

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the decision making of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition in public procurement cases. It deals with both procurement oversight and the underlying incentives of the participants of proceedings. The aim of this thesis is to show the motivation of participants of proceedings is various and it often differs from the initial purpose of the oversight. The decisions of the Office and the length of proceeding before the Office play an important role in the incentives of participants.

First, the author summarizes the legislative framework of the proceeding before the Office with emphasis on economically important aspects. Then he performs the analysis of the decisions. The results show that the length of proceeding before the Office is quite long and both contracting authorities and petitioners respond to this fact. The contracting authorities tend to cancel the procurement or make a deal even during the proceeding, on the other hand some the petitioners submit frivolous proposals. In addition the fines imposed by the Office are rather on lower boundary.