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Institute of Political Studies: Department of International Relations

American "Foreign Policy" in Film

George W.S. Hays II

Adviser: Prof. Ing. Petr Drulák, PhD.

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For you,

with thanks

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Abstract

This work takes David Campbell's concept of "foreign policy," as applied to American elite identifiers, and expands its application to sub-elite identifiers as well. As with Campbell's analysis of American identity, the common context is international conflicts where the United States is a participant. The discourse of the elite is represented by State of the Union Addresses covering the times of the conflicts, while the sub-elite discourse is represented by major war films about those same conflicts. While Campbell's argument implies that there should be a common resultant identification of the elite and sub-elite identifiers, this is not the case. Across time, conflicts, and administrations, the elite identifications stress hierarchy and order, as was also concluded by Campbell. Across time, conflicts, and productions, the sub-elite identifications stress proximity of experience and right action. The identifications of the two groups, while both laying claim to the identity of "America", are in conflict with each other. Through the analyses and conclusion, this work challenges the dominant post-structuralist concept of the "inside"/"outside" of a political-identificational space (only relevant for the elite) and suggests in its place the more fluid and subjective "here"/"there" of a moral-identificational space (which encompasses both the elite and sub-elite identifications). The implication of this work is that through the democratization of media, there is also a democratization of identification, which has and is likely to continue to widen the divide between policy-makers/legitimacy-takers (the elite) and policy-takers/legitimacy-makers (the sub-elite). The result of the analyses, conclusions, and implications is that there is no single "America" upon which to place an identificational claim, that the various different "America" identifications are conflictual and exclusionary to other "America" identifications, and that thus there is no "America".

Preface- Swing Sets and Twin Towers

If history were taught in the form of stories, it would never be forgotten.

-Rudyard Kipling

Thanks to television, for the first time the young are seeing history made before it is censored by their elders.

-Margaret Mead

When I was about 10 years old, I met one of my two best friends. I met her on the playground. I remember that, while I was swinging, there was this tall girl playing some sort of word game with two or three younger kids on the other side of the swing set. The word game, if it had ever been given an official name, would probably have been "Opposites."

The premise of the game was that, with a magical word of assent, the three kids were "transported" into the "World of Opposites," something like the Bizarro World of the Superman Comics. In this world, everything meant the opposite and was done the opposite way. What really caught my attention, and encouraged me to leave the swing and approach them, was the growing genuine fear among the little kids that they were trapped in this new confusing realm and could not get out (first, they had to figure out how to opposite-ask to leave the World of Opposites, but they always got confused when my friend asked them if they meant it, leading to an affirmative answer meaning a negative in the world they were still in, and so trapping them by declaration in the World of Opposites).

I was fascinated by many aspects of this exchange. The first point that fascinated me was the cruelty of so simple a game. Immediately upon this thought, however, and

indeed feeding the cruelty of it all, was the patently obvious fabrication of the whole thing. These kids, all of us, were still on the playground, which had not changed. All of the other kids around us were in the "real" world, using normal language with each other and the playground-monitors and everything around them. The physical qualities of the world had not changed at all. Even a little kid knows that when you trip you fall down, not up; that we walk on grass and not sky; that the sun is bright and warm, not dark and cold. These qualities had not changed. Nothing had changed. The only difference was the use of language to experience "reality," and to have this experience with a certain degree of isolation from the rest of the playground-world. I decided to break the isolation.

The little kids explained to me how they were trapped in this world of opposites that they had unfortunately gotten in to, and they warned me not to enter it. I told them to leave the World of Opposites, and they said that they had tried but could not. I told them the whole thing was in their minds, and if they simply walked away and refused to play, they would be back to the "real world." Suddenly, it all made sense to them, and they stopped playing, and they walked away a little angry at having been tricked.

Why bring up my friend and this children's game? Truly, the answer should be obvious. We too exist in a world dominated by, and based on dominance of, language. Is it not any more nonsensical than the World of Opposites? Is it not any more terrifying? Is it not any more isolated? Can it not be any more abandoned? We are but even bigger kids playing the same language game, we just do not remember beginning it. Years later, another event and discourse that I was far more audience to than participant in (though we are all always participants in whatever discourse we “observe”) would fundamentally change my world.

On the morning of September 11th, 2001, I was in my first period class in the first weeks of my Senior year of high school. The bell rang, and I made my way with some others for Senior free-mod, which was a “study hall” kind of period only for Seniors in the school’s cafeteria. I remember walking up to the wide double doors and seeing everyone staring above them. That is where the televisions were.

I walked in, turned around, and saw one of the Twin Towers billowing out smoke from a gash in its side. From the murmurs and comments swirling around, I found out that a plane had flown into it not too long ago. It was not too much longer before we saw

another plane swing into the frame and hit the other tower. I remember a few split seconds, or perhaps even whole seconds, of confusion in my mind: I thought they were replaying the initial accident from a different vantage point, but why then was there already smoke before the plane hit? It was the second strike that removed the comfort of the thought of the first having been a terrible accident. Not long after, one of the school's faculty came rushing in to say the Pentagon had been hit too, and within moments those pictures were on the screen. It was at this point I heard someone joke that we had better be careful, the town's new water tower adjacent to the school might be next. I was appalled and ashamed, but it was a disgust still pure of 9/11. I was disgusted that something so obviously historically important (though the importance was still a blank, waiting to be formed) and something so tragically deadly to so many was being made fun of by its association with a water tower in small-town Ohio. I was insulted that he would sully this tragedy by linking it to a place and a people wholly removed from it. We were not New Yorkers, and since the end of the Cold War, we Ohioans had nothing of value to fear being attacked. The towers collapsed, one by one, and I had that bit of confusion again being unable to distinguish a repeated occurrence from a replay of the initial. There was silence.

On the morning of September 11th, 2002, I sat in the book depository of an eastern Slovak school and grieved for my country and my loneliness on such an important day. I felt I was surrounded by a continent of people who could not hope to understand this day as I and my "fellow Americans" did, a continent of people who could not understand the sorrow and anger and fear, a continent of people who were not truly "us." That evening, I stood as close to the TV as possible, listening to the names of the dead, trying thereby to be connected to my country, trying to be "American." I was no longer confused by the successive pictures of destruction; they were as familiar now as a family album.

During that year, something had changed, but what? On September 11th, 2001, while the unfolding story was horrible, tragic, and important, it was something horrible, tragic, and important happening in New York; just as it had been almost ten years before, just as such things had happened in Oklahoma City and Atlanta in the interim. I only knew of what was going on because I was a Senior in a room that normally played the morning news. Lots of students across the country did not know about it until they got

home from school in the afternoon. Even more did not think much of it when they did find out. It was not even a week, however, before I would see students diving under desks at the sound of an airplane or at the feel of a truck shaking the building as it thundered past. By September 11th, 2002, the attack was seen as an attack on all of us equally; and as I strained to hear the words coming from New York, so too students all over the US sat in their classrooms, watching the same broadcast as I, watching the same places at the same times that had become so historic, but a year after they began to become historic.

What had changed? The answer is: space and time; in short, context. The 9/11 attacks had been inculcated to the point of shibboleth crossed with benediction and invocation; that these are all religious terms is intentional, and they carry the metaphor of vehicle as well as meaning.

Chapter 1- Introduction: The "Here" Inside[1]

America is not anything if it consists of each of us. It is something only if it consists of all of us.

-Woodrow Wilson

The Here and Now

Central to the engine of reality-creation in both stories in the above Preface is the proximity of communicants: message senders, message receivers, and the "here" which they occupy. On the playground, the isolation that was broken by an outsider was all that held the World of Opposites together. In the year between 9/11/2001 and 9/11/2002, "here" was extended beyond the crash-sites and beyond the crash-date to encompass the entire country, all countrymen, and an indefinitely extended timeframe. One "here", already fragile and restricted, was punctured and destroyed while the other was extended and entrenched. But what is "here"?

"Here" is an arena and mechanism for identity creation. For quite some time (perhaps from Westphalia until the 1960's), "here" was where socio-political and geo-political space overlapped; the combination of national identity and state identity forming the often discussed "inside/us" vs "outside/them". Advancements in communications' technologies have helped to shrink the first of these previously overlapping lines, that of socio-political identity. "Inside", as an identificational concept, no longer corresponds to

[1] Large parts of this chapter were first written for, and may be found in: George Hays II, "The Effects of Cold War Speech in the Post-Cold War World: Identification of the Enemy in the War on Terror" (MA diss., Charles University, 2009).; George Hays II, "Three Incarnations of *The Quiet American*," *Perspectives* Vol. 20 No. 1 (2012).; and George Hays II, "American 'Foreign Policy' in Film," *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 2 (2014).

"inside" as a concept of bounded sovereignty. So, where is national identity now?

As communications' technologies have advanced, identification has been democratized. With each new advancement, more and more individuals have been able to produce and consume more and more individualized messages of identity. A person can go to YouTube and search for a particular video, and the site will correspondingly suggest similar videos to watch next. This creates a rabbit-hole effect, something like reification on steroids. While this is the current point of extreme of the process, it is not the only point. The Internet in general allows for a similar process with every interaction. The echo-chambers of 24-hour news networks in the US are truly disturbing. One of the media which precedes all of these, however, is film.

Though film is not the most recent, most "democratized," or most extreme medium of this sub-elite identification, it is extremely valuable and instrumental. Taking film as a level of analysis allows for a manageable corpus with a long tradition and variety that still allows for a clear indication of the trend and functioning of sub-elite identification. Film is organized into genres with intended (and tested) audiences. One genre in particular would seem to lend itself best to the investigation of elite vs sub-elite identification: war films.

War is an incredibly strong identificational process. It is truly "us" on the "inside" versus "them" on the "outside." It would seem to reason, then, that representations of war made by sub-elites should correspond with the elite identification. Analysis of popular war films, however, does not bear this out. "Here" does not generally encompass the elite and sub-elite narratives of war. Actually, the sub-elite identifications seem to place the enemy within the structured political borders of the political state.

By refusing to play the word game as dictated, by ignoring the rules of custom and habit and instead looking at the matter from a different perspective, we can see the world anew. The old world we had been in seems to melt away, and what had been so convincingly real now appears to be so transparently fabricated. By taking control of identification and context, a very different reality emerges. Just as "here" expanded from New York to the whole country, so can we see it shrink from the whole country to our individual selves.

What Came Before

This work is mainly concerned with building on and responding to the argument in Campbell's *Writing Security*. Since Campbell's work is central to this work, it will be discussed in greater detail on its own in the following chapter. It is sufficient for now to pull out a few terms and concepts to make sense of the other texts that will be covered first. Campbell's argument concerns American identity creation (what he terms foreign policy) through the act of traditional Foreign Policy (meaning the actions/interactions of a state towards/with the world).[2] It is a Reflectivist work, attempting to understand the concepts of identity and identification. Campbell concludes that "America" must always identify itself vis-à-vis an enemy; but that while this enemy may take on different structural appearances (i.e. being different states), it is ultimately always the same post-structural concepts of chaos and barbarism that America is at odds with.[3]

As regards the contributions and contributors from outside of IR, those concerned with discourse analysis have had a tremendously important impact, especially as regards to this work. Brown and Yule's *Discourse Analysis* is an example. Though the text is grounded heavily in philosophy of language and linguistics, or perhaps because of it, their understanding and dissection of discourse can be found among the first steps of any further analysis. They define discourse as, "a dynamic process in which language was used as an instrument of communication in a context by a speaker/writer to express meanings and achieve intentions."[4] Due to the dynamic nature of discourse, "it is necessary to know … who the speaker and hearer are, and the time and place of the production of the discourse,"[5] in order to properly analyze and understand a particular instance of discourse. Furthermore, due in part to this contextuallity of time, space, and participants, it is important to recognize "what a speaker can imply, suggest, or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says."[6] These three points in particular are important to the formation of this work.

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[2] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity: Revised Edition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
[3] Campbell, *Writing Security*.
[4] Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 26.
[5] Brown and Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, 27.
[6] Brown and Yule. *Discourse Analysis*, 31.

Where Brown and Yule provide an introduction, the work of Titscher, Jenner, and Meyer provide a clarification. Their *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning* is an almost encyclopedic catalog spawned from, and aimed at making sense of, the disparate and dynamic methods and theories subsumed under "discourse analysis." They investigate, record, and describe twelve disciplines and sub-disciplines which claim in some manner the title of discourse analysis, from grammarians and philosophers to socio-politico scientists concerned with critical discourse analysis.

Critical discourse analysis, as developed over the last thirty to forty years, has produced certain theoretical principles. Critical discourse analysis is not concerned with isolated language, but with the impact of and interaction between language and society. In this way, language and society are seen to shape and be shaped by each other, as well as, unitedly, to constitute discourse itself. Traditionally, power-relations are intimately involved with discourse, and as such studying the relationship between power and discourse is key. Other areas uniquely related with discourse are general social conditions in a culture as well as ideologies in a culture. Though a particular discourse must be analyzed with an understanding towards its historical context, it must also be recognized to connect with, impact, and be impacted by other discourses. Finally, critical discourse analysis, by being both interpretative and explanatory in nature, is dynamic and is always open to new interpretations based on new contexts and information.[7]

A key distinction of critical discourse analysis from other forms of discourse analysis is its concept of context. Context is usually understood in terms of the relations of the different parts of the discourse to itself and/or to the setting the discourse is in.[8] In critical discourse analysis, context is understood to be in terms of the surrounding language and setting of the discourse, its relations to other discourses, and the cultural knowledge brought to the discourse by its participants.[9] This unique combination strives to lay bare "the frequently unclear and hidden ideological effects of language use … [and] power-relations."[10] With its interest in ideologies, power-relations, and social conditions, one of the main applications of critical discourse analysis has been in the area

[7] Stefan Titscher et al, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 146.
[8] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,* 147.
[9] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,* 147-148.
[10] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,*147.

of identifying, and the striving to resolve, inherent prejudices; be they sexual, racial, or other forms.[11] However, the areas of application extend to all themes of social power.

The issue of contextual meaning is immensely important for this work, especially as it stands juxtaposed to inherent meaning.[12] Ricoeur's *The Rule of Metaphor*, Benveniste's *Problems in General Linguistics*, and Richards *Philosophy of Rhetoric* all speak to this issue.[13] The difference, and perhaps even conflict between these two should be easily seen existing similarly between the Rationalists and the Reflectivists. One of the points of this work, however, is to show how the conflict, and indeed the confusion, between these two forms of meaning exist within and among the Reflectivists (see the discussion on Cederman below in this section).

In addition to these, perhaps, lesser-knowns, dominant influences on Reflectivism from outside of IR are shared by Derrida and Foucault especially. The respective works of each are numerous and deep, though two concepts in particular stand out and are of tremendous importance; not just to the field but also to this work.

In many ways, Derrida gave birth to the heart of Reflectivism, at least the shade under which this work rests. Much of the fruit of his work came from the philosophical debate about the meaning and function of *logos*:[14] whether the spoken word somehow has some primary structural attachment to meaning; or whether, as in the written word, it is all signs and context. Derrida comes down on the side of context, on the absence of inherent structural meaning between sign and signified, and he does it by way of deconstruction.[15]

Deconstruction examines the dichotomous and hierarchical meanings within words. Each word, in order to have meaning, contains the context of its opposite as well: up/down, in/out, man/woman, civilized/barbaric, etc. These internal contexts have several consequences, especially since they are connected to (if also separable from) some speaker. As Foucault stresses throughout several of his works,[16] not only are statements

[11] Titscher, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis,* 147.
[12] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), Study 3.
[13] See the discussion on this in "The Argument" section in Chapter 2 below.
[14] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
[15] Derrida, *Of Grammatology*.
[16] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).; Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (London and New

of "truth" and "knowledge" no longer true or factual, they are connected to a hierarchization of society and power in a sick circular dance of power-knowledge-truth creation and reinforcement.

That "truth" is a moral and normative concept replete with a continuing story affected by the power-knowledge duo in the form of the elite is essential to this work; for in essence it is the same message as is this work. "Truth"-applied is identity, and this work seeks to demonstrate that such application is being performed without (and in contradiction to) the elite and its wielding of that duo.

There is another thinker who is important to mention regarding deconstruction, and this thinker and his work will return us again to the realms of IR. Ashley's application of deconstruction through the process of double reading demonstrates another key aspect of the contextuality within words: that of the obfuscation of concepts and arguments, purposefully or not. Double reading is the act of "reading" or examining a statement or argument as a monologue, effectively being empathetic to the author, and then examining the same statement or argument as a dialogue, effectively deconstructing the key words that lie at the heart of the statement or argument and seeing what differences emerge between the two versions.[17] By "reading" the Rationalist discourse regarding sovereignty and anarchy in this manner, Ashley demonstrates how the concept of sovereignty is decoupled from the state and, with it, the boundaries between inside/domestic/sovereignty and outside/international/anarchy blur away.[18] The understanding of the ordered and bounded state at the Rationalist core melts and dissipates.

The concept of double reading, specifically the dialogical function of deconstruction, is central to this work. What is more, Ashley's investigation into the problem of sovereignty/anarchy, inside/outside, and state/non-state is one of the main departure points for us. The contributions of Derrida, Foucault, and Ashley as a whole to Reflectivist thought, and thereby to the thoughts and arguments presented here, are

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York: Routledge Classics, 2005).; Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2008).; Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2003).

[17] Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol.17, No.2 (1988): 229-235.

[18] Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," 241-251.

immeasurable. That reality, truth, and knowledge are created rather than given; that language acting as a lens both shapes and distorts these concepts and our relationships with them and through them; and that in the hierarchy of meaning within words lies a power construct all alter the understanding of "reality," identity, and all of the components going in to each.

Having gone through some general background, it is now time to enter in on some more specific points relevant for us here. There are several levels and components in this work that touch upon areas of investigation discussed elsewhere. The time periods and events at the core of this work are tied to the Cold War and the transitions between the Cold War and the post-Cold War 90's as well as the transition from the 90's to the decade beginning with the September 11 attacks. The Cold War and the War on Terror, both separately and linked through the 90's, have been fertile ground for metaphorical analysis as evidenced by (in addition to Campbell's *Writing Security*) Ivie's three chapters on Cold War metaphor in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, Parry-Giles' *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, Cameron's *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War* and Colas's *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' after the Cold War*. As Colas and Cameron bridge the Cold War and post-Cold War worlds, others have looked exclusively at the War on Terrorism, such as Jackson's *Writing the War on Terrorism*, as well as Hodges and Nilep's *Discourse, War and Terrorism*. While these works, and many others like them, concentrate on textual analysis of policy-maker pronouncements, others have ventured into the area of metaphors in the arts, including film.

Drulak's *Metaphors of the Cold War* (*Metafory Studene Valky*) looks at both the American and Soviet understandings of the Cold War in the areas of political pronouncements, theorists' pronouncements, and artistic pronouncements. These investigations, however, all concentrate on identifying the Cold War primarily, with identification of the participants being secondary and/or by virtue of the other participant (American identification vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and vice versa). Identification of the self and/or the participation in identification by the sub-elite and audience does not really figure in. A good example of this is in Drulak's chapter "The Cold War in the Arts"

("Studena valka v umeni") where he discusses *The Third Man*,[19] which is a famous and influential description of the Cold War. In the same chapter, Drulak also examines Stanley Kubrick's film *Dr. Strangelove*.[20] Again, the object of the analyses is to describe the Cold War and the relationship between the two actors in it, not to investigate the self-identification of either of them vis-à-vis the audience, which is the structure of the analysis in this work. As we shall see, changing the components of the identificational relationship from a static "representation-of-America" vs "representation-of-Other" to a more dynamic inclusion of the audience yields a different resultant identity.

In the above analyses, in addition to being concerned mostly with metaphors of the event rather than the actors, discussion of the actors is limited to the state level, meaning the political elite. Instances where this is not the case are exemplified well by Kaldor's examination of sub-elite national identificational actors,[21] and Muller's analysis of sub-elite understandings of the "self/other" in both negative and positive contexts[22] (both are discussed in greater depth in "The Argument" section below). While both authors examine sub-elite identification in different degrees and towards different ends, neither uses film nor directs their analysis towards the US. In the case of Kaldor, as a New War theorist, this makes sense. The greatest interest for the impacts of sub-elite national identifiers are in failing states (Yugoslavia in Kaldor's case) or post-colonial spaces. The US is not a failing state, nor is it considered to be a post-colonial space, yet the existence of sub-elites, the communication tools at their disposal, and the potential for "foreign policy" in the differential-identificational meaning argued by Campbell are all there.

The concept of "here" is both spatial and temporal. It is perfectly subjective, as it is always only knowable based on the contextuality of the speaker; yet it is never limited by any other objective or "objective" borders of any kind. It can move from a position within the self (forgive the "inside" metaphor, but language is limiting), to within the body, to within any area outside of the body and across time based on the event-scenario,

[19] Petr Drulak, *Metafory Studene Valky: Interpretace Politologickeho Fenomenu* (Praha: Portal, 2009), 243-246.
[20] Drulak, *Metafory Studene Valky*, 250-253.
[21] Mary Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era," in *War*, ed. P. F. Diehl (London: Sage Publications, 2005).
[22] Martin, Muller, "Situating Identities: Enacting and Studying Europe at a Russian Elite University," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol.37, No.1 (2008).

the discourse, and the speaker. What this does in terms of conflict and differential-identification is that it allows for the almost infinite fracturing of context regarding the seemingly obvious conflict between two opposing structure-states. The conflict or war between these two structures no longer defines "us" and "them," rather it provides the canvas for the true identificational conflict.

This subjective identificational concept of "here" is most closely touched upon in the literature by the discussion of *Heimat*.[23] The concept of *Heimat*, its depiction, and the study of it are also highly connected to film and film analysis.[24] *Heimat* is a form of conceptual-territorial-space which, at one and the same time, represents and transcends the local, to the regional, and ultimately to the national.[25] Not only is *Heimat* fluid and subjective like "here" is; but *Heimat* also forms the basis for the nation, rather than the nation determining *Heimat*.[26]

At first blush, the concept of *Heimat* sounds a lot like the popular American notion of "any-town USA." This is another form of conceptual-territorial-space, yet it does not transcend in the manner of *Heimat*. In fact, "any-town USA" (the agricultural inland) is quite exclusionary to other regions (the coasts, cities, workers in services in general, non-Christians, minorities to a varying degree, etc.). A unique examination of this can be found in Dittmer's work on Captain America and 9/11.[27] While the imagery and visual metaphors Dittmer cites are often replete with "any-town USA" (or

[23] Julian Young, "Heidegger's Heimat," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011).; Guntram H. Herb, "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94 (2004). See also from discussion in Herb: Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).; Alon Confino and Ajay Skaria, "The Local Life of Nationhood," *National Identities* 4 (2002).; and Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border* (Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 1996).

[24] Alexandra Ludewig, "'Heimat, Heimat, uber alles': Heimat in two contemporary German Films," *Studies in European Cinema* 5 (2008).; and Uta Larkey, "New Places, New Identities: The (Ever) Changing Concept of Heimat," *German Politics and Society* 26 (2008).

[25] Herb, "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979," 142-143.

[26] Herb, "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979," 143.

[27] Jason Dittmer, "Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (2005). See also, again: Confino and Skaria, "The Local Life of Nationhood."; and Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*.

"Centerville," as it is presented in the work[28]), there is a problem because the central conflict, the attack, happened in not-just-any-towns: New York City and Washington, DC. Dittmer does not come out to recognize this point, and yet he makes it all the same by analysing how Captain America himself goes to both Ground Zero and Centerville. But Captain America is not just a superhero; he is a true embodiment of identity-"America" and the "here"-ness of the moral-identificational-space. He is the linchpin holding the disparate territories together, making "any-town USA" and New York City one-and-the-same.

It is this issue of the moral-identificational-space actually being the defining point holding together the conceptual-territorial-space that is missing in *Heimat*. There is a "somethingness" about the land itself that is unifying, however not unique. The same is true for "any-town USA." Yet, what makes it unifying is not the territory, not the objective or "objective" markings, not even the people.[29] Rather, what unifies is the moral-identificational-space existing before/during/after the determination of the conceptual-territorial-space and making it meaningful. This moral-identificational-space, this "here"-ness, is prior to and independent of any bordering. What this also means is that the moral-identificational-space can (and does) change independently of the "objective" structures. One of the best ways to demonstrate this divergence is through an analysis of conflict representation; the resultant identity from the differential-identificational conflict clearly displaying the separation of the subjective moral-identificational-space (identity-"state") from the "objective" conceptual-territorial-space (structure-state).

In between the two editions of *Writing Security*, Campbell published a work also concentrating on the events in the Balkans in the 1990's. In *National Deconstruction*, Campbell looks at the splintering of the Yugoslav state, at its deconstruction.[30] This

[28] Ditmer, "Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics," 639.
[29] This point is extremely important as it steps away from the *Heimat* related concept of primordialism. While Captain America is an Anglo-American white male, he is far more an anthropomorphization of the moral-identificational-space of 'his people' than any kind of ethno-differential model. See Alan Bairner, "National Sports and National Landscapes: In Defence of Primordialism," *National Identities* 11 (2009).; Murat Bayar, "Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (2009).; and Joseph R. Gusfield, "Primordialism and Nationality," *Society* 33 (1996).
[30] David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 17-20.

deconstruction happens at the hands of several parties, but also by the sub-elites of Yugoslavia. Campbell concentrates on the transitions from "state" to "states," but the legitimating identities for those states must come from somewhere. Although Campbell challenges the traditional pairing of national identity with state territoriality, the emotional, historical, and theoretical mechanisms he employs all revolve around the state.[31] The terrible specters of the Holocaust raised during the Yugoslav wars are, as he rightly states, due in part to this terrible pairing.[32] As a question of legitimation of national identities, however, the resultant expulsion of the other need not happen. It did happen in Yugoslavia, but it is not necessary. Furthermore, it is a separate act rising from the contestation of a single legitimate identity by a multitude of legitmating identities. In the Yugoslav wars, a popular example of splintering nation/state relations, the legitimating identities had recourse to "historical" territories as well. This would seem to make the terrible pairing more likely. The US, however, does not have such an alliance between legitimating identities and territories, at least not since the resolution of the Civil War.

Cederman provides an analysis of analyses[33] that is helpful at shedding light on the question of sub-elites and identity (indeed, also by way of Yugoslavia) which has been building up in the immediate review above. He demonstrates that, through the various understandings of state and nation as both individual concepts as well as relational concepts, there are various forms of "constructive identity" which are actually being discussed by theorists.[34] Campbell's understanding of the state and the nation would appear to fall in line with Cederman's Type 4 constructivism, where both the nation and the state are problematized.[35] The problem is, while Campbell accepts the *problematizability* of the nation, he almost exclusively looks at the problematizing of the state by virtue of the combination of Foreign Policy and "foreign policy." Without act or intent, this moves his analysis to Type 2, where the state is problematized while the

[31] Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, Chapter 1.
[32] Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, 8-13.
[33] Lars-Erik Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," in *Handbook of International Relaitons*, ed. W. Carlsnaes et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2002).
[34] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 410-413.
[35] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 419-422.

nation is accepted without problematization.[36] This is a very different form of analysis than would seem to be intended by Campbell's arguments elsewhere, yet it is the de facto position he comes into from his analysis concentrating on that nexus of state-act and identity-differentiation.

At issue between the Type 2 and Type 4 versions (and the Type 3 between) is the performativity of identity (held in the question of whether or not to problematize the identity of the state and/or nation), but also the legitimacy of those identities. Campbell accepts the need and right to problematize both state and national identity, yet only problematizes the state. This leaves open to question the issue of legitimacy regarding the Foreign Policy actions of the political elite, yet also, and in the same action, questions the legitimacy of the "foreign policy" performance-representation of the elite for those subsumed under the structures concerning Foreign Policy, i.e. the citizens of the state.

What Comes Next

There are two main questions at the heart of this work. The first question is: What happens when Campbell's concept of "foreign policy" is applied to a different identifier than the one with which he worked? What happens when the identification comes from the sub-elite rather than the elite? The second question is: What does the answer from the first question mean for the concept of national identity in general, and American identity in particular? What does this new view mean for the concepts, the daily perceptions, and the uses of identity?

This work will argue that the application of "foreign policy" to a group distanced from the role of Foreign Policy not only results in a different national identification, but it results in a contradictory national identification. This difference should have consequences for not only the concept of national identity, but the use of that concept as well; challenging the place of "inside/outside" in the theoretical discourse. In terms of the daily perceptions and uses of national identity, the various and oft discussed fractures and anomalies within society should be viewed again with a new eye towards their inception, mode of sustainment, and aims where the overall binding structures can no longer be

[36] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 413.

taken as given. Protestations and mistrust can be steps on the way to greater unity, but they can also be steps on the way to dissolution.

The path to these conclusions begins with the next chapter, where the underpinning argument and concepts of this work will be presented. The work will be situated in the Reflectivist tradition, though this will be done by challenging other Reflectivist works. The key concept of "here" will be defined and placed within a structured methodology of film analysis called "guiding questions." The films to be analyzed will cover the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, with concentrations on Vietnam, Nuclear Fears, the Unipolar Moment, and the War on Terror.

Chapter Three will present the elite identifications of these same wars and eras. The chapter is only a token representation of the elite identifications, as it is taken for an initial assumption (born out by previous scholars' works) that the elite identification does not disrupt the construct of "us/inside" vs "them/outside". The corpus for this analysis will be State of the Union speeches from the years indicated by the films.

Chapter Four begins the film analyses by examining films from the Cold War era. This Cold War chapter will be sub-divided into "The Vietnam War," "The Other Wars," and "Nuclear Fears." Chapter Five will continue with the film analyses of the Post-Cold War era. It will be subdivided into "Nuclear Fears," "The Unipolar Moment," and "Post-911."

Chapter Six will provide a comprehensive analysis of the three previous chapters. It will examine the identifications between identifiers (elite and sub-elite), as well as the identifications across the periods and eras analyzed. Any emerging trends will be noted and discussed. Finally, a summation of the work, potential criticism and response, and the implications of the work will be presented in the Conclusion

Chapter 2- Theory and Methodology: "Here" and "There"[37]

Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.

-Robert Cox

Fiction is a long, rambling encounter with many things … Fiction re-complicates what politicians wish to oversimplify.

-Mohsin Hamid

David Campbell and *Writing Security*

Campbell's work aims to demonstrate that "we can understand the state as having 'no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.'"[38] Specifically, he argues that, rather than being an independently and objectively existential thing, the United States' identity is the perpetually created product of its foreign policy; and thus, that the United States' foreign policy and foreign policy creation are central to the existence of the nation's identity.[39] Campbell supports himself by way of recounting the history of the identity/differentiation concept in the emergence of the state in Europe, the concept's export to the American colonies, its engraining into the fledgling American state, and its role in the Cold War. After tracing the identity/differentiation concept up through the Cold War, Campbell further looks into its manifestations in the post-Cold War world.

[37] Large parts of this chapter were first written for, and may be found in: Hays, "Three Incarnations of *The Quiet American*."; and Hays, "American 'Foreign Policy' in Film."
[38] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9.
[39] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 8.

Campbell begins with a brief argument problematizing, and defending the need to problematize, the concept of the state and state identity. He argues that identity is perpetually created by a state through the temporally dependent "*stylized repetition of acts*"[40] (italics in original) which propagates the identity-*cum*-difference relationship.[41] Campbell applies this base to the problematization of the Cold War, the pronouncement of its being finished, and the inherent meaning of understanding and identity which exists in that pronouncement.[42] In the course of re-investigating the nature of the Cold War's emergence, he discovers in the internal documents foundational to the United States's position at the beginning of the Cold War the explicit and implicit recognition that the main "fear" and "enemy" was actually disorder and anarchy, with the Soviet Union being at most a medium of its deliverance.[43] With the true enemy being anarchy and disorder, a non-temporally specific enemy, Campbell continues by researching its history and evolution in relation to the state.

In order to understand the fear of disorder and anarchy in relation to the state, Campbell first examines the emergence of the state. Disregarding the "traditional narrative" of the emergence of the state as being a change in social organization surrounding the event of the Peace of Westphalia, Campbell shows that the "state" which emerged after Westphalia and the end of Christendom was a new means toward performing the old task of securing identity amid disorder. The internal religious conflicts that emerged in Christendom tore apart the identifying powers that had been in place since the fall of the Roman Empire. The new "states," formed along these denominational divides, allowed for a new manner of identification concerned with danger and difference without reliance on God, altering and adding another level of fear and difference onto the world.[44] True to its religious roots, the new state maintained the evangelism of fear that became so prominent in the centuries of Christendom. Contrary to the religious usage, however, where fear of personal corruption led to intense self-reflection in order to stave off Hell after death, the new state propagated the evangelism of fear in terms of the

[40] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.
[41] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9-10.
[42] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 15-17.
[43] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 19-33.
[44] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 40-48.

corruption of individuals leading to the death of the state.[45]

The evangelism of fear incited by the state was concerned with the reversion of humankind back to the anarchic, disordered, and (thereby) dangerous world of "nature" which existed before the "state."[46] With the fear propagated being one of disorder in absence of the state, the internal state necessarily became identified as order.[47] Anything which challenged or threatened this identity was considered to be "foreign" in the sense of being beyond the spatial/identificational boundary of internal state order. This identificational process, which Campbell calls "foreign policy," impacts traditionally understood Foreign Policy between states, and vice versa.[48]

Having introduced the conceptual split between "foreign policy" and Foreign Policy,[49] the delineation between a spatial/identificational inside and outside, Campbell provides an argument demonstrating the simultaneous creation of complementary moral spaces, where the inside, as well as being ordered, is morally superior to the outside.[50] The discursive "main means" towards this moral-identification of space, where the inside is good and ordered and the outside is bad, disordered and threatening, is the body.[51] Campbell charts the development of identity/difference through the evolution of the *corpus mysticum* (the body of Christ) into the *corpus mysticum* (the body of the Church), and subsequently, after Westphalia, into the body politic.[52]

The identification of the state by means of the body is very important. Campbell shows that this metaphorical understanding opens the way to identification of "otherness" as deadly disease which can easily infiltrate the body, and must therefore always be guarded against.[53] This understanding of the inside/outside combines with the American identification traditions of Puritanism, revolution, and the perpetual frontier (that being the edge of civilization-order/nature-anarchy) to produce a super fear of being "infected"

[45] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 48-51.
[46] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 61-62.
[47] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 62-63.
[48] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-69.
[49] Foreign Policy is the traditional sense of "bridge building" between states, while "foreign policy" is the process of differentiation, or "wall building," and can be at the individual level, the state level, or anything in between. Both forms reinforce and impact each other.
[50] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 73-74.
[51] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 75.
[52] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 75-80.
[53] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 82-86.

by "pathogens" leading to the "death" of the state and a return to anarchy, all due to proximity to the "infection" nature-anarchy.

Campbell traces this fear of infection by anarchy through the Puritan times (where proximity to Native Americans and distance from Europe threatened their maintenance within civilization)[54] and through the revolutionary period (where, having abandoned their Europeaness yet still confronted with the anarchic frontier, their maintenance within civilization was even more threatened) to the post-revolutionary period (where the European combined with the frontier as a threat in terms of immigrant, foreign power, and foreign power manipulating the frontier).[55] In each of these periods, the threat of infection by anarchy promised to demonstrate itself by a breakdown in internal order, which meant civil unrest, attacks on the Puritan-capitalist system, and disagreement with the government.

Having traced these pathogenic fears from the founding of the US, Campbell then retraces them in the context of Communism, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. By being able to retrace through different periods of identificational threat the same context of fear of infection by anarchy, Campbell shows that the Cold War, already shown to have been founded on the fear of disorder and anarchy more than military conflict, was not a unique event in the American experience, but rather a re-introduction of the same classic fears of the outside-anarchy infiltrating and destroying the inside-civilization, the act of delineation between the two being a necessary act of identification.[56] This act of identification regarding pathogenic fears took on the dimension of "national security" under the Eisenhower administration through an effort to promote and maintain the "normal" (i.e. "inside," "civilized," "non-infected," "American") by systematically investigating and removing the "abnormal" (i.e. "outside," "anarchic," "infected," "un-American") from proximity to the national government and other influential places.[57] This "national securitization" of identification as a means to maintain the "normal" transcends the actions and existence of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, though is in

[54] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 107-116.
[55] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 119-130.
[56] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 139.
[57] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 151-156.

perpetual need of some form of "other" through which to counterpoint itself.[58]

The Argument

Before presenting the argument, especially considering the departure we are taking, an initial point needs to be made. It is, perhaps, a peculiar point, yet it is valid and valuable; and although seemingly self-evident, the point is not often made. Logic is a primary assumption, and it is assumed here. It is assumed here simply because no other alternative seems present or adequate to use (quite an advantage to the Rationalists). Its existence and its use, however, have consequences and should be acknowledged for that. Logic is a primary assumption.

Campbell attempts to provide an alternate understanding of American foreign policy, specifically during the Cold War, through the deconstruction of national identity in general, and American identity in particular. At the center of his analysis is the role of conflict in defining the "other," which thereby allows and determines the identity of the self. This is what Campbell terms "foreign policy."[59] His vehicle for this identification through conflict is the Foreign Policy of the state (in the traditional understanding of the term foreign policy).[60] As will be argued here, the equating of national identity with state identity, and specifically the reliance upon the identifiers which Campbell uses in his analysis, perpetuates an understanding of national identity which has, at its base, the Rationalist-dominated discourse in International Relations. This running assumption greatly impacts the result of any question regarding national identity.

The aim here is to provide an alternative analysis of American national identity using Campbell's premises, all save one: "foreign policy" will here be divested from Foreign Policy in its application to national identity by introducing a new discourse, that of popular, mass released, American film. It is the goal of this analysis to demonstrate the greater complexity existing in identity formation, the multiplicity of identities subsumed under the single term "America," and the multiplicity of temporal contexts impacting the identification process.

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[58] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 168-169.
[59] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-69.
[60] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-69.

Campbell concentrates throughout his work on the use of "foreign policy" by various elites to determine the identity of the "state." It privileges the relationship between "foreign policy" as a process of identification and Foreign Policy as a practice of states and thereby elites. While there are certainly good and understandable reasons for this, it is not necessary to allow the relationship between the two to stand unaltered, and indeed there may be every reason to separate the two. First, however, a defense of the route Campbell took.

Campbell's analysis begins pre-Westphalia and ends with the end of the Cold War. As a matter of identity creation through differentiation, not to mention the recording of such practice, the elites of the times investigated *must* be privileged simply because of the demands in communication (both then and across time) as well as having a view of the world, provided by education and experience, that could contemplate something beyond the horizon.[61] In addition, the center of his investigation was United States' Foreign Policy in the Cold War.[62] As stated repeatedly above, Foreign Policy is the venue of states, inferring the interaction of the leaders of political communities (states), here regarded as the elite. For Campbell, the use and understanding of "foreign policy" was a means for understanding US Foreign Policy. The utilization of this tool, however, does not wed the two things together.

In explaining and developing the concept of "foreign policy," Campbell explains also the etymology of *foreign*. Before the creation of the term *international*, *foreign* had been used as a term of demarcation between, essentially, the regularly experienced world of the "self" and everything else.[63] This demarcation "served to indicate the distance, unfamiliarity, and alien character of those people and matters outside of one's immediate household, family, or region, but still inside the political community that would later comprise a state."[64] It is this personal understanding of *foreign* taken together with "foreign policy" that allows, and perhaps even necessitates, the understanding of differentiation/identification on a level "below" that of the elite and in a manner that goes towards the formulation and fixing of qualities *within* the identity of the state; in short,

[61] This is what is understood here by Campbell's comment on the "logistical dimension." Campbell, *Writing Security*, xi.
[62] Campbell, *Writing Security*, Introduction.
[63] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 37.
[64] Campbell, *Writing Security*, pg 37.

the formulation of the characteristics of the "us" existing in the "'us' vs. 'them'" construction.

Campbell allows for, and even explicitly enumerates, several sub-elite "foreign policy" identification groups.[65] The problem here, however, is that after he acknowledges them, he seems to forget their existence as actors, especially within the US. This may be due to the structural limitations of his research as discussed above, but whatever the reason, it is a mistake. To apply "foreign policy" to US Foreign Policy, without an explanation or acknowledgment that this identification is being committed by only one of many identification groups, badly skews the concept of identification generally, as well as that of the US specifically.

This final point, perhaps read as a charge, is in need of further clarification. In two places, Campbell references the identificational role of sub-elites. For clarity, larger sections of the texts will here be reproduced and cited.

In the Preface, Campbell states:

> Any exhaustive account of identity, particularly one indebted to Foucault, would require a thorough discussion of the resistance to the scripting of identity proffered by those with greater access to social resources. Crudely put, one would have to consider the full range of popular resistances to elite practices. Although I consider some of the theoretical issues relevant to this question in chapter 8, I have restricted the argument in the bulk of the book to the representational practices of those acting in official capacities. This narrower ambit has an obvious logistical dimension, but I think it is intellectually justified by the space for alternative interpretations made available by the open-ended and overly figurative character of the texts of foreign policy, which allow their scripting of identity to be contested from within.[66]

Later in Chapter 3, Campbell discusses the interaction of Foreign Policy and "foreign

[65] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 69.
[66] Campbell, *Writing Security*, x-xi. While Campbell references a further investigation in Chapter 8, the investigation neither references nor resolves the issues being discussed here.

policy" with a few key points being:

> "[F]oreign policy" can be understood as referring to all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as "foreign" in the process of dealing with them. In this sense, "foreign policy" is divorced from the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between a self and an other located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or geography. These are the forms of "foreign policy" that have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty and constituted identity through time and across space. … Foreign Policy as state-based and conventionally understood within the discipline – is thus not as equally implicated in the *constitution* of identity as the first understanding ["foreign policy"]. Rather, Foreign Policy serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by "foreign policy" and to *contain* challenges to the identity that results. … Foreign Policy is a discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in its legitimation.[67]

In these two sections, we can see what would appear to be a contradiction. Campbell appears to state that the identificational-cum-political role of the sub-elite is to provide resistance to the identificational practices of the elite, and that due to the "logistical dimension" assumed to be tied to the historically-textually dependent nature of his analysis, this area is not investigated. Later, Campbell states that the sub-elite practice "foreign policy" on a relatively lower level of interaction between ethnic or gender groups within the state. Yet, the differential-identity coming from these lower levels provides a larger national identity that gives legitimacy and purpose to Foreign Policy.

This is important for two reasons. First, there is a conflict between the sub-elite's function being resistance or legitimation as regards to the political elite. Second, there is a conflict between the sub-elite's being sub-national or nation forming. This work sides

[67] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68-70. All italics in original.

with the role of the sub-elite being one of legitimation and, thereby, nation forming. This view is in line with Cederman's Type 4 analysis[68] as well as Kaldor's use of sub-elite national actors.[69]

Let us now look at several of Campbell's premises:

1. "foreign policy" is an act of identification/differentiation through conflict;
2. Foreign Policy, an act of interaction after "foreign policy"-separation, is impacted by this identification process;
3. this in turn impacts "foreign policy" identification;
4. "foreign policy" is an act committed at all and any level of identification, elite and sub-elite alike, while Foreign Policy is an elite-specific act.

Now let us posit a few more premises:

1. Foreign Policy and "foreign policy" have often been incorporated into one and the same thing since Westphalia;
2. the specific identification group at the nexus of this "foreign policy"-cum-Foreign Policy was the political elite;[70]
3. their impact was due to the ability to communicate and organize, an ability which requires some amount of education (primarily literacy in the time period where Campbell begins) combined with various forms of communication-infrastructure;[71]
4. their positioning (at the nexus) was due to their monopoly of these abilities;
5. the elite having a monopoly of these abilities, providing an unbalanced impact on Foreign Policy, does not discount the potential for identification by sub-elite groups, it only discounts

[68] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity."
[69] Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."
[70] Though not expressly stated, this is the operational theme in Campbell's analysis.
[71] Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," 418-419.

their impact;[72]

6. sub-elite groups have been gaining in the abilities of communication and organization through the past several decades of increased education and communications technology, most importantly free mass media dispersing sub-elite identification and the internet making open and direct social networking and communications possible.[73]

This allows for several conclusions to be reached:

1. with this increase in enabled numbers, the monopoly of the political elite is disintegrating;
2. with the disintegration of this monopoly, so disintegrates the elite's position as the nexus of national identity creation, altering the relationship of "foreign policy"/Foreign Policy to the point of equivalence, though this time favoring the "foreign policy" side of sub-elite/sub-national identification;
3. the collapse of the heretofore nexus implies the collapse of heretofore national identity (singular), replacing it with pseudo-national identities (plural) which are no longer actually "national," as they are not privileged with a monopoly over group-identification abilities;
4. this means that a large number of groups (potentially ever increasing and devolving, potentially conflicting) are laying claim to a national identity assumed to be one-and-the-same when, de facto, no such nation may further exist. In effect, it is equality towards the lowest denominator; if all men are kings, there is no king. If all individuals are "America," then there is no America.

[72] This is the tension between vertical and horizontal organization of social groups. See Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."; Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique."

[73] For more on these points, see Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."; and James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network: Second Edition*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

Various points discussed heretofore need to be unpacked and explained further. The first of these is more a point of clarification, however. The terms "elite" and "sub-elite" have been used repeatedly up to this point with only indirect explanation. "Elite" is here understood as the "foreign policy" actors responsible for Foreign Policy within a state, extended to include the actors responsible for directing the operation of the state. "Sub-elite" is here understood as "foreign policy" actors not connected to Foreign Policy. In short, the elite are the policy-makers/legitimacy-takers situated at the nexus of "foreign policy" (which is an act of all beings of identity) and Foreign Policy while the sub-elite are the policy-takers/legitimacy-makers removed from the Foreign Policy structures of the state.

The elite correspond to the traditional vertical organization and actor-hood utilized by Kaldor, while the sub-elite correspond to the horizontal organization and actor-hood utilized by Kaldor.[74] The sub-elite as a concept, however, is slightly more complicated. Anyone who is not the elite in the society is the sub-elite. To make sense of this in terms of actors, though, the concept of the sub-elite needs to be more specified. While the sub-elite can be anyone and everyone below the elite, in this work the sub-elite is narrowed to the horizontal organization of the constituent parts of film. This means the sub-elite, for the purposes of this work, are the producers and consumers of popular mass-release Hollywood films.[75]

Next, as the elite are policy-makers/legitimacy-takers and the sub-elite are policy-takers/legitimacy-makers, the two are not involved in an "either/or" or "zero-sum game" regarding influence. The elite can and do continue to make policy (i.e. Foreign Policy) regardless of the sub-elite. The issue is legitimacy, not competency. The elite can only make policy reflecting the identity interests of the nation and not just the state if they are in-step with the identifications of the legitimacy-makers (i.e. the sub-elite). In contrast to Campbell's statement on the role of the sub-elite from the Preface discussed above, this is not a question of "resistances to the elite practices" because the "practices" are "foreign policy" (i.e. us/them differential identity). At issue is resistance to the elite as a

[74] Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Globalized Violence in a Global Era."
[75] While it is true that the elite may also consume such films, they do not have the numbers to make a determining influence (profit) on the content of the films. The constituent part of the sub-elite do have this ability. For more on this, see the "Film and Discourse" section below.

legitimate practitioner at the nexus of "foreign policy"/Foreign Policy (i.e. does the elite belong to the "us" or to a "them"). It is not a question of act, but of actor.

Thirdly, the notion of national identity, as a form of identity, logically requires the combination of a single sign with a single signified. To speak of "John," although there are many "John"s, only has meaning if the sign is attached to a single signified that can be determined. If we ask for "John" and are presented with two Johns, we can determine which was asked for by the signified (significations possessed). If we do the reverse and we somehow list the innumerable significations, we should theoretically come to a single sign, our "John." It is not possible for there to be a single "John" attaching to different signifieds and for the relationship to have identificational meaning. The same holds true for the nation.

Finally, as regards to "America," it is necessary for there to be a single signified attached to that sign. Campbell argues that the elite perform a function at the nexus of "foreign policy" and Foreign Policy that is, in this context, a signification of that signified. If a signified applied to that sign contains the signification of a disconnect between "foreign policy" and Foreign Policy, however, it necessitates the loss of meaning of the sign. The existence of such a conflict of multiple signifieds attached to a single sign is argued by this work; the conclusion of which is the loss of meaning of "America." This is not to say that the state has "disappeared" or been "replaced" by another political actor. Supplantation would actually lend itself to a unity of the sign-signified problem. Rather, it is to say that the national identity, by losing *logical* meaning, loses *logical* existence. Where this fits in regards to performativity is another matter.

Methodologies and Discourses

This work is a combination of two forms of discursive analysis, whereby the rhetoric and metaphors of the universe of discourse (presidential/administrative speech and mass released American film concerning the Cold War, 1990's, and War on Terror) are analyzed in order to understand the identifications of the participants. The

overarching methodology upon which this work is based is taken from Drulak's critique of Jäkel.[76] Drulak revises Jäkel's 12 methodological steps into seven:

1. Choice of the target domain and of the speech community.
2. Corpus (universe of discourse) collection and deduction of conceptual metaphors.
3. Search for metaphorical expressions.
4. Revision of conceptual metaphors.
5. Establishment of frequencies.
6. Comparison of distinct discursive segments.
7. Elaboration of practical implications.

The target domain will be "America," though due to the speech community being American political/identificational speech (through conflict), we should find that this target will often be *conveniently*[77] interchanged with "us." Due to the nature of the investigation, we are actually beginning with and are interested in a single conceptual metaphor "America"/"us" IS "good" as well as its negative equivalent "not-America"/"them" IS "bad." Because of this point, step 4 will be removed. The frequencies of metaphorical expressions concerning this exact conceptual metaphor as well as its negative equivalent will be tallied.[78] Unlike in Drulak's adaptation, though, the frequencies will not be qualified in terms of relative degree of usage, as there is effectively only one conceptual metaphor. Instead, an absolute number will be provided. As there are two universes of discourse concerned with a single conceptual metaphor and speech community, step 6 will be slightly altered to compare the discursive segments between the universes of discourse rather than within a single universe of discourse. It is this comparison that should reveal the identificational conflict within the traditional

[76] Petr Drulak, "Identifying and assessing metaphors: discourse on EU reform," in *Political Language and Metaphor: Interpreting and Changing the World*, ed. Carver et al. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 105-118.
[77] The term "conveniently" is here used and stressed because of the interchangedness already existing between these terms and speakers as used by Campbell. The second analysis will demonstrate the same interchange, though coming from different speakers with different results.
[78] A conceptual metaphor may be thought of as the general metaphor attached to a specific concept, such as "The State IS a Body" whereby we understand the difficult to conceive State via the more understandable Body. A metaphorical expression is a more specific metaphor that fits within the concept outlined by the conceptual metaphor, such as "the head of state" or "the arm of the military." For a discussion on what conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions are and how they function, see Drulak, "Identifying and assessing metaphors: discourse on EU reform."; and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980).

structure of "America."

The re-worked methodology is as follows:

1. Choice of the target domain and of the speech community.
2. Corpus (universes of discourse) collection and deduction of conceptual metaphors.
3. Search for metaphorical expressions.
4. Establishment of frequencies.
5. Comparison of distinct discursive elements between universes of discourse.
6. Elaboration of practical implications.

It is assumed here that the conclusion of the analysis of the first discourse will result in an identification much in line with that concluded by Campbell. There will be an ordered and good "inside/domestic" encompassing and being led by the elite that stands juxtaposed to the chaotic and evil "outside/international" where the enemy to our hero resides. In short, "we (the speaker) are 'us;' 'us' is whatever is 'inside;' whatever is 'us' and 'inside' is 'good.'"

Film and Discourse

Before entering into the methodological steps outlined in this section, it is necessary to say a few words, both on the particular importance and value of the use of film in an analysis of this sort,[79] as well as the means through which the analysis will be conducted. The most important point to bring up regarding the use of film is that mass released films are designed to make money. Making a film, especially current mass released films, takes a lot of money, and on top of the costs, there is the desire for profit. Profit is realized with sales (obviously), but those sales depend on public reaction to and acceptance of the film.[80] This is where the value of analysis incorporating films comes in. During the pre-production phases, when producers and companies are looking through

[79] For more studies on media and film, see Der Derian, *Virtuous War*.; Drulak, *Metafory Studene Valky*.
[80] This point also has a further peculiar aspect, whereas history and facts (even in an historical film about real events) can and are altered to help reinforce the acceptable narrative of the current time. Fears of global destruction in *Thirteen Days* and America's historical relationship with the Middle East in *Lions for Lambs* are examples of this.

scripts and projects, they are looking for what they believe will be accepted and well received by the public. This means having an understanding of the public's sense of identity and that identity's direction. A simple example is the lack of (and most likely perpetual lack of) "good Nazis" in popular American film. The American mass audience identity of "Nazi" does not allow for the concept of good, and no film has allowed for (or probably will allow for) such a combination.[81] In contrast to an impossible form of "hero," there is also a preponderance of examples of structurally unlikely villains: the President of the United States rather than a drug kingpin, the US Military rather than Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, honest US soldiers rather than corrupt US soldiers, the US Military rather than the North Vietnamese, the American People rather than the US soldiers in Vietnam, US Military and Intelligence Services seeking weapons of mass destruction in Iraq rather than burgeoning Iraqi Civil War fighters.[82] What this reasoning suggests is that actualized, mass released films have gone through a process whereby their content is believed to reflect identifications held by the mass audience, thereby encouraging acceptance and creating profit.[83]

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[81] Films such as *Schindler's List* and *Valkyrie*, though portraying nominally Nazi characters as heroes, both show a process of the "Nazi" becoming "non-Nazi" through heroic acts. These acts are in conflict with the acts and goals of the larger "Nazi" representation, thus entailing that through acting as a hero and becoming a hero, the character ceases to be "Nazi" and becomes something else. That "non-Nazi"-something-else is what is acceptable and receivable by the mass audience. Similarly, the initially affable Zoller from *Inglourious Basterds*, though not presented as a hero, is still presented as decent and relatively innocent until his more violent disposition is revealed towards the end.

[82] The referenced films are, in order: Phillip Noyce, *Clear and Present Danger* (Paramount Pictures, 1994).; Edward Zwick, *The Siege* (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1998).; David O. Russel, *Three Kings* (Warner Bros., 1999).; Francis F. Coppola, *Apocalypse Now* (Zoetrope Studios, 1979).; John Irvin, *Hamburger Hill* (RKO Pictures, 1987).; Paul Greengrass, *Green Zone* (Universal Pictures, 2010).

[83] While this logic may be the intent, it does not always provide a successful product. There are many aspects that go into making a film successful that are completely outside the realm of pre-production planning, not to mention any kind of conscious decision-making process. This actually touches upon the release and reception of *The Quiet American* in 2002.

Similarly, this logic does not always mean that two films from two companies coming out at roughly the same time will have the same message given in a similar manner (though the combination of *Fail-Safe* and *Doctor Strangelove* as well as *Deep Impact* and *Armageddon* are fascinating examples of this being the case). Around the same time as *The Quiet American* was being produced, another Vietnam War movie, *We Were Soldiers*, was underway. *We Were Soldiers* has a different message than *The Quiet American*, and may at first appear to be in conflict with it as the first seems to be pro-America and the other anti-America as regards Vietnam. This is only superficial, however, as *We Were Soldiers* concentrates on the soldiers doing the fighting they were asked to do (demonstrating the theme of "go ahead and hate the war, but not the soldiers"), while *The Quiet American* looks at who those soldiers are and how those soldiers came to be there (also potentially demonstrating the same theme).

There is also the occasional case of sheer star-power (John Wayne and *The Green Berets*), although this would appear to be an ever less common occurrence. This may be the result of the recognition

While there are further methodological steps being introduced for the purpose of analyzing the second universe of discourse, the core methodology outlined above still holds. The additional steps outlined below are necessary to solve a methodological disparity between the two universes of discourse. In the more traditional analysis concerning presidential/administrative speech, the speaker and the conflict are relatively evident. By virtue of how the speaker is presented (behind podiums with seals, in offices/buildings of government, flanked by flags in prominent positions) and by virtue of "direct" statements in the form of the discourse, the role of the speaker, the identification of the conflict, and the relation between the speaker and the conflict are relatively evident. This is not the same with films, as films are stories. They come from different creators (screenwriters, production companies, directors, actors) with different goals (entertainment, profit, communication rather than announcement and information). Analyzing stories requires a certain degree of deciphering that is not necessary for deciphering "traditional" discourse. Mainly, the speaker and conflict must be teased out of several possibilities presented in the film. The means for doing that here is by a series of guiding questions. Those questions are:

1. What is the conflict?
2. Who are the participants?
3. What is the message? (Who and/or what is "America"?)
4. What is the argument delivering the message? (What occurs to situate an identity of "America"?)[84]

The application of these questions spawns some sub-questions:

1. a. What is the setting conflict? (What is the war/event happening surrounding the story?)
1. b. What is the real conflict? (What is the engine of the story, what issue separates "the good guy" from "the bad guy"?)
1. c. Are the two conflicts the same?
2. a. Who is "the good guy"? (Not to be confused with the protagonist.)

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of past mistakes (*The Green Berets* being among the greatest). It could also perhaps be related to the increased ease and horizontalization of communication, making the pre-production judgments easier.

[84] Questions 3 and 4 are inspired by and loosely based on the methodology developed in Drulak, "Identifying and assessing metaphors: discourse on EU reform," 107-108. Question 3 takes the place of "conceptual metaphors" while Question 4 takes the place of "metaphorical expressions."

2. b. Who is "the bad guy"? (Not to be confused with the antagonist.)

2. c. Who is a catalyst? (Who acts, but without significant impact on the real conflict?)

I am Here, You are There, We are Inside

The purpose of these questions is, in essence, to provide a double reading of a deconstruction; to deconstruct Campbell's deconstruction.[85] Campbell's analysis makes a link between "us vs. them," "inside vs. outside," "good vs. bad." The consequence of this is the creation of an identity structure that includes the speaker, relative space, and moral authority. It takes for granted, however, the relative spatial/identity of the speaker. This is understandable, considering Campbell's main area of analysis being the political elite whose concept of national identity and sovereign space overlap, but it is not a necessary connection.

The above guiding questions no longer look at the order "we (the speaker) are 'us;' 'us' is whatever is 'inside;' whatever is 'us' and 'inside' is 'good.'" Instead, it reverses the chain and begins with the concept "good." Now, the order is "we (the speaker) accept that in this discourse there is some thing 'good;' we accept that in this discourse there is some thing 'us;' we accept that in this discourse whatever is 'good' correlates to whatever is 'us;' we accept that whatever is 'good' and 'us' is we (the speaker)."

In this second ordering, there is no assumed connection between the speaker, "us," and "inside." In fact, there is no need for a sovereign-spatial relation at all. The de-metaphorized metaphor of "inside," the connection between Foreign Policy (state) and "foreign policy" (nation) is removed. Instead, there is a less defined temporal/spatial reference of "here." "Here" is inherent in the "existence" of the speaker, but it has no identificational force on its own. It has no set limits, no borders, no permanence. It can expand to the body, to the state, to the world, to the present, to the presentized-past, to the presentized-future, and everything in between; yet it has no fixicity outside of the context of the discourse. "Here" is where the speaker, "us/good," and context overlap. Rather

[85] The concept of double reading used here is that from Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State."

than a pie-chart, picture a Venn diagram.

The difference is that between a depiction of conflict where the "good" and the "bad" are attacking each other and killing each other, and a depiction of conflict where the "good" may be attacking and killing some actor all while being attacked and killed, but the "bad" need not be the actor attacking and killing the "good." It is entirely possible for the "bad" of the second reading to have been subsumed previously under the "good" of the first reading (e.g. depictions of fellow American soldiers, American authority structures, American anti-war population, etc). The removal of the sovereign-spatial correlation makes Campbell's understanding of conflict (inter-state/inter-national) one possible identifying conflict among many. The canvas conflict, or setting conflict, is still essential to this form of identity creation at the sub-elite level (just as without a canvas there is no painting), but it is no longer necessarily defining.

The notion of inside is territorially based, while here is experientially based. What is this territoriality and where does it come from? The territoriality of "inside" and identity comes from the territoriality of the state. The state is territorially dependent, it is spatially dependent. The link between territorial and spatial dependence connects to a very true concept of "inside." In space and territory, there is a definable inside and outside. It is important to note that this is "definable" and *not* "defined." What is meant by this is that it can be a meaningful, recordable, act with transferable nature of meaning to declare "this point is inside, that point is outside" even though the entire exercise, meaning, and structure is both artificial and ephemeral.

This is not the case with "here." The concept of here is not recordable in any meaningful transferable manner, because that would necessitate, at the very least, artificial objectivity, while "here" is perfectly subjective. Its meaning cannot be conveyed beyond the speaker in the time and space it is spoken. How is this widened to perform an identificational role in a group? By the description of the *qualities* of "here" which *are* "objectifiable," meaningful, transferable, and identificational. The problem, however, is that these qualities can be, and are, shared among many "here"s. Everyone, when speaking about themselves, is "good." Therefore, we must look at the context of the speaker in place and time *as well as* in relation to the structure of the declared "not-good." It is only in this manner that we can tease out the identificational knot of everyone

being "America" while individual structures within that traditional title are considered "not-America."

"Inside" is based on boundaries apart from the speaker, meaning where the boundaries of the structure America end, so too, roughly, are the boundaries of the identity "America." "Here" is based on the speaker alone, making "America" perfectly subjective, perfectly identificational. "Inside" can be an expression of "here," but this need not be true in the reverse. There are many "here"s inside a room.

Campbell, in *Writing Security*, develops and applies "foreign policy" as a differential-identificational-concept. Uniting this concept with the practice of traditional Foreign Policy, Campbell seeks to investigate and understand the creation and evolution of American identity.[86] But when the "foreign policy"/Foreign Policy construct is disunited and the differential-identificational-concept of "foreign policy" as practiced by sub-elite identifiers is examined, several important points emerge.

Perhaps the most important point that emerges is that the "us" contained within the identificational construct "us"/"them" is as relative as the "them." While Campbell rightfully problematizes and demonstrates the latter, he ignores the former. By problematizing the former, it is demonstrated that the identificational "other" of the identity-"America"[87] is actually part of the structure-America.[88] This means that both of the identificational components of the differential-identity-construct ("self"/"other," "us"/"them," "inside"/"outside," "good"/"bad") are contained within Campbell's concept of "America." In short, the enemy is "within," yet this cannot be the case. The resolution is to abandon Campbell's use of the structural metaphor of "inside"/"outside" for the less objective and fixed metaphor of "here"/"there."

[86] Campbell, *Writing Security*.
[87] The terms identity-"America" and "America" refer to the subjective identificational qualities of the nation belonging to the country The United States of America. In this work, the key qualities are the "here"-ness of the moral-identificational-space (discussed below). In short, they refer to the essence of American-ness; something like Plato's forms.
[88] The terms structure-America and America refer to the objective qualities of the country The United States of America. This means, for example, concepts such as citizenship, political organizations, political decision-making structures and actors, laws, formal institutions, etc.

Chapter 3- Elite Discourse: "Us" and "Them"

We have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension, leaving forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself.

-Dwight Eisenhower

Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late.

-George W. Bush

Introduction

This chapter presents the State of the Union speeches that correspond to the films in the following two chapters. Where the films depict an actual event, speeches were chosen to reflect the timeframe of the event. Where the films depict a fictional event, speeches were chosen to reflect the time the film was made. Speeches and events are presented in chronological order, with the two general sections being "Cold War" and "Post-Cold War."

Cold War

The Korean War[89]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The Korean War

Actual: The Free World vs International Communism

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America and its Allies

Bad: Communists

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

The United States must fight and win in Korea, as Korea is the center of the battle between the Free World and International Communism. Though the war in Korea is the center of the conflict, the war with International Communism is broader. Only through responsible, efficient, and unified policy can America win the war with International Communism. America should realize the broad war it is in with International Communism, and wage that war accordingly.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Eisenhower makes three general points regarding the international nature of the Korean War. The first is America's allies. The second is America's enemies. The third is America's capabilities.

First, Eisenhower refers repeatedly to the role the US is playing in various regions of the world where it has established alliances: in the Americas and especially in Western

[89] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829, 2011).

Europe. This role is only right to be expanded to Asia, in particular to the Republic of Korea via the United Nations operation. The Republic of Korea, an alliance with it, and the defense of it do not stand alone, however. The United States is also allied with Nationalist China, and is protecting their forces. At the moment, however, the tactic of defending Nationalist China is counteracting the defense of the Republic of Korea. This is because the true threat is not Communist Korea and Communist China separately, but Communism as a whole.

Eisenhower stresses the unity of the Communist enemy that the United States faces. He mentions the Communist Chinese attacking the US and UN forces in Korea, and Eisenhower makes the connection between this ability of the Communist Chinese to attack with the American policy regarding Nationalist China. By guaranteeing the neutral security of the border between Communist and Nationalist China, America's China policy has freed up Communist Chinese forces to operate in Korea. In effect, the US is protecting Communist China in one theater of war and enabling them to attack UN and US forces in s second theater of war. There two theaters are also not the only ones, as Eisenhower links several wars in Asia together. The only resolution, according to Eisenhower, is to treat the world as a single theater of war: the Free vs the Communist.

In order to fight this global war, however, the US must recognize its strengths and its limits. The US must require and enable its allies to fight their share of the war. Second, the US must fight its lion's share of the war with greater efficiency, making full use of its industrial and technological capabilities.

Nuclear Fears[90]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: US/Soviet Nuclear Arms Race

Actual: American Nuclear Proliferation vs Soviet Nuclear Proliferation

[90] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 7, 1954. in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10096, 2011).; John F. Kennedy, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 14, 1963, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138, 2011).

2. Who are the participants?

Good: United States of America and its Allies

Bad: Soviet Union and its Allies

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

The United States and its allies only possess and desire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. As such, they are willing and wanting to place limits on the testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons in general. America should work to limit nuclear proliferation, if only among its non-allies.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Both Eisenhower and Kennedy discuss the general danger that nuclear weapons pose to the United States. Eisenhower mentions the threat of Soviet weapons in particular, while Kennedy mentions the threat of nuclear proliferation more broadly. However, even Kennedy maintains that there is a difference between allied nuclear weapons and non-allied nuclear weapons.

For Eisenhower, the Soviet nuclear program is justification enough for a strong American nuclear deterrent. However, it is still valuable for the Americans and Soviets to work together to limit nuclear proliferation. If the two countries could do this, he suggests, it would go a long way to encouraging peace between the two superpowers. While the knowledge of nuclear weapons should be restricted, however, Eisenhower sees a necessity in the sharing of nuclear tactics with American allies.

Kennedy is more broad and nuanced in his position, though. He similarly sees a need to limit the knowledge of nuclear weapons technology. However, Kennedy sees value in the proliferation of nuclear weapons among American allies in Europe. It is only the proliferation of nuclear weapons prowess among the Soviet allies that is dangerous.

The Vietnam War: Beginning[91]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The Vietnam War, 1965

Actual: The Free World vs Dictatorial Aggression

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America

Bad: International Communism

Catalyst: North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese

3. What is the message?

The United States of America has no narrow or selfish interests. It seeks a free and peaceful world, not territory or influence. The unified forces of aggression represented by International Communism threaten the free and peaceful world. "America" can and should build a free and peaceful society at home while also building a free and peaceful world; but it must be willing to prioritize the world over itself.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Johnson maintains the concept of a single theater of war between the Free and the Communist. He adds to this concept the unity of the war across a broad time-frame, ranging from Berlin, through Korea and Formosa, to Cuba and Vietnam. Johnson also

[91] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 4, 1965, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907, 2011).; Lyndon B. Johnson, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 12, 1966, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28015, 2011).

links this global battle to the domestic battles "at home," the need to build and ensure peace and prosperity in both areas. He recognizes, however, that the desired country the US is attempting to build for itself is impossible to accomplish in a world that is not first also guaranteed in its freedom. This reality entails American material and military sacrifice at the expense of its own needs.

In one motion, Johnson links the Vietnam War to the previous battles the US has fought (and won) in its global defense of freedom, while implying that this latest battle is not the final battle. He implies that the Vietnam War has turned a corner and will soon be won. Johnson repeatedly stresses that American force is not being used for narrow national interest or blood-lust; but rather, it is being used for the promotion of freedom of all peoples, *including the North Vietnamese*. Now that the corner has been turned, America is magnanimously looking for a diplomatic and peaceful route to guarantee this freedom in Vietnam. Vietnam is only the latest battle, however, and the US must be prepared and willing to fight the next battle and the one after that, until dictatorial aggression has been removed as a tool of state policy from the world.

Johnson also links the battle for peace to the domestic realm. A peaceful and prosperous and free America is essential to a peaceful and prosperous and free world, as America is a part of the world, not just the leader of the world. The US has finite resources, even if those resources are great. Nonetheless, America cannot be distracted by the global war and turn a blind eye to its own needs. There is a difference, though, between ignoring the home front and prioritizing the global front. If it comes to a choice between curing the US of poverty and injustice and treating the world for these ailments, America must sacrifice its own needs for the sake of the world.

The Vietnam War: Transitioning[92]

1. What is the conflict?

[92] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 17, 1968, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28738, 2011).; Lyndon B. Johnson, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 14, 1969, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29333, 2011).

Setting: The Vietnam War, 1967-1968

Actual: The Free World vs Dictatorial Aggression

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America

Bad: Communist Vietnam

Catalyst: The South Vietnamese

3. What is the message?

The US hopes for a successful peace in Vietnam, but it will not naïvely wait for that peace. Communist Vietnam has been dishonorable and duplicitous in its talk of peace, despite America acting in good faith. "America" cannot and should not hold back its strength in breaking the enemy, all the while still earnestly seeking an immediate and definite peace.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There is an odd and noticeable change in Johnson's approach to the Vietnam War between the 1968 and 1969 speeches. In the first, he is defiant of the costs and efforts of the US to secure peace in Vietnam. In the second, Johnson is predominantly conciliatory in his inability to achieve this. In both speeches, Communist Vietnam is singled out as separate and unique in America's relations in the world.

In 1968, Johnson stresses the strength of the US to wage a less naïve war in Vietnam. No longer will America give respite to the enemy as an encouragement to them to choose the peace table. Rather, the US will hammer away at the North Vietnamese until they make honest and genuine moves for peace. Johnson stresses that the US still hopes and welcomes peace, but mot at the expense of false-hopes. He similarly stresses America's victories in the face of the enemy, on the battlefield and in the creation of a

democratic South Vietnam. Despite the heavy costs, Johnson notes the victories on the home front. America is building its Great Society, regardless of the billions to be spent on the Vietnam War.

In the 1969 speech, Vietnam is barely mentioned in any meaningful way. Where it is mentioned most, Johnson apologizes for not being able to achieve the peace he and America wants; not just in all of Vietnam, but even in South Vietnam. He states that Communist defeat is still certain, but there is a lack of conviction in this belief. The Vietnam War is left open-ended.

In both speeches, the trials of Vietnam are separated from the other American interactions with Communism. Notably, Johnson stresses diplomatic successes with the Soviet Union. While he still acknowledges the various threats of the Cold War, Johnson's discussion of the Soviet Union is one of potential successful engagement at the table of diplomacy. Such belief is altogether absent from the discussion of the Communist Vietnamese.

The Soviet-Afghan War[93]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980's

Actual: Freedom and Peace vs Domination and War

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The Free World

[93] Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery," February 18, 1981, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43425, 2011).; Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union," January 26, 1982, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42687, 2011).; George Bush, "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress," February 9, 1989, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16660, 2011).; George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 31, 1990, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18095, 2011).

Bad: The Soviet Union

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

The United States, like the rest of the Free World, loves and values peace and freedom. More importantly, the people on their own love peace and freedom. These peoples, including "America", should individually and collectively demonstrate against the forces of dictatorship, oppression, and war.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There is surprising little in the speeches examined. In fact, "little" implies too much. Out of the four speeches covering the beginning and end of the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980's, Afghanistan is only mentioned once, in 1982. This single mention is coupled with the Polish events of the 1980's, and is actually attached to a decision of the European Parliament not the United States. The essence of the single mention is that the Soviet Union is a force bent on oppression and domination against the innocent and peace loving peoples of the Free World. These people, independent of the policies and goals of their respective states, do and should hope and demonstrate for peace and freedom in the theaters of Soviet aggression.

Post-Cold War

Post-Cold War Nuclear Fears[94]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The United States of America vs non-Soviet nuclear threats

[94] Bush, "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress," February 9, 1989.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 31, 1990.; George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991, in *The*

Actual: Humanity vs Nuclear Weapons Technology

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America, Russia, IAEA supportive countries

Bad: Nuclear Weapons Technology

Catalyst: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Terrorists

American Presidency Project, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253, 2011).; George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 1992, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1994, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 24, 1995, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51634, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 23, 1996, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," February 4, 1997, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53358, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 1998, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56280, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 19, 1999, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577, 2011).; William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 2000, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58708, 2011).; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals," February 27, 2001, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643, 2011).; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644, 2011).; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 2003, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645, 2011).; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29646, 2011).; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 23, 2007, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24446, 2011).; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 2008, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76301, 2011).; Barrack Obama, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 24, 2012, in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99000, 2015).

3. What is the message?

Nuclear weapons technology is a multi-faceted threat for all of humanity. This technology and knowledge needs to be tightly controlled and guarded. "America" must take a leading role in designing and enforcing protections against the spread and misuse of nuclear weapons technology.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There are three definable discourses within the larger universe of discourse covered by the speeches. The first and most unique, as part of the transition out of the Cold War, refers to responsible nuclear weapon development. The second, and largest discourse, refers to the responsible limitation, reduction, and control of nuclear weapons. The final discourse refers to enforcement of these controls.

Presenting the final speech of the Cold War, in 1989, G. Bush refers to the incontrovertible importance of America's nuclear arsenal. The American nuclear arsenal, however, is still dangerous. The nuclear weapons technology must be utilized in a responsible manner that keeps one eye on the environmental impacts that the industry has. To ignore the side-effects of the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons it to invite nuclear destruction of a kind separate from that of the Soviet arsenal.

This necessity of responsible production is immediately changed once the Cold War is over. The discourse shifts in the 1990s, almost exclusively, to the reduction of global Cold War era nuclear arsenals, and the introduction of limitations on the development of any further nuclear weapons. Much of this discourse is devoted to congratulatory language of the successes in these areas, that nuclear weapons are not being pointed at the US or USSR/Russia any more, that the former belligerent states are allied in disarming and enforcing the global control of nuclear weapons technology. The overall discourse is one of the successful closing and sealing of the Pandora's box of nuclear weapons technology.

The final discourse concentrates on dealing with the fact that the box was not perfectly sealed. Throughout the 1990s, there was a running concern about the North

Korean burgeoning nuclear program. Though it was considered to be under control, the 2000s demonstrated this was not the case. In addition to North Korea, Iraq and Iran are discussed as states not respecting the dangers of nuclear weapons technology, as expressed by their push to gain these weapons. A new thread of the discourse relates to terrorists and their patron states gaining and using nuclear weapons technology.

Though this final discourse is quite brief, it rounds out the message of the threat of nuclear weapons technology. The Cold War belligerents opened Pandora's box, and it will not be so easily closed. As long as nuclear weapons technology is not under complete control, the threat will remain.

The Gulf War[95]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The Persian Gulf War
Actual: The Peaceful New World vs the Aggressive Old World

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America and its Allies
Bad: Iraq
Catalyst: Kuwait

3. What is the message?

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a new world. In this new world, aggression will no longer be tolerated or condoned. The strong will respect the weak, and the weak will not fear the strong. "America" should always be ready to lead the peaceful nations in enforcing this new order.

[95] Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 1992.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The Persian Gulf War is the first post-Cold War conflict. As such, it is the first demonstrable test of the existence of a new order in the world. The United States of America and other allied countries unite in demonstrating this new order against old-world aggression. This aggression takes many forms, yet all of them are outdated and incompatible with the new order.

The first form of aggression is of a classical nature. It is the aggression of a strong state against a weaker one, as evidenced by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This is the most immediate aggression that needs to be tackled, and is being repudiated by the united efforts of the US and its allies under the rulings of the United Nations. Iraq is forced to withdraw from Kuwait.

The second form of aggression is terror through acts of violence. This is demonstrated by Iraq launching missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel. It is also demonstrated by Iraq torturing prisoners of war. Not only will these acts not be tolerated, but more importantly, they will not dampen the resolve or unity of the US and its allies in enforcing the new order on Iraq.

The third form of aggression is ecological. Iraq's scorched earth policy, the devastation of which is compounded by the "scorched earth" being oil fields, shall not be tolerated as a tool of war. The devastation will be combated along with the Iraqi army. Again, this aggression will not dampen the US and its allies in enforcing the new order.

The final form of aggression is against the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein, before the war and through the war, is hurting his own people. This form of aggression, perhaps more than any other, has no place in the new order. Not only will the US and its allies fight Iraq on all of the various fronts of aggression previously mentioned, but it has a duty to make clear through actions that there is a difference between the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people. The American and allied response is not against the Iraqi people in any way, only against the regime's aggression against the people and Iraq's neighbors. The US and its allies have a duty to protect the people from the damage of the regime as part of the new order.

The War in Somalia[96]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The War in Somalia

Actual: Best Fighting Force vs Less-than-best Fighting Force

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America

Bad: Unspecified

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

The United States of America has the best military of any state in any time. The soldiers fighting and dying around the world demonstrate that. Their ability and their sacrifice keep the US safe. "America" should always support them to maintain their top position and ensure their ability to protect the country.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There is a single mention of Somalia in only part of a sentence, with almost nothing to analyze. The mention is coupled with a mention of the Bosnian War. The overall statement praises the military for being the best, for fighting and dying bravely in these separate wars, and the connection these wars have to America's security. The elite-ness of the military is conditioned on the support they receive from the rest of the country. The US must commit sufficient resources to maintain the quality of the military, and thereby maintain the security of the country.

[96] Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1994.

The Bosnian War[97]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The Bosnian War

Actual: Peace and Order vs Violence and Chaos

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America and its Allies

Bad: Enemies of Peace

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

The United States of America is a force for peace and order in the world. This mission is clearly understood by America and its forces. This mission, in progress around the world as well as in Bosnia, is successful. "America" must continue in its mission of peace until the final victory of peace and order is achieved, and chaos and violence are destroyed.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

America's efforts in Bosnia are titanic in scope and humanitarian in nature. There has never been a larger humanitarian effort for a single localized conflict in history. This effort is just, attempting to ensure peace and order for not just states and a region, but for individual people. This battle for peace is part of a larger and ongoing battle that spans several theaters around the world, and faces multitudes of threats.

America is fighting need as well as violence and chaos in Bosnia. The US is

[97] Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1994.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 24, 1995.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 23, 1996.

orchestrating the largest humanitarian airlift ever seen, not just fighting the forces that are creating the need for the aid. Those forces are committing acts of true barbarism and terror.

America's enemy in Bosnia is responsible for terrible crimes against the people. Rape and terror, as well as mass killings, are only part of it. America is leading its allies in a successful battle against this evil, which is using chaos as well as violence as its weapons.

The Bosnian War is one front of several where the US is enforcing peace throughout the world. Not all of these fronts require the military, but the military is fully aware of its job and its place in America's campaign of peace. Whether the necessary tools are soldiers and bombs in Bosnia, new alliances with former enemies, diplomatic pressure in Europe and the former Soviet Union, or engagement with Russia to secure nuclear weapons technology, America's campaign of global peace is united and successful.

The War on Drugs[98]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The War on Drugs, 1994
Actual: Civilization vs Barbarism

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Civilized America
Bad: Barbaric America
Catalyst: Drugs

[98] Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1994.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 24, 1995.

3. What is the message?

Drug use and drug crime are a symptom, but not the disease. Drugs would not be a problem in a society with strong personal and communal relationships. "America" should foster such communal relationships and identities.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Drug crime is a problem, and it is a problem deserving of strict treatment and penalties. Nonetheless, drug use is a symptom of a more fundamental problem, the dissolution of communal relationships in society. Until this problem is resolved and reversed, the War on Drugs will continue.

The discourse in the speeches refer to strengthening drug laws, as well as strengthening prevention and rehabilitation programs. Despite these efforts, drug use is rising, as are drug related crime rates. This is being caused by a larger problem.

After referencing the drug problems and laws in the 1994 speech, Clinton stresses that the problem stems from a dissolution of communal relations in society. Whether these relations be familial, religious, or economic, the void is being filled by drugs. It is not until these failures eating away at the soul of society are reversed that any headway can truly come in the War on Drugs. Clinton later offers, in the 1995 speech, an example of a church attempting to do just that. The church has moved into a high risk area, trying to rebuild community in the face of drugs.

Terrorism in the 90's[99]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Terrorism in the 1990s

[99] Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 23, 1996.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," February 4, 1997.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 1998.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 19, 1999.; Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 2000.

Actual: Legitimate Ordered Civilization vs Illegitimate Criminal Chaos

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America

Bad: Terrorists

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

Terrorism is a particular threat of the post-Cold War world. It is a threat to the United States of America, to ordered and peace loving countries, and to the state system itself. No matter the form the terrorism takes on, the US must fight it on every front. "America" should defend the victims of terror, no matter who or where they are; and "America" should actively pursue and eliminate the terrorists, no matter who or where they are.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Throughout the discourse, there are three identified kinds of terrorism. The first kind, briefly, is domestic terrorism (namely Oklahoma City). The second kind is general non-state terrorism. The third kind is state-terrorism. Seemingly regardless of the type of terrorism, the greatest threat is that they will be able to magnify their illegitimate and chaotic effect on the world via the acquiring of weapons of mass destruction.

There is only a passing mention of directly specified domestic terrorism, and that is in terms of the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The majority of the discourse is dedicated to a general and ephemeral concept of "terrorists/terrorism" that is similar to, but different from, organized crime. The lack of specificity allows the discourse to cover potential domestic, foreign, and international terrorist actors. A similarly passing mention is made of bin Laden.

A clearly differentiated kind of terrorism is state-terrorism. The specific states mentioned are Iraq and Serbia. Both states are implicit in acts of savage and illegal violence. This concept of illegality is an important one. Repeatedly, state-terrorist actors are referred to as being "outlaw" or in some other way illegitimate. This keeps with the trend of terrorism being an illegal act of violent chaos.

Whether it is through being termed an "outlaw state" or through being grouped together with drug traffickers and organized crime, the various kinds of terrorism are attached to the notion of being illegal, irregular, and illegitimate. Other than the state-terrorism, there is no strong connection to terrorism in general being a war-like enemy. Nonetheless, terrorism is a violent threat to order and peace, and a natural bedfellow of other nefarious and anti-social acts.

Another running trend throughout the discourse is the extreme danger of these terrorist groups getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, regardless of the level or kind of terrorism. Much of the discourse in this regard is directed specifically towards chemical weapons and biological weapons, and far less on nuclear weapons. The fear, though, is that any of these weapons could give the terrorist groups disproportionate power to spread their chaos and violence. Not only must the trauma of the use of these weapons be prevented, but their disproportionating effects as well.

The War on Terror[100]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The War on Terror

Actual: Civilized Freedom vs Barbaric Oppression

[100] Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals," February 27, 2001.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 2003.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 23, 2007.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 2008.; Obama, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 24, 2012.

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America and its allies

Bad: International Terrorist Groups and their state sponsors

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

The United States of America is engaged in a global defensive struggle against violent, reactionary, oppressive groups of terrorists and their state sponsors. The struggle is unrestricted in time and space, but the consequences of failure mean the loss of countless innocent lives, including those of American citizens. "America" must act unitedly, and it must lead the world in defeating these diabolical forces via military forces, law enforcement forces, and diplomatic forces.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There are three main discussions in the speeches. The first is the nature of the terrorist groups. The second is the nature of the connection between these terrorist groups and their state sponsors. The final is the nature of the United States of America in the fight against these groups and states.

The terrorists belong to various groups, yet their character is the same. They detest everything good, free, and progressive. The terrorist leaders are diabolical and cowardly, recruiting the weak and impressionable to carry out their evil violence against the innocent. The terrorists' warped morality ignores any sanctity or security, murdering indiscriminately regardless of nationality or faith, even attacking Muslims in mosques; promising the reward for these attacks is paradise. The terrorists hate all who do not follow in their doctrine of hate, and the consequence of their hate is fear, oppression, and death.

There are increasingly fewer states upon whom these terrorist groups may rely upon for support, but that support is apocalyptic in nature. These rogue regimes, shunned

by the world, do more than provide safe bases of training and operation for the terrorists. More and more, they utilize their resources as states to acquire, develope, and pass on the technologies of mass terror via weapons of mass destruction. Not all of these states can be dealt with in the same way, but neutralizing the threat they pose is a key component to successfully waging war against the terrorists. In many ways, the ruling regimes of these states are terrorist organizations themselves, sharing in the warped morality of fear and oppression and violence, threatening their people and their regions with terror for their own selfish and narrow interests.

The United States of America, by contrast, is a force for freedom and justice in the world. While the American military is an incredible force, the guarantee of freedom under America's protection is a tremendous weapon against the terrorists in its own right. Free people do not choose terror and violence, and thus free people are automatically allies of the US. America's great purpose and strength can only be fully realized, however, if it is united. This does not mean that all must agree, as vigorous debate is key to a free and democratic people; but this strength in diversity must be actively embraced and converted into unity of purpose. When America keeps its gaze on the grand responsibilities it has in the world, rather than on narrow selfish interests, there is no end to the good the country can achieve for the world.

The Iraq War[101]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The Iraq War

Actual: Peaceful and Ordered Regimes vs Violent and Chaotic Regimes

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The United States of America and its Allies

[101] Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 2003.; Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004.

Bad: Regime of Saddam Hussein

Catalyst: Iraq

3. What is the message?

Regimes of violence and chaos are a threat to the world, not just the citizens of those regimes. Though it is a complex and difficult task, the United States can and must combat such regimes. "America" should do whatever it takes to replace chaotic and violent regimes with peaceful and ordered democratic regimes.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There are two periods covered in the discourse: pre-invasion and post-invasion. The pre-invasion period focuses on the leadership of the Saddam Hussein regime, while the post-invasion period focuses on the supporters of the regime. In both cases, the groups are violent and chaotic, and thus illegitimate in power and a danger to the civilized world of peaceful and ordered regimes.

The pre-invasion period concentrates almost exclusively on the person of Saddam Hussein. He is presented as a violent and untrustworthy actor at both the international and domestic levels. Internationally, Hussein is presented as a rogue leader. He cooperates with terrorists, destabilizes his region, and clandestinely seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction. On this last point, Hussein has repeatedly taken advantage of the United Nations diplomatic good faith. He has constantly ignored UN resolutions, and any apparent respect for such decisions has been a deception.

At the domestic level, Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction against his own civilians. More broadly, he has instituted campaigns of torture and terror across his country. Taken together, this makes Hussein the greatest enemy of the Iraqis, who desperately need relief, peace, and order.

The post-invasion period is a mix of tremendous success as well lingering trouble. The trouble is the violence attributed to the cowardly supporters and beneficiaries of the Hussein regime, in effect the lower levels of the ousted regime. These "thugs" do not

appreciate the peace and order that Iraq's fledgling democratic regime represent and promise. These holdovers mean that the transition will be longer and more costly. They are a losing minority, however, as the vast majority of Iraqis recognize and value the new regime and the rights and stability it guarantees. The United States and its allies will not abandon these grateful Iraqis, nor will they abandon the mission of guaranteeing peace and order in the world of which the Iraq War is a part.

Chapter 4- The Cold War: Jungles and Mushroom Clouds

I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves, and the enemy … was in us.

-Chris Taylor

Gee, I wish we had one of them Doomsday Machines.

-Buck Turgidson

Introduction

This chapter presents the Cold War films for analysis. The films are split up into three different general sections. The first, and largest section, is "The Vietnam War." This is followed by "The Other Wars," which contains films on Korea and Afghanistan. The final section is "Nuclear Fears," which functions as a transition into the subsequent film analysis chapter.

The Vietnam War

Apocalypse Now[102]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Vietnam War post-1968 (US vs Communist Vietnam)

[102] Coppola, *Apocalypse Now*.; This analysis was originally published in Hays, "American Foreign Policy in Film."

Actual: Civilization vs Barbarism (both traditional and counter, i.e. Civilization/order vs Barbarism/anarchy and Barbarism/Eden vs Civilization/Gomorra; as well as the individual Rational vs Primal).

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Willard (ultimately), Vietnamese (if not purely Catalyst)
Bad: Military, Kurtz
Catalysts: Vietnamese (if not purely Good)

3. What is the message?

To be "civilized" is to ask whether or not to exercise power, before asking how to exercise power. Right makes might. "America" is "civilized", and is only mighty because of siding with "right".

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

It is quite difficult to place the framework of "good" vs "bad" in this instance. The majority of the film is played out between degrees of "bad". This is not to say that there is a lack of innocents; that there is no victim. Quite the contrary, the Vietnamese are shown repeatedly to be innocent throughout the film, always on the defensive, always having serene, perhaps sublime, lives disturbed. This state almost helps feed into the conflict of the film; almost creating it entirely: the conflict between Civilization and Barbarism. This conflict (along with the fight to determine how to classify the one from the other) exists in multiple facets at multiple levels strung throughout the film.

Several specific forms of the general conflict would seem to be obvious. The Americans vs the Vietnamese, the Army vs Kurtz, Williard vs Kurtz, the Boat vs the Jungle. None of these are clear-cut, however, nor is the list complete. Which is "civilized" and which is "barbaric"? Which of the two is "good"? It becomes clear that the Vietnamese, if considered "barbaric" (as indeed they are outright labelled in the film

as well as being so inferred) are portrayed as “noble savages”. As innocents and victims, they are in a way the “good”. It is the cold amoral “civilization” which is “bad”. As regards the Army and Kurtz, it is revealed that both are actually in the same position, ‘balancing on the razor’s edge’ between “barbarism” and “civilization”. Kurtz is willing to recognize his dangerous tightrope walk and embrace it, and so he is labelled insane. The Army does not recognize it, and so infer, wrongly, that they are sane and truly, fully, purely “civilized”. Each of the non-Vietnamese participants is a dangerous combination of both “barbarism” and “civilization”: Kurtz seeing his actions and rationalizing them, the Army draping themselves in faux-rationality and the tropes of civilization so as to hide from themselves their true nature – the excruciating, damaging falsehood of the unified duality; a doublespeak of the identity of the soul.

This conflict of the fusion of the best and worst parts of both “civilization” and “barbarism” exists within the Army and Kurtz, as stated above, but also within the other group actors (the Air Cavalry, the Boat, the USO) and, most importantly, within Willard. The internal conflict concerning Willard is taking place throughout the entire film, meshing thoughts of the jungle battles and Saigon, conflicts of being home, and drunken martial arts at the beginning; and his developing affinity with Kurtz and final choice concerning whether or not to assume Kurtz's place after he kills him. It is this final decision, within the last few minutes of the film, which ultimately places Willard in the position of “good”.

Before reaching this final scene and final decision, it will be instrumental to provide a few more scenes. One of the first and most famous is the scene of the Air Calvary attack on a village. The helicopters swoop in to the sound of Wagner’s *Valkyrie* blasting from attached speakers. The terrified villagers run in panicked escape, while the Communist fighters provide defensive and covering fire, evacuate the children from school, and try to help the elderly. The village is laid to waste. The stated reason for the attack is to allow Willard and his boat to proceed on their mission. The true reason, though, is that the Air Cavalry’s commanding officer, Kilgore, wants to surf.

Later on, Willard and the boat crew come to the point of no return. It is a bridge marking the edge of where American forces are to operate. They come to the bridge at night, during a hellish battle which we find out happens every night. While trying to get

some information and supplies, Willard finds out that every day the Military takes/rebuilds/opens the bridge, and every night the Vietnamese take/damage/close the bridge. This nightly battle happens continually so that the Military can state: "The road is open." The soldiers engaged in this constantly repeating action (the definition of insanity), are quite understandably disturbed. There is no order, no command, and no sense. There is only constant (and constantly repeated) violence and death for no gain.

The first of these two scenes challenges the moral position of the declared "civilization". The second challenges its rational position. Throughout the film, Willard is trapped in the organization of the Military, his mission, and himself; all of which is morally and rationally questionable. Willard saves himself, and returns to true Civilization, by breaking the cycle of immoral irrationality when given the chance to become a "god."

After Willard kills Kurtz, whose only difference from the Military proper was his recognition of the rational recognition of the immorality of his actions, Willard is presented with the option of taking his place. When Willard walks out of Kurtz's temple, all of the members of the tribe bow to him as the new leader. Willard, however, refuses the "honor" by walking back to the boat and leaving the group. He is not only leaving the tribe, however, as he has already declared himself separated from the Military as well. He refuses his past and present association with the Military as well as his potential future as Kurtz. This break is both rational and moral. It is moral for the obvious reasons of ending his role in the violence of declared "civilization". It is rational in that, if he became a neo-Kurtz, there would undoubtedly be another assassin sent after him. By breaking the cycle, by refusing to use power that he can quite easily use, he saves himself in both body and soul and returns to true Civilization.

We Were Soldiers[103]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: American-Vietnam War (1965, first battle)

[103] Randall Wallace, *We Were Soldiers* (Los Angeles: Icon Entertainment International, 2002).

Actual: Intimate-Experience/Knowledge/Participants in Battle vs Distant-Experience/Knowledge/Non-Participants in Battle

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Almost all soldiers in battle (both American and Vietnamese), soldiers' wives/families (both American and Vietnamese)

Bad: Faceless war/policy planners, any and all who do not have intimate knowledge/experience of the war (including Americans at the time as well as audiences between then and now)

Catalyst: Participants in French-Indochina War

3. What is the message?

Preparing and conducting a war that one does not (and will not) have intimate experience and knowledge of is unjust and unwise. Judgment of these events without intimate experience or knowledge is unjust and unwise. "America" should have intimate knowledge and preparation for any war it enters, and "Americans" should have intimate knowledge or experience of such events before passing judgment on them. "Americans" should value and trust only those who have had such intimate experience and provide such intimate knowledge.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The beginning of the film feels very much like a lesson to the audience about Vietnam and its various wars. This is not without reason, as the book[104] and interviews of this true story stress that "Hollywood" (and therefore, the audiences) has never "gotten the war right." The first lesson is that the American-Vietnam War was not the first; before this came the French-Indochina War. This is where the film begins. In the exact

[104] Joseph L. Galloway and Harold G. Moore, *We Were Soldiers Once…and Young: La Drang – the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2004).

same spot where the American-Vietnamese battle at the core of the film is to take place, we see the Vietnamese quickly and easily decimate a French force. The scene immediately attempts to close the distance of knowledge and experience in the audience. The Vietnam War is actually several wars. The Vietnamese are well trained, well ordered, and battle-hardened. The US is not the first "superior" force it has met and overcome.

The French-Indochina War, and this particular massacre, are also an important point in determining distance vs intimacy in the film itself. Military commanders early on are shown disparaging the weakness of the French, rather than noticing the strength of the Vietnamese. Opposing this scene is one of Colonel Moore researching late into the night the mistakes the French made. His list is an almost exact version of the reasons generally accepted as being the reasons for the American defeat. Moore's intimate knowledge will only be gained by his superiors through distant experience, over a long time, and at the cost of many lives (a sentiment shared by the Vietnamese Colonel at the end of the film).

The second lesson relates to the nature of the "desired" soldier. The film spends a large amount of time displaying training and base-life before the battle. During training, two different officers are presented and commented on by Moore. One, Herrick, is a gung-ho Lieutenant, shouting orders, pushing his men to move quickly and complete the task. Moore and his sergeant, Plumley, comment that this soldier is looking to win medals, but will end up getting people killed. In contrast, we see Lieutenant Geoghegan taking care of one his black soldiers feet and encouraging the rest of his platoon to do the same with each other. Moore looks on this second Lieutenant warmly, and they develop an almost father-son relationship. The lesson is that the most desired soldier is not the one looking to fight (Herrick ends up ordering his men into an ambush, and is killed along with most of his men), but the one who is looking out for the welfare of his men (Geoghegan also dies, but he does so attempting to carry out one of his wounded men). Herrick does not have intimate knowledge or experience. He acts the way a film-soldier would act. Geoghegan, however, intuitively acts as Moore does, and so he acts with the intimacy that Moore has.

The third lesson deals with the war on the home front. This is displayed through the roles of the families (especially the wives) and, relatedly, to the allusions to race

tensions. As part of the long introduction to the characters on the base, we are introduced to the families of Moore and Geoghegan, as well as the wives of the other officers. We do not simply meet the soldiers, *in res*, in the jungle. They are made human by having family and children, by singing songs as they move, by having bed-time rituals. Again, this is an issue of closing distance. The wives become more important once the casualty notifications start coming in. Rather than the Hollywood picturesque somber officer and chaplain giving notification, a cabbie searches the housing area to deliver the telegram. Mrs. Moore and Mrs. Geoghegan take on the responsibility of delivering the messages. Not only is the audience brought in to the intimacy of the wider suffering of this first battle, but this is done through a similar expression of the intimacy of the Wives' Club in contrast to the distance of the military-cabbie-telegram operation.

There is a second war on the home front, which is far closer to an actual battle: US race relations in the mid-60's. We are introduced to this problem in a meeting of the Wives' Club. The army base is in the South, and a Northern wife mistakes a Jim-Crow sign (Whites Only) at a laundromat. The black wife of the group explains the situation to her, and proclaims that she will take pride in making sure her husband's uniform is perfect, despite the fact that many of the people he is defending do not respect him. Later, in a departure speech, Moore specifically mentions the various races represented in the group, and how they are lucky to know a harmony amongst themselves that the country is not yet able to know. This lesson provides a degree of moral balance, an intimacy between the audience and the soldiers they think they know. The American-Vietnam War was full of moral atrocities, but so was civilian life in the US.

In addition to these lessons, there are several striking examples of distance and intimacy from the battle. One of the instances in particular is set up over a long time in the film, beginning on base and extending to the end of the battle. Several times, Sergeant Savage tries to endear himself to Plumely through pleasant small talk regarding the beautiful weather on any given day on the base. To each comment of "Beautiful day, Sergeant Major," Plumely replies gruffly with a variation of "How do you know what kind of damn day it is!" Savage is one of the soldiers forced into the ambush by Herrick; he is also one of the few to return alive from the hellish day and night cut off from the rest of the American force. When Savage is back among the rest of the force, though not

out of the larger battle, Plumely approaches him and says, "Now *that's* a good day." Savage, and the audience, become aware that Plumely's responses were not gruff simply for the sake of being mean, but rather they were gruff do to a distance and misunderstanding between Plumely and Savage (and the audience) about what is truly valuable and praiseworthy. Through surviving the battle, Savage has gained this intimate knowledge.

A similar experience is had by the reporter, Galloway. Not comfortable with covering the war according to the press releases and chaperoned trips of the military (distance), Galloway comes to see and record what is going on for himself. He tells Moore that he is the first in his family not to be a soldier, that he felt he could do more good with a camera instead of a gun. During the course of the battle, however, he uses both. For those few days, he becomes a soldier, fighting alongside the other soldiers. Galloway closes his distance perfectly, participating in the battle and recording it as well. Once the battle is over, and the chaperoned press visit commences, he is as speechless to the reporters' ignorant questions as are the rest of the soldiers. Galloway confesses to Moore that he does not know how to tell the world what he has seen and been a part of. Moore replies, "You have to." Galloway is the bridge of experience between those who have intimate knowledge (the soldiers fighting) and those who are at a distance (the civilians watching). Essentially, the film (and the book it is based on) is that bridge-building.

Two more instances from the battle bear highlighting, in part because they involve the Vietnamese soldiers as an equal in this intimacy of experience. The first follows a regular Vietnamese soldier from his mountain base, to his death in battle, to his legacy afterwards. We meet the soldier writing a letter to his love while he sits inside the mountain waiting to be called on. Suddenly, the order is given, and he rushes into battle. Through luck and circumstance, he finds himself within striking distance of Moore. The Vietnamese soldier charges with fixed-bayonet, only to be killed by Moore with only a few feet left between them. Moore searches the body, finds the letter and picture of the dead man's love, and manages to get the letter to the woman (which reconnects to the notion of family and the war on the home front). Even though the two men are enemies, there is a certain amount of respect and camaraderie. They both possess the same intimate

experience and knowledge, and Moore knows full well that he could just as easily have been the dead man with an unsent letter to his wife in his pocket.

Finally, there are the final prolific words of the Vietnamese Colonel. He helped defeat the French in the years before this lost battle; and out of all of the characters, he has the greatest and most intimate of experience and knowledge. The Vietnamese Colonel bemoans the loss of the battle, not because of the battle itself, but because he knows that the decision-makers suffering from distance of knowledge and experience will wrongly interpret their victory. This mistaken interpretation will lead to them committing the US to a long, costly, and futile war. The Vietnamese Colonel bemoans the loss of the battle because he knows it means several more years of pointless bloodshed until the inevitable victory of the Vietnamese comes to pass.

Platoon[105]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting:	American-Vietnam War (1967-1968)
Actual:	Elias/Idealism/Moral-action vs Barnes/Realism/Immoral-action for/within Taylor's/America's Soul

2. Who are the participants?

Good:	Taylor (perhaps), Elias (if not wholly catalyst)
Bad:	Taylor, Barnes (if not wholly catalyst)
Catalyst:	Elias, Barnes, Rhah, Vietnamese

3. What is the message?

We all have a choice in our actions, in both what we do and how we do it. It is best to use the knowledge and experience gained from the past to help guide our actions

[105] Oliver Stone, *Platoon* (Los Angeles: Hemdale Film, 1986).

in the present and in situations new to us. Similarly, it is right to pass on our knowledge and experience to others, even if it is only the knowledge of our mistakes. Regardless of past immoral action, America has "an obligation to build again, to teach to others what we know, and to try with what's left of our lives to find a goodness, and meaning, to this life."

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film centers around dichotomies and contrasts born out through conflict. These conflicts range across and progress from the setting conflict of the Vietnam War, to the platoon divided between Barnes and Elias, to the actual internal conflict of Taylor's desire to kill Barnes. Ultimately, this progression in the introduction of dichotomies in the film also follows the intensity and importance of the dichotomies, as well as their joint resolution.

The film opens with an American troop transport delivering fresh troops to a base in Vietnam. The hatch slowly opens, and the soldiers stagger out into the blinding light. The imagery is almost science-fiction like, with a spaceship discharging its crew on an alien planet. In many ways, this first dichotomy of "the world" the soldiers come from and return to versus this foreign and hostile other-world or under-world they are in is accurately portrayed by such imagery. Very quickly, though, the more visceral dichotomies replace the Sci-Fi imagery. As the live soldiers, including Taylor, file off the plane, there are several body-bags brought to replace them. After this dichotomy of life and death comes the dichotomy of before and after, as the surviving soldiers file past. They are filthy and battered and belligerent in their relief and joy to be trading places with the fresh recruits from "the world." In both physical and psychological terms, the surviving soldiers are significantly and visibly altered by their experience. Taylor looks upon them in almost horror, especially the bloodiest and filthiest of them who looks strikingly like Taylor does in the close of the film. Taken together, these first dichotomies set apart Vietnam as another world, the experience of which forever changes who you are, whether alive or dead.

This set of dichotomies transitions to the next through Taylor's first days in the platoon. He describes the experience in a letter home by referencing hell. Taylor says that "hell is the impossibility of reason," and he is in hell. Vietnam and his place in it is without reason, it is a hellish other-world. And in this world, there are two opposing rulers: Elias and Barnes.

The dichotomy of Elias and Barnes presents Taylor with the choice that is at the core of the actual conflict. Elias is a Christ-like idealist, though also a brave and deadly warrior. Barnes is, in many ways, Elias's antithesis. Barnes is an anti-Christ, a tyrant rather than a shepherd, a realist rather than an idealist; and although he is a deadly warrior like Elias, Barnes is a murderer as well.

When we first see Elias, he is walking through the jungle in line with the men, appearing to be a regular soldier rather than a Sergeant. He is carrying a large machine gun across his shoulders, and the image is much like Christ carrying the cross. This is not the only Christ-like metaphor for Elias. Later in the film, Barnes refers to him as "a water-walker." The night before the battle that will lead to Elias's death, he and Taylor are sitting peacefully in the trees, much like Christ in the garden before the passion. After Barnes shoots and supposedly kills Elias, he seems to return from the dead. As he is finally killed by the Vietnamese, he raises his hands to heaven in a pose of spiritual ascension. Much like the apostles, Elias's soldiers gather in private out of fear and pain and confusion. And beginning with this scene, Taylor denies the lessons and wishes of Elias three times: plotting to kill Barnes, attempting to kill Barnes, and finally killing Barnes.

Barnes contrasts Elias completely. In the same scene where we first see s humble Elias, Barnes is giving orders as if he is the Lieutenant, and not just a Sergeant. Barnes is visibly scarred about his face, giving him a subtly monstrous appearance. This is important, because later during a fight, Barnes will scar Taylor's face, giving him the mark of the beast. Barnes lords over his followers with intimidation and manipulation, somehow winning at poker more than should be normal, and refusing to spare his most loyal sycophant, O'Neil, from the last battle so he can be sure to make leave and see his girl in Hawaii. Rather than being a Christ figure towards whom children are given, Barnes takes a village child and threatens to execute her after doing so to the girl's

mother. In the final battle, Barnes and Taylor meet, and as Barnes attempts to deliver a death-blow, his eyes glow red with fire. After the battle, when Taylor successfully kills Barnes, smoke rises up in a more sinister spiritual release. This release, however, consumes Taylor; a symbol of his failure to follow Elias.

Taylor is the participant of importance in the film, because he is the one presented with the choice of which path to follow; either that of Elias or that of Barnes. The choice truly begins in the village battle scene. Taylor forces an old woman and her adult son out of a hiding place. The man is mentally and physically disabled, but Taylor goes into a rage directed at him. After beating the man, Taylor shoots at the ground just in front of him, screaming "Dance mother fucker! Dance!" Though urged by one of Barnes's soldiers to kill the man and his mother, Taylor refuses and begins to calm down. The other soldier, however, beats the man to death, horrifying Taylor. After this and seeing Barnes execute a woman and threaten to do the same to a child, Taylor fully swings to the opposite position represented by Elias, and saves several women/girls from being raped by Barnes's soldiers.

Taylor's seemingly decisive turn towards to Elias, however, does not survive the death of Elias. Rather than follow Elias's example from the village and seek military justice for Barnes, Taylor follows Barnes's course of opportunistic and personal revenge. Just as when Barnes finds Elias alone and takes careful aim to shoot him, Taylor finds Barnes alone after the final battle, takes aim, and fires.

Taylor and Barnes are not truly alone, however. As Taylor comes to and picks up a Kalashnikov, we see a Vietnamese soldier struggling in the background. Taylor completely ignores him, and slowly moves directly to where we find Barnes, wounded and asking Taylor for a medic. Taylor raises the gun, Barnes realizes what is going to happen, and tells Taylor to do it. Taylor fires, and the smoke rises, while the Vietnamese continues to crawl away. As Rhah, earlier told Taylor, "Only Barnes can kill Barnes." To kill Barnes, and through killing Barnes, Taylor has become Barnes.

With this as the final scene of action, we could conclude that Taylor fails in his choice, becoming Barnes, and removing the possible good participant from the film. Whether or not there is a good participant, however, must be left to Taylor's final monologue. As he is choppered out of the battle-zone, Taylor recounts,

> I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves, and the enemy … was in us. The war is over for me now, but it will always be there, for the rest of my days, as I'm sure Elias will be, fighting with Barnes for what Rhah called possession of my soul. There are times since I've felt like the child born of those two fathers. But be that as it may, those of us who did make it have an obligation to build again, to teach to others what we know, and to try with what's left of our lives to find a goodness, and meaning, to this life.

Here, it seems that Taylor is speaking from the future. He is speaking from, perhaps, a position of more experience after more choices; choices that mirror the dichotomous battle for his soul that took form in Elias and Barnes. And if this is the case, perhaps Taylor has finally learned the lessons that Elias was trying to teach from his own unseen experiences and failures, as indeed we saw him trying to teach his men throughout the film. If Taylor's final charge to "teach to others what we know, and to try with what's left of our lives to find a goodness, and meaning, to this life," if this ultimate lesson of Elias expressed through compassion to his soldiers and candid talks with Taylor, if this is the final true position of Taylor, then Taylor is ultimately good. We must learn from our mistakes and teach others from our experiences, both positive and negative. Perhaps this negative choice of Taylor's is told to us, not as a complete story, but as a warning of what not to do.

Full Metal Jacket[106]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Vietnam War
Actual: Balance vs Imbalance

[106] Stanley Kubrick, *Full Metal Jacket* (Burbank: Warner Bros., 1987).

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Joker

Bad: Everyone Else

Catalyst:

3. What is the message?

Imbalance is the greatest enemy of existence. Where there is imbalance, there can be no good. Only a balanced mind can make right and just decisions. "America" should be balanced in its being, decisions, and actions. The consequence of imbalance is ruination.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film is a tapestry of imbalances woven together to frame and highlight Joker's final action. These imbalances range from the order of the first part in contrast to the chaos of the second, to concepts of the enemy, to the nature and purpose of killing. Throughout the film and these points, Joker seems the most balanced of all of the characters. When he finally executed the sniper, Joker's balance is assured.

As the contrast between the two parts of the film frames the film as a whole, it is necessary to begin there. The film opens with boot camp on Parris Island. As a boot camp, it is filled with order. Soldiers drill, sing cadences, memorize regulations, and strive to make every aspect of their world ordered and disciplined. This contrasts starkly with the second part of the film, set in Vietnam. The soldiers are surrounded by civilians, prostitutes, thieves, and guerillas. The soldiers walk around unkempt, disrespectful of authority, and drunk on killing.

The names of the main characters are also tellingly different between the two parts. In the first part, the main characters are Joker, Pyle, and the Drill Sergeant. Each of them is a mental name. Joker gets his name from his constant use of irony, a mental trait. Pyle gets his name from being an idiot, also a mental trait. The Drill Sergeant's main

function is to destroy and rebuild the mental being of the recruit. The main characters in the second part, however, have anti-mental names: Animal, 8-ball, Crazy, Rafterman, and Cowboy. It could be argued that Rafterman and Cowboy are not anti-mental; but a man on a raft goes with the current, and the function of a cowboy is one of action and not one of mental process.

As there is a break between order and chaos in these two parts, so also are there differences in the understanding of the enemy. In the first part, the soldiers are drilled into thinking that the Communist Vietnamese are the enemy. For the most part, this view is unchallenged. Pyle introduces a new concept, however, by shooting the Drill Sergeant. The Drill Sergeant has been abusing Pyle throughout the entire period of boot camp. Pyle's simple childlike mind finally snaps, and he becomes a perfect killing machine. He is something of a Frankenstein's monster turning on his creator. Rather than sneaking doughnuts into the barracks, he sneaks in live ammunition, sets a trap, kills the Drill Sergeant, and then kills himself. Pyle's enemy is personal, not political.

In the second part of the film, there are multiple concepts of the enemy. For the *Stars and Stripes* editor, the enemy is bad morale. For the helicopter gunner, it is any living thing in Vietnam, including women and children and livestock. For other soldiers, it is the South Vietnamese soldiers they consider cowardly or the South Vietnamese people they consider ungrateful. In one contrasting scene, Crazy waxes on the virtues of the North Vietnamese enemy, saying that he loves them and no one else in the world is worth killing.

Perhaps the strongest theme in the film is that regarding the nature of killing. This theme is set up in the first part with the soldiers being drilled to kill without thinking and without hesitation. In essence, and by declaration, they are to become killing machines. Pyle is the perfect example of a killing machine, and he is truly disturbing to watch in action. The goal of being a killing machine is in direct conflict with something Joker says in the second part about the military wanting soldiers who can think, and indeed, Joker seems to be the only soldier who does think.

In the second part of the film, Joker famously has "Born to Kill" written on his helmet, while he has a peace button on his jacket. He refuses to obey his editor and remove it. Once Joker is out in the field, a colonel notices the contrasting decorations and

criticizes Joker for it. Joker's response is that he is not sure why he wears the contrasting points, but perhaps it is something about the duality of man.

The contrasting points Joker wears seem to fit the contrasting points of the film as a whole. The final sniper scene, however, demonstrates that these two points are not necessarily contrasting, they are not necessarily on conflict. When Rafterman saves Joker from the sniper, he transforms into an extremely extroverted kill-drunk soldier while Joker seems to revert in on himself for the first time. As the sniper is laying there, slowly dying in agony, Joker argues with Animal about what to do. Animal wants to leave her as she is, but Joker does not. Animal finally says that if Joker wants to "waste" the sniper, he should go ahead. We finally see a real struggle going on inside Joker, an amplification of the struggle briefly shown during the platoon punishment of Pyle. Joker does not want to kill or harm anyone, especially if they are no threat, but the distasteful act in this instance is one of mercy. Finally, Joker pulls the trigger, and the sniper's pleas for death are granted. The reactions of the other soldiers are of awe and admiration at Joker's ferocity and cold-bloodedness. They do not understand, however, that Joker acted out of mercy and kindness, not anger and vengeance. Joker killed in order to grant peace, thereby removing the conflict between his head and his heart, and achieving true balance.

This balance is crystallized in Joker's closing comments. He repeats Pyle's manic words before killing the Drill Sergeant, "I am in a world of shit." Joker's pronouncement is a calm acknowledgment of the reality he finds himself in, however, not the threatening pronouncement of a deranged homicidal, suicidal, killing machine. Joker follows this statement with the assertion that he is alive, and happy to be so. Pyle's statement was followed with bullets.

The Other Wars

M.A.S.H.[107]

[107] Robert Altman, *M.A.S.H.* (Los Angeles: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1970).; This analysis was originally published in Hays, "American Foreign Policy in Film."

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Korean War (US/UN vs Communist Korea/Communist China/USSR)
Actual: Civilian/Draft Doctors "Do No Harm!" vs Regular Army "Harm!"

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Hawkeye, Trapper, Duke, Radar, Draftees in general (the unintroduced "we" in "You're what we call a Regular Army Clown.")
Bad: Burns, O'Houlihan (initially), Henry, Padre, Commander of Japan hospital, Regular Army in general (the other half of the above statement)
Catalyst: The local civilian population, the unseen Communist forces, the patients

3. What is the message?

It makes no sense to recklessly destroy life (military operations) and at the same time try so hard to save life (the doctors). The only "good" result of this tension is to not destroy life in the first place, but rather respect and protect all life. "America" is a saviour of any who need saving.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

There are many scenes which depict the righteous distinction between the civilian doctors and the military doctors/structures. In addition to the "regular army clowns" there is the double confusion between morale and morals. It is a double confusion because, as O'Houlihan and Burns are writing their letter of distress to Army command, they confuse both the meaning of morale with morality as well as the degree to which both qualities exist in the camp. Somehow, high spirits are/should be equated with piety, while low spirits are/should be equated with debauchery: instead of being two separate things (which they are) if not comprising the opposite correlation (the debauched do seem happier in that same scene). In addition, by the end of the scene, O'Houlihan and Burns

are acting immoral together and improving their personal morale at the same time. The hypocrisy is distilled in that the true issue between them and the draftees is one of honesty. The draftees know what they are doing is wrong, but they also understand why they are doing it and accept the situation. O'Houlihan and Burns are repressing these things, claiming the moral high ground, committing the same immoral acts, and suffering because of the repression.

There is a similar conflict of morality between Burns and Hawkeye, Trapper, and Duke regarding the Korean boy Ho-Jon. Burns initially tries to "save" him by teaching him English via the Bible. The colonialist overtones are obvious. Hawkeye, Trapper, and Duke, however, attempt to save Ho-Jon from having to serve in the war spawned by the "Western" colonizing forces of International Communism and Capitalism.

A moral conflict more directly connected to the issue of "saving lives" in the M.A.S.H. unit comes when Burns blames Boone (a young private) for killing a patient. The patient is severely injured, he goes into cardiac arrest, Burns barks an order for a particular drug and syringe. Boone is unclear what exactly he wants, brings the wrong kind of syringe, and in the course of this the patient dies. Burns blames the young draftee for killing the soldier, rather than recognizing it was the war that killed the soldier. Trapper, furious with Burns, punches him. In the scene, there is pictured the futility of the effort of killing and saving at the same time. The decision to do so was made by the Regular Army, and the representative of the Regular Army in the scene (just as the metaphorical Regular Army he symbolizes), does not see that the war is what is killing its soldiers, not the inexperienced young privates charged with saving them.

A scene which ties together many of the above points (neo-colonialism, moral relativism, and the charge of the Medical Corps to save lives) is Hawkeye's and Trapper's trip to Japan. In Japan, they are presented with two sons. The first (and the reason for the trip) is the son of an important American politician. He is a wounded soldier, though the wound is not severe at all. The two skilled doctors were pulled out of their unit, where they are of far more use, because the life of this politician's son is considered more valuable than the lives of other soldiers. While in Japan, Hawkeye and Trapper come across the bastard baby of an American soldier and a Japanese woman. The baby has a serious medical condition and will die without an operation from the two

doctors. The Regular Army officer in charge of the hospital will not allow the military's resources to be used on the bastard son, again exemplifying moral relativism and neo-colonialism. Hawkeye and Trapper perform the operation anyways, kidnap the officer when he protests, and make compromising photos of the officer with a prostitute in order to blackmail him into silence.

Perhaps most artistically metaphorical of all is the Last Supper scene dripping with military rhetoric. The gathering is to "send-off" the dentist, who wants to commit suicide because he experienced impotence. Beyond the metaphors and connections of manliness surrounding the character and situation and its relation to militarism, the scene combines the "holy sacrifice" of the Last Supper with the "suicide" of a perfectly healthy man while lauding his action with military clichés. "No one asked him to go on this mission." "He knew it meant certain death." "This is what we reserve our highest medals and honors for." The result is an exemplification of the sheer ludicrousness of military sacrifice, all tied back to the size and performance of a man's penis.

Charlie Wilson's War[108]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting:	Soviet-Afghan War
Actual:	Help Afghanistan (and implicitly, by consequence, "ourselves") vs Hurt Soviets (and implicitly, by consequence, "ourselves")

2. Who are the participants?

Good:	Charlie, Gust, partly Joanne (she gives the goal/demand of "Afghanistan for the Afghanis" but then seems to stop with defeat of the Soviet Union)
Bad:	Other members of the subcommittees, CIA in general
Catalysts:	Pakistanis, Saudis, Israelis, Soviets, Afghans, partly Joanne

[108] Mike Nichols, *Charlie Wilson's War* (Universal City: Universal Pictures, 2007).; This analysis was originally published in Hays, "American Foreign Policy in Film."

3. What is the message?

Merely defeating an enemy does not necessarily bring about peace and security. Helping those in need should. "America" is/should be a force *for* good and aid, not just a force *against* evil.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Just about the entire film devotes itself to delivering the message, including the title and its relation to the opening and closing scenes. Though the movie centers on the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the subsequent American involvement, the conflict, message, and title is concerned with Charlie Wilson's personal war. His war, we are shown, was not one *against* the Soviets, but rather one *supporting* the Afghanis. The revelation of this being *his* war makes the ceremony of recognition split between the beginning and end of the film tragic, as it also transforms the seeming humility of the opening scene with thinly veiled disappointment in the closing scene. Charlie succeeded in aiding the defeat of the Soviet Union, but failed in his war to aid the Afghanis.

Charlie's war was given to him by Joanne when she charged him with the three tasks related to the Soviet-Afghanistan War. The first and foremost was to "save Afghanistan for the Afghanis." The means and consequence of this would be to defeat the Soviet Union, and thereby end the Cold War. Again, though he managed the means and consequence of his goal, he failed to achieve his ultimate goal. We see this becoming Charlie's goal more than just Joanne's mission when he visits the refugee camps and sees and hears first hand of the horrors the people are enduring. Yes he has always wanted to defeat the Soviets, and yes he thought that the Afghanis deserved help since they were the only ones actually fighting the Soviets, but his visible transformation in the refugee camps clearly makes helping the Afghanis his ultimate goal.

A final contrast between the beginning and end of the film demonstrates the true tragedy of this failure. At the beginning of the film, Charlie is in a hot tub with several strippers in Las Vegas. He wants to hear a report from Dan Rather in Afghanistan. The people around him (drunk, high, debauched) do not know where Afghanistan is, what is

going on there, or why it is important. This situation is repeated in a meeting of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. After a multi-year long successful campaign of aiding the Afghanis in their war with the Soviets, Charlie is unable to secure minor funding for the building of a school there. He is ridiculed by the few other members of the Subcommittee present, culminating with one Representative saying, "Charlie, nobody gives a shit about a school in Pakistan." To which, Charlie, depressed and dejected, replies, "Afghanistan." After all the time, publicity, money, and effort, not only has the central concern of *his* war been lost, but the people have been forgotten.

We, the audience, are dramatically informed why this is important in the immediately preceding scene. Charlie's friend and CIA ally Gust finally delivers his long-awaited story of the Zen-Master and the little boy at the party celebrating the Soviet defeat. In telling the story, Gust tries to convey to Charlie the importance of not merely seeing the defeat of the Soviets as the end of the story. He tells Charlie that they are not finished, and must work to rebuild the country and provide the Afghanis jobs and hope. Charlie says that he is trying, but Gust takes his demeanor as being a brush-off. He hands Charlie a classified intelligence report as he says, "the crazies have started rolling into Kandahar like it's a fucking bathtub drain." Gust tears Charlie's whiskey out of his hand, dumps it in a potted plant (actually and metaphorically trying to "sober-him-up" by replacing alcohol with intel), and snaps, "Listen to what I'm telling you!" As he says these words, the sound of airplane engines comes closer and louder from somewhere in the darkness. This scene, and its message, connects the Soviet-Afghan War with the American-Afghan War. It states clearly that our uncompleted efforts, our unwillingness or inability to help the Afghanis after wartime, contributed to 9/11. History is connected, and guilt is transferred.

Nuclear Fears

Thirteen Days[109]

[109] Roger Donaldson, *Thirteen Days* (Los Angeles: New Line Cinema, 2000).; This analysis was originally published in Hays, "American Foreign Policy in Film."

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Cuban Missile Crisis (US vs USSR/Cuba)

Actual: Own Judgment/Conflict Resolution vs Strategic Standard Operating Procedures/Conflict Evolution

2. Who are the participants?

Good: "Civilians"/independent thinkers (both US and USSR)

Bad: "Military"/rigid strategy thinkers (both US and USSR)

Catalysts: Humanity (everyone waiting for the final outcome and preparing for it, including Cuba)

3. What is the message?

Strategic Rationality, which is at the core of Standard Operating Procedures, is inherently Irrational when it comes to surviving potential nuclear conflict. "There is something immoral about abandoning your own judgment." "America" is "moral" because it will work tirelessly to find a solution to bring peace.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The argument is best demonstrated by clarifying the participants above. The good and the bad are not separated purely in terms of Civilian Leadership and Military Leadership, though by and large these groups are so separated. It seems to be part of each group that Civilians think more independently than Military members. There are, however, several Civilians who would be classified as Bad. They are "bad", though, because they do not use their own thought applied to the specific situation. They think in terms of rigid preconceived strategies (like the Military does). Similarly, some Military members are "good", precisely because they step outside of their rigid structures to think for themselves at how best to do the most good in the situation (and thereby run the risk

of being removed from their place in the Military, thus officially being Civilianized). This split exists in both the US and the USSR.

The three key Civilians are J. Kennedy, R. Kennedy, and O'Donnell. They spend the entire film resisting (and justifying their resistance to) the prepared strategies of the Military, which call for airstrikes and/or the invasion of Cuba. Two historical points are mentioned among the three Civilians in private which work as a single analogy. The first is the distant, though poignant, case of the beginning of World War I. J. Kennedy recalls the danger and damage caused by the Military's Standard Operating Procedures. He points out that they were designed for the previous war, not the current war, and once those plans were committed to, they could not be rescinded. The result is the Great War. The more personal historical case is The Bay of Pigs, in which J. Kennedy did not exercise his own judgment and authorized invasion as the Military suggested. The result was a tremendous fiasco, a public defeat, and an increase in the insecurity of the region that contributed to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Taken together, the analogy is that if the Civilians follow the Military plans again, the plans will be wrong and lead to nuclear war with the USSR. Here, J. Kennedy states the Message: "There is something immoral about abandoning your own judgment."

The key Military members are the collective Joint Chiefs of Staff. Together, they outline the plans of airstrikes and invasion that the Civilians are resisting implementing, and ultimately refuse. They repeatedly provide probability estimates, strategic statements, and follow their operating procedures without question. In one scene, this dependence on procedure leads the Admiral of the Navy to authorize (counter the President's orders) to fire warning flares at a Soviet ship. His thinking process was contained by a list of predetermined steps, none of which considered that firing anything towards a Soviet ship could result in confusion, retaliation, destruction, and ultimately nuclear war. The Admiral's action was immediately rebuked by the Civilian, Secretary of Defense McNamara, explaining that the embargo line was not a theatre of war, but a form of communication between the two countries completely unique from anything ever seen/done before (and thus outside the realm of pre-planned procedures).

A bad Civilian would be Acheson, who recommends forceful action against the missiles in Cuba, and then calmly walks the President through the consequences of that

action as seen by strategic thought. Acheson stops short of admitting the scenario he is outlining will result in the use of nuclear weapons, but J. Kennedy fills in the blank for him. The response is "Hopefully, cooler heads will prevail." This response is ironic because the entire point of having strategic standard operating procedures is to have a cool-headed rational plan to follow. That plan predicts and (eventually) demands the use of nuclear weapons, thereby ending all life. The cool-headed strategists are proposing suicide in the hope/belief that someone will act *irrationally* at some point to prevent the consequence of the irrational-rational policy of brinkmanship.

A good Military member is Commander Ecker. He flies a low-level reconnaissance mission over Cuba after the Joint Chiefs secure a procedural imperative from the President. If an American plane is attacked, the Military has the authorization to respond. This is a loophole the Military manages to create to enact their plan of airstrikes and invasion. The Civilians recognize this, and they recognize that the pilots are bound to be shot at. The only option is to convince the pilots to lie. O'Donnell calls Ecker, explaining that breaking with his Military training to obey orders and answer truthfully will save humanity. After the mission, during which Ecker and his wingman are fired upon, Ecker lies to his ground crew, convinces his wingman to lie as well, and then travels to D.C. and lies about the attack to the Joint Chiefs directly. By thinking for himself in the situation, Ecker denies the Joint Chiefs their loophole to go to war.

Finally, this divide between Civilian/independent thinkers and Military/rigid strategy thinkers crosses the US/USSR divide. The clearest and best example of this comes in the scene of R. Kennedy secretly negotiating with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrinyn. First, while waiting outside the office, O'Donnell is asked by a Soviet, who is also waiting, "Who are you?" After thinking for a moment, O'Donnell responds, "A friend." He never clarifies whose friend he is, but immediate exchange of relaxed smiles between he and the Soviet would seem to imply that they, as Civilians, are on the same side: resolving the conflict. This scene transitions to inside the office where the negotiation is taking place. In response to R. Kennedy's statement that the US will not allow the weapons to become operational, the Ambassador states, "Then I fear our two nations will go to war. And I fear where war will lead us." The delivery of this statement is not a threat. It is more a personal thought and personal fear of the Ambassador,

identifying him as being part of the Civilian group. This is solidified when, at the end of the negotiation, the Ambassador states,

> We have heard stories that some of your military men wish for war. You are a good man. Your brother is a good man. I assure you, there are other good men. Let us hope that the will of good men is enough to counter the terrible strength of this thing that was put in motion.

Through this statement, the Ambassador similarly identifies himself as a "good man," identifies "good men" within the USSR, and excludes "military men" in large part from this group.

Dr. Strangelove[110]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Cold War Nuclear Showdown (US vs USSR)

Actual: True Rationality/Prevent Nuclear War vs False Rationality/Control Nuclear War

2. Who are the participants?

Good: President Muffley, Commander Mandrake (if any), potentially the audience

Bad: General Ripper, General Turdgeson, Ambassador Desadski, Premier Kissov, Dr. Strangelove (if not all)

Catalyst: Kong and aircrew

[110] Stanley Kubrick, *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (Culver City: Columbia Pictures, 1964).

3. What is the message?

It is not possible to rationally possess and/or use nuclear weapons, because it is not possible to rationally control such weapons. The only way to "control" such weapons, and thereby prevent a nuclear war, is to not have the weapon-systems at all. The only true rational and strategic option is elimination of the weapons. "America" recognizes the ridiculousness and danger of the false rationality of the controllability of nuclear weapons.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film displays the failure of two strategic nuclear deterrence systems and how this failure destroys the world. The first deterrence system shown is the American system based on human reliability, nuclear bombers, and standing operating procedures. This is the first system to fail, and sets in motion the second system. This is the system of the USSR, and it is based on computers and technology in an effort to circumvent the human reliability problem. Ultimately, however, this circumvention also removes the last insurance of survival for all human life. Both systems attempt to control nuclear weapons, and through that control to preserve the lives and way of life of the respective American and Soviet peoples. This desire to *control* the weapons, however, is what ultimately allows for the weapons to become uncontrollable; and both countries fail in their goal of preservation of life.

The failure of the American system stems from a combination of the failure of the human reliability program at the commanding level (General Ripper goes insane and orders an attack), the success of the human reliability program at the operational level (Kong's aircrew dutifully does everything possible to bomb the Soviet Union). This failure is compounded by the failure of the standard operating procedures in one case (Ripper acts under an approved decapitation SOP, which assumes that Washington, DC, has been destroyed along with the command structure and gives lower commanders authority to launch their nuclear weapons), and their success in another (Kong's aircrew

isolates their radio communication, attempts to reach designated targets, and then bomb a target of opportunity when the official targets cannot be reached).

These failures trigger the Soviet system. The Soviet system is a massive computer bank programmed to set off all of their nuclear weapons if the system "senses" an attack. The resultant explosion of the massive nuclear arsenal is designed to destroy all life on Earth. It is intended to be the final statement in nuclear deterrence, as no one would risk setting off the closed-circuit system. The perfection of the so-called Doomsday Device is supposed to rest on several levels of the benefit of the removal of the human element. First, there is no way for a rogue actor to set it off, as was the failure in the American system. Second, the mechanization that is desired by using standard operating procedures is perfected by actually handing over operation to a machine. Third, the deterrent effect cannot be weakened by the emotions or fears of a leader who may be convinced to not destroy the world, for "no sane man would do such a thing." The human element does creep in, however. Being designed by humans, the device is flawed, and does not differentiate between mistakes or accidents and an actual attack. More importantly, the perfect deterrent effect is lost because the Soviet leader chose to keep it secret until "next Monday" because he "likes surprises."

Of course this is all shown through dark humor and entertaining metaphor. Three areas in particular stand out in the film. The first is the various oxymoronic statements and devices. Next is the names of the characters. Finally, and most prevalently, is the sexualization of the nuclear system.

While relatively few, the oxymoronic devices are striking and emphasized in the film through camerawork and dialogue structure. The two which stand out the most both deal with the relationship between peace and war. The more comedic involves Turgidson and de Sadesky getting into a fight, only to have President Muffley admonish them both; "Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room!" The implication being that war (including one of global annihilation) should be conducted peacefully and in a civilized manner. The more potent and realistic device is shown in the scene of the attack on the air-base. While American troops storm an American base to try and prevent the nuclear attack, the actual motto of Strategic Air Command is shown prominently in the background: "Peace is Our Profession."

The names of the characters in *Dr. Strangelove* are immensely illustrative. To begin with the beginning, General Ripper is named after Jack the Ripper, a violent and dangerous psychopathic serial killer who took credit for "giving birth" to the twentieth century. General Ripper wishes to inaugurate the post-twentieth century. On the operational end of Ripper's plan is Major Kong, or King Kong. He is a mindless (though not heartless) actor of brute force, misunderstood and misused, who ultimately falls to his massive and violent death. General Turgidson is turgid, pompous, and overly self-important. Most notably, and accurately, named is Dr. Strangelove himself. He optimizes the film, the logic behind the weapons-systems, and personifies the actual conflict. Dr. Strangelove presents a strange love of violence and desolation. His rationality and identity is visibly split between a logical half and a violent emotional half, which is not controlled. In fact, the two halves are seen to be battling each other, perhaps to the death. They are only united as the nuclear holocaust nears, and Dr. Strangelove manages to rise from his wheelchair and give a Nazi salute.

Strangelove, as a character and as a concept, is a good connection to the final area of metaphor: the sexualization of violence. The film is replete with sexuality, innuendo, and metaphor. To continue with Dr. Strangelove in this vein, his final scene of rising from his wheelchair is a return of potency to the impotent. The power that grants such a significant arousal is the imminent nuclear end of all life. It is a strange love that is aroused by the wholesale annihilation of all life. This strange love is exactly what nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy are, though. The full title of the film is: *Dr. Strangelove: or How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb*. To love "the bomb" against an apparently natural aversion is truly strange. This title is played in the opening credits over the image of a mid-air refueling between an air-tanker and a nuclear bomber. The music is romantic dancing music, and the concentrated camerawork breaks down the refueling into a seduction dance, erection, penetration, and decoupling. Similar to Strangelove, we can return to Ripper and his name-sake's sexual violence; also we can look to Turgidson's nick-name, Buck, and all the innuendo that opens to.

Ripper as a character and initiator of the plot deserves a closer look, though. The question that should naturally arise in the audience, "Why would Ripper do this?" is answered part way through the film. He explains to Mandrake, his British exchange

officer, that he (Ripper) is no longer able to perform sexually. Ripper attributes this impotency to the introduction of fluoride into the drinking water of the country, and attributes the "fluoride conspiracy" to the communist Soviet Union. Essentially, Ripper utilizes a super-potent weapon to retaliate against those whom he believes made him impotent. As if to drive the point home, when Kong tries to dislodge the bomb from the plane, he ends up riding it down to earth, a man hooting and hollering gleefully with a giant nuclear phallic symbol between his legs.

The bombs in this scene with Kong serve as other sexual symbols as well. There are two bombs in the plane, and painted on each respectively are the messages "Hi there!" and "Dear John." These messages are the beginning and ending phrases of a relationship (the alpha and the omega, one might say, to present a further metaphor of almighty power). And what is the result of the bomb? The result is a single successful nuclear explosion, which sets off a chain reaction of nuclear explosions, not unlike the disproportionate chain reaction of a single sperm fertilizing a single egg.

The metaphor of the bombers being sperm and the USSR the egg is born out throughout the film. The planes' progress is tracked on "the Big Board" in the War Room. There is discussion of "deep penetration" and "evasion of defenses" and finally the realization that only one needs to get through to set off the unstoppable reaction of the Doomsday Device. With each scene, we see the planes nearing the target, and the image is not unlike the diagrams of sperm making fast for the egg.

In addition to the message, the uniqueness of the participants needs to be addressed. In some way, and at some point, all of the characters are guilty of participating in the formation and operation of the system that will ultimately destroy the world. Mandrake and the President try the hardest of the characters to correct the problem before it is too late, but this does not remove the fact that both have intimately assisted the development of the weapon-system before this point. This leaves the possibility of there being *no* "good" participants. One way out of this is to introduce the audience as a participant.

Unlike the other films being analyzed, *Dr. Strangelove* is a comedy, and a dark and ironic comedy at that. It is not the sort of comedy where the characters recognize the humor and laugh along with the audience. This is important, as it means that no one in

the film actually learns a lesson from their experience (as best demonstrated by the mineshaft gap discussion and de Sadesky's spying up to the last moment). There is no message for any of the characters, only the audience who see the ridiculousness of the characters and the situation. Only the audience recognizes that the only way "out" of a nuclear war or nuclear accident (or both) is to not have the weapons and systems that could cause it.

There is a problem with the audience being the "good guy", though.[111] Just like Mandrake and the President, the American audience is also culpable for the development of the weapon-system. In a democracy, ultimately, the power is in the hands of the people, and the people are the audience. Now the question becomes, has the audience learned anything? They laugh at the ridiculous characters flitting away their last moments, then the movie ends. Does the audience force the solution? Do they act on their experience? They have not so far. If there were an audience watching the audience, they would most likely see a group of people not dissimilar to Turgidson and de Sadesky in the moments before the world disappears. So, perhaps, there truly is no "good" in this one.

[111] The complexity of the proposition of the audience actually being a participant in the film cannot be overstated. There are several points to it. First, the "audience" should not be thought of as a collection of individual real people, but firstly as the concept in the construction of the film that actually enables the existence of comedy. Without the "audience" the film has no humor, for there is no one to interact with the situations to realize the absurdity (as none of the characters are able to do so). It is the recognition of this absurdity that conveys the message of the film. However, the "audience" necessarily transcends the role of concept into the role of existence. This means that, at some point, the concept will be replaced by individuals who will temporarily fill the role of the concept, yet eventually return to being individuals in the world outside of the film. The concept "audience" can be the "good", but this is complicated by the concept "audience" being transitory. When the individuals are no longer part of the world of the film, they are confronted with other realities and with other complexities. A purely anti-war and anti-nuclear position may work in the world of the film, but the outside world is not as simple. It is this conflict between the concept "audience" and the existant audience that can break the classification of the audience as the "good".

Chapter 5- The Post-Cold War: Through a Glass, Darkly

You have the right to remain silent, General. You have the right to a fair trial. You have the right not to be tortured, not to be murdered. Rights you took away from Tarik Husseini. You have those rights because of the men who came before you who wore that uniform.

-Anthony Hubbard

It is not for you to decide what happens here.

-Freddy

Introduction

This chapter presents the Post-Cold War films for analysis. The films are split up into three different general sections. The first section, transitioning from the previous chapter, is "Nuclear Fears." This is followed by "The Unipolar Moment," which contains films on the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, the War on Drugs, and terror in the 90s. The final section is "Post-9/11."

Nuclear Fears

The Peacemaker[112]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Bosnian War

[112] Mimi Leder, *The Peacemaker* (Universal City: DreamWorks SKG, 1997).

Actual: Old World vs New World

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Devoe, Kelly
Bad: Gavrich
Catalyst: Vertikoff, Kodoroff

3. What is the message?

Whoever does not transition to the New World is lost. The Old World is past, and living in that mode makes one blind to the new threats and new conditions of the New World. America should and must adapt to the new requirements of the New World.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

This film is a truly difficult one to analyze. It seems on the surface to be incredibly shallow and straightforward: the US is always right, and others are always wrong. There is much in the film to support this, and if true, it would mean the film actually would be in agreement with the elite discourse. The Old World vs New World conflict, however, allows for much of this elite discourse to remain while expanding, rightfully, beyond its constraints.

Before going on, it will be helpful to unpack and explain the various meanings of the actual conflict. The Old World and the New World are spatial, temporal, and metaphysical. In spatial terms, this means the classic positions and portrayals of Europe and the US. In temporal terms, this means the "world" that is no longer (that prior to the end of the Cold War) and the "world" as it is today (post-Cold War). In metaphysical terms, this means a fundamental difference in how time is experienced, where the US is linear and progressable while Europe is cyclical and unchangeable. The fact that the US is *progressable*, able but not determined to progress, is the key point of difference between the shallow conflict analysis and the deeper conflict analysis. Both Devoe and

Kelly recognize their personal past mistakes and learn from them, but this is not a necessarily universal and pre-determined truth. They both suffer in learning this lesson, but the pain and the lesson are unique to them as individuals. It is not systemic. Even if the term "New World" is carried on to the further post-Cold War notion of "New World Order," this new order is not the one determined by the US, but one imposed upon the US in terms of non-state terrorism. That conclusion is only eluded to in the film, however, as not even the world and time the film was made in was fully aware of this shift.

With these terms of the conflict unpacked, it is easier to see their expression in the films. Moving from one spatially-classified grouping to another is perhaps the most illustrative manner of comparing and contrasting the two worlds. The film begins in the Old World of Europe, so that would seem to be the best place to begin the analysis.

The film opens in Serbia at the christening of a child. This scene on its own greatly contrasts the New of the Child with the Old of the Orthodox Church and ceremony surrounding the Child. To this setting is introduced the alarm of a pager, and a man steps out to use his cell phone. Again, there is the contrast between New and Old. Suddenly, the New man is gunned down by an acquaintance.

After this initial scene, there is very little New displayed regarding Serbia. The homes and buildings are all old and heavily damaged from the war. Though the war that caused the damage is contemporary, the feeling is one of age and almost natural condition. The impression is of wars from the past, such as the two world wars. This feeling is reinforced by Gavrich being a piano teacher. The classical music he teaches and plays entrenches more and more the Old World of Serbia.

A potential objection to this Old World Serbia would be the video recording made of Gavrich's speech. Certainly, if a pager and cell phone depict the New, A-V equipment and tapes must also. This is true, and yet what is the purpose of the recording? It is to communicate with the New World. The tape is not of the Old, but of the New and for the New.

While the Serb actions interact with, and to a certain extent form the New World, they themselves are in the past, motivated by the Old World. Whether this past is blind nationalism, or blind brotherly loyalty, or PTSD from seeing family gunned down; none of them are operating in the present. In Gavrich's taped speech, he declares, "I am just

like you, whether you like it or not." This is not entirely true. As he says, he expects the world to see what he has done as just another outcropping of perpetual, cyclical, Balkan violence. This is ultimately true and appropriate. Gavrich is not "just like you" in the sense that he is not a monster or in the sense that he is part of the New World; rather he is trying to make "you" like him, pulling you into the Old World through sharing the horrors of senseless violence his people and region have disproportionately suffered.

Russia is the next space we are introduced to in the film. First, we see the Russian military conducting some kind of operation involving nuclear weapons. The imagery is very dark and sinister, very Cold War. Then, a soldier speaks up to his officer that he does not like their current mission of nuclear disarmament. "I didn't join the Russian Army to dismantle it for the Americans," he says. "None of us did," responds the officer, "the world changes. We must change with it." That "changed world" quickly turns more sinister, as the officer participates in the slaughter of his men and the taking of the nuclear weapons by a paramilitary unit under a renegade Russian general. The "changed world" is one without political loyalties, where only profit matters.

The opening finishes out with the military train colliding with a local commuter train. The collision awakens a very old couple in their country home. They stumble out of an old house, and they look like they could easily be from the middle of the century and not its end. Suddenly, a powerful nuclear flash, the dawn of the New World detonated by Russians and not Americans, envelopes them.

The first elderly couple discussed above are not the only Old depiction in this opening. The occupants of the local commuter train also appear in older clothes and older poses, as though the image were a snapshot of an immigrant boat headed for New York in sepia tones rather than a commuter train carrying post-Soviet locals. The military train being coal-powered also adds to the datedness. This is in great contrast to the images of the paramilitary unit. Their train is diesel-powered, and they are replete with night-vision goggles and laser-sites. They are cutting-edge, if not futuristic, in their presentation. There is no bridge of progression between the two groups of Russians, though. The difference only accentuates the datedness of the civilians and regular soldiers, the regular and true Old World. The two groups appear to be the beginning and ending joints of a circle, with the nuclear flash the soldering point.

There is a later scene set in Russia that, much like Gavrich's tape, would seem to imply Russia's joining with the New World. As the three American helicopters enter Russian air-space, they are confronted and fired upon by Russian air-defense forces. Again, this involves much technology. It is, however, Cold War technology towards Cold War ends. The Russian air-defense soldiers ignore the American arguments announcing the New World, and instead revert to Cold War distrust of the Americans.

Vienna is the final European space displayed, and it is unique among the other European settings. In Vienna, Old and New are thoroughly mixed. Renaissance paintings and furnishings are juxtaposed with the most modern computers and technology. Hundreds-year-old buildings (looking like new) are surrounded by tourists at modern cafés. This is fitting, however, as Vienna is where the New and Old Worlds come face-to-face. It is the meeting point and bridge between the Americans and the Russians (both friendly and not).

The depictions of America are very different. Both in Washington, DC and New York City (not to mention the military base abroad), everything is New. The technology is the most advanced and is wide spread among all of the actors. The actors are all in a position of dominance in the Post-Cold War world. While the NSA advisor mentions that he misses the Cold War, it is comment of weary authority rather than injured pride (as with the Russian soldier's comment). The Americans are the heirs of the passing Old World, and the owners of the New.

What this New World truly is, however, is only known and demonstrated by Kelly and Devoe via Gavrich. Kelly and Devoe are the only Americans, and the only participants, that we see make the full transition to the New World. This occurs at different times for each of them, and in different ways. For Kelly, it is more of a career oriented revelation. For Devoe, it is a full existential shift.

We see Kelly's transition in a couple scenes. The first is subtle, and deals with her being a woman in authority. This is most clearly established by her having to leave the pool to head the task-force. Unlike the men who show few signs of what they had been doing before being called in, she has dripping wet (long) hair that has spotted her suit. She specifically requests a military liaison who will not be difficult taking orders from a

woman. And, when requesting information from the Russians on the phone, she is forced to declare, “I am the man in charge.”

The next group of scenes deal with her professional character transitioning. In her initial briefing, where she meets Devoe, her analysis is confined by the Old World logic of political terrorism. Devoe uses her evidence to supplant her analysis with an Old World analysis of his own, which is theft for the purpose of sale. As regards the train, Devoe’s analysis is the correct one, however, Kelly points out later that the theft by Kodoroff is simply the initial step in a larger plan that is not confined to Old greed.

This final point emerges in a conversation between Kelly and Devoe, which ends up linking their transitions. They are flying to Vienna and debating the nature of the world. Kelly has finished her transition by this point, stressing that motivation in the New World may be solely about expression of pain and a desire to spread that pain. Devoe maintains at this point that greed and power and respect are the universal and sole motivations for actions like this.

It is this position of Devoe’s that sets up his existential crisis when his friend Vertikoff is killed in Vienna. Devoe is deeply pained and dumbfounded by Vertikoff’s murder. He declares that it makes no sense, because killing “a Dimitri Vertikoff” is not “useful.” This declaration is important for two reasons. First, it equates killing with utility, a trait which no longer holds in the New World. Secondly, Devoe has just witnessed his own death to some degree. Vertikoff was the Russian version of Devoe. Vertikoff was killed walking away from bribing the man who was chasing them. He was the surrogate, standing in the place and performing the act Devoe himself had repeatedly committed. But Vertikoff was of the Old World, and the New World killed him.

This is the fate shared by almost all of the Old World characters. Vertikoff dies in Vienna. Kodoroff dies in a fight with Devoe after the Vienna trip. Gavrich and his brother both die in New York. Yet Kelly and Devoe both manage to escape a similar fate by having transitioned in time to the New World. As Devoe controversially declares to Gavrich just before Gavrich commits suicide, the wars of the Old World are “not our [wars].”

The wars of the Old World and the New World are the final point to mention. What are these wars? In the case of the Serbs, it seems to be wars of nationalism and the

consequences of those wars, much like the various Balkan wars of the twentieth century. For Russia, Kodoroff's nationalist speeches combined with candid statements of devotion to wealth and class seem like a neo-Tsarist tradition. As mentioned above, the wider Russian position would seem to remain in the Cold War. America, on the other hand, seems to be delving into a new era of warfare under the lead of Devoe and Kelly. It may be similar to past wars (as the German tourist in New York cries "Fascism!" as all bags are searched looking for the nuclear device), but it is an era of warring for peace and stability and survival in the face of the chaotic collapse of the Old World.

The Sum of All Fears[113]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Nuclear Showdown
Actual: Blinding/Imprisoning Fear vs Liberating Truth

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Ryan, Cabot (to a degree), Grushkov/Spinnaker (to a degree)
Bad: Fowler, Nemerov
Catalyst: Dressler

3. What is the message?

Fear causes mistakes and condemns us to a false path which leads to destruction. Ignoring limitations caused by fear helps us to discover truth. Only the strength of unafraid truth can prevent ruination. America must not let fear overshadow truth.

[113] Phil A. Robinson, *The Sum of All Fears* (Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 2002).

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film portrays a key problem from the unipolar moment. Without an existential enemy, it is difficult to gauge threat and prepare for it. This may allow for the re-submersion into old fears for the comfort of being able to identify the enemy. However, the unipolar world is more complex than that, and to return to outdated fears is to aid in one's own destruction. Fear leads to ignorance and mistakes. Truth and knowledge help avoid ignorance and mistakes, contain fear, and avoid ruination.

The beginning of the film consists of several different scenes that set a tone of fear and mistrust. The first is the Israeli nuclear equipped jet that is shot down. This scene leads into a nuclear drill with President Fowler and his administration. The enemy is an unstable Russia. When the actual unstable Russia experiences a regime change, the Senate Intelligence Committee expresses fear and distrust of the new president, Nemerov. Soon, there is a scene in the Kremlin where President Nemerov threatens Cabot and the US with war if they get involved in Chechnya. Finally, Dressler is introduced with his Neo-Nazi hatred for both the US and Russia.

Each of these opening scenes introduces a component of the ultimate problem. It is not for nothing that the first piece introduced is the bomb itself, buried in the sands of time, placed there by a past conflict. The scenes of the US and Russia demonstrate that, regardless of openness and stability, both are trapped by pre-conditioned fears that influence their perceptions of reality. Finally, Dressler brings the setting full circle. His is an ideology similarly buried in time and forgotten; and his nuclear action is similarly one from outside the standard bipolar plan.

Combating this setting of fear and ignorance are a few actors dedicated to finding out truth. The first of these that we are introduced to is Cabot in the opening nuclear drill. He tries to get Fowler to realize that Russia (and a state in general) is not the only potential nuclear threat facing the US. Fowler dismisses Cabot's observation. Later, after the Intelligence meeting, Cabot tells Ryan that he never gives Senators all of the information they should have at once. First, Cabot gives them a taste of what the situation is, to let them get used to it, and only after that informs them fully. This strategy cuts down on fear and friction caused by new information and new situations. Perhaps this

was the strategy Cabot was employing with Fowler earlier. Another interesting link between the scenes is the ignorance of identification among the fearful. Both Fowler and the Senate Chairman mispronounce key structures in their respective fears. The President mispronounce the main Russian nuclear facility, and the Chairman mispronounces the name of the new Russian president he so deeply mistrusts. Both instances demonstrate a lack of full comprehension of this object of instinctual fear.

Cabot has a Russian counterpart, Grushkov a.k.a. Spinnaker. Grushkov provides a similar intelligence role for Nemerov as Cabot does for Fowler. Via Spinnaker, he and Cabot keep each other informed as to what is true and what is not, "in hopes of staving off disaster."

Ryan seems to naturally gravitate to this role of truth and information, regardless of fears. When we first meet him, Ryan gets into a debate with his colleagues over the identity of a Russian aide (an attention to detail juxtaposed to the misidentification of Fowler and the Senator). Ryan is similarly not afraid to speak truth to power in his advising Cabot during the Intelligence meeting, Nemerov concerning his college-days' romances, Grushkov concerning the missing scientists, or Fowler and his advisers concerning analysis of the Grozny attack. Through interaction with Cabot, Ryan hones this natural tendency into a dedicated tool directed at preventing fear from dominating facts and leading to ruin.

Eventually, Ryan surpasses Cabot in this role. When the three Russian nuclear scientists are discovered in Ukraine, Cabot is convinced that they are under orders from Nemerov to build an untraceable bomb for use in Chechnya. This analysis contradicts Cabot's entire experience with, and information from, Spinnaker. He ignores this information, however, influenced by the Cold War fear and mistrust within him. When Ryan tries to tell him that the analysis does not make sense, Cabot shuts him down. By the time Ryan has the necessary information to warn the administration of the real danger, it is too late.

Once the bomb goes off, we see the true role of fear. This is best exemplified by contrasting the nuclear drill from the opening with the actual nuclear crisis. The first thing that is obvious is the complete lack of calm that existed in the drill. The advisers are afraid. They do not have information. The NSA chief repeatedly answers to each of

Fowler's questions, "I don't know." They are all on edge, and have problems with even simple tasks like opening a fold-out seat on Air Force One.

The second thing that is obvious is the contrast in locations. The drill is held underground in a bunker within a mountain. The bunker is solid, stable, and predictable. The crisis is dealt with from the air in Air Force One. It is small, fragile, and quite literally turbulent and unpredictable.

The final point, which is slightly less obvious, is the nature of events. The drill concerns an unstable Russia, not controlled from the center, with rogue elements at the core of the crisis. This is the situation Fowler's administration has been training for, and it is in many ways the situation that develops, yet it is the scenario that the administration refuses to acknowledge. Instead, they assume a unified and centrally ordered plan, even after Nemerov admits to rogue elements in his military. Fowler's advisers ignore the significance of the few facts that they have (like the absence of any evidence for a missile launch or strike), and instead try to create more complex scenarios that agree with their predetermined cause (a cruise missile launched from a bomber below radar level). When Ryan is finally able to contact the administration on Air Force One, he is cut off before he can provide the crucial information necessary to de-escalate the situation.

Ryan is finally able to communicate with both Fowler and Nemerov by hijacking the hotline the two use to communicate. He gets to the Pentagon and convinces the officer in charge to just let him "send some information." Ryan's "information" is one of two speeches in the film that solidify the actual conflict and the message. He starts by stating that the USA has been a victim of a terrorist (fear) attack. Ryan continues dictating that the situation is "no longer about Baltimore. Now it's about fear. Our fear of your missiles, your fear of our subs. Fear of being weak or making a mistake. The same fear of the other guy that built these bombs in the first place!" His message gets through to Nemerov, who has been kept relatively calm throughout thanks to Grushkov. A de-escalation strategy is agreed upon, fear is tempered, and disaster is averted.

The second speech is made by Fowler. At a ceremony together with Nemerov at the Whitehouse, Fowler states, "…we have finally learned, at far too great a cost, that if the most powerful weapons ever created are unleashed, they will be fired not in anger, but in fear." As Nemerov's speech follows, Grushkov admits to Ryan that he is

Spinnaker, and they agree to "keep the back-channels open" as he and Cabot had once done. The only way to limit fear and stave off disaster is through the sharing and use of truth.

The Unipolar Moment

Courage Under Fire[114]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: The Persian Gulf War
Actual: Truth/Ugly Reality vs Lies/Pleasant Fabrications

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Serling, Ilario (to a certain degree), Gartner (to a certain degree)
Bad: Hershberg, Monfriez, Altameyer
Catalyst: Iraqi Military, Walden, Ilario (to a certain degree), Gartner (to a certain degree)

3. What is the message?

Only the truth is honorable. Only the truth will set you free. The lie, for whatever reason, leads to dishonor and ruination. America should acknowledge and embrace the "whole, hard, cold truth."

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film is concerned with two truths. The first is the friendly-fire incident where Serling killed several of his men including his best friend. The second is the actions of

[114] Edward Zwick, *Courage Under Fire* (Los Angeles: Fox 2000 Pictures, 1996).

Walden and her crew during an attempted rescue of a downed helicopter. Serling ultimately tries to expose the first truth for his own reasons, and he is trying to uncover the second truth for a combination of its own merits as well as recompense for initially following orders to keep silent and thereby participating in the cover-up of his friendly-fire incident.

During a night time battle, Serling's tanks got separated and the enemy infiltrated their lines. In the ensuing confusion, Serling fired on and destroyed one of his own tanks, which was being commanded by his friend Boylar. This friendly-fire incident is subsequently suppressed by the Pentagon, forcing Serling to hide his suffering from his wife and to lie to Boylar's parents about the circumstances of his death. The secretiveness and lies eat away at Serling, all the while he is given the task to investigate Walden's story for the Medal of Honor.

Walden's story is ultimately also a friendly-fire incident. She was not killed accidentally, though, as Serling uncovers. After coming to the aid of a downed helicopter, and being shot down as well, Walden faces a mutiny of her crew. At the height of the argument, she is accidentally shot by Monfriez. The next morning, just before being rescued, she assures Monfriez that there will be a reckoning for his actions. The wounded Walden provides covering fire while her crew head for the rescue helicopter. When the pilot asks about her, Monfriez lies and says she is already dead. The pilot calls in a napalm strike on the area, and Walden is most assuredly killed.

Throughout the revelation of these two stories, the tension between truth and falsehood is played out in the evolution of guilt in the survivors. To begin with Walden's story, all three crew members who took part in the mutiny are visibly changed, if not outright suffering. One, Altameyer, is suffering from both physical and mental anguish in a veteran's hospital. As Serling questions him, and begins to approach the key points in the story, Altameyer begins crying out "Jesus!" and self-administering morphine until he loses consciousness.

Ilario and Monfriez are more complex. Ilario is a walking skeleton, chain-smoking and nostalgic about innocence. He is evasive about key points in the story, and is adamant that he does not want to tell the story again. As we later find out, his declaration about not wanting to recount the story anymore is likely due to the guilt he

feels about contributing to Walden's death and then lieing about it. We also later find out that he is a drug addict, trying to escape from reality.

Monfriez seems normal and healthy. With more interaction, however, it becomes obvious that he is overcompensating in two areas: loyalty and machismo. When we first meet Monfriez, he is chewing out a recruit for abandoning one of his fellow soldiers on the obstacle course. While Monfriez makes a convincing show of it, he then sends the recruit on his way and both forget about the struggling soldier. This shows that Monfriez is trying to stress the point about not abandoning a comrade, yet that this loyalty is not a natural characteristic for him. As regards machismo, Monfriez continuously acts big, tough, and belittling. His version of events puts him as the key actor making all the proper and heroic decisions. When Serling challenges him on a point, Monfriez begins to back-peddle and say that he cannot remember every detail. Monfriez declares that Walden was weak and cowardly, when in fact these characteristics and actions belonged to him. Monfriez is attempting to cover up his deficiencies (self-centeredness and cowardice) by overcompensating in these areas.

Ultimately, Altameyer and Monfriez succumb to their guilt and deceit. Altameyer will keep himself drugged out of awareness until death takes him, and Monfriez commits suicide rather than face his true self and his actions. Ilario, however, seems to make it through to the other side. He goes AWOL after talking with Serling, but ensures that Serling or the military will find him. Ilario keeps his drugs in a bad hiding place, and they are quickly discovered. This and his mentioning to Serling about where he likes to go to think brings Serling and the authorities to Ilario. Ilario admits that he perhaps wanted to be caught, and after telling the whole true story to Serling, he breaks down in tears of both guilt and redemption. By telling the truth, facing his actions and accepting responsibility for them, there is a possibility for Ilario to move on and recover.

These two alternatives, ruination or redemption, play themselves out within Serling as well. The secretiveness and lies seem to fuel his post-traumatic stress disorder, pushing him into alcoholism and slowly pulling him away from his family. The turning point comes when Serling is pulled off of the case by Hershberg, his commanding general and supposed friend, half-way through the investigation.

Hershberg was Serling's commander during the friendly-fire incident, and he considers their current position as punishment for Serling's mistake. Hershberg repeatedly alludes to this in their conversations, and stresses that he gave Serling the Walden assignment "as a way back." The implication is that the assignment is a "way back" for the both of them, and similarly, failure to provide the desired result will end both of their careers.

Hershberg's removal of Serling does several things. It clarifies to Serling that they are not true friends, as Hershberg is willing to sacrifice both Serling and the truth to save his own career. It brings Serling's existential crisis to a head, as he had been participating in the cover-up to preserve his career in the military, which was seemingly most important to him. By facing and overcoming the fear of life outside of the military, Serling realizes that truth and honor are far more important to him. He continues the Walden investigation on his own, he begins to cooperate with Gartner on exposing the friendly-fire incident, and by dedicating himself to uncovering truth, Serling begins to conquer his alcoholism.

Gartner, an investigative reporter, demonstrates that he is Serling's true friend. Gartner is persistent in trying to get Serling to comment on the incident, but he is also willing to set his personal interest aside to try and help Serling deal with his demons. Ultimately, Gartner is also the one to complete the whole story surrounding Serling. Until the end of the film, all we know about the friendly-fire incident is that Serling fired on and killed his own men. Gartner reveals what Serling did after this mistake, which was making a calm and rational decision in the heat of battle to order his men to turn on their lights. This identified clearly the American tanks, preventing any more accidental deaths, and saving countless lives. Serling made a tragic mistake, but he also immediately prevented any more. Serling is a hero, a point Hershberg ignored completely until Gartner forced it from him. Immediately after, Serling presents the general with his full report on Walden; which contains the "whole, hard, cold truth," the only way to honor the honorable.

The film concludes with Walden's posthumous award, with Serling noticeably absent. He is finally confessing to Boylar's parents. They are kind, receptive, and graciously forgiving of him. They urge Serling to forgive himself likewise. He seems to

do so, as Serling finally, truly, returns home. The sun graces his face as he stands at his front door, in full dress uniform, sober and at peace.

Black Hawk Down[115]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: US/UN Humanitarian Intervention in the War in Somalia
Actual: Intimate Experience vs Distant Experience

2. Who are the participants?

Good: The Soldiers on the Ground
Bad: The Commanders and Policy-makers at a safe distance
Catalyst: The Somalis

3. What is the message?

Effective policy can neither be properly formed nor properly executed by a group that is distanced from the experience of living and enforcing that policy. To attempt it is a futile waste. "America" should value and utilize those with intimate experience to form and execute policy, or to decide to not engage at all.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film follows the true story of American forces as part of the UN mission to Somalia. Throughout the film, the concept of the destructive nature of distance is displayed in various forms, ranging from personal experience, to command, to policy formation. In each case, the greater the distance, the greater the potential danger that distance creates.

[115] Ridley Scott, *Black Hawk Down* (Santa Monica: Revolution Studios, 2001).

The film opens with a quotation attributed to Plato, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.” This speaks to the most intimate of personal experiences, as well as the consequences of that experience. Only the dead have fully experienced war, and so they are the only ones who will no longer engage in warfare. Everyone who is more distantly removed from the full experience will continue to fight, which is perhaps the greatest and most destructive mistake of all that is caused by distance. Only the dead know not to fight.

The quotation starts off several examples of the dangers of distance regarding personal experience. While it is perhaps the least self-evident, the rest of the examples are not so shrouded. The first casualty of the operation is also the newest soldier on base. Blackburn arrives young, fresh-faced, inexperienced, and wanting to fight. He never gets a chance, as he falls from the Black Hawk, and provides the first bit of friction to the distantly conceived plan to capture the warlord Aidid.

Blackburn’s injury is only metaphorically connected to his inexperience, but distance from experience does directly lead to other casualties. Most notably among these are the casualties that will result from the Rangers not being properly geared for their mission. In the scene where they are all getting ready, several mistakes are made. The soldiers leave their water behind, since they will only be gone for a short time. Similarly, they leave behind some of their body armor. Why take the back-armor plate, one soldier muses, if you are not planning to run away and expose your rear. He is ultimately shot in the back and killed, not from running away, but from being surrounded in an urban battle-field he was not prepared for.

These tragic mistakes are offered as advice to Grimes, who is going to battle for the first time. While this is his first battle, it is not his first war. On paper he is incredibly experienced, as he has been in several wars/conflicts. The problem is that Grimes was always in an office, operating as a data-entry clerk. He is a veteran without any combat experience, and his baptism-by-fire seems to drive him a little insane before the end.

A stark example of personal experience is the contrast between the soldiers’ insertion at the beginning of the battle and their final extraction at the end. The soldiers that we mainly follow are inserted via helicopter, a relatively distance-maximizing conveyance. Their feet do not touch the ground until they are in the middle of the battle-

zone. Their extraction, on the other hand, is by foot, running along the outside of armored vehicles. There cannot be any more intimate experience to contrast with the insertion than running *beside* protective armor. There is no clear demarcation between the battle-zone and the safe-zone, there is no protection in moving from the one to the other, and there is no aid other than their own feet and will to keep moving.

One final detail between the insertion and extraction stands out, and that is the children. As the soldiers are flying into the battle-zone, they pass over s boy on a hill. He is a picket for the terrorists that the soldiers are heading in to fight. The boy signals the terrorists by calling them with a cellphone and holding it up to the air, so the terrorist can hear the helicopters. The soldiers in the helicopter think the boy is waving, and so they wave back. Soon, however, the soldiers will be fighting children as well as adults in the streets. During the extraction, there are also children. These children are in the safe-zone, however, and begin running alongside the soldiers as if it were a game. Those with distant experience and those with intimate experience have thus switched places, and the soldiers are no longer innocently unaware children.

The distance of command is another destructive force. It seems almost formulaic: the higher the rank, the worse the leadership. This is exemplified by the conflict between Ranger Captain Steele and Delta Sergeant Sanderson. The sergeant has the better grasp of the situation and the better strategy, yet the captain attempts to pull rank to enforce his inadequate strategy. This is compounded by their divisional representations: the more elite and experienced Delta vs the less elite and experienced Rangers.

The problem of the distance of command only increases the further up the chain we go. There are several striking examples of this. One of the first is the general's staff explaining the mission. There will not be any heavy support, no gunships, for the mission. This determination comes from the administration in Washington. They want a lower profile operation because Somalia "is not Iraq." Washington, the greatest distance from the battle, does not see that, for the soldiers on the ground most intimately experienced with the battle, being shot at is the same no matter where the shooting is taking place.

McKnight, who is the one concerned about the lack of support, is told by his superior Harell that "life is imperfect." He responds that life is "imperfect" for the

superior officers circling high above the city, but for the soldiers on the ground, it is unforgiving. Later, these two come into conflict again over the same point. Harell is relaying directions to McKnight, who is heading the convoy and is under heavy fire. Harell orders a turn, but too late. McKnight snaps that he needs to be told to turn before the turn comes up. Harell calmly replies that he needs to slow down, as there is a time-lag (read "distance") between directions and transmission. McKnight snaps back that they cannot slow down; they are under heavy fire and taking casualties. The point of contention at the briefing has become a fulfilled prophesy about the problems of distance.

The time-lag/distance is magnified when we see General Garrison. He is back at base, watching the battle unfold on black and white screens. What he is experiencing of the battle, what is informing his commands, is a colorless, two-dimensional, framed, silent, delayed image of what is all too overpowering and lethal for the soldiers on the ground. The black and white, simplified, images that the general has of the battle contrast with the aftermath of the battle he experiences. The general tours the field hospital, where the red blood and bodies are all too visible. He tries to mop up a puddle of blood with a cloth, but all he manages to do is spread it around and make a larger mess.

The inability to mop up the blood, and in fact making the situation worse, is a metaphor of failed policy, which leads to the final area of distance. Part of this overlaps with command and Washington's refusal to utilize overwhelming force as it had in Iraq, but there are other examples. One, tragically, comes from the general when he instructs the soldiers to not leave anyone behind. This policy leads to several casualties in attempts to recover soldiers' remains. Ultimately, the policy is abandoned, and both living and dead are left behind.

Perhaps the greatest distance of policy is displayed with UN and US rules of engagement. The UN is completely ineffectual, as it is one degree more removed than even Washington of other state actors from the realities of what is happening on the ground. The ludicrousness of American rules of engagement is demonstrated at the beginning of the film when the Rangers must watch from their circling helicopters as the terrorists steal the UN food supply and slaughter the starving civilians, because the Americans can only engage if they themselves are fired upon. The humanitarian

intervention is crippled by policy and forced to watch the inhumane slaughter of the innocents that the intervention is meant to protect.

The clearest critique of policy comes during the interrogation of Durant after he is captured by the terrorists. Durant says that the US will not negotiate for his release, and that he does not have the authority to negotiate on his own. The terrorist responds that American soldiers have the power to kill but not to negotiate, while in Somalia killing is negotiating. The distance between policy formation and execution is removed. Everyone with a weapon is a policy-maker, and the only distance is between life and death. This policy, the terrorist stresses, cannot and will not be replaced by democracy from abroad, and certainly not as easily as by the US capturing their leader, Aidid.

The final policy-from-a-distance is the removal of US troops from Somalia after the battle. Eversmann, one of the main Rangers that we follow throughout the film, does not understand it. Nothing has changed except the soldiers. They have experience now. They have understanding of the situation. They have bled. But now that intimate understanding and experience has been gained, nothing is to be done with it. The sacrifice will go without use. Distant Washington has decided that the suffering and losses will have been in vain.

Behind Enemy Lines[116]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Bosnian War
Actual: Military vs Diplomats

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Reigart and all under his command
Bad: Piquet and everyone above Reigart
Catalyst: Serb Forces

[116] John Moore, *Behind Enemy Lines* (Los Angeles: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 2001).

3. What is the message?

Diplomats use (mainly American) military strength for their own ends. These ends may be for peace or for personal reasons. Regardless, diplomacy is a lesser force for good than American military strength being used independently. "America" should do what it knows is right, and not restrain itself according to the diplomatic wishes of others.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film opens with two important scenes. The first is a scene of Serb soldiers planting trees. The scene, though peaceful, is still disturbing. The second scene is of American fighter pilots preparing to take off in response to an alert, only for the alert to be called off. The unresponsive "bandit" was a NATO craft not following communications procedures; the second one that day. Combined, these two opening scenes provide the basis for the message of the film: despite the peaceful images the Serbs are presenting, something does not feel right; and NATO (read "the International Diplomatic Community") is incompetent. These two themes are repeated throughout the film, but they ultimately unite. NATO is incapable of being a force for good in the Balkans because of its emphasis on diplomacy at the expense of the military, because of a desire for the veneer of peace greater than a desire for a true and just peace, and because they are unable or uninterested to see through the façade of the Serbs.

Throughout the film, we see the Serb soldiers and politicians discuss the recently agreed peace plan as a strategic tool to buy time and hide their genocidal operations. This is the peace plan that Piquet is so vociferous in supporting and so desperate to maintain at the expense of Burnett's life. It is this peace plan that Burnett jeopardized by flying off mission, according to Piquet; even though Burnett flew off mission to investigate the Serbs violating the plan. It is this peace plan that is providing cover for the Serb policy of genocide.

Ultimately, the Serb actions are only possible because they are enabled by Piquet and diplomats like him, including Americans. Rather than verify the peace plan, Piquet

makes sure that the primarily American forces will do nothing to jeopardize it. The result is flight plans that are registered with the Serb forces, guaranteeing that while NATO forces may be watching, they will not see anything.

Burnett and O'Malley both confront Reigart on this point at different times. Burnett does not want to be a cop watching nothing, but to actually do something meaningful. O'Malley cannot understand the logic of risking Burnett's life by respecting lines drawn by diplomats when obviously Burnett was shot down and is in trouble.

Eventually, Reigart's internal conflict over the matter breaks in a heated conversation with Piquet. The conversation is the result of Reigart leaking Burnett's story to the press, specifically to a reporter Piquet forced on him for the purposes of public relations. Reigart fumes that an American pilot is down, and his countrymen want him back. Piquet responds, just as angrily, that there are more than American concerns involved. A breach of the peace plan now could lead to more war and more deaths. Piquet's position is noble in its own way, but by being willfully blind to the realities on the ground, he is ignorant of the fact that the war is still going on and innocent people are being slaughtered.

This point is made most clear when Burnett reaches Hac, a supposed safe zone that is anything but. There, he is almost killed by a local commander who has lost his belief in American promises. The man rages at Burnett that the Americans said there would be peace now, even as they are being bombarded by the Serb forces. Just then, a Serb tank tears through a wall decorated with American flags and paraphernalia, firing a deafening shot that kills many of the town's defenders holed-up there.

This scene leads into another example of NATO's/diplomatic willful incompetence. In order to evade capture, as a military tactic, Burnett switches uniforms with a dead Serb. The Serbs realize the switch, but use it to their advantage, displaying the body as Burnett's. Piquet believes the claims of the people that Burnett claims are after him rather than recognizing Burnett's tactics. Piquet informs Reigart, and the French rescue forces that Piquet ordered to replace Reigart's American team are recalled. Burnett can see the rescue helicopter turn around, seemingly oblivious to him.

In the climactic scene, Burnett is able to reach his ejection seat and use it to signal his location. Reigart, this time, ignores the diplomats and the chain of command and

orders an American rescue operation. Not only does the ejection seat have a homing beacon, but it also contains the digital pictures proving the Serbs genocide operation. Rather than immediately heading to the safety of the rescue, Burnett retrieves the disk under fire.

The film closes with Burnett and Reigart rediscovering value in the American military. Burnett destroys his resignation letter he filed when he was kept to watching nothing under the order of the diplomats. Reigart loses his command for disobeying orders, even though the result was saving Burnett and revealing the horrors of the Serb genocide program. He retires with honor, rather than being reassigned to the political/diplomatic "administrative" post at the Pentagon. Ultimately, the search for truth and justice under Reigart's command helped limit a genocide that was headed to be on par with the Holocaust. It was not in line with the political aims of the diplomats, however, and so he is punished. The veneer was deemed more valuable than the truth.

Clear and Present Danger[117]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: War on Drugs
Actual: Selfless Duty vs Selfish Interest

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Ryan
Bad: President Bennett, Cutter, Ritter, Cortez
Catalyst: Escobedo, Drug Cartels in General, Admiral Greer, Clark

3. What is the message?

Selfish interest only leads to ruination. Selfless duty, though difficult, is the only

[117] Noyce, *Clear and Present Danger*.

moral and right option. America should act selflessly and fulfill its obligations faithfully.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Throughout the film, there is a strong theme of subordinates and subordination, which frames the actual conflict regarding duty. Some expressions of subordinates are quite straightforward. Ryan is subordinate to Greer and Bennett. Ritter is subordinate to Cutter and Bennett. Cortez is subordinate to Escobedo. They are all subordinates in both titles and functions. The concepts of subordinate and subordination are expanded by Greer on his deathbed, though.

Ryan visits Greer in the hospital, where he is receiving treatment for cancer. Ryan describes a problem he has run into, where Bennett has tasked him with proving a large sum of money discovered in Bennett's friend's account is drug money, and thereby forfeit to the government. This is an incredible difficult task, and Greer correctly identifies the reason for it being given to Ryan. Ryan has been working hard to impress President Bennett, and he has also been enjoying the proximity to power that working for the President had brought him. Bennett knows that Ryan is impressed with him, and so keeps manipulating this feeling to get more and more political benefit for himself. It is upon hearing Ryan's problems that Greer reminds him, and us, of the true subordination structure.

Greer asks Ryan if he recalls the oath he took when he first started working for Greer at the CIA. Greer reminds him that Ryan's oath was not to President Bennett, but "to [Bennett's] boss," the American people. Greer clarifies that the President is not the top person, but that he and Ryan and Cutter and Ritter and the President are all the subordinates of the country and its citizens. This clarification adds another level and another dynamic to the concept of subordination, and it reintroduces the notion of duty.

The emphasis placed on the role of the people as supreme authority, and the notion of duty that this raises, crystallizes the actual conflict. It also clearly puts the President, Cutter, and Ritter in the role of bad guys. Each of them is acting in terms of personal interest, rather than public duty.

President Bennett uses the terminology of his office as subordinate to the people to actually begin a war of personal revenge. His friend is murdered by the drug cartels, and he angrily wishes for retribution. Bennett knows that he cannot simply use the military for a personal grudge, so he declares that the drug cartels "represent a clear and present danger to the United States." He uses this term to justify a clandestine jungle war (heavy with allusions to Vietnam) that the people (represented via the Congressional oversight panel) would never accept.

Cutter aids the President in this effort. Cutter has no personal desire for revenge, as Bennett has. However, Cutter does have a personal interest in exercising power. He is essentially running the operation in place of the President. Cutter is integral to the decisions regarding the use of American power. He is making policy and controlling the forces of the sole super-power. This is clarified when he meets with Cortez to discuss a backroom deal that would unite the Bennett administration and the Escobedo-cum-Cortez drug cartel allow cocaine into the United States in regulated amounts for joint political and economic gain.

Ritter seems to be interested merely in doing what Cutter and Bennett want him to do. His personal benefit is knowing what is happening and being included and protected. Ritter demands a "get out of jail free card" for his involvement, as much as a point to differentiate himself from Ryan (who is as deeply involved in the operation, though unaware) as for any actual protection. Ritter seems genuinely threatened and appalled by Ryan's sense of duty, and is not greatly troubled by his assignment to have Ryan killed.

Clark is supposed to be the mechanism for Ryan's death. Clark has been put in charge of the soldiers on the ground, but is cut off from them when Bennett agrees to Cutter's advice to simply abandon the soldiers and the operation. Clark's sense of duty flows downwards to his soldiers (but noticeably not to the American people), and he is furious that they have been abandoned. When Ritter tells him that the problem is due to Ryan and will be reversed if Ryan is killed, Clark is willing to obey. The only thing that saves Ryan is Clark's distrust of authority, which causes him to abduct Ryan but stop short of killing him until Ritter's reaction is ascertained. When Ritter, believing Ryan is dead, simply hangs-up on Clark and ignores his pleas for the operation to be reactivated

to save the soldiers, Clark knows who to trust. Ryan is the only one with a true sense of duty.

Greer's gentle admonition of Ryan's favor-seeking immediately sets him straight. Not only does Ryan search for and uncover the wider truth regarding the operation in Columbia, but he personally attempts to correct the wrongs he mistakenly helped commit. Ryan goes to Columbia and engages with both Clark and Escobedo to organize a rescue of the captured American soldiers. When Chávez, the only soldier to escape capture, attacks Clark and Ryan in the jungle, Ryan immediately takes responsibility for the collapse of the operation and suffering of the soldiers, saving Clark's life in the process. Ryan also exposes Cortez's betrayal to Escobedo, gaining the drug-lord's support without any kind of deal that would betray the American people.

After successfully saving the American soldiers, Ryan returns to Washington, DC. Here, he faces two greater challenges. The first is the climax of the actual conflict between Ryan and President Bennett. In the oval office, Ryan accuses the President of betraying the people and the soldiers for the fulfillment of personal interests. Bennett scolds Ryan, and then tries to woo him with talk of power and blame. Bennett explains that Ryan has "a chip in the big game now." He continues, describing Ryan's knowledge of the scandal as something that can used for Ryan's own personal benefit in the future. Then Bennett changes to gentle threats. He tells Ryan that only Cutter and Ritter will be blamed slightly. Most of the blame will be heaped on Greer's memory. The country will suffer under the weight of another scandal if Ryan steps forward, and Bennett will escape blame. "It's the old Potomac two-step," says the President. To which Ryan resoundingly responds, "I don't dance."

The scene in the Whitehouse cuts to the final scene in the Congressional Hearing-room. Here, Ryan will fully inform the oversight committee that he had unknowingly misled at the beginning of the operation. The final lines heard are the oath to tell the truth, which Ryan swears to. Ryan will expose himself to political and legal dangers, all from a sense of unwavering duty to the people he previously swore to represent and defend.

The Siege[118]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Terrorism in New York City

Actual: Protecting American Ideals vs Protecting American Lives

2. Who are the participants?

Good: FBI (Hubbard)

Bad: Military (Devereaux), administration, CIA (Bridger) (to a limited extent)

Catalyst: the terrorists, CIA (Bridger) (to a limited extent)

3. What is the message?

To attack America means to attack its ideals, not its lives. Therefore, to protect America means to protect its ideals over protecting lives. Therefore, to sacrifice American ideals to protect American lives is to attack America. "America" is its ideals.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

At the center of the film is whether fundamental American ideals (rule of law, due process, protection from torture, etc.) can and/or should be abandoned "temporarily" in order to save American lives. Throughout the movie, we see that not only is such a sacrifice unacceptable, but it is also counter-intuitive. As the film opens, we see a Muslim Sheik suspected of terrorism kidnapped under Devereaux's orders and held without recognition or trial. This opening scene, this "initial" sacrifice of ideals, is later shown to be the main reason the terrorist cells attack New York City.

Trying to fight the cells while also protecting the system is Hubbard and the FBI. In scenes with both of the other two main structure-America participants, he stresses the

[118] Zwick, *The Siege*.; This analysis was originally published in Hays, "American Foreign Policy in Film."

need (both practical and moral) to act within the system of ideals and laws in order to preserve the ideals. This moves from a procedural discussion with Bridger that he cannot spy on the suspected terrorists without the proper warrant, to a speech on ethics in the midst of a joint Military-CIA torture session of a suspected terrorist. It is during this second speech that the message and argument are clearly made by Hubbard.

The speech comes after the FBI offices are bombed, resulting in the deaths of Hubbard's friends and co-workers; and after his Arab partner's son is detained in a mass prison camp despite his position as an FBI agent. Hubbard tries to arrest the suspected terrorist, but the Military knows about him too thanks to their spying on Hubbard. The Military attacks the building that the suspect and Hubbard are in, and takes the suspect. Hubbard later finds the suspect, Devereaux, and Bridger in a basement bathroom of the make-shift prison camp. He sees that the two are torturing the suspect, and launches into his defence of the ideals they are breaking. The climax of Hubbard's speech is, if you do this, if you torture, if you abandon the ideals on which America is based, then the terrorists win. This charge is later translated into the point that by violating America's ideals and its laws, by ultimately summarily executing this assured terrorist, Devereaux has done more damage to America than the terrorists with all of their bombs.

This transition comes about in the final scenes where Hubbard and the FBI actively distract, evade, and conflict with the Military culminating in Hubbard arresting Devereaux. The charge is murder of an American, the tortured terrorist. Hubbard walks into the command centre "armed" with the law. He presents Devereaux with a Federal Writ removing him from power as a consequence of the murder charge. Furious, Devereaux maintains, "I am the Law! Right here, right now, I am the Law!" In response, Hubbard reads Devereaux his Rights, altering them slightly. He says, "You have the right to remain silent, General. You have the right to a fair trial. You have the right not to be tortured, not to be murdered. Rights you took away from Tarik Husseini. You have those rights because of the men who came before you who wore that uniform."

Devereaux's sense of immediate presence of moral power is shared by Bridger. In an earlier scene, Bridger admits how she is related to the whole situation. When the US was allied with the Sheik and his followers (the current terrorists), she taught them how to make bombs. When it was no longer policy to be allied with this group, they were

abandoned by the US and by her. At that time, and ever since, she is constantly reacting to situations trying to make things "right." She is using whatever power she has in the moment to try and "fix" things. The problem is, she is willing to do *whatever* is necessary to try and "fix" things; and 'things' are always changing. By succumbing to moral relativism, by abandoning the ideals she and the others are supposed to protect, she helps make the situation worse.

In the end, Bridger "fixes" things one last time by sacrificing herself to stop the last terrorist; her personal creation. Devereaux is arrested and removed by Hubbard. Martial Law ends, and the Military leaves New York City.

Rules of Engagement[119]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Yemeni Terrorist Attack on US Embassy
Actual: Intimate-Experience vs Distant-Experience

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Colonel Hodges, Colonel Cao
Bad: NSA Advisor Sokal, Major Biggs
Catalyst: Terrorists, Ambassador Mourning, Colonel Childers

3. What is the message?

Only those who have had intimate experience should make the rules and policies to guide others who will be put into similar positions. Similarly, only those who have intimate experience should be put in a position to judge the actions of others put in similar positions. America should trust and value those with intimate experience over those with distant experience.

[119] William Friedkin, *Rules of Engagement* (Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 2000).

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

In many ways, the argument of the film is opened and closed by the conflict portrayed in its first scenes: Vietnam. The film opens with a flip of a coin, luck. Few things are so intimate as luck. That coin-flip leads one commander, Hodges, into a Vietnamese ambush and the other, Childers, into a career that will ultimately lead him into a different kind of ambush. The resolution of this final ambush is the testimony of Cao, the commander of the ambush that so thoroughly wounded Hodges. It is Cao's testimony that finally solidifies the actual conflict against the distant American political actors.

The setting conflict is not Vietnam, however. It is a post-Cold War conflict of Yemen terrorists attacking the American embassy. Childers, now a colonel, is sent to protect and, if necessary, evacuate the embassy. Upon his arrival at the embassy, Childers sees that the information from (distant) Washington, DC, is inaccurate. The situation is quite violent and dangerous, and he is ultimately compelled to order his Marines to fire into the crowd, which is full of armed terrorists attacking and killing his men.

It is the veracity of Childers assertion of this final statement that is questioned by the American government and military prosecution, and what leads to the actualization of the actual conflict. Led by the NSA, the government challenges Childers version of events and the legality of his order to fire. The distant government challenges Childers' interpretation and use of the legal rules of engagement.

We are first presented with the government's challenge to Childers when we meet NSA Advisor Sokal. Sokal challenges Childers' superior, saying that Childers could have and should have done something different. Sokal references newspaper headlines, a distant account rather than any more immediate account, as evidence of both the failing of Childers' judgment as well as his guilt. Sokal's argument seems to make sense, and is justifiable to a degree, until Childers' superior leaves the room, and Sokal declares to his aid that he does not want to see or even acknowledge the existence of an embassy security tape (intimate knowledge) that could verify Childers' account.

The tape is immensely important, as when we see Sokal finally watch it, we are shown that Childers' account is accurate. It is the only evidence that proves this, and it is willfully destroyed by Sokal. Through the tape's destruction, Sokal attempts to unfairly privilege the argument of the distant over Childers' intimate knowledge. The tape's absence, however, is ultimately used to the advantage of Childers's defense.

Childers' attorney is Hodges, his friend and fellow officer whom he rescued in Vietnam. When we meet the two of them, it is at Hodges' retirement party. Childers says that, although Hodges has spent the majority of his career behind a desk, "he knows how to fight." This means that Hodges has intimate knowledge, and indeed it is because of his intimate knowledge of battle that Hodges has been forced behind a desk. Later, when Childers asks Hodges to defend him, he uses this quality of intimate knowledge as his main reason. Childers wants someone who has been in battle and knows what it is like to represent him.

Hodges, as a military lawyer with combat experience, is juxtaposed with the prosecution, Biggs. Biggs is, what Hodges refers to, as a beach-boy with no intimate knowledge of combat. Biggs is a talented, brilliant, and fair prosecutor, but he is only in the military to repay his college dues. He has no intimate knowledge, and this is what taints him. Just like Sokal, Biggs uses newspaper headlines to challenge Childers' position. To further demonstrate the distance of Biggs' knowledge from intimate knowledge, Hodges repeatedly asks him a trivia question about combat life-expectancy of a lieutenant in Vietnam. Eventually, so certain of the distance of Biggs' knowledge, Hodges even makes a deal with him to testify against Childers in exchange for the correct answer. Biggs' final answer is two weeks, supported by official historical statistics. From intimate knowledge, not corrupted by the distancing forces of the political necessities of Washington, DC, Hodges corrects him. "Sixteen fucking minutes." Ultimately, that disparity is the space between intimate and distant knowledge.

To accentuate this distance, and again tie everything back to Vietnam, Hodges cross-examines Biggs' surprise witness: Colonel Cao. Cao testifies that in Vietnam, with all of its distance from the Yemen context of the trial, Childers broke the Geneva Convention by executing a Vietnamese prisoner of war to force the cessation of the attack on American troops, including Hodges. As damning as this testimony is, Hodges asks

him, soldier to soldier, if Cao himself would not have done the same thing if fortunes had been reversed. Cao replies that he would indeed have executed an American POW to save the lives of his compatriots. It is not only a legitimization of Childers' actions in his career, but also a rebuke to the distant policy-makers who would wrongly believe that they could and should make a perfect set of rules for a distant and complex situation far removed from themselves.

As Hodges cannot find any evidence to verify Childers' account, he is left to rely on his intimate knowledge of Childers and his intimate knowledge of combat. Cao's testimony legitimates Hodges intimate account of combat. In his defense of Childers, Hodges ultimately states that his only evidence is Childers and the account he gives. "He said that I would have done the exact same thing if I were in his position." Speaking of Childers, Hodges says, "Here's my case. He's all I've got. Thirty-two years of service, thirty-two years of heroism as a United States Marine." In the end, you either believe the intimate or you believe the distant. The jury chooses the intimate, just as we are supposed to as well.

Post-9/11

Body of Lies[120]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: War on Terror
Actual: Intimate Experience vs Distant Experience

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Ferris, Hani
Bad: Hoffman
Catalyst: Al Saleem, Aisha

[120] Ridley Scott, *Body of Lies* (Burbank: Warner Bros., 2008).

3. What is the message?

Distant experience causes both practical and moral problems. Relying on it ultimately defeats the goals of the practitioner and fundamentally diminishes their moral authority (with both of these points complimenting and impacting the other). Intimate experience is more practically effective and morally supportive. "America" does/should rely on intimate experience.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Throughout the film, the two alternatives are represented and developed through the competition of Hoffman (distance) and Hani (intimacy). These two characters are competing for the discipleship of Ferris as well as for the successful capture of Al Saleem. Ultimately, the two goals are linked.

We are first introduced to Hoffman and distance at the very beginning of the film. As seems of an ambush against American forces and the use of torture by American forces play out, we hear and see Hoffman writing a presentation about the fundamental weakness of the American position in the War on Terror. This weakness is one of technology, and thereby a distant experience. Hoffman contrasts the technological superiority of the US being able to intercept digital communications and track their origins with the terrorists' response of forgoing distance-utilizing technologies in favor of intimate face-to-face communication. The result, as Hoffman states, is that the US is blind. The terrorists have realized an uncomfortable truth, the best way to fight an army from the future is to pretend like it is the past. While this opening by Hoffman clearly presents both the problems of the actual War on Terror as well as the actual conflict of the film, what is telling is that Hoffman is writing this presentation using a high degree of technology. Rather than sitting at his desk and typing or writing out his speech, Hoffman is wandering around his home and dictating the speech through his hands-free mobile-device that is transmitting to his laptop. The process is very much one of distant-experience, while the irony of the message contrasted with its composition demonstrates

an even greater and more fundamental distance: Hoffman does not recognize that he is committing the "sins" that he is stressing are so problematic.

When we finally meet Hani, we see that he similarly recognizes this problem of technology in fighting the terrorists. He does not, however, remain stuck in this loop as Hoffman does. Hani nurtures personal relationships, much as the terrorists do. He demands loyalty and honesty, and he utilizes both reward and punishment on an intimate level.

To contrast with Hoffman's perpetual use of technology, we see Hani use a cell phone only once, and this he hands to a terrorist-cum-informant. The entire scene is a nurturing of an intimate relationship that will become essential. Hani abducts a low-level terrorist and takes him out into the desert. Rather than threatening the man, Hani calls the terrorist's mother and hands him the phone. As the conversation takes place in the background, Hani explains to Ferris what is going on. Hani has been taking care of the terrorist's neglected mother, and has made it appear to the woman as though her son were doing these good things. The terrorist is shamed, and he will help Hani whenever asked in order to both maintain the respect and welfare of his mother as well as to stave off the implicit threat that Hani can expose the relationship to the other terrorists. The intimate knowledge about and experience with the man has allowed Hani to create an intimate relationship with him, and this intimate relationship will ultimately win the double-competition with Hoffman.

Hani's use of punishment is no less intimate. Three brief scenes demonstrate this. The first is a scene of corporal punishment. Hoffman has attempted to infiltrate the same terrorist house as Hani, but he has used one of Hani's compatriots (a Jordanian) as a spy. Hoffman's effort failed, and Hani has discovered the spy. Hani brings Ferris to a prison and shows him the man being beaten as punishment for spying for the US. The punishment is two-fold. First, obviously, the beating is punishment for the disloyal citizen. Ferris, however, is also being punished by being forced to see the consequences of Hoffman's actions. Hani is removing distance and replacing it with intimacy. The other two scenes involve the direct and intimate punishment of Ferris. In the first, Ferris is banished from Jordan and Hani for not controlling Hoffman's distant meddling in the operation, which ultimately results in the loss of the terrorists that had been under

surveillance. The second is the refusal of Hani to help Ferris rescue his girlfriend, who has been abducted, seemingly, by the terrorists in retribution for a Hoffman-esque operation conducted by Ferris. Hani's refusal pushes Ferris to Hoffman looking for help, and results in Ferris being abducted and tortured by the terrorists.

This final scene of punishment leads us to the role of Ferris and his development throughout the film. Initially, Ferris is at odds with Hoffman. We see them contrasted with each other, with Hoffman representing distant-experience and Ferris representing intimate-experience. While Hoffman interacts with Ferris and the mission through phone calls and drone flights, Ferris is in the field, meeting with informants, physically gathering intel, and engaging in combat. Ferris is repeatedly frustrated by the various forms of distance embodied in Hoffman. When he makes an asylum deal with an important informant, Hoffman rejects it. Ferris predicts that the informant's life will be in danger if abandoned, and this comes to pass. He sees the informant being abducted by terrorists, and Ferris is forced to shoot him in order to ensure that the informant is not able to tell the terrorists anything. Hoffman watches all of this via drone, and is indifferent on the phone with Ferris; demonstrating emotional distance to this unnecessary death. Later, Ferris and his Arab partner manage to steal some CDs and memory sticks from a terrorist house. As they are trying to escape, their car is blown up, and Ferris's partner is killed. Hoffman again responds with emotional and cognitive distance when Ferris asks him what the agency is doing to help the family of his partner. Hoffman responds that he is not doing anything because he did not know the man, and charges Ferris to help the family if he cares so much. Meanwhile, Ferris is pulling out shards of bone that were blown from his partner like shrapnel into his arm. It is a very intimate connection to his partner and the events of his death.

These early experiences push Ferris into the arms and intimate methods of Hani. They seem to share a common appreciation for manners, face-to-face discussions, and having direct knowledge about the people and customs they are engaged with; all of which are examples of intimate-experience. Despite this, Ferris is the middle-man between Hani and Hoffman, who is directing Ferris's Jordan mission from Washington, DC. Hoffman's actions, including the introduction of a second operation that puts in

jeopardy that of Ferris and Hani, causes so much tension that Ferris is eventually forced to leave. Once he is shunned by Hani, Ferris begins to turn to Hoffman and his methods.

Ferris begins to develop his own plan to trap Al Saleem. The plan is one of distant-experience: misrepresentation, manipulation from afar, and disregard for innocent and unknowing actors. In the various scenes portraying the designing and enacting of the plan, Ferris is shown repeatedly initiating phone-calls (something not seen before). Not only is Ferris running his operation via phone, like Hoffman, but he is also shown using a hands-free device to while simultaneously doing household chores, just like Hoffman.

This point of running operations via phone while doing chores deserves further discussion. In several scenes, Hoffman is shown to be running operations or working in general in a domestic setting. He helps his young son use the toilet, is present at a soccer game, and takes the kids to school. These scenes are important, because they show a progression of distancing even while being physically present. Though at the soccer game, he misses the key shot of his child. In the only time he seems to speak to one of his children, in the car on the way to school, the girl shuts him out (while playing on her mobile device), with a dejected and distant "Whatever" to his question. Hoffman had just used this term with Ferris on his phone. What we see through these scenes is that Hoffman is distant in almost every facet of his existence. He is distant from the true nature of his work by both manner and geography. He is distant from his personal relations by neglect, even though he is geographically and physically exceedingly close. There is not intimate experience in Hoffman's life. He makes a single attempt to alter this, when Ferris's girlfriend is abducted and Hani refuses to help. Hoffman physically travels to Jordan, he closes the geographical distance. His distant methods do not change, however, and is ultimately unable to help Ferris at all.

In the end, we see that Hani's intimate methods were the best option. His caring for the mother of the low-level terrorist pays off, and Hani is led to Al Saleem and saves Ferris in one fell swoop. After this, Ferris has a final conversation with each of his mentors individually. The first is with Hani, as Hani rescued him and put him in a hospital without anyone else knowing. In this conversation, Ferris recognizes (reluctantly) Hani's success and the value of his intimate methods. The conversation quickly turns to Ferris's girlfriend, Aisha. She was not abducted, rather her abduction was

faked by Hani in order to set up Ferris's abduction, lead Al Saleem out of hiding to enjoy such a success, and capture him. Hani comments that Aisha knows nothing about what has gone on, aside from the fact that Jordanian security services needed her to leave her apartment in a hurry. If Ferris had died for her, Hani says that he would have told her of Ferris's self-less romantic sacrifice; and so Aisha would have loved him forever. Instead, Hani tells him, Ferris must earn her love. It is a final choice between distant experience and intimate experience.

Ferris begins to settle on his choice in the final conversation with Hoffman. Hoffman offers him a comfortable and powerful desk job in DC. Essentially, Hoffman offers his form of life to Ferris. Ferris begins to prevaricate in his answer, and tells Hoffman that perhaps he will remain in the Middle East for a time (effectively to woo Aisha). Hoffman replies that there is nothing to like in the Middle East, that nobody likes the region, and finally that if "you walk out on me … you're giving up on America." Ferris replies, "Be careful calling yourself America." This final exchange demonstrates both Hoffman's perpetual distance, as well as the single great confusion of intimacy he has. Hoffman has equated himself with "America", and yet this scene conveys to Ferris and the audience that Hoffman is certainly not "America".

Hoffman watches Ferris some time later, on a drone feed, as Ferris acts out his choice. Ferris is buying sweets before going to meet Aisha. He has returned to his original intimate-experience, which is caring about the people, the culture, and the region. He is removing the distant-experience that being an American spy had caused, then and now. He is, as Hoffman concludes, "done."

Green Zone[121]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: Iraq War

Actual: Reasons necessitating War/Means justify Ends vs War necessitating Reasons/Ends justify Means

[121] Greengrass, *Green Zone*.

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Miller
Bad: Poundstone
Catalyst: Freddy, Brown, Dayne

3. What is the message?

"The reasons we go to war always matter," because the decision to go to war is all we can control. Once in war, nothing is as controllable. "America" should only go to war for just and necessary reasons, and it is the duty of each "American" to ensure the reasons are just and necessary.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

This film is surprisingly complex to analyze and therefore to classify the first three guiding questions. There would seem to be several competing conflicts and messages, with little to clearly indicate which is the superior to the others. These include a relatively complimentary conflict between Reality and Appearance of Reality (Miller vs Poundstone again), as well as a very unique Reality/Non-intervention vs Self-Absorption/Intervention (where Freddy is the "good guy" ["It is not for you to decide what happens here"] and all of the Americans are in the wrong for assuming the opposite). Ultimately, however, a primacy of Reasons would seem to allow for the incorporation of these others; though Freddy's admonishment is turned into a consequence of wrong actions. The importance of Reasons (and reason) seems to present itself almost immediately.

The film opens with the experience of "Shock and Awe" as experienced from the ground. The home that we see is that of General Alrawi, demonstrating a connection between the Reasons for War and the consequences of war. While under bombardment,

he gives orders to his aide to get the men to safety, and effectively prepare the groundwork for insurgency.

Next, we see Miller and his team preparing to act on intel regarding weapons of mass destruction (the declared motive for the war). When the team arrives at the scene, there is chaos. The soldiers sent to secure the site were too few, and they have taken casualties. Miller watches powerlessly as he sees the site being looted, potentially of the dangerous weapons it his mission to find and secure. Miller organizes his small team to neutralize the enemy fighters and enter the hidden weapons site. His team is successful in entering the site, but it nothing but an old abandoned toilet factory. This is not the first time that the intel has been wrong, and in fact, the intel has never been accurate. Once returned to the base, Miller approaches his commander with the problem of faulty intel, to which his commander replies that they (the soldiers on the ground doing the search) are being blamed for the failure. When Miller raises the issue at a group intelligence briefing, it is insinuated that he is unable to follow orders, and a visiting general orders him to act on his orders rather than waste time questioning them. Various officers repeat, as almost a mantra, "The intel is good;" the implication being that Miller and all the others acting on the information are wrong.

One more opening scene is important to point out, and that is the scene where we meet Poundstone. He is part of a meeting party, greeting an Iraqi expat whom the US hopes will have a leading role in Iraq. In the midst of this exultant welcome, Dayne, a reporter, questions Poundstone about the heretofore undiscovered weapon caches. Poundstone feigns frustration while lauding the important step to post-Saddam Iraq that is being taken with the expat's arrival.

Taken together, these scenes provide several important and interesting points. The first communicates the suffering of the Iraqis, while simultaneously conveying the lack of knowledge of the consequences of the US action. The second conveys the suffering of the US forces as they attempt to carry out their respective missions attached to the declared reasons for going to war. The final demonstrates the fluidity of those reasons: WMD have not been found, but democracy is coming to Iraq, and so we should all be happy.

Miller is not satisfied with orders, and Brown encourages his skepticism. Miller seems nonplussed by his commanders wanting merely to "hold up the WMD weapons on

CNN" and show the people back home that "we" were right. Brown is personally battling Poundstone and his "democratizing" turn in policy; which is uninformed by events on the ground, ignores the knowledge and will of the Iraqi people, and is so, by definition, undemocratic and impractical. Miller and Brown unite in an effort to discover the true reasons for the war, with Brown declaring as "naïve" Miller's assertion that they and Poundstone are on the "same team."

Miller and Brown never actually discover what the real reasons behind the war are. They (mainly Miller) only discover that the declared reason of WMD could not be it, as Alrawi personally told Poundstone that no such weapons existed anymore. Poundstone willfully ignored this information, created an imaginary informant (that was supposed to be Alrawi), and through this "informant" generated fake intelligence that spawned the war and all of its consequences. There are a few potential reasons indicated, however. One is the "democratization" of the region, as demonstrated by the handpicked expat (who is ultimately rejected by his domestic peers in a scene reminiscent of *Laurence of Arabia*). Another potential reason is personal political power. This is demonstrated by Poundstone's general behavior, the display of the "Mission Accomplished" speech in Saddam's palace full of Americans, the relationship displayed between Poundstone and the Whitehouse in regards to the diary of Alrawi's aide, and finally Poundstone representing the Pentagon (a political position) versus Brown (CIA) and Miller (Army). A final potential reason is intimated in the closing scene of the film. As Miller drives off into the distance, the camera widens to show an oil refinery in the background.

That there are so many potential and undeveloped reasons for the war is not problematic, as the message and conflict relate to the *positioning* of the reasons: should reasons determine war, or should war determine reasons? Poundstone's answer seems to be that the war was desirable for some reason, but not desirable enough for the country. So, some reason needed to be made in order to allow for the desired war. The answer to this question for Miller, however, is the anithesis; reasons should determine action. War is not desirable, and it should only be waged as the effect of clear causes. This answer puts Dayne, and the American audience, at the center of the conflict.

As Miller investigates the reasons for the war, he realizes that Poundstone seems to be at the center of every detail. Poundstone met and brought in the mysterious

informant, Poundstone shared the informant's intel with Dayne and the public, Poundstone is the power in Baghdad, Poundstone is trying to stop and/or kill Miller and Alrawi before either can talk. The linchpin, however, is Dayne. She is overwhelmed and flattered by Poundstone sharing the top secret "intel" with her. She never attempts to verify or follow-up on the information until it is too late. This infers another culpable actor, however, exposed by Alrawi. Neither the public nor the administration looked into Poundstone's story either. As Alrawi says, "They believed the lies, because they wanted to believe them."

While we see Miller justified in his fury against Poundstone and the general ignorance that led to the war, we also see the emptiness of his ultimate victory. Miller discovers that Alrawi is the supposed informant, that there are no WMD, and that Poundstone's lies led to war. Aside from punishing Poundstone (which we never see), nothing can really happen to save Miller or the US from the consequences of the collective failure.

As Freddy declares after he kills Alrawi, "It is not for you to decide what happens here." Miller knows and recognizes this, as the most he can do is encourage Freddy to flee before the scene is locked down. As the camera pulls back and captures the night-time Baghdad skyline, we see the city erupting in the beginnings of the insurgency. The images are eerily reminiscent of the opening images of "Shock and Awe."

In his mass email exposing Poundstone, Miller tells Dayne, "Let's get it right this time." What he really means, though, is we need to be prepared to get it right *next time*. It is too late for this time. Miller confronts Poundstone with his damning report, to which Poundstone replies, "It doesn't matter now." Miller rages, "The reasons we go to war always matter." Miller is wrong in this instance, however, and Poundstone is right. The reasons to go to war only matter *before* the war begins. Afterwards, all that matters are the consequences. This is immediately demonstrated after Miller's confrontation with Poundstone. Miller goes back out on another dangerous mission in search of WMD, and he knows it will be fruitless.

Lions for Lambs[122]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: War on Terror in Afghanistan

Actual: Educated by the Past vs Uneducated by the Past

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Malley, Hayes (potentially)

Bad: Irving, Roth, Ernest, Arian

Catalyst: Taliban/Al Qaeda forces

3. What is the message?

Without learning from the past, not only do we make the same mistakes, but we can make worse mistakes. In either case, being ignorant or unmindful of the past leads to an undesirable future. "America" must learn from its mistakes and its history to make a better future for itself.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

The film mainly follows events taking place simultaneously in three different places: Washington, DC, California, and Afghanistan. All of the events are linked between either the actors or the action: the insertion of Special Forces into remote mountaintops as part of a new US strategy to win the war in Afghanistan. Beyond this, there is an almost metaphysical connection between some of the actors. They seem almost outside of time, repeating decisions and events, and even sharing existence across the separations of time and space. The crux of these connections is the charge to learn from the past in order to improve the future.

[122] Robert Redford, *Lions for Lambs* (Los Angeles: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2007).

There are three conversations in the film that particularly display the necessity of learning from the past. The first is Roth's interview with Irving. The second is Roth's conversation with her editor about the Irving interview. The third, and most important, is the conversation between Malley and Hayes.

Roth came of age personally and professionally during the Vietnam War. The effects of that time on her are repeatedly made plane as she interviews the much younger Senator Irving. Roth makes repeated observations that Irving's "new" strategy for securing victory in Afghanistan (the placement of small operating "points" in enemy territory) sounds strikingly like the failed American policy in Vietnam 40 years earlier. Her distaste for the plan and distrust of it is made clear by her repeated summation of the plan as providing "bait" to attract the enemy, rather than to provide a commanding presence in the area as Irving terms it.

In another exchange during the interview, Irving presents outright contempt for learning from history. In a rant against diplomacy, he brings up the uselessness of the United Nations in impacting Saddam Hussein. Irving continues that despite sanctions and admonitions, several countries continued to deal with Hussein. Roth makes the point that the US armed Hussein in the 80's. She asks if Irving does not think it "critical to examine how we got to this point," in essence, is it not critical to know and learn from history. Irving cuts her off, however, maintaining that that we got to the present does not matter because we must act and "move forward." He sees no value in history, no value in understanding the reasons why a situation has developed in the manner that it has, no value in even acknowledging past attempts to solve similar problems. Irving is young, and problems are caused by the old.

While Irving is willfully ignorant of history, Roth is willfully negligent of it. This is perhaps the greater of the two sins. In another exchange during the interview, Irving places part of the blame of the failing and unpopular wars on the news media. He stresses that the news media was and is complicit in the wars, as they willfully and actively sold the government's message to the people. Roth herself acknowledges this when she then goes to speak with her editor about the interview. She confesses to him that she has a bad feeling about the story, that she was spoon-fed propaganda, that it is a repeat of the news blitz leading up to the invasion of Iraq. Roth and her editor debate about whether the job

of the media is to filter and investigate stories or simply report facts. As it seems clear that Roth does not want to write the story, her editor deftly threatens her. She is old, has a severely ill mother, and would not be hired by anyone else if she lost her current job over this refusal. As we see later, Roth did write the story, as Hayes sees the headlines on the news banner in the closing of the film. More importantly, perhaps, we see Roth's reaction to her decision. She takes a taxi around Washington, DC, and as she passes Arlington Cemetery, she breaks down in tears. As she looks at all of the grave markers, she realizes that her willful negligence of history will lead to far more markers and names on ignored monuments.

The third conversation is between Malley and Hayes. This conversation is the most important of the three because Hayes has a clear choice about his future and Malley informs that choice with history. Malley sees potential in Hayes, but he fears that the student is going to waste it. Ultimately, the potential that Hayes has is the choice to hone his intelligence, combine that with his persuasive charisma, and make a difference at some level in the US.

At the beginning of the conversation, Malley makes Hayes an offer: completely stop attending Malley's course and get a B, or attend and fully participate. Hayes is incredulous and nihilistic. He challenges repeatedly the notions of the efficacy of participation in society and progress in politics. If progress is impossible, why bother trying?

In order to try and connect with him, Malley tells Hayes about Ernest and Arian. They were not as naturally gifted as Hayes, nor were they as lucky. Ernest and Arian desperately wanted to make a difference, though. They saw American society suffering from numerous problems, and they honestly believed that engagement was the way to help. This led them to enlist in the army to fight in the War on Terror. This was Ernest's and Arian's mistake. They ignored other options to make an immediate domestic impact, and they succumbed to a classic fault of believing s current war is the defining event of one's time and is therefore necessary to be involved in.

Malley stresses repeatedly that he disagreed with their decision to enlist and attempted to talk them out of it. He similarly stresses to Hayes, however, that at the very least Ernest and Arian were willing to commit themselves to trying to improve their

society. Whether they succeed or fail, whether anyone succeeds or fails, what is important is the honest attempt to improve.

Malley is unique among all of the actors in the story. He is the only one who we see actually learning from history. Malley was drafted into the Vietnam War, and afterwards campaigned against it while keeping his personal life together and making progress where all of his war buddies failed. After inspiring Ernest and Arian to serve, although not in a way he supported, Malley tries to impact Hayes earlier on and direct him to domestic service. Rather than latching on to Hayes, Malley gives him information and a heartfelt plea before cutting him loose to make his adult decision.

Hayes is the second most important actor because he has a decision to make. Will he take the history that Malley provides him, or will he take the uninformed (though convincing) narrative that he originated with? Will Hayes take the B, something for nothing, or will he participate and work for whatever he can earn? Ultimately, the film does not answer this question. Hayes is sitting with his fraternity brother watching Roth's headline banner, unwilling or unable to answer his fraternity brother's question concerning Malley's grade. Despite this, there is a potential future for Hayes that is displayed in the film.

Irving is a potential future for Hayes. Hayes and Irving share the same natural talents, and at the moment they are both willfully ignorant of history. Irving's plan, as described by Roth to her editor, is not a plan for the military, but a plan for Irving to become President of the United States. Irving's plan is essentially Malley's offer: get something for nothing. Irving can promise victory without any real change or sacrifice for the public, and by the time the consequences of the failure are known, he will already be in the Whitehouse. Malley challenges Hayes to consider serving in Congress, where Irving now is. Hayes replies that they are all ignorant and selfish, which is a description of himself at the moments well as Irving. Hayes and Irving both use the exact same words regarding political intentions; a refutation of presidential ambitions being a declaration of presidential ambitions.

Zero Dark Thirty[123]

1. What is the conflict?

Setting: War on Terror

Actual: Adaptation to Change/Evolution vs Ignorance of Change/Extinction

2. Who are the participants?

Good: Maya

Bad: Jessica, bin Laden

Catalyst: Dan

3. What is the message?

The world is always changing. One can either adapt and survive, or be ignorant and suffer the consequences. "America" should always be aware of change and be adapting to it.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

In following the hunt for Osama bin Laden from 9/11 until 5/1, the film is propelled by the tension between adaptation and a refusal to adapt. These tensions arise around the resolution of several critical points. The first, and most fundamental, is the 9/11 attack itself. This attack is a dramatically clear separation of Cold War realities and War on Terror realities. Subsumed under this point are the changes in relevant tactics. This leads to the next most dramatic point: the use of torture. The final critical point is the transition to the post-bin Laden world. Throughout all of these points (except, perhaps, the final one), Maya seems to be particularly prescient about the fundamental changes going on around her and how best to adapt to them. Just about everyone else is the

[123] Kathryn Bigelow, *Zero Dark Thirty* (Culver City: Columbia Pictures, 2012).

opposite, often leading to their ruination.

The first critical point, the 9/11 attacks, is introduced *in medias res*. This is done quite effectively through the playing of audio recordings from the day of the attacks against a black screen. We understand the tragedy of several of the recordings because we know full well what happened before and after the speakers' words. We know that the initial tower strike was not an accident, and reassuring calls to loved ones from the neighboring tower are premature. We know that the dispatcher's calming assurances to those trapped in the flaming towers that the firemen are on their way is doubly tragic; there will be no rescue for the trapped or for the firemen as the towers come crashing down. The imageless screen is representative of the intense confusion of those moments, and yet telling in that we do not need to be shown those images another time in order to see them before our eyes. We have seen them enough. Rather than confusion, we see clarity in the black screen. Hindsight is twenty-twenty, but hindsight is not valuable for anticipation and adaptation. The 9/11 attack itself is a failure to adapt to a new world and a new reality where stateless individuals are the greatest threat to the most powerful state.

While the opening of the film masterfully displays the failure to adapt to a post-Cold War world, more telling is the reinforcement of this failure in subsequent scenes beginning two years after the 9/11 attacks. The first of these are the torture scenes. Despite the horrors of the scenes themselves, there is the futility of the entire undertaking. The questions seem better designed for a soldier or intelligence officer who would have wider knowledge about the details of grand operations, rather than a compartmentalized money man in an operation more akin to organized crime. When this problem is combined with the impossibility and irrelevance of answering some of these same questions, all that can possibly come of the torture sessions is the destruction of everyone involved. Asking when the next attack is to take place is impossible to answer because the subject no longer has any concept of time. Asking where bin Laden was in the past is irrelevant, because the real question is/should be about where he is now. The questions and methods are backwards and out of touch, and so are whatever answers that come from them.

These structural problems are soon reinforced by the intelligence meeting that Maya attends in Lahore. There, an agent describes a possible bin Laden sighting made by

a farmer in Tora Bora. Maya immediately discounts the value and credibility of the sighting, as the description is of pre-9/11 bin Laden behavior. When Jessica challenges her, saying why should he change what he has always done, Maya responds that the US invasion is the reason. This exchange is very telling. It further highlights the misguided questioning during torture sessions, as the people forming the questions have clearly not transitioned to the world they are operating in. Jessica, who appears to be a long term agent, does not fully understand the dramatic changes that have taken place because of the 9/11 attacks. She is used to opponents with standard operating procedures, which are not easily changed. Maya, however, better understands the new enemy and the new world they are fighting in. More importantly, she understands that bin Laden is aware of these significant changes too, and she understands that he is adapting as the US needs to do.

There is another discussion between Maya and Jessica later in the film that highlights Jessica's failure to recognize, much less adapt to, the new world. When the two of them are discussing enemy motivation, Jessica takes the position that money trumps ideology. Maya disagrees, though admits that this worked in the Cold War. Jessica takes this admission as a submission, validating her materialistic view. This is problematic on two counts. First, it reinforces the lack of adaptation and even the lack of recognition that change is possible. Second, it leads directly to Jessica's death. She is lead to believe that she has bought a high-level informant. Believing that this informant wants a large sum of money, she see no problem letting his car pass security check-points without search. Ultimately, the person she believes is the informant blows up the car, having come close enough to kill Jessica and several others.

Though Jessica's lead was perhaps never going to pan out, Maya develops a lead of her own. Rather than continuing to torture the prisoner, Maya tricks him into thinking that he has already been helpful, and thus rewards him. By adapting to the situation like this, she opens him up to small talk that leads to the revelation of the existence of an important courier for bin Laden. This courier is the man that the agency should find and follow, as it is this man who can lead them to bin Laden.

Identifying the courier is not enough, as Maya finds out. Now that she is so close, she encounters another critical point, the post-bin Laden world. This is particularly problematic, because bin Laden is still alive. Maya gets into an argument with her station

chief, however, about how important bin Laden and the search for him is. The chief points to recent lone wolf attacks, arguing that bin Laden does not matter anymore. Maya replies with a threat that clearly taps into the continuing significance of bin Laden, as a symbol. She threatens to report to Congress that the chief is preventing the capture of bin Laden. The chief is ultimately removed for other reasons, but the point is still made. It is not yet the post-bin Laden world. Premature adaptation can be just as problematic as lack of adaptation.

Finally, there is enough information and support to launch an attack on bin Laden's house in Abbottabad. The mission is successful, and bin Laden is killed. He failed to adapt, allowed himself to become predictable again, and suffers the consequences. Now comes the true transition to the post-bin Laden world. Maya boards a military transport, where she is the only passenger. The pilot asks her where she wants to go, and she begins to cry, seemingly confused. Just as the film begins *in medias res*, so too it ends. This is a critical point of transition to the post-bin Laden world, and now it is no longer clear if the Maya, who has successfully adapted through all of the other points in the film, can make this last adaptation. The consequences of failure, however, are known to us all.

Chapter 6- Elite and Sub-Elite: There Are "Here"s Everywhere

This war is, for Americans, the most painful phase of Communist aggression throughout the world. It is clearly a part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing in Indochina and in Malaya, and of the strategic situation that manifestly embraces the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there. The working out of any military solution to the Korean war will inevitably affect all these areas.

-Dwight Eisenhower

You're what we call a regular army clown.

-Hawkeye Pierce

Introduction

There should be several immediately evident differences between the elite discourse and the sub-elite discourse. The most obvious and most important of these differences is the nature of the identifications made. This chapter will begin with analyzing the analyses of the elite discourse and the sub-elite discourse separately, making note of the most common and most important internal trends. Then, the analyses of the two discourses will be analyzed together, demonstrating the conflicts between the elite and the sub-elite identifications of America.

Intra-Discourse Analyses

Elite Discourse

In the elite discourse, there is a near universal alignment of structure-America with identity-"America". There are also notable evolutions in the discourse within and across the two time periods. While these near universal trends exist, there are exceptions that also need to be discussed.

It is perhaps not surprising that structure-America and identity-"America" should overlap in the elite discourse. Indeed, this is the conclusion of various works mentioned in Chapter1 and Chapter 2 (most importantly Campbell's analyses), and the founding point of contention at the heart of this work. Nonetheless, there should be value seen in the confirmation of this point. Here, in a universe of elite discourse different from that utilized by Campbell, similar results have been reached.

Of greater interest, perhaps, is the evolutionary trends within the elite discourse here analyzed. There is a trend of focus that evolves across the two time periods, as well as a trend of identity that is found in both periods separately. The identity trend also mirrors and reinforces Campbell's findings.

The evolving focus is at times rough, but taking the discourse as a whole, it describes a process of narrowing focus approaching the end of the Cold War followed by a broadening of focus after the Cold War. The trend begins with an identification of the "other" as a global Communist actor. Throughout the Vietnam War periods, this global Communist actor becomes a series of local Communist actors, identified as the separate Communist states rather than the Communist ideology itself. Within this narrowing focus, Communism and some formation of dictatorial power are interchanged, yet the trend continues to be one of de-globalizing focus.

Crossing over into the post-Cold War world, this trend of narrowing focus is reversed just as steadily as it was formed. Individual states are singled out as outliers to the new post-Cold War world order. Focus then begins to expand to more specified states, but also implicitly individual (though not always named) terrorist organizations. Connections are made between the state and non-state actors, though maintaining implicit individualities. The expanse of focus is returned to a global and singular "other" with the onset of the War on Terror, where the previously individualized state and non-state actors

are unified into a single global terrorist threat. There are implications that this focus is again on the path towards narrowing, as early Cold War statements of a common enemy being fought in different theaters via different tactics appear again in War on Terror statements.

This pattern of statements is only one shared commonality between the two time periods. Another is a trend of identity. In both time periods, the "other" is often identified as being some formation of unjust/illegitimate violence. Whether this violence is international aggression or domestic tyranny, whether it is part of global ideology or localized politics, the trend is found in several instances in both periods. Similarly, the "self" is identified as some formation of ordered peace, fighting reluctantly in the defense of the weak. Both of these trends correspond perfectly to Campbell's findings as well.

Not all of the speeches analyzed fit into the trends outlined above. In respect to the War in Somalia and the War on Drugs, there are significant departures. Of the two, the War on Drugs is the more important.

In the War on Drugs, the discourse is kept at the domestic level, rather than internationalized. This has the logical effect of "othering" something within structure-America. What is othered, however, is not necessarily a group, but rather a behavior. At fault, in the discourse, is a moving away from traditional social structures. It implies that a traditional social approach, based on hierarchal institutions, is the best and only manner to "win" this conflict. The apex of such traditional hierarchal institutions is the elite itself. The implication is that the sub-elite are part of the "other". While this is telling and important, especially for the purposes of this work, it must be discarded as the discourse ignores the international level that is at the core of the conflicts being analyzed.

The War on Drugs was declared a more important exception because there was substance to the discourse being analyzed. The discourse for the War in Somalia does not comprise even one sentence, and there is nothing in that clause to base a significant analysis upon. This is a similar, though slightly less barren, situation regarding the Soviet-Afghan War. While it too is barely mentioned, there is at least an identificational utterance to be analyzed.

Sub-Elite Discourse

In the sub-elite discourse, there is a near universal misalignment of structure-America with identity-"America". There are no noticeable trends, other than the "self" and the "other" both being identified within structure-America. Though not a trend, a notable point is the reoccurrence of the theme of proximity in the actual conflicts.

It is striking to realize in various war films that the true enemy is actually within structure-America. It is positively jarring to consider that in the midst of battle and death at the hands of a foreigner, one's enemy is an American, though not "American". This throws on its head the popular notion of war films; but more importantly, it exposes a message of internal dissonance that is popularly consumed. The greatest enemy of "America" is American.

This American enemy is no single kind. In some films, like *Platoon*, it is a soldier of similar rank and station to the "American" hero. In other films, like *Black Hawk Down*, it is the military leadership. In other films, like in *Rules of Engagement*, it is the political leadership. In some films, the enemy does not even actually make an appearance. This kind of enemy is known, though not pictured, such as the faceless military planners sending soldiers off to war in *We Were Soldiers*. In some films, a strong argument could be made that the entire cast of participants is the enemy, as in *Dr. Strangelove*. Regardless of the differences in kind of the American enemy, what stands out and what is important is that in almost every case the enemy belongs to structure-America.

Just as there is no set kind for the enemy, there is no set kind for the "American" hero. In some films it is a lowly soldier, like in *Full Metal Jacket*. Other times it is a higher-up agent in the CIA, as in *Clear and Present Danger*. Sometimes, the "American" hero is the apex of the elite, as in President Kennedy in *Thirteen Days*. Sometimes, again as in *Dr. Strangelove*, a strong argument could be made that the hero is the audience itself.

Across the classification of participants in these films, it is important to recognize that no single kind or position of actor is always good or always bad. There is no steady positioning of these roles. This demonstrates that the identification is not one of class,

where the "little guy" is always the hero, and the powerful are always the enemy. Nor is it a question of social standing, where black and white and men and women can easily find themselves on either side of the dividing line. These structural characteristics do not come in to play. Rather, it is the moral-identificaitonal space that is key, and anyone can either occupy or shun that space. It is not a question of "inside" or "outside", but of "here" or "there".

In light of this point, it is quite fascinating to realize that just over a quarter of the films actual conflicts specify some formation of proximity, and in each case it is the closer proximity that is privileged as being the "good". In *We Were Soldiers*, *Black Hawk Down*, *Rules of Engagement*, and *Body of Lies*, the actual conflict is one of intimate experience privileged over distant experience. In *Thirteen Days* and in *Behind Enemy Lines*, the actual conflict can be seen as a different level of this proximity theme. In *Thirteen Days*, it is one's own judgment privileged over distant procedures (and in many ways echoes the themes in *Rules of Engagement*). In *Behind Enemy Lines*, the theme is one of the knowledge and experience of the soldiers up to and including the Admiral privileged over the diplomats and policymakers above the Admiral.

While other themes can be seen to be shared across various films, no single theme can be found in nearly as many films. The next closest themes are formations of idealism and truth, at three films each. If these two themes are subsumed under a wider theme of moral action, though, they now match the size of proximity. This new and larger theme, however, can also subsume two more films with a theme of help, now meaning that the largest theme is moral action (with the idealism themed films of *Platoon*, *The Siege*, and *Clear and Present Danger*; the truth themed films of *Dr. Strangelove*, *The Sum of All Fears*, and *Courage Under Fire*; and the help themed films of *M.A.S.H.* and *Charlie Wilson's War*).

The value and validity of this larger theme is debatable. One would assume that doing the morally right thing would figure into the hero of any and all of the films. While that is true to a degree, figuring in to the hero and being the central point of conflict are two different things. It is telling that, even with the expansion of the theme, moral action is not the theme for even half of the films. The absence of what would seem to be a point

of such common-sense gives some weight and value to the acceptance of the larger general theme.

A final theme that is particularly valuable to point out, even if it only occurs twice, is that of learning. This theme is interesting because the two times it occurs are in the War on Terror films *Lions for Lambs* and *Zero Dark Thirty*. Both times, the theme stresses the importance of learning from the past to avoid repeating mistakes and/or in order to solve current problems. The reference points for lessons to learn from were the Vietnam War and the late Cold War.

Inter-Discourse Analysis

It was anticipated that there should be strong differences between the elite and sub-elite discourses. This anticipation was reasonable, and the results should be somewhat evident from the separate analyses. Surprisingly, though, there are also areas of similarity, which should be discussed first.

It needs to be clarified that these areas of similarity referred to vary from the near exact to the distant resembling. To begin with the distant resembling, the waves of narrowing focus in the elite discourse and the theme of learning from the sub-elite discourse are important. The next in line on the spectrum is the Nuclear Fears discourse in both the elite and sub-elite. The most similar area comes out of the inadvertent analysis of the elite War on Drugs discourse.

The *potentially* emerging pattern of wide-focus threat, narrowing focus threat, shift of threat, wide-focus threat, narrowing focus threat is interesting on its own, but it is of no particular relevance for this work. When the details of this potential wave are looked at more closely, and that through the sub-elite lens of the learning theme, it becomes quite relevant. If there is a wave, it is a wave that is getting shorter in frequency. The first wave of narrowing focus took from the beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s, almost twenty years. The second wave of narrowing occurred within a single presidency (and carried over into the next), at most, half of the time needed for the first wave. This would imply an elite that is learning from the past. Now the important questions: What are the elite learning? and What would the sub-elite have them learn?

It appears the elite are learning that an initially assessed global and unified threat is in actuality a series of individual, though at times similar, threats that need to be handled in different ways. It can be assumed, and only assumed, that there is little perceived of more being learned. This assumption is based on the nature and content of the discourse surrounding the sub-elite learning theme.

The two relevant films for the learning theme are *Lions for Lambs* and *Zero Dark Thirty*. The first is based in reality, while the second is based on real events. By being based in reality, it is meant that similar policies did exist and similar discussions did or could have occurred. By being based on real events, it is meant that similar people did exist and similar events did occur. It is the combination of the limited number of films, the two kinds of film, the disparities between film and reality, and imperfect knowledge that makes the claim to elite learning an assumption. However, if the perception of elite learning had been demonstrably greater, the films would likely have content different from that which they do. It is this content that is important.

Both *Lions for Lambs* and *Zero Dark Thirty* are critical of the portrayed elite (and at times sub-elite) not learning from the *progression* of history. The progression of history is something greater than the actors of history, of which the narrowing focus of threat is concerned. The progression of history is about actions in context. In *Lions for Lambs*, Senator Irving's "new" strategy in Afghanistan is challenged by Roth as being the same failed policy from the Vietnam War. It is using soldiers as bait to try and engage an elusive enemy, the result of which, in Vietnam, was a lot of wasted lives. The elite have learned the lesson to narrow their focus, but they have not learned from past mistaken policies. They have not learned from the progression of history, that similar actions in a similar context are likely to yield similar results: a lot of dead soldiers.

In *Zero Dark Thirty*, there is a different challenge regarding the progression of history. In various scenes, Jessica repeatedly presents knowledge learned from the Cold War and attempts to apply it to the War on Terror. Maya challenges her on this. One of the key exchanges is during the briefing in Lahore. Maya immediately discounts the farmer's sighting of bin Laden in Tora Bora as behavior he would no longer present after the American invasion of Afghanistan. Jessica challenges Maya's analysis based on the concept of standard operating procedures, something from the Cold War. Bin Laden had

always behaved this way, why change? Jessica's challenge fails on two points. First, bin Laden is not the USSR, and standard operating procedures are neither as intricate nor as difficult to change in his smaller organization. Second, the US never invaded the USSR. One would think that such an event would alter the means and route and destination of the Soviet leadership. The second exchange deals with motivation. Jessica believes that the enemy in the War on Terror is just as materialistic and buyable as the Communist enemy of the past. Again, Maya challenges her on this point. Unfortunately for Jessica, her mistaken assumption leads to her death, as she wrongly believes she has purchased a high-level informant only to be blown up after inviting him in. Again, the elite have narrowed their focus, but they have not learned from the progression of history. A different context should encourage different actions.

The second area of similarity between the elite and the sub-elite concerns the Nuclear Threat discourse. It is an area of similarity because, ultimately, the nuclear concerns of the elite begin to mirror the nuclear concerns of the sub-elite. This only happens after the end of the Cold War, though. During the Cold War, it is a very different case.

During the Cold War, the elite see nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology as a valuable tool in the hands of the US and its allies, as well as a terrible threat in the hands of the enemy and its allies. In either case, America or its enemies, the nuclear concern is about the strength of the "nuclear tool," and its use towards America's interests. The nuclear concerns of the sub-elite during the Cold War are very different.

During the Cold War, the sub-elite see the *existence* of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology and nuclear strategy as the main enemy, not the purposeful *use* of the "tool" against America's interests by the Soviets. For the sub-elite, there is no proper or even purposeful use of nuclear weapons possible by either side. Rather, the existence of the weapons and the belief among the elite that they are useful and usable is terrifying. The sub-elite challenge the utilitarian perception of nuclear weapons with portrayals of insane and misguided elite pushing for a nuclear third world war that the elite believe they can win, even beginning to plan for the fourth world war in *Dr. Strangelove*.

After the Cold War, the elite discourse begins to change and to approach the sub-elite discourse. Without a nuclear enemy, the existence of nuclear weapons seems unreasonably costly, and nuclear weapons technology being released by the restructuring of the world order seems particularly dangerous. In short, the elite come to see after the Cold War what the sub-elite saw throughout the Cold War; it is the weaponry and not the user that is the enemy. The nuclear level is perhaps the only level in all of human history where a weapon is solely a weapon, and not a tool under different conditions.

The approach of the sub-elite remains more or less the same across the transition into the post-Cold War world. The only thing that really changes are the number of potential actors, and thus an increase in threat. The position of the sub-elite is best expressed in *The Sum of All Fears*.

In *The Sum of All Fears*, American nuclear material that was made into an Israeli nuclear bomb during the Cold War is unearthed and used against the US after the Cold War. Involved in the process are disgruntled and poorly paid Russian nuclear scientists, mercenaries, and an international pseudo-fascist terror organization (all unique, if not new, post-Cold War threats). Exposed in the process are the persistent Cold War mentalities of the American and Russian elites, which are unable and unwilling to see the wider truth and rush to the brink of nuclear Armageddon with each other. Not only does this film demonstrate the continued fear of the sub-elite, but it adds the fear that the elite have not actually changed at all.

The final area of similarity emerges from the inadvertent elite War on Drugs analysis. This similarity is the most complete of the three here discussed, and yet it is not a similarity of the content of themes and discourses as the previous two have been. Rather, this final similarity is concerned with the identification of the enemy as being within structure-America.

As noted above, there is a problem with the elite War on Drugs analysis, as it inadvertently departs from the necessary international conflict component of this work. Rather than looking at the international component of the War on Drugs (as the sub-elite do), the elite discourse focuses solely on the domestic front. This places the elite and sub-elite on different levels of analysis, and yet it exposes an important commonality among them: the concept of "here" being within, yet narrower than, structure-America.

In the elite discourse, two Americas are presented. The first is a civilized and traditionally ordered America. This America provides at one and the same time a social hierarchy and a community safety net. The effects of this traditional order are to provide a barrier to drug use, an alternative to drug use, and a community to help rehabilitate and reintegrate former drug users. This is the true "America", and it is where the elite, as the pinnacle of hierarchy, position themselves.

The second America is a barbaric and post-traditional space. It is full of chaos, fear, and self-centeredness. This America is inviting to drug use, as there is a vacuum that needs to be filled and no structures to block or even discourage the advance of drugs in these post-communities. This America is the enemy within structure-America. It also happens to be composed of sub-elites.

The sub-elite discourse concerning the War on Drugs is something of the reverse. The America of the sub-elite is the true "America". It is full of hardworking, selfless, honest individuals. The elite, on the other hand, occupy an America that is self-centered and uncaring. This second America is willing to become actively complicit in the drug-trade, not to mention to send brave American soldiers into battle for personal reasons and then betray them.

In both cases, the elite and the sub-elite utilize a very directly self-referential concept of "here". For the elite, the elite are the true "America" vis-à-vis the enemy sub-elite. The qualities of "America" are order, tradition, and hierarchy. For the sub-elite, the sub-elite are the true "America" vis-à-vis the enemy elite. The qualities of "America" are honesty, selflessness, and duty. The enemy identifications being within structure-America are similar. The content of those identifications are very different. Essentially, this distinction is the whole point of the argument in this work. This distinction also leads into the main difference between the elite and sub-elite discourses.

The elite and the sub-elite occupy two different "here"s, with different and contradicting characteristics, both laying claim to being "America". The strongest themes of the elite center on order, and these themes place the elite (as "America") in some prominent position within the order. Either the elite are the initiators of the order (like in the immediate post-Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror), or they are guarantors of the existing order (like in the other time periods). In either case, the order

that the elite is attached to is the ultimate good. Even if the actions of the elite and their declared enemy are similar or the same, such as their actions regarding nuclear weapons, the elite are "good" and they are "America" by virtue of being attached to the "here" of the particular order of the time.

The various orders of the elite are hierarchical, as any social order is.[124] This means that if the sub-elite question that hierarchy in any way, they are questioning the order as well and are thus not "America". This is indeed what the sub-elite do, and in fact they go beyond mere questioning.

The main themes of the sub-elite deal with proximity and morality. By concentrating on proximity, the sub-elite are in direct conflict with hierarchy. Proximity, and thus the sub-elite, favor being closer to the event or the experience. Indeed, the further one is removed from the experience, the less they are able to know, the less they are able to act rightly. This means that the second theme of concentration, morality, is very much attached to the first theme of proximity. The combination contradicts the "might makes right" hierarchical identification of the elite and replaces it with a union of wisdom gained from experience guided by "common" moral sense. This yields, from the sub-elite, an identification of "right makes might." By acting rightly in a context of direct experience, the true "American" is able to overcome whatever enemy, even the elite of structure-America.

[124] Even a "round table" equality is a social norm based on a tradition that is given an authority over the present.

Chapter 7- Conclusion: You Are "Here"

Any kingdom divided against itself is laid waste; and any city or house divided against itself will not stand.

-Matthew 12:25, NAS

Be careful calling yourself America.

-Roger Ferris

The Way Here

Campbell's *Writing Security* presents an analysis of American identity via the "foreign policy" of the elite. At the core of the analysis is the concept of "inside"/"outside". The elite are both the dividing line and the protectors of the "inside" vis-à-vis the "outside". It is little wonder that their identification would reflect the position they hold: order and hierarchy vs the infection of chaos from the "outside".

There is nothing in the concept itself that restricts "foreign policy" to any one single group, in fact it is quite the opposite. For Campbell's analysis of national identity to hold, however, these other groups within structure-America would need to have similar or complimentary identifications. More than this, for identity-"America" to exist at all, the various significations would need to align under the single sign.

The concept of "here"/"there", taking the place of "inside"/"outside", allows for this application across the elite and sub-elite alike. By analyzing discourses for each group of comparable import and preparation for the same international conflicts of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a more complete application of differential

"foreign policy" leading to a more complete presentation of resultant national identity is possible.

Across both broad time periods, the elite discourse demonstrates a near perfect alignment of structure-America and identity-"America". Throughout a trend of narrowing and broadening focus of the enemy (from global ideology, to particular states, to global ideology), the borders of the United States remained the nearly exclusive delineator of the "good" vs the "bad". In these cases, the "good" was characterized by the order provided, maintained, and protected by the elite. The "bad" was characterized by the violent challenges to this order made by illegitimate and chaotic regimes abroad.

There was a single case where the elite discourse deviated from the trend. This deviation came in the War on Drugs analysis. Rather than maintaining the international trend found in all of the other analyses, the War on Drugs analysis privileged the hierarchy, order, and tradition provided by the elite over the disorder and challenge to tradition provided by the sub-elite within structure-America. It is important to note that even in this deviation of the "other", the elite identification of "America" remains the same.

Across both broad time periods, the sub-elite discourse demonstrates a near universal misalignment between structure-America and identity-"America". In these cases, both the "good" and the "bad" belong to structure-America. The occupants of these positions are not stable, though. The "good" range from lowly soldiers to high-ranking officers and administrators, and even at times to the President himself. The "bad" similarly cover the same spectrum. There is no consistent juxtaposition of military vs civilian or elite vs sub-elite.

Regardless of the occupants, the main themes of the actual conflicts deal with proximity and moral action. In terms of proximity, those who are closest to the action and to the experience are privileged over those further removed. In terms of moral action, those who operate according to ethical values and ideals are privileged over those who operate according to personal interest.

In *The Peacemaker* and *Behind Enemy Lines*, the theme of proximity aligns with the structure-America participants in the film. This gives an impression of alignment between structure-America and identity-"America", but this alignment is only superficial.

The proximity displayed is, again, tied to the particular characters, and it is not a systemic relation to all of structure-America. This means that, although no structure-America enemies are presented, there is nothing to imply that they could not exist within the universes of the films, albeit off-screen.

The resultant identities of the two groups is far from complimentary. Indeed, the difference between them is profound in their respective exclusions of the other. The elite discourse privileges the order and hierarchy (interests and distance) embodied by the elite. The sub-elite by far privileges the opposite of moral action and proximity of experience. Even as running concepts, the two are exclusionary to each other. The "America" of the elite and the "America" of the sub-elite are in conflict; and as identifications, they thus destroy the sign to which they are both attempting to attach themselves.

That there is such a fundamental conflict of identifications challenges Campbell's analyses, as well as the core concept of "inside"/"outside" that he uses. While "inside"/"outside" can be utilized by the elite to bridge structure-America and identity-"America", it cannot be used as an identificational concept for the sub-elite. This raises the problem of "inside"/"outside" being a useful identificational concept at all. The more subjective and less structural identificational concept of "here"/"there" developed in this work more clearly and universally aids in the understanding of identifications in both elite and sub-elite groups.

Criticism and Response

Even a cursory reading of the titles of the chapters and sub-chapters raises two relatively significant criticisms of this work. The first criticism regards the validity of the choice of the elite's universe of discourse. The second criticism regards the relevance of films from across different times in contrast to that elite universe of discourse.

The choice of State of the Union Addresses is indeed problematic on two levels. The first level is that not all Addresses are equal. The second level is the choice of the State of the Union Addresses as a universe of discourse at all.

Not all Addresses are equal. Certain speeches from certain key years are not actually a State of the Union Address, but rather merely the first speeches of presidents to Joint Sessions of Congress. By virtue of the President giving these speeches within weeks of taking executive office, these speeches are not classified as a State of the Union.[125] A president three weeks in to office does not likely know the state of the Whitehouse, much less the state of the country. This means that some correlations between the films and the speeches are particularly weak, as it is often the case that the new President dedicates the first speech to a particular policy goal or outline, and completely ignores larger (international) events.

While this disparity is problematic, it would seem to cause only superficial problems. It is very unlikely that a State of the Union speech from the first out of four years would dramatically diverge from the subsequent speeches in terms of identification, even with experience and knowledge present in that first year.[126] That no speech within the elite universe of discourse varied from the same identification over three generations, regardless of person or party in office, should outweigh the weakness of these few first-time speeches.

The second level of problem with the elite universe of discourse is more substantive. The declared title of the universe of discourse is the "State of the Union." The title on its own declares that the discourse is going to be concerned with the overall condition of the single "united" country. What is more, the person giving the speech is the democratically chosen single representative of the entire country. Of course the identification of the discourse is going to present a unified identity of everyone within the bounds of that representation and within the relevant realm of that speech. Any deviation would question the legitimacy of that President's office and/or not fulfill the required task of the State of the Union Address.

This criticism is strong, but it would be far graver if it were not for that inadvertent War on Drugs analysis. Within the parameters of international conflict, the criticism would hold. Yet, by this domestic-directed discourse sneaking in, we see that

[125] Gerhard Peters, "State of the Union Addresses and Messages: Research Notes," in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php, 2015).
[126] Take for example George Bush in 1989, after having served 8 years as Vice-President.

the President need not (and does not) stick to a unified and unifying message of representation of the all citizens of the United States of America. Within the borders, in this domestic theme, there is a true "America" and a false "America". There is no logically consistent reason why such a differentiation should stop at the water's edge.

The second criticism goes to the relevance of the sub-elite discourse. President Johnson makes his optimistic speeches before the most decisive events of the Vietnam War occur. It is unfair to criticize the lack of ability of a person or President to see into the future, especially when what their statements are being measured against are *post hoc*. The films about these events come, naturally, after the events. By the argument presented above, the films are going to be measured and judged against the identifications of the audience after the events have taken place. It is an unfair, and indeed an un-illustrative, comparison.

This criticism is quite damning, and it goes to the essence of the assumptions of the argument, not just the argument's method. Three points stand against it, however. The first is that there is a consistent divergence of message and identification between elite and sub-elite across time. The second is that the gap between elite and sub-elite knowledge, the gap between event and portrayal, decisively closes throughout the post-Cold War period. The third is that some films actually pre-empt reality.

As has already been demonstrated above, the difference between the elite and sub-elite identifications is not limited to particular themes or time periods. The two identifications are relatively stable regardless of the degree, nature, or time period of the conflict. Indeed, the conflict seems to matter very little. The elite consistently value order and hierarchy, while the sub-elite value experience and moral behavior. The disparity is not so much because President Johnson was wrong about the weakness of the enemy in 1968, but because he persisted in the belief that the Vietnam War would bring order to the world, and that this was the essence of the identity of "America". The sub-elite would disagree on this point, even if the Tet Offensive had been a tremendous failure and marked the end of North Vietnam.

The second point goes to the heart of the criticism and disarms it. The criticism assumes a consistent delay between events and portrayals. The Vietnam War films analyzed here were all made *after* the conclusion of the war. However, many of the post-

Cold War films were made shortly after the events or wars that they portray (for example the films concerning the Bosnian War), and all of the War on Terror films (except, arguably *Zero Dark Thirty*) were made during the war. This means that the presumed time gap of the criticism no longer exists in any meaningful way. Again, the reinforced difference is of identification, not the context of the conflict.

The third point is the strongest in disarming the criticism of the time difference between event and portrayal. *The Siege* accurately portrays a course of events years before they happen. A devastating terrorist attack on New York City leads to massive fear and xenophobia among the public. This fear allows and encourages a massive response by the United States government, up to and including the compromising of Constitutional rights and liberties. Eventually, this government over-reach is challenged by a massive campaign by the public to regain their rights, even at the expense of suffering further terrorist attacks. The only time gap here is, sadly, waiting for life to imitate art.

Implications

It is neither the nature nor the intent of this argument to provide explanations and predictions. The goal is to understand the phenomenon that is now, with the recognition of all the limitations involved in trying to see (much less understand) the phenomena to come. Nevertheless, this current understanding has potentially wider lessons to be had.

For a long time, elite discourse has been confused with national discourse. This, most likely, has been because of structural reasons regarding the making and disseminating of identificational messages: mainly literacy and access to communications infrastructure. As time has passed, however, communications has become ever more democratized with increased informational as well as technological literacy and accessibility. More and more people are able to create, disseminate, and consume more and more identificational messages; significantly challenging the centuries' old monopoly of the elite in this area. There are several consequences of this collapsing monopoly of identificational messages, both in terms of theoretical considerations as well as "real world" implications.

In regards to theory, it should be quite evident that an increase and diversification in message makers would likely lead to an increase and diversification in messages. This realization has not been found in previous literature, though. Rather, some common and undefined base national identity is taken as given in regards to America, with sub-group identities being analyzed always within some context of the wider American whole (African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, LGBT-Americans, etc.). The above argument does not in any way discount such research, but merely points out that assuming the common denominator is problematic. Indeed, the argument of "here"ness presented in this work fits well with the research into sub-groups. Both are actually concerned with the concept of "here". The difference resides in the other researches not recognizing the elite as a sub-group; nor in recognizing that "America" is a commonly used sign with no common meaning. These two points are profoundly important.

By recognizing the elite as just another sub-group, albeit a sub-group in a privileged position regarding communications, the genealogy of the national identity becomes exposed. What is considered to be *the* national identity is only the "here" of the elite, similar in formation and performance of the "here" of the sub-elite. The dominant communication position of the elite gave their micro-message of identity the illusion of a macro-message of identity. It also magnified the fluidic and subjective dichotomy of "here"/"there" into a relatively stable and structural dichotomy of "inside"/"outside"; the prominent position of which, within the field of study, helped to reinforce the structures that were at the same time being criticized.

With more micro-messages of identity coming from more identifiers, the dominance of the elite message is being reduced. What is seemingly not reduced, however, is the dominance of the false belief in the existence of a national identity to which to lay claim. Since the expression of national identity was only ever an expression of the elite "here", to appropriate the sign without likewise appropriating the meaning is to remove the meaning altogether. What remains is a cross between a Messier object and a mass psychosis: something that is easily seen until directly looked at, but in all actuality is a shared delusion.

All the various groups lay claim, directly or indirectly, to ownership of the true "America", yet there is nothing attached to that sign. All claims to it are false, because

there is nothing to which to lay claim. The meanings *given* to the sign, though, are many and varied. This allows for the situation as demonstrated in the above analyses, where the characteristics of "America" by the elite are in direct conflict with the characteristics of "America" by the sub-elite. "America" is thus divided, and so the sign cannot stand.

What remains when America exists, but "America" cannot? It would seem that the only point that the various claimants to "America" have in common is the conflict over the claim itself. Once it is realized that there is no true "America" but rather "america x" and "america qs" and "america jg-09/g3-13", one would expect the legitimacy given to America as a structure should wane significantly. Where the legitimacy wanes, one would expect the power to fracture.

When one looks to the "real world," the competition over legitimate identity shows itself more and more clearly. The use of mass-release film for the above analyses was a methodological concession to necessity. The medium creates a manageable, though appropriate, universe of discourse. The structure and logistics of producing such films ensures there are responsive audiences of an appreciable size. Such films, however, are already outmoded in terms of non-elite message dispersal, as well as in terms of entertainment. Television and the Internet have democratized these areas even more so than film.

With television, and in particular the 24-hour news culture, we see the union of fact, fiction, object, and observer into a self-feeding loop of message without awareness or memory. By these channels also being wedded to positions on the political spectrum, a form of perfectly reifying tribalism emerges that no analysis is required in order to recognize. These tribes unite elite and sub-elite as one sub-group, yet the concept of "here" applies all the same. One tribe is the true "America" while the other is not. This has famously evolved into a campaign-cum-conspiracy theory that the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, is not American and is actually a clandestine operative attempting to destroy the country.[127]

Reliance on such networks for news begins to cleave the population into fundamentally different groups. This goes beyond previously existing political divisions.

[127] Such outlandishness is not new, though. The papist fears concerning President John Kennedy were similar in nature.

Foundational facts no longer seem to need to be shared. Without these, there is no space for a true debate, much less a conversation, to allow unity. One could argue that this is nothing new, and just a more technologically advanced version of earlier politically aligned newspapers. While there are certainly similarities, in the realm of 19th and 20th Century newspapers, one would likely have to at least be exposed to the other headlines on the news stand and the other customers jostling for their purchases. Now, one can go straight to a specific channel in one's home at the push of a button and bypass even the environment where the "other" meanders.

The Internet takes these fractured and fracturing extremes and multiplies them to fantastic degrees. There are potentially as many identifications as there are identifiers online, and the nature of the Internet allows those identifiers to be near perfect (as near to perfect as is possible) self-feeding loops of identificational messages. It has become a truism that "one can find anything online," and just as much so that "one can 'prove' anything with what is found online." This means that "facts" are not only disputed and disputable, but the nature of what "fact" and "thinking" and "knowing" means to many people is becoming altered. In regards to the largest man-made tragedies of this century (or culminating in this century), "facts" are the antithesis of conventional authoritative statements, while "thinking" is the demonstration of this disparity and "knowing" is the gaining of support of one's narrative by others. "Reality" has become democratized. And so the elite kill 3000 people and frame a terrorist group for personal greed. The 28 victims of an ill young man become never-existing entities in an elite operation to pacify the population. One in ten scientists who disagree with the research on climate change become the thin red line facing the elites and their economic dominance plans. All police (enforcers of the elite) become murderous monsters. Routine military exercises become a shadowy operation to take over sections of their own country. It is a short but substantial trip from Watergate and Iran Contra, through *Clear and Present Danger,* to Sandy Hook. Down the rabbit-hole, there are some very particular "here"s.

Finally, we can see the emergence of "here" in contexts removed from America and statism in general. After all, what is the emergent Islamic State if not a sub-elite utilizing advancements in communications to challenge the legitimacy of both political and religious elite identifications? What are the "lone wolf" attacks they inspire if not the

expression of individuals shifting their "here"ness to an identification with which they have no structural relationship? The war with ISIS is as much, if not more, a war of identifications and identifiers as it is a war of anything else.

Conclusion

Campbell's argument using "foreign policy" is powerful, but it does not delve deep enough. The concept immediately raises the question of what would the argument look like if "foreign policy" were applied to levels not directly connected to Foreign Policy. The answer to that question has been the goal of this work, and that answer is very different than Campbell's.

The elite present a particular discourse when faced with international conflicts. This discourse is dominated by themes of hierarchy and order. These themes are recurring across several generations, individuals, and significant global and state-centric events.

The sub-elite also have a particular discourse when faced with international conflicts. Their discourse, however, is dominated by themes of proximity and moral action. These themes directly conflict with the position and themes of the elite, and they are similarly recurring across several generations, individuals, and significant global and state-centric events.

Campbell's work would suggest that the identities of the elite and of the sub-elite should be united in an international conflict, yet we see that they are not. Rather than being united in their identities, we see that they are united in their *identifications*. Both the elite and the sub-elite associate themselves to a relative moral-space of "here". Both the elite and the sub-elite claim that their respective "here" is "America". That two conflicting significations are attached to the same sign removes meaning from the sign. There is no "America"; and without it, there seems little hope for America either.

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Appendix-Pre-defense Report

The Mala Obhajoba was held on November 24, 2015. After the Mala Obhajoba, three points were specified as needing improvement. Those points were:

1. Clarify the concept of "sub-elite." Where does the concept come from? Is sub-elite identical with society? Why is it not an agent? What is its relation with legitimacy?
2. Clarify the message and the main finding including its political implications. That is best done both in starting paragraphs and in concluding paragraphs of the thesis.
3. Address the concerns raised by the referee. Those concerns, as submitted in the review, are:
    a. The statement on page 79 contained in the analysis of *Thirteen Days* where it is stated "That plan predicts and (eventually) demands the use of nuclear weapons, thereby ending all life." It is not likely that a nuclear exchange between the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis would have ended all life.
    b. The conclusion on page 85 contained in the analysis of *Doctor Stangelove* suggesting that the audience may not be considered as the "good guy" because they have failed to successfully pressure the disarmament of a nuclear power. Declaring nuclear disarmament as the only "good" is a very normative statement.
    c. The statement contained in the analysis of *Lions for Lambs,* citing the film, where the character "Roth makes the point that the US armed Hussein in the 80's." Such information is not historically correct.

The following corrections have been made:

1. More was written on the sub-elite, explaining the concept as an expression of the horizontalization of social organization discussed by Kaldor in her politics of

identity argument. It was further clarified that "sub-elite" is a classification, whereas the actor is the specific group that is being looked at: the constitutive parts of the Hollywood mass-release film industry. These changes may be found on page 29, as well as footnote 75 on page 29.

2. New paragraphs were written on pages 17-18 specifying research aims and conclusions. More real-world implications of the trends identified in the argument were added on pages 158-159.
3. Footnote 80 on page 32 was added to clarify the place of the films as perceived and accentuated history, rather than being presenters of historical fact; specifically mentioning *Thirteen Days* and *Lions for Lambs*. In the *Dr. Strangelove* analysis, footnote 111 on page 90 was added to discuss the complex role of the audience in the functioning of comedy, and how the audience role in comedy and the audience role in life must be understood as separate, though related, concepts.