European Security Cluster, or the Salzburg Forum Vision 2020 (Austrian Interior Ministry, 2013, 13). Both of these ideas use regional efforts to combat terrorism. Lastly, the priority of Austria is also to provide a holistic counter-terrorism approach that is also based on social peace and freedom (CODEXTER Austria, 2012, 1).

Belgium:

Belgium's main emphasis in the fight against terrorism is the approach to tackle the root causes of terrorism and empower the civil society to prevent radicalization (Coolsaet/De Swielande, 2007, 11). One case study on the Belgian approach class this the "characteristic sensibility" (Coolsaet/De Swielande, 2007, 17) approach. Secondly, Belgium's priority is also to delegate competences to the EU level and proposed to create a European Intelligence Unit (Coolsaet/De Swielande, 2007, 11). The last priority of Belgium is to respect human rights and also lobbies for this on the EU level (CODEXTER Belgium, 2014, 1). According to the experts, "Belgium has historically approached counter-terrorism measures with caution and an emphasis on the need for providing suspected terrorists with due process" (Counter-extremism Project, 2016, 7)

Bulgaria:

In Bulgaria, terrorism is mostly seen as an international phenomenon and therefore the action against terrorism is seen, first and foremost as global action, also carried out by the external action of the EU (CODEXTER Bulgaria, 2013, 1). Terrorism should be mainly countered in third countries (Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior, 2014, 4). Secondly, Bulgaria wants to ensure that existing measures on the EU level are used and fully implemented rather than creating new measures (Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior, 2014, 3). Thirdly, Bulgaria has a strict and relentless internal policy on terrorism symbolized by the deportation of persons considered to be national security risks (Bulgarian News Agency, 2016). The preferences of Bulgaria are in line with its recent exposure to terrorism through the 2012 Burgas bus bombing, an attack on Israeli tourists, carried out by a Canadian and Australian citizen by order of Hezbollah.

Croatia:

The dominant theme in Croatia is the perception of terrorism as an international threat that can be fought with international measures such as the establishment of democracy in third countries (CODEXTER Croatia, 2011, 1). An internal counter-terrorism approach is the second priority. However this takes place in a formal and cautious manner, emphasizing the civil society and

public-private partnerships (Peresin, 2013, 11, 15). Thirdly, given its geographical position, Croatia favors regional approaches (CODEXTER Croatia, 2011, 23).

Cyprus:

Because of the low number of terrorist incidents in Cyprus, the first and most important preference is the international fight against terrorism on the global level. This is visible by several bilateral treaties, also with non-EU members and by the fact that the fight against terrorism is mostly included in the foreign policy department (Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Secondly, Cyprus wants to ensure the functioning of the EU approach on terrorism and created in 2010 the position of a national counter-terrorism coordinator to oversee the implementation of EU measures (CODEXTER Cyprus, 2011, 1). Thirdly, Cyprus has the preference to tackle root causes of terrorism and respect civil liberties (CODEXTER Cyprus, 2011, 1).

Czech Republic:

In the Czech Republic's national counter-terrorism strategy and also voiced by one Czech counter-terrorism official in a presentation at Charles University, it becomes evident that terrorism is primarily perceived as a global threat that needs a global response. According to the official Oldřich Krulík, there is "no sense of dividing security in outer and inner security" (Krulík, 2015). Hence, the first and also a long-time preference is the global fight against terrorism (CODEXTER Czech Republic, 2012, 10). Secondly, the protection of human rights is a preference often emphasized by the Czech Republic for instance with the review of every measure with regard to security and freedom of the individual (Czech Security Policy Department, 2013, 10; CODEXTER Czech Republic, 2012, 10). Thirdly, the cooperation with allies and other EU member states is outlined (Krulík, 2015).

Denmark:

In a foreword to the 2012 government report on counter-terrorism efforts by the at the time Danish minister of foreign affairs Sovndal, it is emphasized that fighting terrorism in Denmark means primarily fighting the root causes of terrorism with a broad policy ranging from development assistance to de-radicalization efforts (Danish Government, 2012, Foreword; CODEXTER Denmark, 2007, 1). Secondly, the foreword and other sources emphasize the continuing preference for safeguarding citizen's rights and prohibit further radicalization (Danish Government, 2012, Foreword). Thirdly, despite the mentioning of the EU as a platform for counter-terrorism, the global level with the UN is prioritized as "core element" and "framework" (Danish Government, 2012, Foreword).

Estonia

The 2013 fundamentals of counter-terrorism, approved by the Estonian government, line out three major preferences by Estonia. First and foremost, the threat of terrorism is seen as a global threat that can be countered with global measures. It is striking that the heading of one of the sections is "terrorism in the world and in Estonia" (Estonian Government, 2013, 2) and even global counter-terrorist missions are considered (Estonian Government, 2013, 4). Secondly,

these global measures should tackle the root causes and establish “stable, economically sustainable and democratic societies” (Estonian Government, 2013, 4). Thirdly, it is important to Estonia that human rights and citizen’s freedoms are maintained (Estonian Government, 2013, 1).

Finland:

Finland’s 2010 national counter-terrorism strategy clearly states the most important priority in its counter-terrorism efforts as “to prevent terrorism by tackling and addressing the root causes of terrorism” (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2010, 4). This is emphasized with further emphasis on the prevention of social exclusion and the involvement of the civil society in combating terrorism (CODEXTER Finland, 2014, 1). Secondly, the Finnish strategy also has a priority on human rights and fundamental freedoms in all specific measures against terror (CODEXTER Finland, 2014, 1). Lastly, the Finnish point to the existing EU guidelines that need to be effectively implemented (CODEXTER Finland, 2014, 9).

France:

France perceives terrorism mostly as a global threat and therefore demands principally for a global response. This is visible with the global measures France is taking since the occurrence of terrorism in France with the *Groupe Islamique Armé* of the 1990s and the recent involvement of France in the coalition against *Daesh*. (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Additionally, France used its G8 presidency in 2003 and 2010 mainly for the fight against terrorism (CODEXTER France, 2013, 6-7). Secondly, France aims at EU actions on terrorism by enhancing “dialogue and cooperation within the existing framework (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Hence, implementation is prioritized before new measures or delegation to the EU level. Thirdly, France emphasizes the principle of human rights and civil liberties given to terrorist suspects which should help in the fight against radicalization (CODEXTER France, 2013, 2).

Germany:

Germany’s counter-terrorism preferences cannot be easily ranked. However, the dominant perception of being a target of a global threat and considering the experts’ judgement that international and bilateral rather than European cooperation is highly significant in Germany, the preference for global action is ranked first (CODEXTER Germany, 2011, 9). Just after this, the action and the implementation of the EU’s strategies has to be mentioned as the second priority (CODEXTER Germany, 2011, 10). Thirdly, the fight against root causes and radicalization with an active civil society approach is another preference of Germany (German Interior Ministry, 2016).

Greece:

The dominant preference of Greece is the implementation of EU-actions and strategies. This is because the Greek national terrorism law is mostly based on the EU’s framework decisions (Triantafyllou, 2015, 361) and because Greece has self-claimed a “leading role in promoting EU policy in the area of combating terrorism” (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Secondly, the geographical position on the borders of Europe have led Greece to also taking a regional approach to counter-terrorism, also outside of the EU (FG News, 2016). Lastly, Greece emphasizes the need for the respect of human rights (CODEXTER Greece, 2012, 1).

Hungary:

The national security strategy and the experts' opinion on the Hungarian counter-terrorism efforts emphasizes global action as the first priority. It states that the nature of terrorism is mainly perceived as global and thus requires cooperation with allied countries and non-allied countries when similar interest are pursued (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, 12, 22). Secondly, this international action should tackle the root causes which are perceived as instability, poverty and the lack of democracy (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, 10). The last preference is the preservation of fundamental freedoms (CODEXTER Hungary, 2012, 1). Finally, it is interesting that the Hungarian security strategy sees bilateral cooperation as the most essential (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, 12).

Ireland:

The documents on and by Ireland point to a dominating preference on a domestic approach. The Department of Justice of Ireland states that the "responsibility of combating international terrorism lies primarily within individual member states" (Irish Department of Justice, 2016). It is also striking that the strategy is mainly published on the pages of the Department of Justice and not as in other cases on the webpages of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. Secondly, the Irish Government fully supports "all actions" (CODEXTER Ireland, 2007, 4) on the EU level. Lastly, Ireland has the approach to create social peace and inclusion to prevent terrorism (CODEXTER Ireland, 2007, 1).

Italy:

Italy strongly favors global action and sees international cooperation as the keystone of counter-terrorism (Italian Foreign Ministry, 2016). Therefore, Italy was focused on the introduction of "most appropriate legislation to assure the highest level of coordination at the international level" (CODEXTER Italy, 2008, 1). Another main goal is to set up partnerships between countries in the Western world and possible host countries of terrorism to prevent the emergence of terrorism (Italian Foreign Ministry, 2016). Secondly, Italy focuses on strict domestic measures and is commended on this by experts (Luttwak, 2016). The "Escort to the border" section of Law 155 allows Italy to deport foreigners immediately if they present a threat to the danger of the security of the state (CODEXTER Italy, 2008, 6). Hence, the number of potential terrorist suspects is kept low and the security agencies can effectively monitor the remaining suspects (Luttwak, 2016). Thirdly, Italy is strongly involved in the implementation of the measures on the EU level (Italian Foreign Ministry, 2016).

Latvia:

Latvia sees global action as the first priority in counter-terrorism. The Baltic state sees it as essential that domestic measures are taken in accordance with coordinated measures at the international level and therefore concludes multiple bilateral treaties (Latvian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2016; CODEXTER Latvia, 2013, 4). Secondly, Latvia fully supports the existing EU approach on counter-terrorism and states on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs its active involvement in the development of the existing EU measures (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Thirdly, the rule of law and the consideration of citizen's rights is emphasized and the experts' report clearly states that every extradition request is evaluated on the topic of human rights (CODEXTER Latvia, 2013, 4).

Lithuania:

Lithuania's first priority in the fight against international terrorism is global action. The 2014 Annual Review of the State Security Department points to the exposure Latvia's to international events (Lithuanian State Security Department, 2014, 24) and also experts acknowledge that Latvia takes "every effort to contribute to international cooperation" (CODEXTER Lithuania, 2005, 1). This emphasis can be considered to persist with the protests and radicalization of the domestic population due to the propaganda by Russia and the conflict in Ukraine (Lithuanian State Security Department, 2014, 24). Secondly, it is well acknowledged that Lithuania is part of the Schengen area and therefore, despite not being directly affected by terrorism in recent years, cooperation within the EU framework is necessary to prevent terrorism in Europe (Lithuanian State Security Department, 2014, 25). Lastly, the experts' judgement accentuates the priority for the "consideration to the protection of human rights and the rule of law" (CODEXTER Lithuania, 2005, 1).

Luxembourg:

Luxembourg's primary preference is to ensure that on the EU level a "systematic and enhanced use of existing instruments" (Luxembourg Government, 2015) is ensured and dedicated large parts of its 2015 Presidency in the European Council to this goal. However, the strong emphasis on citizen's rights as the second priority and the perseverance of a strict banking privacy law may contradict some of these efforts for instance in the area of terrorism financing (Khandekar, 2011, 12). Lastly, Luxembourg also takes an approach that makes use of an "extended international cooperation" (CODEXTER Luxembourg, 2005, 5).

Malta

Malta's geographical position and its exposure to developments in the North of Africa, for instance the failed state of Libya have led Malta to have global action as its first priority in the fight against terrorism (Scicluna, 2015). This is visible with Malta's foreign policy that depicts the fight against terrorism as one of the competences of the foreign policy department (CODEXTER Malta, 2008, 1). The next priorities are the delegation of interior and external security to the EU level, because Malta's capabilities are considered to be weak and are envisioned to be increased with more action on the EU level (Corpi d'Elite, 2016). Thirdly, Malta emphasizes the respect to citizen's rights as one of their priorities.

Netherlands:

Documents about the counter-terrorism strategy of the Netherlands suggest that the first priority in the fight against terrorism is to tackle root causes and empower the civil society

(CODEXTER Netherlands, 2008, 1). It is stated that the Netherlands' main strategy is to "take action at the earliest possible stage (CODEXTER Netherlands, 2008, 1). Additionally, to combat radicalization, support for families and a point of contact for citizens to report radicalized individuals (Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2015, 8). The next priority for the Netherlands is to enhance the effectiveness of actions on the EU level with further improving information exchange and implementation (CODEXTER Netherlands, 2008, 6). This is also one of the goals the Netherlands have set for their 2016 EU presidency in 2016 (Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2015, 9). Lastly, the Netherlands also include Global Action into their preferences with International fora such as the Foreign Terrorist Fighters forum and the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2015, 9)

Poland:

In Poland, terrorism is mainly perceived as a transnational phenomenon that globally threatens international peace. Hence, global action against terrorism is perceived as the first priority and hence, the slogan of the Polish effort can be named as "no country is able to tackle terrorism alone" (CODEXTER Poland, 2012, 1). After this priority, Poland emphasizes the need for the implementation of the EU efforts and therefore actively participates in the effort of the EU (CODEXTER Poland, 2012, 9). As a third priority, Poland underlines the respect for citizen's rights (CODEXTER Poland, 2012, 1).

Portugal:

Portugal has not been exposed to terrorism often so far, however its geographical position close to unstable countries in North Africa had its effect on the policy of Portugal (de Faria Costa, 2015, 343). Accordingly, firstly, global action is central to Portugal efforts against terrorism. This happens through multiple agreements, for instance within the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries (CODEXTER Portugal, 2006, 3). Hence, experts acknowledge Portugal an "unprecedented level of international cooperation" (CODEXTER Portugal, 2006, 1). The next priority of Portugal is a strict domestic approach with a cooperation of the armed forces and the internal security forces and a new law introduced in 2016 that allows public prosecutors to deny citizenship to individuals that would be a peril to national security or are involved in terrorism (Safe Communities Portugal, 2016). Thirdly, Portugal is actively involved in the implementation of EU policies (de Faria Costa, 2015, 343).

Romania:

Romania perceives terrorism mainly as a global threat and accordingly, the responsibility for the fight against terrorism "lies within the entire international community" (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). This conviction is also seen in Romania's 50 bilateral anti-terrorism cooperation agreements (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The next priority for Romania is the implementation of actions on the EU level and since it has been a quite recent new member (2007), this implementation of existing strategies is prioritized over the start of new EU-wide counter-terrorism projects (CODEXTER Romania, 2008, 1). Thirdly, Romania emphasizes the need for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom rights (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Slovakia:

Since Slovakia has not been subject to major terrorist attacks, its fight on terrorism mainly centers on the international level and adequate global action (Slovak Spectator, 2015). Hence, a strong focus of the policies lies on the international level and Slovakia has to ensure that it is not used as a base of terror groups (CODEXTER Slovakia, 2007, 1). Next, the second priority lies in the implementation of measures on the EU level (CODEXTER Slovakia, 2007, 1). Lastly, and most recently, strict domestic measures are emphasized. After the attacks, Slovakia intensified the monitoring of Muslim citizens and stressed the security risks of migration (Slovak Spectator, 2015).

Slovenia:

The Slovenian counter-terrorism approach is mainly based on global action, because it is perceived that the interdependence in matters of security is dominant for Slovenia's considerations of terrorism (Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Hence, Slovenia has concluded multiple bilateral agreements and sees "the UN as the only truly global forum for combating terrorism" (CODEXTER Slovenia, 2010, 1). Secondly, Slovenia has the fight against the root causes as another major priority and sees this as most important long-run solution (CODEXTER Slovenia, 2010, 1). Lastly, the full respect for human rights and democracy is outlined (CODEXTER Slovenia, 2010, 1).

Spain:

The ending of the terrorism threat of ETA to Spain announced by the group in 2011 has set new priorities in the counter-terrorism strategy of Spain (CODEXTER Spain, 2013, 1). First and foremost, Spain now and also has before focused on international cooperation to combat terrorism (CODEXTER Spain, 2013, 7). The country is considered to be "extremely active in all the international fora" (CODEXTER Spain, 2013, 8) and has multiple bilateral treaties. The 2013 strategy states that the past experience of Spain with terrorism puts Spain "in an ideal position to provide considerable added value to international collaboration in counter-terrorism." (Spanish Government, 2013, 26). Secondly, Spain works actively for the implementation of the measures on the EU level (CODEXTER Spain, 2013, 7). Thirdly, the experience with ETA has led Spain to also include the concept of social peace and freedom into their strategy and preferences (Spanish Government, 2013, 25). According to 2013 National Security Strategy, "the maturity of the Spanish society" (Spanish Government, 2013, 25) together with the rule of law have led to the end of ETA.

Sweden:

The Swedish counter-terrorism strategy clearly states international cooperation as the main priority for Sweden (Swedish Government, 2014, 2). This can also be seen with the fact that Sweden is one of the largest donors for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna with its Terrorism Prevention Branch (CODEXTER Sweden, 2010, 10). The next priority for Sweden is to tackle the root causes with an active civil society in which a lot of institutions are involved and where preventive work is in the center (CODEXTER Sweden, 2010, 1). Lastly,

Sweden also works to implement a more effective EU level approach and “is playing an active role” (Swedish Government, 2014, 11) in these efforts.

United Kingdom

The counter-terrorism strategy of the United Kingdom prioritizes global action as the most suitable answer to terrorism. It is clearly stated in their 2011 anti-terrorist strategy that the success of counter-terrorism highly “depends on international collaboration” (UK Government, 2011, 8). Moreover, this international strategy has also proven to be successful against al-Qaeda and hence will be further pursued (UK Government, 2011, 3). The next priority in the fight against terrorism is to address the root causes which are outlined as conflict, instability, the lack of participation possibilities and limited educational or employment opportunities (UK Government, 2011, 3-5; CODEXTER United Kingdom, 2007, 1). Lastly, the UK emphasizes the respect for citizen’s and human rights and for instance does not deport terrorism suspects if they are subject to harm in their home country (UK Government, 2011, 8).

A14: Table of member states preferences on counter-terrorism

Member state	Preferences in Counter-Terrorism
Austria	Delegation of competences to the EU, Non-EU regional solutions, Increase of social equality and freedom
Belgium	Address root causes and empower the civil society, Delegation of competences to the EU, Global action
Bulgaria	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, (Strict) Domestic measures
Croatia	Global action, Address root causes and empower the civil society, Non-EU regional solutions
Cyprus	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Address root causes and empower the civil society
Czech Republic	Global action, Focus on civil rights, Implementation of existing EU measures
Denmark	Address root causes and empower the civil society, Focus on civil rights, Global action
Estonia	Global action, Address root causes and empower the civil society, Focus on civil rights
Finland	Address root causes and empower the civil society, Focus on civil rights, Implementation of existing EU measures
France	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Focus on civil rights
Germany	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Address root causes and empower the civil society
Greece	Implementation of existing EU measures, Non-EU regional solutions, Focus on civil rights
Hungary	Global action, Address root causes and empower the civil society, Focus on civil rights
Ireland	(Strict) Domestic Measures, Implementation of existing EU measures, Increase of social equality and freedom
Italy	Global action, (Strict) Domestic Measures, Implementation of existing EU measures
Latvia	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Focus on civil rights
Lithuania	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Focus on civil rights

Luxembourg	Implementation of existing EU measures, Focus on civil rights, Global action
Malta	Global action, Delegation of competences to the EU, Focus on civil rights
Netherlands	Address root causes and empower the civil society, Implementation of existing EU measures, Global action
Poland	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures Focus on civil rights
Portugal	Global action, (Strict) Domestic Measures, Implementation of existing EU measures
Romania	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Focus on civil rights
Slovakia	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures (Strict) Domestic Measures
Slovenia	Global action, Address root causes and empower the civil society, Focus on civil rights
Spain	Global action, Implementation of existing EU measures, Increase of social equality and freedom
Sweden	Global action, Address root causes and empower the civil society, Implementation of existing EU measures
UK	Global action, Address root causes and empower the civil society, Focus on civil rights

Bibliography

Sources

- Austrian Interior Ministry (2013). Austrian Security Strategy. Available online at: <https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=52251> [27.06.2016].
- Becker, M./Niesen, C. (2016). Was der eine weiß, erfährt der andere noch lange nicht. Available online at: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bruessel-anschlaege-warum-die-eu-am-anti-terror-kampf-scheitert-a-1083992.html> [24.05.2016].
- Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior (2014). Comments of Bulgaria on the Internal Security Strategy for the EU 2015-2020. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2014/docs/contributions/ms-os_bg_comments_iss_en.pdf [27.06.2016].
- Bulgarian News Agency (2016). Bulgaria in U.S. Department of State's Annual Country Reports on Terrorism 2015. Available online at: <http://www.bta.bg/en/c/DF/id/1349040> [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Austria (2012). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Belgium (2014). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Bulgaria (2013). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Croatia (2011). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Cyprus (2011). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Czech Republic (2012). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Denmark (2007). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Finland (2014). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER France (2013). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].
- CODEXTER Germany (2011). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Greece (2012). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Hungary (2012). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Ireland (2007). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Italy (2008). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Latvia (2013). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Lithuania (2005). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Luxembourg (2005). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Malta (2008). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Netherlands (2008). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Poland (2012). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Portugal (2006). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Romania (2008). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Slovakia (2007). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Slovenia (2010). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Spain (2013). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER Sweden (2010). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016].

CODEXTER United Kingdom (2007). Profiles on counter-terrorist capacity. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp [27.06.2016]

- Corpi d'Elite (2016). International terrorism: Malta's security apparatus inadequate. Available online at: <http://corpidelite.net/afm/2015/02/international-terrorism-maltas-security-apparatus-inadequate/> [27.06.2016].
- Council of Europe (2014). Action against Terrorism: Background. Available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/country_profiles_bg_en.asp [29.06.2016].
- Counter-extremism Project (2016). Belgium: Extremism and Counter-extremism. Available online at: http://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/BE-04212016.pdf [27.06.2016].
- Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). Measures against terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/200DAED54749D3BBC22571B100298AEB?OpenDocument&print> [27.06.2016].
- Czech Security Policy Department (2013). Strategy of the Czech Republic for the Fight against Terrorism. Available online at: http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/6022/file/Czech_NatAction_Plan_Combat_Terrorism_2013.pdf [27.06.2016].
- Danish Government (2012). Government Report on Counter-terrorism Efforts. Available online at: www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/6024/file/Denmark_government_report_counter_terrorism_efforts_2012_en.pdf [27.06.2016].
- Deutscher Bundestag (2013). Antwort der Bundesregierung. Europäische Zusammenarbeit in der Police Working Group on Terrorism [printed matter 17/13340]. Available online at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/134/1713440.pdf> [20.05.2016].
- Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (2015). Annual Plan 2015. Available online at: www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/6036/file/Netherlands_annual_plan_National_Coordinator_Security_Counterterrorism_2015_en.pdf [28.06.2016].
- Empirical Studies of Conflict (2016). RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. Available online at: <https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/rand-database-worldwide-terrorism-incidents> [15.06.2016].
- Estonian Government (2013). Fundamentals of Counter-Terrorism in Estonia. Available online at: https://www.siseministerium.ee/sites/default/files/dokumendid/tvv_pohialused_2013_en.pdf [27.06.2016].
- EUR-Lex (2010). Sources of European Law. Available online at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3A114534> [31.05.2016].

- Eurobarometer (2001). Standard Eurobarometer 56. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/1404> [06.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2002). Standard Eurobarometer 58. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/331> [06.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2003). Standard Eurobarometer 60. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/yearFrom/1973/yearTo/2003/surveyKy/397> [06.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2004). Standard Eurobarometer 62. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/455> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2005). Standard Eurobarometer 64. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/833> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2006). Standard Eurobarometer 66. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/584> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2007). Standard Eurobarometer 67. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/617> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2010). Standard Eurobarometer 73. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/917> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2011). Standard Eurobarometer 75. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/1019> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2012). Standard Eurobarometer 78. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/1069> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2013). Standard Eurobarometer 80. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/1123> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer (2014). Standard Eurobarometer 82. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2041> [09.06.2016].

- Eurobarometer (2015). Standard Eurobarometer 84. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2098> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer Interactive (a) (2016). My voice counts in (our country). Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/theMeKy/25/groupKy/292> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer Interactive (b) (2016). (Our country)'s voice counts in the EU. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/theMeKy/25/groupKy/154> [09.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer Interactive (c) (2016). What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/theMeKy/42/groupKy/208> [06.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer Interactive (d) (2016). For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? – The European Union. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/theMeKy/18/groupKy/97> [16.06.2016].
- Eurobarometer Interactive (e) (2016). For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the national government or jointly with the EU? – The fight against international terrorism. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/theMeKy/10/groupKy/40> [16.06.2016].
- Eurojust (2016). History of Eurojust. Available online at: <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/history.aspx> [23.05.2016].
- European Council (2002). Council Decision 2003/48/JHA of 19 December 2002 on the implementation of specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorist. Available online at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32003D0048> [23.05.2016].
- European Council (2004). Declaration on combatting terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf> [20.05.2016].
- European Council (2016). Joint statement of the EU Heads of State or Government and the leaders of the EU institutions on the terrorist attacks in Brussels. Available online at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/22-joint-statement-hosg/> [27.05.2016].
- European Counter Terrorism Centre (2016). Infographic. Available online at: <https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiy9ZDj0Y7OAhVBvRoKHZ4YBRMQFgg4MAI&url=https>

%3A%2F%2Fwww.europol.europa.eu%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fpublications%2Fectc_infographic_public.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHOzNxXUXRVDQM_etPw_nJg7NoUtw&bvm=bv.127984354,d.bGg [25.07.2016].

European External Action Service (EEAS) (2015). EU INTCEN Factsheet. Available online at: http://eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/docs/20150206_factsheet_eu_intcen_en.pdf [20.05.2016].

European Parliament (2006). Questions to the council. Available online at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20060518&secondRef=ANN-01&language=EN&detail=H-2006-0338&query=QUESTION> [23.05.2016].

Europol (2016). History. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149> [20.05.2016].

Europol Press Release, January 25 (2016). Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthens the EU's Response to Terror. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/ectc> [23.05.2016].

Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2010). National counter-terrorism strategy. Available online at: http://www.intermin.fi/download/24910_242010.pdf [27.06.2016].

FG News (2016). Anti-terrorism and migration crisis on the focus of Cyprus-Jordan-Greece trilateral cooperation. Available online at: <http://famagusta-gazette.com/antiterrorism-and-migration-crisis-on-the-focus-of-cyprusjordangreece-tr-p33426-69.htm> [27.06.2016].

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). The principles of France's counter-terrorism action. Available online at: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/terrorism/france-s-action/> [27.06.2016].

General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (2009). The Lisbon Treaty's impact on the Justice and Home Affairs Council. Available online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111615.pdf [01.07.2016].

German Interior Ministry (2016). Terrorismus. Available online at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Terrorismus/bekaempfung/Terrorismus/terrorismus_node.html [27.06.2016].

Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). Terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/terrorism.html> [27.06.2016].

GTD (2016). Global Terrorism Database. Available online at: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/> [15.06.2016].

- Guttman, A (2016). So spionierte die Schweiz mit Israel Araber aus. Tageszeiger Online. Available online at: <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/So-spionierte-die-Schweiz-mit-Israel-Araber-aus/story/24626064> [21.05.2016].
- Harvard Law School (2016). Counter Terrorist Group. Available online at: <http://pilac.law.harvard.edu/europe-region-efforts//counter-terrorist-group-ctg> [21.05.2016].
- Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). National Security Strategy. Available online at: <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/4/32/b0000/National%20Security%20Strategy.pdf> [27.06.2016].
- Irish Department of Justice (2016). Terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/terrorism> [27.06.2016].
- Italian Foreign Ministry (2016). Fight against terrorism. Available online at: http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/temi_globali/lotta_terrorismo [27.06.2016].
- Justice and Home Affairs Council (2016). Joint statement of EU Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs and representatives of EU institutions on the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016. Available online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/24-statement-on-terrorist-attacks-in-brussels-on-22-march/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Joint%20statement%20of%20EU%20Ministers%20for%20Justice%20and%20Home%20Affairs%20and%20representatives%20of%20EU%20institutions%20on%20the%20terrorist%20attacks%20in%20Brussels%20on%2022%20March%202016 [26.05.2016].
- Khandekar, G. (2011). The EU as a Global Actor in Counter Terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/eu/Gauri-Khandekar-The-EU-as-a-Global-Actor-in-Counter-Terrorism.pdf> [27.06.2016].
- Krulík, O. (2015). Presentation given to the class “comparative counter-terrorism” given at Charles University Prague in November 2015. Slides available in online system of Charles University.
- Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). Fighting international terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/security-policy/directions-of-security-policy/fighting-international-terrorism> [27.06.2016].
- Luttwak, E. (2015). Italy has lessons to teach in counterterrorism. Available online at: <http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20151217-ASEAN-ECONOMIC-COMMUNITY-REALITY-CHECK/Viewpoints/Edward-N.-Luttwak-Italy-has-lessons-to-teach-in-counterterrorism?page=2> [27.06.2016].

- Luxembourg Government (2015). Achievements of the Luxembourg Presidency. Available online at: <http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/12/21-pe-libe-schneider/index.html> [27.06.2016].
- Lithuanian State Security Department (2014). Annual Review. Available online at: <http://www.vsd.lt/Files/Documents/635718603371696250.pdf> [27.06.2016].
- Newsblog (Spiegel Online) (2016). Newsblog zu den Anschlägen in Brüssel. Available online at: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bruessel-u-bahn-bomber-war-laut-tv-sender-nicht-allein-a-1083861.html> [24.05.2016].
- Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). International Security. Available online at: <https://www.mae.ro/en/node/2858> [28.06.2016].
- Safe Communities Portugal (2016). Portuguese Government approves a National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. Available online at: <http://www.safecommunitiesportugal.com/portuguese-government-approves-a-national-strategy-for-combatting-terrorism/> [28.06.2016].
- Scicluna, M. (2016). Counter-terrorism in Malta. Available online at: <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20151125/opinion/Counter-terrorism-in-Malta.593453> [27.06.2016].
- Slovak Spectator (2015). Slovakia responds to the attacks in Paris. Available online at: <http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20063856/slovakia-responds-to-the-attacks-on-paris.html> [28.06.2016].
- Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). Fight against terrorism. Available online at: http://www.mzz.gov.si/en/foreign_policy_and_international_law/international_security/fight_against_terrorism/ [28.06.2016].
- Spanish Government (2013). The National Security Strategy. Available online at: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/Documents/estrategiaseguridad_baja_julio.pdf [28.06.2016].
- Special Eurobarometer 371 (2011). Internal Security. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_371_en.pdf [06.06.2016].
- Special Eurobarometer 432 (2015). Europeans' attitudes toward security. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf [06.06.2016].
- Spiegel Online (2016). Europäische Geheimdienste richten Anti-Terror-Zentrum ein. Available online at: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/terrorismus-europaeische-geheimdienste-richten-anti-terror-zentrum-ein-a-1078201.html> [23.05.2016].
- Swedish Government (2014). The Swedish Counter-terrorism strategy. Available online at: http://www.government.se/contentassets/b56cad17b4434118b16cf449dbdc973d/en_strategi-slutlig-eng.pdf [28.06.2016].

- TE-SAT (2007). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2007-eu-terrorism-situation-trend-report-1467> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2008). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2008-eu-terrorism-situation-trend-report-1469> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2009). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2009-eu-terrorism-situation-trend-report-1471> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2010). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2010-eu-terrorism-situation-trend-report-1473> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2011). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2011-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-1475> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2012). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2012-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-1569> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2013). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2013-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2014). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2014-european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2014> [15.06.2016].
- TE-SAT (2015). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available online at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015> [15.06.2016].
- The Telegraph (2012). EU extradition on demand undermines justice. Available online at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562149/EU-extradition-on-demand-undermines-justice.html> [10.03.2016].
- Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Treaty on European Union. Available online at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf [01.07.2016].
- Treaty of Amsterdam (1999). Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union. Available online at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf> [01.07.2016].

Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union. Available online at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> [01.07.2016].

UK Government (2011). The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism. Available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summary.pdf [28.06.2016].

Literature

- Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride?: Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. *Journal of public Economics*, 37(3), 291-304.
- Argomaniz, J. (2009). Post-9/11 institutionalisation of European Union counter-terrorism: emergence, acceleration and inertia. *European security*, 18(2), 151-172.
- Argomaniz, J. (2012). *The EU and counter-terrorism: politics, polity and policies after 9/11*. Routledge.
- Argomaniz, J., Bureš, O., & Kaunert, C. (2015). A decade of EU counter-terrorism and intelligence: a critical assessment. *Intelligence and National Security*, 30(2-3), 191-206.
- Armingeon, K., & Ceka, B. (2014). The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system. *European Union Politics*, 15(1), 82-107.
- Balzacq, T. (2008). The policy tools of securitization: Information exchange, EU foreign and interior policies. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(1), 75-100.
- Balzacq, T., & Hadfield, A. (2012). Differentiation and trust: Prüm and the institutional design of EU internal security. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(4), 539-561.
- Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The new intergovernmentalism: European integration in the post-Maastricht era. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(4), 703-722.
- Blatter, J., & Blume, T. (2008). In Search of Co-variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 14(2), 315-356.
- Bossong, R. (2013). Public good theory and the 'added value' of the EU's anti-terrorism policy. *European security*, 22(2), 165-184.
- Bossong, R. (2014). EU cooperation on terrorism prevention and violent radicalization: frustrated ambitions or new forms of EU security governance?. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27(1), 66-82.
- Bureš, O. (2008). Perceptions of the Terrorist Threat among EU Member States. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 4(1), 51-80.
- Bureš, O. (2011). *EU counterterrorism policy: a paper tiger?*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd..
- Bureš, O. (2012). Informal counterterrorism arrangements in Europe: Beauty by variety or duplicity by abundance?. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(4), 495-518.
- Bureš, O. (2016). Intelligence sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU: lessons learned from Europol. *European View*, 1-10.

- Carrera, S., & Geyer, F. (2007). The Reform Treaty & Justice and Home Affairs-Implications for the Common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. *CEPS policy brief*, (141).
- Cini, M. (2016). Intergovernmentalism. *Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (Eds.): European Union politics. Oxford University Press*, 65-78.
- Chalk, P. (2000). The third pillar on judicial and home affairs cooperation, anti-terrorist collaboration and liberal democratic acceptability. *Fernando Reinares (Eds.): European Democracies Against Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, Aldershot*, 175-211.
- Chopin, T., & Lequesne, C. (2016). Differentiation as a double-edged sword: member states' practices and Brexit. *International Affairs*, 92(3), 531-545.
- Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (1999). The social construction of Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4), 528-544.
- Coolsaet, R., & de Swielande, T. S. (2007). *Belgium and counterterrorism policy in the Jihadi era (Egmont Paper 15)* (Vol. 15). Academia Press.
- De Faria Costa, J.F. (2015). Portugal. Kent Roach (Ed.). *Comparative Counter-terrorism Law*. Cambridge University Press, 326-343.
- De Mesquita, E. B. (2007). Politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterror. *International Organization*, 61(01), 9-36.
- De Wilde, P., Leupold, A., & Schmidtke, H. (2016). Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance. *West European Politics*, 39(1), 3-22.
- Deflem, M. (2006). Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a Global Perspective. *Justice Quarterly*, 23(3), 336-359.
- Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C., & Nölke, A. (2008). Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(1), 101-124.
- Dyson, K. (2010). *Which Europe?: the politics of differentiated integration*. Springer.
- Edwards, G., & Meyer, C. O. (2008). Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(1), 1-25.
- Egeberg, M., Trondal, J., & Vestlund, N. M. (2015). The quest for order: unravelling the relationship between the European Commission and European Union agencies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(5), 609-629.
- Gaisbauer, H. P. (2013). Evolving patterns of internal security cooperation: lessons from the Schengen and Prüm laboratories. *European security*, 22(2), 185-201.

- Gerspacher, N. (2010). The France and Europol relationship: explaining shifts in cooperative behaviour. *Lemieux, F. (Ed.): International Police Cooperation: Emerging issues, theory and practice. Portland: Willian Publishing, 144-166.*
- Goertz, G. (2006). *Social science concepts: A user's guide*. Princeton University Press.
- Goertz, G., & Levy, J. (2007). Causal Explanation, Necessity Conditions and Case Studies. *Levy, J., & Goertz, G. (Eds.): Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 9-45.*
- Haas, E. B. (1961). International integration: the European and the universal process. *International Organization, 15(03), 366-392.*
- Haas, E. B. (1980). Why collaborate? Issue-linkage and international regimes. *World Politics, 32(03), 357-405.*
- Hegemann, H., Heller, R., & Kahl, M. (2011). Terrorismusbekämpfung jenseits funktionaler Problemlösung: Was beeinflusst politisches Handeln im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus?. In *Terrorismusforschung in Deutschland* (pp. 281-304). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Holzinger, K., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Differentiated integration in the European Union: Many concepts, sparse theory, few data. *Journal of European Public Policy, 19(2), 292-305.*
- Jansson, J. (2016). Building resilience, demolishing accountability? The role of Europol in counter-terrorism. *Policing and Society, 1-16.*
- Jasinski, F. (2002). The European Union and Terrorism. *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 11, 35-55.*
- Jensen, C. (2016). Neo-functionalism. *Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (Eds.): European Union politics. Oxford University Press, 53-64.*
- Kaunert, C. (2010). Towards supranational governance in EU counter-terrorism?-The role of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. *Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, 4(1), 8-31.*
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Keohane, D. (2008). The Absent Friend: EU Foreign Policy and Counter-Terrorism. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(1), 125-146.*
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton university press.
- Kolb, R. W. (Ed.). (2007). *Encyclopedia of business ethics and society*. Sage Publications.

- Kroll, D. A., & Leuffen, D. (2015). Enhanced cooperation in practice. An analysis of differentiated integration in EU secondary law. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(3), 353-373.
- Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lowi, T. J. (1972). Four systems of policy, politics, and choice. *Public administration review*, 32(4), 298-310.
- Luif, P. (2007). *The Treaty of Prüm: A Replay of Schengen?*. Policy Paper. Available online at: <http://www.eu-consent.net/library/deliverables/D38c.pdf> [26.05.2016].
- Marin, L. (2008). The European arrest warrant in the Italian Republic. *European Constitutional Law Review*, 4(02), 251-273.
- Meyer, C. O. (2009). International terrorism as a force of homogenization? A constructivist approach to understanding cross-national threat perceptions and responses. *Cambridge review of international affairs*, 22(4), 647-666.
- Monar, J. (2001). The dynamics of justice and home affairs: laboratories, driving factors and costs. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4), 747-764.
- Monar, J. (2006). Cooperation in the justice and home affairs domain: characteristics, constraints and progress. *European Integration*, 28(5), 495-509.
- Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. *Government and opposition*, 42(3), 292-313.
- Monar, J. (2013). Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor Perspective: From Cooperation to Integration in EU Criminal Justice?. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 14(3), 339-356.
- Monar, J. (2015). The EU as an International Counter-terrorism Actor: Progress and Constraints. *Intelligence and National Security*, 30(2-3), 333-356.
- Moravcsik, A., & Katzenstein, P. J. (1998). *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht* (Vol. 1). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999). A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. *International organization*, 53(02), 267-306.
- Nugent, N. (2006). *The government and politics of the European Union*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Occhipinti, J. D. (2015). Still moving toward a European FBI? Re-examining the politics of EU police cooperation. *Intelligence and National Security*, 30(2-3), 234-258.

- Peresin, A. 2013. Croatian counter-terrorism strategy: Challenges, Prevention and Response System. *Research Paper of the Research Institute for European and American Studies*. Available online at: <http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas160.pdf> [27.06.2016].
- Rittberger, B., Leuffen, D., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2014). Differentiated integration of core state powers. *Philipp Genschel/Markus Jachtenfuchs (Eds.) Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers, Oxford University Press, 189-201*.
- Rosamond, B. (2016). Theorizing the European Union after Integration Theory. *Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (Eds.): European Union politics. Oxford University Press, 79-96*.
- Schimmelfennig, F., & Rittberger, B. (2006). Theories of European integration. *Jeremy John Richardson (Eds.). European Union: power and policy-making. Routledge, 73-96*.
- Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., & Rittberger, B. (2015). The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation. *Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6), 764-782*.
- Schneider, C. J. (2014). Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy, 21(5), 699-712*.
- Schreier, M. (2014). Qualitative content analysis. *Uwe Flick (Ed.) The SAGE handbook of qualitative data analysis, 170-183*.
- Schroeder, U. C. (2013). *The organization of European security governance: internal and external security in transition*. Routledge.
- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research a menu of qualitative and quantitative options. *Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294-308*.
- Stone Sweet, A., & Sandholtz, W. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. *Journal of European public policy, 4(3), 297-317*.
- Tekin, F. (2012a). Differentiated integration at Work. *Baden-Baden: Nomos*.
- Tekin, F. (2012b). Opt-Outs, Opt-Ins, Opt-Arounds? Eine Analyse der Differenzierungsrealität im Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts. *integration, 35(4), 237-257*.
- Triantafyllou, G. (2015). Greece. Kent Roach (Ed.). *Comparative Counter-terrorism Law*. Cambridge University Press, 344-362.
- Wagner, W. (2003). Review Section. *Journal of European public policy, 10(6), 1033-1039*.
- Walsh, J. I. (2006). Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3), 625-643*.

Zhelyazkova, A. (2014). From selective integration into selective implementation: The link between differentiated integration and conformity with EU laws. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(4), 727-746.

Zimmermann, D. (2006). The European Union and post-9/11 counterterrorism: a reappraisal. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(2), 123-145.