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American "Foreign Policy" in Film

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Summary

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Introduction

There are two main questions at the heart of this work. The first question is: What happens when Campbell's concept of "foreign policy" is applied to a different identifier than the one with which he worked? What happens when the identification comes from the sub-elite rather than the elite? The second question is: What does the answer from the first question mean for the concept of national identity in general, and American identity in particular? What does this new view mean for the concepts, the daily perceptions, and the uses of identity?

This work will argue that the application of "foreign policy" to a group distanced from the role of Foreign Policy not only results in a different national identification, but it results in a contradictory national identification. This difference should have consequences for not only the concept of national identity, but the use of that concept as well; challenging the place of "inside/outside" in the theoretical discourse. In terms of the daily perceptions and uses of national identity, the various and oft discussed fractures and anomalies within society should be viewed again with a new eye towards their inception, mode of sustainment, and aims where the overall binding structures can no longer be taken as given. Protestations and mistrust can be steps on the way to greater unity, but they can also be steps on the way to dissolution.

Literature Review[1]

This work is mainly concerned with building on and responding to the argument in Campbell's *Writing Security*. Since Campbell's work is central to this work, it will be discussed in greater detail on its own in the following chapter. It is sufficient for now to pull out a few terms and concepts to make sense of the other texts that will be covered first. Campbell's argument concerns American identity creation (what he terms foreign policy) through the act of traditional Foreign Policy (meaning the actions/interactions of a state towards/with the world).[2] It is a Reflectivist work, attempting to understand the concepts of identity and identification. Campbell concludes that "America" must always identify itself vis-à-vis an enemy; but that while this enemy may take on different structural appearances (i.e. being different states), it is ultimately always the same post-structural concepts of chaos and barbarism that America is at odds with.[3]

As regards the contributions and contributors from outside of IR, those concerned with discourse analysis have had a tremendously important impact, especially as regards to this work. Brown and Yule's *Discourse Analysis* is an example. Though the text is grounded heavily in philosophy of language and linguistics, or perhaps because of it, their understanding and dissection of discourse can be found among the first steps of any further analysis. They define discourse as, "a dynamic process in which language was used as an instrument of communication in a context by a speaker/writer to express meanings and achieve intentions."[4] Due to the dynamic nature of discourse, "it is necessary to know … who the speaker and hearer are, and the time and place of the production of the discourse,"[5] in order to properly analyze and understand a particular instance of discourse. Furthermore, due in part to this contextuallity of time, space, and participants, it is important to recognize "what a speaker can imply, suggest, or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says."[6] These three points in particular are important to the formation of this work.

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[1] Large parts of this chapter were first written for, and may be found in: George Hays II, "The Effects of Cold War Speech in the Post-Cold War World: Identification of the Enemy in the War on Terror" (MA diss., Charles University, 2009).; George Hays II, "Three Incarnations of *The Quiet American*," *Perspectives* Vol. 20 No. 1 (2012).; and George Hays II, "American 'Foreign Policy' in Film," *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 2 (2014).

[2] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity: Revised Edition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

[3] Campbell, *Writing Security*.

[4] Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 26.

[5] Brown and Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, 27.

[6] Brown and Yule. *Discourse Analysis*, 31.

Where Brown and Yule provide an introduction, the work of Titscher, Jenner, and Meyer provide a clarification. Their *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning* is an almost encyclopedic catalog spawned from, and aimed at making sense of, the disparate and dynamic methods and theories subsumed under "discourse analysis." They investigate, record, and describe twelve disciplines and sub-disciplines which claim in some manner the title of discourse analysis, from grammarians and philosophers to socio-politico scientists concerned with critical discourse analysis.

Critical discourse analysis, as developed over the last thirty to forty years, has produced certain theoretical principles. Critical discourse analysis is not concerned with isolated language, but with the impact of and interaction between language and society. In this way, language and society are seen to shape and be shaped by each other, as well as, unitedly, to constitute discourse itself. Traditionally, power-relations are intimately involved with discourse, and as such studying the relationship between power and discourse is key. Other areas uniquely related with discourse are general social conditions in a culture as well as ideologies in a culture. Though a particular discourse must be analyzed with an understanding towards its historical context, it must also be recognized to connect with, impact, and be impacted by other discourses. Finally, critical discourse analysis, by being both interpretative and explanatory in nature, is dynamic and is always open to new interpretations based on new contexts and information.[7]

A key distinction of critical discourse analysis from other forms of discourse analysis is its concept of context. Context is usually understood in terms of the relations of the different parts of the discourse to itself and/or to the setting the discourse is in.[8] In critical discourse analysis, context is understood to be in terms of the surrounding language and setting of the discourse, its relations to other discourses, and the cultural knowledge brought to the discourse by its participants.[9] This unique combination strives to lay bare "the frequently unclear and hidden ideological effects of language use … [and] power-relations."[10] With its interest in ideologies, power-relations, and social conditions, one of the main applications of critical discourse analysis has been in the area of identifying, and the striving to resolve, inherent prejudices; be they sexual, racial, or other forms.[11] However, the areas of application extend to all themes of social power.

The issue of contextual meaning is immensely important for this work, especially as it stands juxtaposed to inherent meaning.[12] Ricoeur's *The Rule of Metaphor*, Benveniste's *Problems in General Linguistics*, and Richards *Philosophy of Rhetoric* all speak to this issue (see discussion in "The Argument" section below). The difference, and perhaps even conflict between these two should be easily seen existing similarly between the Rationalists and the Reflectivists. One of the points of this work, however, is to show how the conflict, and indeed the confusion, between these two forms of meaning exist within and among the Reflectivists (see the discussion on Cederman below in this section).

In addition to these, perhaps, lesser-knowns, dominant influences on Reflectivism from outside of IR are shared by Derrida and Foucault especially. The respective works of each are numerous and deep, though two concepts in particular stand out and are of tremendous importance; not just to the field but also to this work.

In many ways, Derrida gave birth to the heart of Reflectivism, at least the shade under which this work rests. Much of the fruit of his work came from the philosophical debate about the meaning and function of *logos*:[13] whether the spoken word somehow has some primary structural attachment to meaning; or whether, as in the written word, it is all signs and context. Derrida comes down on the side of

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[7] Stefan Titscher et al, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 146.
[8] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,* 147.
[9] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,* 147-148.
[10] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,*147.
[11] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,* 147.
[12] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), Study 3.
[13] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

context, on the absence of inherent structural meaning between sign and signified, and he does it by way of deconstruction.[14]

Deconstruction examines the dichotomous and hierarchical meanings within words. Each word, in order to have meaning, contains the context of its opposite as well: up/down, in/out, man/woman, civilized/barbaric, etc. These internal contexts have several consequences, especially since they are connected to (if also separable from) some speaker. As Foucault stresses throughout several of his works,[15] not only are statements of "truth" and "knowledge" no longer true or factual, they are connected to a hierarchization of society and power in a sick circular dance of power-knowledge-truth creation and reinforcement.

That "truth" is a moral and normative concept replete with a continuing story affected by the power-knowledge duo in the form of the elite is essential to this work; for in essence it is the same message as is this work. "Truth"-applied is identity, and this work seeks to demonstrate that such application is being performed without (and in contradiction to) the elite and its wielding of that duo.

There is another thinker who is important to mention regarding deconstruction, and this thinker and his work will return us again to the realms of IR. Ashley's application of deconstruction through the process of double reading demonstrates another key aspect of the contextuality within words: that of the obfuscation of concepts and arguments, purposefully or not. Double reading is the act of "reading" or examining a statement or argument as a monologue, effectively being empathetic to the author, and then examining the same statement or argument as a dialogue, effectively deconstructing the key words that lie at the heart of the statement or argument and seeing what differences emerge between the two versions.[16] By "reading" the Rationalist discourse regarding sovereignty and anarchy in this manner, Ashley demonstrates how the concept of sovereignty is decoupled from the state and, with it, the boundaries between inside/domestic/sovereignty and outside/international/anarchy blur away.[17] The understanding of the ordered and bounded state at the Rationalist core melts and dissipates.

The concept of double reading, specifically the dialogical function of deconstruction, is central to this work. What is more, Ashley's investigation into the problem of sovereignty/anarchy, inside/outside, and state/non-state is one of the main departure points for us. The contributions of Derrida, Foucault, and Ashley as a whole to Reflectivist thought, and thereby to the thoughts and arguments presented here, are immeasurable. That reality, truth, and knowledge are created rather than given; that language acting as a lens both shapes and distorts these concepts and our relationships with them and through them; and that in the hierarchy of meaning within words lies a power construct all alter the understanding of "reality," identity, and all of the components going in to each.

Having gone through some general background, it is now time to enter in on some more specific points relevant for us here. There are several levels and components in this work that touch upon areas of investigation discussed elsewhere. The time periods and events at the core of this work are tied to the Cold War and the transitions between the Cold War and the post-Cold War 90's as well as the transition from the 90's to the decade beginning with the September 11 attacks. The Cold War and the War on Terror, both separately and linked through the 90's, have been fertile ground for metaphorical analysis as evidenced by (in addition to Campbell's *Writing Security*) Ivie's three chapters on Cold War metaphor in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, Parry-Giles' *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, Cameron's *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War* and Colas's *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' after the Cold War*. As Colas and Cameron bridge the Cold War and post-Cold War worlds, others have looked exclusively at the War on Terrorism,

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[14] Derrida, *Of Grammatology*.

[15] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).; Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2005).; Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2008).; Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2003).

[16] Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol.17, No.2 (1988): 229-235.

[17] Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," 241-251.

such as Jackson's *Writing the War on Terrorism*, as well as Hodges and Nilep's *Discourse, War and Terrorism*. While these works, and many others like them, concentrate on textual analysis of policy-maker pronouncements, others have ventured into the area of metaphors in the arts, including film.

Drulak's *Metaphors of the Cold War* (*Metafory Studene Valky*) looks at both the American and Soviet understandings of the Cold War in the areas of political pronouncements, theorists' pronouncements, and artistic pronouncements. These investigations, however, all concentrate on identifying the Cold War primarily, with identification of the participants being secondary and/or by virtue of the other participant (American identification vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and vice versa). Identification of the self and/or the participation in identification by the sub-elite and audience does not really figure in. A good example of this is in Drulak's chapter "The Cold War in the Arts" ("Studena valka v umeni") where he discusses *The Third Man*,[18] which is a famous and influential description of the Cold War. In the same chapter, Drulak also examines Stanley Kubrick's film *Dr. Strangelove*.[19] Again, the object of the analyses is to describe the Cold War and the relationship between the two actors in it, not to investigate the self-identification of either of them vis-à-vis the audience, which is the structure of the analysis in this work. As we shall see, changing the components of the identificational relationship from a static "representation-of-America" vs "representation-of-Other" to a more dynamic inclusion of the audience yields a different resultant identity.

In the above analyses, in addition to being concerned mostly with metaphors of the event rather than the actors, discussion of the actors is limited to the state level, meaning the political elite. Instances where this is not the case are exemplified well by Kaldor's examination of sub-elite national identificational actors,[20] and Muller's analysis of sub-elite understandings of the "self/other" in both negative and positive contexts[21] (both are discussed in greater depth in "The Argument" section below). While both authors examine sub-elite identification in different degrees and towards different ends, neither uses film nor directs their analysis towards the US. In the case of Kaldor, as a New War theorist, this makes sense. The greatest interest for the impacts of sub-elite national identifiers are in failing states (Yugoslavia in Kaldor's case) or post-colonial spaces. The US is not a failing state, nor is it considered to be a post-colonial space, yet the existence of sub-elites, the communication tools at their disposal, and the potential for "foreign policy" in the differential-identificational meaning argued by Campbell are all there.

The concept of "here" is both spatial and temporal. It is perfectly subjective, as it is always only knowable based on the contextuality of the speaker; yet it is never limited by any other objective or "objective" borders of any kind. It can move from a position within the self (forgive the "inside" metaphor, but language is limiting), to within the body, to within any area outside of the body and across time based on the event-scenario, the discourse, and the speaker. What this does in terms of conflict and differential-identification is that it allows for the almost infinite fracturing of context regarding the seemingly obvious conflict between two opposing structure-states. The conflict or war between these two structures no longer defines "us" and "them," rather it provides the canvas for the true identificational conflict.

This subjective identificational concept of "here" is most closely touched upon in the literature by the discussion of *Heimat*.[22] The concept of *Heimat*, its depiction, and the study of it are also highly connected to film and film analysis.[23] *Heimat* is a form of conceptual-territorial-space which, at one and

[18] Petr Drulak, *Metafory Studene Valky: Interpretace Politologickeho Fenomenu* (Praha: Portal, 2009), 243-246.

[19] Drulak, *Metafory Studene Valky*, 250-253.

[20] Mary Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era," in *War*, ed. P. F. Diehl (London: Sage Publications, 2005).

[21] Martin, Muller, "Situating Identities: Enacting and Studying Europe at a Russian Elite University," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol.37, No.1 (2008).

[22] Julian Young, "Heidegger's Heimat," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011).; Guntram H. Herb, "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94 (2004). See also from discussion in Herb: Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).; Alon Confino and Ajay Skaria, "The Local Life of Nationhood," *National Identities* 4 (2002).; and Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border* (Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 1996).

the same time, represents and transcends the local, to the regional, and ultimately to the national.[24] Not only is *Heimat* fluid and subjective like "here" is; but *Heimat* also forms the basis for the nation, rather than the nation determining *Heimat*.[25]

At first blush, the concept of *Heimat* sounds a lot like the popular American notion of "any-town USA." This is another form of conceptual-territorial-space, yet it does not transcend in the manner of *Heimat*. In fact, "any-town USA" (the agricultural inland) is quite exclusionary to other regions (the coasts, cities, workers in services in general, non-Christians, minorities to a varying degree, etc.). A unique examination of this can be found in Dittmer's work on Captain America and 9/11.[26] While the imagery and visual metaphors Dittmer cites are often replete with "any-town USA" (or "Centerville," as it is presented in the work[27]), there is a problem because the central conflict, the attack, happened in not-just-any-towns: New York City and Washington, DC. Dittmer does not come out to recognize this point, and yet he makes it all the same by analysing how Captain America himself goes to both Ground Zero and Centerville. But Captain America is not just a superhero; he is a true embodiment of identity-"America" and the "here"-ness of the moral-identificational-space. He is the linchpin holding the disparate territories together, making "any-town USA" and New York City one-and-the-same.

It is this issue of the moral-identificational-space actually being the defining point holding together the conceptual-territorial-space that is missing in *Heimat*. There is a "somethingness" about the land itself that is unifying, however not unique. The same is true for "any-town USA." Yet, what makes it unifying is not the territory, not the objective or "objective" markings, not even the people.[28] Rather, what unifies is the moral-identificational-space existing before/during/after the determination of the conceptual-territorial-space and making it meaningful. This moral-identificational-space, this "here"-ness, is prior to and independent of any bordering. What this also means is that the moral-identificational-space can (and does) change independently of the "objective" structures. One of the best ways to demonstrate this divergence is through an analysis of conflict representation; the resultant identity from the differential-identificational conflict clearly displaying the separation of the subjective moral-identificational-space (identity-"state")from the "objective" conceptual-territorial-space (structure-state).

In between the two editions of *Writing Security*, Campbell published a work also concentrating on the events in the Balkans in the 1990's. In *National Deconstruction*, Campbell looks at the splintering of the Yugoslav state, at its deconstruction.[29] This deconstruction happens at the hands of several parties, but also by the sub-elites of Yugoslavia. Campbell concentrates on the transitions from "state" to "states," but the legitimating identities for those states must come from somewhere. Although Campbell challenges the traditional pairing of national identity with state territoriality, the emotional, historical, and theoretical mechanisms he employs all revolve around the state.[30] The terrible specters of the Holocaust raised during the Yugoslav wars are, as he rightly states, due in part to this terrible pairing.[31] As a question of

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[23] Alexandra Ludewig, "'Heimat, Heimat, uber alles': Heimat in two contemporary German Films," *Studies in European Cinema* 5 (2008).; and Uta Larkey, "New Places, New Identities: The (Ever) Changing Concept of Heimat," *German Politics and Society* 26 (2008).

[24] Herb, "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979," 142-143.

[25] Herb, "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979," 143.

[26] Jason Dittmer, "Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (2005). See also, again: Confino and Skaria, "The Local Life of Nationhood."; and Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*.

[27] Ditmer, "Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics," 639.

[28] This point is extremely important as it steps away from the *Heimat* related concept of primordialism. While Captain America is an Anglo-American white male, he is far more an anthropomorphization of the moral-identificational-space of 'his people' than any kind of ethno-differential model. See Alan Bairner, "National Sports and National Landscapes: In Defence of Primordialism," *National Identities* 11 (2009).; Murat Bayar, "Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (2009).; and Joseph R. Gusfield, "Primordialism and Nationality," *Society* 33 (1996).

[29] David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 17-20.

[30] Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, Chapter 1.

[31] Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, 8-13.

legitimation of national identities, however, the resultant expulsion of the other need not happen. It did happen in Yugoslavia, but it is not necessary. Furthermore, it is a separate act rising from the contestation of a single legitimate identity by a multitude of legitmating identities. In the Yugoslav wars, a popular example of splintering nation/state relations, the legitimating identities had recourse to "historical" territories as well. This would seem to make the terrible pairing more likely. The US, however, does not have such an alliance between legitimating identities and territories, at least not since the resolution of the Civil War.

Cederman provides an analysis of analyses[32] that is helpful at shedding light on the question of sub-elites and identity (indeed, also by way of Yugoslavia) which has been building up in the immediate review above. He demonstrates that, through the various understandings of state and nation as both individual concepts as well as relational concepts, there are various forms of "constructive identity" which are actually being discussed by theorists.[33] Campbell's understanding of the state and the nation would appear to fall in line with Cederman's Type 4 constructivism, where both the nation and the state are problematized.[34] The problem is, while Campbell accepts the *problematizability* of the nation, he almost exclusively looks at the problematizing of the state by virtue of the combination of Foreign Policy and "foreign policy." Without act or intent, this moves his analysis to Type 2, where the state is problematized while the nation is accepted without problematization.[35] This is a very different form of analysis than would seem to be intended by Campbell's arguments elsewhere, yet it is the de facto position he comes into from his analysis concentrating on that nexus of state-act and identity-differentiation.

At issue between the Type 2 and Type 4 versions (and the Type 3 between) is the performativity of identity (held in the question of whether or not to problematize the identity of the state and/or nation), but also the legitimacy of those identities. Campbell accepts the need and right to problematize both state and national identity, yet only problematizes the state. This leaves open to question the issue of legitimacy regarding the Foreign Policy actions of the political elite, yet also, and in the same action, questions the legitimacy of the "foreign policy" performance-representation of the elite for those subsumed under the structures concerning Foreign Policy, i.e. the citizens of the state.

Theory and Methodology[36]

David Campbell and *Writing Security*

Campbell's work aims to demonstrate that "we can understand the state as having 'no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.'"[37] Specifically, he argues that, rather than being an independently and objectively existential thing, the United States' identity is the perpetually created product of its foreign policy; and thus, that the United States' foreign policy and foreign policy creation are central to the existence of the nation's identity.[38] Campbell supports himself by way of recounting the history of the identity/differentiation concept in the emergence of the state in Europe, the concept's export to the American colonies, its engraining into the fledgling American state, and its role in the Cold War. After tracing the identity/differentiation concept up through the Cold War, Campbell further looks into its manifestations in the post-Cold War world.

Campbell begins with a brief argument problematizing, and defending the need to problematize,

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[32] Lars-Erik Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," in *Handbook of International Relaitons*, ed. W. Carlsnaes et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2002).
[33] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 410-413.
[34] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 419-422.
[35] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 413.
[36] Large parts of this chapter were first written for, and may be found in: Hays, "Three Incarnations of *The Quiet American*."; and Hays, "American 'Foreign Policy' in Film."
[37] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9.
[38] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 8.

the concept of the state and state identity. He argues that identity is perpetually created by a state through the temporally dependent "*stylized repetition of acts*"[39] (italics in original) which propagates the identity-*cum*-difference relationship.[40] Campbell applies this base to the problematization of the Cold War, the pronouncement of its being finished, and the inherent meaning of understanding and identity which exists in that pronouncement.[41] In the course of re-investigating the nature of the Cold War's emergence, he discovers in the internal documents foundational to the United States's position at the beginning of the Cold War the explicit and implicit recognition that the main "fear" and "enemy" was actually disorder and anarchy, with the Soviet Union being at most a medium of its deliverance.[42] With the true enemy being anarchy and disorder, a non-temporally specific enemy, Campbell continues by researching its history and evolution in relation to the state.

In order to understand the fear of disorder and anarchy in relation to the state, Campbell first examines the emergence of the state. Disregarding the "traditional narrative" of the emergence of the state as being a change in social organization surrounding the event of the Peace of Westphalia, Campbell shows that the "state" which emerged after Westphalia and the end of Christendom was a new means toward performing the old task of securing identity amid disorder. The internal religious conflicts that emerged in Christendom tore apart the identifying powers that had been in place since the fall of the Roman Empire. The new "states," formed along these denominational divides, allowed for a new manner of identification concerned with danger and difference without reliance on God, altering and adding another level of fear and difference onto the world.[43] True to its religious roots, the new state maintained the evangelism of fear that became so prominent in the centuries of Christendom. Contrary to the religious usage, however, where fear of personal corruption led to intense self-reflection in order to stave off Hell after death, the new state propagated the evangelism of fear in terms of the corruption of individuals leading to the death of the state.[44]

The evangelism of fear incited by the state was concerned with the reversion of humankind back to the anarchic, disordered, and (thereby) dangerous world of "nature" which existed before the "state."[45] With the fear propagated being one of disorder in absence of the state, the internal state necessarily became identified as order.[46] Anything which challenged or threatened this identity was considered to be "foreign" in the sense of being beyond the spatial/identificational boundary of internal state order. This identificational process, which Campbell calls "foreign policy," impacts traditionally understood Foreign Policy between states, and vice versa.[47]

Having introduced the conceptual split between "foreign policy" and Foreign Policy,[48] the delineation between a spatial/identificational inside and outside, Campbell provides an argument demonstrating the simultaneous creation of complementary moral spaces, where the inside, as well as being ordered, is morally superior to the outside.[49] The discursive "main means" towards this moral-identification of space, where the inside is good and ordered and the outside is bad, disordered and threatening, is the body.[50] Campbell charts the development of identity/difference through the evolution of the *corpus mysticum* (the body of Christ) into the *corpus mysticum* (the body of the Church), and

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[39] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.
[40] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9-10.
[41] Campbell, *Writing Security,* 15-17.
[42] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 19-33.
[43] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 40-48.
[44] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 48-51.
[45] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 61-62.
[46] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 62-63.
[47] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-69.
[48] Foreign Policy is the traditional sense of "bridge building" between states, while "foreign policy" is the process of differentiation, or "wall building," and can be at the individual level, the state level, or anything in between. Both forms reinforce and impact each other.
[49] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 73-74.
[50] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 75.

subsequently, after Westphalia, into the body politic.[51]

The identification of the state by means of the body is very important. Campbell shows that this metaphorical understanding opens the way to identification of "otherness" as deadly disease which can easily infiltrate the body, and must therefore always be guarded against.[52] This understanding of the inside/outside combines with the American identification traditions of Puritanism, revolution, and the perpetual frontier (that being the edge of civilization-order/nature-anarchy) to produce a super fear of being "infected" by "pathogens" leading to the "death" of the state and a return to anarchy, all due to proximity to the "infection" nature-anarchy.

Campbell traces this fear of infection by anarchy through the Puritan times (where proximity to Native Americans and distance from Europe threatened their maintenance within civilization)[53] and through the revolutionary period (where, having abandoned their Europeaness yet still confronted with the anarchic frontier, their maintenance within civilization was even more threatened) to the post-revolutionary period (where the European combined with the frontier as a threat in terms of immigrant, foreign power, and foreign power manipulating the frontier).[54] In each of these periods, the threat of infection by anarchy promised to demonstrate itself by a breakdown in internal order, which meant civil unrest, attacks on the Puritan-capitalist system, and disagreement with the government.

Having traced these pathogenic fears from the founding of the US, Campbell then retraces them in the context of Communism, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. By being able to retrace through different periods of identificational threat the same context of fear of infection by anarchy, Campbell shows that the Cold War, already shown to have been founded on the fear of disorder and anarchy more than military conflict, was not a unique event in the American experience, but rather a re-introduction of the same classic fears of the outside-anarchy infiltrating and destroying the inside-civilization, the act of delineation between the two being a necessary act of identification.[55] This act of identification regarding pathogenic fears took on the dimension of "national security" under the Eisenhower administration through an effort to promote and maintain the "normal" (i.e. "inside," "civilized," "non-infected," "American") by systematically investigating and removing the "abnormal" (i.e. "outside," "anarchic," "infected," "un-American") from proximity to the national government and other influential places.[56] This "national securitization" of identification as a means to maintain the "normal" transcends the actions and existence of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, though is in perpetual need of some form of "other" through which to counterpoint itself.[57]

The Argument

Before presenting the argument, especially considering the departure we are taking, an initial point needs to be made. It is, perhaps, a peculiar point, yet it is valid and valuable; and although seemingly self-evident, the point is not often made. Logic is a primary assumption, and it is assumed here. It is assumed here simply because no other alternative seems present or adequate to use (quite an advantage to the Rationalists). Its existence and its use, however, have consequences and should be acknowledged for that. Logic is a primary assumption.

Campbell attempts to provide an alternate understanding of American foreign policy, specifically during the Cold War, through the deconstruction of national identity in general, and American identity in particular. At the center of his analysis is the role of conflict in defining the "other," which thereby allows and determines the identity of the self. This is what Campbell terms "foreign policy."[58] His vehicle for

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[51] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 75-80.
[52] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 82-86.
[53] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 107-116.
[54] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 119-130.
[55] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 139.
[56] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 151-156.
[57] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 168-169.
[58] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-69.

this identification through conflict is the Foreign Policy of the state (in the traditional understanding of the term foreign policy).[59] As will be argued here, the equating of national identity with state identity, and specifically the reliance upon the identifiers which Campbell uses in his analysis, perpetuates an understanding of national identity which has, at its base, the Rationalist-dominated discourse in International Relations. This running assumption greatly impacts the result of any question regarding national identity.

The aim here is to provide an alternative analysis of American national identity using Campbell's premises, all save one: "foreign policy" will here be divested from Foreign Policy in its application to national identity by introducing a new discourse, that of popular, mass released, American film. It is the goal of this analysis to demonstrate the greater complexity existing in identity formation, the multiplicity of identities subsumed under the single term "America," and the multiplicity of temporal contexts impacting the identification process.

Campbell concentrates throughout his work on the use of "foreign policy" by various elites to determine the identity of the "state." It privileges the relationship between "foreign policy" as a process of identification and Foreign Policy as a practice of states and thereby elites. While there are certainly good and understandable reasons for this, it is not necessary to allow the relationship between the two to stand unaltered, and indeed there may be every reason to separate the two. First, however, a defense of the route Campbell took.

Campbell's analysis begins pre-Westphalia and ends with the end of the Cold War. As a matter of identity creation through differentiation, not to mention the recording of such practice, the elites of the times investigated *must* be privileged simply because of the demands in communication (both then and across time) as well as having a view of the world, provided by education and experience, that could contemplate something beyond the horizon.[60] In addition, the center of his investigation was United States' Foreign Policy in the Cold War.[61] As stated repeatedly above, Foreign Policy is the venue of states, inferring the interaction of the leaders of political communities (states), here regarded as the elite. For Campbell, the use and understanding of "foreign policy" was a means for understanding US Foreign Policy. The utilization of this tool, however, does not wed the two things together.

In explaining and developing the concept of "foreign policy," Campbell explains also the etymology of *foreign*. Before the creation of the term *international*, *foreign* had been used as a term of demarcation between, essentially, the regularly experienced world of the "self" and everything else.[62] This demarcation "served to indicate the distance, unfamiliarity, and alien character of those people and matters outside of one's immediate household, family, or region, but still inside the political community that would later comprise a state."[63] It is this personal understanding of *foreign* taken together with "foreign policy" that allows, and perhaps even necessitates, the understanding of differentiation/identification on a level "below" that of the elite and in a manner that goes towards the formulation and fixing of qualities *within* the identity of the state; in short, the formulation of the characteristics of the "us" existing in the "'us' vs. 'them'" construction.

Campbell allows for, and even explicitly enumerates, several sub-elite "foreign policy" identification groups.[64] The problem here, however, is that after he acknowledges them, he seems to forget their existence as actors, especially within the US. This may be due to the structural limitations of his research as discussed above, but whatever the reason, it is a mistake. To apply "foreign policy" to US Foreign Policy, without an explanation or acknowledgment that this identification is being committed by only one of many identification groups, badly skews the concept of identification generally, as well as that of the US specifically.

This final point, perhaps read as a charge, is in need of further clarification. In two places,

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[59] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-69.
[60] This is what is understood here by Campbell's comment on the "logistical dimension." Campbell, *Writing Security*, xi.
[61] Campbell, *Writing Security*, Introduction.
[62] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 37.
[63] Campbell, *Writing Security*, pg 37.
[64] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 69.

Campbell references the identificational role of sub-elites. For clarity, larger sections of the texts will here be reproduced and cited.

In the Preface, Campbell states:

> Any exhaustive account of identity, particularly one indebted to Foucault, would require a thorough discussion of the resistance to the scripting of identity proffered by those with greater access to social resources. Crudely put, one would have to consider the full range of popular resistances to elite practices. Although I consider some of the theoretical issues relevant to this question in chapter 8, I have restricted the argument in the bulk of the book to the representational practices of those acting in official capacities. This narrower ambit has an obvious logistical dimension, but I think it is intellectually justified by the space for alternative interpretations made available by the open-ended and overly figurative character of the texts of foreign policy, which allow their scripting of identity to be contested from within.[65]

Later in Chapter 3, Campbell discusses the interaction of Foreign Policy and "foreign policy" with a few key points being:

> "[F]oreign policy" can be understood as referring to all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as "foreign" in the process of dealing with them. In this sense, "foreign policy" is divorced from the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between a self and an other located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or geography. These are the forms of "foreign policy" that have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty and constituted identity through time and across space. … Foreign Policy as state-based and conventionally understood within the discipline – is thus not as equally implicated in the *constitution* of identity as the first understanding ["foreign policy"]. Rather, Foreign Policy serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by "foreign policy" and to *contain* challenges to the identity that results. … Foreign Policy is a discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in its legitimation.[66]

In these two sections, we can see what would appear to be a contradiction. Campbell appears to state that the identificational-cum-political role of the sub-elite is to provide resistance to the identificational practices of the elite, and that due to the "logistical dimension" assumed to be tied to the historically-textually dependent nature of his analysis, this area is not investigated. Later, Campbell states that the sub-elite practice "foreign policy" on a relatively lower level of interaction between ethnic or gender groups within the state. Yet, the differential-identity coming from these lower levels provides a larger national identity that gives legitimacy and purpose to Foreign Policy.

This is important for two reasons. First, there is a conflict between the sub-elite's function being resistance or legitimation as regards to the political elite. Second, there is a conflict between the sub-elite's being sub-national or nation forming. This work sides with the role of the sub-elite being one of legitimation and, thereby, nation forming. This view is in line with Cederman's Type 4 analysis[67] as well as Kaldor's use of sub-elite national actors.[68]

Let us now look at several of Campbell's premises:
1.   "foreign policy" is an act of identification/differentiation through conflict;

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[65] Campbell, *Writing Security*, x-xi. While Campbell references a further investigation in Chapter 8, the investigation neither references nor resolves the issues being discussed here.
[66] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-70. All italics in original.
[67] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity."
[68] Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."

2.   Foreign Policy, an act of interaction after "foreign policy"-separation, is impacted by this identification process;
3.   this in turn impacts "foreign policy" identification;
4.   "foreign policy" is an act committed at all and any level of identification, elite and sub-elite alike, while Foreign Policy is an elite-specific act.

Now let us posit a few more premises:

1.   Foreign Policy and "foreign policy" have often been incorporated into one and the same thing since Westphalia;
2.   the specific identification group at the nexus of this "foreign policy"-cum-Foreign Policy was the political elite;[69]
3.   their impact was due to the ability to communicate and organize, an ability which requires some amount of education (primarily literacy in the time period where Campbell begins) combined with various forms of communication-infrastructure;[70]
4.   their positioning (at the nexus) was due to their monopoly of these abilities;
5.   the elite having a monopoly of these abilities, providing an unbalanced impact on Foreign Policy, does not discount the potential for identification by sub-elite groups, it only discounts their impact;[71]
6.   sub-elite groups have been gaining in the abilities of communication and organization through the past several decades of increased education and communications technology, most importantly free mass media dispersing sub-elite identification and the internet making open and direct social networking and communications possible.[72]

This allows for several conclusions to be reached:

1.   with this increase in enabled numbers, the monopoly of the political elite is disintegrating;
2.   with the disintegration of this monopoly, so disintegrates the elite's position as the nexus of national identity creation, altering the relationship of "foreign policy"/Foreign Policy to the point of equivalence, though this time favoring the "foreign policy" side of sub-elite/sub-national identification;
3.   the collapse of the heretofore nexus implies the collapse of heretofore national identity (singular), replacing it with pseudo-national identities (plural) which are no longer actually "national," as they are not privileged with a monopoly over group-identification abilities;
4.   this means that a large number of groups (potentially ever increasing and devolving, potentially conflicting) are laying claim to a national identity assumed to be one-and-the-same when, de facto, no such nation may further exist. In effect, it is equality towards the lowest denominator; if all men are kings, there is no king. If all individuals are "America," then there is no America.

Various points discussed heretofore need to be unpacked and explained further. The first of these is more a point of clarification, however. The terms "elite" and "sub-elite" have been used repeatedly up to this point with only indirect explanation. "Elite" is here understood as the "foreign policy" actors

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[69] Though not expressly stated, this is the operational theme in Campbell's analysis.

[70] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 418-419.

[71] This is the tension between vertical and horizontal organization of social groups. See Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."; Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique."

[72] For more on these points, see Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."; and James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network: Second Edition*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

responsible for Foreign Policy within a state, extended to include the actors responsible for directing the operation of the state. "Sub-elite" is here understood as "foreign policy" actors not connected to Foreign Policy. In short, the elite are the policy-makers/legitimacy-takers situated at the nexus of "foreign policy" (which is an act of all beings of identity) and Foreign Policy while the sub-elite are the policy-takers/legitimacy-makers removed from the Foreign Policy structures of the state.

Next, as the elite are policy-makers/legitimacy-takers and the sub-elite are policy-takers/legitimacy-makers, the two are not involved in an "either/or" or "zero-sum game" regarding influence. The elite can and do continue to make policy (i.e. Foreign Policy) regardless of the sub-elite. The issue is legitimacy, not competency. The elite can only make policy reflecting the identity interests of the nation and not just the state if they are in-step with the identifications of the legitimacy-makers (i.e. the sub-elite). In contrast to Campbell's statement on the role of the sub-elite from the Preface discussed above, this is not a question of "resistances to the elite practices" because the "practices" are "foreign policy" (i.e. us/them differential identity). At issue is resistance to the elite as a legitimate practitioner at the nexus of "foreign policy"/Foreign Policy (i.e. does the elite belong to the "us" or to a "them"). It is not a question of act, but of actor.

Thirdly, the notion of national identity, as a form of identity, logically requires the combination of a single sign with a single signified. To speak of "John," although there are many "John"s, only has meaning if the sign is attached to a single signified that can be determined. If we ask for "John" and are presented with two Johns, we can determine which was asked for by the signified (significations possessed). If we do the reverse and we somehow list the innumerable significations, we should theoretically come to a single sign, our "John." It is not possible for there to be a single "John" attaching to different signifieds and for the relationship to have identificational meaning. The same holds true for the nation.

Finally, as regards to "America," it is necessary for there to be a single signified attached to that sign. Campbell argues that the elite perform a function at the nexus of "foreign policy" and Foreign Policy that is, in this context, a signification of that signified. If a signified applied to that sign contains the signification of a disconnect between "foreign policy" and Foreign Policy, however, it necessitates the loss of meaning of the sign. The existence of such a conflict of multiple signifieds attached to a single sign is argued by this work; the conclusion of which is the loss of meaning of "America." This is not to say that the state has "disappeared" or been "replaced" by another political actor. Supplantation would actually lend itself to a unity of the sign-signified problem. Rather, it is to say that the national identity, by losing *logical* meaning, loses *logical* existence. Where this fits in regards to performativity is another matter.

Methodologies and Discourses

This work is a combination of two forms of discursive analysis, whereby the rhetoric and metaphors of the universe of discourse (presidential/administrative speech and mass released American film concerning the Cold War, 1990's, and War on Terror) are analyzed in order to understand the identifications of the participants. The overarching methodology upon which this work is based is taken from Drulak's critique of Jäkel.[73] Drulak revises Jäkel's 12 methodological steps into seven:

1. Choice of the target domain and of the speech community.
2. Corpus (universe of discourse) collection and deduction of conceptual metaphors.
3. Search for metaphorical expressions.
4. Revision of conceptual metaphors.
5. Establishment of frequencies.
6. Comparison of distinct discursive segments.
7. Elaboration of practical implications.

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[73] Petr Drulak, "Identifying and assessing metaphors: discourse on EU reform," in *Political Language and Metaphor: Interpreting and Changing the World*, ed. Carver et al. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 105-118.

The target domain will be "America," though due to the speech community being American political/identificational speech (through conflict), we should find that this target will often be *conveniently*[74] interchanged with "us." Due to the nature of the investigation, we are actually beginning with and are interested in a single conceptual metaphor "America"/"us" IS "good" as well as its negative equivalent "not-America"/"them" IS "bad." Because of this point, step 4 will be removed. The frequencies of metaphorical expressions concerning this exact conceptual metaphor as well as its negative equivalent will be tallied.[75] Unlike in Drulak's adaptation, though, the frequencies will not be qualified in terms of relative degree of usage, as there is effectively only one conceptual metaphor. Instead, an absolute number will be provided. As there are two universes of discourse concerned with a single conceptual metaphor and speech community, step 6 will be slightly altered to compare the discursive segments between the universes of discourse rather than within a single universe of discourse. It is this comparison that should reveal the identificational conflict within the traditional structure of "America."

The re-worked methodology is as follows:

1. Choice of the target domain and of the speech community.
2. Corpus (universes of discourse) collection and deduction of conceptual metaphors.
3. Search for metaphorical expressions.
4. Establishment of frequencies.
5. Comparison of distinct discursive elements between universes of discourse.
6. Elaboration of practical implications.

It is assumed here that the conclusion of the analysis of the first discourse will result in an identification much in line with that concluded by Campbell. There will be an ordered and good "inside/domestic" encompassing and being led by the elite that stands juxtaposed to the chaotic and evil "outside/international" where the enemy to our hero resides. In short, "we (the speaker) are 'us;' 'us' is whatever is 'inside;' whatever is 'us' and 'inside' is 'good.'"

Film and Discourse

Before entering into the methodological steps outlined in this section, it is necessary to say a few words, both on the particular importance and value of the use of film in an analysis of this sort,[76] as well as the means through which the analysis will be conducted. The most important point to bring up regarding the use of film is that mass released films are designed to make money. Making a film, especially current mass released films, takes a lot of money, and on top of the costs, there is the desire for profit. Profit is realized with sales (obviously), but those sales depend on public reaction to and acceptance of the film. This is where the value of analysis incorporating films comes in. During the pre-production phases, when producers and companies are looking through scripts and projects, they are looking for what they believe will be accepted and well received by the public. This means having an understanding of the public's sense of identity and that identity's direction. A simple example is the lack of (and most likely perpetual lack of) "good Nazis" in popular American film. The American mass audience identity of "Nazi" does not allow for the concept of good, and no film has allowed for (or

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[74] The term "conveniently" is here used and stressed because of the interchangedness already existing between these terms and speakers as used by Campbell. The second analysis will demonstrate the same interchange, though coming from different speakers with different results.

[75] A conceptual metaphor may be thought of as the general metaphor attached to a specific concept, such as "The State IS a Body" whereby we understand the difficult to conceive State via the more understandable Body. A metaphorical expression is a more specific metaphor that fits within the concept outlined by the conceptual metaphor, such as "the head of state" or "the arm of the military." For a discussion on what conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions are and how they function, see Drulak, "Identifying and assessing metaphors: discourse on EU reform."; and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980).

[76] For more studies on media and film, see Der Derian, *Virtuous War.*; Drulak, *Metafory Studene Valky*.

probably will allow for) such a combination.[77] In contrast to an impossible form of "hero," there is also a preponderance of examples of structurally unlikely villains: the President of the United States rather than a drug kingpin, the US Military rather than Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, honest US soldiers rather than corrupt US soldiers, the US Military rather than the North Vietnamese, the American People rather than the US soldiers in Vietnam, US Military and Intelligence Services seeking weapons of mass destruction in Iraq rather than burgeoning Iraqi Civil War fighters.[78] What this reasoning suggests is that actualized, mass released films have gone through a process whereby their content is believed to reflect identifications held by the mass audience, thereby encouraging acceptance and creating profit.[79]

While there are further methodological steps being introduced for the purpose of analyzing the second universe of discourse, the core methodology outlined above still holds. The additional steps outlined below are necessary to solve a methodological disparity between the two universes of discourse. In the more traditional analysis concerning presidential/administrative speech, the speaker and the conflict are relatively evident. By virtue of how the speaker is presented (behind podiums with seals, in offices/buildings of government, flanked by flags in prominent positions) and by virtue of "direct" statements in the form of the discourse, the role of the speaker, the identification of the conflict, and the relation between the speaker and the conflict are relatively evident. This is not the same with films, as films are stories. They come from different creators (screenwriters, production companies, directors, actors) with different goals (entertainment, profit, communication rather than announcement and information). Analyzing stories requires a certain degree of deciphering that is not necessary for deciphering "traditional" discourse. Mainly, the speaker and conflict must be teased out of several possibilities presented in the film. The means for doing that here is by a series of guiding questions. Those questions are:

1.   What is the conflict?
2.   Who are the participants?
3.   What is the message? (Who and/or what is "America"?)
4.   What is the argument delivering the message? (What occurs to

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[77] Films such as *Schindler's List* and *Valkyrie*, though portraying nominally Nazi characters as heroes, both show a process of the "Nazi" becoming "non-Nazi" through heroic acts. These acts are in conflict with the acts and goals of the larger "Nazi" representation, thus entailing that through acting as a hero and becoming a hero, the character ceases to be "Nazi" and becomes something else. That "non-Nazi"-something-else is what is acceptable and receivable by the mass audience. Similarly, the initially affable Zoller from *Inglourious Basterds*, though not presented as a hero, is still presented as decent and relatively innocent until his more violent disposition is revealed towards the end.

[78] The referenced films are, in order: Phillip Noyce, *Clear and Present Danger* (Paramount Pictures, 1994).; Edward Zwick, *The Siege* (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1998).; David O. Russel, *Three Kings* (Warner Bros., 1999).; Francis F. Coppola, *Apocalypse Now* (Zoetrope Studios, 1979).; John Irvin, *Hamburger Hill* (RKO Pictures, 1987).; Paul Greengrass, *Green Zone* (Universal Pictures, 2010).

[79] While this logic may be the intent, it does not always provide a successful product. There are many aspects that go into making a film successful that are completely outside the realm of pre-production planning, not to mention any kind of conscious decision-making process. This actually touches upon the release and reception of *The Quiet American* in 2002.

Similarly, this logic does not always mean that two films from two companies coming out at roughly the same time will have the same message given in a similar manner (though the combination of *Fail-Safe* and *Doctor Strangelove* as well as *Deep Impact* and *Armageddon* are fascinating examples of this being the case). Around the same time as *The Quiet American* was being produced, another Vietnam War movie, *We Were Soldiers*, was underway. *We Were Soldiers* has a different message than *The Quiet American*, and may at first appear to be in conflict with it as the first seems to be pro-America and the other anti-America as regards Vietnam. This is only superficial, however, as *We Were Soldiers* concentrates on the soldiers doing the fighting they were asked to do (demonstrating the theme of "go ahead and hate the war, but not the soldiers"), while *The Quiet American* looks at who those soldiers are and how those soldiers came to be there (also potentially demonstrating the same theme).

There is also the occasional case of sheer star-power (John Wayne and *The Green Berets*), although this would appear to be an ever less common occurrence. This may be the result of the recognition of past mistakes (*The Green Berets* being among the greatest). It could also perhaps be related to the increased ease and horizontalization of communication, making the pre-production judgments easier.

situate an identity of "America"?)[80]

The application of these questions spawns some sub-questions:

1. a.   What is the setting conflict? (What is the war/event happening surrounding the story?)
1. b.   What is the real conflict? (What is the engine of the story, what issue separates "the good guy" from "the bad guy"?)
1. c.   Are the two conflicts the same?
2. a.   Who is "the good guy"? (Not to be confused with the protagonist.)
2. b.   Who is "the bad guy"? (Not to be confused with the antagonist.)
2. c.   Who is a catalyst? (Who acts, but without significant impact on the real conflict?)

I am Here, You are There, We are Inside

The purpose of these questions is, in essence, to provide a double reading of a deconstruction; to deconstruct Campbell's deconstruction.[81] Campbell's analysis makes a link between "us vs. them," "inside vs. outside," "good vs. bad." The consequence of this is the creation of an identity structure that includes the speaker, relative space, and moral authority. It takes for granted, however, the relative spatial/identity of the speaker. This is understandable, considering Campbell's main area of analysis being the political elite whose concept of national identity and sovereign space overlap, but it is not a necessary connection.

The above guiding questions no longer look at the order "we (the speaker) are 'us;' 'us' is whatever is 'inside;' whatever is 'us' and 'inside' is 'good.'" Instead, it reverses the chain and begins with the concept "good." Now, the order is "we (the speaker) accept that in this discourse there is some thing 'good;' we accept that in this discourse there is some thing 'us;' we accept that in this discourse whatever is 'good' correlates to whatever is 'us;' we accept that whatever is 'good' and 'us' is we (the speaker)."

In this second ordering, there is no assumed connection between the speaker, "us," and "inside." In fact, there is no need for a sovereign-spatial relation at all. The de-metaphorized metaphor of "inside," the connection between Foreign Policy (state) and "foreign policy" (nation) is removed. Instead, there is a less defined temporal/spatial reference of "here." "Here" is inherent in the "existence" of the speaker, but it has no identificational force on its own. It has no set limits, no borders, no permanence. It can expand to the body, to the state, to the world, to the present, to the presentized-past, to the presentized-future, and everything in between; yet it has no fixity outside of the context of the discourse. "Here" is where the speaker, "us/good," and context overlap. Rather than a pie-chart, picture a Venn diagram.

The difference is that between a depiction of conflict where the "good" and the "bad" are attacking each other and killing each other, and a depiction of conflict where the "good" may be attacking and killing some actor all while being attacked and killed, but the "bad" need not be the actor attacking and killing the "good." It is entirely possible for the "bad" of the second reading to have been subsumed previously under the "good" of the first reading (e.g. depictions of fellow American soldiers, American authority structures, American anti-war population, etc). The removal of the sovereign-spatial correlation makes Campbell's understanding of conflict (inter-state/inter-national) one possible identifying conflict among many. The canvas conflict, or setting conflict, is still essential to this form of identity creation at the sub-elite level (just as without a canvas there is no painting), but it is no longer necessarily defining.

The notion of inside is territorially based, while here is experientially based. What is this territoriality and where does it come from? The territoriality of "inside" and identity comes from the territoriality of the state. The state is territorially dependent, it is spatially dependent. The link between territorial and spatial dependence connects to a very true concept of "inside." In space and territory, there

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[80] Questions 3 and 4 are inspired by and loosely based on the methodology developed in Drulak, "Identifying and assessing metaphors: discourse on EU reform," 107-108. Question 3 takes the place of "conceptual metaphors" while Question 4 takes the place of "metaphorical expressions."
[81] The concept of double reading used here is that from Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State."

is a definable inside and outside. It is important to note that this is "definable" and *not* "defined." What is meant by this is that it can be a meaningful, recordable, act with transferable nature of meaning to declare "this point is inside, that point is outside" even though the entire exercise, meaning, and structure is both artificial and ephemeral.

This is not the case with "here." The concept of here is not recordable in any meaningful transferable manner, because that would necessitate, at the very least, artificial objectivity, while "here" is perfectly subjective. Its meaning cannot be conveyed beyond the speaker in the time and space it is spoken. How is this widened to perform an identificational role in a group? By the description of the *qualities* of "here" which *are* "objectifiable," meaningful, transferable, and identificational. The problem, however, is that these qualities can be, and are, shared among many "here"s. Everyone, when speaking about themselves, is "good." Therefore, we must look at the context of the speaker in place and time *as well as* in relation to the structure of the declared "not-good." It is only in this manner that we can tease out the identificational knot of everyone being "America" while individual structures within that traditional title are considered "not-America."

"Inside" is based on boundaries apart from the speaker, meaning where the boundaries of the structure America end, so too, roughly, are the boundaries of the identity "America." "Here" is based on the speaker alone, making "America" perfectly subjective, perfectly identificational. "Inside" can be an expression of "here," but this need not be true in the reverse. There are many "here"s inside a room.

Campbell, in *Writing Security*, develops and applies "foreign policy" as a differential-identificational-concept. Uniting this concept with the practice of traditional Foreign Policy, Campbell seeks to investigate and understand the creation and evolution of American identity.[82] But when the "foreign policy"/Foreign Policy construct is disunited and the differential-identificational-concept of "foreign policy" as practiced by sub-elite identifiers is examined, several important points emerge.

Perhaps the most important point that emerges is that the "us" contained within the identificational construct "us"/"them" is as relative as the "them." While Campbell rightfully problematizes and demonstrates the latter, he ignores the former. By problematizing the former, it is demonstrated that the identificational "other" of the identity-"America"[83] is actually part of the structure-America.[84] This means that both of the identificational components of the differential-identity-construct ("self"/"other," "us"/"them," "inside"/"outside," "good"/"bad") are contained within Campbell's concept of "America." In short, the enemy is "within," yet this cannot be the case. The resolution is to abandon Campbell's use of the structural metaphor of "inside"/"outside" for the less objective and fixed metaphor of "here"/"there."

Analysis

Intra-Discourse Analyses

Elite Discourse

In the elite discourse, there is a near universal alignment of structure-America with identity-"America". There are also notable evolutions in the discourse within and across the two time periods. While these near universal trends exist, there are exceptions that also need to be discussed.

It is perhaps not surprising that structure-America and identity-"America" should overlap in the elite discourse. Indeed, this is the conclusion of various works mentioned in Chapter1 and Chapter 2

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[82] Campbell, *Writing Security*.

[83] The terms identity-"America" and "America" refer to the subjective identificational qualities of the nation belonging to the country The United States of America. In this work, the key qualities are the "here"-ness of the moral-identificational-space (discussed below). In short, they refer to the essence of American-ness; something like Plato's forms.

[84] The terms structure-America and America refer to the objective qualities of the country The United States of America. This means, for example, concepts such as citizenship, political organizations, political decision-making structures and actors, laws, formal institutions, etc.

(most importantly Campbell's analyses), and the founding point of contention at the heart of this work. Nonetheless, there should be value seen in the confirmation of this point. Here, in a universe of elite discourse different from that utilized by Campbell, similar results have been reached.

Of greater interest, perhaps, is the evolutionary trends within the elite discourse here analyzed. There is a trend of focus that evolves across the two time periods, as well as a trend of identity that is found in both periods separately. The identity trend also mirrors and reinforces Campbell's findings.

The evolving focus is at times rough, but taking the discourse as a whole, it describes a process of narrowing focus approaching the end of the Cold War followed by a broadening of focus after the Cold War. The trend begins with an identification of the "other" as a global Communist actor. Throughout the Vietnam War periods, this global Communist actor becomes a series of local Communist actors, identified as the separate Communist states rather than the Communist ideology itself. Within this narrowing focus, Communism and some formation of dictatorial power are interchanged, yet the trend continues to be one of de-globalizing focus.

Crossing over into the post-Cold War world, this trend of narrowing focus is reversed just as steadily as it was formed. Individual states are singled out as outliers to the new post-Cold War world order. Focus then begins to expand to more specified states, but also implicitly individual (though not always named) terrorist organizations. Connections are made between the state and non-state actors, though maintaining implicit individualities. The expanse of focus is returned to a global and singular "other" with the onset of the War on Terror, where the previously individualized state and non-state actors are unified into a single global terrorist threat. There are implications that this focus is again on the path towards narrowing, as early Cold War statements of a common enemy being fought in different theaters via different tactics appear again in War on Terror statements.

This pattern of statements is only one shared commonality between the two time periods. Another is a trend of identity. In both time periods, the "other" is often identified as being some formation of unjust/illegitimate violence. Whether this violence is international aggression or domestic tyranny, whether it is part of global ideology or localized politics, the trend is found in several instances in both periods. Similarly, the "self" is identified as some formation of ordered peace, fighting reluctantly in the defense of the weak. Both of these trends correspond perfectly to Campbell's findings as well.

Not all of the speeches analyzed fit into the trends outlined above. In respect to the War in Somalia and the War on Drugs, there are significant departures. Of the two, the War on Drugs is the more important.

In the War on Drugs, the discourse is kept at the domestic level, rather than internationalized. This has the logical effect of "othering" something within structure-America. What is othered, however, is not necessarily a group, but rather a behavior. At fault, in the discourse, is a moving away from traditional social structures. It implies that a traditional social approach, based on hierarchal institutions, is the best and only manner to "win" this conflict. The apex of such traditional hierarchal institutions is the elite itself. The implication is that the sub-elite are part of the "other". While this is telling and important, especially for the purposes of this work, it must be discarded as the discourse ignores the international level that is at the core of the conflicts being analyzed.

The War on Drugs was declared a more important exception because there was substance to the discourse being analyzed. The discourse for the War in Somalia does not comprise even one sentence, and there is nothing in that clause to base a significant analysis upon. This is a similar, though slightly less barren, situation regarding the Soviet-Afghan War. While it too is barely mentioned, there is at least an identificational utterance to be analyzed.

Sub-Elite Discourse

In the sub-elite discourse, there is a near universal misalignment of structure-America with identity-"America". There are no noticeable trends, other than the "self" and the "other" both being

identified within structure-America. Though not a trend, a notable point is the reoccurrence of the theme of proximity in the actual conflicts.

It is striking to realize in various war films that the true enemy is actually within structure-America. It is positively jarring to consider that in the midst of battle and death at the hands of a foreigner, one's enemy is an American, though not "American". This throws on its head the popular notion of war films; but more importantly, it exposes a message of internal dissonance that is popularly consumed. The greatest enemy of "America" is American.

This American enemy is no single kind. In some films, like *Platoon*, it is a soldier of similar rank and station to the "American" hero. In other films, like *Black Hawk Down*, it is the military leadership. In other films, like in *Rules of Engagement*, it is the political leadership. In some films, the enemy does not even actually make an appearance. This kind of enemy is known, though not pictured, such as the faceless military planners sending soldiers off to war in *We Were Soldiers*. In some films, a strong argument could be made that the entire cast of participants is the enemy, as in *Dr. Strangelove*. Regardless of the differences in kind of the American enemy, what stands out and what is important is that in almost every case the enemy belongs to structure-America.

Just as there is no set kind for the enemy, there is no set kind for the "American" hero. In some films it is a lowly soldier, like in *Full Metal Jacket*. Other times it is a higher-up agent in the CIA, as in *Clear and Present Danger*. Sometimes, the "American" hero is the apex of the elite, as in President Kennedy in *Thirteen Days*. Sometimes, again as in *Dr. Strangelove*, a strong argument could be made that the hero is the audience itself.

Across the classification of participants in these films, it is important to recognize that no single kind or position of actor is always good or always bad. There is no steady positioning of these roles. This demonstrates that the identification is not one of class, where the "little guy" is always the hero, and the powerful are always the enemy. Nor is it a question of social standing, where black and white and men and women can easily find themselves on either side of the dividing line. These structural characteristics do not come in to play. Rather, it is the moral-identificaitonal space that is key, and anyone can either occupy or shun that space. It is not a question of "inside" or "outside", but of "here" or "there".

In light of this point, it is quite fascinating to realize that just over a quarter of the films actual conflicts specify some formation of proximity, and in each case it is the closer proximity that is privileged as being the "good". In *We Were Soldiers*, *Black Hawk Down*, *Rules of Engagement*, and *Body of Lies*, the actual conflict is one of intimate experience privileged over distant experience. In *Thirteen Days* and in *Behind Enemy Lines*, the actual conflict can be seen as a different level of this proximity theme. In *Thirteen Days*, it is one's own judgment privileged over distant procedures (and in many ways echoes the themes in *Rules of Engagement*). In *Behind Enemy Lines*, the theme is one of the knowledge and experience of the soldiers up to and including the Admiral privileged over the diplomats and policymakers above the Admiral.

While other themes can be seen to be shared across various films, no single theme can be found in nearly as many films. The next closest themes are formations of idealism and truth, at three films each. If these two themes are subsumed under a wider theme of moral action, though, they now match the size of proximity. This new and larger theme, however, can also subsume two more films with a theme of help, now meaning that the largest theme is moral action (with the idealism themed films of *Platoon*, *The Siege*, and *Clear and Present Danger*; the truth themed films of *Dr. Strangelove*, *The Sum of All Fears*, and *Courage Under Fire*; and the help themed films of *M.A.S.H.* and *Charlie Wilson's War*).

The value and validity of this larger theme is debatable. One would assume that doing the morally right thing would figure into the hero of any and all of the films. While that is true to a degree, figuring in to the hero and being the central point of conflict are two different things. It is telling that, even with the expansion of the theme, moral action is not the theme for even half of the films. The absence of what would seem to be a point of such common-sense gives some weight and value to the acceptance of the larger general theme.

A final theme that is particularly valuable to point out, even if it only occurs twice, is that of learning. This theme is interesting because the two times it occurs are in the War on Terror films *Lions for*

Lambs and *Zero Dark Thirty*. Both times, the theme stresses the importance of learning from the past to avoid repeating mistakes and/or in order to solve current problems. The reference points for lessons to learn from were the Vietnam War and the late Cold War.

Inter-Discourse Analysis

It was anticipated that there should be strong differences between the elite and sub-elite discourses. This anticipation was reasonable, and the results should be somewhat evident from the separate analyses. Surprisingly, though, there are also areas of similarity, which should be discussed first.

It needs to be clarified that these areas of similarity referred to vary from the near exact to the distant resembling. To begin with the distant resembling, the waves of narrowing focus in the elite discourse and the theme of learning from the sub-elite discourse are important. The next in line on the spectrum is the Nuclear Fears discourse in both the elite and sub-elite. The most similar area comes out of the inadvertent analysis of the elite War on Drugs discourse.

The *potentially* emerging pattern of wide-focus threat, narrowing focus threat, shift of threat, wide-focus threat, narrowing focus threat is interesting on its own, but it is of no particular relevance for this work. When the details of this potential wave are looked at more closely, and that through the sub-elite lens of the learning theme, it becomes quite relevant. If there is a wave, it is a wave that is getting shorter in frequency. The first wave of narrowing focus took from the beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s, almost twenty years. The second wave of narrowing occurred within a single presidency (and carried over into the next), at most, half of the time needed for the first wave. This would imply an elite that is learning from the past. Now the important questions: What are the elite learning? and What would the sub-elite have them learn?

It appears the elite are learning that an initially assessed global and unified threat is in actuality a series of individual, though at times similar, threats that need to be handled in different ways. It can be assumed, and only assumed, that there is little perceived of more being learned. This assumption is based on the nature and content of the discourse surrounding the sub-elite learning theme.

The two relevant films for the learning theme are *Lions for Lambs* and *Zero Dark Thirty*. The first is based in reality, while the second is based on real events. By being based in reality, it is meant that similar policies did exist and similar discussions did or could have occurred. By being based on real events, it is meant that similar people did exist and similar events did occur. It is the combination of the limited number of films, the two kinds of film, the disparities between film and reality, and imperfect knowledge that makes the claim to elite learning an assumption. However, if the perception of elite learning had been demonstrably greater, the films would likely have content different from that which they do. It is this content that is important.

Both *Lions for Lambs* and *Zero Dark Thirty* are critical of the portrayed elite (and at times sub-elite) not learning from the *progression* of history. The progression of history is something greater than the actors of history, of which the narrowing focus of threat is concerned. The progression of history is about actions in context. In *Lions for Lambs*, Senator Irving's "new" strategy in Afghanistan is challenged by Roth as being the same failed policy from the Vietnam War. It is using soldiers as bait to try and engage an elusive enemy, the result of which, in Vietnam, was a lot of wasted lives. The elite have learned the lesson to narrow their focus, but they have not learned from past mistaken policies. They have not learned from the progression of history, that similar actions in a similar context are likely to yield similar results: a lot of dead soldiers.

In *Zero Dark Thirty*, there is a different challenge regarding the progression of history. In various scenes, Jessica repeatedly presents knowledge learned from the Cold War and attempts to apply it to the War on Terror. Maya challenges her on this. One of the key exchanges is during the briefing in Lahore. Maya immediately discounts the farmer's sighting of bin Laden in Tora Bora as behavior he would no longer present after the American invasion of Afghanistan. Jessica challenges Maya's analysis based on the concept of standard operating procedures, something from the Cold War. Bin Laden had always behaved this way, why change? Jessica's challenge fails on two points. First, bin Laden is not the USSR,

and standard operating procedures are neither as intricate nor as difficult to change in his smaller organization. Second, the US never invaded the USSR. One would think that such an event would alter the means and route and destination of the Soviet leadership. The second exchange deals with motivation. Jessica believes that the enemy in the War on Terror is just as materialistic and buyable as the Communist enemy of the past. Again, Maya challenges her on this point. Unfortunately for Jessica, her mistaken assumption leads to her death, as she wrongly believes she has purchased a high-level informant only to be blown up after inviting him in. Again, the elite have narrowed their focus, but they have not learned from the progression of history. A different context should encourage different actions.

The second area of similarity between the elite and the sub-elite concerns the Nuclear Threat discourse. It is an area of similarity because, ultimately, the nuclear concerns of the elite begin to mirror the nuclear concerns of the sub-elite. This only happens after the end of the Cold War, though. During the Cold War, it is a very different case.

During the Cold War, the elite see nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology as a valuable tool in the hands of the US and its allies, as well as a terrible threat in the hands of the enemy and its allies. In either case, America or its enemies, the nuclear concern is about the strength of the "nuclear tool," and its use towards America's interests. The nuclear concerns of the sub-elite during the Cold War are very different.

During the Cold War, the sub-elite see the *existence* of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology and nuclear strategy as the main enemy, not the purposeful *use* of the "tool" against America's interests by the Soviets. For the sub-elite, there is no proper or even purposeful use of nuclear weapons possible by either side. Rather, the existence of the weapons and the belief among the elite that they are useful and usable is terrifying. The sub-elite challenge the utilitarian perception of nuclear weapons with portrayals of insane and misguided elite pushing for a nuclear third world war that the elite believe they can win, even beginning to plan for the fourth world war in *Dr. Strangelove*.

After the Cold War, the elite discourse begins to change and to approach the sub-elite discourse. Without a nuclear enemy, the existence of nuclear weapons seems unreasonably costly, and nuclear weapons technology being released by the restructuring of the world order seems particularly dangerous. In short, the elite come to see after the Cold War what the sub-elite saw throughout the Cold War; it is the weaponry and not the user that is the enemy. The nuclear level is perhaps the only level in all of human history where a weapon is solely a weapon, and not a tool under different conditions.

The approach of the sub-elite remains more or less the same across the transition into the post-Cold War world. The only thing that really changes are the number of potential actors, and thus an increase in threat. The position of the sub-elite is best expressed in *The Sum of All Fears*.

In *The Sum of All Fears*, American nuclear material that was made into an Israeli nuclear bomb during the Cold War is unearthed and used against the US after the Cold War. Involved in the process are disgruntled and poorly paid Russian nuclear scientists, mercenaries, and an international pseudo-fascist terror organization (all unique, if not new, post-Cold War threats). Exposed in the process are the persistent Cold War mentalities of the American and Russian elites, which are unable and unwilling to see the wider truth and rush to the brink of nuclear Armageddon with each other. Not only does this film demonstrate the continued fear of the sub-elite, but it adds the fear that the elite have not actually changed at all.

The final area of similarity emerges from the inadvertent elite War on Drugs analysis. This similarity is the most complete of the three here discussed, and yet it is not a similarity of the content of themes and discourses as the previous two have been. Rather, this final similarity is concerned with the identification of the enemy as being within structure-America.

As noted above, there is a problem with the elite War on Drugs analysis, as it inadvertently departs from the necessary international conflict component of this work. Rather than looking at the international component of the War on Drugs (as the sub-elite do), the elite discourse focuses solely on the domestic front. This places the elite and sub-elite on different levels of analysis, and yet it exposes an important commonality among them: the concept of "here" being within, yet narrower than, structure-America.

In the elite discourse, two Americas are presented. The first is a civilized and traditionally ordered America. This America provides at one and the same time a social hierarchy and a community safety net. The effects of this traditional order are to provide a barrier to drug use, an alternative to drug use, and a community to help rehabilitate and reintegrate former drug users. This is the true "America", and it is where the elite, as the pinnacle of hierarchy, position themselves.

The second America is a barbaric and post-traditional space. It is full of chaos, fear, and self-centeredness. This America is inviting to drug use, as there is a vacuum that needs to be filled and no structures to block or even discourage the advance of drugs in these post-communities. This America is the enemy within structure-America. It also happens to be composed of sub-elites.

The sub-elite discourse concerning the War on Drugs is something of the reverse. The America of the sub-elite is the true "America". It is full of hardworking, selfless, honest individuals. The elite, on the other hand, occupy an America that is self-centered and uncaring. This second America is willing to become actively complicit in the drug-trade, not to mention to send brave American soldiers into battle for personal reasons and then betray them.

In both cases, the elite and the sub-elite utilize a very directly self-referential concept of "here". For the elite, the elite are the true "America" vis-à-vis the enemy sub-elite. The qualities of "America" are order, tradition, and hierarchy. For the sub-elite, the sub-elite are the true "America" vis-à-vis the enemy elite. The qualities of "America" are honesty, selflessness, and duty. The enemy identifications being within structure-America are similar. The content of those identifications are very different. Essentially, this distinction is the whole point of the argument in this work. This distinction also leads into the main difference between the elite and sub-elite discourses.

The elite and the sub-elite occupy two different "here"s, with different and contradicting characteristics, both laying claim to being "America". The strongest themes of the elite center on order, and these themes place the elite (as "America") in some prominent position within the order. Either the elite are the initiators of the order (like in the immediate post-Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror), or they are guarantors of the existing order (like in the other time periods). In either case, the order that the elite is attached to is the ultimate good. Even if the actions of the elite and their declared enemy are similar or the same, such as their actions regarding nuclear weapons, the elite are "good" and they are "America" by virtue of being attached to the "here" of the particular order of the time.

The various orders of the elite are hierarchical, as any social order is.[85] This means that if the sub-elite question that hierarchy in any way, they are questioning the order as well and are thus not "America". This is indeed what the sub-elite do, and in fact they go beyond mere questioning.

The main themes of the sub-elite deal with proximity and morality. By concentrating on proximity, the sub-elite are in direct conflict with hierarchy. Proximity, and thus the sub-elite, favor being closer to the event or the experience. Indeed, the further one is removed from the experience, the less they are able to know, the less they are able to act rightly. This means that the second theme of concentration, morality, is very much attached to the first theme of proximity. The combination contradicts the "might makes right" hierarchical identification of the elite and replaces it with a union of wisdom gained from experience guided by "common" moral sense. This yields, from the sub-elite, an identification of "right makes might." By acting rightly in a context of direct experience, the true "American" is able to overcome whatever enemy, even the elite of structure-America.

Conclusion

Overview

Campbell's *Writing Security* presents an analysis of American identity via the "foreign policy" of the elite. At the core of the analysis is the concept of "inside"/"outside". The elite are both the dividing

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[85] Even a "round table" equality is a social norm based on a tradition that is given an authority over the present.

line and the protectors of the "inside" vis-à-vis the "outside". It is little wonder that their identification would reflect the position they hold: order and hierarchy vs the infection of chaos from the "outside".

There is nothing in the concept itself that restricts "foreign policy" to any one single group, in fact it is quite the opposite. For Campbell's analysis of national identity to hold, however, these other groups within structure-America would need to have similar or complimentary identifications. More than this, for identity-"America" to exist at all, the various significations would need to align under the single sign.

The concept of "here"/"there", taking the place of "inside"/"outside", allows for this application across the elite and sub-elite alike. By analyzing discourses for each group of comparable import and preparation for the same international conflicts of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a more complete application of differential "foreign policy" leading to a more complete presentation of resultant national identity is possible.

Across both broad time periods, the elite discourse demonstrates a near perfect alignment of structure-America and identity-"America". Throughout a trend of narrowing and broadening focus of the enemy (from global ideology, to particular states, to global ideology), the borders of the United States remained the nearly exclusive delineator of the "good" vs the "bad". In these cases, the "good" was characterized by the order provided, maintained, and protected by the elite. The "bad" was characterized by the violent challenges to this order made by illegitimate and chaotic regimes abroad.

There was a single case where the elite discourse deviated from the trend. This deviation came in the War on Drugs analysis. Rather than maintaining the international trend found in all of the other analyses, the War on Drugs analysis privileged the hierarchy, order, and tradition provided by the elite over the disorder and challenge to tradition provided by the sub-elite within structure-America. It is important to note that even in this deviation of the "other", the elite identification of "America" remains the same.

Across both broad time periods, the sub-elite discourse demonstrates a near universal misalignment between structure-America and identity-"America". In these cases, both the "good" and the "bad" belong to structure-America. The occupants of these positions are not stable, though. The "good" range from lowly soldiers to high-ranking officers and administrators, and even at times to the President himself. The "bad" similarly cover the same spectrum. There is no consistent juxtaposition of military vs civilian or elite vs sub-elite.

Regardless of the occupants, the main themes of the actual conflicts deal with proximity and moral action. In terms of proximity, those who are closest to the action and to the experience are privileged over those further removed. In terms of moral action, those who operate according to ethical values and ideals are privileged over those who operate according to personal interest.

In *The Peacemaker* and *Behind Enemy Lines*, the theme of proximity aligns with the structure-America participants in the film. This gives an impression of alignment between structure-America and identity-"America", but this alignment is only superficial. The proximity displayed is, again, tied to the particular characters, and it is not a systemic relation to all of structure-America. This means that, although no structure-America enemies are presented, there is nothing to imply that they could not exist within the universes of the films, albeit off-screen.

The resultant identities of the two groups is far from complimentary. Indeed, the difference between them is profound in their respective exclusions of the other. The elite discourse privileges the order and hierarchy (interests and distance) embodied by the elite. The sub-elite by far privileges the opposite of moral action and proximity of experience. Even as running concepts, the two are exclusionary to each other. The "America" of the elite and the "America" of the sub-elite are in conflict; and as identifications, they thus destroy the sign to which they are both attempting to attach themselves.

That there is such a fundamental conflict of identifications challenges Campbell's analyses, as well as the core concept of "inside"/"outside" that he uses. While "inside"/"outside" can be utilized by the elite to bridge structure-America and identity-"America", it cannot be used as an identificational concept for the sub-elite. This raises the problem of "inside"/"outside" being a useful identificational concept at all. The more subjective and less structural identificational concept of "here"/"there" developed in this

work more clearly and universally aids in the understanding of identifications in both elite and sub-elite groups.

Implications

It is neither the nature nor the intent of this argument to provide explanations and predictions. The goal is to understand the phenomenon that is now, with the recognition of all the limitations involved in trying to see (much less understand) the phenomena to come. Nevertheless, this current understanding has potentially wider lessons to be had.

For a long time, elite discourse has been confused with national discourse. This, most likely, has been because of structural reasons regarding the making and disseminating of identificational messages: mainly literacy and access to communications infrastructure. As time has passed, however, communications has become ever more democratized with increased informational as well as technological literacy and accessibility. More and more people are able to create, disseminate, and consume more and more identificational messages; significantly challenging the centuries' old monopoly of the elite in this area. There are several consequences of this collapsing monopoly of identificational messages, both in terms of theoretical considerations as well as "real world" implications.

In regards to theory, it should be quite evident that an increase and diversification in message makers would likely lead to an increase and diversification in messages. This realization has not been found in previous literature, though. Rather, some common and undefined base national identity is taken as given in regards to America, with sub-group identities being analyzed always within some context of the wider American whole (African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, LGBT-Americans, etc.). The above argument does not in any way discount such research, but merely points out that assuming the common denominator is problematic. Indeed, the argument of "here"ness presented in this work fits well with the research into sub-groups. Both are actually concerned with the concept of "here". The difference resides in the other researches not recognizing the elite as a sub-group; nor in recognizing that "America" is a commonly used sign with no common meaning. These two points are profoundly important.

By recognizing the elite as just another sub-group, albeit a sub-group in a privileged position regarding communications, the genealogy of the national identity becomes exposed. What is considered to be *the* national identity is only the "here" of the elite, similar in formation and performance of the "here" of the sub-elite. The dominant communication position of the elite gave their micro-message of identity the illusion of a macro-message of identity. It also magnified the fluidic and subjective dichotomy of "here"/"there" into a relatively stable and structural dichotomy of "inside"/"outside"; the prominent position of which, within the field of study, helped to reinforce the structures that were at the same time being criticized.

With more micro-messages of identity coming from more identifiers, the dominance of the elite message is being reduced. What is seemingly not reduced, however, is the dominance of the false belief in the existence of a national identity to which to lay claim. Since the expression of national identity was only ever an expression of the elite "here", to appropriate the sign without likewise appropriating the meaning is to remove the meaning altogether. What remains is a cross between a Messier object and a mass psychosis: something that is easily seen until directly looked at, but in all actuality is a shared delusion.

All the various groups lay claim, directly or indirectly, to ownership of the true "America", yet there is nothing attached to that sign. All claims to it are false, because there is nothing to which to lay claim. The meanings *given* to the sign, though, are many and varied. This allows for the situation as demonstrated in the above analyses, where the characteristics of "America" by the elite are in direct conflict with the characteristics of "America" by the sub-elite. "America" is thus divided, and so the sign cannot stand.

What remains when America exists, but "America" cannot? It would seem that the only point that the various claimants to "America" have in common is the conflict over the claim itself. Once it is realized that there is no true "America" but rather "america x" and "america qs" and "america jg-09/g3-

13", one would expect the legitimacy given to America as a structure should wane significantly. Where the legitimacy wanes, one would expect the power to fracture.

When one looks to the "real world," the competition over legitimate identity shows itself more and more clearly. The use of mass-release film for the above analyses was a methodological concession to necessity. The medium creates a manageable, though appropriate, universe of discourse. The structure and logistics of producing such films ensures there are responsive audiences of an appreciable size. Such films, however, are already outmoded in terms of non-elite message dispersal, as well as in terms of entertainment. Television and the Internet have democratized these areas even more so than film.

With television, and in particular the 24-hour news culture, we see the union of fact, fiction, object, and observer into a self-feeding loop of message without awareness or memory. By these channels also being wedded to positions on the political spectrum, a form of perfectly reifying tribalism emerges that no analysis is required in order to recognize. These tribes unite elite and sub-elite as one sub-group, yet the concept of "here" applies all the same. One tribe is the true "America" while the other is not. This has famously evolved into a campaign-cum-conspiracy theory that the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, is not American and is actually a clandestine operative attempting to destroy the country.[86]

Reliance on such networks for news begins to cleave the population into fundamentally different groups. This goes beyond previously existing political divisions. Foundational facts no longer seem to need to be shared. Without these, there is no space for a true debate, much less a conversation, to allow unity. One could argue that this is nothing new, and just a more technologically advanced version of earlier politically aligned newspapers. While there are certainly similarities, in the realm of 19th and 20th Century newspapers, one would likely have to at least be exposed to the other headlines on the news stand and the other customers jostling for their purchases. Now, one can go straight to a specific channel in one's home at the push of a button and bypass even the environment where the "other" meanders.

The Internet takes these fractured and fracturing extremes and multiplies them to fantastic degrees. There are potentially as many identifications as there are identifiers online, and the nature of the Internet allows those identifiers to be near perfect (as near to perfect as is possible) self-feeding loops of identificational messages. It has become a truism that "one can find anything online," and just as much so that "one can 'prove' anything with what is found online." This means that "facts" are not only disputed and disputable, but the nature of what "fact" and "thinking" and "knowing" means to many people is becoming altered. In regards to the largest man-made tragedies of this century (or culminating in this century), "facts" are the antithesis of conventional authoritative statements, while "thinking" is the demonstration of this disparity and "knowing" is the gaining of support of one's narrative by others. "Reality" has become democratized. And so the elite kill 3000 people and frame a terrorist group for personal greed. The 28 victims of an ill young man become never-existing entities in an elite operation to pacify the population. One in ten scientists who disagree with the research on climate change become the thin red line facing the elites and their economic dominance plans. All police (enforcers of the elite) become murderous monsters. Routine military exercises become a shadowy operation to take over sections of their own country. It is a short but substantial trip from Watergate and Iran Contra, through *Clear and Present Danger*, to Sandy Hook. Down the rabbit-hole, there are some very particular "here"s.

Finally, we can see the emergence of "here" in contexts removed from America and statism in general. After all, what is the emergent Islamic State if not a sub-elite utilizing advancements in communications to challenge the legitimacy of both political and religious elite identifications? What are the "lone wolf" attacks they inspire if not the expression of individuals shifting their "here"ness to an identification with which they have no structural relationship? The war with ISIS is as much, if not more, a war of identifications and identifiers as it is a war of anything else.

Conclusion

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[86] Such outlandishness is not new, though. The papist fears concerning President John Kennedy were similar in nature.

Campbell's argument using "foreign policy" is powerful, but it does not delve deep enough. The concept immediately raises the question of what would the argument look like if "foreign policy" were applied to levels not directly connected to Foreign Policy. The answer to that question has been the goal of this work, and that answer is very different than Campbell's.

The elite present a particular discourse when faced with international conflicts. This discourse is dominated by themes of hierarchy and order. These themes are recurring across several generations, individuals, and significant global and state-centric events.

The sub-elite also have a particular discourse when faced with international conflicts. Their discourse, however, is dominated by themes of proximity and moral action. These themes directly conflict with the position and themes of the elite, and they are similarly recurring across several generations, individuals, and significant global and state-centric events.

Campbell's work would suggest that the identities of the elite and of the sub-elite should be united in an international conflict, yet we see that they are not. Rather than being united in their identities, we see that they are united in their *identifications*. Both the elite and the sub-elite associate themselves to a relative moral-space of "here". Both the elite and the sub-elite claim that their respective "here" is "America". That two conflicting significations are attached to the same sign removes meaning from the sign. There is no "America"; and without it, there seems little hope for America either.

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