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UN Secretariat: Representative sample of the world population or dominance of specific groups?

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to apply the Representative Bureaucracy theory established and developed within the Public Administration scholarship addressing the lack of formal accountability of bureaucratic bodies on the case of the largest international bureaucracy in the world – the United Nations Secretariat. It builds on the normative presumption that it is necessary to staff the bureaucracy proportionally from all the societal groups so that it reflected the values of the society in whole and the policy outcomes corresponded to those produced if all the society participated in the process. Accordingly, we aspire to find out whether the UN Secretariat is a representative sample of the world population in terms of its bureaucrats' national affiliation, and, if not, what are the factors associated with a better relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat. Through the usage of descriptive statistics tools and Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression, we find out that the *per capita* representation of different Member States in the UN Secretariat is by no means equal and, thus, the UN Secretariat is not a representative sample of the world population. Moreover, the research identified internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people and low contributions to the UN budget as two of the factors associated with better passive *per capita* representation of a country in the UN Secretariat. As a result, we concluded that even if the UN strives to promote unity and equality, it does not equally represent all the people living on Earth and, thus, it should start to think about UN Secretariat staffing reform.

Keywords

Accountability, Equality, Equitable Geographical Distribution, International Bureaucracy, United Nations, Representation, Representative Bureaucracy, Representativeness, Secretariat

Abstrakt

Cílem této diplomové práce je aplikovat veřejnosprávní teorii Reprezentativní byrokracie, která nabízí řešení problému nedostatku kontroly a odpovědnosti byrokratických těles na národní a subnárodní úrovni, na případ největšího mezinárodně byrokratického orgánu světa – Sekretariátu Organizace Spojených Národů. Základem této teorie je předpoklad, že pokud se byrokratický orgán skládá ze zástupců různých společenských skupin ve stejném poměru jako tomu je v celé společnosti, a tím pádem reprezentuje průřez hodnot, které daná společnost jako celek vyznává, bude tento orgán produkovat opatření, která by přijala i celá společnost v případě, že by se mohla na jejich tvorbě podílet. Proto se v této práci snažíme zjistit, zdali je Sekretariát OSN reprezentativním vzorkem světové populace z pohledu jeho národnostního složení a jaké faktory případně ovlivňují míru zastoupení jednotlivých států. Pomocí nástrojů deskriptivní statistiky a mnohonásobné lineární regrese metodou nejmenších čtverců jsme zjistili, že *per capita* zastoupení jednotlivých států v Sekretariátu OSN není zdaleka jednotné, a Sekretariát OSN tudíž není reprezentativním vzorkem světové populace. Jako faktory spojené s vyšší mírou *per capita* zastoupení jednotlivých státu byla identifikována schopnost státu zajistit blahobyt a příležitosti svému obyvatelstvu a nízké příspěvky do rozpočtu OSN. Z výzkumu tudíž vyplynulo, že Sekretariát OSN, i přes snahu prosazovat rovnost a jednotu, nereprezentuje všechny obyvatele planety stejnou měrou, a tudíž by měl přistoupit k personální reformě.

Klíčová slova

Mezinárodní byrokracie, Organizace spojených národů, Odpovědnost, Reprezentace, Reprezentativní byrokracie, Reprezentativnost, Rovnost, Sekretariát, Spravedlivé zeměpisné rozdělení, Zastoupení

Range of the thesis: 114 723

Declaration of Authorship

The author hereby declares that she compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature, all the sources and literature used have been properly cited and the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague May 13, 2016 Kristýna Bartošová

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List of Abbreviations

ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DSG	Deputy Secretary-General
EGD	Equitable Geographical distribution
EU	European Union
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression
PA	Public Administration
RB	Representative Bureaucracy
RQ1	First Research Question
RQ2	Second Research Question
SG	Secretary-General
UIA	Union of International Associations
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSCEBC	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
US	United States (of America)
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WB	World Bank
WW2	World War 2

Introduction

Today, we are living in a globalized world where nation states are no longer the only actors present nor the most influencing ones. On the contrary, as many prominent scholars agree (e.g. Duffield, 2007; Keohane, 1998; Koremenos et al., 2001; Martin and Simmons, 2012; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006), the power of international institutions, international organizations (IOs) notwithstanding, is on the rise, and their influence over our everyday reality is gradually becoming more and more visible and in some cases even indispensable for maintaining the contemporary world order (Keohane and Nye, 2001).

The exponential rise of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in general can be illustrated not only through their global impact on states, regions and individuals, but also by their growing number (Duffield 2007, p. 1; Martin and Simmons 2012, p. 326). As Kegley and Blanton (2014, p. 146) argue, in 1909 there were 37 IGOs operating, in 1960 their number equated 154. As for 2014, there was a total number of 273 conventional intergovernmental bodies operating, 37 of them offering universal membership (i.e. operating globally), 36 IGOs serving its functions intercontinentally, and 199 regional IGOs (UIA, 2015b, p. 25).

Such a development of IOs has happened due to the fact that some of the crucial questions of contemporary global politics, e.g. non-proliferation, disarmament, global warming, health issues, poverty, etc., cannot be dealt with effectively on the national level anymore. As these issues are multiplying and growing in importance over the years, the nation states tend to act as principals transmitting their competences and delegating part of their authority to agents, i.e. the international organizations and their supranational bureaucratic organs, to coordinate tackling of these issues globally or at least internationally (Bauer and Weinlich, 2011, p. 254; Karlas, 2015, pp. 72-74; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p. 4; Reinalda, 2009, p. 8). Therefore, the power and influence of different IGOs, e.g. European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN), to name the most visible ones, can be felt and seen by almost every human being living on the planet.

Every type of international organization, be it rather intergovernmental or supranational, needs its own administrative body (a secretariat, a commission, or a bureau) to provide it with technical services and secure its day-to-day operation (Rittberger et al., 2012, p. 84). The most common tasks of such bodies consist primarily of agenda setting, negotiations mediation, and monitoring of implementation by states.

However, since the supranational institutional design of IGOs has been increasingly present in the international system recently, the power of bureaucracies has been on the rise and their functions and competences have widened, in some cases even incorporating substantial scope of decision- and policy-making capacities (Barkin, 2013, pp. 30-38; Karlas, 2015, p. 144; Rittberger et al., 2012, p. 84).

This notion of contemporary politics allegedly undermines the idea of democracy since a non-elected technocratic body separated from national democratic institutions can hugely influence and determine the policy outcomes against public interest (Dahl, 1999, pp. 33-34; Keohane et al., 2009, p. 2) by *"specifying and implementing the details of program regulations and controlling the flow of daily operations"* (Selden, 1997, p. 718). The lack of accountability in the case of IGOs might then lead to unauthorized or illegitimate exercise of power, unjust or unwise decisions (Grant and Keohane, 2005, p. 30), IGOs promoting special interests of certain actors, *"policies favouring some states over others, improper incursions into national sovereignty or abuse of delegated authorities by international secretariats or civil servants"* (Charnovitz, 2011, p. 334), and IGOs operating in a *"nontransparent and unaccountable fashion"* (Keohane et al., 2009, p. 23).

A Public Administration (PA) theory of Representative bureaucracy (RB) originally proposed in the 1940s by the work of Kingsley (1944) and greatly developed ever since by various scholars (e.g. Andrews et al., 2014; Clark et al., 2013; Grissom et al., 2009; Kennedy, 2014; Lim, 2006; Meier, 1975; Saltzstein, 1979; Selden 1997), tries to reconcile this tension on the national level by suggesting that *"bureaucracy will be responsive to the interests and desires of important social groups in society if its personnel are drawn proportionately from these social groups and share the same values and attitudes as the groups they represent"* (Saltzstein, 1979, p. 469) implying democratic commitment to equal access to power for all (Selden, 1997b, p. 6).

In this thesis, we aspire to transfer the findings of Representative Bureaucracy to the international arena and address the lack of formal accountability of bureaucracies on the case of the largest international bureaucracy in the world – the United Nations.

The UN Secretariat is a great example of a working international bureaucracy enjoying substantial competences in decision- and policy-making stemming from its *"creative capacity"* to introduce ideas and take initiative (Novosad and Werker, 2014, p. 10). Similar to other bureaucratic bodies, it lacks electoral accountability, since at least three steps separating the bureaucrats from the electorate can be identified: (1) voters elect their officials, (2) who co-appoint the administrators leading the IGO (3) staffed by civil servants purposely protected from political pressure (Mosher, 1982, p. 4-5; Selden, 1997b, p.4).

The aim of this thesis is thus to address the issue of UN Secretariat lack of formal accountability building upon the findings of the representative bureaucracy theory described above by answering following research questions:

> **RQ1: Is the UN Secretariat representative of the world population in terms of its bureaucrats' national affiliation?**
>
> **RQ2: If not, what are the factors associated with a better relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat?**

In RQ1, we understand representativeness as a quality of something reflecting accurately upon a sample (Yourdictionary.com, 2015). According to the representative bureaucracy theory, we presume that the UN Secretariat would produce broadly representative policies if it was composed of individuals of all world nationalities at the same ratio as represented in the world population. However, considering real world settings in which variety of factors influencing representation of countries in IGOs can be identified, **we assume that the level of representativeness will come out differentiated and not equal among countries (Hypothesis for RQ1),** similar to the case of 'Who Runs the International System' research conducted by Paul Novosad and Eric Werker in 2014 (Novosad and Werker, 2014), which showed the overrepresentation of small, rich democracies in the senior positions within the UN Secretariat.

As for the RQ2, three hypotheses are being considered in this thesis. Firstly, **there might be no factors influencing the relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat** (Hypothesis 0 for RQ2, null hypothesis), if the level of representativeness of different Member States comes out equal or close to equal. Secondly, **Novosad's and Werker's (2014) findings of *"democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic power"* might prove out to be the only major factors having effect on the nation representation in the UN Secretariat** (Hypothesis 1 for RQ2). Yet, we believe that those 'hard' and international politics factors such as economic power, wealth, diplomatic contacts, alliances etc., as identified by Novosad and Werker (2014), might not be the only ones having impact on the countries' representation in the UN Secretariat. On the other hand, **the internal**

capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people, such as easy access to nutrition, clean water, education, healthcare, infrastructure and absence of violence, might be associated with its higher representation in the UN Secretariat (Hypothesis 2 for RQ2).

We believe in the validity of Hypothesis 2 since we assume that people struggling to satisfy their basic needs presumably cannot or do not have any interest in seeking career positions within the UN Secretariat. Another line of this argumentation points to the fact that to be able to represent a country in the UN Secretariat a person needs to possess certain skills and qualifications (e.g. college degree) and have access to relevant information (e.g. internet connection available). Therefore, growing opportunities of people living in a country may lead to the increase of given country relative representation in the UN Secretariat.

However, we do not claim our list of possible factors to be all-encompassing. Even though we believe opportunities of people are one of the substantial factors in the UN Secretariat composition, we do not deny a possible effect of other conditions, such as the presence of corruption, nepotism, and social inequality on the UN Secretariat staffing. However, as the effect of these variables on the number of UN Secretariat staff of a given nationality is hard to measure, we decided not to include them into our analysis.

We operationalize the 'representation' of a country in the UN Secretariat as the number of 'Professional and higher'[1] UN Secretariat staff of given national affiliation divided by number of the country population multiplied by 10^6 for better interpretation (number of professional staff of given nationality per million of their countrymen, later on referred to as staff/population ratio, variable 'staffpopratio2'). The 'UN Secretariat representativeness' is then understood as a situation where the staff/population ratios of all the Member States are equal or close-to equal.

To be able to answer the RQ1, the staff/population ratios are to be calculated for all the Member States and compared between each other as well as with the ideal equal representation ratio calculated as a total number of 'Professional and higher' UN Secretariat staff divided by the total population of all the member states. This approach is in accordance with the Representative Bureaucracy theory, since it assesses

[1] One of the UN Secretariat staff categories, see chapter 2 for more details

the proportionality of different nationalities represented in the Secretariat and their access to power as required by Saltzstein (1979, p. 469) and Selden (1997b, p. 6).

As for the RQ2, the 'opportunities of people living in a country' are operationalized as a combination of their access to education, health, information infrastructure, and political stability. The educational opportunities are being measured by the enrollment in tertiary education (variable 'tertiary'), health as a combination of disease prevention reflected in measles immunization (variable 'immunization') and the appropriate access to water and nutrition reflected in the % of population with access to improved water source (variable 'watersource'), access to information infrastructure as a number of internet users per 100 people (variable 'internetusers'), and absence of violence (variable 'stability') as a World Bank (WB) 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' index. The 'hard politics' factors (Hypothesis 2) in the context of the United Nations organization will be summarized in the variable 'contribution' reflecting assessments (net financial contributions) in United States Dollars due towards the UN budget by given Member State. Data for all the hypotheses are coming from the UN and World Bank databases and will be elaborated on more in the Methodology chapter. All the data used in this thesis reflect the situation back in 2013, since the resources do not provide us with more recent data for some variables. Majority of the values reflected in the text will be rounded to two decimal places for better orientation.

To assess the validity of our hypotheses for RQ2 focusing on factors associated with better relative representation of a country in the UN Secretariat, the statistical effect of the abovementioned variables ('tertiary', 'watersource', 'immunization', 'internetusers', 'stability', and 'contributions' as a control variable) on the staff/population ratio will be evaluated one by one while holding other independent variables constant through the employment of the Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression method (OLS). With the help of multiple regression, we will be able to decide whether there is a statistically significant relationship between individual independent and dependent variables and thus, whether our hypotheses do or do not correspond to reality.

Presented later in the thesis, our research shows that the UN Secretariat is not representative of the world population in the matter of its bureaucrats national affiliation (in the normative, representative bureaucracy sense of equality of people), and the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people is one of the factors associated with better passive representation of a country in the UN Secretariat, as we presupposed in our hypotheses. Larger economic power measured in terms of the contributions to the UN budget, on the other hand, seems to be associated a significant decrease in the staff/population ratio, contrary to what Novosad and Werker (2014) suggested in their work. For the rest of the results, see the chapter on analysis and discussion.

The text of the thesis is divided into four chapters. The first one explores various theoretical conceptions of international organizations, their components, national and international bureaucracies, and their development in time through the lenses of both Public Administration and International Relations (IR) scholarship. It presents the potential of the Public Administration Representative Bureaucracy theory in the current international system and sets the way for our research questions and their explanation. The Second chapter deals with the operation of the UN Secretariat and its current staffing policy. It tries to uncover the different staff categories existing in the UN Secretariat system, present the existing 'Equitable Geographical Distribution' (EGD) system, and evaluate its functionality. Methodology of our research is being explained in detail in the third chapter focusing on data we use and their source as well as on methods being used to meet the aim set in the introduction. The fourth chapter is earmarked for analysis and discussion. Here, the research problems are being analyzed and the research questions answered. In the Conclusion part, the fulfillment of the research aims is assessed and possible directions for further research sketched out.

1. Theoretical background

International organizations as a specific branch of international institutions, their existence, functioning and impact have served as one of the main topics of both international relations scholarship and policymaking efforts since 1990s and still continue to grow in importance (Duffield, 2007, p. 1; Martin and Simmons, 2012, p. 326; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p. 3). Historically, however, the meaning and effect of IGOs has been much disputed and the term 'international organization' emerged in the literature quite recently (Reinalda, 2009, p. 5; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p. 3) in spite of *de facto* existence of international organizations in today's sense in the form of public unions, international commissions and bureaus, such as Central Rhine Commission created in 1804, Universal Postal union formed in 1863, Pan-American Union (1889) and International Labor Office (1900), just to name a few (Potter, 1922, pp. 270-271)[2]. Even though Paul Reinsch (1911, p. 4) stated in 1911 that *"the realm of international organization is an accomplished fact"* and Article 23 of the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations (League of Nations, 1919) mentioned the commitment of the Members to *"establish and maintain the necessary international organizations"* for the purpose of securing and maintaining *"fair and humane conditions of labor"*, the term and concept of international organizations became widely accepted by the IOs themselves only after WW2 by establishment of *"an international organization to be known as the United Nations*" in the Preamble of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p. 4).

During the rest of the 20th century, the scholarly interest in IGOs has been changing both in intensity and variety of viewpoints presented by different schools of thought (Mathiason, 2007, p. 2; Reinalda, 2009, p. 5). Classical realism dominant in 1940s and 50s tended to see international organizations as mere forums or arenas without any effect of their own where nation-states meet and discuss their preferences and interests. Between 1950s and 1970s, research focusing on internal features of IGOs was barely existing due to the IGOs inefficiency during the Cold War, with only few exceptions such as functionalist works of Haas (2009) and Cox and Jacobson (1974). In 1970s, the new concept of transnationalism enriched the IR literature by inclusion of non-state actors into the international arena primarily through the neoliberal institutionalist work of Keohane and Nye (1972). However, formal international

[2] For complete list of international administrative bodies in operation see Potter (1922, p. 270-271)

organizations were still not the main object of inquiry and the broader notion of international regimes prevailed. In 1979, a neorealist book 'Theory of International Politics' by Kenneth Waltz finally opened the black box and focused on international bureaucracies however still in the sense of instruments serving the purpose of running the organization in technical sense having no substantial competences over the subject matters (Waltz, 1979, p. 111). Academic turnover came in the 1990s when international organizations came back to power and the research flourished in consequence of the end of the Cold War and subsequent globalization (Mathiason, 2007, p. 2; Martin and Simmons, 2012, pp. 329-336; Reinalda, 2009, pp. 5-8; Rodogno et al., 2013, p. 95). As Mathiason (2007, p. 2) argues, since the end of the Cold War most researchers have investigated *"how governments interact in multilateral negotiations, peacekeeping, human rights, and development assistance"* and "*analyzed the growing role of civil society in international politics."*

Today, most of the academic papers (e.g. Kegley and Shannon, 2014; Reinalda, 2009) build on the definition of IGOs used in the Yearbook of International Organizations created by Union of International Associations (UIA, 2015) which defines IGOs as institutional bodies "*based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation states including three or more nation states as parties to the agreement having a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks*." This definition builds on the notion of an international organization being not only an arena or a foreign policy instrument of nation states but an autonomous actor *per se* capable of independent action.

To be able to see it so, we need to accept the principal-agent rationalist premise where nation-states act as principals delegating part of their authority (or sovereignty) to international organizations (agents) so that IGOs can perform certain tasks in the issue area (Bauer and Weinlich, 2011, p. 254; Karlas, 2015, pp. 72-74; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p. 4; Reinalda, 2009, p. 8). Moravcsik (1998, p. 67) then distinguishes two types of sovereignty (authority) transfer. He (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 67) speaks about sovereignty pooling when decisions are adopted by non-unanimous voting, whereas sovereignty delegation means the transfer of decision making authority to a supranational organ.

Archer (2001, p. 58) distinguishes five types of possible organs operating within an international organization: (1) interstate organs, (2) organs of international functionaries, (3) parliamentary organs, (4) organs of the representatives of interest groups of economic and social life, and (5) organs of mixed membership. Karlas (2015, pp. 141-142) adapts Archer's typology and introduces one of his own consisting of (1) plenary meetings as the highest decision making organ with all states being represented in there (interstate organ in Archer's terms), (2) an executive board in charge of ongoing decision-making consisting of a limited number of member states elected for a certain period (also an interstate organ but with different functions and competences), (3) secretariat dealing with administrative matters and limited decision-making capacities (Archer's organ of international functionaries), (4) judicial organ and (5) other organs (parliamentary assemblies, organs representing different interest groups, etc.). According to Karlas (2015, p. 142), we can find the first three types within almost every IGO in the world, the other two categories are present only in some of them.

In this thesis, we will focus primarily on administrative bodies/international bureaucracies (type 2 in Archer's typology and type 3 in the one of Karlas) and their composition. Every type of intergovernmental organization, be it rather intergovernmental or rather supranational, needs its own administrative body to provide it with technical services and secure its day-to-day operation; these bodies are most often called secretariats, commissions or bureaus (Rittberger et al., 2012, p. 84). More specifically, as Bauer and Weinlich (2011, p.252) claim, international bureaucracy can be defined as *"the material component of an IGO, staffed and run by international civil servants (...), an agency that has been set up by the member states of an IGO with some degree of performance and coherence and beyond direct formal control of individual national governments in order to pursue a pre-defined policy in the international arena"*.

According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004, pp. 17-18), four main characteristics define a bureaucracy – hierarchy, continuity, impersonality, and expertise. *Hierarchy* ensures precisely cut competences of every individual official and his accountability towards his superiors, *continuity* suggests a stable long term prospect for its employees, *impersonality* embodies the existence and compliance with prescribed rules as well as non-arbitrariness and relative independence on the changes in political structures, and *expertise* secures the suitability of individual officials to their tasks in terms of merit, training and professionality (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, pp. 17-18). Compared to plenary organs or executive councils, the staff of such bodies (international civil servants) do not represent individual member states, but rather the IGO itself and therefore act independently of their states' instructions and constitute a supranational body.

IGOs administrative organs' most common tasks include agenda setting, negotiations mediation and states' implementation monitoring. However, since the supranational institutional design of IGOs has been increasingly present in the international system recently, the power of bureaucracies has been on the rise and their functions and competences have widened, in some cases even incorporating substantial scope of decision- and policy-making capacities (Barkin, 2013, pp. 30-38; Karlas, 2015, p. 144; Rittberger et al., 2012, p. 84). These are realized primarily through creation of rules prescribing "*action for actors both inside and outside the organization"* (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 18) by which the bureaucracy becomes a *"responsible authoritative decision maker, even as IGOs are the external masters to whom they are formally accountable"* (Bauer and Weinlich, 2011, p. 252) and impact IGO's outcomes and vicariously also its members and other audiences.

Traditionally, rulemaking bodies (on the national level of inquiry primarily), as Koppell (2014, p. 35) suggests, have been studied in the field of Public Administration. Consequentially, as the political authority has reallocated upward (supranationally), downward (subnationally) and sideways from nation-states in time (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, p. 233), the scope of PA research have widened and incorporated also other levels of inquiry, especially the subnational and supranational ones. Hence, PA scholars have gradually accepted international bureaucracies as one of their objects of study focusing primarily on the topics of *"functioning of the international civil service[3], management reforms and organizational change[4], and the influence of bureaucrats on international policy making[5]"* (Ege and Bauer, 2013, p. 136).

Despite the renewal of academic interest in international organizations in the last twenty-five years and widening of their policy-making capacities, only few works looking at IGOs and their bureaucracies as public administrators exist today in the field of IR (Bauer and Weinlich, 2011, pp. 252-253; Mathiason, 2007, p. 2; Welch and Wong, 1998, pp. 43-44) with only few exceptions such as Cox and Jacobson (1974), Haas and Haas

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[3] To name some recent works belonging to this category, see e.g. Ellinas and Suleiman (2011), Geri (2001), and Hooghe (2005)
[4] To name some recent works belonging to this category, see e.g. Bauer (2008 and 2012), Kassim (2008), and Nay (2011)
[5] To name some recent works belonging to this category, see e.g. Mathiason (2007), and Weller and Xu (2010)

(1995) and Ness and Brechin (1988). Forgetting these and few more exceptions, mainstream IR continues to see IGOs as *"a function of interactions between states"* rather than actors *"preparing international policy decisions and programs as well as supervising the domestic implementation of international agreements"* (Ege and Bauer, 2013, p. 135).

That is not the case of Public Administration field which tends to perceive IGOs as *"an additional level of policy making*" (Ege and Bauer, 2013, p. 135) within the multi-level governance system and *"recognizes the importance of global rulemaking"* (Koppell, 2014, p. 35). However, as O'Toole (2014, pp. 3-4) and Koppell (2014, p. 35) suggested in 2014, transnational bureaucracies are still being largely ignored by public administration scholars too. In 2014, only one out of 66 studies published in the 'Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory' dealt with an international issue partially, all the rest stemmed from a national or subnational level of inquiry (O'Toole, 2014, pp. 3-4).

Consequently, as Kim et al. (2014, p. xiii) claim, "*we are lacking a systematic, generalizable body of knowledge about how international organizations and bureaucracies make decisions and the factors that affect their performance and responsiveness"*. To be able to understand and describe current state of the world politics in terms of the impact and internal functioning of IGOs as autonomous actors, we need to broaden the perspectives of these two research fields and bring together knowledge from both IR and PA in order to bring in a working interdisciplinary theory. Luckily, scholarly focus on questions of administration and management at transnational level is slowly but steadily growing within both of the disciplines and converging, creating a new intersecting sub-discipline of 'International Bureaucracy Research' step by step (Ege and Bauer, 2013, pp. 135 and 142; Kim et al, 2014, pp. xiii-xv). However, this scenario is not likely to come along naturally since scholars of the two sub-disciplines do not have the chance to share and question the research of each other as they publish in different journals, participate in different associations and contribute to different conferences; in consequence, some external action is said to be needed to force the cooperation (Ege and Bauer, 2013, p. 143; Kim et al, 2014, p. xvi).

In this thesis, we will try to reconcile this tension by using a PA Representative Bureaucracy theory to address a commonly questioned weakness of bureaucracies in general – lack of formal accountability - on the case of the largest international bureaucracy in the world – the UN Secretariat.

The theory of representative bureaucracy was originally proposed within the public administration scholarship in the 1940s by the work of Kingsley (1944) examining British civil service and concluding that a bureaucracy must be representative of the dominant social class in the society if the political and social environment is to be stable (Andrews et al., 2014, p. 3; Meier, 1975, p. 527; Saltzstein 1979, p. 466; Selden, 1997b, pp. 4-5). It has been greatly developed ever since by various scholars both theoretically and in practice by applying this concept to different administrative bodies ranging from local to national and covering whole range of policy issues, such as fire service, federal executive service, or Farmers Home Association (e.g. Andrews et al 2014; Clark et al 2013; Grissom et al 2009; Kennedy 2014; Lim 2006; Meier 1975; Saltzstein 1979; Selden 1997).

It addresses the issue of rising power of bureaucratic/administrative bodies lacking electoral and other types of accountability[6] in general (Coleman et al., 1998, p. 718; Kennedy, 2014, p. 395-396; Meier, 1975, p. 529; Saltzstein, 1979, p. 465) due to at least three steps separating electorate from the bureaucracy[7] (Mosher, 1982, p. 4-5; Selden, 1997b, p. 4). This notion of contemporary politics allegedly undermines the idea of democracy since a non-elected technocratic body separated from national democratic institutions can hugely influence and determine the policy outcomes against public interest (Dahl, 1999, pp. 33-34; Keohane et al., 2009, p. 2) by *"specifying and implementing the details of program regulations and controlling the flow of daily operations"* (Selden, 1997, p. 718). The lack of accountability in the case of IGOs might then lead to unauthorized or illegitimate exercise of power, unjust or unwise decisions (Grant and Keohane, 2005, p. 30), IGOs promoting special interests of certain actors, IGOs operating in a *"nontransparent and unaccountable fashion"* (Keohane et al., 2009, p. 23), and *"policies favouring some states over others, improper incursions into national sovereignty or abuse of delegated authorities by international secretariats or civil servants"* (Charnovitz, 2011, p. 334).

Representative bureaucracy theory tries to reconcile this tension by suggesting that *"bureaucracy will be responsive to the interests and desires of important social*

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[6] Accountability, in the words of Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 29), *"implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met."*

[7] The electorate elects their officials who appoint top-level administrators leading the organizations staffed by civil servants purposely protected from political pressure and influence (Selden, 1997b, p. 4).

groups in society if its personnel are drawn proportionately from these social groups and share the same values and attitudes as the groups they represent" (Saltzstein, 1979, p. 469) implying democratic commitment to equal access to power for all (Selden, 1997b, p. 6). In other words, it is necessary to staff the bureaucracy (sample) proportionally from all the societal groups, so that it reflected the values of the society in whole (population) and the policy outcomes correspond to those produced if all the society participated in the process (Andrews et al., 2014, 4; Grissom et al., 2009, p. 911; Krislov, 2012, p. 7; Meier, 1975, p. 528; Meier and Bohte, 2001, p. 456; Selden, 1997a, p. 396; Selden, 1997b, p. 4).

Representative bureaucracy approach is based on the rationalist perception of individuals as utility maximizers which can be translated into individual bureaucrats enjoying discretion over some issues and using it naturally in accordance with their own values and beliefs (Meier and Bohte, 2001, p. 456). Therefore, the decisions made within the bureaucracy are, according to Meier (1975, p. 527), the outcome of *"administrative capabilities orientations, and values, which in turn depend on bureaucrats' backgrounds, training, education, and current associations."* Kingsley (1944, p. 282) explains this more by claiming that *"the essence of responsibility (...) is to be sought in an identity of aim and point of view, a common background of social prejudice, which leads the agent to act as if he were the principal."* In sum, the theory rests on the presumption that the *"mechanisms of representativeness are the linkage of social characteristics to values and values to behavior and policy"* (Saltzstein, 1979, p. 467) and that consistent values and discretion over an area directly linked to these values are both needed to make a bureaucracy representative (Meier and Bohte, 2001, p. 457).

However, this might turn out to be a problematic feature in reality since the bureaucrat's ability to transform his values into a corresponding policy can be largely limited by his position in terms of scope of his work, location in the hierarchy, other structural characteristics of the bureaucracy, the external political and social context, organizational socialization, and legal constrains (Grissom et al., 2009, p. 911; Meier and Bohte, 2001, p. 456; Saltzstein, 1979, p. 470; Selden, 1997b, p. 5). Therefore, while the important decisions are taken at the top of the bureau, we can say the bureaucrats working at these top posts are most likely to implement their values into the policy output (Meier, 1975, p. 530). Likewise, Mosher (1982, p. 15) emphasizes: *"A public service, and more specifically the leadership personnel of a public service, which is broadly* *representative of all categories of the population (...), may be thought of as satisfying Lincoln's prescription of government "by the people" in a limited sense."* Therefore, scholars testing the premises of representative bureaucracy should focus primarily on the decision- and policy- making level.

Question prevails what factors should the researchers look at while testing representative bureaucracy hypotheses. Even here the academics' opinions differ. In 1974, Krislov (2012, pp. 13-19) suggested to look at race, language, gender, education, income, religious preference, age, veteran status, disabilities, nature of the area the bureaucrat comes from, and his party identification when trying to understand US bureaucracies on the national level primarily. Today, most scholars working within the representative bureaucracy tradition examine bureaucrats' race and gender; leaving age, education, occupation, class, geographic location, attitudes, marital status, religion, party affiliation, language and sexual orientation behind (Bailey, 2004, p. 246; Kennedy, 2014, p. 405; Saltzstein, 1979, p. 466). When we look at the composition of the IGOs, some scholars (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 34-35; Woods, 2007, pp. 2 and 4) point out the unrepresentative narrowly-focused education and similar North-American or Anglophone background and worldviews of the international bureaucrats which works against the IGO's efficiency and production of just measures. As Saltzstein (1979, p. 468) highlights, it is important to keep in mind that in representative bureaucracy research we expect these categories to substitute the values shared by their representatives even if *"very little is known about the relationship between the two"*. Therefore, we should not blindly accept any of the measures mentioned here but rather think about the context in which the examined bureaucracy operates (Kennedy, 2014, p. 405) and what characteristics might fit best the values examined.

Building upon the findings of the representative bureaucracy theory described above while looking at our object of inquiry - the UN Secretariat, two research questions can be formulated as follows:

RQ1: Is the UN Secretariat representative of the world population in terms of its bureaucrats' national affiliation?

RQ2: If not, what are the factors associated with a better relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat?

By representativeness in RQ1 we mean a quality of something reflecting accurately upon a sample (Yourdictionary.com 2015). Fundamentally, this is in line with the representative bureaucracy statement claiming that to ensure the responsiveness of the Secretariat to the interests of as many people living on Earth as possible, its professional personnel should be drawn proportionately from diverse groups representing the world population as whole.

We chose the bureaucrats' nationality as the category best capturing the group values while taking into account the context in which the UN Secretariat operates since it sufficiently reflects the world diversity on one hand, and the UN collects data about the nationality of its civil servants on the other. In the same time we must acknowledge that there might be a discrepancy between the values of staff and those of their co-nationals stemming e.g. from an incompatibility of values and interests of the country‘s governing elite and its citizens or from the fact that the representatives are living far from their homes and consequently the compliance of their values with that of their co-nationals might be gradually weakening or permanently lost. Nevertheless, we still believe that the nationality is the best category available within the UN data.

Consequentially, according to the representative bureaucracy theory, we presume that the UN Secretariat would produce broadly representative policies if it was composed of individuals of all world nationalities at the same ratio as they are represented in the world population. This statement can be also reframed in terms of Selden's (1997b, p. 6) democratic commitment to equal access to power for all by saying that to consider the UN Secretariat really democratic and impartial, it would have to, in theory, grant every individual the same power to influence activities of the organ, i.e. to provide the same level of probability of getting a post in the UN Secretariat for every human being on the planet independently of his nationality.

However, considering the real world settings in which variety of different historical, economic, political and other factors influencing representation of countries in IGOs can be identified, **we assume that the level of representativeness will come out differentiated and not equal among countries (Hypothesis for RQ1)**. This was also the case of 'Who Runs the International System' research conducted by Paul Novosad and Eric Werker in 2014 (Novosad and Werker, 2014), which showed the overrepresentation of small, rich democracies in the senior positions within the UN Secretariat.

The **RQ2**, on the other hand, provides us with number of possible hypotheses. Firstly, if our hypothesis for RQ1 proves wrong and the null hypothesis for RQ1 turns out to be right, **there will be no factors influencing the relative representation**

of a Member State in the UN Secretariat (Hypothesis 0 for RQ2). Secondly, Novosad's and Weker's (2014) findings of ***"democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic power"*** **might prove out to be the only major factors having effect on the nation's representation in the UN Secretariat (Hypothesis 1 for RQ2)**. Yet, we argue that those "hard" and international politics factors such as economic power, wealth, diplomatic contacts, alliances etc., as identified by Novosad and Werker (2014), might not be the only ones having impact on the countries' representation in the UN Secretariat. In contrast, we believe that **the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people, such as easy access to nutrition, clean water, education, healthcare, infrastructure and absence of violence, can be associated with its higher representation in the UN Secretariat**, too **(Hypothesis 2 for RQ2).**

We believe so as we assume that people struggling to satisfy their basic needs such as need for appropriate nutrition (including water), sanitation, education, and healthcare, presumably cannot or do not have slight interest in seeking career positions within the UN Secretariat. Another line of this argumentation points to the fact that to be able to represent a country in UN Secretariat a person needs to possess certain skills and qualifications (e.g. college degree) and have access to relevant information (e.g. internet connection available). Therefore, growing opportunities of people living in a country might lead to the increase of given country's relative representation in the UN Secretariat.

Nonetheless, even if we believe that opportunities of people in a given country might be one of the important explanatory variables in the UN Secretariat composition, we do not deny a possible effect of other conditions, such as abovementioned hard politics factors or even the existence of corruption, nepotism, and social inequality in the countries concerned. However, we decided not to include these factors in our analysis due to their complicated measurability and the thesis' limited extent.

2. United Nations Secretariat and its Staffing Policy

United Nations Secretariat is recognized by Article 7 of the UN Charter (UN, 1945) as one of the six[8] major organs of the United Nations, the world's largest inter-governmental organization with universal membership founded in 1945 and currently made up of 193 Member States, which fulfils its objectives in maintaining the international peace and security, promoting sustainable development, protecting human rights, upholding international law and delivering humanitarian aid (UN, 2015). It does so through its organs and with the assistance of its funds, programmes and specialized agencies[9] (UN, 2016a).

UN Secretariat serving as an *"organ of international functionaries"* in Archer's (2001, p. 58) terms and a "*secretariat dealing with administrative matters and limited decision-making capacities"* in the words of Karlas (2015, p. 142) is a great example of a working international bureaucracy defined by four abovementioned features of hierarchy, continuity, impersonality, and expertise (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, pp. 17-18). It is headed by a Secretary-General (SG) – the Chief administrative officer at the Organization and employs "*such staff as the Organization may require"* who *"answers to the United Nations alone for their activities, and take an oath of to seek or receive instructions from any Government or outside authority"* (UN, 1945, art. 97 and 100; UN, 2000).

Historically, the key tasks of the Secretariat were to *"prepare the ground for decisions taken by the policy-forming organs of the UN, (...) and execute those decisions"* (International Organization, 1947, p. 344). Today, as Novosad and Werker (2014, p. 9.) state, it still *"serves the other bodies of the UN, [and] administers operations initiated by those bodies, [but it also] conducts surveys and research, (...) communicates with non-state actors such as media and non-government organizations, (...) plays a key role in implementation and in setting the agenda, (...) is the main source of economic and political analysis for General Assembly and Security Council, (...) operates political field missions, prepares the technical assessments that proceed*

[8] Others being (1) General Assembly representing interstate organ and plenary meetings in Archer's and Karlas's typologies, (2) Security Council in terms of Karlas's executive board category of IGO's organs, (3) Economic and Social Council as a representative of Archer's "organs of the representatives of interest groups of economic and social life" and Karlas's other organs, (4) Trusteeship Council as Karlas's other, and (5) International Court of Justice as a judicial organ distinguished by Karlas (Archer, 2001, p. 58; Karlas, 2015, pp. 141-142; UN, 2016)

[9] For more information see United Nations (2015a)

peacekeeping operations and appoints the leaders of peacekeeping operations”. In consequence of these wide responsibilities, the secretariat enjoys substantial competences in decision- and policy- making stemming from its *“creative capacity”* to introduce ideas and take initiative (Novosad and Werker, 2014, p. 10).

Looking at its composition and structure, the Secretariat consists of 41 081 international civil servants of 189 different nationalities located throughout the world, including 20 778 people working in field-operations (peacekeeping or special political missions), 12 791 in non-field operations based at New York headquarters and 7 512 at other duty stations, such as Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Geneva, Nairobi, Santiago and Vienna, as at 30 June 2015 (UNGA, 2015, p. 17-21; UN 2016b). All these members of staff are headed by the Secretary-General and organized along departmental lines with precisely defined area of action (UN, 2016; UN, 2016b).

The staff is further divided into following categories: (1) Professional and higher categories, (2) General Service categories, (3) National Professional Officers, (4) Field Service, and (4) Senior appointments (UN Careers, 2016). (1) 'Professional and higher categories' *“entail work that are analytical, evaluative and conceptual duties”* and comprise of seven different grade levels P-1 to P-5, P-6/D-1 and P-7/D-2 ranging from Assistant Officer to Director (UN Careers, 2016; UNSCEBC, 2016). United Nations register 12 220 people representing this category within the Secretariat as at 30 June 2015 (UNGA, 2015, p. 22). Within this category we can also distinguish a subcategory of 'senior and policymaking levels' when taking into account only the D-1 and above grade levels (UNGA, 2015).

(2) 'General Services' positions, on the other hand, support the execution of UN programs operationally and technically, and “include administrative, secretarial and clerical support as well as specialized technical functions such as printing, security and buildings maintenance” (UN Careers, 2016; UNSCEBC, 2016). There are seven grade levels in the category (G-1 to G-7) with positions ranging from Assistants to Managers (UNSCEBC, 2016) employing 24 349 people in total in as at June 2015 (UNGA, 2015, p. 22).

(3) 'National Professional Officers', sometimes included in the Field Service category, *“are normally locally recruited and perform functions at the professional level”* while serving in their home country at one of the UN non-headquarters duty stations on five different levels - A through E (UN Careers, 2016).

(4) 'Field service category', whose staff are recruited internationally to serve in field mission and *“provide administrative, technical, logistics and other support services to United Nations field missions”*, include four different grade levels (FS-4 to FS-7) and consists of 4142 people serving worldwide (UN Careers, 2016; UNGA, 2015, p. 22).

Last but not least, (5) 'Senior appointments' positions present the highest posts within the Secretariat for which an appointment of the General Assembly or the Secretary-General is needed. These posts include: Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General (DSG), Under-Secretary-General (USG) and Assistant Secretary-General (ASG). The USG and ASG posts are included in 'D-1 and above' category of 'senior and policymaking levels' for the purposes of the Composition of the Secretariat Report since they are appointed by the SG only, and are not the subject to Member States’ political approval (UN Careers, 2016; UNGA, 2015).

If we take a closer look at the Secretariat’s staffing policy, we can distinguish several means of appointment depending on the level in the UN Secretariat hierarchy. Under the Article 97, the UN Charter states that the *“Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”* (UN, 1945, art. 97). Deputy Secretary-General is to be appointed by the Secretary-General after mandatory consultations with Member States, and as mentioned above, the USG and ASG posts are being appointed on the discretion of Secretary-General in general (UN Careers, 2016). However, several exceptions and specific requirements set by General Assembly exist, e.g. *“the USG of the Office of Internal Oversight Services is appointed by the Secretary-General following consultations with Member States and approval by the General Assembly”*, etc. (UN Careers, 2016). The discretionary power of appointments of the remaining staff also officially rests on the Secretary-General (UN, 1945, art. 101), however it was in practice transferred to the Office of Human Resources Management of the Secretariat by General Assembly (UNGA, 1997; Wynes and Zahran, 2011, p. 3).

Article 101 of UN Charter further introduces two criteria to be applied when staffing the Secretariat – 'highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity' and 'as wide geographical basis as possible' stating that: *“The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.*

Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide geographical basis as possible" (UN, 1945, art. 101).

The requirement of 'as wide geographical basis as possible' was later on accompanied by the principle of 'equitable geographical distribution ' mentioned in many resolutions of General Assembly asking e.g. for *"the attainment of equitable geographical distribution in the Secretariat and to also ensure as wide a geographical distribution of staff as possible in all departments, offices and levels, including at the Director and higher levels, of the Secretariat"* (Fall and Zhang, 2012, p. 10; UNGA, 2012, para. 5). The implementation of EGD into recruitment practice was enabled in 1948 by introduction of 'desirable ranges' system calculating satisfactory numbers of posts for each Member State ensuring its adequate representation, where financial contributions of the Member States were originally the only factor used to calculate the ranges (Fall and Zhang, 2012, p. 11). In 1962, two more factors of membership and population were added to the calculation of the EGD in the UN Secretariat while asking primarily for a *"more balanced regional composition of the staff at levels of D-1 and above"* (UNGA, 1962, art. 1 (b) and (d)).

Today, *"all posts at the professional level and above established for one year or more"* within the regular budget (Fall and Zhang, 2012, p. 9 and 12) are subject to the EGD where the midpoint of the desirable range has been calculated as follows since 1988: 40 % of the posts are allocated via the Membership factor, 5 % depending on the Member State population, and 55 % based on the proportions of the assessments paid to the UN budget by Member States (UNGA, 1987, art. 1 (b)-(d)). The upper and lower limits of each range are then defined as 15 % upwards and downwards from the midpoint, *"but not less than 4.8 posts up and down, the upper limit of the range being not less than 14 posts"* (UNGA, 1987, art. 1 (e)). These ranges are then taken into account during the recruitment process and implemented in the staff-selection policies.

If we look at the 'equitable geographical distribution' requirement through the lens of representative bureaucracy theory, we can see it as an effort to overcome the lack of UN Secretariat electoral accountability and maximize its neutrality and responsiveness to all its audiences. However, due to its applicability to the regular budgetary positions only, mere 11.28 % of all posts within the UN Secretariat were subject to EGD in 2012 (Fall and Zhang, 2012, p. 12). As Fall and Zhang (2012, p. 12) argue, this is due to the fact that in 1948, when the desirable ranges system was introduced, the UN Secretariat mainly consisted of regular budget professional posts; thus there was no need to include extra-budgetary positions into the calculations. Today, when a great number of Secretariat posts is located within extra-budgetary peacekeeping missions, the current desirable ranges system does not adequately ensure the equitable geographical distribution within the Secretariat and both the Member States represented by the General Assembly and the Inspectors from the 2012 Joint Inspection Unit call for adjustment of the system of desirable ranges and inclusion of all 'Professional and higher' posts to fit the current Secretariat better and ensure equality in these terms (Fall and Zhang, 2012, p. 12; UNGA, 2008, IV, art. 17).

Looking for support in the existing scholarly literature, we find out that not much academic literature exists on the topic of Staffing the UN Secretariat or its geographical distribution. First article dealing with the topic is Richard N. Swift's Personnel Problems and the United Nations Secretariat published in 1957 summarizing achievements and challenges persisting in 1950s within the recently created and rapidly growing United Nations Secretariat (Swift, 1957). In his paper, Swift (1957) focused primarily on the recruitment problem, competitive salaries and allowances capable of motivating skilled employees, protection of staff rights, and questions of ensuring close-to-equal geographic distribution shortly after UN enlargement.

The geographical distribution question stayed on the scholarly list and even took on special interest and urgency in the 1960s with sixteen new African members coming in in 1960, and Soviet Union demanding more control over the Secretariat. This time some of the academia (Goodrich, 1962; Kay, 1966; Reymond, 1967) tried to describe and analyze the ongoing situation, negotiations and Secretariat's policy outcomes to address this issue, appropriate ratio of career and non-career appointments, and recruitment practices in general. They also referred to rising attempts of governments to politicize the recruitment and promotion processes as well as the structure of international civil service itself and its leadership in general to balance their position in the international system during the Cold War period (Goodrich, 1962, p. 469; Reymond, 1967).

This was still the case in 1976 when Theodor Meron (1976, p. 659) pointed out the rising "internal and external [political] pressures with regard to recruitment and promotion, and in broader terms with respect to (…) international character and independence" of the UN Secretariat from the member states and their permanent missions. He also warned about effects that might have led to the transformation of the UN Secretariat to an intergovernmental rather than supranational body lacking neutrality and confidence of some member states (Meron, 1976, pp. 692-693).

In 1981, Robert S. Jordan (1981, p. 236) referred to the accelerating discontent of both the member states and Secretariat employees with the state of the affairs within the administrative body at that time connected to the politicization efforts asking for improvements in the efficiency and integrity of the international civil service. He (Jordan, 1981) further discussed the challenges and trends the Secretariat was facing, such as financial pressures stemming from uncertain global economic conditions, and growing activism among international civil servants due to their discontent. In terms of growing UN membership and subsequent quest for adequate geographical representation, Jordan (1981, p. 237) mentions a *“sharp disagreement as to whether geographical representation should, at times, dominate over considerations of merit in recruitment”* since “*there can be little prospect that secretary general can implement to the satisfaction of everyone the requirement to balance off equitable geographic representation with the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity”* (Jordan, 1981, p. 242).

After the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and unblocking of the Security Council in 1990s the situation stabilized and geographical distribution of the UN Secretariat almost disappeared from the scholarly literature. The only exception we found is Houshang Ameri’s (1996) Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat, an exhaustive book-length political study of the UN shortcomings and ineffectiveness, its causes and consequences published in 1996. In his work, Ameri (1996) concentrates on 'Professional and higher' levels of UN civil service and identifies doubts about Secretariat’s *“independence, integrity and competence, as well as the existence of corruption, waste, fraud and abuse (...), declining quality of the staff, poor personnel management, the politization of the Secretariat’s policies and practices with regard to recruitment, appointment and promotion of the staff as well as the lack of proper career development plan”* as some of the causes of Secretariats institutional *“malaise”* (Ameri, 1996, pp. 549-550). He also suggests that the quest for *“equitable geographical distribution have had the effect or relegating principle of merit to a secondary position”* (Ameri, 1996, p. 550) and thus contributed to the incompetency and ineffectiveness of the Secretariat.

Twenty years later, in 2014, Novosad and Werker finally shifted from the descriptive to more analytic and exploratory approach by publishing the

'Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat' article. In this paper, they constructed a 60-year dataset, by nationality, of approximately 80 most senior positions in the Secretariat and found out that, statistically, democracy, wealth, economic power and diplomatic contacts are good predictors of the share of senior positions held by a country in the UN secretariat and that the most overrepresented countries in the Secretariat are small rich democracies such as Norway (Novosad and Werker, 2014).

In accordance with all the aforementioned pieces of information, we can conclude that the system of “equitable geographical distribution” and its “desirable ranges” in its current form cannot ensure the representativeness and neutrality of the UN Secretariat as required by the representative bureaucracy theory. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask whether the UN Secretariat reflects the world population accurately and if not, what types of states are being favored by the current system. In this thesis, we will attempt to do so by building upon the Novosad’s and Werker’s (2014) conclusions and testing whether they hold true when taking other possible predictors, such as people opportunities and level of development into account.

3. Methodology

A variety of techniques is being used by representative bureaucracy scholars to answer their research questions, including percentages, regression analysis, Gini Index/Lorenz Curve and representation ratios (Kennedy, 2014, p. 408). For the purposes of this thesis, we chose to operationalize the 'passive representation' of different countries in the UN Secretariat as their staff/population ratio ('staffpopratio2') measured in the number of 'Professional and higher' staff of given nationality per million people of the country's population and the 'UN Secretariat representativeness' as a situation where the staff/population ratios of all the UN Member States are equal or close-to-equal. This approach is in line with both the abovementioned definitions of RB by Saltzstein (1979, p. 469) and Selden (1997b, p. 6) since it reflects the degree of proportionality of different nationalities represented in the UN Secretariat and their (un)equal access to power.

The staff/population ratio will be calculated from the variable 'pstaff' (number of 'Professional and higher' category staff of the UN Secretariat by nationality), whose values were taken from the 2013 'Report of the Secretary-General on Composition of the Secretariat: Staff Demographics' (UNGA, 2013), divided by variable 'population' retrieved from the 'Population, total'[10] Indicator, year '2013' of the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2016)[11] and multiplied by 10^6. We chose to examine the 'Professional and higher' category of staff despite the RB scholars' call for the focus on decision- and policy- making positions due to the unavailability of the data reflecting all staff of 'D-1 and above' category by nationality[12]. The year of 2013 was chosen as a referential point for all the variables since there are no more recent data available for some of the variables used. By using this approach, 'staffpopratio2' can be interpreted as a number of professional staff of given nationality per 1,000,000 of their fellow countrymen.

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[10] Definition of the Indicator by the World Bank (2016): *"Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates."*

[11] Since the World Development Indicators Database does not collect data on Nauru, its population value was retrieved from the World Factbook by CIA (CIA, 2016) and added to the dataset. The value comes from the 2015 population estimate which was the closest value to the 2013 that we could find. Moreover, supposedly, the difference in population between 2013 and 2015 will be marginal.

[12] Data for the 'D-1 and above' category by nationality are available only for the posts that are subject to the equal geographical distribution

To be able to answer the RQ1 – whether the UN Secretariat is passively representative of the world population in terms of its bureaucrats' national affiliation – and to test our hypothesis we will calculate the staff/population ratio of every UN Member State, set it as the dependent variable, use individual UN Member States (variable 'Country.Name') as nominal independent variables, order them by their dependent variable values, and plot them into a bar plot ordered by their increasing staff/population value. Consequently, an ideal global staff/population ratio will be calculated by dividing the sum of Member States' populations by total number of UN Secretariat Professional staff and compared with the existing values. In the end, we will interpret the acquired data, assess the equality of different countries representation in the Secretariat, and thus validate or reject our hypothesis on its passive (non-)representativeness.

As for the RQ2, the null hypothesis can be confirmed as soon as we get the answer for RQ1. If we will conclude that the UN Secretariat is representative of the world population in terms of each Member State's staff/population ratio, Hypothesis 0 anticipating the non-existence of factors having the power to influence the representation of Member States can be automatically confirmed and the other two ones (Hypotheses 1 and 2) rejected. If not, we should proceed to the assessment of the other two hypotheses focusing on whether 'hard politics factors' and/or the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people can lead to its higher relative representation in the UN Secretariat.

To be able to do so, we operationalize the 'opportunities of people living in a country' (Hypothesis 2) as a combination of their access to education, health, information infrastructure, and political stability. We will measure their educational opportunities by the population's enrollment in tertiary education (variable 'tertiary') with data coming from the World Bank Education Statistics, indicator 'Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%)'[13], year '2013' (World Bank, 2016a). Their health will be operationalized as a combination of disease prevention reflected in the variable 'immunization' retrieved from the WB Development Indicator 'Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)'[14], year '2013' (World Bank, 2016), and the appropriate

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[13] Definition of the Indicator by the World Bank (2016a): *"Total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 to 8), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving."*

[14] Definition of the Indicator by the World Bank (2016): *"Child immunization measures the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received vaccinations before 12 months or at any time*

access to water and nutrition reflected in the variable 'watersource' taken from the World development indicator 'Improved water source (% of population with access)'[15], year '2013' (World Bank, 2016). The access to information infrastructure will be measured as a 'Number of internet users (per 100 people)' (variable 'internet users'), year '2013' coming from the WB Development Indicators[16] (World Bank, 2016) and data on political stability and absence of violence (variable 'stability') will be drawn from the indicator 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate'[17], year '2013' from World Bank Worldwide Governance indicators (World Bank, 2016b) hypothetically ranging from -2.5 to 2.5.

The 'hard politics' factors (Hypothesis 1) in the context of the United Nations organization will be summarized in the variable 'contribution' reflecting assessments (net financial contributions) in United States Dollars due towards the UN budget by given Member State based on the gross national income primarily with some adjustments (e.g. for countries with low per capita income) (United Nations, 2016c). The data will be retrieved from the 'net contributions' presented in the United Nations Secretariat's 'Assessment of Member States' contributions to the United Nations regular budget for the year 2013 and of new Member States' advances to the Working Capital Fund for the biennium 2010-2011 and the contributions to the United Nations regular budget for 2011 and 2012' Report (UN Secretariat, 2012).

To assess the validity of our hypotheses focusing on factors leading to a better relative representation of a country in the UN Secretariat, we will evaluate the statistical effect of the abovementioned variables ('tertiary', 'watersource', 'immunization', 'internetusers', 'stability', and 'contributions') on the staff/population ratio one by one while holding other independent variables constant through the employment

before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized against measles after receiving one dose of vaccine."

[15] Definition of the Indicator by the World Bank (2016): *"Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population using an improved drinking water source. The improved drinking water source includes piped water on premises (piped household water connection located inside the user's dwelling, plot or yard), and other improved drinking water sources (public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection)."*

[16] *„Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 12 months. Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc."* (World Bank, 2016).

[17] Definition of the Indicator by the World Bank (2016b): *„Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5."*

of the Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression method. By doing so, we will be able to *"examine the unique contribution of each variable (...) through the separation of the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable"* (Allison, 1999, p. 3). With the help of multiple regression, we will be able to decide whether there is a statistically significant relationship between individual independent and dependent variables and therefore, whether our hypotheses do or do not correspond to reality. Last but not least, the majority of the values used in the text will be rounded to two decimal places.

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1 RQ1: Representativeness of the UN Secretariat

In 2013, there were 12,194 'Professional and higher' members of UN Secretariat staff of 185 different nationalities representing 7,132,086,085 people living in 193 UN Member states in total. Stemming from these numbers we can easily calculate our 'normative' staff/population ratio of 1.709738196, rounded to 1.71 further in the text. This number reflects the fact, that every million people living on Earth are hypothetically represented by 1.71 staff in the UN Secretariat and consequentially, every 588,235[18] people are represented by one member of staff there.

According to the Saltzstein's definition (1979, p. 469) and the representative bureaucracy theory in general, this one member of staff should share the values and attitudes of the group of 588,235 people he represents based on their common characteristics in order to make the UN Secretariat responsive to their interests. If we translate this into our factor of nationality, every Member State should be represented in the UN Secretariat by a number of staff which equals to its population divided by 588,235 to be represented fairly. In consequence, we could consider the UN Secretariat to be a representative sample of the world population if the staff/population ratio multiplied by 10^6 of every UN Member State equates or lies close to 1.71.

However, this is not the case in reality. When calculating the staff/population ratios of different UN Member states, we get the values ranging from 0 to 128.91 with a mean of 8.24, median of 3.25, and standard deviation of 14.65. These suggest very unequal distribution of the UN Secretariat posts in terms of the staff/population ratio and RB theory in general. To illustrate this, we constructed a barplot of all the 'staffpopratio2' values ordered increasingly (for better resolution, see Appendix no. 1):

[18] Rounded from 588,235.2941176471



Figure 1- Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State (graph)

For a more precise understanding, see a map reflecting the geographical distribution of the 'staffpopratio2' variable (for better resolution, see Appendix no. 2), light yellow representing the most underrepresented countries, dark red the most overrepresented and the lightest shades of orange (as in the case of the Czech Republic) the hypothetical normative representation rate of 1.71:



Figure 2- Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State (map)

Apparently, Western Europe countries tend to be overrepresented along with other Western-minded democracies such as Canada or Australia. However, they are not the only ones. The red color appears in a limited quantity on all the continents, covering a wide range of countries with different characteristics. Same can be said about the lightest shades of yellow representing the most underrepresented countries.

Taking a closer look at our 'staffpopratio2' data (Annex no. 1), the Member State having the closest 'staffpopratio2' to the ideal value of 1.71 - the Czech Republic - ranks 66 out of 193 with its 1.71195875 staff per million in population. This means that 65 UN Member States are relatively underrepresented in the Secretariat and almost twice as many (127) countries are relatively overrepresented. This fact is also exacerbated by the 'staffpopratio2' median value of 3.25 which is almost twice as large as the normative, ideal one.

There are 8 countries with the 'staffpopratio2' equating to 0 due to the absence of staff of respective nationality in the UN Secretariat. These are Angola, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu, six of them being small island states in Oceania with population ranging from 9,540 in case of Nauru to 253,165 for Vanuatu. Therefore, the zero staff in the UN Secretariat is nothing we should worry about in their case since their populations does not reach even half of the number normatively required to be represented by one member of UN Secretariat. A different situation arises while examining Angola (population of about 23.4 million in 2013) and United Arab Emirates (approx. 9 million of population in 2013). Building on our Hypothesis 3 for RQ1, we suppose that the hypothetical absence of almost 40[19] Angolans in the UN Secretariat could stem from its low access to improved water source (48.2 %, 3rd lowest worldwide), only 19.1 % of population with access to the internet, low enrollment in tertiary education (9.92 %), and a negative value of the stability index (-0.39). On the other hand, zero representation of United Arab Emirates in the UN Secretariat (compared to 15 members of staff ideally[20]) goes against all our hypotheses for RQ2 since it is a stable, developed country and the 28th largest contributor to the UN Budget.

These countries are, in terms of staff/population ratio, followed by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (0.04 members of staff per one million people), rather newly established country of South Sudan (0.09), Viet Nam (0.10), and some of the most populous countries such as Indonesia (0.13), India (0,19) and China (0.22). The group of underrepresented Member States further contains 51 other countries with diverse characteristics and no obvious common feature ranging from very small to large,

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[19] Compared to the ideal, normative staff/population ratio, number rounded from 39.8619434

[20] Rounded from 15.3679626

democratic to authoritarian, poor to rich, even though it contains only four (but all very populous) OECD members – Turkey (0.61), Mexico (0.78), Poland (1.18) and Japan (1.63).

The huge variety of countries' characteristics can be found even on the other side of the spectrum among the overrepresented countries. The top positions are though being occupied by small (in majority island) states such as Saint Kitts and Nevis with its 128.91 members of staff per million inhabitants[21], San Marino (95.57), Seychelles (66.74), Grenada (47.21), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (45.73), Dominica (41.66), and Barbados (35.40). The high staff/population ratio of these countries seems to be caused primarily by their low populations; there is no country with population over one million people in the top 15 overrepresented Member States. Tentatively, we can agree with Novosad's and Werker's (2014, p. 1) conclusion about dominance of small, rich democracies.

Lower in the table, the countries start to differentiate, even though the less populated ones still predominate. Belgium, the most represented Member State among those with population of over ten million people, whose staff/population ratio ranks 32nd highest with its 14.4 members of staff per million people followed by 33rd Canada (13.25), 41st France (10.9), and 44th United Kingdom (10.12). Germany's staff/population value amounted to little more than half of it (5.47) and was listed 73rd from the top. What might be surprising is the 87th position of the United States of America which exceeded the median value by 0.85 only. Nonetheless their staff/population ratio of 3.97 is still more than 30 times larger than the one of similarly populated Indonesia and 1.6 larger than the one of its Cold War rival Russian Federation (2.43).

For those, who would call the outcomes skewed by extreme results of small states on both sides of the staff/population ratio spectrum, we also constructed a subset of 161 Member States with population equal or higher than 588,235 normatively subjected to at least one member of staff in the UN Secretariat (see Annex no. 3). Their staff/population ratios range between 0 (Angola and United Arab Emirates) and 32.85 in the case of Guyana, with the mean of 4.97, median of 2.51 and standard deviation of 5.92. These numbers suggest more equality than in the first case, but are still very far from equal representation of people from all over the world. For the distribution of values, see the following graph (for better resolution, see Appendix no. 3):

[21] While having the population of 54,301 and 7 nationals working in the UN Secretariat in 2013



Figure 3- Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State - Subset of Member States of Population Equal or Larger than 588,235 (graph)

The ideal value of 1.71 represented by the Czech Republic ranks 102nd from the top (60th lowest), leaving 59 countries behind. What is interesting is the fact that there is only one European country being normatively underrepresented – Poland, the rest of them can be found among the overrepresented ones led by 3rd Ireland (22.83), 7th Switzerland (20.27), 11th Finland (17.28), 12th Denmark (16.92) and 15th Belgium (14.40) mentioned above. In this subset, Canada ranks 15th, France 22nd, United Kingdom 23rd, Germany 49th, United States of America 62nd and Russian Federation 83rd. China and India fell down to the 8th and 7th lowest value.

More detailed analysis of the individual states and their rank in the staff/population ratio is however beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, even though we did not cover most Member States, their rank and characteristics, we can still conclude that the staff/population ratio varies widely from country to country, and thus answer our first research question in terms that the **UN Secretariat is not representative of the world population in the matter of its bureaucrats' national affiliation** (in the normative, representative bureaucracy sense of people's equality) and that this **level of representativeness came out differentiated and not equal among countries** as we presupposed in our Hypothesis for RQ1.

4.2 RQ2: Factors associated with a better representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat

Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis for RQ2 since some factors differentiating the relative representation of Member States in the UN Secretariat obviously exist. To be able to assess the remaining hypotheses about statistical impact of (1) so called hard policy factors of *“democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic power”* (Novosad and Werker, 2014, p. 1) measured in terms of Member States’ financial contributions to the UN budget (Hypothesis 1 for RQ2) and (2) internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people (Hypothesis 2 for RQ2) in terms of education, health, information infrastructure and political stability, we will conduct the Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression.

As we mentioned in the methodology section, we want to predict the staff/population ratio as a function of the population’s enrollment in tertiary education (variable 'tertiary'), disease prevention ('immunization'), appropriate access to water and nutrition ('watersource'), access to information infrastructure (variable 'internet users'), political stability (variable 'stability') and 'contribution' reflecting assessments due towards the UN budget. However, as some of the variables are extremely non-normally distributed, we need to proceed to variables transformation.

Variable transformation is usually used in order to (1) get more normally (and symmetrically) distributed data, (2) achieve equality of spread across different levels of a factor (reduce heteroscedasticity), (3) adjust for non-linearity of a relationship, and (4) enable additivity of two factors (Fox, 2002, p. 107-117; Roberts, 2008, p. 492). However, Roberts (2008, p. 492) suggests, that one of the main and most overlooked reasons to transform the data is their increased clarity and sensitivity of statistical tests. Therefore, even though there is no assumption of normality in case of OLS, transformation might lead to more sensitive results. This is in line with Zimmerman’s (1995) claim that *“that non-parametric tests (where no explicit assumption of normality is made) can suffer as much, or more, than parametric tests when normality assumptions are violated, confirming the importance of normality in all statistical analyses, not just parametric analyses”* (Osborne, 2002).

When eyeballing our data and density plots of the original variables (Annex no. 5), we can identify four variables which are significantly skewed and whose transformation towards more normally distributed variables might be helpful

– the dependent variable of 'staffpopratio2' (extremely positively skewed, with skewness of 4.73) and the independent variables of 'immunization' (negatively skewed, skewness of -1.99), 'watersource' (negatively skewed, skewness of -1.38), and 'contribution' (extremely positively skewed, skewness of 7.66). Other variables of 'tertiary', 'stability' and 'internet users' exhibit only light skew with absolute values of skewness smaller than 0.52.

As some of these values appear to be rather lognormally distributed, we chose to apply the natural log transformation as suggested e.g. by Allison (1999, p. 154), Osborne (2002) and Zumel and Mount (2014, p. 82). As explained by Osborne (2002) and Fox (2002, p. 107), the log transformation is useful to transform positively skewed variables non-comprising zero values since it works *"by compressing the right side of the distribution more than the left side"* (Osborne, 2002). For negatively skewed variables, their reflection must be conducted prior to logging them (Osborne, 2002). For the variables containing zero values, taking natural logarithm of (x+c) is suggested[22], where c equals the smallest but *"sufficiently large"* constant which ensures that the minimal value of such a variable equals 1.0 (Fox, 2002, p. 107; Osborne, 2002).

First of all, we transform our extremely positively skewed dependent variable of 'staffpopratio2' into a new 'logstaffpopratio' by taking its natural logarithm as suggested above to improve its normality, address the problem of heteroscedasticity, and to make the statistical tests more sensitive (Roberts, 2008, p. 492). However since there is 0 value of 'staffpopratio2' in the case of some Member States, we should take the logarithm of (x+c) in accordance with abovementioned scholarly recommendations. However, after careful consideration, we decided to log the variable itself and remove the countries having zero Staff in the UN Secretariat to be able to run the OLS. This should not be a problem when looking at the countries of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu which are less populated than needed for one member of UN Secretariat staff normatively and will be eradicated from our analysis anyway when taking into account only Member States with populations larger than 588,235. Other situation arises with Angola and United Arab Emirates which has to be treated as outliers.

We are aware, that removing certain cases is an artificial intervention to the dataset which in our case removes extreme values located in one tail of the distribution curve

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[22] 'c' being a constant (also called 'start') needed to be added to the variable when it contains one or more zero values since the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, in most analyses c=1 (Fox, 2002, p. 107; Osborne, 2002)

only. As Osborne (2002) suggests, there is a *“great debate in the literature about whether outliers should be removed or not”*, in those terms we take on his stance and believe that *“outlier removal is desirable, honest, and important”* (Osborne, 2002) for our analysis. Since we tried both approaches (removing the outliers and adding a constant to the staff/population ratio), we can state, that removing the outliers of Angola and United Arab Emirates was actually more beneficial for our analysis since they happened to be very influential in terms of residuals and thus made the coefficient outcomes less statistically significant for the rest of the cases. Therefore we decided to 'scarify' these two cases for the good of precision and statistical significance, while still keeping in mind that our outcomes does not take them into account and thus will not be fully generalizable.

As for the independent variables, we decided to log transform the variable 'contribution' to 'logcontribution' with a base constant of *e* as Zumel and Mount (2014, p. 80) suggest for all lognormally distributed variables such as monetary amounts. The negatively skewed variables of 'immunization' and 'watersource' will be transformed into 'loglackofimmunization', and 'loglackofwatersource' by their reflection and subsequent logging. Since both the negatively skewed variables of 'immunization' and 'watersource' are measured in percentage, their values can range between 0 and 100 revealing the percentage of people having access to improved water source and measles immunization in the given Member State. In fact our 'watersource' variable ranges between 39.9 and 100 and 'immunization' from 25 to 99. To transform these variables into the lack of water source/immunization, we use the functions of 'lackofwatersource' = (100 - 'watersource') and 'lackofimmunization' = (100 - 'immunization'). By doing so we get new positively skewed variables hypothetically ranging between 0 and 100, in fact reaching the values between 0 and 60.1 in case of 'lackofwatersource' and 1 to 75 for 'lackofimmunization'. To avoid their skewness, we proceed to taking their natural logarithm. For the 'lackofimmunization' variable, we will take its natural logarithm to get the values of 'loglackofimmunization'. For the 'lackofwatersource', we need to take into account the zero values present contained and thus take a natural logarithm of (x+1) to get our final variable of 'loglackofwatersource' as suggested by Fox (2002, p. 107).

Our final model for OLS including the control variable of 'contribution' thus looks as follows:

$$\text{'logstaffpopratio'} = a + b_1*\text{'tertiary'} + b_2*\text{'loglackofimmunization'} + \\ + b_3*\text{'loglackofwatersource'} + b_4*\text{'internetusers'} + b_5*\text{'stability'} + \\ + b_6*\text{'logcontribution'}$$

Or as follows using the original variables:

$$\log(\text{'staffpopratio2'}) = a + b_1*\text{'tertiary'} + b_2*\log(100\text{-'immunization'}) + \\ + b_3*\log[1 + (100\text{-'watersource'})] + b_4*\text{'internetusers'} + b_5*\text{'stability'} + \\ + b_6*\log(\text{'contribution'})$$

The regression will be conducted in R statistical software first using the dataset containing all the UN Member States ('reg1') and later on building on its subset of Member States with population equal or larger than 588,235 ('reg2'). However, since all the cases with some missing values are being omitted by the procedure when conducting the multiple regression analysis, we decided to run the regression with the 'tertiary' variable removed too since it contains 82 missing values and thus restricts the explanatory value of the model by not taking into account more than 40 % Member States[23]. Therefore we will also run a 'reg3' regression modelled as 'logstaffpopratio' = a + b_1 * 'loglackofimmunization' + b_2 * 'loglackofwatersource' + b_3 * 'internetusers' + b_4 * 'stability' + b_5 * 'logcontribution' taking into account all the UN Member States and 'reg4' along the same model considering the subset of member States with population equal or larger than 588,235 only. By doing so we get the 'reg3' model building on 174 cases instead of 106 in the case of 'reg1' and thus improve its explanatory power at the cost of 'tertiary' variable sacrifice.

However, the Member States of Angola, Brunei, Dominica, Kiribati, Libya, Lichtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, North Korea, Palau, San Marino, Somalia, South Korea, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Yemen will not be taken into account by any of our regression models since some of the variables values are missing in their cases.

[23] Other variables contain significantly lower number of missing values than 'tertiary': 'staffpopratio2' – 0 missing values, 'immunization' – 2 values missing (Lichtenstein and Nauru), 'watersource' – 12 missing values (Brunei, Dominica, Libya, Lichtenstein, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Somalia, South Korea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen), 'internetusers' – 4 values missing (Nauru, Palau, San Marino, South Korea), 'stability' – 0 missing values, and 'logcontribution' – 0 missing values. Consequently, the 'reg1' model takes into account 106 and the 'reg3' 174 cases out of 193 Member States in total.

Let us now proceed to the analysis itself. By running the abovementioned regressions in R, we get the following results summarized in a table:

Table 1- Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression results (table)

	Dependent variable:				
	logstaffpopratio				
	(reg1)	(reg2)	(reg3)	(reg4)	(reg5)
tertiary	0.008	0.011^{*}			
	(0.005)	(0.005)			
loglackofimmunization	0.338^{***}	0.359^{***}	0.259^{***}	0.298^{***}	-0.096
	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.089)
loglackofwatersource	-0.313^{*}	-0.305^{*}	-0.426^{***}	-0.469^{***}	
	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.104)	(0.115)	
internetusers	0.019^{**}	0.015^{*}	0.020^{***}	0.017^{**}	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	
stability	0.351^{**}	0.312^{*}	0.394^{***}	0.372^{***}	
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.099)	(0.106)	
logcontribution	-0.357^{***}	-0.323^{***}	-0.371^{***}	-0.335^{***}	
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.048)	
Constant	4.929^{***}	4.373^{***}	5.746^{***}	5.345^{***}	1.398^{***}
	(0.729)	(0.804)	(0.551)	(0.701)	(0.197)
Observations	106	101	174	152	184
R^2	0.528	0.501	0.583	0.468	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.500	0.469	0.570	0.449	0.001
Note:			$^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$		

When eyeballing the coefficients above, we can tell that our analysis provides us with statistically significant results for majority of variables and reaches the R^2 of 0.528 in the case of original regression model or even 0.583 in the 'reg3' regression model. This number indicates that the 'reg1' model explains 52.8 % of the variability of the response data around its mean when considering 106 observations, and the 'reg3' model even 58.3 % building on 174 cases after the 'tertiary' variable removal.

The only variable lacking statistical significance is the tertiary education enrolment in the first regression model which suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between the total enrollment in tertiary education measured in percentage and the relative passive representation of a given country in terms of staff/population ratio when considering all the 106 Member States for which the data on the tertiary enrolment are available.

However, this result changes when we focus on the countries with a population of more than 588,234 in the 'reg2' model. When considering the subset of states for which the data of 'tertiary' variable are available and which have, at the same time, the population larger than 588,234, we get a statistically significant coefficient of 0.011. This number suggests, that with every extra percent of tertiary enrollment (other variables being held constant) the staff/population ratio grows by approximately 1.1 %[24]. This looks like a minor and even negligible change. However, when applied to a hypothetical case of a 10 million people country with the ideal staff/population ratio, the effect is more visible[25] and grows significantly when taking overrepresented and more populous countries into account. Therefore we can conclude that tertiary education enrolment rate has a positive effect on the passive representation of a state in the UN Secretariat when analyzing the Member States populated enough to be subject to at least one member of UN Secretariat in terms of the theory of representative bureaucracy only. However, we need to keep in mind that due to the absence of data for 87 countries in total (60 for the subset), this outcome does not cover the whole situation properly.

The rest of the analyzed variables shows statistically significant effects for all the regression models, be it for all the Member States, their subset based on the population size, taking or not-taking the tertiary education into account. In our interpretation, we will focus on our original model of 'reg1', even though it reflects only 106 cases. However, since the coefficients differ only in hundreds

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[24] All the coefficients were interpreted using following procedures suggested by Prof. Shmueli (2009): (1) For log-transformed dependent variable and non-transformed independent variable, we use the interpretation formula of *“a unit increase in X is associated with an average increase of 100(exp(b)-1) percent”* and (2) for both independent and dependent variable log-transformed *“a 1% increase in X is associated with an average 100*exp(d log(1.01)-1) percent increase in Y”*

[25] For a hypothetical country with a population of 10 million and the 'normative' staff/pop ratio of 1.7 per million people, an increase of 10 % in tertiary education enrolment would mean an increase in staff/population ratio by 1.9 UN staff members in total

across all the models, the outcomes can be generalized to all the 174 Member States with all the data available by introducing only minor changes to the interpretation.

Variable 'loglackofimmunization', however, even though its coefficient is statistically significant, does not reflect the relationship as we predicted. In fact, all the regression models outcomes suggest that the staff/population ratio decreases with increasing immunization. In our hypothesis, we predicted the opposite. This counterintuitive result in theory points to the presence of multicollinearity of two or more independent variables or/and non-linear relationship of the variables. This argument is further supported by a statistically insignificant negative coefficient when regressing 'logstaffpopratio' on 'loglackofimmunization' only ('reg5'). However, the variance inflation factor test does not provide us with results suggesting high multicollinearity. Therefore, we cannot satisfactorily explain the relationship between immunization and the degree of passive representation of a given state. Another variable representing disease prevention should be used to test the validity of our theoretical model. However, all the theoretically suitable variables reported by the World Bank (e.g. number of physicians per 1000 people) report large number of missing values which would dramatically decrease the explanatory power of our model. Since collection of suitable data is out of question in our case, we have to settle for the status quo.

The rest of the variables supports our hypothesis of staff/population ratio growing with the ability of a country to ensure the wellbeing and opportunities of its own people. The outcome coefficient of 'loglackofwatersource' in 'reg1' model suggests that a 10% increase in the access to improved water source is associated with a 3.13% increase in the staff/population ratio. This effect could be visible only in the cases of overrepresented or heavily populated countries. For a country with the ideal level of passive representativeness (1.7) the increase by 3.13% would mean 0.05321 staff member per million people more, which does not make much difference in the case of few million people country. However, when dealing with a country with population of about billion people, the level of access to water source matters.

Considering the access to information reflected in the variable 'internetusers', the 'reg1' model suggests that 1 internet user increase is associated with an average of 1.9 % increase in the staff/population ratio per million people. That is a huge associated growth. Imagine two countries with the populations of a billion people, one of them with 'internetusers'$_1$=95 and the other 'internetusers'$_2$=99, all other controlled characteristics being identic. Let us suppose that the first one has the ideal 'staffpopratio2' of 1.7 and therefore is represented by 1700 members of staff in the UN Secretariat. In this case, hypothetically, the second one would 'dispose' of 1829.2 staff members.

The change in the staff/population ratio associated with the variable of 'stability' is harder to imagine, since the 'stability ' index ranges approximately from –2.5 to 2.5 and one unit increase in this index (approx. one fifth of a possible range) thus reflects 35.1% increase in the staff/population ratio. Therefore if there were two identical countries with the only difference being their level of political stability (one of them having the value of Somalia (-2.74) and the other one the one of the New Zealand (1.45)) with 4.19 units apart, the more stable would be represented by almost 2.5 (247.1%) more staff members in the UN Secretariat than the latter. This is probably the most surprising outcome of our research due to the magnitude of associated growth.

Last but not least we need to evaluate the effect of the financial assessments being paid by member states to the UN budget. As we can see from the table above, we cannot agree with Novosad and Werker (2014) who argue that the economic power of a country is positively related to its representation in the UN secretariat. Based on our model, their claim might hold true when considering the raw numbers of UN Secretariat employees of given nationality but turns out not to when operating with the relative passive representativeness measured in staff/population ratio. In our case, a 10% increase in net contributions to the UN budget is associated with a 3.57/% decrease in staff/population ratio per million people. Even though it might seem counterintuitive, it can be easily explained by the fact that the largest contributors tend to have large populations too and the other way around. Moreover the outcome is also heavily associated with the dominance of small states when assessing the RQ1. States disposing of small populations tend to, in the majority of cases, be overrepresented in the UN Secretariat. Based on their small population and therefore lower gross national product in absolute terms, they also contribute a smaller amount in contributions, statistically. This situation might have been caused by the currently used EGD formula heavily prioritizing the membership factor over population. Consequentially, the negative coefficient is understandable and logical.

In sum, the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people such as easy access to nutrition, clean water, education, healthcare, infrastructure and absence of violence definitely seem to be one of the factors that lead to a better relative representation of a member State in the UN Secretariat at least when analyzed by the abovementioned model (Hypothesis 0 for RQ2 stating that there are no factors influencing the relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat rejected, Hypothesis 2 for RQ2 confirmed).

We found out that within this model, tertiary education enrolment rate has a positive effect on the passive representation of a state in the UN Secretariat when analyzing the Member States populated enough to be subject to at least one member of UN Secretariat in terms of the theory of representative bureaucracy only, percentage of internet users in the country and access to waters source exhibit a positive effect on its passive representation in all the conducted regression models, with a largest influencer being the 'stability' variable hypothetically capable of 247% increase in the staff/population ratio when considering the least and most stable country in the world.

The 'loglackofimmunization' variable however, exhibits ambiguous results. With its statistically significant positive coefficient it behaves against our theoretical presumptions. Even though it does not exhibits multicollinearity when testing for variance inflation factors, we still believe in the ambiguity being caused by some kind of multicollinearity since a negative coefficient changes to a positive one when introducing more variables. As a solution, another variable representing disease prevention should be used to test the validity of our theoretical model. However, since there is no such variable covering the majority of the UN member states available, a new data should be collected for further research. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Larger economic power measured in terms of the contributions to the UN budget, on the other hand, is not associated with a better passive representation of a country in the UN Secretariat operationalized as a ratio of the number of UN Secretariat staff with given national affiliation and the population of the examined country. On the contrary, it seems to be associated with the opposite – a significant decrease in the staff/population ratio. Even though changes in the 'contribution' variable are negatively associated with changes in the dependent variable, they are clearly not the only major factor having effect on the nation’s representation in the UN Secretariat. Therefore, we can reject the Hypothesis 1 for RQ2.

To conclude, we can answer the RQ2 by stating that the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people and low contributions to the UN budget are two of the factors associated with a better passive representation of a country in the UN Secretariat.

Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to apply the Public Administration Representative Bureaucracy theory addressing the lack of formal accountability of bureaucratic bodies on the case of the largest international bureaucracy in the world – the United Nations Secretariat. Stemming from Saltzstein's (1979, p. 469) claim stating that *"bureaucracy will be responsive to the interests and desires of important social groups in society if its personnel are drawn proportionately from these social groups and share the same values and attitudes as the groups they represent",* the thesis aspired to find out whether the UN Secretariat is a representative sample of the world population in terms of its bureaucrats' national affiliation (RQ1), and, if not, what are the factors associated with a better relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat (RQ2). Following hypotheses focused on the UN Secretariat were presented in the introductory part:

- **Hypothesis for RQ1:** We assume that the level of representativeness will come out differentiated and not equal among countries (Hypothesis for RQ1).
- **Hypothesis 0 for RQ2:** There might be no factors influencing the relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat if the level of representativeness of different Member States comes out equal or close to equal.
- **Hypothesis 1 for RQ2:** *"Democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic power"* (Novosad and Werker, 2014) might prove out to be the only major factors having effect on the nation representation in the UN Secretariat.
- **Hypothesis 2 for RQ2:** Internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people, such as easy access to nutrition, clean water, education, healthcare, infrastructure and absence of violence, might be associated with its higher representation in the UN Secretariat.

In the theoretical part, we presented the Representative Bureaucracy theory and its potential benefits to the study of international bureaucratic bodies. In chapter 2, we described the functioning of the UN Secretariat and concluded that the current system of "equitable geographical distribution" and its "desirable ranges" cannot ensure the representativeness and neutrality of the UN Secretariat as required by the representative bureaucracy theory. Therefore, it was appropriate to ask whether the UN Secretariat reflects the world population accurately, and, if not, what types of states are being favored by the current system.

The reasoning behind our hypotheses (especially the Hypothesis for RQ1 and Hypothesis 2 for RQ2) rests on our presumption that people struggling to satisfy their basic needs presumably cannot, or do not have any interest in seeking career positions within the UN Secretariat, and that to be able to represent a country in the UN Secretariat a person needs to possess certain skills and qualifications (e.g. college degree) and have access to relevant information (e.g. internet connection available).

To be able to answer the RQ1 and assess the validity of the related hypothesis, the 'representation' of a country in the UN Secretariat was operationalized as a staff/population ratio determined as the number of 'Professional and higher' UN Secretariat staff of given national affiliation divided by number of the country population multiplied by 10^6, and the 'UN Secretariat representativeness' as a situation where the staff/population ratios of all the Member States are equal or close-to equal. The staff/population ratios of every Member State were then calculated and compared between each other as well as with the ideal equal representation ratio of 1.71 staff members per million people of population computed as a total number of 'Professional and higher' UN Secretariat staff divided by the total population of all the member states. The country closest to this hypothetically 'ideal' level of representation turned out to be the Czech Republic with its staff/population ratio of 1.712 ranking 66th lowest (leaving 65 countries relatively underrepresented and 127 relatively overrepresented).

The representation of different Member States in the UN Secretariat came out as by no means equal. When calculating the staff/population ratios of every Member State we arrived at the values ranging from 0 to 128.91 with a mean of 8.24, median of 3.25, and standard deviation of 14.65 (for more illustrative view, see Appendices no. 1 and 2). No obvious common characteristics of the overrepresented/underrepresented countries were found. Small, in majority islandic, states dominate both ends of the table. Western Europe in general tends to be overrepresented along with other Western-minded democracies such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, as visible in the Appendix no. 2, they are accompanied in their overrepresentation by various countries be they small or large, rich or poor, democratic or authoritarian, spread out across all the continents. Similar situation supervenes on the opposite side of the spectrum among the underrepresented countries, with United Arab Emirates as the very unlikely representative of 0 staff members in the UN Secretariat. This situation does not change a lot even if we exclude the states with population lower than 588,235[26] people with the data ranging from 0 to 32.85 with a mean of 4.97, median of 2.51, and standard deviation of 5.92 (see Appendix no. 3). These numbers suggest more equality than in the first case, but they are still very far from equal representation of the world population represented by the staff/population ratio of 1.71 per each millions of population wherever in the world.

Therefore, we answered the RQ1 in terms that the UN Secretariat is not representative of the world population in the matter of its bureaucrats national affiliation (in the normative, representative bureaucracy sense of equality of people), and that the level of representativeness came out differentiated and not equal among countries which we had presupposed in our hypothesis.

Considering RQ2, the 'opportunities of people living in a country' were operationalized as a combination of their access to education, health, information infrastructure, and political stability. Statistical effects of the 'tertiary', 'watersource', 'immunization', 'internetusers', 'stability', and 'contributions' variables on the staff/population ratio were assessed one by one while holding other independent variables constant through the employment of the Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression method.

By doing this, we found out that within our model tertiary education enrolment rate had a positive effect on the passive representation of a state in the UN Secretariat when analyzing the subset of states with the population of 588,235 people or more only, percentage of internet users in the country and access to watersource exhibited a positive effect on its passive representation in all the conducted regression models, with a largest influencer being the 'stability' variable hypothetically capable of 247% increase in the staff/population ratio when considering the least and most stable country in the world. The 'immunization' variable, however, exhibited ambiguous results presenting the opposite effect than forecasted. Even though it did not exhibit multicollinearity when testing for variance inflation factors, we still believe in the ambiguity being caused by some kind of multicollinearity since a negative coefficient changes to a positive one when introducing more variables.

[26] Number of people hypothetically needed for a country to be subject to 1 member of staff in the UN Secretariat according to the Representative Bureaucracy theory

In our research we thus showed, that the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people is one of the factors that are associated with a better relative representation of a member State in the UN Secretariat. Thus, Hypothesis 0 for RQ2 stating that there are no factors influencing the relative representation of a Member State in the UN Secretariat was rejected, and Hypothesis 2 for RQ2 confirmed.

Larger economic power measured in terms of the contributions to the UN budget, on the other hand, was found not to be associated with a better passive representation of a country in the UN Secretariat according to our analysis. On the contrary, it seemed to be associated with the opposite – a significant decrease in the staff/population ratio. However, even though a statistically significant relationship between the two variables was found, the economic power is clearly not the only major factor having effect on the Member State representation in the UN Secretariat. Therefore, we rejected also the Hypothesis 1 for RQ2.

In sum, the RQ2 was answered in terms that internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people and low contributions to the UN budget are the factors associated with better passive representation of a country in the UN Secretariat identified in our research.

Possible downsides of our research design we are aware of can be summarized as follows: First of all, it needs to be emphasized that our research was purely theoretical aimed at confronting an ideal normative state with a real situation uncovering the space for potential improvements. Nonetheless, we do not want to claim that this hypothetically ideal state we are in search for would be feasible, sustainable, and even desirable in the real world system. We only focused on exposing the shortcomings in the current system of UN secretariat staffing and their consequences, not on the quest for solutions. Secondly, in this thesis, we built on the Representative Bureaucracy theory based on the on the presumption that the *"mechanisms of representativeness are the linkage of social characteristics to values and values to behavior and policy"* (Saltzstein, 1979, p. 467). In our research we thus supposed that the nationality of a UN Secretariat staff member is a good representative of their values, behavior at work and policy outcome. However, we must acknowledge that there might be a discrepancy between the values of staff and those of their co-nationals stemming e.g. from an incompatibility of values and interests of the country governing elite and its citizens or from the fact that the representatives are living far from their homes and consequently the compliance of their values with that of their co-nationals might be gradually weakening or permanently lost. Thirdly, we are aware that the satisfactory explanatory power of our model rests on the variables we chose to employ. We do not deny the possibility of discrepant outcomes if our research problem was operationalized in a different way. Last but not least, even if we believe that people's opportunities are one of the important explanatory variables in the UN Secretariat composition, we do not deny a possible effect of other conditions, such as abovementioned hard politics factors or even the existence of corruption, nepotism, and social inequality in the countries concerned.

Therefore, we suggest following improvements to be implemented into a future research on the topic. Firstly, the relationship between the national affiliation of UN Secretariat staff and their values and behaviour should be researched. This would help to clarify whether the Representative Bureaucracy theory is a suitable concept for the UN Secretariat or not. Secondly, a different variable representing disease prevention should be used to test the validity of our theoretical model. As we did not find other sources of suitable data, a new data collection might be needed to verify our research outcomes. Thirdly, different variables should be used for operationalization of our research model to verify its validity. Last but not least, similar studies examining different factors associated with a better Member State representation in the UN Secretariat should be carried out to uncover the fullest possible model of the representation in the UN Secretariat.

In conclusion, even though the thesis was very idealistic in its nature focusing on a purely normative question of democratic representativeness, multiple take away points transferable into practice can be drawn from our research. Firstly, it is obvious that in spite of the UN claiming to fight all kinds of inequality in the world and its current motto: *"It's your world!"* (UN, 2016d), its Secretariat does not reflect the world population satisfactorily. Moreover, even the existing 'Equitable Geographical Distribution' requirement seems to be outdated and not reflecting the current state of the organization even if we accept its prescribed calculations of the desirable ranges since it is used to allocate approximately one fourth of the 'Professional and higher' posts in the UN Secretariat only. Therefore, it is high time the UN started thinking about a reform giving more weight to the population factor which would be applied to all the 'Professional and higher' posts in the UN Secretariat to live up to its equality and democracy commitments.

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List of Appendices

Appendices

Appendix no. 1: RQ1 - Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State (graph)



Appendix no. 2: RQ1 - Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State (map)



Appendix no. 3: RQ1 - Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State - Subset of Member States of Population Equal or Larger than 588,235 (graph)



Appendix no. 4: Dataset (table)

Complete dataset named “finaldataset.csv” with 193 observations (Member States) and 10 variables can be found on the CD attached.

Appendix no. 5: R Script (text)

```
setwd("C:/Users/krist/Dropbox/DP/R")
finaldataset <- read.csv("C:/Users/krist/Dropbox/DP/R/finaldataset", sep="")
install.packages("foreign")
install.packages("car")
install.packages("lmtest")
install.packages("MASS")
install.packages("stargazer")
install.packages( "e1071")
library(car)
library(lmtest)
library(foreign)
library(MASS)
library(stargazer)
library(e1071)

#RQ1 #dependent variable creation
finaldataset$staffpopratio <- finaldataset$pstaff/finaldataset$population
finaldataset$staffpopratio2<-finaldataset$staffpopratio*1000000
RQ1<-subset(finaldataset, select=c(Country.Name, Country.Code, staffpopratio2))
RQ1b <- RQ1[order(RQ1$staffpopratio2),]
par(mar = c(8.5, 4, 3, 0) + 0.2)
barplot(RQ1b$staffpopratio2, main="Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State",
ylab="Number of UN Secretariat staff per million people of population", names.arg =
RQ1b$Country.Name, cex.lab=0.8, cex.names = 0.35, las=2, col=topo.colors(193))
RQ1_final<-subset(RQ1b, select=c(Country.Name, Country.Code, staffpopratio2))
write.csv(RQ1_final, file="RQ1_final")
install.packages("rworldmap")
library(rworldmap)
par(mar = c(8.5, 0, 3, 0) + 0.2)
data(finaldataset)
sPDF <- joinCountryData2Map(finaldataset,joinCode = "ISO3",nameJoinColumn = "Country.Code",
verbose=TRUE, mapResolution = "coarse")
mapDevice() #create world map shaped window
mapCountryData(sPDF,nameColumnToPlot='staffpopratio2', catMethod="quantiles", colourPalette =
"heat", mapTitle="Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State", addLegend =
TRUE)

# excluding countries not enough populated
popullated<-subset(finaldataset, population>=588235)
write.csv(popullated, file="popullated")
RQ1p<-subset(popullated, select=c(Country.Name, Country.Code, staffpopratio2))
RQ1pb <- RQ1p[order(RQ1p$staffpopratio2),]
RQ1pb_final<-subset(RQ1pb, select=c(Country.Name, Country.Code, staffpopratio2))
write.csv(RQ1pb_final, file="RQ1pb")
par(mar = c(8.5, 4, 3, 0) + 0.2)
barplot(RQ1pb$staffpopratio2,main="Passive Representation in the UN Secretariat by Member State",
ylab="Number of UN Secretariat staff per million people of population", names.arg =
RQ1pb$Country.Name, cex.lab=0.8, cex.names = 0.35, las=2, col=topo.colors(193))
```

```
summary(RQ1pb$staffpopratio2)
sd(RQ1pb$staffpopratio2, na.rm = TRUE)

#RQ2 # finaldataset varibles density control
popdensity<-density(finaldataset$population, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(popdensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$population))
staffdensity<-density(finaldataset$pstaff, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(staffdensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$pstaff))
psrdensity<-density(finaldataset$staffpopratio2, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(psrdensity)
waterdensity<-density(finaldataset$watersource, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(waterdensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$watersource))
finaldataset[is.na(finaldataset$watersource),]
tertiarydensity<-density(finaldataset$tertiary, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(tertiarydensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$tertiary))
internetusersdensity<-density(finaldataset$internetusers, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(internetusersdensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$internetusers))
stabilitydensity<-density(finaldataset$stability, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(stabilitydensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$stability))
ontributionsdensity<-density(finaldataset$contribution, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(contributionsdensity)
immunizationdensity<-density(finaldataset$immunization, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(immunizationdensity)
table(is.na(finaldataset$immunization))
# finaldataset varibles skewness control
skewness(finaldataset$staffpopratio2)
skewness(finaldataset$contribution)
skewness(finaldataset$immunization, na.rm =TRUE)
skewness (finaldataset$watersource, na.rm =TRUE)
skewness(finaldataset$stability)
skewness(finaldataset$tertiary, na.rm =TRUE)
skewness(finaldataset$internetusers, na.rm =TRUE)

#dependent variable transformation
finaldataset$logstaffpopratio<-log(finaldataset$staffpopratio2)
logstaffpopratiodensity<-density(finaldataset$logstaffpopratio, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(logstaffpopratiodensity)
finaldataset$logstaffpopratio[finaldataset$logstaffpopratio=="-Inf"] <- NA
#independent variable transformation and density control
finaldataset$logcontribution<-log(finaldataset$contribution)
lcdensity<-density(finaldataset$logcontribution, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(lcdensity)
finaldataset$lackofimmunization<-100-(finaldataset$immunization)
finaldataset$loglackofimmunization<-log(finaldataset$lackofimmunization)
llimdensity<-density(finaldataset$loglackofimmunization, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(llimdensity)
finaldataset$lackofwatersource<-100-(finaldataset$watersource)
finaldataset$loglackofwatersource<-log1p(finaldataset$lackofwatersource)
llwdensity<-density(finaldataset$loglackofwatersource, na.rm=TRUE)
```

```
plot(llwdensity)

#subsetting
popullated<-subset(finaldataset, population>=588235)
# popullated varibles density control
plog2pspr2density<-density(popullated$logp2spr2, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(plog2pspr2density)
ptertiarydensity<-density(popullated$tertiary, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(ptertiarydensity)
pinternetusersdensity<-density(popullated$internetusers, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(pinternetusersdensity)
pstabilitydensity<-density(popullated$stability, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(pstabilitydensity)
plcdensity<-density(popullated$logcontribution, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(plcdensity)
pllimdensity<-density(popullated$loglackofimmunization, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(pllimdensity)
pllwdensity<-density(popullated$loglackofwatersource, na.rm=TRUE)
plot(pllwdensity)

#regression
reg1<-lm(logstaffpopratio~tertiary + loglackofimmunization +loglackofwatersource +internetusers
+stability +logcontribution, data=finaldataset)
summary(reg1)
vif(reg1)
bptest(reg1)
residualPlots(reg1)

reg2<-lm(logstaffpopratio~tertiary + loglackofimmunization +loglackofwatersource +internetusers
+stability +logcontribution, data=popullated)
summary(reg2)
vif(reg2)
bptest(reg2)
residualPlots(reg2)
reg3<-lm(logstaffpopratio~loglackofimmunization +loglackofwatersource +internetusers +stability
+logcontribution, data=finaldataset)
summary(reg3)
vif(reg3)
bptest(reg3)
residualPlots(reg3, fitted=T)

reg4<-lm(logstaffpopratio~loglackofimmunization +loglackofwatersource +internetusers +stability
+logcontribution, data=popullated)
summary(reg4)
vif(reg4)
bptest(reg4)
residualPlots(reg4, fitted=T)

reg5<-lm(logstaffpopratio~loglackofimmunization, data=finaldataset)
summary(reg5)
stargazer(reg1,reg2, reg3, reg4, reg5, type="html", out="output.htm", omit.stat=c("f", "ser"),
star.cutoffs = c(0.05, 0.01, 0.001))
```

Institute of Political Studies
Master's Thesis Proposal

Univerzita Karlova v Praze

Fakulta sociálních věd

Institut politologických studií

Projekt diplomové práce

UN Secretariat: Representative sample of the world population or dominance of specific groups?
Sekretariát OSN: Reprezentativní vzorek světové populace nebo převaha určitých skupin?

Jméno: Kristýna Bartošová
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Ročník: druhý
Akademický rok: 2015/2016
Datum odevzdání: 20. 9. 2015

Introduction (societal and academic relevance of the topic, delimitation of the topic)

Today, we are living in a globalized world where nation states are no longer the only actors present nor the most influencing ones. On the contrary, as many prominent scholars agree (e.g. Duffield 2007, Keohane 1998, Koremenos et al. 2001, Martin and Simmons 2012, Rittberger and Zangl 2006), the power of international institutions, international organizations (IOs) notwithstanding, is on the rise, and their influence over our day-to-day reality is gradually becoming more and more visible and in some cases even indispensable for maintaining the present-day world order (Keohane and Nye 2001). Accordingly, international organizations, their existence, functioning and impact have served as one of the main topics of both international relations (IR) scholarship and policymaking efforts since 1990s and still continues to grow in importance (Martin and Simmons 2012, Duffield 2007).

Such a development of IOs happens due to the fact, that some of the crucial questions of contemporary global politics, e.g. the non-proliferation, disarmament, global warming, health issues, poverty, etc. cannot be dealt with effectively on the national level anymore. As these issues are multiplying and growing in importance over the years, the national states tend to transmit their competences to supra-national bodies, i.e. the international organizations, to coordinate tackling of these issues globally or at least internationally. In this way the given international organization is gaining more and more power and influence over time.

This is also the case while looking at the only universal global international organization, the United Nations Organization (UN), its bodies and organs whose structure has been developing and growing since its foundation in 1945. Both the focus and the scope of work of the UN have widen extensively. Today, UN fulfils its objectives in maintaining the international peace and security, promoting sustainable development, protecting human rights, upholding international law and delivering humanitarian aid (UN 2015) through its organs and with the assistance of its funds, programs and specialized agencies[27].

This paper will focus on one of the most powerful UN organs which is yet a bit hidden from the eyes of observers - the UN Secretariat - and its representativeness of the

[27] For more information see http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/funds-programmes-specialized-agencies-and-others/index.html (UN 2015a)

world population. It will explore whether different nationalities are being equally represented in the Secretariat and whether the actual allocation of seats favors specific groups or not.

Literature Review, Theoretical Framework

Not much academic literature exists within the topic of Staffing the UN Secretariat or its geographical distribution. First article dealing with the topic was Richard N. Swift's *Personnel Problems and the United Nations Secretariat* published in 1957 summarizing achievements and persisting challenges of Secretariat recruitment in 1950s including geographical distribution problem in growing United Nations (Swift 1957).

The geographical distribution question stayed on the scholars' list and even took on special interest and urgency in the 1960s with sixteen new African members coming in 1960 and Soviet Union demanding more control over the Secretariat. In this time the academia tried to describe and analyze the ongoing situation, negotiations and Secretariat's policy outcomes to address this issue and recruitment practices in general. They also referred to rising attempts of governments to politicize the recruitment and promotion processes (Goodrich 1962, Kay 1966, Reymond 1967). This was still the case in 1976 when Theodor Meron pointed out the rising politicization of the UN administrative body compared to the original Charter and warned about its effects that might have lead the adjustment of UN Secretariat to an intergovernmental rather than supranational body lacking neutrality and confidence of some member states (Meron 1976).

After the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and unblocking of the Security Council in 1990s the situation stabilized and geographical distribution of the UN Secretariat disappeared from the scholarly literature.

Twenty years later, in 2014, Novosad and Werker finally shifted from the descriptive style to more analytic and exploratory approach by publishing their article *Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat*. They constructed a 60-year dataset, by nationality, of senior positions in the secretariat and found out that, statistically, democracy, wealth, economic power and diplomatic contacts are good predictors of the share of senior positions held by a country in the UN secretariat and that the most overrepresented countries in the Secretariat are small rich democracies such as Norway (Novosad and Werker 2014).

In the thesis, we will build on theoretical findings of representative bureaucracy theory originally proposed within the public administration scholarship in the 1940s by the work of Kingsley (1944) (Meier 1975, Saltzstein 1979) and greatly developed ever since by various scholars applying this concept to different administrative bodies ranging from local to national and covering whole range of policy issues (e.g. Andrews et al 2014, Clark et al 2013, Grissom et al 2009, Kennedy 2014, Lim 2006, Meier 1975, Saltzstein 1979, Selden 1997).

Representative bureaucracy theory addresses the issue of rising power of bureaucratic/administrative bodies lacking electoral and other types of accountability in general. This notion of contemporary politics undermines the idea of democracy since a non-elected body can hugely influence and determine the policy outcomes against public interest (Kennedy 2014, Meier 1975, Selden 1997) by *"specifying and implementing the details of program regulations and controlling the flow of daily operations"* (Selden 1997: 718). This is also the case of UN Secretariat which serves as an UN executive organ, carries out the substantive and administrative tasks of the UN, sets the agenda of other major organs, implements their decisions and administers the programs and policies adopted by them (United Nations 2004).

Representative bureaucracy theory tries to reconcile this tension by suggesting that *"bureaucracy will be responsive to the interests and desires of important social groups in society if its personnel are drawn proportionately from these social groups and share the same values and attitudes as the groups they represent*" (Saltzstein 1979: 469). In other words, it is necessary to staff the bureaucracy (a sample) proportionally from all the societal groups, so that it reflects the values of the society in whole and the policy outcomes correspond to those produced if all the society (population) participated in the process (Meier, 1975: 528).

However, as claimed e.g. by Meier (1975) and Kennedy (2014), there is no common definition of the representative bureaucracy concept. Even though all the concerned scholars agree on its central features mentioned above, many inconsistencies can be found (Kennedy 2014). For the purposes of our research we will stem from the following definitions as provided in Kennedy's (2014: 400) research:

> "Kranz (1975: 123): "Representative bureaucracy is one in which the ratio of each minority group in a particular government agency equals that group's percentage in the population in the area served by that office"

Rehfuss (1986: 454): “Representative bureaucracies, composed of individuals with commitments to varied group interests, occupations and classes, presumably assure internal bureaucracy struggles will produce broadly representative policies”

Meier (1993: 393): “A bureaucracy is representative in the passive sense if the bureaucrats share the same demographic origins (race, sex, education, religion, etc.) as the general population . . . A bureaucracy is an active representative if it produces policy outputs that benefit the individuals who are passively represented””

Research aims, Research questions, hypotheses

If we depart from these definitions, adjust them to our research topic and focus only on the notion of Meier’s (1993) passive representation, we can presume that according to the bureaucratic representation theory the UN Secretariat would produce broadly representative policies if it was composed of individuals of varied nationalities at the same ratio as in the world population.

Accordingly, in order to be seen as an unbiased, democratic and impartial global organ we would expect equal or close-to-equal representation of every human being living on our planet in the UN Secretariat. To consider UN Secretariat really democratic and impartial, it would have to, in theory, grant every individual the same power to influence the activities of the organ, i.e. to provide the same level of probability of getting a post in the UN Secretariat for every human being on the planet independently of his nationality.

However, considering the real world settings in which variety of different historical, economic, political and other factors influencing representation of countries in IOs can be identified and taking into consideration the outcomes of Novosad’s and Werker’s (2014) research, we assume that the level of representativeness will come out differentiated and not equal among countries.

We also argue that those “hard” and international politics factors such as economic power, wealth, diplomatic contacts, alliances etc., as identified by Novosad and Werker (2014), are not the only ones having impact on the countries’ representation ratio in the UN Secretariat. On the other hand, we believe that the internal capacity of a country to ensure wellbeing and opportunities of its people, such as easy access to nutrition, clean water, education, healthcare, infrastructure and absence of violence, can lead to its higher representation in the UN Secretariat, too.

We believe so as we assume that people struggling to satisfy their basic needs such as need for appropriate nutrition (including water), sanitation, education and healthcare, presumably cannot or do not have slight interest in seeking career positions within the UN Secretariat. Another line of this thesis argumentation points to the fact that to be able to represent a country in UN Secretariat you need to possess certain skills and qualifications (e.g. college degree) and have access to relevant information (e.g. internet connection available).

This leads us to the following hypothesis: **Growing opportunities of people living in a country lead to the increase of given country's relative representation in the UN Secretariat**. The aim of this thesis is to prove this hypothesis right or wrong through answering following research questions:

RQ1: Is the UN Secretariat representative of the world population in terms of countries' staff/population ratio?

RQ2: If not, to what extent is the relative representation of a given country influenced by the opportunities of people living there?

By answering these we explore, whether individuals of different nationalities worldwide are equally or close-to-equally represented in the UN Secretariat, in other words, whether their representation is fair enough for such an important international body (e.g. as in the theory of representative democracy) or whether there are some countries being favored based on their internal capacity to ensure wellbeing of their own people.

Conceptualization of key terms and variables

a. Representativeness

By representativeness we mean a quality of something reflecting accurately upon a sample (Yourdictionary.com 2015). In terms of UN Secretariat, its representativeness can be defined as equal a priori probability of an individual being selected into the secretariat, across countries.

b. Opportunities of people living in a country

By opportunities of people living in a country we mean regular's people access to satisfaction of their basic needs - education, nutrition, disease prevention, healthcare, information, political stability and absence of violence.

c. UN Assessments

UN Assessments are the *"amount of money that the General Assembly determines should be assessed to finance the approved appropriation, which is shared among Member States to pay for the expenses of the Organization"* (UN Committee on Contributions 2015).

Operationalization of key terms and variables

a. Representativeness

In this paper we operationalize representativeness as the number of UN Secretariat staff with given national affiliation divided by number of the country's population ("staff/population ratio"). We can decide whether the UN Secretariat is representative of the world population in terms of national affiliation while comparing the staff/population ratios of different countries and identifying the differences between them. If they are equal or close to equal, we can speak about UN Secretariat being representative of the world population.

b. Opportunities of people living in a country

We operationalize opportunities of people living in a country and its different factors as follows:

i. **Education** – to measure educational opportunities we use two indicators retrieved from World Bank (WB) Development Indicators – literacy rate – "literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)", onwards referred as "literacy" – and enrolment in tertiary education – "school enrolment, tertiary (% gross)", referred as "tertiary" in the paper (World Bank 2015)

ii. **Health** – to measure health we decided to divide this category into three separate ones:

   a. **Disease prevention** – measured as % of population with access to improved water source ("Improved water source (% of population with access)", one of the indicators of WB Development Indicators, World Bank 2015), referred as "watersource" in the paper

   b. **Health Services** – operationalized as number of physicians per 1000 people ("Physicians (per 1,000 people)", one of the indicators of WB Development Indicators, World Bank 2015), referred as "physicians" in the thesis

   c. **Appropriate nutrition** – operationalized as depth of the food deficit ("Depth of the food deficit (kilocalories per person per day)", one of the indicators of WB Development Indicators, World Bank 2015), referred as "fooddeficit" below

iii. **Information infrastructure** – as a number of internet users per 100 people ("Internet users (per 100 people)", one of the indicators of WB Development Indicators, World Bank 2015), referred as "internetusers"

iv. **Political Stability and absence of violence/terrorism** – as identically named indicator in WB Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 2015a), referred as "stability" in the paper

c. Financial contribution per country

In our research, we operationalize country's financial contribution as net financial contributions of a state to the UN budget. We name this variable "contribution" and use UN Secretariat assessment data (UN Committee on Contributions 2015a) per country.

Methodology

To be able to answer our research questions and assess the validity of the hypothesis, we will use descriptive and inferential statistics tools.

To answer the RQ1 descriptive statistics will be employed. Different countries will be used as nominal independent variables and their staff/population ratios as dependent variable. We will plot all the countries into the bar chart, identify the measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion. In the end, we will interpret the data observed and describe the representation of different countries in the Secretariat.

To assess the validity of RQ2 and our hypothesis, multiple regression statistical technique will be employed with staff/population ratio as a dependent variable and "literacy", "tertiary", "watersource", "physicians", "fooddeficit", "internetusers" and "stability" as independent variables. As we noted earlier in the text, we also believe in the impact of economic and political factors on the number of the staff of given nationality. Therefore, we include the UN "contributions" per country as a control variable to the regression, too. With the help of multiple regression, we will be able to decide, whether there is a statistically significant relationship between independent and dependent variables and therefore whether our hypothesis does or does not correspond to reality.

As it was mentioned above, for the independent variables, primary data coming from World bank databases (World Bank 2015 and 2015a - Worldwide governance indicators and Development indicators, for the variables called “literacy”, “tertiary”, “watersource”, “physicians”, “fooddeficit”, “internetusers” and “stability”), UN assessments database (for the variable “contributions”, UN Committee on Contributions 2015a) will be used. Our dependent variable – the staff population ratio – will be constructed from number of staff per nationality coming from the 2013 Report of the Secretary-General on Composition of the Secretariat: Staff Demographics (UN General Assembly 2013), and “population” variable data coming from UN Population Division Database (UN Population Division 2015). For all the variables we will use the data from 2013 since they are the most recent available for some of the variables.

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8. Conclusion

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