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**Role of the Army in the State at the Time
of Transition: Case Study of Civil-Military
Relations in Egypt**

Diplomová práce

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ANOTACE (ABSTRAKT)

V souvislosti s událostmi Arabského jara v roce 2011 došlo k významným politickým změnám ve státech zejména v regionu severní Afriky. Mezi státy, ve kterých rozsáhlé protesty zapříčinily svržení dosavadního autoritářského režimu a započaly demokratizační procesy, se nacházel taktéž Egypt, jemuž se práce podrobně věnuje v případové studii. Obecně řečeno se tato práce zabývá analýzou civilně-vojenských vztahů ve státech charakterizovaných nízkou úrovní politické kultury. Primárně se zaměřuje na společnosti procházející demokratizačním procesem, kde armáda tradičně zaujímá silnou pozici ve státě, a tudíž se tak často stává klíčovým aktérem stojícím v čele tranzice. Za hlavní předmět zkoumání je stanovena role armády v době přechodu k demokracii. Zároveň si práce pokládá několik výzkumných otázek, zaměřených jednak na pozici armády ve státě, jednak na pohnutky rozhodující o případné vojenské intervenci. V druhé části je podrobně analyzován vybraný případ civilně-vojenských vztahů v Egyptě prostřednictvím pěti stanovených faktorů, a to ve dvou rovinách: konceptuální a intervenční. Cílem této práce je objasnit, které faktory determinují silnou pozici armády v daném pretoriánském státu, jaké pohnutky ji vedou k vojenské intervenci a z jakých důvodů armáda zastává pozici arbitra a nesnaží se o uzurpaci moci.

ABSTRACT

In connection with the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the region of northern Africa in particular underwent significant political changes. One of the states in which widespread protests caused the overturn of the authoritarian regime and subsequently established the democratization process was also Egypt, whose case is profoundly analysed in the second part of the thesis. Generally speaking, the thesis is concerned

with the analysis of civil-military relations in states characterized by the low political culture. In the first place, it focuses on societies undergoing democratization process where the military traditionally maintains strong position within the state and hence often assumes the role of the leader of the transition. Therefore, the principal objective of the analysis constitutes the role of the army at the time of transition to democracy. At the same time, the thesis poses three research questions aiming partly at the military position, partly at the motives determining the willingness of the military to intervene. In the second part, the thesis analyses the given case through five defined factors which it subsequently examines in two levels: conceptual and interventionist. The goal of the thesis is to explain which factors determine strong position of the army in given praetorian state, which motives induce military to intervene and based on which reasons the army maintains the arbitrator position instead of taking over the state.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

Egypt, armáda, civilně-vojenské vztahy, tranzice, demokratizace, vojenská intervence, vojenský režim, vojenské zájmy, motivy intervence, pretoriánský stát, model arbitra

KEYWORDS

Egypt, military, civil-military relations, transition, democratization, military intervention, military regime, military interests, motives of intervention, praetorian state, arbitrator model

PROHLÁŠENÍ

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracovala samostatně a použila jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne 4. 8. 2015

Ema Šťastná

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Na tomto místě bych ráda poděkovala svému vedoucímu práce, PhDr. Vítu Stříteckému, M.Phil., Ph.D., a to zejména za trpělivost, odborné rady a flexibilitu, bez čehož bych tuto práci dokázala jen s velkými obtížemi napsat v termínu. Zároveň bych chtěla vyjádřit své díky Mgr. Tomáši Kučerovi, Ph.D. za poskytnutí důležité literatury a zejména za mnohdy i nestandardní konzultace, které taktéž významně přispěly k finální podobě práce.

Institut politologických studií
Projekt magisterské diplomové práce

PROJECT NAME

Role of Army as a Stabilizer at the Time of Transition to Democracy and its Reflection by Western Media

PROJECT BACKGROUND & CHOICE OF THE TOPIC AND EXPLANATION

The process of democratization is highly vulnerable to the deviations from the democratic path, especially in case of transition from a dictatorship or a totalitarian regime. Regarding to the Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, especially in the second half of the 20th century many states experienced such complications that in many cases led to the abandonment of the democratic regime and restored the previous regime or a regime alternatively authoritarian. The process of democratization for some specific countries, such as numerous Latin American states, was lasting for several decades. The role of the army appeared to be significant as it virtually controlled the transition and in the events of the substantial abuse of the power the army intervened and toppled the government.

Nowadays, similar events might be perceived as a consequence of so called Arab Spring, especially in Egypt. The Egyptian army has been substantially enjoying great public trust and popularity unlike the recently elected governments. The military overthrow of the unpopular government was hence largely welcome by the public. The situation in Thailand does diverge from the situation and circumstances occurred in Egypt. Since the termination of absolute monarch rule in 1932, there have been substantial attempts to fulfil the process of democratization, however the position of the army was dominant to the weak and unstable position to the newly established institutions hence Thailand experienced many years of military control of the state. After the military coup in 1991, the military appointed the civilian government with pro-democratic tendencies which led to the weakening of the power of the military in the state. In 2013, the military took over the government again and has been in power until today.

The thesis discusses the role of army in states undergoing the process of democratization. Subsequently, it focuses on two specific case studies, the cases of Egypt and Thailand and analyses the position of army within the system and the role it plays related to the democratization of the country. The findings of the thesis aim to explain the acting and the intentions behind such behaviour of the military and the contribution to the political system as such.

The second part of the thesis focuses on the point of view of the selected Western media on the role of the army in Egypt as well as in Thailand. It analyses the potential approval or disapproval by the media and the stance they have taken in connection with the situation. The findings of the second part aspire to determine either diverging or similar posture towards the two different situations and the rationale behind it.

THE AIM OF THE THESIS

In my diploma thesis, I would like to prove and demonstrate the significant role of the military within the democratizing regimes. It would analyse whether the intentions of the army to intervene to the civilian government are based on the popular trust in its role as a stabilizer or whether the military interventions are done with a view to gain the power over the state. Based on the factors identified in the theoretical part, the role of the army would be analysed and determined in both chosen states, Egypt and Thailand. Consequently, the thesis aims to focus on the perception of the military coups in the selected countries by Western media. It intends to identify whether the perception is of diverging character or whether the media approach both cases in the same or similar manner. The factor of the communication of the army in the crisis towards the international community would play a significant role in both cases.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions of the diploma thesis are following:

1. Under which circumstances could hypothetically military play a role of stabilizer within the regime in the process of democratization?
2. Which factors related to the military coup have played essential role in both states and which factors are diverging and which ones are similar in both cases?
3. Based on which factors is the perception of both military coups by Western media built and how do they approach both cases?

HYPOTHESIS

The thesis discusses the role of the army within the specific conditions of the democratization process characterized by the weak government and recently established but not yet anchored institutions. The hypothesis of the thesis is based on the role of the army already steadily consolidated with a certain degree of credibility and authority within an unstable regime which endowed the military with the considerable power to intervene. The long-term position of the army within the previous political system and its current stance towards the democratic tendencies to some extent determine the role of the army in the transition. Army could take the position of a stabilizer within the system in order to control the smooth transition or to minimize the disturbing elements or the attempts on the usurpation of the power. Alternatively, army could exploit the position of a weak government to a military coup and to seize the power.

Secondly, the hypothesis concerning the Western perception is based on the degree of affiliation of the current government towards the Western democracies and based on that Western media perceive the situation as either positive or negative.

METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The thesis will work with the combination of various methods, especially the combination of the descriptive, qualitative and the discursive analysis. The very first part of the thesis, the theoretical background, will be based on the descriptive analysis using primarily the secondary sources in order to support subsequent findings. For the purposes of the thesis and based on the theoretical as well as historical outcomes, in the second part of the thesis I will identify the criteria influencing the role of the army

within the state. Those criteria will be the historical development of the army within the state, the degree of affiliation of the army towards the authoritarian regime, the constitutional anchor of the army and the level of its independence within the political system, willingness and the degree of the use of force within the state and last but not least the perception of the army by the public.¹ Those five (four) criteria will be consequently analysed as the independent variables influencing the final role of the army within the state and will form the basis of the findings of the thesis. The two dependent variables representing the two possible roles of the army within a state are either the intention of the army to usurp the power for itself and to merge the civilian government and military together. The second possible dependent variable is the independent status of the army on the civilian rule which enables the army to act as a stabilizer within the state and to control the progress of the democratization and intervene if needed.

The last part is based on the discursive analysis, when the key words will be identified based on which the content and the affiliation of the media will be analysed. The Narrative Conceptualization Analysis (NCA) will be applied following the steps as described in the article of Tanja Collet (2009). Those steps are: (1) selection of the concept; (2) construction of the corpus of texts; (3) selection of the key words which refer to the concept chosen in (1); (4) location of the key words in the corpus; (5) extraction of the events described by the contexts containing the key words; (6) location of the events on a temporal axis in chronological order; (7) analysis of the so-obtained narrative.

SOURCE REVIEW

The thesis will be based on a variety of primary as well as secondary sources in connection with the specific nature of each part of the paper. In the theoretical part, I will use mainly the secondary sources based on the academic articles concerning the methodological part of the thesis as well as the role of the military within a state. In the following part, the combination of the primary and secondary sources will be used. Among the primary sources I would use the official Thai and Egyptian government documents such as constitutions (current and preceding), government and military reports, furthermore I will use the statistics and data available from the international organizations such as the United Nations, Transparency International etc in order to gain greater insight to the inner circumstances. For the last part concerning the media analysis, I will use and analyze the news primarily from the news agencies such as Associated Press, Agence France-Presse and Reuters and the news published in specific newspapers such as The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Economist and Le Monde.

OUTLINE

1. Introduction
2. Theoretical background and key definitions
3. Methodology

¹ The last condition will be examined only if the relevant and reliable sources will be found.

4. Through the qualitative analysis of the position of military within the political systems of Egypt and Thailand and the circumstances of the military coups. Each country will be particularly examined in a separate chapter.
5. Through the discursive analysis of the Western media news concerning the position of military and especially military coups in Egypt and Thailand. Each country will be particularly examined in a separate chapter.
6. Summary of the key findings
7. Conclusion
8. Literature

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“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master unless he transforms might into right and obedience into duty.”

Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*

INTRODUCTION

The process of democratization is highly vulnerable to the deviations from the democratic path, especially in case of transition from a dictatorship or a totalitarian regime. Regarding to the Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*,² especially in the second half of the 20th century many states experienced such complications that in many cases led to the abandonment of the democratic regime and restored the previous regime or a regime alternatively authoritarian. The process of democratization for some specific countries, such as numerous Latin American states, was lasting for several decades. Mainly between 1945 and 1976, the military intervention represented relatively widespread tool of political changeover, as it occurred in varying degree in more than two thirds of the states of Latin America, Asia, Africa as well as Middle East.³ Frequently, it was the army that maintained the crucial role during the process as it virtually controlled the transition. In the events of the substantial abuse of the power it intervened and, subsequently displaced the existing government. Alternatively, the military perceived itself as the only relevant political actor capable of governing while strengthening its privileged position within the state. In that case, sooner or later the military reached an impasse, incapable of legitimization of its regime while at the same time it was unable to withdraw from the ruling position.⁴ The military models either of a 'stabilizer' or a 'ruler' greatly differs from the prevailing Western perception of the military as a highly professional institution fully subservient to the well-institutionalized and relatively stable civilian government based on frequent democratic elections.

² See Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 366 p.

³ Nordlinger, Eric A., *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977): xi.

⁴ Finer, Samuel E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 243.

In 2011, as a consequence of the Arab Spring, the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown by the military intervention which initiated the period of unstable democratization in Egypt. As in the case of Latin America, the Egyptian army has been substantially enjoying great public trust and popularity and hence represented the decisive role during the transition process. Moreover, strongly supported by the public, the military overthrew the recently elected government with Mohamed Morsi as a president and installed a new government led by the former Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. He subsequently confirmed its presidential mandate by landslide victory in subsequent elections held in 2014. The military role during the 2011 political turnover principally consisted of restoration of the order in the state and holding the elections. During the second political change, the military was called on to bring down the Morsi's government. In both cases, the function of the Egyptian army may be at the first sight perceived as stabilizing, with no interest in open participation in politics. However, such explanation would be very poor and surely inadequate considering the actual reasons behind the interests and behaviour of the armed forces in such unstable praetorian state.

Therefore, in order to analyse the civil-military relations in Egypt and hence explain the actual interests and motives of the military within the state undergoing transition, I have chosen three main research questions that will be explained on this case. Firstly, how is the traditionally strong position of the army within the society reflected on the formulation of civil-military mechanisms in politically unstable states? Secondly, what are the factors and motivators explaining the willingness of the military to intervene during the political changes in those unstable societies? And finally, why the army prefers to hold back instead of installation of direct military regime, in spite of its superior power and position within such politically destabilized state? I assume that the military particularly in states undergoing democratization process secures at the first place its own interests, prepared to defend them in the event of their endangerment. At the same time, in order not to fall into disrepute among the public, the army prefers to hold back from the direct political engagement and instead, it decides to directly intervene only when it deemed necessary. Therefore, by such posture, the military maintains its strong position in the state even at the time of internal political instability. In this connection, the army indirectly precludes weak civilian institutions from its

effective control with the intention to maintain sufficient autonomy from the political decisions-making process.

Regarding the methodology, the diploma thesis is an instrumental case study primarily operating with qualitative analytical methods. The first section presents the key characteristics as well as the classifications of the military and civil-military relations, using the prevailing as well as alternative theoretical conceptions from the field. Subsequently by its compilation, the five factors are derived in order to explain civil-military relations as well as the predominant military position within the states undergoing transition: historical experience and development, political conditions, socio-economic aspects, external influence and security environment. The analysis reflects on two varying levels: the conceptual and the interventionist level. As to the conceptual level, factors represent five independent variables determining the military position within the society with low political culture. As to the interventionist level, the pro-interventionist tendencies of the armed forces increase by the cumulation of those motives leading to weakening or even endangerment of the military power within the state (either economically, socially, politically, or legislatively). Those motives inducing the military intervention are analysed respectively, patterned on the five independent variables.

The second part of the thesis is concerned with the civil-military relations in Egypt, based on the application of the variables on the case with respect to the two levels described above. Generally, the time scale covered in the thesis is from the military intervention in 1952 until present. However, the time frame varies according to the each factor in order to provide its sufficient analysis. Each variable is examined separately, altogether completing the picture of the long-term military position in Egypt. Subsequently, it explains the principal motives leading to the military interventions and direct political involvement between 2011 and 2014. Finally, the thesis offers the explanation and the rationalization of the military posture as well as its decisions to intervene in the politically unstable state. In essence, the Egyptian case represents the example of the military with arbitrator role at the state with weak and toothless civilian institutions, unable of effective control over the armed forces. At the same time, such undemocratic regimes, lacks the legitimacy and thus are to a great extent dependent on the military support. The events of January 2011 represent the disruptive moment

causing the supplantation of the old authoritarian regime. The subsequent democratization process, however, does not succeed in establishing the strong civilian institutions within the system, slowly slipping into the state before 2011.

With regard to the literature review, the great variety of primary as well as secondary sources has been used for the purpose of the thesis. As to the primary literature, due to the limited data available on the topic, only few sections are fully grounded on its basis. Primarily, the sources reflecting the informal political development or socio-economic situation within Egypt throughout the years are nearly impossible to find due to the long-term authoritarian character of the domestic political regime and the practical inexistence of independent and nongovernmental sources. Therefore, only few sections of the thesis are widely grounded on their basis, notably the official constitutional as well as legislative development of the civil-military relations and the data used from international organizations such as Freedom House or Amnesty International. As to the secondary literature, the thesis works with wide variety of academic sources, both the monographs and articles, particularly in the first theoretical part but also in other sections. In order to reflect the recent development, alongside with the academic articles, there have been used the newspaper articles as well as several studies, such as of International Crisis Group and others.

As to the diversion from the original structure of the diploma thesis outlined in the project, I have decided to make several considerable changes which in my opinion do not harm the overall quality of the thesis but rather the contrary. Firstly, I have dropped the intention to examine two various empirical cases of the civil-military relations, particularly in Egypt and in Thailand. Instead, I have focused more profoundly on the transition in Egypt due to the particularity of the case study distinguished by the factors and motives leading to the regime turnover and the role the military assumed during the transition. Moreover, neither the overall conceptual framework, nor the potential comparative aspect of the thesis will be anyhow affected by the elimination of the case study of Thailand, as the thesis did not intend at the first place to compare both examples. Last but not least, due to the limited extent of the thesis, I would not be able to analyse the factors in sufficient measure in both cases without making grave compromises negatively influence the overall quality of the thesis. Concerning the second change, I have omitted the section concerning the

Western media reflection as the limitation of the thesis would not leave enough space for the in-depth analysis. Moreover, this section was not integrally connected with the rest of the thesis hence it would not be anyhow affected by its skipping.

1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Current widespread perception of the armed forces stems primarily from the Western conception of army based on “professionalization of war [...] and norms of conventional warfare.”⁵ Such model of military organization developed throughout the centuries, particularly “in the mid-eighteenth century with the invention of army ‘divisions’ by the French, and in the mid-nineteenth century with the development of the Prussian general staff system and increasing functional specialization.”⁶ Nowadays, this model is largely accepted as a desired form of armed forces and is considered ideal for the states globally. In response to that, several scholars presented alternative theoretical concepts of armed forces criticizing contemporary prevailing model as originally Western and therefore not corresponding with the historical and cultural development of the non-Western states.⁷ Regarding the analytical part of the civil-military relations in Egypt, the compilation of conventional as well as alternative theories may greatly contribute to the overall understanding of the development and characteristics of its armed forces.

The first part of the chapter discusses the major features perceived as inherent to armed forces in general. This encompasses most notably the characteristics of the army as well as its obligations and powers within a state. Furthermore, the paper focuses on the civil-military relations in particular, described in detail by presenting the various types and classification of the civil-military relations. Consequently, the specific attention is paid to the further characteristics and typology of the military regimes and the military interventions as well as the withdrawals. Following parts examine the civil-military relations in two types of states – in a democratic regime and the states in the transition to democracy. Especially the latter serves as the background for the following section in which the factors are defined in order to analyze the role of the army in the selected case. Therefore, the definition of key factors is crucial to understand the role of

⁵ Farrell, Theo. „World Culture and Military Power,” *Security Studies* [online] 14, 3 (2005): 464. Accessed June 20th, 2015.

⁶ *Ibid*, 464.

⁷ See, for example Finnemore, Martha, „Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism,” *International Organization*, 50, 2 (1996): 325-347; Schiff, R.L., „Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 22, 1 (1995): 7-24; Wendt, Alexander, Barnett, Michael, „Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization,” *Review of International Studies*, 19 (1993): 321-347; Farrell, Theo, „World Culture and Military Power,” *Security Studies*, 14, 3 (2005): 448-488.

the armed forces in states undergoing democratic transitions as well as the motives that compel the military to intervene.

1.1. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMED FORCES

The military, sometimes described as a “purposive instrument [...] whose principal object is to fight and win wars,”⁸ constitutes a vital element of a state. Samuel Huntington summarizes the principal skill of the army to the Harold Lasswell’s phrase ‘management of violence’ with its primary function of a victorious battle.⁹ What makes army a powerful organization within a state is the fact that military has the exclusive right to use of coercive force. Therefore, military could be easily perceived either as a symbol of security or as a substantial threat to the state. The concept of ‘modern’ army developed hand in hand with the emergence of the modern state. According to Carol A. Drogus and Stephen Orvis , the modern state ideal is characterized by four defining features: “(1) territory, (2) sovereignty (external and internal), (3) legitimacy, and (4) bureaucracy”¹⁰ and became universally accepted mainly after the decolonization process in 1960s. Such features reflect on and hence predetermine to a large extent the structure and characteristics of the modern military.

Amos Perlmutter depicts the modern soldier as “corporate (in terms of exclusivity), bureaucratic (in terms of hierarchy), and professional (in terms of sense of mission).”¹¹ Huntington furthermore defines professionalism by three elements which are “expertness; social responsibility; and corporate loyalty.”¹² Professionalism in particular is the feature that became inherent for armed forces during the nineteenth century and further developed during the twentieth century.¹³ The evolution of the professionalization was also tightly connected to the technological progress and thus more demanding knowledge regarding the weaponry as well as the military strategy.

⁸ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 7.

⁹ Huntington, Samuel, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 11.

¹⁰ Drogus, Carol A., Orvis, Stephen, “Introducing Comparative Politics,” Sage Edge [online], 2015. Accessed June 29, 2015.

¹¹ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 3.

¹² Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 24.

¹³ Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn, David, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies,” *Journal of East Asian Studie* [online]. 9 (2009): 19.

Hence, in order to adequately secure the external defence of the state, it was no longer possible “to be skilled in either politics and statecraft or the use of force for the maintenance of internal order.”¹⁴ Moreover, the army is hierarchically structured, based on central command and discipline and endowed with *esprit de corps*, beliefs and sentiments toward the nation.¹⁵ In connection with that, Perlmutter’s model of professional soldier comprises several following features: “(1) expertise (‘the management of violence’); (2) clientship (responsibility to its client, the society or the state); (3) corporateness (group consciousness and bureaucratic organization); and (4) ideology (the ‘military mind’),”¹⁶ the parallel of the Finer’s *esprit de corps*. Additionally, the bureaucratic character of the army reflects on the features such as “(1) rationality in decision making [...]; (2) impersonality in social relations [...]; (3) centralization of authority [...]; and (4) routinization of tasks through rules, roles, and files.”¹⁷ Another important characteristic of the modern Western army is secularism hence the military ideology is not openly proclaiming an inclination to certain religion.

Regarding the nature of the military institutions, they are inherently undemocratic and hence unsuitable for political governance besides its hierarchical, command based structure and lack of legitimacy. Moreover, the depersonalization of the soldiers is also amplified by the unquestioning obedience of the commands of the authority derived from ranks. Besides, secular military organization is also more capable to form such military establishment fulfilling the conditions of objectivity and professionalism, an environment essential for building a stable army. In that connection, any political involvement of the officer may significantly “threaten the very reason for his corporate existence, becoming a political master instead of a political instrument.”¹⁸ In this regard, it is believed that higher institutionalization of the army, comprising among others the physical and ideological separation from the political institutions,¹⁹ may ensure the existence and the position of the institution even in case of political change.

¹⁴ Huntington, S., *The Soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations*, 32.

¹⁵ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 7, 9.

¹⁶ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 24.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 26.

¹⁹ Schiff, R. L., “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” *Armed Forces & Society* [online], 22 (1995): 7.

The consequent characteristic describing an ideal army is its subordination to the civilian control and to the legitimately elected political institutions. In fact, the degree of the democratization process is closely interlinked with and to a certain extent affected by the level of civilian control of the armed forces in the state.²⁰ According to Croissant, there are “three areas of political decision-making: political recruitment and overall public policymaking, national defence, and internal security”²¹ that is decisive in relation to the civilian control of the armed forces. Furthermore, Huntington underlines three crucial areas of responsibilities of the soldier to the state:

*“He has, first, a representative function, to represent the claims of military security within the state machinery. [...] Secondly, the military officer has an advisory function, to analyze and to report on the implications of alternative courses of state action from the military point of view. [...] Finally, the military officer has an executive function, to implement state decisions with respect to military security even if it is a decision which runs violently counter to his military judgment.”*²²

Such civil-military relation anchored in democratic regime is depicted as objective civilian control. Therefore, such control limits the political power of the army in a state but at the same time contributes to the state security guaranteed by military organisation. However, there are some exceptions concerning the disobedience of the command that are qualified as legitimate. First of all, a soldier is justified not to fulfil the command (1) when political orders are incompatible with military professionalism; (2) when political orders are illegal; or (3) when political orders are incompatible with basic morality.²³ On the other hand, all three cases should not anyhow undermine the objective civilian control or should lead to strengthening of the political position of the army within a society.

²⁰ Rukavishnikov, Vladimir O., Pugh, Michael, Civil-Military Relations, in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* ed. Guiseppe Caforio (Pisa: Springer, 2006), 137.

²¹ Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., *Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies*, 187.

²² Huntington, S., *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 72.

²³ Born, Hans. Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Relevance, Issues, and Research Agenda, in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* ed. Guiseppe Caforio (Pisa: Springer, 2006), 160.

1.2. CLASSIFICATION AND TYPOLOGY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Probably the most widespread classification of the society reflecting on civil-military relations is offered by Huntington. He distinguishes “civil societies”, where military institutions reach the high degree of institutionalization while at the same time maintain low degree of political involvement, and “praetorian societies” showing the opposite, low degree of institutionalization whereas the political participation of the army reaches the high level.²⁴ Unlike in case of civic societies, Frederick Mundell Watkins defines that the military is politically active in the society and “exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force. Praetorianism flourishes only when the weakness of political institutions encourages military independence.”²⁵ Therefore, the important aspect of objective civilian control is the subordination of the armed forces to the legitimate political institutions appointed through the democratic election process and anchored in the democratic political system.


Finer (1962) presents another classification influencing the civil-military relations, regarding the level of the political culture. He identifies four different orders of political culture assessed by three conditions: the degree of public approval of the legitimacy of the institutions; public recognition of the sole political authority; and the degree of public involvement in these institutions and other associations. Therefore, societies with a high level of institutionalization, publically accepted and legitimate political institutions and the supremacy of political control over the military fulfil all three conditions. At the same time, countries of ‘low’ political culture are distinguished by the “public is relatively narrow and is weakly organized, and where the institutions and procedures of the regime are in dispute also.”²⁶ Finer classifies Egypt among the countries at the bottom of this category. The last category encompasses the countries with the lowest degree of political culture, where public discussion concerning the acceptance of the government and its legitimacy is almost nonexistent.

²⁴ Desch, Michael C., *Civilian Control of the Military: the Changing Security Environment*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 9.

²⁵ Watkins, Frederick Mundell, 'Praetorianism', in *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1934).

²⁶ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 87-89.

Figure 1: Relationship between the levels of political culture and of military intervention²⁷



Concerning the classification of the military organisation as such, Perlmutter (1977) identifies three military types based on the following characteristics: expertise, client, corporateness, conscription, ideology and disposition to intervene as shown in Figure 2. The military type most suitable for a stable democratic regime is a ‘professional soldier’. “The praetorian soldier thrives in an environment of political instability. The revolutionary soldier is linked to a political order that is stable despite its origins in an unstable, decaying, or new political system.”²⁸ Despite the specific and mostly advantageous position of the military in a state with unstable, weak political institutions, “praetorian conditions affect the military establishment negatively, lowering the standards of professionalism”²⁹ thus weakening the organisation from within, which altogether very likely may result in even greater destabilization of the political state, e.g. a military coup. The revolutionary army type occurs primarily in connection with a great political change, e.g. revolution, and the soldiers are basically the tool of the mobilization for particular political movement or party. Therefore, the revolutionary army stands on the universal conscription grounded on the general public

²⁷ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 139.

²⁸ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 9 - 16.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 12.

support, while in case of professional and praetorian armed forces, the “recruitment and promotion are based on membership in a specific and well-marked collectivity, such as class, ethnic group, region, kinship formation, or tribe.”³⁰

Figure 2: Military Types and Orientations³¹

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Professional</i>	<i>Praetorian</i>	<i>Revolutionary</i>
Expertise	Specific knowledge based on objective standards of professional competence; High	Professional knowledge not very strictly observed	Professional knowledge oriented to social-political values
Client	State	Any of these: Nation Ethnic group Tribe Military State	Party-movement
Corporateness (Type of authority)	Hierarchical, cohesive-organic, collective, subordinate, automatic/ manipulative narrow	Hierarchical, noncohesive, collective, shifting subordination, narrow	Before and during revolution: Egalitarian, highly mobile, cadres, manipulative, wide
Conscription	Restrictive; universal only in war	Restrictive	Universal
Ideology	Conservative	Traditional, materialist, antisocialist, praetorian	Revolutionary; party-movement
Disposition to Intervene	Low	Permanent / continued	High before and during revolution; low after

Another important aspect of the armed forces described by Wendt and Barnett (1993) and closely connected with the conscription approach is the capital- versus labour-intensive military approach. The authors connect the capital-intensive militarization with currently prevailing, ‘conventional’ military due to its primary

³⁰ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 13-14.

³¹ *Ibid*, 16.

subordination to the state and not to the people as well as because it “derive[s] most of [its] capability from the physical and human capital.”³² The labour-intensive militarization, on the other hand, is more grounded on the labour factor and is subsequently divided into “the ‘cadre-conscript’ army, [...] which consists of masses poorly trained conscripts organized around a capital-intensive core of professionals [...] and people’s army, [...] which is generated primarily by the mass mobilization of lightly armed militias.”³³

In order to focus on the civil-military relations as such, there are several models assessing varying criteria. First of all, Huntington (1957) presents the types of civil-military relations based on pro/antimilitary ideology, the degree of political power of the military and the degree of professionalism. The five identified patterns are as follows:

- [1] *“Antimilitary ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalism. This type of civil-military relations generally is found in more primitive countries where military where military professionalism has been retarded or in more advanced countries when security threats are suddenly intensified [...];*
- [2] *Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism. [...] Civil-military relations in modern totalitarian states may tend toward this type. [...];*
- [3] *Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. A society which suffers few threats to its security [...];*
- [4] *Promilitary ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism. A society with continuing security threats and an ideology sympathetic to military values [...];*
- [5] *Promilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism...”³⁴*

In addition to the professionalism of the army and its willingness to be a political actor, Huntington evaluates another important factor which is orientation of the military ideology based on the security environment of the state. Despite the fact that the factor of threat is probably not causally linked with the other factors, it considerably influences the general activity of the armed forces within and outside the state. As an alternative

³² Wendt, Alexander, Barnett, Michael, „Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization,” *Review of International Studies*, 19 (1993): 324.

³³ *Ibid*, 325.

³⁴ Huntington, S., *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 97.

explanation of civil-military relations in a state, Schiff (1995) presented the concordance theory based on cooperation rather than coercion among three players – the armed forces, the political representatives, and the citizenry. She argues that if the three partners are able to reach the cooperative approach and therefore show high level of integration, internal military intervention is less probable to happen. Therefore, concordance theory emphasize “dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society.”³⁵

Regarding the patterns of civil-military relations not solely reflecting the military model inherent to Western democracies, Michel Martin (2006) developed four varying patterns identified in posttransitional Africa: the Western managerial model, the ‘Kemalist’ model, the Recourse model, and finally the Disintegration model. So far quite uncommon Western managerial model is distinguished by the “by the institutionalized subordination of a professionalized military rendered politically and ideologically neutral.”³⁶ ‘Kemalist’ model, stemming from the Turkish case, is characterized by the strong political leader with the intention to ensure the legitimacy of his rule by introduction of modernization reforms of economic, administrative or social kind. Such model may serve as an initial stage in order to establish the Western managerial model. The other two patterns are connected with the unstable political situation and insufficient legitimacy of the political institutions and representatives. The military behaviour corresponds with recourse model while the only objective of the military intervention is to arbitrate and penalize civilian representatives for violating democratic principles. Therefore, the military perceives the intervention as the form of recourse to the society to remedy the situation. Ultimately, disintegration model of military behaviour appears usually in such occasions when the civil-military relations are virtually disrupted due to the decomposition of the military in the aftermath of the collapse of the state, foreign intervention or civil war.³⁷

All the above-mentioned models reflecting the civil-military relations vary in the degree of civilian control of the armed forces, in general divided into objective and

³⁵ Schiff, R. L., *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*, 12.

³⁶ Martin, Michel L. Soldiers and Governments in Postpraetorian Africa: Cases in the Francophone Area. in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* ed. Guiseppa Caforio (Pisa: Springer, 2006), 188-195.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 190-195.

subjective civilian control.³⁸ Jacques van Doorn (1969) further identifies three principal mechanisms of control used in case of the latter: control by recruitment and selection; control by indoctrination; and control by organization. Whilst the first mechanism aims at the selection of only those soldiers with certain required societal and/or political qualifications through the recruitment process; the second mechanism presupposes the party membership of the officers; and the last, most extreme mechanism guarantees the total control over the armed forces by their direct integration to the political party structure.³⁹ All of the depicted instruments primarily bolster the loyalty of the soldiers and their affiliation toward the particular political leader or party.

On the other hand, the mechanisms of the objective civilian control are merely based on the depoliticization of the armed forces which includes the minimization of any influence of the political party or individual upon the officers. According to Constantine Danopoulos, the essential instruments ensuring objective control are: First, already mentioned “depoliticization related to defining the military’s role and mission [...] under the control of the legitimate and democratically elected the armed forces [...].Second, the removal of party influence [...].Third, Danopoulos mentions democratization, politicians. [...] and professionalization is the fourth element.”⁴⁰ Morris Janowitz (1960) criticizes the prevailing assumption of the depoliticization of the armed forces, presenting the theory of the ‘citizen-soldier’ where he perceives the professional officers as being inherently political actors due to their participation in politico-military realm. He presupposes that the “greater the connection between society and the military, the less significant the attitudinal differences, which in turn increases possibilities of civilian control of the armed forces.”⁴¹

Furthermore, Desch (1999) highlights the threats to be another significant indicator regarding the overall strength of civilian control of the armed forces. He argues that “the structural threat environment affects the character of the civilian leadership, the nature of the military institution, the cohesiveness of state institutions,

³⁸ The first scholar who initiated such division of civilian control was Samuel Huntington in his work *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957).

³⁹ Rukavishikov, Vladimir O., Pugh, Michael, *Civil-Military Relations*, 157.

⁴⁰ Danopoulos, Constantine. *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 2-7.

⁴¹ Heiduk, Felix. „From guardians to democrats? Attempts to explain change and continuity in the civil–military relations of post-authoritarian Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. *The Pacific Review* [online], 24, 2 (2011): 252.

the method of civilian control, and the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas and cultures.”⁴² Therefore, he assesses the stability of the civilian control based on two factors: the origin of the threats, whether they are external or internal, and the intensity of the threats, which he subdivides to ‘low’ and ‘high’.

Figure 3: Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threats⁴³

		External threats	
		High	Low
Internal threats	High	Poor (Q3)	Worst (Q4)
	Low	Good (Q1)	Mixed (Q2)

According to Figure 3, the most stable civil-military relations are identified in the societies being exposed to high external threats but low internal threats, whereas the states facing the high internal threats and almost no external danger are classified as the weakest in terms of civilian control of the military.⁴⁴ Subsequently, the externally oriented military doctrines rather reinforce the civilian control whereas those internally focused tend to weakens it. Moreover, in case of the quadrant 4, states tend to “adopt subjective control mechanisms, and the military is likely to be highly unified but internally focused.”⁴⁵

1.2.1. CHARACTERISTICS AND TYPOLOGY OF MILITARY REGIMES

First and foremost, as it was already stated in the previous parts, military regimes are inherently undemocratic due to their strict hierarchical structure, obedience based on commands, and promotion on the basis of ranks and merits. This assumption is supported by the findings presented by Finer (1991) working with Freedom House data, where “all but two out of 36 military governments (i.e. 94 per cent) were ranked as

⁴² Desch, M. C., *Civilian Control of the Military: the Changing Security Environment*, 13.

⁴³ Desch, M. C., *Civilian Control of the Military: the Changing Security Environment*, 116.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 13-14.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 119.

authoritarian and lacking basic civil freedoms, compared to 60 per cent of 73 civilian regimes.”⁴⁶ Another research carried out by Nordlinger (1977) confirms that military regimes perform much poorer in comparison with the civilian governments with respect to the measures such as “legitimation, non-coercive rule, minimisation of violence, and responsiveness to popular wishes.”⁴⁷ Also, the governing body in military regimes is not exclusively composed of the military officers due to its inherent lack of capability of administrative and political kind. On the other hand, regarding the ability to bring about the modernization and economic development, military regimes are more successful in achieving such reforms than the democratic states.⁴⁸

However, the military junta lacks the sufficient legitimacy of civilian regimes; therefore it solely derives its power from the army support. The regime is hence more prone to another military intervention as the loyalty of the soldiers could be easily weakened by e.g. another politically ambitious military faction. In order to prevent such subversion, loyalty of the majority of the military that does not directly participate in governance is strengthened by the system of penalization and rewards. Also, when the military regime decides to bolster its public acceptance by e.g. introduction of general elections, it “moves out of the realm of the provisional, and purports to be a regime in its own right.”⁴⁹ The regime therefore establishes itself as a regular political actor, nevertheless without the sufficient characteristics and skills such actor should dispose of and without the willingness to alternate which puts the army into problematic situation.

Moving on to the typology of the praetorian military regimes, one of the most acknowledged classifications is offered by Perlmutter identifying ‘the arbitrator army’ and ‘the ruler praetorian army.’ Contrary to the ruler army, the arbitrator army represents the less extreme case of military interference, where the military men “are civilian-oriented [...], dedicated to protecting and preserving constitutional government [and with the objective to return] to the barracks after political corruption has been

⁴⁶ May, R. J., Selochan, et al., *The military and democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, (Canberra, ACT: ANU E Press, 2004): 5.

⁴⁷ Nordlinger, E. A., *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 197.

⁴⁸ May, R. J., Selochan, *The military and democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, 4.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 184.

eliminated and stability restored.”⁵⁰ Consequently, the arbitrator army is characterized by following features:

*“(1) acceptance of the existing social order; (2) willingness to return to the barracks after disputes are settled; (3) no independent political organization and lack of desire to maximize army rule; (4) a time limit for army rule; (5) concern with improvement of professionalism; (6) a tendency to operate behind the scenes as a pressure group; and (7) a fear of civilian retribution.”*⁵¹

The main reason why the army replaces the political leadership and take the lead of the state is due to the nonexistence of any political group capable of establishing the political order. Likewise, participation in governance is perceived as rather damaging to the integrity of the military, therefore it meddles in politics as less as possible with no real concern for constituting the political ideology. The second type of military regime, the ruler praetorian army, is distinguished by ensuing characteristics:

*“It (1) rejects the existing order and challenges its legitimacy; (2) lacks confidence in civilian rule and has no expectation of returning to the barracks; (3) has a political organization and tends to maximize army rule; (4) is convinced that army rule is the only alternative to political disorder; (5) politicizes professionalism; (6) operates in the open; and (7) has little fear of civilian retribution.”*⁵²

Unlike in the first case, the ruler army desires to take over the governance of the state and legitimates itself as a dominant political actor by the establishment of a radical-nationalist party and, subsequently, by the introduction of an ideology to support it. The structure of the ruler military regime also reflects its endeavour to “to replace the progressive politicians, ex-guerrillas, intellectuals, and paramilitary groups” and instead, it implements its political ambitions by pursuing “support from professionals, the bureaucracy and the technocrats in the economy.”⁵³

⁵⁰ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 105.

⁵¹ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 104-105.

⁵² *Ibid*, 108.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 95, 110-111.

Finer offers another perspective on military regimes evaluating the degree of involvement of the armed forces in government. First type, indirect rule, appears in the systems with nominally functioning civilian government with constitutional powers. Such military regime occurs in the event of the intervention through the mechanisms of blackmail or displacement. Quite opposite of that is the third form, direct rule, which is according to Finer, the least sophisticated as well as a not long lasting type of governance, very often falsely proclaimed as provisional. The last type of military regime is so called 'dual' with two dominant pillars of civilian representation on one side and the army on the other, unified by the ruling of oligarchy or despot.⁵⁴ In the last form, both the civilian party as well as the military are to a certain extent institutionalized. Hence, in the event of the political change, they are both relatively qualified to take over the ruling.

Within the praetorian military regimes, several subcategories are distinguished reflecting the size and composition of governing body. Military autocracy therefore stands for one man rule, military oligarchy for governance of few, and authoritarian praetorianism signifies the fusionist model of military-civilian rule composed almost solely from the experts and bureaucrats as in the ruler military regime. Military oligarchy, on the other hand, tends to create the illusion of electorate support by irregular and manipulated elections.⁵⁵

1.2.2. CHARACTERISTICS AND TYPOLOGY OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS

Above all, non-democratic systems are more prone to the military intervention primarily due to the lack of legitimacy of the ruling party or leadership and hence insufficient public support of the regime. Under such conditions, the system shows higher level of political instability rooted in weak institutionalization of the existing political representatives.⁵⁶ Therefore, the armed forces become not only the sole source of support of the regime, but also its backbone on which the existence of the regime

⁵⁴ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 165-179.

⁵⁵ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 95.

⁵⁶ See Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 488 p.

depends. In order to strengthen the loyalty of the military, the ruling party tends to politicize it so as to attach the soldiers more to the regime. Such politicization of the army may in the end turn against the regime itself. However, military coups in fact are not conducted by the military organisation as such but very often by a small, but sufficiently strong faction or the individuals with political ambitions.⁵⁷

In order to successfully carry out a military coup, not only that the army has to dispose of the substantial motive and the determination to overthrow the ruling party or leader - 'disposition' -, but also the overall situation has to be favourable to create the unique opportunity to act - 'occasion.'⁵⁸ Regarding the former, based on Stepan's institutional theory, the motives to intervene have roots in the 'new professionalism' which expanded the capabilities of military administration, but also in a transformation concerning the perceived legitimacy, often by public and the military itself, of assuming a wider institutional role. Another theory concerning the 'disposition' is the motive to install economic reforms toward modernization and development in collaboration with technocrats. Finally, the political-polarization theory reflects the factor of 'occasion' as it presupposes that the military reaches the decision from the high degree of polarization among political actors and the virtual inability of the ruling government to maintain support.⁵⁹

Consequently, the overall situation in the society indicates the preferable type of military intervention. Finer defines six such modes varying in intensity and range of mechanisms applied within given states. In mature societies with consolidated and indisputably legitimate civilian institutions, military force could use only the means of influence as the 'constitutional channel'. Second mode is the 'collusion or competition with the civilian representatives' which may lead to the influence of civilian counterparts in mature political cultures or to blackmail of civilian authorities in case of developed political cultures. Additionally, escalated forms of blackmail used by military organisation are 'the intimidation of the civilian authorities' or 'threats of non-cooperation with, or violence towards, the civilian authorities' which both may lead to the indirect military rule. If military refuses or fails to protect the civilian government

⁵⁷ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 101.

⁵⁸ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 23.

⁵⁹ Casper, G. "Theories of Military Intervention in the Third World: Lessons from the Philippines." *Armed Forces and Societies* [online], 17, 2 (1991): 193-206.

from violence or even decides to employ violent means against it, it may result in the displacement of the civilian authorities in states with low political culture or, more extremely, in the supplantation of the existing civilian regime in case of minimal political culture.⁶⁰

After seizure of power, the military personnel may either “consolidate their position, penetrating civil society [...] and discouraging opposition, or to shift from a ‘caretaker’ role by restoring civilian governments while maintaining a guardian or veto role.”⁶¹ In fact, many military regimes may perceive themselves as more representative and more competent than previous civilian government. After some time, however, the military political leadership inclines to disintegration which, subsequently, may lead to ‘return to the barracks’ - the military withdrawal from direct rule. Such situation occurs in case of the combination of three factors: “the disintegration of the original conspiratorial group, the growing divergence of interests between the junta of rulers and those military who remain as active heads of the fighting services, and the political difficulties of the regime.”⁶² Therefore, the way how the withdrawal takes place is grounded on the willingness of the military junta to hand back the power and the manner by which such withdrawal is conducted.

1.2.3. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC STATE

With regard to the civil-military relations in democratic state, there has been already a lot said on this topic in the chapter 1.1. as a majority of the characteristics of the armed forces stem from the prevailing Western-oriented theories. However, it is imperative to mention the main characteristics and factors of democratic regime and the role of the army therein in order to distinguish it from democratizing regimes described in following subchapter.

First and foremost, the democratic government is built on the legitimacy derived from the citizenry. According to Linz and Lipset (1990), the democratic regime can be defined based on three criteria: reasonable contest for government posts; high level of political engagement; and the level of political and civic liberties guaranteeing the

⁶⁰ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*,140.

⁶¹ May, R. J., Selochan, et al., *The military and democracy in Asia and the Pacific*,8.

⁶² Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*,191.

previous two conditions.⁶³ Regarding the position of army in democratic state, the armed forces must be subordinated to the civilian control as it serves as an instrument to face primarily external threats. In order to ensure the effective democratic control of the armed forces, Rudolf Joo (1996) designates eight tools:

“(1) a clear and legal constitutional framework; (2) a significant role for the parliament in legislating and budgeting on defence and security matters; (3) transparency of defence and security policy; (4) hierarchical responsibility of the military to the parliament via a civilian organ of public administration; (5) professional officer corps that respects civilian authority; (6) division of tasks [...] (7) a civil society with democratic institutions with consensus on the role of the military; and (8) a nongovernmental security community consisting of independent academics, media experts, as well as advisors to political parties.”⁶⁴

Only if all of above-mentioned requirements are fulfilled, the democratic control is sufficiently institutionalized in the state. However, in addition to the military subordination to the civilian government, ‘vertical control,’ the civilian institutions as such should be subject to the democratic principles.⁶⁵ According to Rukavishikov (2006), horizontal control to the military encompasses various social institutions. Also, it is ensured through the acceptance of the civilian control and respect to human rights for granted by military personnel themselves. Moreover, another effective tool is control over the defence budget which means that “military manpower and basic organizational issues are subject to parliamentary budget appropriation review and approval.”⁶⁶ Finally, the nature of security environment contributes to a large extent to the determination of the type of civil-military relations. Particularly in case of democratic states, the threats are predominantly of external origin and based on the realist perception of anarchical conflict.⁶⁷ Therefore, armed forces can be strictly apolitical and nonpartisan organisation fulfilling its role of protector against external rather than internal danger.

⁶³ Diamond, Larry, Linz, J. J., Lipset, S. M. *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experience with Democracy* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 6-7.

⁶⁴ Joo, Rudolf, “The Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Experience of Hungary” (Chaillot Paper 23, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris, 1996), 5.

⁶⁵ Dahl, Robert Alan, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 245.

⁶⁶ Rukavishikov, Vladimir O., Pugh, Michael, *Civil-Military Relations*, 139-160.

⁶⁷ Wendt, A., Barnett, M., *Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization*, 321.

1.2.4. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIZING STATE

Democratizing states, unlike democracies, appear in the state of transition from authoritarian regime towards democracy. Therefore, especially civilian institutions in most cases are not developed yet and show high degree of instability. Military organisation, on the other hand, is well institutionalized within the system due to its often significant position during the authoritarian ruling. However, the perception of the function and orientation of the military forces considerably differ from its role in democratic systems. Hence, the most significant factors, such as historical progress, political situation, socio-economic conditions, external influence, security environment, should be analyzed in order to highlight the major differences of the civil-military regime from the Western perception and the obstacles it has to face to successfully fulfil the transition. First of all, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) distinguish two types of phases of the democratizing process: “the transition from autocracy to a partially democratic regime and the shift to a fully institutionalized democracy.”⁶⁸ The states undergoing the first phrase are more prone to the armed conflict, particularly due to still powerful position of the old elites confronted by the transitional process and on the contrary weak and yet not fully established civilian institutions. Second stage is therefore related to the institutionalization process of the institution, in particular enhancement of free political contest and ensuring the accountability of the legitimate government.⁶⁹ Most states in the process of democratization more or less fulfil the first phase whereas they fail in successfully adopting measures necessary to complete the process.

From the historical perspective, the armed forces became institutionalized and modernized under the colonial rule. Colonial states tended to recruit soldiers coming from the periphery or from cultural, religious or ethnic minority group in order to strengthen the loyalty and secure the imperial control. Furthermore, the military served as an instrument to accomplish the demands from foreign actors or their domestic counterparts rather than reflecting the population needs. Moreover, most of the colonial armies were based on capital-intensive militarization rather than labour-intensive, which might be more convenient in terms of lesser economic burden but impossible due to the illegitimacy of the regime.⁷⁰ During and after the decolonization process, military built

⁶⁸ Mansfield, Edward D., Snyder, Jack, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” *International Organization* [online], 56, 2 (2002): 304.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 304-305.

⁷⁰ Wendt, A., Barnett, M., *Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization*, 331-332.

up the image of guardian of the state independence and sovereignty due to the primary role it played in the pro-independence struggles.⁷¹ Subsequently, the army adopted the nationalist attitude in order to appeal to its responsibility to the state and thus to justify its interference in politics. The armed forces, therefore, represented the cornerstone of most of post-colonial governments as the existence of the regimes was basically dependent on military backing.⁷² Overall, despite the considerable impact of the legacy of authoritarian regime on the post-transitional state, the final form of civil-military relations is in fact not predetermined by its set prior the transition but rather ‘filtered’ through the democratization process.⁷³

Concerning the political situation, democratizing societies show persistent inability and incapacity of the civilian institutions to strengthen their position towards the army in general. Moreover, those institutions are often generally perceived as highly corrupted, inefficient and following the interests of powerful actors rather than of population. Additionally, they tend to be hardly comprehensible by the public and incline to bypass the constitution in case of political stalemate.⁷⁴ Also, the introduction of elections and thus new civilian governments creates an impression of political change. In reality, however, it rather serves as cover for the interests of powerful actors, including the military elites, and is not accompanied by other steps necessary for instituting democratic answerability.⁷⁵ Therefore, in the democratizing states, the principle of civilian control of the armed forces is hard to achieve, if not almost impossible. According to Croissant and Kuehn (2009), the process of institutionalization of the civilian control undergoes two stages facing different problems:

“‘First generation problems’ refer to the challenges of securing the democratic civilian regime against military intervention and institutionalizing civilian decision-making power over the political centre [...]. The “second generation problems” include the need to extend and institutionalize civilian decision-

⁷¹ Heiduk, F., *From guardians to democrats? Attempts to explain change and continuity in the civil-military relations of post-authoritarian Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines*, 252.

⁷² Wendt, A., Barnett, M., *Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization*, 338.

⁷³ Agüero, Felipe. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Eranco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 28-30.

⁷⁴ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 114-115.

⁷⁵ Mansfield, E. D., Snyder, J., *Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War*, 299.

making power into former exclusive domains of the military, particularly internal security and external defence policymaking.”⁷⁶

Accordingly, the level of the democratization process could be partially derived from the degree of institutionalization of the civilian control of the armed forces.

Another important characteristic reflecting the democratization process of the state is the level of professionalism reached within the military organisation and, in relation with that, potential political ambitions of the officers. Due to the specific condition related to the regime change from the authoritarian rule and unstable transformational environment, the ‘new professionalism’ is a typical feature. It is characterized by the relatively high level of organisation and cohesiveness as well as the broadening of skills or interests otherwise exclusively inherent to other institutions, such as administration or economic involvement. In consequence of acquisition of such management capabilities, the military tends to increase its involvement in politics⁷⁷ and to displace the governing civilian body overgrown by corruption and cronyism. As a result, military organisation becomes “a centre for political turmoil, political ambition, and threats to legitimate authority.” At this stage, military officers believe in their ability to govern and that the military coup would be beneficial to the country’s overall progress.⁷⁸ This way, therefore, army anchors its superior position within the society and ensures its economic interests which would be otherwise threatened by civilian control.

As a result, democratizing states are exposed to inner security threats rather than external conflict. Despite the importance of the surrounding environment of the state, the inner situation becomes the major concern supported by the unstable and barely legitimate civilian government and political ambitions of various entities. Moreover, Wendt and Barnett (1993) believe that the inner instability is partially caused by the global economy favouring certain actors at the cost of others.⁷⁹ In other words, external influence and/or previous imperial experience indirectly affect the state’s current

⁷⁶ Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., *Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies*, 205.

⁷⁷ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 120.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 93.

⁷⁹ Wendt, A., Barnett, M., *Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization*, 333.

proneness to internal threats, which therefore weakens the overall democratization progress.

1.3. FACTORS DETERMINING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In the final analysis, the vast differences between the development and nature of civil-military relations in democracies and democratizing states stem from several key variables. Croissant and Kuehn identify three conditions determining the difference: “historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between development and democratic consolidation.”⁸⁰ Rukavishikov adds to those arguments another two factors, reflecting the socio-economic situation within the state and the impact of international threats.⁸¹ Moreover, in terms of foreign influence, additional conditions should be considered, including the likelihood of external intervention and the “type and degree of education or training that officers may have received abroad.”⁸² Additionally, specifically in the case of the Third World countries in the Arab and African regions, the civil-military relations vary in terms of military professionalism, types and structures of local military regimes, as well as in the development of virtual political authorities and coteries, also comprising the armed forces.⁸³ On the basis of what has been already said, I identify five factors that have decisive influence on the final form of civil-military relations in the states undergoing democratization process. At the same time, those factors should explain why the armed forces remain in a certain position and do not tend to take over the regime, even though they are endowed with the necessary dispositions to do so. Therefore, the factors are divided into two subsequent categories: the factors determining the military position in the civil-military relations in the state – referred to the conceptual level of the analysis; and motives inducing the military interventions – referred to the interventionist level but to a large extent derived from the conceptual level factors.

⁸⁰ Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., *Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies*, 187.

⁸¹ Rukavishikov, Vladimir O., Pugh, Michael, *Civil-Military Relations*, 133.

⁸² Barany, Z., “The Role of The Military,” *Journal of Democracy* [online], 10, 22 (2011): 2.

⁸³ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 117.

This reason is based on the notion that army is unsuitable for long-term political ruling as it would endanger its corporate integrity as well as its adherence to the historically determined military ideology,⁸⁴ usually the loyalty to the sovereign or the state. Therefore, the subsequent factors should explain (1) the historical, political and social development of the exclusive position the armed forces maintain in transitional states; (2) the decisive motives compelling the military to temporarily take over the political power in the state despite potential consequences that might be detrimental for military reputation; and (3) what restricts the army from overthrowing the civilian governments and assuming the full control over the state. Those factors are as follows: historical experience and development, political conditions, socio-economic aspects, security environment, and finally external influence.

Historical experience and development represent the first factor not inherent to the Third World states undergoing the period of colonialism or such regime which had similar impact on the institutionalization process. Former colonial actors primarily composed of Western democracies subsequently transmitted or at least influenced constitutional organisation and political structure of the post-colonial states.⁸⁵ Moreover, the politicization tendencies of the previous authoritarian regimes towards the military as well as the role played by army in post-colonial struggle strengthened its already powerful position within the state. As a result, there is indisputable correlation between the historical development of the state and the existing form of civil-military relations. Within this condition, I will focus on the diachronic evolution of the role and the position of army towards the society by selection of the events assumed to be vital junctures in the development. In case of Egypt, the post-colonial legacies will be discussed, followed by the development of civil-military relations during the authoritarian regime. Similarly, I will analyse the last period of transition in Egypt as well as its termination discussing the function the military performed during the process.

The factor of *socio-economic aspects* comprises two parts: present overall position of armed forces within the society and military instruments of influence; and the military impact on economic development including the economic interests of

⁸⁴ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 34.

⁸⁵ May, R. J., Selochan, et al., *The military and democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, 1.

military personnel. The social environment as well as economic conditions, including general wealth of the state, shape the sentiments towards the regime and, subsequently, either increase or decrease the likelihood of the coup d'état. In that connection, it is believed that there is correlation between the economic development and the democratic regime, "making violent forms of political opposition more costly."⁸⁶ Moreover one of the most articulated arguments affecting the civil-military relations is the (non-) existence of middle class in the state. Perlmutter argues that a well established middle class historically acted as the stabilizer of the civilian regime and hence in case of its absence, the alternative actors may substitute such function. Although it could be any organized political entity within the state, usually it is the military that exploits such a situation due to its exclusive position. Moreover, the existent social classes incline to fragmentation and are rather inactive in terms of political participation.⁸⁷ As a result, military officers tend to gain public popularity through the recruitment mechanism or nationalist appeal. Besides, the recruitment process determines the social structure of the armed forces, which may lead to either greater interconnection with the society or distance from it. As to overall perception of the military within the society, the elements such as the above-mentioned nationalist approach strengthen the notion of the military as a guardian of the national interests bound by the responsibility to protect the state if necessary. Regarding the economic factor, the military's endeavour to protect its economic interests in post-authoritarian period may increase the army's political involvement. Simultaneously, the economic activities of the military as such broaden its autonomy from the civilian institutions. At any case, the civilian governments are generally unable to adequately finance the armed forces as during the authoritarian era. Therefore, the officers tend to seek "some 'off-budget' sources of revenue, such as military businesses and/or external aid,"⁸⁸ out of reach of civilian control.

The factor of *political conditions* to a large extent determines the military position within the state and is greatly interlinked with all the other factors. In general, the level of institutionalization of the civil control over the armed forces largely determines the evolution of democratization process. The finding whether there is any

⁸⁶ Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., *Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies*, 210.

⁸⁷ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 97.

⁸⁸ Heiduk, F., *From guardians to democrats? Attempts to explain change and continuity in the civil-military relations of post-authoritarian Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines*, 254.

elementary civilian control and if so, how it is shaped also contributes to the overall explanation of the civil-military relations. States where the civilian government are installed only formally and hence are not virtually accountable to its electorate cannot be considered as electoral democracies with representative civilian institutions. Given these points, in this section, I will examine several factors that I deem necessary in order to assess the impact of the political environment on the position of the army and vice versa. First of all, the degree of institutionalization indicates the formal nature of the regime. Factors such as whether there are any civilian institutions and if so, to what degree they are accountable to the electorate or whether their function is purely nominal with no real powers. Secondly, the definition and the scale of powers of the armed forces in the constitution indicate its formal position within the state. Especially in case of the Third World states with low level of institutionalization, the informal power structure within the state is the true indicator of the political influence of the military. Factors such as who has the actual control over the armed forces or the informal linkage between the army and the state leaders and/or the government reveal the factual position of the army within the state. Last but not least, the authoritarian regimes derive its legitimacy primarily from the military support. The more the regime uses the repressive tools against the society, the more it becomes dependent on the willingness of the army to back the regime. Thus, the last factor should examine the degree of the constraints towards the society in order to determine such dependency. In brief, all of the mentioned conditions practically mirror the formal and informal degree of institutionalization of the army and its either direct or indirect political participation.

The following factor concerns the *security environment* which may be of internal or external origin and varies in terms of intensity. As has been noted, the states undergoing the democratization process are more prone to inner threats rather than foreign intervention. Therefore, the identification of the actors controlling the state power is essential to effectively face those threats and, hence, to act as a safeguard of the society. Weak civilian institutions hand in hand with economic decay largely contribute to the disintegration of society and, therefore, to higher occurrence of inner threats.⁸⁹ As a result, in such a high-threat environment other than legitimate political actors may use the situation to assume power through nationalist appeal. On the contrary, actors in states characterized by low incidence of threats tend to “act in accordance with

⁸⁹ Wendt, A., Barnett, M., *Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization*, 329-331.

worldwide professional norms”⁹⁰ as they are limited by the legitimacy precondition. Therefore based on Desch’s security threat model, the origin of the threats as well as their intensity will be analysed as it largely forms to the position of the army within the society.

The last but definitely not the least factor determining the civil-military relations focuses on *external influence* on the state. It comprises not only the situation in the immediate surroundings, but also the foreign military assistance in the shape of economic incentives, exchange programmes or weaponry supply. As an illustration, the United States are among the most active states engaging in such strategy, providing military training to 98 000 students coming from 105 states between the years 1976 and 1994 through ‘U.S. International Military Education and Training’ programme (IMET).⁹¹ Also, in the context of primary support of local governments from external actors, the state is more susceptible to the inner conflicts⁹² as the ruling elites lack domestic legitimacy. However, unlike in case of central European states where the entrance to NATO was accompanied by the restructuring military reforms in order to make them fully professionalized, foreign influence in the Third World states is principally oriented to economic support conditioned by geopolitical interests of the donor rather than to the support of democratic transition.

1.3.1. MOTIVES INDUCING THE MILITARY INTERVENTION

Similar factors determining the civil-military relations in the Third World states are greatly interlinked with the motives leading to the military coup. Naturally, some motives may play more a substantial role than others in military’s decisiveness to intervene. For instance, the factor of security environment significantly affects the civil-military relations however it does not often constitute the decisive motive for military coup. Similarly, the condition of external influence is practically limited to the event of war where the possible defeat may form sufficient motive for the coup. In such case, the sitting government is perceived as incompetent to lead the state to the war particularly

⁹⁰ Farrell, T. *World Culture and Military Power*, 486.


⁹¹ *Ibid*, 465.

⁹² Wendt, A., Barnett, M., *Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization*, 342.

by military officers, to whom defeat represents the unacceptable humiliation of military forces.⁹³

Perlmutter summarizes the major motives leading directly or indirectly to the military intervention in Figure 4. All the factors and consequential reactions depicted in the figure are reflected in the four out of six categories in the preceding section.

Figure 4: Corporate Orientation and Military Interventionism in Non-institutionalized Political Systems⁹⁴



Regarding the first factor – *historical experience and development* – especially in states with colonial past, the army assumed the role of ‘insurrectionary army’, openly railing against the governing regime with the objective to free the territory or overturn

⁹³ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 94.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 116.

the existing socio-political structure referring to national resurrection.⁹⁵ This factor is however relevant only in the societies pursuing its independence, however after reaching the sovereign state, the factor no longer directly contributes to the willingness of the army to intervene. However, as to the indirect influence, the military may refer to the national interest as to the objective motive to intervene, associated with its historical legacy of the power fulfilling the national quest for freedom.

The second objective factor which increases the likelihood of military intervention is the *socio-economic aspects* of the army's position within the state. In that context, the pro-interventionist tendencies arise by the cumulation of following motives: (1) existing social order is greatly unfavourable to a large part of the society; (2) the installed regime faces abrupt nationalist appeal from other powerful elites, such as armed forces; (3) the society reached a high level of fragmentation which increases the overall intrastate instability; (4) there is no real political participation of the society including institutionalized political parties or interest groups; (5) the army's prestige or general popularity and the acquisition of administrative skills provoke military action against the illegitimate and discredited governing body.

In terms of *economic aspects* of the interventions, the probability of the military coup increases when the economic interests of military or other powerful groups are threatened by the government, e.g. by the means of budget cuts in national defence. Also, based on the statistic data from Centre for Systemic Peace, out of 256 military coups between 1974 and 2006, 230 coups occurred in countries with lower GDP per capita than \$4.000, whereas only seven of the them took place in states with GDP per capita reaching over \$8.000.⁹⁶ Such results indicate that there is indisputable correlation between economic development and military coups assuming that economic interests of more than only ruling elites are at stake.

Concerning *political motives*, the level of institutionalization of armed forces is related to the degree of willingness of the military to take action against pro-reform movements. According to Eva Bellin (2004), "the more institutionalized the security establishment is, the more willing it will be to disengage from power and allow political

⁹⁵ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 209.

⁹⁶ Center for Systemic Peace. 2006. "Coups d'État, 1960-2006." Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets: Coups d'État, 1960-2006.

reform to proceed.”⁹⁷ Moreover, the process of the legitimization of the military coup is purely of political character, the armed forces have to represent the most politically institutionalized group within the political system at a given time whilst no other adequately or more powerful political actors is present.⁹⁸ The aspect of ‘new professionalism’ endowing the army with new administrative skills along with the knowledge that in the state there is no other power that could prevent the military from the action notably endorses the decision to intervene. Moreover, by such action, the army forestalls other political movements to limit its autonomy or powers in military junta.

The following case of Egypt will be examined based on the aforementioned factors regarding the conceptual level as well as the motives regarding the interventionist level of the analysis. Each of the five factors will be analysed separately with the intention to identify: firstly, why the arbitrary praetorian role of the army prevails at the civil-military relations rather than other; secondly, what induces the military to intervene. Moreover, by the following profound analysis, I will attempt to clarify the rationalization behind the question why the army rather choose to stay aloof from the politics when it disposes of necessary capabilities to rule arbitrarily without any greater limitations.

⁹⁷ Bellin, Eva, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics* [online], 36, 2 (2004): 31.

⁹⁸ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 100-101.

2. CASE STUDY: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT

The events of the Arab spring in 2011 directed Egypt towards the democratic path by supplanting the then military regime ruling in Egypt since the military coup in 1952. The Egyptian protests were inspired by the mass demonstrations in Tunisia, and increased in intensity throughout several phases. On 25 January 2011, the first wave of protests encompassed tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo. The major motives of the protests were corruption, brute police methods, worsening of the economic situation and pervasive political repression. Around 1.5 million people assembled on 7 February to express their disapproval of the existing government and demanded Mubarak to resign which happened four days later.⁹⁹ Despite the omnipresent euphoria from the success of overthrowing the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak and consequent attempts to establish a democratic government, the current political situation resembles the situation before the transition. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a former field marshal, won in the presidential elections in 2014 by landslide victory of 23.38 million votes, whereas his only opponent Hamdeen Sabahi gained only 735.285 votes. According to an external survey in 2014, 52 percent of Egyptians are satisfied with the Sisi's presidency, in spite of the fact that Sisi "presided over an interim government that banned public demonstrations, killed 1.000 Brotherhood supporters and arrested more than 20.000 people, including prominent journalists."¹⁰⁰ Today, the democratic transition initiated in 2011 is thereby fundamentally threatened, while instead it seems that the regime goes back into the groove, the regime dominated by military or former military men.

Concerning the military organisation, it is composed of three branches: army, navy, and air forces. Moreover, it is ranked as 14th largest in the world with annual budget spending of US\$4.21 billion.¹⁰¹ Despite its historical direct political rule, the armed forces today can be characterized "as a professional and largely meritocratic force [...] even though cronyism and favouritism at its highest levels seem to have been

⁹⁹ Nepstad, S. E., "Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria," *Journal of Peace Research* [online]. 2013, 50(3): 342.

¹⁰⁰ Vick, Karl, "Al-Sisi Wins Egypt's Presidency But Is Stumbling Already." *Time* [online], 1 (2014): Accessed July 12, 2015.

¹⁰¹ „Egypt's Army: Ambitious Men in Uniform," *Economist* [online], Beirut and Cairo, 2013. Accessed July 10, 2015.

quite widespread.”¹⁰² Therefore, based on the Perlmutter’s classification, Egypt was until 2011 no doubt a modern praetorian state with high political activity of the armed forces on one hand, and weak and unstable civilian institutions on the other. Accordingly, the society might be described by a relatively ‘low’ political culture with the only noticeable nongovernmental political activity being of the Muslim Brotherhood. The ruling regime of Hosni Mubarak and his predecessors can be classified according to Perlmutter’s categorization as a ‘praetorian ruler army’ governed by army established political party instead of direct military involvement in the politics. In fact, from 1952 to 2011, the country was governed by presidents coming from military organisation whose regimes were primarily grounded on the armed forces.¹⁰³ The events of 2011 changed the perception of Egypt in terms of political regime, nevertheless after four years since the revolution, another military man has assumed the presidential post.

The case study primarily aims at the examination of civil-military relations in Egypt under the aforementioned factors where each of them is separately analysed in particular subcategory. Subsequently, the motives inducing the two military interventions are highlighted in the corresponding subcategories. Firstly, the historical experience and development is discussed, reflecting the legacy of the colonial supremacy and the post-colonial situation under the authoritarian regime and the development of the last democratic transition in 2011 until today. The second condition focuses on the political aspect of civil-military relations in Egypt, formal, legislative and informal institutionalization of the army and its high degree of interconnection with the state apparatus. Moreover, with the recent regime change, the political situation of today is closely analysed, pointing out the major modification of the civil-military relations conception under “new” Egyptian rule. Similarly, the next factor of socio-economic situation is discussed, where both social and economic interests of the army are reflected before and particularly after the transition. In case of external influence, the Egyptian armed forces benefit from long-term economic, technological and other support from the United States which dramatically ameliorated its overall military skills and contributed to the military modernization. Finally, due to almost homogenous population comprised of Muslim majority, Egypt was in 20th century rather exposed to

¹⁰² Lutterbeck, D., “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* [online], 39, 1 (2012): 36.

¹⁰³ Karawan, Ibrahim, „Politics and the Army in Egypt“, *Survival* [online], 53, 2 (2011): 44.

the external threats, stemming from the geopolitical position in the Middle East region. However, with increasing insurgency and terrorist activity particularly in Sinai Peninsula, the security environment has changed. Therefore, the factor of security environment may play an important role in legitimization of the military political interference and hence should be examined.

Based on the factors, the following analysis should contribute to clearer picture of the civil-military relations in Egypt, primarily concerning the conceptual level of the case. Additionally, the factors should highlight the prestigious position of the military within the society and the state throughout the years and should therefore explain the stance of armed forces towards the regime particularly during the 2011 protests. Also, the motives inducing the Egyptian military to intervene in both cases should provide sufficient explanation of the interventionist level of the case. By the combination of both conceptual and interventionist factors, the thesis should ultimately address the question why the army, in spite of disposing of such material and overall power over the state as well as assessing the most prestigious position within the society, assumes the arbitrator rather than the ruler position and hence does not strive for direct political engagement.

2.1. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The modernization of the Egyptian army is associated with the introduction of the Stone's reforms in the nineteenth century. Before the reforms, the armed forces were composed of 18.000 men with little organisation and high rate of illiteracy among the officers as well as nonexistent command structure, the characteristics that virtually made the army incompetent of any war combat. After the implementation of the reforms, aiming primarily at education and training of the soldiers and officers or modernization of weaponry, the Egyptian military gained the status of the most formidable force in the Middle East region.¹⁰⁴ During the first half of the twentieth century, the army underwent several important changes aimed at its enlargement as well as the further modernization. Moreover, the formation of the Royal Egyptian Air Force (REAF) in 1937 contributed to the overall prestige of the army, supplied with the

¹⁰⁴ McGregor, Andrew J., *A military history of modern Egypt: from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006), 140-141.

British aircraft. Unlike the other officers, the pilots completed university studies in Egyptian universities characterized by high degree of pro-nationalist atmosphere which influenced their political opinions.¹⁰⁵ Under those circumstances, the predominantly noninterventionist position of the Egyptian army changed with the rise of the second generation officers.¹⁰⁶ Before the military coup in 1952, Finer described the political situation in Egypt as follows: “The purported parliamentary system largely if not entirely alienated from the public; shamelessly manipulated to provide a colour of legality by a narrow ambitious and selfish oligarchy [...] corruption, inefficiency, betrayal and ‘colonialism’. [...] The institutions had been manipulated to maintain the rulers in power.”¹⁰⁷ As a result of the situation, a group solely composed of military officers with Gamal Abdel Nasser in the lead took over the regime and, subsequently, put an end to the Albanian-Ottoman dynasty ruling in Egypt since 1805.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, the revolutionary body called the Free Officers justified the power take-over by the objectives, such as: “attaining political independence, safeguarding the ‘national honor,’¹⁰⁹ and restructuring cultural and social life,” that needed to be fulfilled through strong and united government which only military can install. The real motives which led to the military coup were indisputably the humiliating defeat of armed forces in Palestine, the increasing nationalist feelings and the effort to change the existing political class structure.¹¹⁰

With the Nasser assuming the presidential post in 1956, Egypt experienced more or less direct military regime. According to Nasser, the army was the only institution that is capable of necessary changes to be effectuated and at the same time maintains the order.¹¹¹ For that reason, the Revolutionary Command Council, exclusively comprised from the officers with the president on the top, represented the governing body as shown in Figure 5.

¹⁰⁵ McGregor, A. J., *A military history of modern Egypt: from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*, 238-239.

¹⁰⁶ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 128.

¹⁰⁷ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 117.


¹⁰⁸ Cook, Steven A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 64.

¹⁰⁹ See Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J., *Nasser and His Generation*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), chapters 3-4.

¹¹⁰ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 40.

¹¹¹ See Nasser, Gamal Abdel, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, (G. O. Printing Offices, 1954).

Figure 5: The Ruler Regime in Egypt¹¹²



Moreover, during this period, the presidential post became institutionalized as the unquestionable political leader of Egyptian state,¹¹³ and hence fully installed the presidential praetorian regime in the state.

The cardinal turning point for the army's position within the state occurred in the context of the defeat during the Six-Day War in 1967. The armed forces were taken by surprise by the massive Israeli attack completely shutting down the Egyptian air defence system. The involvement of Egyptian army in the internal Yemen conflict as well as general unpreparedness of the military for such kind of attack also contributed to the humiliating defeat. In that connection, the prestige of the Egyptian army immediately dropped and the military regime's ability to bring the state to the desirable economic and political changes was largely discredited.¹¹⁴ As a consequence, the then president Sadat significantly reduced the number of officers participating in the politics and thus limited the political engagement of the army. For illustration, in 1960s military offices

¹¹² Perlmutter, Amos. *Egypt: The Praetorian State*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974): 136.

¹¹³ Cook, Steven A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 63.

¹¹⁴ Karawan, Ibrahim, Egypt, in *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*, ed. by Danopoulos, Constantine P., Watson, Cynthia, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), 112.

assumed between 41 percent up to 66 percent of the cabinet seats whereas in 1975 they constituted only 15 percent of the government and under the Mubarak rule, the number further dropped to only 10 percent.¹¹⁵ The military restored its reputation by its overwhelming victory in the 1973 War, however it remained separated from active political engagement. Another disruptive moment when the military intervened in the domestic affairs was during the riots and widespread protests of the “public sector workers, government employees, pension recipients, and an urban lumpenproletariat of unemployed and semi-employed groups”¹¹⁶ as a reaction to the government decision to increase the prices of elementary goods and services due to the urge from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this time, military dispatched its troops to pacify the situation and thereby came down on the side of the then president Sadat. Consequently, the Camp David Accords in 1978 between Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin¹¹⁷ put an end to three decades of open conflict. Under the Mubarak’s regime, army was involved in several internal conflicts, for example in 1986 it repressed the unrest initiated by the paramilitary organisation Central Security Forces¹¹⁸ or in 1990s in the context of the Egypt’s war against the Islamist terrorist groups and radicals.¹¹⁹ During this period, the army constituted a vital element of the Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. However, to control over the strong military apparatus, Mubarak also established the parallel repressive forces which were centrally directed by the Ministry of Interior. Mubarak effectively controlled the society through the “system of surveillance and intimidation” provided by “the Central Security Forces, the Egyptian National Police, and the State Security Investigations Service (SSI),”¹²⁰ as well as through the National Democratic Party (NDP).

The most recent events associated with the Arab Spring represent the most profound military intervention in Egypt’s history since 1952. During the first massive

¹¹⁵ See Cooper, Mark N., “The Demilitarization of the Egyptian Cabinet,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 14, 2 (1982): 203-225.

¹¹⁶ Karawan, Ibrahim, *Egypt*, 115.

¹¹⁷ See Gwertzman, Bernard, “Egypt and Israel Sign Formal Treaty, Ending a State of War After 30 Years; Sadat and Begin Praise Carter’s Role,” *The New York Times* [online], March 26, 1978. Accessed July 12.

¹¹⁸ Karawan, Ibrahim, *Egypt*, 115

¹¹⁹ McGregor, Andrew J., *A military history of modern Egypt: from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*, 283.

¹²⁰ Meitzner, Marcus, *Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt*, 439.

wave of protests in January 2011, the military posture towards the unexpected situation was rather ambiguous. The army tried to employ the posture described by Lutterbeck as “standing with the people while at the same time being an integral part of the regime.”¹²¹ In practice, the military did not anyhow repress the demonstrators as the other pro-Mubarak security forces. However, it did not try to prevent them from killing or brute treatment while being physically present. Also, when Mubarak offered several concessions to the protesters, the army called on them to accept the deal and to go home.¹²² As to the interventionist motives, there are several reasons explaining such an initial unwillingness of the military to intervene and hence take charge of the situation. First of all, the military was not prepared to rule due to the inexperience of the officers in that matter; consequently, the politicization would endanger the coherence of the military; and at last, the army had to follow its strategic interests which were to a large extent associated with the Mubarak’s regime.¹²³ However, as neither concessions nor the repression worked and based on the assumption that the destabilized situation accompanied by increasing violence would only damage the army’s reputation,¹²⁴ the military officers finally decided to side with the protesters.

After the meltdown of the Mubarak’s regime and thereby the instruments of the domestic security, the military basically remained the sole “organization capable of maintaining at least a minimum degree of social and political order.”¹²⁵ Therefore, the “Higher Council of the Armed Forces” assumed the power after Mubarak’s abdication, with the intention of “restoring stability, putting the country on the road to democracy and restoring civilian government.”¹²⁶ In the fourth Communiqué issued in February, the military highlighted the fact that the situation is only temporary and that as soon as such conditions are fulfilled, it would hand over the powers to an “civilian and elected authority” within a “free democratic state.”¹²⁷ The most recent military coup was staged in connection with the rule of Mohamed Morsi, the representative of Muslim Brotherhood who won in the presidential elections in January 2012. However, with the

¹²¹ Lutterbeck, D., *Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations*, 37-38.

¹²² Weaver, Matthew, Siddique, Haroon, et al., “Egypt protests – Wednesday 2 February,” *The Guardian* [online], 2011. Accessed July 10, 2015.

¹²³ Albrecht, H., Bishara, D., *Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt*,

¹²⁴ Barany, Z., *The Role of The Military*, 3.

¹²⁵ Karawan, I., *Politics and the Army in Egypt*, 43-50.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 43.

¹²⁷ „Statement From the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces.” *The New York Times* [online], February 11, 2011. Accessed July 10, 2015.

overwhelming support in the parliament, Morsi had in fact a free hand in ruling without any serious legislative opposition. Later that year, in the presidential decree issued on November 22, Morsi pronounced his “decisions to be above judicial review and immunized the constituent assembly and Consultative Council from judicial dismissal.”¹²⁸ As a consequence of the following controversial steps and measures taken by Morsi highly criticized by the public calling for his resignation, the armed forces decided to topple the Morsi’s government and to take the lead of the state for another time. Since that time, the armed forces de facto controlled the political system.¹²⁹ The military acted on the basis of the public demand on displacement of the government and its traditional nationalist duty, therefore disposing of sufficient motives to intervene,

2.2. POLITICAL CONDITIONS

From the historical perspective, the Egyptian regime constituted certain pseudodemocratic institutions in order to create an impression of participation of other political entities than just ruling government on the politics. The real function of those institutions, however, was quite the contrary. They were designed to “preserve the power, prestige, privileges, and importantly, distributional advantage of the dominant elite and its allies at the expense of society.”¹³⁰ Under the Nasser regime, the Liberation Rally, the party dominated by the officers, served basically as an effective tool for indoctrination of the military’s ideology into the public. Also, Nasser created a new kind of executive body which worked as a mediator of the pressure coming from the military organization and as a coordinator of the executive department of the regime. As a result, Egypt represented the most developed praetorian regime in the region.¹³¹ Under Sadat, the military control over the civilian institutions formally weakened as the Parliament, composed of various political parties, had some power over certain policy areas. Moreover, the non-state political groups and movements were allowed to participate in the social spheres without being repressed. However, when the Law 40/1977 that allowed the establishment of the political parties was introduced, it served

¹²⁸ Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Egypt 2013.” 2013. Accessed July 12, 2015.

¹²⁹ Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015.” 2015. Accessed July 11, 2015.

¹³⁰ Cook, Steven A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 6.

¹³¹ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 147-151.

in fact as another tool for manipulation from the military. For an illustration, the then ruling party composed of the military and civilian representatives just changed the name to the National Democratic Party a year after. Therefore, the factual power to influence the political decision-making process was really limited as the NDP represented the majority of the seats and hence maintained the critical power.¹³² Another quite significant, but virtually meaningless pseudodemocratic “innovation” was the presidential elections held in 2005. With the new amendments to the Political Parties Law adopted in 2004, the parties which intended to nominate a candidate were forced to fulfil several criteria in order to do so, such as that they had to be politically active for five consecutive years and obtain at least five percent of the seats in both chambers of the Parliament. As a result, there were only two official presidential candidates, Hosni Mubarak nominated by the NDP and Ayman Nour, the leader of Al-Ghad party. The result of the elections was no surprise: Mubarak received 88 percent of the votes while his opponent gained only 8 percent. Furthermore, as to the parliamentary elections to the lower house in 2005, although the Muslim Brotherhood gained 88 of 454 seats in total, it did not constitute enough seats to disrupt the dominant position of the NDP. Moreover, the real legislative power of the People’s Assembly was questionable as the vast majority of the legislation comes from executive body. The elections to the 264-seat Upper house were similarly circumscribed, with 88 members appointed directly by the president and the rest elected for the six-year mandates.¹³³

After the 2011 revolution, the political system in Egypt slightly improved from 6 to 5 according to Freedom House scale, and therefore gained the ‘Partly Free’ status, mainly as a consequence of two changes: the holding the presidential elections which were to large extent in accordance with the international standards despite several imperfections; and the disempowerment of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).¹³⁴ The situation today indicates the reversion of the regime to the state before 2011. The presidential elections held in May 2014, accompanied by many considerable irregularities, ended triumphantly for Sisi who obtained 96.6 percent of the votes. In spite of formally free course of elections, Eric Bjornlund, president of the organisation monitoring elections, stated that “Egypt’s repressive political environment made a

¹³² Cook, Steven A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 26-69.

¹³³ Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Egypt 2010.” 2010. Accessed July 12, 2015.

¹³⁴ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2013*.

genuinely democratic presidential election impossible,” referring among others to the vast financial and verbal support of Sisi’s candidacy from the state as well as the business elite.¹³⁵

As to the constitutional development, the first constitution ratified in 1956 defined the political system as a “democratic republic”, with sovereignty derived from the people and the guarantee of “liberty, security, safety, and equality of opportunity”.¹³⁶ The constitution also guaranteed essential civil rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression or an independent judiciary. The 1964 constitution built on the previous political definition, expanding the authority of the parliament by the power to withdraw its confidence from the government. In both constitutions, the presidential mandate is endowed with substantial powers, such as “the capacity to dissolve the People’s Assembly, promulgate decrees with the force of law, declare a state of emergency, and command the armed forces.”¹³⁷ The constitution adopted in 1971 continued highlighting the democratic definition of the state, stipulating the sovereignty of the law to be the “only guarantee for the freedom of the individual” as well as the “sole basis for the legality of authority” in the state.¹³⁸ In 1980, the amended constitution identified Islam as the principal religion of the state as well as that the shari’a, Islamic jurisprudence, represents the prime source of Egyptian legislation.¹³⁹ Moreover, other ratified amendments instituted the upper chamber of the parliament – the Majlis ash-Shura – functioning primarily as a consultative body. With the adoption of the 2005 constitution, the considerable change concerning presidential elections was made, allowing the multi-party presidential contest,¹⁴⁰ despite highly restrictive conditions regarding the candidacies as noted above. With widespread success reached by the Islamist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular during the 2005 parliamentary elections, the amendment to the constitution issued in 2007 banned all

¹³⁵ Kirkpatrick, David D., “International Observers Find Egypt’s Presidential Election Fell Short of Standards,” *The New York Times* [online], May 29, 2014. Accessed July 10, 2015.

¹³⁶ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 65.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 66-72.

¹³⁸ „Constitution of the United Arab Republic 1971.” Preamble and Articles 64–65. (in Arabic), (Cairo: al-Ahram Foundation, 1977).

¹³⁹ „Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1980,” (Cairo: State Information Service, May 1980).

¹⁴⁰ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 68.

religion-based political parties in order to prevent them from contesting in the following elections.¹⁴¹

After the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, several constitutive documents have been released, all anchoring the democratic nature of the republic, with the sovereignty derived from the people and Islam as the state religion. The ‘Constitutional Declaration’ adopted in March 2011 introduces several new institutional changes in the aftermath of the regime collapse. For instance, it endowed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces with the power over the administration of the state, which in practice meant that the SCAF had the legislative authority, the representative function of the state internationally as well as domestically, or it had the right to appoint the new cabinet. Moreover, it explicitly defined the mission of the armed forces, characterized as the “property of the people,” to be “the protection of the country and the safety and security of its lands.”¹⁴² In 2012, the constitution which superseded the interim proclamation represented the new regime and thereby fully replaced the constitution from 1971. The most significant changes include the reduction of conditions for the presidential candidates, constitution of the term limitation of the presidential mandate, renewal of judicial control of elections, or the more restricted definition of the conditions necessary in order to declare the state of emergency. However, due to rather vague formulation concerning the military trials, the constitution left space for potential intimidation of civilians.¹⁴³ Regarding the role of the military within the state, the constitution describes them as “a patriotic, professional and neutral institution that does not interfere in political affairs and is the protective shield of the country.”¹⁴⁴ The most recent constitution, approved by the referendum under the Sisi’s rule, on the one hand outlawed the religion-based parties and strengthened the independence of the military from civilian control, e.g. by the requirement of the military background of the defence minister, and on the other formally ameliorated the rights related to the women’s rights and other civil rights a liberties.¹⁴⁵ As in previous constitutional documents, the strong

¹⁴¹ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2010*.

¹⁴² „The 2011 Egyptian Constitutional Declaration,” Article 53, 56. (unofficial translation). Accessed July 13, 2015.

¹⁴³ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2010*.

¹⁴⁴ „The New Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2012,” Preamble (unofficial translation). Accessed July 12, 2015.

¹⁴⁵ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015*.

bound between the army and the people is underlined, referring to the 2011 events as to the time when “our patriotic army delivered victory to the sweeping popular will.”¹⁴⁶

Without a slight doubt, the army represents the vital element of the political regime, especially in a crisis or when it considers its core interests as endangered.¹⁴⁷ In fact, all the Egyptian presidents except for the short-term rule of Morsi were former military officers, often highly respected and therefore to a large extent supported by the armed forces. Moreover, in addition to the presidential mandate, the presidents often “assumed the posts of prime minister, commander of the army, head of the National Security Council, ruling party chief, and chairman of the judiciary,” which led to the creation of “presidential monarchy”¹⁴⁸ with a vast control of the political system by one person. Besides, the political involvement of the officers was indisputable not only at the highest political level, but also in regional politics as the bulk of the regional governors “were senior-ranking military and police officers,” whose major task resided in guaranteeing that “opposition activists do not engage in activities that would undermine political control potentially raze Egypt’s democratic facade, or (worst of all) actually empower political institutions.”¹⁴⁹ Apart from the military organisation, the major source of the support of the regimes derived from strategic groups of technocrats and industrialists.¹⁵⁰ Another effective tool of the intimidation and control of the society and mainly the opposition movements was the use of military tribunals under the Emergency Law. Given that the state of emergency was applied from 1981 until 2012 (and consequently for three months after the 2013 coup), it was a widespread practice.¹⁵¹

As to the interventionist level, at the time of 2011 political shift, the military had a minor interest in direct political control of the state as the upcoming transition period would very likely harm the military prestige and coherence. Instead, its aim was to “stay in the background yet remain an arbitrator; and shun the limelight even as it retains

¹⁴⁶ „Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014,” Preamble (unofficial translation). Accessed July 10, 2015.

¹⁴⁷ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 30.

¹⁴⁸ Karawan, I., *Politics and the Army in Egypt*, 44.

¹⁴⁹ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 26.

¹⁵⁰ Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 132.

¹⁵¹ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015*.

decisive influence.”¹⁵² However, with the landslide victory of Muslim Brotherhood in both parliamentary and presidential elections, the military’s core interest to maintain control over security was seriously threatened. Therefore, encouraged by the public as well as international disapproval of the Morsi’s governance, the military staged another coup and consequently installed an interim government nominally composed of civilian representatives. Hence the political course remained heavily influenced by military. The subsequent massive campaign on support of the former marshal’s candidacy financed from military funds and openly endorsed by military officers led to the certain Sisi’s electoral triumph. Additionally, in connection with the parliamentary elections announced in June 2014, certain measures were adopted in order to disadvantage the more or less institutionalized opposition parties and privilege the regional power brokers associated with the government. The final results allocating 420 of total 567 seats to the nonpartisan candidates and only 120 to party lists proved the pre-election arrangements to be effective.¹⁵³

As noted above, the more the regime used various tools to repress the population and various social movements, the more it became dependent on the security forces. The regimes in Egypt could be defined as highly repressive, leaving little room for citizens to form any cohesive opposition groups that would be capable to challenge the dominant military position. Through the measures such as “restrictive electoral laws, poll rigging, continued limits on the press, and the considerable power of the president,” the regime maintained any political activity effectively circumscribed.¹⁵⁴ Besides, the regime exercised widespread practice of arrest or prosecution of activists in order to preclude them from gaining popularity. By unofficial estimations, the total number of people jailed or detained from political reasons reached 25.000 between 1992 and 1998.¹⁵⁵ The regime also maintained almost total control over the media, with restricted press freedom, state owned major broadcast television and radio stations, and books, theatre plays or films being subject to censorship.¹⁵⁶ Due to rampant corruption permeated through all levels of state administration contributed to decline of already questionable legitimacy of the government. Based on the Corruption Perception Index

¹⁵² International Crisis Group, “Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt’s SCAF,” (Middle East Report N.121, 2012).

¹⁵³ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015*.

¹⁵⁴ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 12-26.

¹⁵⁵ Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Egypt 1998.” 1998. Accessed July 12, 2015.

¹⁵⁶ Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Egypt 2008.” 2008. Accessed July 12, 2015.

(CPI) surveyed by Transparency International, Egypt was ranked 63 out of 99 states in 1999 and 115 out of 180 in 2008.¹⁵⁷ Situation of today has been slowly slipping to the state before 2011. In spite of enhancement of several laws concerning civil rights and liberties, the government even now prevents the activists from gathering or any public dissent, and limits the activity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by various regulations and prohibitions, e.g. the ban on foreign funding, considered as “harm to national interest” under the penalty of life imprisonment and the fine up to \$70,000. Additionally, the ‘independent’ media, owned by pro-Sisi private entities, face huge self-censorship regulations. Over all, according to Freedom House classification, Egypt is characterized as ‘Not Free,’ ranking the political rights by 8 out of 40 and civil liberties by 18 out of 60.¹⁵⁸ As to the corruption status, the CPI of the last four years has markedly fluctuated, reaching the score 94 of 174 states in 2014 in comparison with the score 32 two years ago.¹⁵⁹ Despite everything, the results of the poll, asking Egyptians “whether democracy was more important, or a stable government without full democracy,” indicates that the majority – precisely 54 percent of Egyptians – prefers the stable regime over unstable democracy.¹⁶⁰

In spite of the repression taken particularly against the Muslim Brotherhood, it was increasing in popularity throughout the decades until the landslide presidential and parliamentary victory in 2012. Therefore, in order to gain comprehensive insight to the political situation in Egypt, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood as the only relevant political opponent to the military should be shortly analysed. First of all, founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is indisputably the oldest Islamist organisation in the world, with its principal objective to unite the society under the law and principles of Islam.¹⁶¹ Therefore, the movement emerged parallelly with the rise of Egyptian armed forces, acquiring more than half a million members under the Nasser’s regime and gaining regional recognition,¹⁶² however unlike the military it never assumed the power (until the 2012 elections). During the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood

¹⁵⁷ Amnesty International, “Corruption Perception Index 1998”, 2015. Amnesty International, “Corruption Perception Index 2008,” 2015, both accessed July 10, 2015.

¹⁵⁸ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015*.

¹⁵⁹ Amnesty International, “Corruption Perception Index 2012,” 2015; Amnesty International, “Corruption Perception Index 2014,” 2015, both accessed July 10, 2015.

¹⁶⁰ Vick, K., *Al-Sisi Wins Egypt's Presidency But Is Stumbling Already*.

¹⁶¹ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 10.

¹⁶² Perlmutter, A., *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, 160.

bolstered its reputation by establishing the volunteer units fighting in the wars and, with the ratification of the peace treaty, by open criticism of the settlement with Israel. As a result, they soon represented an important political force that could not be only subject to suppression.¹⁶³ Therefore, since 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood members have been allowed to take part in the parliament in order to boost the pseudodemocratic character of the institution while remaining under the regime's control. However, as a consequence of its presence in the People's Assembly as well as through the control of main professional syndicates, the Muslim Brotherhood became powerful to the extent that they were in a position to question the existing political system.¹⁶⁴ In reaction to that situation, several measures were adopted in order to weaken the Brotherhood's predominance primarily in the syndicates but also its influence in the parliament. Despite the widespread prosecution and arrests of the Brotherhood's members, particularly with the oncoming elections, the Muslim Brotherhood remained the only political force with which the military "must contend and whose interests must be taken into account."¹⁶⁵ Such 'special' treatment was reflected in the fact that the Muslim Brothers have never been condemned to death penalty unlike the members of the Islamic Group.¹⁶⁶ After the Morsi's removal from power, the interim government banned the religious-based political parties, hence precluding the Muslim Brotherhood from participation in political institutions, while almost thousand of its members were sent to jail or forced to exile.¹⁶⁷ With the controversial Morsi's governance suspected from attempt to take over the executive as well as legislative power, the overall popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood has declined. Therefore, the only political group able to face the military backed regime is now ousted from official political participation.

¹⁶³ McGregor, Andrew J., *A military history of modern Egypt: from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*, 247.

¹⁶⁴ ¹⁶⁴ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 88-90.

¹⁶⁵ International Crisis Group, *Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF*, 13.

¹⁶⁶ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 1998*.

¹⁶⁷ „Egypt and its Referendum: Back to the bad habits of the past?," *Economist*, (Cairo, Jan 11th, 2014). Accessed July 9, 2015.

2.3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

This two-part section closely analyses the factors rooted in the general well-being of the state subsequently affecting the public sentiments towards the prevailing regime as well as the military. In Egypt in particular, the social aspects of the armed forces, such as the social structure, recruitment mechanism, or the military reputation and prestige, largely determine its position maintained within the society. As to the military social structure, since 1825, the army has been composed of the *fellahin*, the “resulting class of peasant farmers form[ing] the backbone of the country.”¹⁶⁸ Similarly, the major source of support for the military comes from the countryside, additionally to such groups of Egyptians, either poor or wealthy, for which the guarantee of the stable and relatively secure environment is crucial. On the other hand, the vast majority of the protesters gathered in Cairo or other cities were members of educated middle class.¹⁶⁹ From the historical perspective, the middle class represented less than 10 percent of the population until 1970s. Since then, with the implementation of reforms directed to the industrial modernisation and economic development, the middle class has gained momentum, increasing to 52 percent in 2005 with a drop to 44 percent in 2011.¹⁷⁰ Under those circumstances, the social structure of the army, representing the interests in the long-term of the farmers or other group profiting from the stable regime, has noticed such class shift within its ranks and thus has tended to capture the middle-class interests respectively.

Regarding the recruitment process, historically, the Egyptian armed forces are based on universal conscription. The obliged duration of the service varies from 18 to 36 months. However, for following nine years the men create the compulsory reserve. The age required for the conscription to the military service is between 18 and 30 years for men.¹⁷¹ The conscription basis of the recruitment provides the military with the necessary contacts and position in the society. With practically every man going through the military service, the armed forces has built strong ties to the society, assuming its “duty and [...] responsibility of protecting the homeland”¹⁷² as it is noted in

¹⁶⁸ McGregor, Andrew J., *A military history of modern Egypt: from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*, 79.

¹⁶⁹ International Crisis Group, *Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF*, 16.

¹⁷⁰ Prasad, Naren, „Arab Middle Class and Social Policies: Key to Successful Transition,” *EconoMonitor* [online], 2014. Accessed 10 July, 2015.

¹⁷¹ Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook: Egypt.” 2012. Accessed July 10, 2015.

¹⁷² Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014, Preamble.

the 2014 constitution. Therefore, it partially explained the probable refusal of the military officers and conscripts to intervene against the demonstrators by using coercive measures.¹⁷³ Besides, once becoming the military officers, the only possible career advancement is within the army structure as their entire professional life will be dedicated to the army. Therefore, it is of military primary interest to create incentives to preserve its institutional concerns as well as benefits.¹⁷⁴ In connection with the military modernization and overall development, it is not surprising that the armed forces have identified with the position of modernists introducing major industrial or economic reforms. In fact, such technocratic approach accompanied with scientific progress bolstered the military image connected with advancement. Moreover, the army represents “the only state organization with the capacity to undertake infrastructure development and other public works projects,”¹⁷⁵ hence such types of activities greatly welcomed by public.

Finally, the Egyptian military organisation is distinguished by its prestigious position and positive reputation among the public. The army experienced one major downfall related to the defeat in 1967 during the Six-Day War with Israel. However, from that time on, the military considerably limited its direct political engagement and, consequently regained its legitimacy in absolute victory over Israel in 1973. Based on this experience, the military was not interested in direct involvement in the politics as it would do more harm than good to its privileged role within the regime. Rather, the military maintained its influence on the regime in order to preserve its large economic prerogatives,¹⁷⁶ but preferred to stand aside from direct political decision-making process. Additionally, throughout the years, the military has bolstered its position of a guardian protecting the national sovereignty and dignity. Therefore, the military intentionally preserved the nationalist narrative as to be its key interest, placing “the officers at the centre of struggles against colonialism, external aggression, and the realization of the ‘national will.’”¹⁷⁷ The fact that military preserved its autonomous

¹⁷³ Barany, Z., *The Role of The Military*, 4.

¹⁷⁴ Meitzner, Marcus, “Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt,” *Contemporary Politics* [online], 20, 4 (2014): 444.

¹⁷⁵ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 15.

¹⁷⁶ Albrecht, Holger, Bishara, Dina. “Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt.” *Middle East Law and Governance* [online], 3, 1-2 (2011): 18-22.

¹⁷⁷ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 28.

position in both security and foreign policy enabled it to keep such nationalist posture for decades. Today, majority of the population perceives army to be the most reputable institution in Egypt and the only one being truly bound to the national good.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, despite its ambiguous stance towards the demonstrations organized on January 2011, it was the military that was entrusted by the society with the conduct of democratic transition.¹⁷⁹ Consequently, regarding Morsi's removal from the presidential office, the protesters calling for the termination of government of the Muslim Brotherhood spread posters of the army chief around the cities, referring to him as to "as a font of the dignity and security which they feel Egypt has lacked since Nasser's time."¹⁸⁰ Therefore, such public entrustment of the military to bring about the stability to the state represented indisputably one of the interventionist motives.

As to the economic development and general welfare of the state, since the *inifah*, or economic opening in 1970s, Egypt has undergone liberalization process without the introduction of market economic principles. Therefore, the businessmen have been closely tied to the state as their fortune maintained under the state control.¹⁸¹ Under the Mubarak's rule, since 1990s the regime continued opening the economy through various privatization and deregulation policies, followed by the reforms between 2004 and 2008 aiming at the attraction of foreign investments and stimulation of economic growth.¹⁸² Therefore, through the privatization and business incentives, the military has even more strengthened its influence by expanding the business to other areas. However, the Mubarak's probable successor, Gamal Mubarak, favouring the etatist ideas and thereby centralized economy, would likely put an end to the ongoing liberalization process. What's more important, Gamal's proposed economic privatization schemes would dismantle the military business holdings.¹⁸³ Therefore, the events of January 2011 to a certain extent played into the army's hands as it would prevent Gamal Mubarak from assuming the presidential office. In other words, the potential succession of presidential office by Gamal would vastly endanger the army's

¹⁷⁸ Tewfik, Aclimandos, "Egyptian Army: Defining a New Political and Societal Pact," *Aljazeera Centre for Studies*, 2011. Accessed July 7, 2015.

¹⁷⁹ Meitzner, M., *Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt*, 448.

¹⁸⁰ The Economist. *Egypt's Army: Ambitious Men in Uniform*.

¹⁸¹ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 143.

¹⁸² Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook: Egypt*.

¹⁸³ Nepstad, S. E., *Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria*, 342.

economic interests, representing another motive which contributed to the willingness of the military to intervene.

Regarding the linkage between military and economy, it is estimated that army's business comprises between 10 percent and 40 percent of the state's GDP, "most likely making it the economically most important actor of the country."¹⁸⁴ The range of business activities in which the military is involved is wide: according S. Tadros from Al Jazeera (2012), it owns more than 35 factories producing "everything from flat screen televisions and pasta to refrigerators and cars. It owns restaurants and football grounds... And it is not just manufactured goods: the military provides services, managing petrol stations for example."¹⁸⁵ Therefore, the military could easily exert big economic leverage on the existing regime or could act as an ally, such as during the societal turbulences in 2008 when the military distributed the bread to help Mubarak's regime to manage the situation. Moreover, the military attracts foreign investors through its various joint ventures, and hence generates important income for the state. Besides, the military utilizes its business activities as an effective instrument of socio-economic power. For an illustration, as a reaction to the democratic transitional process, the SCAF attempted in the first place to secure the military's business interests through its isolation from the democratic unrest,¹⁸⁶ the settlement of the situation was of its secondary interest at the moment. Consequently, the vision of the economic development of the elected government considerably differed from the existing practices, such as costly subsidization of military enterprises. In addition to that, the Muslim Brotherhood overtly criticized the prevailing conditions, and hence threatened the economic interests of the military officers.¹⁸⁷ Among others, such actions planned by Muslim Brotherhood also represented another motive contributory to the second military intervention.

Another factor determining the army's influence on the government stems from the military budget making as well as from the overall expenditures on the armed

¹⁸⁴ Stier, Ken, „Egypt's Military-Industrial Complex," *The Times* (September 2, 2011). Accessed July 2, 2015.

¹⁸⁵ Tadros, Sherine, "Egypt military's economic empire," *Al Jazeera*, (February 15, 2012). Accessed July 10, 2015.

¹⁸⁶ Mietzner, Marcus, "Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt," *Contemporary Politics* [online]. 2014, 20(4): 442-443.

¹⁸⁷ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 80.

forces. Around the 1960s and 1970s, the military budget comprised a significant part of the state budget, rising from 7.4 percent of the GNP in the beginning of 1960s up to 21 percent by the 1970s,¹⁸⁸ particularly due to the ongoing conflict with Israel. Today, the military expenditures represent approximately 1.7 percent of the GDP, ranking Egypt by 54 out of 133 states.¹⁸⁹ As to the budget making, the 2012 constitution has adopted such measures that prevent the military budget as well as its economic interests from possible governmental interventions. Consequently with Sisi assuming the presidential office, the military making process has become almost opaque with respect to the government operations towards the armed forces.¹⁹⁰ Given that the budget making lacks transparency and military key interests are to a certain extent independent from the governmental influence, the armed forces have managed to maintain its privileged economic position at the state level as well as within the society.

2.4. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

Concerning the external influence, Egypt has benefited over a long period from diplomatic and particularly economic relations with the United States. Egypt receives the financial assistance of US\$1.3 billion annually which makes it the second largest recipient of the US military aid after Israel.¹⁹¹ It enables military officers to modernize the army's equipment as well as weaponry and thereby strengthen its role as a guarantor of the Israeli-Egyptian peace in the region. At the same time, the Egypt constitutes a "crucial subsidy for the U.S. defence industry" as well as important market for U.S. goods, therefore the U.S. military aid is often depicted as unconditional or even 'untouchable', "provided the regime of Hosni Mubarak with very effective leverage against attempts to change the way the United States grants aid."¹⁹² Especially extremist Islamist movements or the most powerful Islamist party in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, are openly against the very existence of Israel and hence the relations with the United States and thereby, given the opportunity without any limitation, they would very likely

¹⁸⁸ Dessouki, Ali, El-Labban, Adel, "Arms Race, Defense Expenditures, and Development," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (1981): 70– 75.

¹⁸⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook: Egypt*.

¹⁹⁰ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015*.

¹⁹¹ U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action. „Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” 2015, Accessed July 12, 2015, 3.

¹⁹² Berger, L. "Guns, Butter, and Human Rights--The Congressional Politics of U.S. Aid to Egypt." *American Politics Research* [online]. 2012, 40(4): 607-8.

restart the conflict. Naturally, it is in the key interest of the armed forces not to antagonize the US and rather maintain the stable political environment. When looking into the past, the assassination of the president Sadat by the Islamist extremist was directed against his peace accord with the Israeli counterpart. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, notwithstanding the possible repercussions, “refused to break Egypt’s relations with Israel over that country’s invasion of Lebanon”¹⁹³ in order to retain good relations with the US. At the same time, the Mubarak regime also profited from the anti-Semitic sentiments within the society which were rarely challenged or suppressed. Consequently, in connection with the domestic as well as international appeal towards the amelioration of the existing poor Egypt’s performance regarding human rights, several liberals within the U.S. Congress called for the reassessment of the conditions concerning the U.S.-Egyptian relations,¹⁹⁴ however until the events of 2011 and later, the extent of the U.S. military aid was practically untouched.

In the course of the January 2011 demonstrations, the question of human rights became more topical as well as the unwillingness of the congress to further support the Mubarak regime. Therefore, in case of the Mubarak regime support during the revolution, the military as the major recipient of the U.S. aid faced the likely withdrawal or radical cut of the U.S. financial assistance which basically positioned the Egypt’s army among the well-equipped and hence the most sophisticated armed forces in the world.¹⁹⁵ On the contrary, the U.S. responded to the events of August 2013, when the government backed by Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) ordered to kill several hundreds of Morsi supporters, by suspension of part of the financial aid.¹⁹⁶ With the U.S. attempt to condition the aid to a certain extent with regard to the human rights situation in the country, the reduction practically comprised the freeze of the supply of military equipment to Egypt and other provisions. Subsequently, in March 2015 the president Obama fully restored the aid when marshal Sisi took charge of the government, arguing by the importance of the U.S.-Egypt relations for the stability of

¹⁹³ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 23.

¹⁹⁴ Berger, L., *Guns, Butter, and Human Rights--The Congressional Politics of U.S. Aid to Egypt*, 627.

¹⁹⁵ See for example Kechichian, Joseph, Nazimek, Jeanne, “Challenges to the military in Egypt,” *Middle East Policy* 5, 3 (1997): 125–139; Hashim, Ahmed, “The Egyptian military, part two: From Mubarak onward,” *Middle East Policy* 18, 4 (2011): 106–128; Gelvin, James L., *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs To Know*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): p. 210.

¹⁹⁶ Meitzner, Marcus, *Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt*, 447.

the Middle East region, irrespective to the accusation concerning human right violations and political constraints.¹⁹⁷ Both the cases of peril of the U.S. military assistance contributed to the augmented interest of the military to take such steps, even to intervene, so as to restore the good relations with the United States.

As a result, the military interest in preserving the US financial support directly affects the political decision-making process of the state in favour of the regional and internal status quo. Nevertheless, the aid does not anyhow assist in the democratization process or to the enhancement of the human rights, rather it proved its counterproductive role in this respect. At the same time, the aid aimed at modernization of the army greatly contributes to the overall strengthening of the military position within the state. The armed forces are thereby perceived as a credible, legitimate organisation characterized by high level of institutionalization and modernization. For this reason, the officers turned political actors may become more preferable leaders than the elected civilian governments due to their massive support from the armed forces as well as the public as well as their actual capability of maintaining the order within the state, unlike other political actors.

2.5. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FACTOR

Regardless of the two world wars, the Middle East region underwent a great period of instability during the decolonisation process as well as in connection with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Since then, Egypt was involved in four Arab-Israeli conflicts, while only in the last one Egypt came out of the combat victoriously. The overwhelming defeat of the Egyptian armed forces in Sinai during the Six-Day War in 1967 was completely shocking and humiliating experience for both the military leaders and the officer turned politicians. It was the turning point for the Egyptian civil-military relations to the effect that army deemed responsible for the failure and thereafter began to limit its direct involvement in the politics. The military regained its legitimacy during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 as it retrieved the Sinai from Israel. As the military restored the powerful position in the Middle East, Egypt

¹⁹⁷ See Dryer, Geoff, "US restored Egypt military aid," *Financial Times* [online], April 1, 2015, accessed July 11, 2015; Rampton, Roberta, Arshad, Mohammed, "Obama ends freeze on U.S. military aid to Egypt," *Reuters* [online], March 31, 2015, accessed July 20, 2015.

could effectively negotiate the conditions of the peace treaty with Israel in 1978 which successfully resolved Egypt's major external threat. Since then, Egypt has not been directly involved in any international armed conflict. However, as Egypt borders on Gaza Strip from the northern corner of Sinai, it has been experiencing enormous difficulties with securing the area and forestalling the ongoing flow of weaponry and combatants to Gaza, especially during the Gaza War in 2008-2009. In October 2014, hundreds of houses in the area were destroyed in order to suppress the raising armed insurgency and preclude the transfer.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, with the rise of Islamist state of Syria (ISIS), Egypt exposed to an increased probability of terrorist attack on its territory as well as the outflow of the recruited Islamist militants from among Egyptians.

In regard to domestic security, until 2011 the political regime in Egypt was basically backed by the armed forces with practically no legitimacy. For example, in 1977 during "Bread Riots," the armed forces intervened in order to restore order in the country and thus backed up Sadat's regime which was confronted by potentially huge political crisis.¹⁹⁹ Apart from that, Egypt's greatest source of inner security instability stems from the northern corner of Sinai, which has become the haven of the various terrorist organizations as well as other insurgent groups and has been hardly under the control of the government. Besides the Islamist insurgency and the activity of several isolated gangs in the area, Egypt experienced several terrorist attacks in the 1990s, for example the bombing killing 2,000 people or the massacre of 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997.²⁰⁰ The likelihood of the terrorist attack has increased with the rise of the ISIS and the general destabilization of the region due to the Islamic state's expansion. Furthermore, Muslim Brotherhood represents another source of instability for the regime, challenging the political leaders by its nonviolent activities and rising popularity. Such kind of domestic threat, though of rather political than security character, also contributed to the weakening of existing political institutions and strengthening of the military control. However, unlike in case of members of Islamist Group, the representatives of Muslim Brotherhood were never executed²⁰¹ due to the potential wave of protests it might evoke. During the most recent wave of protest which became fatal for the regime of Hosni Mubarak, the army proved to be indispensable as it

¹⁹⁸ Freedom in the World: Egypt 2015. *Freedom House* [online], 2015. Accessed July 12, 2015.

¹⁹⁹ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 73.

²⁰⁰ "Egypt's rulers: A history lesson." *The Economist* [online]. Cairo, 2014. Accessed July 12, 2015.

²⁰¹ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Egypt 1998*.

took over the control when the internal security forces were “over-powered in fierce street battles” and consequently collapsed.²⁰² After the initial period of military ambiguity concerning its stance towards the protests, the only coercive force on the side of the Mubarak regime and fighting against the protesters was police,²⁰³ contributing to the highest degree to the overall death toll mainly among protesters. Therefore, the events of 2011 on can be definitely depicted as a high internal threat, in fact representing the biggest such interference into inner stability since the Nasser’s takeover in 1952.

Figure 6: The Changing Security Environment in Egypt, 1948 – present:

		External threats	
		High	Low
Internal threats	High	1948-1952 2008-2009 (Q3)	1976-1977 1990s 2011- (Q4)
	Low	1952-1976 (Q1)	1977-1990 2000-2008 (Q2)

Using the Desch’s classification in Figure 6, Egyptian security environment was more or less stable between 1977 and 1990²⁰⁴ with the following period of the inner instability caused by the extended terrorist activity and accompanied by several devastating attacks. The period between 2000 and 2008 can be characterized by the time of low internal as well as external threats, followed by the two years of increased external threat environment caused by the Gaza conflict and the associated weapon and other smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula. Between 2011 and 2013, Egypt experienced the time of high internal destabilization, which contributed to the strengthening of the military position within the Egyptian society. Since the landslide

²⁰² Albrecht, Holger, Bishara, Dina. *Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt*, 15.

²⁰³ Nepstad, S. E., *Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria*, 347.

²⁰⁴ The assassination of President Sadat in 1981 is not considered to be significantly disruptive in terms of inner threat environment as it was one-off event.

victory of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the political regime has been more or less stabilized and so has been the domestic security environment concerning the revolutionary tendencies. The current source of internal threat is now the powerful Islamist state located in nearby Syria, whose ideological power and expansionist influence largely worsens the already unstable situation at Sinai Peninsula and contributes to the rise of various Islamist terrorist groups.

2.6. SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS

Based on the study, the position of the armed forces within the Egyptian society was profoundly examined in order to understand the conceptual level of the analysis. The five factors explained the prestigious role of the army in Egypt, rooted in the historical development of the country, the colonial legacy and its political direct and indirect involvement, but also grounded on the long-term exquisite reputation and huge economic involvement. Additionally, the technological advancement of the military as well as its rather high-level professionalism endorses the overall perception of the military as a safeguard of the nation and the state. In that connection, the activities of the army connected with the external threats mainly during the Israeli-Arab conflict and internal threats associated with the rise of terrorism and the post-2011 events only strengthened the impression of the military nationalist mission. Supported by the enormous U.S. military aid directly targeted at the amelioration of the technical equipment and weaponry, the army constitutes the most powerful force able to secure the state stability. Concerning the historical development, it shows that the military has changed several forms of regime, being for long time stabilized in the “quasi-civilianized type.”²⁰⁵ The breaking point for the direct military political involvement represented the crushing defeat in Six Day War in 1967 and since then on the military has tended to stay aside from the politics while at the same time making sure its interests and stakes have not been anyhow endangered.

As to the interventionist level of the 2011 events, the cumulation of the motives, such as possible succession of the Mubarak’s son, Gamal, and hence the adoption of the reforms threatening the military interests, the U.S. financial assistance jeopardized by

²⁰⁵ Finer, Samuel E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 186.

the decision to side the falling Mubarak regime, the endangerment of the reputation of the military among the public, and its traditional nationalist duty, have contributed to the army's final decision to support the protesters instead of the existing regime, despite many long-term especially economic guarantees granted by Hosni Mubarak to the military. In fact, the military happened to be placed into rather unfavourable position as it was at the moment unprepared for such convulsion and hence there was clearly low level of *disposition* as for the army. That is to say that the military in fact benefitted from the existing conditions under the Hosni Mubarak's regime with its economic interests secured while its reputation was not threatened by being directly involved in the politics. On the other hand, concerning the *opportunity*, the abrupt progress of the revolution provided the ideal timing for the military intervention. Despite military rather ambiguous position in the beginning of the protests, the army happened to become "a mere passenger of the unfolding events rather than a driver of change," however soon enough it took over the situation and acted as a "to a fully-fledged constitutional actor by March 30."²⁰⁶ Moreover, according to Nepstad (2013), the final decision of the army to side with the demonstrators rather with the regime was determined by "economic motivations, the perception of regime fragility, and the belief that defectors would not be punished,"²⁰⁷ while basically only the police force under the direct Mubarak's control came down on the side of the old regime. Also, unlike during the protests in 1977, the momentum of the demonstrations in January 2011 reached such degree when it was no longer able to preserve the existing regime without heavy casualties and suppression of the society, which would gravely affect the reputation of the military. Therefore, soon enough the military assumed the decisive role in the determining the state's new political development, endowing SCAF with the considerable legislative and political powers and after the elections it acted as a 'watchdog' of the consequent political development.

Concerning the motives leading to the second military intervention, the increasing demand of the public calling for the overthrow of the Morsi's government, the planned constitutive and other actions aiming at limitation of military budgetary independency, and the potential following reforms endangering military economic

²⁰⁶ Albrecht, H., Bishara, D., *Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt*, 17-23.

²⁰⁷ Nepstad, S. E., *Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria*, 343.

interests, all those motives contributed to the another military political interference in such short time. The installed and later on elected government with Sisi as a president only demonstrated the willingness of the people to lower the democratic requirement in exchange for the stable government. The diversion from democratic orientation of the country is demonstrated for example by the law precluding religious-based political parties from the participation in elections, limitation of the activities of NGOs or by the pro-Sisi orientation of the major media in the country. According to Karawan (1996), “the military’s role during [the] critical juncture may prove to be a major determinant of the direction of Egyptian politics”²⁰⁸ which so far exactly explains the situation after 2013. Sisi, the former military man, has assumed the highest political position in the state, strongly financially and otherwise supported by the military, and until now he has enjoyed relatively high public support even despite the fact that Egypt is ranked as “Not Free” according to Freedom House.

²⁰⁸ Karawan, Ibrahim, *Egypt*, 118.

CONCLUSION

The diploma thesis closely analysed the civil-military relations of the state undergoing transition with traditionally well-established position of the army within the society on one hand but rather weak and unstable civilian institutions on the other hand. On the basis of the two varying levels; the contextual level concerning the factors of the civil-military relations in Egypt with the objective to determine the actual role the military played during the 2011 events, and the interventional level with the objective to find out the motives which were decisive in carrying out two latest military interventions.

As to the contextual level, the factors such as long-term development, historical legacy from colonial and post-colonial period, pseudodemocratic political institutions unable to alternate the actual power, constitutional definitions strengthening the independency of the military from the political influence, repressive measures applied on the society in order to minimize the rise of alternative political parties or social movements, vast economic interests of the military officers, the overall high credibility of the army among the public and its association with the national interests, huge foreign financial assistance contributing to the general enhancement of the military as a professional as well as a bureaucratic organisation, and the present internal security threats the only military is capable of dealing with, provide with the complex explanation to the question why it is the army that usually assumes key role during the transitional process in the states with low political culture. Consequently, due to rather undeveloped civilian institutions, for long time precluded from actual participation in decision-making process under the authoritarian regime prior to the transition, “civilians will most likely have neither sufficient capabilities nor compelling incentives to confront the military” and subsequently limit its power on the decision-making processes during the transition.²⁰⁹ In fact, the pseudodemocratic institutions, such as “elections, parliaments, human rights commissions, and formally independent judiciaries represent some of the principle means through which authoritarian leaders co-opt, deflect, and delegitimize their political opponents,” in fact strengthen the authoritarian regime rather than indicate the democratization process within the

²⁰⁹ Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., *Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies*, 211.

regime.²¹⁰ Hence, during the transition it is usually the military that takes the lead in the democratization process, assuming the arbitrator position with the objective to hand over the political power to the civilian government when the situation is stabilized.

As to the interventionist level reflecting the willingness of the military to intervene, the cumulation of more of those factors largely contributes to increase of the pro-interventionist tendencies of the army, principally securing its own interests as well bolstering its perception of a safeguard of the nation putting its protective hand over the well-being of the state and the people. Therefore, as shown in the recent development in Egypt, the combination of the factors of public unrest causing internal security instability, the army's economic interests threatened by the succession of the presidential office by Gamal Mubarak, and the actual endangerment of the U.S. military assistance representing the irreplaceable financial source to the Egypt's military organisation, played a decisive role in overthrowing Mubarak's regime and establishing the democratizing path. In this case, despite the lack of *disposition* factors on the side of the army, the 2011 situation creates the ideal conditions for the *occasion* for military intervention. Subsequently, the government of Muslim Brotherhood which intended to limit the military power by introducing steps such as to control the military budget making represented the direct threat to the military relatively autonomous position within the political decision-making process. Along with the wide public dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood performance and the partial suspension of the supply of military equipment from the U.S., all those factors contributed to both the *disposition* as well as the *occasion* favouring the military intervention.

In case of the last research question, regarding the maintaining of direct political power by the military for longer time than needed, the answer is found by the combination of the contextual and the interventionist factors. The reputation as well as the overall professionalism of the military organisation may be gravely harmed as it would be the army directly responsible for any political decisions. By the example of the devastating defeat of the military forces during the Six Day War in 1967, it is shown that the army's primary function to secure the state was undermined by its political involvement, diffusing the military focus by its participation in government. As for that reason, since that time the Egyptian military hold back from the direct political

²¹⁰ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 135.

involvement, even hesitating at the very beginning of the 2011 events to step out and let the Mubarak regime fall. Therefore, the most favourable position the military in such praetorian regime assumes is to act as *éminence grise*, keeping itself in the background and intervene in the situation when it deemed necessary. In this point, the factors of the interventionist level play the primary role in the decision to intervene, while the factors of the conceptual level determine the position of the army as holding back from direct political participation.

As shown by the analysis of civil-military relations in Egypt, the military with no doubt will continue to play a decisive role in political development of the state, whether directed towards the democratization or to slipping into the authoritarian regime prior 2011. As under the existing circumstances characterized by low political culture and undeveloped civilian institutions, there is little chance that Egypt will in short- or medium-term successfully complete the path towards the democracy. If Egypt decides to restore its democratization efforts, with high probability it will be the military leading the process, while at the same time ensuring that its interests will not be harmed. According to Cook, only the sufficiently strong external stimulant can change the existing civil-military relations within the state, constituting the 'positive conditionality' in order to initiate real democratic transformation.²¹¹ By the complete withdrawal of the U.S. military aid, the military will lose crucial source of technological advancement and financial support. Hypothetically, such step could contribute to the weakening of the military position within the state, leaving the space for other political actors to take a lead. At the same time, such scenario is rather unlikely as it would jeopardize the Egypt-Israel peace and hence the already shaky stability within the region, already challenged by the emergence of Islamic state.

²¹¹ Cook, S. A., *Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 148.

SHRNUTÍ

Tato práce se zabývá analýzou civilně-vojenských vztahů ve státech charakterizovaných nízkou úrovní politické kultury. Primárně se zaměřuje na společnosti procházející demokratizačním procesem, kde armáda tradičně zaujímá silnou pozici ve státě, a tudíž se tak často stává klíčovým aktérem stojícím v čele tranzice. Za hlavní předmět zkoumání práce je stanovena role armády v době přechodu k demokracii. Zároveň si práce pokládá několik výzkumných otázek, které vedou k objasnění pozice armády, jejích zájmů a pohnutek rozhodujících o případné vojenské intervenci. V rámci této práce je stanoveno pět určujících faktorů vycházející z teoretické části, které se významně podílí na určování civilně-vojenských vztahů v demokratizujících se státech. Tyto faktory jsou: historická zkušenost a vývoj, politické okolnosti, socio-ekonomické aspekty, zahraniční vliv a v neposlední řadě faktor bezpečnostního prostředí. Následně jsou odděleně aplikovány na vybranou případovou studii civilně-vojenských vztahů v Egyptě, na základě dvou úrovní: kontextuální s cílem určit skutečnou roli armády během událostí 2011 dále a intervenční s cílem zjistit pohnutky, které ji vedly k uskutečnění dvou vojenských převratů.

Co se týče kontextuální roviny analýzy, faktory prokázané jako určující v objasnění klíčové role armády během demokratizačního procesu ve státech s nízkou politickou kulturou jsou následující: dlouhodobý vývoj a historické dědictví primárně z koloniální a post-koloniálního období, pseudodemokratický charakter politických institucí nedovolující alternaci skutečné politické moci, ústavní vymezení posilující nezávislost armády na politickém vlivu, represivní opatření aplikované na společnost za účelem minimalizace vzestupu alternativních politických stran a sociálních hnutí, rozsáhlé ekonomické zájmy vojenských funkcionářů ve státě, obecně vysoká důvěryhodnost armády mezi veřejností a její spojení s ochranou národních zájmů, značná zahraniční finanční pomoc přispívající k obecnému posílení armády jako profesionální složky stejně jako byrokratické organizace, a v neposlední řadě přítomné interní bezpečnostní hrozby, které je pouze armáda schopna konfrontovat.

V rámci druhé, intervenční úrovně bylo zjištěno, že především nahromaděním více faktorů se zvyšuje příklon armády k vojenské intervenci, primárně se snahou o ochranu svých vlastních zájmů stejně jako za účelem podpořit veřejné vnímání armády

jako ochránce národa. Na příkladu Egypta lze určit, že během první intervence hrála významnou roli kombinace těchto faktorů: občanské nepokoje destabilizující interní bezpečnostní prostředí, ohrožení ekonomických zájmů armády nástupem Gamala Mubaraka na prezidentský post, a v neposlední řadě ohrožení vojenské pomoci Spojených států v případě podpory upadajícího režimu Husního Mubaraka. V rámci druhé vojenské intervence k ní přispěly tyto faktory: snaha Muslimského bratrstva o omezení vojenské moci například kontrolou armádního rozpočtu, částečné pozastavení zásobování egyptské armády Spojenými státy, které nesouhlasily s okolnostmi vlády Muhammada Mursího a také široká nespojenost veřejnosti se soudobým politickým vedením.

Na poslední výzkumnou otázku, co brání armádě k absolutnímu převzetí moci ve státě, je pak potřeba uplatnit obě roviny výzkumu. Armáda v pretoriánském státu jako je Egypt zaujímá primárně pozici jakési šedé eminence, dohlížející na vývoj ve státě. Pouze v případě ohrožení jejích nebo národních zájmů se rozhodne zakročit. Zda-li dojde nebo nedojde k intervenci ovlivňují faktory intervenční úrovně, přičemž faktory konceptuální roviny determinují pozici armády v rámci daného pretoriánského režimu, držící se stranou od přímého politického zapojení.

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