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American Humanitarian Interventions

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ABSTRACT

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, humanitarian intervention became an important pillar in the emerging new world order. From 1989 to 1995, 96 violent civil confrontations have occurred, but 91 of them did not result in humanitarian interventions. Here comes the question: Why? Why there were interventions in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo and not in Rwanda, the Sudan, and Tajikistan? These are the main questions that the following study aims to answer. Particularly, the issue of American humanitarian intervention is scrutinized. The casual factors of interventions are examined to explain the selectivity of American Humanitarianism. Furthermore, a theory building is initiated to outline a model of variables which will allow to explain the combination of which casual factors leads to which form of intervention or non-intervention.

KEYWORDS

foreign policy, globalization, humanitarianism, comparative study, criteria of interventions

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 1/12/2015 **Viktorya Arakelyan**

Master Thesis Proposal

Institute of Political Studies — Faculty of Social Sciences
Charles University in Prague — Date: 11.03.2015

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Proposed Topic:

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Topic Characteristics:

In the wake of several recent humanitarian crises and varying responses to such situations, the scholarly debate with respect to American-led humanitarian interventions has grown dramatically. During the Cold War, policy decisions were seen as driven by the strategic aims of the major powers and framed by East–West tensions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, humanitarian intervention became an important pillar in the emerging new world order. Security scholars have struggled to understand the nature of ‘‘humanitarianism’’ as an interest, often with the result that they simply discount it and emphasize other possible motivations for intervention. The analytic problem has been to understand why humanitarianism is such an inconsistent policy practice as international norms and laws are often not respected and humanitarian concerns do not always produce interventions. The selectivity of humanitarian operations has been interpreted as evidence that strategic interests continue to impact the decision-making process.

This study holds two goals. First, it seeks to move beyond the exploration of motivations to examine the selectivity of American humanitarianism. Second, it initiates a theory building process to outline a group of variables which will allow to explain why the United States launches some humanitarian interventions and avoids others.

Hypotheses:

- Combination of different casual factors leads to different forms of intervention or to non-intervention
- National interests are dominant motives of U.S. humanitarian interventions
- U.S. decision to intervene is subject to domestic pressure from public opinion
- U.S. decision to intervene is influenced by such factors as power disparity and severity of humanitarian emergency

Methodology:

The thesis will use case studies method. These will help to infer and test how the Independent variables (power disparity, public support, strategic interests, humanitarian emergency) causes the dependent variables (intervention, limited intervention, non-intervention). Applying this method, the research will be able to “process trace”, which means to examine the process whereby initial case conditions are translated into case outcome. The other method of inquiry to be implemented in the research is the comparative method which will allow to bring into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among selected cases.

Theoretical background:
Humanitarian Intervention, sovereignty, realism, idealism.

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

AMIS - African Union Mission in Sudan

AU - African Union

BP - British Petroleum

CENTCOM - Central Command

CINC - Composite Index of National Capability

COW - Correlates of War

DPA - Darfur Peace Agreement

DRA - Darfur Regional Authority

ECR - Eastward Coastal Region

EM-DAT - Emergency Events Database

GoS - Government of Sudan

IDP - Internally Displaced Persons

IEA - International Energy Agency

IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

JEM - Justice and Equality Movement

MCR - Middle Coast Region

MENA - Middle East North Africa

MMR - Middle Mountain Region

NIF - National Islamic Front

OFAC - Office of Foreign Asset Control

PDF - Popular Defence Force

PIPA - The Program on International Policy Attitudes

SLA - Sudanese Liberation Army

SLA-MM - Sudanese Liberation Army led by Minni Minnawi

SLA-W - Sudanese Liberation Army led by Abdel Wahid

SPLA -Sudanese People's Liberation Army

SSR - Southern Sahara region

TIFA - Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

UNAMID - United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur

WCR - West Costal Region

WMR -West Mountain Region

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1. Introduction

In the wake of several recent humanitarian crises and varying responses, the scholarly debate with respect to American-led humanitarian interventions has grown dramatically. During the Cold War, policy decisions were seen as driven by the strategic aims of the major powers and framed by East–West tensions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, humanitarian intervention became an important pillar in the emerging new world system. Security scholars have struggled to understand the nature of ‘‘humanitarianism’’ as an interest, often with the result that they simply discount it and emphasize other possible motivations for intervention. The analytic problem has been to understand why humanitarianism is such an inconsistent policy practice as international norms and laws are often not respected and humanitarian concerns do not always produce interventions. The selectivity of humanitarian operations has been interpreted as evidence that strategic interests continue to impact the decision-making process.

This study holds two goals. First, it seeks to move beyond the exploration of motivations to examine the selectivity of American humanitarianism. Second, it initiates a theory building process to outline a group of variables which will allow to explain why the United States launches some humanitarian interventions and avoids others. Subsequently, this thesis attempts to answer a number of relevant questions, particularly:

- Is There a Middle Ground between realism and idealism in humanitarian intervention?
- Are national interests the dominant motives of U.S. humanitarian interventions?
- Is U.S. decision to intervene subject to domestic pressure from public opinion?
- Is U.S. decision to intervene influenced by such factor as power disparity?
- Does U.S. decision to intervene depend on the severity of humanitarian emergency?

- Combination of which factors results in U.S. humanitarian intervention?

Using the literature on humanitarian intervention that is focused on sovereignty, national interests, human security, and international law, this study aims to build a framework that assesses patterns of U.S. humanitarian intervention. What is needed is an approach that detects the potential causal factors and their relationships that lead the U.S. to get involved in humanitarian intervention. This includes determining the main factors that influence the decision-making process. To do this, the following study presents a model of variables, comprised of four independent and two dependent variables, and applies it in selected case studies. The chosen independent variables are complex humanitarian emergency, power disparity, public opinion, strategic necessity. And the dependent variables are U.S. intervention or nonintervention. By applying this model of variables in the chosen case studies of Haiti, Darfur and Libya this thesis seeks to find interconnection between the causal factors, namely the independent variables, and different forms of intervention or nonintervention. Such an approach emphasizes the importance of interactive relationship between the outlined factors. This guide will allow us to identify if there is a mixture of motives for humanitarian intervention, and what does that mixture include.

To place the research on solid ground Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical underpinnings. It seeks to create a theoretical framework that would serve as a cornerstone for the further research. Firstly it will define the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention, then will present its realist and idealist perceptions. Based on this the analytical part of the work will be conducted. In order to gain more inclusive understanding of variables and case studies Chapter 3 provides a brief review of the historical backgrounds and outlines the development of the selected conflicts.

Chapters 4,5,6,7 present each of the selected variables in the frameworks of each of the case studies. These chapters start with the definition of the corresponding variable itself, followed by its application in chosen case studies.

As Discussed earlier, the selected case studies are the crises in Haiti, Darfur and Libya. The repressions in Haiti, which accelerated from 1991, the ongoing crisis in Darfur, and the unrest in Libya, doubtlessly are unique cases and each of them have drastically differing characteristics. However, the selection of the cases is conditioned by many factors. Firstly, each of these cases has been recognized as a potential case for humanitarian intervention. Secondly, these cases differ in both nature of the conflict and geographical positions. Lastly, these crises got different responses from the U.S.

Haiti was chosen for its domestic repressions, which caused deployment of U.S. troops in the country, and for being located in Hispaniola. The peculiarity of Darfur case is the fact that the U.S. did not intervene and its geographical location in Central Africa. Finally, Libya was selected for the civil war that outburst in the country and the U.S. took part in tackling it. The additional factor for selecting Libya was its location within a geopolitically important region of MENA (Middle East North Africa). In this way, the difference of selected variables in each of the cases would allow to relate these variations with the possible U.S. reaction on them. These will help to infer and test how the Independent variables (power disparity, public support, strategic interests, humanitarian emergency) impact the dependent variables (intervention, limited intervention, non-intervention). Applying this method, the research will be able to "process trace", which means to examine the process whereby initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes.

The stated objective of this thesis necessitates the implementation of the other method of inquiry, namely the comparative method. Comparing qualitative and quantitative data will allow to bring into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among the selected cases.

Although humanitarian intervention is a relatively new concept in international relations, the literature on this topic is voluminous. The large quantity of literature not only witnesses the importance of this trend but also illustrates its controversial nature. The general consensus is absent regarding even the most fundamental issues underpinning the concept of humanitarian intervention. As for example a unanimously accepted definition of the concept has not even been developed. Each scholar has his/her own understanding and definition of the discussed concept. Seam Murphy in his book "Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order" defines humanitarian intervention as the "threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights" (Murphy, 1996). For the purpose of this thesis the definition given by Adam Roberts will be used. According to him humanitarian intervention is "a coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants" (Roberts, 2000).

The other controversial aspects of humanitarian interventions is their motivation. The question is whether humanitarian interventions are conducted for exclusively humanitarian purposes or for some other self-interested motives. Authors are highly divided on this subject. From those who argue that humanitarian interventions are solely motivated by the willingness to protect human rights and alleviate human sufferings Richard Betts could be mentioned. In his article "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention" he stated that: "the most interventions since the end of the

Cold War were not driven by the material interest of the outside powers but by their moral interests: peace and justice" (Betts, 1994). Similarly, Andreas Krieg in his work "Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations" stated that humanitarian interventions are conducted "with the sole purpose of saving or rescuing individuals in need" (Krieg, 2012). The other work promoting altruistic motives of humanitarian intervention is the book "Just and Unjust Wars" by Michael Walzer. He sees the justification of humanitarian interventions in the intention to response to the acts that "shock moral conscience of mankind" (Walzer, 1977).

Alternatively, a number of scholars see humanitarian interventions in wholly different light. David Rieff in his book "A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis states" stated that "the vision of the enterprise that they have a right to intervene is too close to the old colonial norms to be viewed independently from them" (Rieff, 2002). David Rieff's point of view is advocated by numerous authors including Jean Bricmont, Neta Crawford, Robert Pape, Michael Butler, and Edward Carr who perceive humanitarian interventions as an opportunity for stronger powers to advocate their own interests (Bricmont, 2006) (Crawford, 2002) (Pape, 2012) (Butler, 2003) (Carr, 2001). Edward Carr in his work "The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations" claims that whatever is the official cause of the state's international action, be it humanitarian considerations or the necessity to maintain peace, the real reason is the self-interest, and all other "excuses" are just rhetorical veil. Because in the "international order the role of power is greater and that of morality is less" (Carr, 2001).

This polarization of viewpoints is particularly evident in the literature regarding American humanitarian interventions. Along with the abovementioned works this thesis reviewed several other sources that address the humanitarian interventions conducted by the U.S. Particularly the

book by Derek Reveron, Nikolas Gvosdev, and Thomas Owens titled “US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Evolution of an Incidental Superpower” should be mentioned.

In addition to books and scholarly articles this thesis heavily relies on official statements and documents, as well as statistical data, in order to base the research on firm quantitative bases.

Based on the abovementioned literature Chapter 2 will draw the theoretical underpinnings of this research.

2. Theoretical Underpinnings

The concept of humanitarian intervention has always been a matter of incompliances. One of the most controversial question in the debate over humanitarian interventions is the definition of reasons and preconditions for intervention. To spread some light on this debate the following chapter defines humanitarian intervention and presents humanitarian intervention from realist as well as idealist perspectives. This chapter examines the compelling grounds for interventions from the perspectives of the mentioned theories.

2.1. Humanitarian Intervention

How could the concept of humanitarian intervention be defined? This question has rather different and even controversial answers, however for the purpose of this thesis Adam Roberts’ definition will be used. He defines humanitarian intervention as “a coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants” (Roberts, 2000). In other words, humanitarian intervention is intervention inspired

by humanitarian concerns. In order to gain more complete and clear understanding of this concept the next two section will examine its constituent parts, namely intervention and humanitarianism. Correspondingly two questions will be answered: first, what is considered to be an intervention; second, what kind of concerns are qualified as humanitarian? The following chapter seeks to scrutinize each in turn.

2.1.1. Intervention

According to Bhikhu Parekh an act counts as intervention if it corresponds to four criteria (Parekh, 1997). First, the object of intervention must be internationally recognized as a sovereign state. Intervention implicates a breach of autonomy. The entity should be recognized as a competent member of the international society in order to take advantage of the right to autonomy and the contributory right to non-interference.

Second, intervention presumes the act of interference into the conduct of state's internal affairs, and not in any case the annexation of its territory. The dividing line between intervention, conquest and war is blurred and hard to define. However, broadly speaking, as distinct from war and conquest, intervention seeks to influence the internal affairs of a state in such a way, which excludes the possibility of taking it over.

Third, an act is considered an intervention if the object-country did not give its consent to it. If consent exists, the act is perceived as a support to a willing party and not as an intervention.

Here a disputable question arises: who in the object-country should give the consent and invite the external help? If the government is legitimate and enjoys wide support, then its position is decisive. However, in cases if the government's authority is disputable, or when the authority

structure is missing, it is the popular attitude that decides to label the external act as an intervention or not.

Fourth, an act could be classified as an intervention if the external agent violates territorial integrity of the object state by using physical force in one form or another (Parekh, 1997). Usually, it assumes the involvement of military force but not necessarily. This criterion is important taking into consideration the fact that states continuously influence each other. Immigration, trade, fiscal and other types of policies sometimes have even profound effects on the internal life of countries. Thus, this kind of influence should be differentiated from intervention.

Regardless of these seemingly clear criteria of intervention, this concept remains highly fuzzy. However, it could be inferred that an act is labeled as an intervention when an external agent (a state, an international body or a group of individuals) coercively interferes into the internal affairs of a state with an intention to redesign the functioning of its internal affairs.

2.1.2. Humanitarianism

Defining the concept of humanitarianism in the context of intervention, Parekh underlines two conditions which prescribe humanitarian nature to an intervention. First, to be called humanitarian, an intervention should be wholly or primarily guided by altruistic, selfless and other-oriented behavior. The altruism is defined as an "unselfish concern for others" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). Therefore, in this regard, altruism is understood as an action that not only is self-interested but in fact is self-harming to some extent (Krieg, 2012). The etymology of the ward "altruism" also spreads light to its use in the discussed context. It derives from the Latin

expression *alteri huic*, meaning "to this other", which in Italian merged into *altrui* "somebody else" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005).

Despite the abovementioned statement that human beings are naturally inclined to help others, Shalom Schwartz and Judith Howard base the actual willingness to help on the individual personality and the situational context (Schwartz & Howard, 1984). Generally, it can be stated that individuals with higher moral development are more likely to conduct an altruistic act. However, the most important triggers for altruistic behavior are considered to be the social norms or socially constructed personal norms. These norms generate a feeling of moral obligation to act or refrain from acting. (Schwartz & Howard, 1984, p. 234). This assumption could be projected to states' or political decision makers' behavior. The spread of humanitarian norms in the international community brings forward the moral obligation of helping others in specific situations.

Another factor that is likely to influence the inclination to conduct an altruistic act is the expected cost of that action (Kerber, 1984) (Pape, 2012). This prescribes a selective nature to such acts, including humanitarian interventions. As Garret Hardin stated "… the central characteristic of all forms of altruism is this: discrimination is a necessary part of a persisting altruism…" (Hardin, 1982)

In this study altruism is referred to as other-oriented action of a state, an international body or a group of individuals motivated by empathy and norms of morality. Such an action has an objective of helping individuals in need, outside of their own nation. Consequently, no act of intervention can be called humanitarian unless the urge to help and the readiness to make necessary sacrifices, is decisive or at least important in the decision to intervene.

The second criteria suggested by Parekh for differentiating humanitarian act is its intention to address a violation of the so called minimum that is required for the life of human beings (Parekh, 1997). The latter concept is conditional, thus the definition of humanitarian intervention itself is not culturally neutral and cannot be universally acceptable.

The founders of international law, Francisi de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, as well as other Christian writers assigned the European states to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries to put an end to human sacrifice and cannibalism (Vitoria, 1917) (Grotius, 1901). Besides, they also accepted other cases when humanitarian intervention should take place, including the denial of the freedom to propagate Christianity, harassment of missionaries, adherence to "barbaric" religious practices (Parekh, 1997). As for nowadays, to the existing intolerance towards slavery and cannibalism is added intolerance towards poverty and starvation. However, their abolishment is not considered as a justification for external intervention. Even though poverty and human sufferings are of a high concern today, but death through poverty, malnutrition, economic and political misrule are regarded as forms of social injustice and require internal restructuring and not intervention from outside. The concept of humanitarian intervention is largely focused on the state. Sufferings and death become a matter of humanitarian intervention only if they occur in the result of the collapse of the state or the abuse of its power. The outside help is urged when a state is engaged in a civil war, or in an act of genocide leading to mass murders, expulsions and ethnic cleansing. In these cases, the international community is expected to pacify the situation, provide security and help to establish bases for the construction of an acceptable structure of civil authority. It is supposed to assist the people of the concerned country to choose their political destiny themselves and not to impose its preferred form of the government.

Therefore, the contemporary understanding of humanitarian intervention is not the same as humanitarian aid and political intervention. The former is only directed at alleviation of sufferings but not establishing peace. The latter, as distinct from humanitarian intervention, intends at imposing a particular structure of civil authority.

This is the ideal understanding of humanitarian intervention. In practice, the line between the abovementioned concepts is not easy to draw. As Parekh concludes, "however disinterested they might be, most acts of humanitarian intervention cannot but involve at least some element of external imposition" (Parekh, 1997). As a result, humanitarian intervention remains a problematic feature of international politics.

In the context of the recent humanitarian crises and different responses to them, the scholarly debate on American-led humanitarian interventions mounted. During the Cold War international relations were seen as a tool for advancing one's national interests. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concept of humanitarian intervention became a significant aspect of the emerging new world order. Scholars have struggled to understand why humanitarian concerns do not always produce intervention. The nature of "humanitarianism" has been studied, often resulting at such conclusions, which undermine it, putting forward other feasible motivations for intervention. The selective nature of humanitarian intervention was presented as a proof that the national interests still influence the decision-making process.

This study holds two main goals. First, it seeks to examine the possible factors, which could explain the selectivity of American humanitarianism. Second, it initiates a theory building process to outline a group of variables, which will allow to explain why the United States launches some humanitarian interventions and avoids others.

In order to accomplish the stated tasks and to gain a complete understanding of all possible explanations of humanitarian intervention this study investigates the main theories that address the question in concern. Particularly, humanitarian intervention from the perspectives of two opposing theories, realism and idealism, are presented in the next section.

2.2. Humanitarian Intervention: Realist Perspective

Realism is doubtlessly the main school of thought that study the phenomenon of U.S. humanitarian intervention. This is evidenced by the substantial amount of literature advancing this theory. Realism was the leading theory during the Cold War, primarily because of its simple, yet profound explanations of the causes of conflicts. Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and many other academics advanced the theory of realism as an explanation of why international conflicts occur.

Explaining realism, Morgenthau stresses that "politics, like society in general is governed by objective laws of human nature" (Morgenthau, 1978). According to these objective laws humans will act rationally for enhancing their chances to survive. To act rationally in realist perception means to act in one's own interest. And the states like humans will do the same to survive. Through the realist lenses state's interests could be defined as the attainment and use of power. Morgenthau elaborates that "power may comprise anything that establishes the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another" (Morgenthau, 1978). In this sense the power can take form of a military might, as well as the ability to inforce one's will on another by other means. According to realist Edward Carr "international politics are always power politics; it is impossible to eliminate power from [the international system]"

(Carr, 2001). Carr further develops his idea stating that the "abstract principles commonly invoked in international politics are not principles at all, but the unconscious reflection of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time" (Carr, 2001). In other words, Carr claims that whatever is the official cause of the state's international action, be it humanitarian considerations or the necessity to maintain peace, the real reason is the self-interest, and all other "excuses" are just rhetorical veil. Because in the "international order the role of power is greater and that of morality is less" (Carr, 2001).

In essence, states are concerned with the balance of power on the international arena. It makes competitiveness one of the most important features of international politics. This characteristic leads to a realist assumption that "states are egotistic actors that pursue self-help" (Brooks, 1997). Thus, the theory of realism claims that international politics, including humanitarian intervention, will always be guided by self-interest. Accordingly, states in the international affairs should and do base their actions on self-interest or in a broader sense national interests (Richardson, 1997).

Subsequently, the realm of national interests should be defined. "The meaning of national interest can vary widely, from increasing a state's power to a survival of a state to upholding international legitimacy" (Krieg, 2012).

Realists could generally defined national interests as the sum of nation's material and security interests. However, the importance of all national interests could not be equalized. Morgenthau differentiates vital and secondary national interests. Vital national interests are directly connected with the survival of the state. Those interests are concerned with the protection of the state as a free and independent nation, as well as the security of institutions, people and fundamental rights. For protecting those interests Morgenthau does not exclude any option of means.

Secondary interests include those removed from the state's borders and do not endanger the security and independence of the nation. Thus, these interests could be abandoned if the anticipated costs outweigh the expected benefits. (Morgenthau, 1978)

Contemporary studies further divide the national interests into subcategories, according to the urgency scale. Particularly, very high urgency interests, vital interest, moderate and low urgency interest are outlined. Very high urgency interest directly deal with the survival of the nation, while vital ones stand for only a high urgency. The last two subcategories respectively correspond to major and peripheral interests (Krieg, 2012).

The protection of very high urgency interest, concerned with state's survival, may cause mobilization of all national resources. Vital interest are decisive and include the defense of important allies and strategic resources. Major national interest are less urgent. They only involve the defense of less significant allies and non-critical resources.

From the realist perspective, the urgency of interests at stake directly correlates with the efforts that state is willing to invest in their protection. Accordingly, the state is willing to devote more resources, in terms of troops, time, money, equipment etc. when higher urgency interest are at stake. (Keifer, 2003)

From the realist point of view while survival and vital national interests deem the use of force necessary, major and peripheral interests may be defended by humanitarian or reconstruction efforts, but not by the deployment of large military forces. (Slenska, 2007)

Besides this narrow definition, national interest could also have a broader explanation. Based on the assertion that it is in the self-interest of every state to preserve global stability and care for global humanity, the states can define their national interests in the context of such liberal

Western values as human rights, democracy and liberalism (Walzer, 1995). Western political culture stresses the importance of preserving its legacy and its values rooted in Greco-Roman classical culture, the Judeo-Christian and the post-Enlightenment heritage (Spielvogel, 2004).

In particular American national interests are often characterized as a mixture of realist security-related interest and value-related interest, based on the moral and ethical values incorporated in the U.S. constitution (William, 2005). However, in spite of the moral aspect, the preservation and promotion of the abovementioned Western values is considered to be a self-interested act. Because "exporting Western values such as democracy, human rights or liberal market economy does ultimately serve the interests of the West due to the fact that countries based on similar values are more likely to become lucrative trading partners or political allies" (Krieg, 2012).

In this study national interests will be defined narrowly, without any moral connotations, including such narrow national interests as economic and strategic interests as well as personal interests of decision makers.

Under the realist rubric of national interest, states may intervene to help an ally or counterbalance a regional hegemon. In some cases the goal could be to prevent the violence from escalation and spreading, while in other cases economic factors could be decisive. These factors revolve around financial interests, promotion of market stability and safeguarding industries and commodities (Roberts, 1993). Rationalists highlight the use of humanitarianism as a shroud to cover self-interest: "the U.S. strategy of fighting tyranny as a way to neutralize its enemies is not 'humanitarian intervention' (Pham, 2004). Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley furthermore argue that any norm of humanitarian intervention (including the window that was left open in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) leaves a wide space for realpolitik, self-interest and abuse of weak states by strong ones (Franck & Rodley, 1973).

2.3. Humanitarian Intervention: Idealist Perspective

The altruistic motives of humanitarian intervention are rooted in the cosmopolitan idea of moral universalism. Cosmopolitanism advocates the belief of a common humanity, conceiving that the world in the first place is comprised of individuals and people, rather than states. Thus cosmopolitan community includes all individuals regardless of the race, religion and nationality and is based on shared values of morality. (Fixdal & Dan, 1998) In other words, the rights of individuals (human rights) are preferred over the rights of states (sovereignty).

The roots of cosmopolitanism could be traces back to the 18th century writings of Emmanuel Kant, but its rise is tidally connected with the acceleration of global integration starting from the end of the 20th century. The weakening of the absolute state-centric worldview in line with globalization is believed to be a fertile ground for creating a global community based on moral values. In such a community individuals are perceived beyond the national borders or the realm of nation. They meet each other exclusively as humans and not members of a particular group. In this cosmopolitan community, universal norms, values, rights and duties connect individuals. These norms arising from humanitarian law, give individuals universal human rights, which should be defended and promoted by the sovereign. Thus, violation of basic human rights is not only a domestic issue, but a matter of concern for the entire global community. Hence, in cosmopolitanism everyone, including states, has a moral duty to help individuals all over the world. Such a desire to intervene is believed to be guided by altruistic considerations only, in other wards by "a sort of philanthropic concern for a fellow human being" (Coates, 2003).

One of the specific cosmopolitan ideologies, solidarism, fosters the notion that the international system is based on the rights of individuals. It suggests that states function being fully aware that

individual rights are at the bases of this system. In solidarist perception each state in the international community should be committed to the enforcement of shared values and norms. Hence, intervention from a solidarist point of view "has to serve the sole purpose of advancing the common norms underlying the system" (Krieg, 2012). Solidarism promotes an idea "…that strangers are a part of us, that security is indivisible, and that all human beings are members of one global family…" hereby making the life of a stranger an equal concern for all governments.

Benevolence and other-oriented behavior are embedded in several major religions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam. From these monotheistic religions, Christianity advocates a type of self-less altruism that is not found in the other two religions (Krieg, 2012). As for example " for the decades the Catholic Church has championed the unity of the human family, the interdependence of peoples and the need for solidarity across national and regional boundaries. So we have welcomed the advances in communications, technology, economics and other secular forces which have brought people into ever close contact with one another…" (United States Catholic Conference, 1992). According to the United States Catholic Conference, interventions should be conducted only for making the world a better place to live, wherein excluding self-oriented motivations (Miller, 2000). Therefore, altruism is perceived as the only virtuous attitude towards humanitarian intervention.

This understanding of humanitarian intervention is also present in just war theory. Within its realm, humanitarian intervention is commonly perceived as a disinterested, rather altruistic form of intervention "with the sole purpose of saving or rescuing individuals in need" (Krieg, 2012).

In a statist world system, with a firm adherence to the principle of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention should be regarded as an exceptional case for using the force. The use of force for facilitating the sufferings of people must be detached from any other interests. Thus, the

justification of humanitarian intervention deems the clearly defined human-right concerned motivations of the intervener as a requirement. "…The issue of humanitarian intervention is largely justified by viewing human rights as a jus cogens[1], thereby, seeing their defense as vital and warranted…" (Helmke, 2004). That is to say that as a contemporary jus cogens humanitarian intervention has been accepted as an exceptional type of intervention. This point of view was stated already in the 1970s by a prominent political thinker Michael Walzer: "…Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response to acts that shock moral conscience of mankind…" (Walzer, 1977), therefore, it can be accepted as moral and legal exception to the non-intervention principle.

This makes the existence of a major humanitarian emergency the supreme prerequisite for intervention. Walzer further continues stating that "… we praise or do not condemn these violations of formal rules of sovereignty, because they uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely an expression…" (Walzer, 1977).

Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata argued that "the fundamental objective of humanitarian action is to alleviate suffering and save lives. Humanitarian action focuses on people and is right based, Political action focuses on states and is guided by national interests and respect for sovereignty" (Ogata, 1998). It follows that as humanitarian intervention is a humanitarian act it should not be guided by politics. Richard Miller even goes that far as to state that humanitarian intervention is "… a form of altruism write large, a kind of self-sacrificial love…" (Miller, 2000).

[1] Jus cogens ="…For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character …"
* United Nations International Law Commission. (1969). (Art. 53).

Thus from the idealist perspective intervention is reasonable when it is intended to save individuals in need and disregards all other possible self-oriented motivation.

3. Historical Backgrounds

The previous chapter provided theoretical bases for the further development of the topic. The outlined theories would be used to underpin the remaining, analytical part of this thesis, namely U.S. intervention or nonintervention in Haiti, Darfur and Libya crises. Through examination of this cases and U.S. response to them this thesis has an objective to understand why U.S. decides to conduct humanitarian intervention using military means in some cases and why it does not in others. Using four independent variables, we seek to explain the occurrence of dependent variables, specifically military intervention and non-intervention. The intended goal of this thesis is to demonstrate a clear pattern in decision-making leading to military intervention.

The accomplishment of the above-mentioned goal requires the understanding of historical frameworks of the selected crises, on the first place. Thus, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the events preceding the crises and the developments of the conflicts themselves.

3.1. Historical Background: Haiti

The 1994 intervention could not be separated from Haiti's history of political instability, repressions, economic hardship and America's extensive involvement in countries affairs.

Initially a Spanish colony, then French, Haiti gained independence in 1804, when the rebellion by a former slave Toussaint l'Ouverture's brought an end to French rule. Since then the country has not witness a protracted period of peace. U.S. started seeing such volatility as a threat to

regional stability (Ballard, 1998). In the period between 1915 and 1934 the U.S. occupied Haiti to resolve the disorder and safeguard its strategic interests along the Windward Passage, the strait that leads to the Panama Canal. In 1920 the U.S. undertook the so-called Operation Uplift, which included construction of roads, bridges, a dam, communication systems, hospitals etc. (Mclean, 1994).

Turmoil in the country was continued throughout the following decades. The most repressive period started after Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier gained the power in 1957. His rule continued 14 years, in 1971 succeeding by his son Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who in 1986 was forced to flee into exile after an army chief, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy seized the power.

In 1987 a democratic constitution was adopted. This constitution remained at the stage of adoption without being implemented as a result of series of coups. However on 16 December 1990 the people of Haiti participated in considerably the first democratic elections in country's history, choosing as a president the leftist Catholic priest, Jean- Bertrand Aristide. Right after being elected by the majority of votes as a president, Aristide undertook an extensive restructuring of the army. He replaced six of the seven members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dismissed General Abraham and appointed General Raul Cedras instead of him (Benton & Ware, 2001). Aristide considered all the newly appointed officials to be more reform-minded.

Shortly afterwards, Aristide's actions raised concerns of the former ruling elite. They accused him of "seeking dictatorial powers, crushing democracy, and using violence to further his goals; in short, they believed that Aristide was positioning himself to become a dictator" (Benton & Ware, 2001) Eventually, on 30 September 1991, Aristide's critics from the right, left, and center of the political spectrum supported the military coup led by Lieutenant general Raoul Cedras

(Center for Law and Military Operations, n.d.). Aristide fled Haiti and eventually found political asylum in the United States.

As a response to this on 16 June 1993, the UN Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti (U.N. SCOR, 1993). Between 1994 and 30 January 1995 the Security Council in total adopted 14 resolutions related to Haiti and the President of the Security Council made several statements on the same topic.

This international pressure gave results soon afterwards. On 3 July 1993 General Cedras and President Aristide signed an agreement, according to which Cedras was obliged to resign and Aristide was supposed to return by October 30 (Center for Law and Military Operations, n.d.). Though this agreement remained unimplemented. As a response the UN renewed sanctions against Haiti on 13 October (U.N. SCOR , 1993). The U.S., on its turn, froze assets of junta members and canceled their visas.

As a result of the harsh conditions in the country, the number of refugees fleeing to U.S. increased drastically. Initially U.S. was determined to provide decent conditions for all the refugees. As it was stated by President Clinton the U.S. "would not refuse entry to Haitian boat people without hearing their claims for asylum" (Center for Law and Military Operations, n.d.). On 29 June 1994 a processing center was opened at Guantanamo bay naval base in Cuba. However, the continuingly rising number of refugees caused changes in U.S. policy. It was decided that "Haitian migrants would be returned to Haiti or taken to "safe havens" at Guantanamo Bay" (Center for Law and Military Operations, n.d.). The number of refugees was continuously growing. The situation hastily worsened by 8 September 1994, when U.S. leaders decided to conduct a military intervention (William, 2000). On 31 July 1994 the UN Security Council gave the green light for intervention, by resolution 940. It authorized member states "to

form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island agreement ....” (U.N. SCOR, 1994).

The U.S. forces were deployed to Haiti from 19 September. The US led the Multinational Force for around six months until the UN took over the Haitian occupation, Since April 1995 (Carey, 1997-1998). US troops remained in Haiti until January 2000 while the last UN troops left the country in February 2001.

The main objectives of the intervention were returning Aristide to Haiti, democratizing the country and assuring its economic development (The World Bank , 1998).

3.2. Historical Background: Darfur

The crisis in Darfur, Sudan, has roots in a long history of ethnic clashes. Sudan’s population of over 28 mil is comprised of over 30 different ethnic groups communicating in more than 400 different languages.

Being notably heterogeneous region, Darfur can broadly be described as Arab and African. The northern and southern regions of Darfur are occupied by Arabic nomads, while the center is resided by African farmers who consist of three major groups: Fur, Zaghawa, and Wassaleit. Desertification and unsustainable drought forced the nomadic tribes to move towards south, into the central regions. This eventually led to clashes with sedentary African farmers (Youngs,

2004). When the 1986 government of Sadiq al Mahdi Arab supremacist movement acquired significant influence, non-Arab farmers in Darfur experienced violation of their interests. The situation further deteriorated during the regime led by Omar al-Bashir, who heavily relied on identity politics, deepening the wedge between Darfur communities.

During the next two decades the segregation among Darfur inhabitants deteriorated, breaking the unity of Darfur tribes. The National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum systematically discriminated and suppressed African communities.

As the Second Sundanese Civil War reached the stage of the peace process in 2002-2005, members of relegated Fur and Zaghawa started forming rebel groups. "Khalil Ibrahim, of the Zaghawa tribe, founded the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2001 and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) formed in 2001 as an alliance between Fur and Zaghawa tribes." (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.)

In mid-2003, the Government of Sudan (GoS) deteriorated suppressions in Darfur by arming the Janjaweed Arab militia and mobilizing the Popular Defense force (PDF). In line with others, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported that these militias were involved in "an ethnically-targeted campaign of mass killings, forced displacement, destruction of property and rape" (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.). The acts against the non-Arab Africans were defined as ethnic cleansing" by the UN officials.

On 25 April 2003 SLA and JEM undertook major actions against the GoS. They were backed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), another major rebel group operating in the South of Sudan. In response to rebel's actions GoS launched bombardments in Darfur.

During the conflict several ceasefires were signed which were eventually breached. On May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) also known as the Abuja agreement was signed by GoS and SLA-MM, led by Minni Minnawi. (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.). The Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) was established by the agreement. It however didn't manage to tackle the violence mainly because the agreement did not involve other influential rebel factions; JEM and SLA-W, led by Abdel Wahid.

In February 2004 another wave of actions against JEM and SLA took place. Later that month President Omar Bashir announced that "the SLA and JEM had been defeated in the region". (Dagne, 2004)

From 2010, when the financial support from GoS decreased, government-backed militias started acting independently. They continued land grabbing, extortion, smuggling and rubbery. The new phase of violence is characterized by inter-Arab fights, changing the narrative of Arab versus non-Arab conflict. Today the conflict has morphed into an inter-ethnic battle.

UN Security Council made its first statement on the situation on May 25, 2004, expressing its concern about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and stated its support for the mediating efforts undertaken by the African Union (AU). Sudanese President Al-Bashir agreed to allow the deployment of AU troops in the country, the number of which reached 7.700 by April 2005. On 25 March 2005, the UN Security Council authorized a UN mission by resolution 1590. Furthermore, in response to opposition from the GoS, the UN suggested transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to joint UN-AU mission of 25.987 personal (Resolution 1769). The mandate the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was further extended Resolution 1935 and 2113.

3.3. Historical Background: Libya

Muammar al-Gaddafi came to power in 1969 and had been Libya's ruler since then. After overthrowing the King Irdis al-Sanusi, Muammar Gaddafi became the leader of what he described as an ongoing revolutionary struggle against the corrosive influence of the West and the oil companies. (Vandewalle, 2012) The presumptive goal was to achieve President Nasser's dream of pan-Arabic nationalism by uniting Libya against Western imperialism (Vandewalle, 2012). Gaddafi, with his lofty and often crude solutions to intricate geopolitical issues, represented the silent endeavours of many leaders in the region to attain self-sustenance from the Western power (Vandewalle, 2012).

During the years prior to the 1986 bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi by the US forces, US State Department included Libya in the list of state-sponsors of terrorism (Vandewalle, 2012). Relations between Gaddafi and the West continuously deteriorated, followed by sanctions and embassy closures. In 1970s, after Jamahiriyya took part in the OPEC oil embargo against US, an intricate trade embargo was established against Libya (US Department of State, 2008). As a result of subsequent series of economic and strategic exchanges relations got more constraint, becoming critical after US shot down Libyan aircraft over what Gaddafi claimed to be Libya's territorial waters. In 1988 two Libyans were accused of being related to bombing in Scotland (Vandewalle, 2012) (Cowell & G., 2009). In 1992 Gaddafi was politically and economically isolated by the UN sanctions. In 2003 after Libya accepted its responsibility for the bombings and agreed to claimant compensation, sanctions were lifted. Gaddafi also agreed to suspend the program of developing weapons of mass destruction.

The protests in Libya began in Benghazi on February 15, 2011 (Vivienne, 2011) (Fahim, 2011). Protests beginning in the second largest city sparked tens of thousands of anti-government demonstration, mirroring the turmoil in the Arab world. The government's response followed shortly, starting with tear gas application, and arrests. It rapidly escalated to usage of live ammunition. The protests spread further from Benghazi. The number of casualties increased deteriorating the hostile attitude towards Gaddafi (NATO, 2011).

The first warning to Gaddafi regime came in the form of the UN Security Resolution 1970 adopted on February 26, 2011. It expressed the Security Council members' worries concerning Gaddafi's actions. The resolution called for immediate ceasefire and established an arms embargo (NATO, 2011). The next step undertaken by the UN was Resolution 1973 adopted on March 12, 2011, having 10 voices in favour and none against (5 members abstained from voting, including the Russian Federation and China) (United Nations, 2011). It once again stated criticism over Libyan government's actions, authorising member states "to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack…" (United Nations, 2011). By this time the international antipathy toward Gaddafi mounted and the UN appealed to NATO to start reconnaissance around Libya. U.S. naval ships were moved closer to the Mediterranean Sea. In the meantime U.S. drones were placed to observe the situation on the ground (NATO, 2011). On March 22, 2011 NATO states decided to implement the resolution 1973, firstly by the arms embargo and then establishing the no-fly zone. By March 31 NATO undertook the responsibility for the Operation Unified Protection, which had three main goals: implementation of the arms embargo, establishment of the no-fly zone, and the protection of civilians (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012).

US was involved in the process of resolving the crises from the very beginning. The Obama administration swiftly criticised Gaddafi's actions. International community perceived US in the role of the leader in Operation Odyssey Down. However US at that time was involved in two ongoing wars- in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, country's economy was in recession and the citizens were well aware of costs of peacekeeping operations.

Nevertheless, as Gaddafi stated his intention to "cleanse Libya house by house" from "rats" NATO and the US undertook decisive actions and destroyed Libya's air defense system in less than seventy two hours (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012). NATO's air campaign lasted from March 31 to October 31, 2011, supporting Libyan rebels in their struggle against Gaddafi government. In total the intervention was conducted by nineteen countries (Chivvis, 2014). In the frameworks of the Operation Unified Protection, US disposed over two hundred twenty Tomahawk missiles for supporting the rebels to overtake Tripoli. Eventually, by October 31, 2011 the Libyan National Transitional Council seized the control of Libya's government and Muammar al-Gaddafi was killed (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012). The Operation Unified Protection was finalized on October 21, at a cost of 1.1 billion dollars for the US (The White House, 2011).

Concluding this chapter, it should be emphasized that each of the above-discussed crises was internationally perceived as a potential case for humanitarian intervention. However the U.S. intervened in two of the cases (Haiti and Libya), while refrained from decisive actions in the third one (Darfur). Thus, this thesis has an aim to determine the key factors influencing the U.S. decision to intervene or not to intervene. For this purposes the following chapters will analyse the selected factor-variables in the contexts of above discussed case studies.

4. Complex Humanitarian Emergency

The first independent variable discussed is complex humanitarian emergency. Complex humanitarian emergencies represent a specific type of the general concept of disaster. As defined by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) a disaster is a "sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community's or society's ability to cope using its own resources. Though often caused by nature, disasters can have human origins" (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, n.d.).

(VULNERABILITY+ HAZARD) / **CAPACITY** = DISASTER

In other words, a disaster is the agglutination of hazards, vulnerability and insufficient capacity to combat the potential risks. Similarly, Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) defines a disaster as a "threatening event, or probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon within a given time period and area" (The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, n.d.).

Disasters could be provisionally categorized, depending on their causes: natural disasters, technological or man-made disasters. Natural disasters are phenomena which take place naturally as a result of geophysical, hydrological, climatological or biological events such as earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanic activity, avalanches and floods, extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires, cyclones and storms/wave surges, disease epidemics and insect/animal plagues. Technological or man-made disasters occur near human settlements and are caused by people. Examples of man-made disasters include complex emergencies/conflicts, famine, displaced

populations, industrial accidents and transport accidents. (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, n.d.)

For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies will be used. This concept embraces the most horrendous conflicts for civilians. These emergencies are of primary concern for UN, other international organizations and government agencies. As a rule, these conflicts are comprised of multiple threats. Moreover, disruption caused by direct violence, different diseases, compulsory population movements and economic decline further deteriorate the situation. The concept of complex emergencies captures as direct as well as indirect, unintentional consequences of violence. Such emergencies are generated by enduring political violence. Civilians may or may not be the premeditated target. However, largescale civilian sufferings are inevitable due to direct violence, starvation, diseases or exposure. Moreover, complex humanitarian emergencies are characterized by government's unwillingness or inability to prevent this suffering. As a result, suffering is more severe than it would be otherwise. Thus, complex humanitarian emergencies stand for the worst cases of political atrocities. Drawing on the abovementioned characteristic features, a complex humanitarian emergency could be defined as "an episode of political violence that severely and extensively disrupts civilian life, and in which the government responsible for public welfare is unable or unwilling to effectively shield the population (or facilitate outside efforts to do so)" (Everett, 2015).

This concept will be operationalized by combination of quantitative thresholds of civilian deaths and displacement. The remainder of this section will cover the core operational criteria.

Two main quantitative indicators are taken to identify the disruption in civilian life: the number of civilian deaths and the scale of population displacement. The number of civilian death is the most straightforward indicator of the suffering caused by conflicts. To substantiate further the

quantitative base, the second indicator is involved. The scale of population displacement is yet another reliable indicator for determining the number of people subject to conflict- associated hazards. Compulsory displacements usually have dreadful consequences. According to Frederick Burkle "in most complex emergencies it is displacement-related issues such as "the migration of populations, separation from food supplies, and destruction of the public health infrastructure – that eventually [cause] the greatest mortality and morbidity, because fleeing populations "suffer almost immediate food, shelter, fuel, water, sanitation, and basic healthcare insecurities" (Burkle, 2006). Burkle adds that the large number of displaced people can deteriorate the spread of disease and cause hindrances for delivering emergency relief. Compulsorily displaced civilians may include both refugees and asylum seekers, who have crossed borders, as well as internally displaced persons (IDP). (The United Nations, 1951)

For the application of the selected indicators separate thresholds are determined for each. Particularly, a disaster should have either 20.000 killed or 500.000 displaced civilians in order to be classified as a complex humanitarian emergency. These thresholds include some level of arbitrariness, which however guarantees the balance of clarity and inclusiveness. If to follow the threshold defined by Valentino (50,000 intentional deaths within five or fewer years), some serious but small conflicts would be excluded (such as the case of political violence in Haiti in 1994 and the Nepalese civil war). Thus, to eliminate this drawback a lower bar for civilian suffering is selected: 20,000 killed in the same 5-year period.

As regarding to the threshold for the scale of population displaced a margin of 500.000 is used drawing on guidelines used by international organizations and relief agencies for identifying humanitarian emergencies.

4.1. Complex Humanitarian Emergency: Haiti

After Aristide was forced to flee the country, widespread violence resumed in the country. Since gaining its independence in 1804, Haiti witnessed a series of violent repressions. During the Duvaliers' era the victims of repressions were the "intellectuals, bourgeois, mulatto groups and black petty bourgeoisie" (Marott & Razafimbahiny, 1999). The representatives of these groups were forced to flee the country or were killed.

During the rule of the de facto government between 1991 and 1994 the repressions resumed, but this time their targets were different from the ones during the Duvaliers' rule. Haitian armed forces and paramilitary groups linked to them, targeted the poor population of Haiti (Marott & Razafimbahiny, 1999). As a result of this widespread violence 4.000 people were killed and more than 300.000 internally displaced (National Truth and Justice Commission, 1996). The number of people fleeing the country was not less significant. According to some estimations it reached 150.000 people (Clinton, 1994). Murders, rape and arbitrary arrests became spread around the country. The situation in Haiti during the above-mentioned period was internationally recognized as disastrous (Marott & Razafimbahiny, 1999). Similar conclusions could be made on the bases of crude death rate data provided by the World Bank, which specifies that in 1990 the death rate was 13 (per 1000). For further information see Table 1.

4.1. Complex Humanitarian Emergency: Darfur

Already in March 2003 the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapil, pointed to similarities between the developments in Darfur and Rwanda. Similarly, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Human Affairs in Sudan, Tom Vraalsen, stated that the

situation in Darfur was the “one of the worst in the world” (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.). In 2004 US provided information to the UN Commission on Human Rights, describing the atrocities which were taking place in Darfur. In May Human Rights Watch reported that “there can be no doubt about the Sudanese government’s culpability in crimes against humanity in Darfur” (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.). On 9 July 2004 the US Congress addressed the situation in Darfur calling it “Genocide”. This term was also used later in September by the US state department and US Secretary of Defense. Meanwhile, the European Parliament referred to the actions of the GoS as “tantamount to genocide” (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.).

While the West repeatedly referred to the atrocities that were taking place in Darfur as Genocide, the African Union and the League of Arab States refrained from doing so. The African Union announced that “there is mass suffering, but it is not genocide” (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.). Similarly, the League of Arab States stated that it doesn’t see “any proof of allegations that ethnic cleansing or the eradication of communities had been perpetrated” (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.).

On 18 September the UN adopted Resolution 1564, requiring from Sudan to protect its civilians as obliged by the Resolution 1556 of July 2004. In the case of not fulfilling the requirements Sudan UN threatened to imply sanctions and set an inquiry based on the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the Crime of the Genocide. Shortly afterwards, on 25 January 2005, The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur stated that while “no genocidal policy had been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control they did warn international offences such as the crimes

against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide" (International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect , n.d.).

The relevance of these statements could be easily confirmed by the empirical data. United to End Genocide reported that the Darfur crises claimed 300.000 lives. 2.7 million People were internally displaced and another 250.000 were forced to flee abroad. These numbers could be also found in the Data provided by the World Bank (Table 2).

Widespread atrocities targeted the members of the Fur, Zagaqa and Masalit tribes. From the very beginning the devastations were unprecedented. As a result of executions of civilians, rape, burning of towns and villages, forced displacements by spring 2004 30.000 people were killed, 1.4 million people became internally displaced and 100.000 fled the country.

4.2. Complex Humanitarian Emergency: Libya

Being the second largest country on the continent with the population of 6.154.623 (Hamdy, 2007) Libya in 2011 experienced a major armed uprising, resulting in both human and economic losses (Weyland, 2012).

Usually the exact number of deaths during the conflicts is somewhat vague and varies across sources. Thus this section relies heavily on estimations given by different sources, mainly on the epidemiological community-based study titled "Libyan armed conflict 2011: Mortality, injury, and population displacement" (Daw, et al., 2015) and the World Bank database (The World Bank, n.d.).

The abovementioned study found out that a total of 21.490 (0.5% of total population) persons were killed and 435.000 (10.33% of total population) displaced. The national mortality rate was

estimated to 5.1 per 1000, varying significantly from region to region (Daw, et al., 2015): In the Middle Coast Region (MCR) the mortality rate was 17.5 per 1000; in the Middle Mountain Region (MMR) - 7.1 per 1000; in Eastward Coastal Region (ECR); Southern Sahara region (SSR) – 2.6 per 1000; West Costal Region (WCR) and West Mountain Region (WMR) – 1.8 per 1000 (Figure 1). Given the year 2011 the World Bank estimated the death rate at 4.18 per 1000.

The average number of the displaced population was 8.3 per 1000 annually. The variations of mortality and displacement rates is presented in Figure 2.

Out of the 21.490 people killed 2675 (13.11%) were killed during the first four months (February-May 2011). From June until August 2011 the number increased to 5127 (25.13%), decreasing to 3152 (15.45%) by February 2012.

Population displacement reached 148.200 (34.07%) during the first four months, increasing to 171.349 (39.39%) by September. And between October 2011 and February 2012 115.451 (26.54%) people were displaced.

Concluding this chapter, it could be said that though definitely every life matters, the emergency in the discussed cases had different magnitude. In Haiti the number of deaths reached 4000 people and the number of displaced population mounted to 450.000. In Darfur the crises claimed 300.000 lives and caused 2.7 million people to flee their homes. In Libya the number of casualties mounted to 21.500 and the number of displaced population reached 435.000.

5. Power Disparity

The selection of the variable power disparity could be explained by the intention to assess the impact of power inconsistency between U.S. and the object-country on U.S. decision to get involved in the humanitarian intervention.

The measurement of national power is a vital issue. The concept of power is somewhat vague and elusive. Throughout the centuries scholars have been trying to elaborate a comprehensive index for measuring countries' power.

The concept of power in context of international relations is difficult to measure due to several reasons. First, potential and actual power are divided by a substantial gap (Chin-Lung, 2004). This difference is caused by qualitative intangible factors, which are hard to assess: will, skills, mastery etc. Second, "power as money" is a misapprehension as "power is relatively low in fungibility" (Baldwin, 1979). Third, the common perception which states that "more means better" is not always true in the discussed realm. For example, for developing countries big population could cause some difficulties rather than create opportunities. Similarly, "the paradox of unrealized power" underlines the phenomenon that weak powers could sometimes be in more favorable stance then strong ones (Baldwin, 1979).

Several approaches have been developed for this purpose. This section drew heavily from the work by Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey (Singer, et al., 1972). It follows the Composite Index of National Capability. CINC is a linear index of capabilities focused on national assets, for measuring hard powers. Being a part of the Correlates of War project (Anon., 2015), CINC comprises six indicators – military expenditure, military personnel, energy

consumption, iron, and steel production, urban population, and total population. This data set serves as an indicator for national capability.

In the frameworks of the Correlates of War project, the concept of "power" is perceived as "the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence – is a function of many factors, among them the nation's material capabilities. Power and material capabilities are not identical, but given their association it is essential that we try to define the latter in operational term so as to understand the former" (Anon., 2015).

The project selected three basic dimensions on which the index is based: demographic, industrial and military. These three dimensions give in-depth and comprehensive image of resources that a country could utilize in cases of armed conflicts.

The military personal data set represents data on the size of state armies. Here military personnel are defined as "troops under the command of the national government, intended for use against foreign adversaries, and held ready for combat as of January 1 of the referent year" (Anon., 2015).

The second indicator is military expenditures, which is the total military budget for a particular state in a given year.

Third component is the total population. Population is considered to be one of the decisive factors in defining country's relative strength. A country which has larger population can maintain larger army and can easier recover from losses in wartime.

The fourth factor which is included in CINC is the urban population. Its aim is to capture such essential but amorphous factors as education, social organization and social

services. Urbanization assumes higher life and educational standards as well as industrialization and concentration of population.

The fifth component is iron and steel production. Together with the sixth component, primary energy consumption, it represents the industrial dimension.

Conglomeration of the abovementioned components allows to create an index, which will be used in this study for defining relative military capabilities of states included in the selected case studies.

Each component of the index is a dimensionless percentage of the world's total:

Ratio= Country/World

CINC= TPR+UPR+ISPR+ECR+MER+MPR/6

Where:

TPR = total population of country ratio

UPR = urban population of country ratio

ISPR = iron and steel production of country ratio

ECR = primary energy consumption ratio

MER = military expenditure ratio

MPR = military personnel ratio (Singer, 1980)

5.1. Power Disparity: the U.S. and Haiti

This section addresses the power correlation between US and Haiti, by using the CINC of the given year for the involved countries (The Correlates of War Project, n.d.). As in the previously discussed case studies, six components of CINC will be presented: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, primary energy consumption.

As for the US, its population given the year of intervention to Haiti (1994) was approximately 260.600 thousands. Urban population constituted around 66.460 thousands. In 1994 the country produced 91.2444 thousands of tons of iron and steel. The country spent around 293.214.000 thousands of US dollars on military expenditures and had a military personal of 1.710 thousands. Finally, the primary energy consumption constituted 4.455.146 thousands of coal-tone equivalents. As a result U.S. CINC score for 1994 was 0.144825 (Table 3).

In 1994 Haiti had a population of 7.041 thousands, with urban population of 1.300 thousands. Countries military expenditures amounted to 24.600 thousands of US dollars and primary energy consumption was recorded at the level of 649.19 thousands of coal-ton equivalents. Given the year 1994 Haiti CINC score was estimated to be 0.000439 (Table 3). Figure 3 displaced the Composite Index of National Capability of US and Haiti on the global scale.

5.2. Power Disparity: the U.S. and Sudan

This section aims at investigating the power correlation between US and Sudan. For this purpose, as for the previous case study, CINC of the given year will be used, with its six components (The Correlates of War Project, n.d.).

In 2003 US total population was around 290.500.00 with 78.621.00 urban population. Iron and steel production totaled to 93.677.00 thousands of tons. During 2003 US spent around 405.000.000 US dollars on military expenditures and had a military personal of 1.427.00 thousands servants. Finally, the primary energy consumption was approximately 5.395.000 thousands of coal-ton equivalents. CINC for US in 2003 totaled to 0.142094 (Table 4).

As for Sudan, the total population was 33.334 thousands, out of which 7.436 thousands lived in cities. Military expenditures in Sudan totaled to 400.000 thousands of US dollars. In the given year Sudan's military personal consisted of 104 thousands servants. Primary energy consumption was estimated to be around 13.456 thousands of coal-ton equivalents. CINC for Sudan in 2003 totaled to 0.002441(Table 4). Power disparity between US and Sudan on the global scale could be also seen on Figure 4.

5.3. Power Disparity: the U.S. and Libya

The following section aims at assessing the power disparity between the US and Libya, by comparing the Composite Indexes of National Capability (CINC) in the given year (The Correlates of War Project, n.d.).

As it was discussed previously CINC score is composed of six components: iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, primary energy consumption, total population and urban population.

The COW dataset of CINC covers the period 1816-2007, thus the data for the latest available year (2007) would be taken. As shown on Table 5, in the given year US total population was

301.621, out of which 82.969 was urban population (population living in cities with population greater than 100.000). Production of iron and steel reached the level of 98.102 tons. On military expenditures US spent 552.568.000 of US Dollars, having a military personal of 1.506.00 servants. Finally, the primary energy consumption amounted to 5,548,023.00 of coal-ton equivalent. Correspondingly, CINC of US in 2007 was 0.142149.

As for Libya, in 2007 it had population of 6.169.00, with 4.993.00 of it living in cities. The country produced 1.250.00 tons of iron and steel, had 656.000.00 US Dollars of military expenditures and a military personal of 76.00 thousand. Correspondingly, CINC of Libya in 2007 was 0.001763. Figure 5 at its turn displaces the correlation of US and Libya CINCs on the global scale.

As this chapter shows, U.S. superiority in terms of power over the selected object countries (Haiti, Sudan, and Libya) is evident.

6. Public Opinion

The support of the American public is extensively held to be a vital prerequisite for launching military actions abroad. The American public has witnessed a range of terrifying events broadcasted live into their homes by CNN and Fox News: conflicts and humanitarian tragedies in Somalia. Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. In each case of humanitarian emergency U.S. considered some form of military intervention, be it unilateral, multilateral with NATO members, or multilateral with UN members.

Several scholars have underlined the fact that public support or lack of it can be an essential factor in countries' eagerness to intervene or to abstain (Weinberger, 1992) (Russett, 1990). Domestic public support may influence political elites' willingness to get the country involved in such conflicts. Many researchers have emphasized that "a mounting body of evidence suggests that the foreign policies of American presidents – and democratic leaders more generally – have been influenced by their understanding of the public's foreign policy views" (Aldrich, 2006). Therefore, public's approval may encourage the leaders to launch military actions in turbulent regions, while disapproval may lead to "collective reluctance" (Van Der Meulen & Soeters, 2005).

Scholarly works on American public opinion related to U.S. participation in wars and military operations unveiled numerous factors, which explain the correlation between public opinion and the occurrence of military intervention. Firstly, there is a perception of latent public opinion (Zaller, 1994). Then the type of the government is perceived as one of the vital factors, assuming that public opinion has more influence in democracies than dictatorships. Risse-Kappen, from his side, underlined the role of institutions (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Other studies concentrated on the influence of the electoral cycle (Lawrence & Shapiro, 2000) (Canes-Wrone, 2006). "The President's ideology guides his choices during the first two years of his mandate, while the following two years are more dedicated to his re-election campaign (Canes-Wrone, 2006). During a second term, the President focuses more on his legacy and less on the popularity of his short-term decisions (Bennett & Stam III, 1998)."

This study has no intention to further investigate the formation of public opinion. It aims to determine to what extent public opinion influences selected dependent variables compared to other independent variables.

6.1. Public Opinion: Haiti

The Gallup Poll conducted on September 23-25, 1994 found that 51 percent of the population disapproved Clinton's actions and while only 44 percent approved. However, the approval rate on this data turned to be five percent higher than earlier in September, when only 39% approved his intentions.

Just before announcing about the reached agreement by former president Jimmy Carter, on 16-18 September, the result of polls showed that public's approval level was at 42 percent. On September 19, after the American troops landed in Haiti, the approval reached 48 percent. The support level however fall to 44 percent soon afterwards (George Gallup, 1994). The initial low level of public's willingness to see US troops intervening in Haiti was also affected by the fact that UN authorized the intervention, eventually reaching the highest level of 54 percent. The other factor that could be considered as a catalyst for increasing the public support was the "relentless television coverage of the Haitian boat people, the stories of atrocities, and the media's demonization of the Haitian military junta" (Carey, 2001).

The average approval level of sending US troops to Haiti was 47 percent before 19 September, when the troops first landed in Haiti, and 46 percent after (Larson & Savych, 2005). The average of the approval of president's policy regarding Haiti was 34 percent before September 19 and 48 percent after. Figure 6 shows the polarization of the structure of support.

The perception of possible outcomes by the public also deserves attention. The Gallup Polls showed that 61 percent of Americans expected US credibility to increase as a result of Haiti intervention. Along with this expectation, it was believed that the flow of refugees would decrease (54 percent). 52 percent expected military leaders to step down by mid-October.

However, only 44 percent considered the likelihood of restoring democracy to be real. Only 37 percent believed that human right violations would stop in Haiti (George Gallup, 1994).

The other important finding was that only 43 percent of Americans considered US involvement in Haiti to be a significant policy accomplishment. Correspondingly 53 percent did not think so (George Gallup, 1994).

6.2. Public Opinion: Darfur

This section is based on the polls taken between 2004 and 2008, including the period after the US official recognition of the atrocities in Darfur as Genocide. The polls were intended to find out American's attitude towards the situation in Darfur and to estimate the willingness of Americans to approve troops' deployment in light of the presence of international coalition of soldiers in Darfur.

The polls conducted by the International Crisis Group reviled the breadth of American support. Around 84 percent of respondents stated that "the US should not tolerate an extremist government committing such attacks, and should use its military assets, short of inserting US combat troops on the ground to protect civilians, to help bring them to a halt" (International Crisis Group , 2005). 81 percent of US citizens supported strict sanctions against the Sudanese leaders, 80 percent supported the establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur, and 91 percent stated that US "should cooperate with the International Criminal Court to help to bring to justice those accused of crimes against humanity" (International Crisis Group , 2005).

A similar attitude was discovered by The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)/Knowledge Networks Poll. It showed that the majority of respondents (60 percent in

2004, 54 percent in 2005, and 63 percent in 2007) were in favor of deploying American troops in Darfur (Table 6).

6.3. Public Opinion: Libya

Public opinion surveys varied during Operation Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protection. Immediately after the Obama's authorization of the US intervention in March 2011 a Gallup poll was conducted. It found out that more Americans approved than disapproved the military action against Libya undertaken by the US and other countries. 47 percent of population approved U.S. military actions against Libya, while 37 percent disapproved (Table 7).

However public opinion shifted three months later. The poll which was conducted on June 22, 2011 showed that Americans are more inclined to say they disapprove then approve the US intervention in Libya. This time 39 percent of U.S. population approved while 46 percent disapproved (Table 8).

This shift in public opinion preceded the voting in the House of Representatives on resolutions that would limit the US role in Libya.

The abovementioned poll tried to define the reason of opposition to the operation, asking the respondents who stated their disapproval "whether they disagree with the substance of the policy or with how it was executed" (Jones, 2011). The responses showed that 64 percent of disapprovals was because the policy itself. This part of the respondents stated that they do not think the US should be in Libya at all. Only 29 percent of disapprovals was explained by the lack of approval from Congress (Table 9).

Reviewing public opinion regarding the US intervention in Libya it should be mentioned that Gallup found out that "the initial support for the US mission in Libya was low compared with other recent US military engagements" (Jones, 2011) (Table 10).

The findings of this chapter could be concluded by summarizing the U.S. public attitude towards prospects of U.S. intervention the selected crises. The intervention in Haiti was approved by 54 percent and disapproved by 45 percent of U.S. population. The Intervention in Darfur conflict was supported by 66 percent and disapproved by 19 percent. The involvement in halting the turmoil in Libya was approved by 47 percent and disapproved by 37 percent of U.S. citizens.

7. Strategic Necessity

This variable stands for the examination of the strategic context behind each case study. It is implemented to find out if national security of the US or its allies would be enhanced by the assumed military intervention or not. The relevance of this variable is explained by the fact that foreign policy decision making includes assessments of risks and benefits from the prospective of country's interests.

Speaking about foreign agenda formation one should take into consideration that though every individual leader may have his own priorities, there are core concepts which could not be repudiated and remain relatively constant (Reveron, et al., 2014). These core elements include "a commitment to the health and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of other bilateral alliances; denuclearizing states that are seen as threats to the United States or the current global order (such as North Korea, and the Islamic Republic of Iran); supporting longtime ally Israel; reducing the impact of a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and other emerging powers; muting the challenges posed by nonstate actors to preserve existing international arrangements

(especially American preeminence); and sustaining a global economic system that permits the ready flow of energy, resources, and foods to the United States while enhancing the ability of other countries to purchase American goods and serviced" (Reveron, et al., 2014). These as well as many other national interests are stated in several official documents including the Defense Strategic Guidance and National Security Strategy (Department of Defense , 2012) (The White House , 2015).

These core interests are reflected in specific policies, conditioned by ad hoc factors. For example, during the World War II the Fourth Fleet was created to safeguard the energy flow, protecting oil tankers traversing the Caribbean. As another example of such policies, Jimmy Carter's and Ronald Reagan's policies regarding Persian Gulf during 1970s and 1980s could be mentioned. They assigned a vital importance to the region by the Carter Doctrine and the Reagan Corollary. The latter obliged the Unites States to protect stability of Persian Gulf states against external and internal threats. Furthermore, in 1983 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was created.

In the next decade the U.S. government actively backed the ideas of alternative routes which would connect Central Asia with Europe without passing through Russia or Iran.

Humanitarian engagement is usually characterized by the concept of forward engagement. Forward engagement assumes utilization of "global network of alliances and partnerships as well as U.S. instruments of power to secure American interests in critical regions" (Reveron, et al., 2014).

Given U.S. reliance on foreign trade and investment, autarkic isolationism has never been a realistic choice for the country. The overseas economic presence accrues significant benefits; it

has been estimated that "US economic integration with the rest of the world leads to a 12 percent increase in U.S. per capita income" (Reveron, et al., 2014).

Therefore, during the last sixty years, the strategy of forward engagement and the economic imperatives turned to have numerous coinciding points. The argument that prosperity at home could be achieved by securing constant access to markets and resources abroad won. This approach became particularly evident by the 1990s. By that time a truly global system of trade emerged, with the so called "just-in-time" supply network and the transition of many production stages abroad. U.S. global engagement became tidily connected to the oil flow from West Africa and the Persian Gulf, high-tech components coming from East Asia and Europe, and various low-cost products shipped from China and other low-wage countries (Reveron, et al., 2014).

7.1. Strategic Necessity: Haiti

"Haiti is a US policy priority. When this close neighbor is more prosperous, secure, and firmly rooted in democracy, Haitians and Americans benefit" (U.S. Department of State, 2015)- stated the US Department of State.

In September 1994, four days before the intervention, US president Clinton in his speech announced to the public his intention to intervene in Haiti. He stated that major human sufferings which started three years ago must be brought to an end. "Haitian dreams of democracy became a nightmare of bloodshed… May God bless the people of the United States and the cause of freedom" (Clinton, 1994) said Clinton in his address. Devotion to Haitian democracy was publicly stated not only by Clinton but other governmental officials as well (Lake, 1994).

Assuring presidential credibility was another imperative at that time. To win over the accusation of being incompetent Commander-in Chief (House, 1994) (Balx & Morin, 1994), Clinton's advisers suggested intervention in Haiti. It was expected that intervention in Haiti would create a strong image for the president (Greenhouse, 1994).

From the other side, there was the issue of refugees fleeing Haiti and heading to US. Political repressions as well as imposed sanctions substantially accelerated migration. By some estimations the number of fleeing Haitians mounted to 150.000 (Clinton, 1994). This situation created a dilemma for the president: either to accept Haitians and risk to lose 1996 presidential elections[2], or to send them back to Haiti, risking to be accused of "racist bias against black Haitians" (Girard, 2004) Voicing opinions of many black liberals in the US, Aristide referred to the US refugee policy as "a cynical joke, It's a racist policy. It's really a way to say we don't care… It's true it's a genocide, it's true it's a holocaust. It's true it's a cynical joke" (Grenhouse, 1994).

Along with the abovementioned circumstances, US-Haiti economic relations should be taken into account. Given the year prior to intervention (1993) US trade in goods with Haiti constituted 228.6 million US dollars of exports and 154.1 million of US dollars of imports, giving in total 382.7 million US Dollars, with a trade surplus of 74.5 million of US dollars (Table 11) (United States Census Bureau, n.d.).

[2] Clinton believed his defeat in the 1980 Arkansas gubernatorial election was because of his decision to accept Cuban refugees (Maranis, 1995).

7.2. Strategic Necessity: Darfur

"Sudan is not a main strategic interest for the United States" (Zissis, 2006) stated Roberta Cohen, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow. In September 2004, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that "Genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility" (Zissis, 2006).

US has been active in insisting for more largescale UN involvement in Sudan and participated in peace negotiations. In 1997 US imposed economic, trade and financial sanctions against Sudan. The reason for these measures were the alleged Sudanese support of international terrorism, its attempts to destabilize neighbors, and extensive human rights violations. In 2007 US imposed a new wave of economic sanctions on Sudan, because of the mass atrocities in Darfur. Those sanctions froze assets of Sudan's citizens who were involved in Darfur killings. They also affected government owned or controlled companies. However the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) issued numerous licenses, authorizing the exportation of some goods to Sudan: "food, agricultural equipment, medicine and medical devices, and personal telecommunication software and hardware, and also permit for specific academic and professional exchanges" (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

Despite all the sanctions, the U.S. and Sudan had some bilateral trade relations. Being a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Sudan is also involved in the frameworks of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States, signed in 2001 (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

Given the year prior to the outburst of the violence in Darfur, 2003, US trade in goods with Sudan amounted to 26.2 million of US dollars in exports and 2.8 million of US dollars in imports

(United States Census Bureau, n.d.) (See Table 12). Totaling to 29 million of US dollars trade exchange between the two and 23.4 million of US dollars of trade surplus.

According to the latest available data Sudan is US 167th largest goods trading partner. In 2013 goods exports totaled 88 million US dollars and imports – 10 million US dollars, in total 98 million US dollars, having the trade surplus of 78 million dollars (Office of the United States Trade Representative , n.d.).

7.3. Strategic Necessity: Libya

After the end of the World War II and the formation of the United Nations, the Great Powers have been involved in competition for establishing and maintaining control over important areas in the Middle East and Northern Africa. This aspiration to possess the crucial and vast natural resources led to numerous wars, formation of alliances and caused innumerable live losses.

Rife geopolitical treasures of Libya caused contention among main international powers throughout the entire history. Libya occupies a comparably large part of the costal border with the Mediterranean Sea, providing an expedient location for ports (Villard, 1956) (Majid, 1963). Low costs of shipping and transportation, plus limited geopolitical risks make Libyan oil fields even more feasible for southern Europe. The possibility of laying the pipeline network within countries borders significantly reduces the likelihood of sabotage by foreign powers (Vandewalle, 2012). "Libya's location also proved to be an important asset. Situated close to the European market, Libyan oil commanded an important advantage over Middle East oil: lower transportation costs, particularly to the southern European ports. Similarly, Libya would not have

to ship its oil through the Suez Canal, a lesson that was learned when the canal was closed after the 1967 Middle East War'' (Vandewalle, 2012).

Libyan oil fields were mostly unexplored at the moment the country gained its official independence in 1951. However the allure of Libyan oil didn't remain unnoticed. By 1959 the United States had invested more than $100 million on Libya, "making the country the single biggest per capita recipient of US largesse in the world" (Vandewalle, 2012). "The independence of Libya in 1951 and its subsequent economic development also politically pulled the country inexorably into the western camp. The country created at the behest of the western powers. In particular, warm relations between the United States and Libya served the interests of both parties, and US companies would assume a leading role in developing the country's oil industry" (Vandewalle, 2012). During the tense years of the Cold War the contention between the West and the Soviet Union did not skip Libya. US along with France and Great Britain directed their efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring any influence in the Mediterranean and Northern Africa (Vandewalle, 2012).

Energy security is a primordial and global commercial primacy. Along the expansion of industrialization, energy has become the core element. Its movement interconnects the commercial and economic interests of a substantial majority of states (Ganova, 2007). Being the most important source of producing energy, oil assigns strategic importance to the Middle East. This region possesses almost two-third of oil resources (BP, 2006). Thus the civil wars which threaten the usage of those resources are a primary concern for a majority of states. At the end of 2005 the Middle East possessed 61.9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. 9.5 percent was in Africa. Libya controls the greatest share of these reserves and approximately

3.334 percent of global reserves (BP, 2006). Furthermore, the extraction of Libyan oil is comparatively easy and needs little refining (Clifford, 2011).

Therefore, in the discussed case, securing the global supply of uninterrupted, affordable energy was a direct or indirect interest of a substantial number of states. Particularly for those who have relatively high levels of energy consumption (US Energy Info, 2015). "According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) the vast majority (around 85 percent) of Libyan oil exports are sold to European countries namely Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. The significance of Libyan oil for European countries could be seen by looking at the numbers of oil import to EU from different countries. In 2010 Libya was third largest oil provider to EU. The oil imports drastically decreased in 2011 and increased back in 2012. For more detailed information on the oil import to EU see Table 13.

With the lifting of sanctions against Libya in 2004, the United States has increased its imports of Libyan oil. According to IEA January through November estimates, the Unites States imported an average of 71,000bbl/d from Libya in 2010 (of which 44.000bbl/d was crude). Up from 56,000bbl/d in 2005 but a decline from 2007 highs of 117,000bbl/d" (US Energy Info, 2015).

Libya's oil extraction, transportation and refining infrastructure is mainly located in the areas, which were controlled by rebels (the eastern half of the country) (Bias, 2011). Thus, the threat to global energy market was swiftly acknowledged by the related states (Kahya, 2011). As Ruchard Swann from Platts stated "the world's 12th- largest oil exporter with the largest reserves of oil in Africa – according to BP's Energy Statistics Bulletion for 2009 – Libya is the most important from an energy viewpoint… If there is a disruption, it could be particularly sensitive just because of the very short distance involved. If you have a long-term contract to buy Libyan crude, which comes to you regularly, it would be harder to replace quickly'' (Kahya, 2011).

The explained importance of Libyan oil lead to the recognition of the opposition in Benghazi. Historical parallels could be drawn to show the situation more clearly: in the nineteen century belligerent recognition was driven by the need to preserve maritime trade, while the recognition of opposition in Libya was determined by the need to secure Libya's participation in the global energy supply. Reasons for recognition varied from country to county but all turned to be related to Libya's natural resources. Though exact details of France's recognition are blurred, there is a possibility that it granted some access to French energy firms (Borger & Macalister, 2011). Qatar's recognition expedited the exploitation of oil resources by Libyan opposition (Krauss, 2011). Recognition by Italy was directed to securing the oil supply from Libya to Italy, which is the main corridor through which Libyan oil goes to Europe (UPI, 2011).

From the other side, recognition made it possible to circumvent the UN sanctions (Donahue & Nightingale, 2011). As Michael Mann, spokesman for European Union foreign policy Chief Catherine Ashton, stated "The European Union's embargo on Libyan oil and gas exports only targets the Gaddafi regime. Mann told the reporters that the 27-nation bloc had no issue with commercial dealings in Libyan gas and oil as long as the revenue did not reach Gaddafi and his supporters. The United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya which the EU adopted and expanded." (Donahue & Nightingale, 2011)

It could be concluded that the recognition of the opposition was in line as with the individual interests of the states that did so (France, Qatar, Italy, UK, US), as well as with the collective interests connected with uninterrupted movement of Libyan oil. From their side, rebels exposed their controlled areas for foreign commercial use, as a mean for fostering recognition (Armstrong, 1993).

As for the US, Gaddafi's regime was not a direct strategic threat. As it was shown, the US allies', the European access to Libya's oil was at cost. Moreover, the "Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities" released by Obama Administration announced that preventing genocide and mass cruelties was a "core national security interest" as well as moral imperative (The White House, 2011). Allowing the abovementioned acts to happen could erode regional stability and undermine US reputation.

The additional factor to be review is the level of U.S. trade in goods with Libya. In 2010, the year prior to intervention, the exports from U.S. to Libya amounted 665.6 millions of U.S. dollars and the imports reached 2.117 million U.S. dollars, in total resulting in trade of goods worth 2782.3 million U.S. dollars (Table 14)

8. Conclusion

This thesis had a goal to understand whether U.S. conducted humanitarian interventions out of realist or idealist motives. Realists argue that a state does not have any trigger to intervene unless national interests are at stake. In such a context interventions will never occur for purely humanitarian reasons. On the contrary, idealist approach claims that humanitarian interventions should be led exclusively by altruistic motivations.

To address the outlined dilemma this thesis developed a model of variables and applied it in three case studies. The used model comprises of four independent variables (complex humanitarian intervention, power disparity, public opinion and strategic necessity) and two dependent variables (intervention and nonintervention). This model was used to determine the interconnection of the dependent and independent variables, to find out which independent

variables were superior in U.S. decisions to intervene. The selected case studies were the crises in Haiti, Darfur and Libya, which were analyzed from four main aspects.

Firstly, the complexity of humanitarian emergency in each of the cases was analyzed. Two indicators were selected for this purpose, number of deaths and number of displaced population. Though doubtlessly every life matters, the emergency in the discussed cases had different magnitude. In Haiti the number of deaths reached 4000 people and the number of displaced population mounted to 450.000. In Darfur the crises claimed 300.000 lives and caused 2.7 million people to flee their homes. In Libya the number of casualties mounted to 21.500 and the number of displaced population reached 435.000.

In the next stage, the power disparity between the U.S. three other related countries, Haiti, Darfur and Libya, was studied. This independent variable was selected to determine whether the U.S. decision to intervene depends on power superiority of U.S. Not surprisingly, in the selected cases U.S. had exclusive power superiority over the object-countries. In the first case U.S. CINC score was 0.144825, Haiti CINC score was 0.000439. In the second case, CINC for U.S. was 0.142094 while, CINIC for Sudan was 0.002441. In the third case, U.S. CINC score was 0.142149, Libya's score was 0.001763.

Thirdly, the thesis reviewed U.S. public opinion regarding the perspective of U.S. intervention in the selected crises. The implication of this variable had an objective to confirm or discard the opinion that public support or lack of it can be an essential factor in countries' eagerness to intervene or to abstain. The review of the public opinion in the selected case studies showed that public attitude varied from poll to poll, conducted in different periods; however, the average level of public approval and disapproval could be detected. As it was discussed, the intervention in Haiti was in average supported by 47 percent of U.S. citizens, the intervention in Darfur was

supported in average by 59 percent (60 percent in 2004, 54 percent in 2005, and 63 percent in 2007). Finally the intervention in Libya was supported in average by 47 percent of Americans.

Finally, the strategic necessity of the each selected potential intervention was analyzed. Doubtlessly, none of the selected crises was a direct threat to the U.S. security, however in two of the cases some U.S. interests were affected while they were not in the other one. The U.S. concernment in the Haitian case is clearly evident from the statement made by the U.S. Department of State, where Haiti was mentioned as a policy priority. It is mentioned in this statement that both Haiti and U.S. benefit if the Haiti is flourishing, is secure and deeply rooted in democracy. Additionally there were other factors that fostered the U.S. intervention. Particularly, it was thought that the intervention would assure presidential credibility for at that time President Clinton and would solve the refugee issue.

Libyan case touched American interests to the extent that the oil supply to U.S. European allies was endangered. Given the year 2010 Libya was the third largest oil supplier to EU. Besides the substantial volume of imports, the significance of Libyan oil for European countries is accelerated by comparably low transportation costs. Furthermore, the extraction of Libyan oil is relatively easy and needs little refining.

As for Darfur, the crises didn't affect any significant interests of the U.S. or its allies.

The extent of the U.S. concernment in the discussed cased could also be inferred from the volume if U.S. trade in goods with the affected countries. Given the year prior to intervention (1993) US trade in goods with Haiti constituted 228.6 million US dollars of exports and 154.1 million of US dollars of imports. The exports from U.S. to Libya amounted 665.6 millions of U.S. dollars and the imports reached 2.117 million U.S. dollars. As for Sudan, US trade in goods

with Sudan amounted to 26.2 million of U.S. dollars in exports and 2.8 million of U.S. dollars in imports. For more detailed information see Table 10, Table 11, Table 12.

Where did the U.S. intervened and where did not? In comparison with Haiti, Sudan and Libya, power disparity was evidently in favor of U.S. Which means that in the selected case studies the significance of this variable cannot be tested, however it should not be neglected in the further research. Next comes the variable of Complex Humanitarian Emergency. The U.S. intervened in Haiti and Libya where the extent of humanitarian emergency was comparably less severe than in Darfur, where the U.S. did not intervene. U.S. intervened in Haiti and Libya where the level of public approval of intervention was comparably low than the level for the approval of Darfur intervention. Finally, U.S. intervened in Haiti and Libya where some of its interests were concerned, while it did not intervene in Darfur where none of its interests was affected.

Based on this, a comparative level of importance could be assigned to the selected variables, putting on the first place strategic necessity, followed by complex humanitarian emergency, public opinion and power disparity.

Though the influence of the selected variables on U.S. decision to intervene differed, with some of them being more influential than others, it's not possible to explain the concept of humanitarian intervention only based on one of these variables. Interventions are not purely humanitarian but that does not mean that states never have some philanthropic motives. It means that humanitarian motives are not sufficient alone. Realist and idealist perceptions on their own do not fully cover the factors which foster intervention. It could be said that mixed motives affect countries decision to intervene or not. Those mixed motives include philanthropic (humanitarian), economic, and political motives. Thus it could be concluded that there is a middle ground for realism and idealism.

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Appendices

Table 1. Death rate, crude (per 1.000 people) in Haiti from 1990-1995

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Death rate	13.116	12.835	12.57	12.31	12.07	11.8

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CDRT.IN

Table 2. Death rate crude (per 1.000 people) Sudan

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Death rate	9.885	9.662	9.443	9.237	9.048	8.88	8.742	8.624	8.53	8.44	8.36

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CDRT.IN

Figure 1. Map of Libya Showing the Mortality and Injury (1000 person) per Year



The scale represents both killed (red) and injured (blue) for each province. Libya 2011.
Source: www.mapsopensource.com

Figure 2. Number of Deaths, Injured and IDPs during the Libyan Conflict over One Year Period (February 2011–February 2012)



Source: ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/figure/277339872_fig3_Number-of-deaths-injured-and-IDPs-during-the-Libyan-conflict-over-one-year-period

Table 3. National Material Capabilities of US and Haiti, 2004

Country	Total Population	Urban Population	Iron and Steel Production	Military Expenditures	Military Personnel	Primary Energy Consumption	CINC score
USA	260,602.00	66,457.00	91,244.00	293,214,000.00	1,710.00	4,455,146.00	0.144825
Haiti	7,041.00	1,300.00	0.00	24,600,000[3]	-	649.19	0.000439

Source http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities

[3] Haiti Military Expenditures data source Index Mundi http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/haiti/military-expenditure

Figure 3. Composite Index of National Capability of US and Haiti (derived by Correlates of War from the Correlates if War capabilities datasets)



Source: http://omniatlas.com/stats/correlates/cinc/

Table 4. National Material Capabilities of US and Sudan, 2004

Country	Total Population	Urban Population	Iron and Steel Production	Military Expenditures	Military Personnel	Primary Energy Consumption	CINC score
USA	290,448.00	78,621.00	93,677.00	404,920,000	1,427.00	5,394,710	0.142094
Sudan	33,334.00	7,436.00	0.00	400,000.00	104.00	13,455.54	0.002441

Source http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities

Figure 4. Composite Index of National Capability of US and Sudan (derived by Correlates of War from the Correlates if War capabilities datasets)



Source: http://omniatlas.com/stats/correlates/cinc/

Table 5. National Material Capabilities of US and Libya, 2007

Country	Total Population	Urban Population	Iron and Steel Production	Military Expenditures	Military Personnel	Primary Energy Consumption	CINC score
USA	301,621.00	82,969.00	98,102.00	552,568,000.00	1,506.00	5,548,023.00	0.1421487
Libya	6,169.00	4,993.00	1,250.00	656,000.00	76.00	62,905.81	0.0017627

Source http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities

Figure 5. Composite Index of National Capability of US and Libya (derived by Correlates of War from the Correlates if War capabilities datasets)



Source: http://omniatlas.com/stats/correlates/cinc/

Figure 6. Structure of Support for Haiti



RAND MG231-A-3.1

Source: American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad by Eric V. Larson, Bogdan Savych

Table 6. American Public Opinion on U.S. involvement in Darfur

If other members of the UN are willing to contribute troops to a military operation to stop the genocide in Darfur, do you think the US should or should not be willing to contribute some troops as well

	Should Step In	Should Not Step In	No Answer	Total
December 21-26, 2004	60%	33%	7%	100%

PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll: Opportunities for Bipartisan Consensus and the Crisis in Darfur

If other members of the UN are willing to contribute troops to a military operation in Darfur, do you think the US should or should not be willing to contribute some troops as well

	Should Step In	Should Not Step In	No Answer	Total
June 22-26, 2005	54%	39%	7%	100%

PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll: Americans on Addressing World Poverty, the Crisis in Darfur and US Trade

Do you favor or oppose the presence of U.S. ground troops, along with troops from other countries, in an international peacekeeping force in Darfur?

	Favor	Oppose	Don't know/Undecided	Total
October12-14, 2007	63%	31%	6%	100%

CNN/ORC Poll # 2007-010: Immigration/Iran/2008 Presidential Election

Source: PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll: Opportunities for Bipartisan Consensus and the Crisis in Darfur; PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll: Americans on Addressing World Poverty, the Crisis in Darfur and US Trade; CNN/ORC Poll # 2007-010: Immigration/Iran/2008 Presidential Election

Table 7. American Public Opinion on U.S. involvement in Libya

Next we have a question about the current military action by the United States and other countries against Libya. Do you approve or disapprove of the current U.S. military actions against Libya?

	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Mar 21, 20011	47%	37%	16%

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/Americans-Approve-Military-Action-Against-Libya.aspx

Table 8. American Public Opinion on U.S. involvement in Libya

Next we have a question about the current military action by the United States and other countries against Libya. Do you approve or disapprove of the current U.S. military actions against Libya?

	Approve	Disapprove
% Approve	47	39
% Disapprove	37	46
% No opinion	16	15

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/148196/Americans-Shift-Negative-View-Libya-Military-Action.aspx

Table 9. American Public Opinion on U.S. involvement in Libya

Do you disapprove mainly because – [ROTATED: you do not think the U.S. should be involved in military action in Libya at all (or because) you do not think President Obama obtained the necessary approval from Congress for the military action?

Based on those who disapprove of U.S. military action in Libya

	U.S. should not be involved in Libya	President did not obtain necessary approval	No opinion
Jun 22, 2011	64%	29%	7%

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/148196/Americans-Shift-Negative-View-Libya-Military-Action.aspx

Table 10. Approval of Prior U.S. Military Actions

Country/Region	Dates	% Approve	% Disapprove
Libya	Mar 21, 2011	47	37
Iraq	Mar 20, 2003	76	20
Afghanistan	Oct 7, 2001	90	5
Kosovo/The Balkans	Apr 30-May , 1999	51	45
Afghanistan and Sudan	Aug 20, 1998	66	19
Haiti	Sep 32-25, 1994	54	45
Somalia	Jun 18-21, 1993	65	23
Iraq	Jan 13, 1993	83	9
Libya	Apr 17-17, 1986	71	21
Grenada	Oct 26-27, 1983	53	34

Notes:

- Includes resent U.S. military engagements asked about, using approve/disapprove response format
- Question wordings vary
- Data are from initial Gallup poll conducted after the military operation began
- Gallup did not ask an approve/disapprove after the 1989 invasion of Panama or the 1991 Persian Gulf War

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/Americans-Approve-Military-Action-Against-Libya.aspx

Table 11. 1993 U.S. Trade in Goods with Haiti

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 1993	15.2	7.0	8.2
February 1993	17.4	11.1	6.3
March 1993	17.8	13.3	4.5
April 1993	25.2	13.7	11.5
May 1993	22.0	13.2	8.8
June 1993	21.2	17.4	3.8
July 1993	14.7	14.0	0.7
August 1993	19.3	14.2	5.1
September 1993	31.0	14.8	16.2
October 1993	24.2	10.8	13.4
November 1993	7.6	12.1	-4.5
December 1993	13.0	12.5	0.5
TOTAL 21993	228.6	154.1	74.5

Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding

Source https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7320.html

Table 12. 2003 U.S. Trade in Goods with Sudan

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 2003	4.2	0.0	4.2
February 2003	0.5	0.0	0.5
March 2003	0.8	0.1	0.8
April 2003	1.7	0.5	1.2
May 2003	1.9	0.4	1.4
June 2003	1.8	0.1	1.7
July 2003	1.3	0.6	0.7
August 2003	4.7	0.2	4.5
September 2003	1.0	0.6	0.4
October 2003	4.9	0.0	4.9
November 2003	0.2	0.3	-0.1
December 2003	3.2	0.0	3.1
TOTAL 2003	26.2	2.8	23.4

Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding

Source: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7320.html

Table 13. Crude Oil Imports to EU-28, 2003-2013

Crude Oil											
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Russia	31.2	32.5	32.9	33.8	33.7	31.8	33.5	34.7	34.8	33.7	33.5
Norway	19.1	18.7	16.8	15.4	14.9	15.0	15.1	13.7	12.5	11.2	11.7
Saudi Arabia	11.2	11.3	10.5	9.0	7.2	6.8	5.7	5.9	8.0	8.8	8.6
Nigeria	4.2	2.6	3.2	3.6	2.7	4.0	4.5	4.1	6.1	8.2	8.1
Kazakhstan	2.7	3.3	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.8	5.3	5.5	5.7	5.1	5.8
Libya	8.4	8.8	8.7	9.1	9.7	9.9	8.9	10.1	2.8	8.2	5.6
Azerbaijan	1.0	0.9	1.3	2.2	3.0	3.2	4.0	4.4	4.9	3.9	4.8
Algeria	3.0	3.3	3.5	2.5	1.9	2.5	1.6	1.2	2.6	2.9	3.9
Iraq	1.5	2.2	2.1	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.8	3.2	3.6	4.1	3.6
Others	17.7	16.4	16.5	16.8	18.9	18.7	17.6	17.1	19.1	14.0	14.4

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nrg_122a, nrg_123a and nrg_124a)

Table 14. 2010 U.S. Trade in Goods with Libya

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 2010	53.2	56.8	-3.5
February 2010	64.2	95.8	-31.6
March 2010	72.4	200.3	-127.9
April 2010	62.3	346.2	-283.9
May 2010	53.5	125.6	-72.0
June 2010	46.7	213.0	-166.3
July 2010	36.5	160.3	-123.8
August 2010	52.5	354.8	-302.0
September 2010	52.5	156.8	-104.3
October 2010	49.2	114.8	-65.6
November 2010	49.4	66.6	-17.2
December 2010	73.0	226.0	-153.0
TOTAL 2010	665.5	2116.8	-1451.3

Note: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding

Source https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7320.html