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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF MILITARY RISE OF CHINA

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Abstrakt

Podoba čínského vojenského vzestupu bude bezpečnostní otázkou 21. století. Čínská ekonomika roste od doby uvolňování raketovým tempem a její implikací je vojenský rozmach čínské armády, která nabývá na síle díky vzrůstající kvalitě a díky strategickému akvizičnímu procesu zmenšuje vojenskou mezeru v porovnání s vyspělými státy.

Čínská vojenská regionální dominance začíná být veřejně akceptována a američtí stratégové se snaží přijít na to, jak Číně udržet na uzdě a přimět ji k dodržování mezinárodních závazků. Čína, přes veškeré spory, ať už historické nebo aktuální, ubezpečuje ostatní členy mezinárodního prostředí, že její vzestup, ať už ekonomický nebo vojenský, je vzestupem mírovým.

Nicméně její akviziční proces, ať už je veden z domácích nebo zahraničních zdrojů, způsobuje obavy nejen v samotném regionu, ale také z globálního hlediska.

Tato diplomová práce přistupuje k čínskému vojenskému vzestupu z alternativního hlediska. Pomoci koncepce Scotta Sagana, se snaží vysvětlit čínský vojenský vzestup z pohledu tří modulů aplikovaných na různé doktrinální období Čínské lidové republiky.

Tři moduly vysvětlují čínský akviziční proces motivace k nákupu zbraní a zbraňových systémů z bezpečnostního, vnitropolitického a normativního hlediska. Práce předpokládá, že lze Saganův koncept, který je zaměřen na vysvětlení akvizičního procesu jaderných zbraní, aplikovat také na zdůvodnění akvizičního procesu zbraní konvenčních.

Abstract

The question of China's military rise will be the security issue of the 21st century. Chinese economy has been growing since open door policies were introduced and

its implications is the military expansion of China's military, which is gaining strength. Thanks to its weapon acquisition process, China's power gap has been shrinking in comparison to other, developed countries.

China's regional military dominance is beginning to be publicly accepted and American strategists are trying to figure out how to keep China respect its international obligations. Despite all disputes, whether historical or current, China assures the other members of the international environment, that her rise, whether economic or military, is a peaceful rise.

However, China's acquisition process, whether it is led from domestic or foreign sources, causes concerns not only within the region but also from a global perspective.

This thesis approaches the Chinese military rise from an alternative perspective. In Sagan design, the thesis tries to explain China's military rise by three modules applied to various doctrinal periods of the People's Republic of China. Three modules explain China's acquisition process from three perspectives - security, domestic political and normative terms.

The work assumes that can Sagan's concept, which is aimed at explaining the process of acquisition of nuclear weapons, can also apply to the rationale of the acquisition process of conventional weapons.

Klíčová slova

Čína, čínský vojenský vzestup, akviziční proces, zbraňové zakázky

Keywords

China, China's military rise, acquisition process, weapon procurement

Prohlášení

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3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne 31. VII. 2015 **Milan Kilík**

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INTRODUCTION

This master thesis addresses two critical questions - one theoretical and one practical. On one side, it deals with the theoretical framework of China's weapon acquisition processes through the different principal doctrines of PRC, on the other, the practical section is devoted to China's military development and more generally, China's military rise and its weapon procurement through a process tracing approach.

Military expenditures and weapon acquisition have causes and consequences and having an accurate answer for both reasons of military hardware and weaponry acquisition of a state in general, China in particular, is critically important to understanding the security environment on the field of international relations. A sovereign state's military buildup, with or without any justifiable rationale, still causes uncertainty and is challenging for the current international system. The need for deep understanding of different positions, and especially the drivers behind it, may bring us closer to understand certain outcomes. In reality, the most common answer for the question of why states acquire or build military capabilities is due to national security reasons. That is to protect themselves from adversaries and limit threats aimed at the existential core objectives by maximizing the power gap between themselves and powers of equitable strength. More broadly speaking, this realpolitik behavior is a natural result of states that exercise their power in uncertain anarchical environment where states are unsure of the material capabilities and intentions of other sovereign states.

Thus, maintaining existential security has become the ultimate aim and prerequisite for fulfilling crucial objectives. This has remained unchanged since the creation of first states and remains applicable today. Nevertheless, there are two other major IR schools that provide us with competing arguments and bring the discussion of weapon procurement into clarification.

Besides the realpolitik behavioral explanation of security, domestic politics and norms also play a significant role in fulfilling security objectives. As Alastair Johnson argues, classical realist and neorealist ideology *"are unsatisfactory because both have difficulty accounting for the considerable volume and consequentiality of non-realpolitik behavior."*[1] Due to the competitive explanations, domestic politics and norms contribute to their share in shaping politics. For such a reason, individuals responsible for weapon acquisition process might not only seek to satisfy states security needs, but are also influenced by domestic actors such as members of the political and military establishment, lobby or even the mass public which leads to bureaucratization of the process. In other words, when some of those actors form a coalition and put direct or indirect pressure through established channels on current decision-making individuals, the weapon acquisition program will likely thrive, regardless of the national security requirements. In addition, bureaucratic actors are characterized as lobbying individuals creating conditions for defense budget and military spending increases by overestimating foreign threat perception. Those actors are either part of the decision-making or policy-making body and their bargaining power is relevant.[2]

Some military capabilities are not acquired for the security or bureaucratic interest reasons, rather because some capabilities are regarded as symbols of strength and reflect the modern identity of state. They are constructed as symbols that heighten international prestige. This normative approach is driven by government leaders in effort to obtain a more prestigious position within the international system.

This theoretical division of reasons behind weapon acquisition process refers to Scot Sagan's distinction, which he made in his article Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons.[3] Sagan provides the audience an empirical study explanation, based on three different models while explaining why states seek to acquire or build a nuclear warhead. Sagan's concept works with three different alternative theoretical frameworks called models, particularly the security model, domestic

[1] Johnston, 1996.
[2] Regarding Sagan, there is no well-developed domestic political theory that identifies channels of influence and coalition formation that produce their desirable outcomes.
[3] Sagan, 1996.

politics model and the norms model. Sagan's concept is directly linked to the nuclear question, hence the thesis assumes that Sagan's framework can be applied and extended to the question of why do states build or try to acquire any kind of weapons – thus putting conventionality in place of analysis as well. Taking over Sagan's approach and applying it to Chinese military rise through reasons of weapon procurement will provide the alternative explanation of military rise of China.

Competing Explanation Of The Weapon Acquisition

Dividing the explanation of military procurement into three categories i) security, ii) domestic politics and iii) norms is not unwarranted. While Scott Sagan's article about nuclear proliferation may be seminal in this respect and was an inspiration for this study, Sagan is not the only one to use it. In addition to Sagan, Evron and Ball also refuse the pure security interpretations for weapon acquisition.

Yoram Evron approaches China's military procurement with similar perspective. Evron identifies three different approaches, called factors, in explaining China's military acquisition processes, particularly the strategic factor, political factor and cultural factor, giving the thesis reliable base for alternative weaponry acquisition explanation.[4]

Continuously, Desmond Ball in his article Arms and Affluence not only refused to characterize the security environment in Asia after post Cold War period as an arms race-feasible, even after selected nations have risen their defence budgets by double digits, which could by given circumstances evolve into the perception of security dilemma.[5] Ball furthermore identified several, other then security reasons and their drivers for military acquisition process in the Asia-Pacific Region.[6] One of the most important facts Ball stressed is that any single-factor explanation for the robust weaponry acquisition programs is not applicable, rather the participation of military buildup in Asia after the Cold War is directly shaped, to a greater or lesser extend, by several other factors – including security, domestic politics but also norms factor.[7] In addition, Ball in his field of study identifies that typical realist views, as threat perception and arms race were less determinate factor in accordance to military acquisition process interpretation.[8]

[4] Evron, 2012.
[5] See Liff and Ikenberry, 2014.
[6] For security dilemma see Herz, 1950.
[7] See Ball, 1993. p. 81
[8] See Ball, 1993.

Regarding competitive weapon acquisition, Scott Sagan holds a very similar point of view. Although his primary focus in the article is to answer the question of why do states build nuclear weapons, it does not mean it cannot be applied to conventional weapons as well. Sagan not only criticizes the near-consensus view of policy-makers regarding nuclear weapon acquisition stating that *"states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means,"*[9] but also identifies that other then security, less obvious reasons, can play significant role, too.[10] Balls and Sagan's words somehow strengthen Evron's arguments and overall create a strong base for Sagan's interpretation.

Evron also notes that in some cases (he particularly mentions China's) military procurement efforts can be influenced by reduced sense of threat, lack of strategic objectives or too much emphasis on self-reliance that factually leads towards nominal decrease of military strength.[11] In other words, the recently acquired capabilities do not have to comply with the military demands to satisfy given objectives as weapons are meant to enable military forces to accomplish their mission.

The thesis further argues that the weapon acquisition process is not only designed to reflect the realpolitik security explanations, but rather the combination of realpolitik and non-realpolitik phenomenon. For this explanation it is needed to take into the account the domestic politic factor and normative as well to get the broader perspective of weapon acquisition process through the recent history of China.

Security

The security reasons for military hardware acquisition might be based upon several realist phenomena including security dilemma. The interpretations of

[9] Sagan, 1996.
[10] According to many policy-makers is the answer so obvious that they do not seek for deeper and competitive interpretation. The basic argument is that the fundamental motivation of weapon acquisition is that state security will be strengthened. See Deutsch, 1984. And also Shulz, 1984.
[11] Evron, 2012.

causes of security dilemma are closely related to military hardware acquisition.[12] In addition, there are different aspects that play key roles in its reasoning, specifically military modernization and arms race that by nature gives state legitimization aspect for its military buildup.

Geoffrey Till argues that the status of an arms race is associated with political tensions created by rapid and unsure military conditions of procurement and is pointed at high strategic stake of the state. Nevertheless, he also stresses that rapidity of military procurement does not have to represent the starting point of an arms race as in reality, state actually needs an intention to increase the military capabilities at other state.[13] In other words, the security dilemma in unsure international environment tightens a state to increase investment into the defence capabilities due to the increase investment to defence or offence capabilities of surrounding state. Because one state cannot be sure about the intentions of the other, it seeks to strengthen the national security through military procurement, which further leads to the security dilemma spiral as military procurements spreads through the region.

In addition to the security explanation, Shambaugh argues that threat perception and both international and domestic environments are major determinants for state's defence strategic postures out of which the weapon procurement process arises.[14]

To sum up, realistic views are perceived as main drivers behind military capability acquisition due to a strong legitimization aspect, which play a key role in promulgation of states security policies and their operational strategies during the process.

Nevertheless, the explanation for military hardware and weapon acquisition only by pure security reason argument is inadequate and insufficient as it can serve other less obvious reasons; the need for competing explanation is necessary. To

[12] See Herz, 1950.
[13] Till and Geoffrey, 2006. p.18
[14] Shambaugh, 2003.

elucidate this point, realist perspective cannot explain everything. Regarding the views of already equipped states by weaponry, realism pursues many theories of how state will behave with such a capabilities but too less is devoted for the weapon acquisition process in particular.

Domestic Politics

Hence, Sagan identifies the domestic politics factor as one of the main influencers, driving militarization processes which goes hand in hand with weapon procurement.

Additionally, Halperin analyzed the models of domestic politics when he classified it as a considerable force in the context of decision-making and even, in earlier stage, during the creation of states strategic documents that reflect both domestic and international policies.[15] His theory suggests that the competing actors clash in political negotiations in which actors seek to hold or increase the power capabilities of his organization to fulfill objectives, placing great emphasis on enforcing his position during the negotiations.[16]

These problems often lead to conflicting perceptions between certain actors who may have different preferences as well as various power positions. Here, Power is understood as definite influence on governmental decision-making process itself or government decision-making body that further implement intended actor's objectives.

From military modernization process perspective, it is important to characterize the channels responsible for strategic decisions; strategic documents implementation, actors negotiating and formulating military capability needs and actors responsible for military equipment and weapon acquisition purchases.

[15] See Halperin, 1974.
[16] Ibid.

Norms

Last major driver behind military buildup is attributed to symbolic role that particular weapons play in defining states identity. Given the nationalistic reinforcement strength, some weapons and military capabilities are not acquired for the security or bureaucratic interest, rather because some capabilities are regard as symbols of power and state identity. To put it simply, for states, some military capabilities are irrelevant to acquire and do not serve the purpose they are meant to serve - countering real threats and lower risks – because, in some cases, the real threats stipulates different capabilities or the risks of threat are already low. Thus the purpose of the acquisition is in strengthening normative believes, predominantly states modernity and identity.

Sagan emphasizes this approach in his article by stating that in some cases, weapon acquisition are carried out due to their symbolic value and are considered to be prestigious for state which is, after the purchase, regarded as a modern state within the international environment.

Furthermore, Eyre and Suchman holds similar views in defining reasons of conventional weapon acquisition. In their article devoted to status, norms, and the proliferation of conventional weapons, they address reasons behind militarization. They stress that it results in more than some national security concerns, rather in some cases, it results in *"highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry"* … as *"weapons have proliferated because of the socially constructed meanings that have become associated with them. Highly technological militaries symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence."*[17]

To sum up the norms reason of military hardware acquisition, Eyre and Suchman link the processes with advanced, modernized weapons that characterize the sovereign state as nation, driven by normative structures towards its legitimacy.[18]

[17] See Eyre and Suchman, 1996.
[18] Ibid.

Why Doctrines?

Before focusing on PRC military acquisition process over its recent history it is necessary to put it in perspective of a framework due to a changing domestic and international environment where threat perception, domestic actors as well as norms evolve over time. Doctrinal explanation of Chinese arms procurement can clarify trends of the acquisition process over the long terms and create a precedent for its understanding. From this point of view, the benefits to divide Chinese historical acquisition process according to different stages of doctrines provide unique insight into the reasons for the acquisition process.

For this reason, fine example of the evaluating framework can be postulated by four stages of military doctrines as they provide strategic insights into tactical and operational functioning and further mirror the military procurement requirements.

The military doctrines not only set the insights into China's behavior on the military field, but also introduce several other dimensions of its defence and security policy preferences, particularly changes in military training, war-fighting approach and the procurement approaches through different stages of recent over-50 year development. Chinese military doctrines are thus perceived as mere theoretical and organizational frameworks for military organizations as they implement the lessons learned and also best practices through domestic and foreign military engagements and moreover set the basis for Chinese forces and their operational capabilities requirements.

In addition, regarding the military doctrine importance, Chieh-cheng Huang argues that *"Because military doctrine must adapt to reflect changes in the strategic and political environment, it is not surprising that the doctrine of people's war (renmin zhanzheng) has undergone substantial revision in the last 20 years and that these changes have mirrored changes in China's security environment and national priorities."*[19] Thus, reflecting the priorities of leaders in accordance to strengthen national security over time changing international and

[19] Chieh-cheng Huang, 2001.

domestic security environment, which naturally calls for different weapon capabilities to meet the leaders, security and norms demands.

For this purpose, the thesis' timetable is divided into four stages of Military Doctrines of People's Republic of China as characterized by Shambaugh[20], namely through People's War, People's War Under Modern Conditions, Limited War and finally recent doctrine of Limited War under High Technological Conditions.[21]

Each stage of the military doctrine reflects the military necessities of different leaders through different stages of domestic and international environment and directly shapes the acquisition process. Sometimes the doctrines are characterized as Mao's revolutionary doctrine, Deng's modernization doctrine and Jiang's high tech doctrine, which was later picked up by his successors, Hu and Xi. The alternative characterization of China's military doctrines predominantly express the major focus of each of the leaders.

It needs to be stressed that the thesis cannot take into account every leader since the establishment of PRC due to the limited scope, rather it focuses on major influencers – Mao, Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi and their closest comrades that influence their decision making and also had influence over selection of China's strategic priorities during the defence planning in general, acquisition process in particular.[22]

People's War

The People's War period[23] (renmin zhanzheng) was undertaken and evolved under strategic thinking of Chinas founding fathers, especially under the chairman of the CCP Mao Zedong, who provided Chinese armed forces with political and military guidance.

[20] Shambaugh, 2006.
[21] See also Mulvenon, and Finkelstein, 2001.
[22] To get an overview of Chinese politics see Joseph, 2010.
[23] Characterized as 1939-1979 but due to limits in military acquisition database of SIPRI, the starting point is set as 1949

Maoist China was a hostile China with main focus on preparation for a total war against the Soviet or capitalist adversaries. Hostile international perception increased taste for military hardware. Also, hostile domestic environment with constant revolutionary tendency led to increase of weapon needs to secure national or party security of a newly founded government. People's war reflects the cooperation between China's peasants and conventional military forces.

Main components of People's War operational strategy stressed the necessities of attrition wars with large, concentrated forces, which were fast and deceptive, and which enabled to conduct surprise attack and stratagem or other guerilla-type tactics if necessary. The trap was in baiting the adversary into the homeland and then engages in surprising attack.

The components also counted on use of mass mobilization of the population to resist the enemy. The main goal of senior strategist was to find and concentrate the power to the adversary's weakest points. Overall, when the forces were not able to conduct a conventional operation, guerrilla warfare principles should be used.

In addition, People's War was mainly shaped by domestic situation, changing international environment and different stages of military development. Stressed the importance of justice war led for only defensive purposes, based on three personnel aspects – regular army units, local army units and the militia,[24] which also required different approach to the acquisition process. Thus, the People's War period is unique and so is the acquisition process.

People's War Under Modern Conditions (PWUMC) And Limited War

Maoist approach of constant struggle and total war preparation has changed with new succeeded leadership. Particular change came when Deng Xiaoping took power.[25]

[24] Chieh-cheng Huang, 2001.
[25] Deng Xiaoping was never a General Secretary of CCP nor head of the Chinese state. In fact, Deng was widely acknowledged as a "Paramount Leader" who exercised the majority of influence

The PWUMC and Limited War concept differed significantly from sole People's War, while sharing several approaches relevant for People's War. For Deng, the cost of People's War was unsustainable. Rather than focusing and preparing for constant inevitable war and pouring vast financial and other resources into the defence industry and military, Deng postponed the unnecessary military engagement and started to focus on economical development.

Deng Xiaoping introduced the People's War Under Modern Condition doctrine in which he gently reevaluated several concepts predicative for People's War. It was Xiaoping's pragmatic approach to reshape Mao's constant revolutionary war in a changing global environment while maintaining ideological continuity. Furthermore, Deng undertook reforms that fundamentally changed the role, scope and visage of China's armed forces and gradually transitioned them according to new international standards of conducting warfare. As mentioned by Chieh-cheng Huang *"Deng reduced the PLA by one million soldiers while stressing the importance of improving military education and upgrading weapon systems. His view that science and technology are the top sources of productivity remains the most quoted phrase by Chinese political and military leaders today."*[26] Nevertheless, Chieh-cheng Huang also warned that the PLA lacked proper equipment and thus could hardly change the status quo. Nevertheless the transition to a new doctrine ensured the appropriate acquisition of military hardware.[27]

People's War under modern conditions includes components as strategic frontiers (coastal active defence) and strategic defence, components that were stressed and gained primary importance during the Maoist era.

For fulfilling current CCP's and PRC military requirements, Deng updated the doctrine along with war-fighting principles by introducing new components as he transitioned China from the concept of active defence to better suited component

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for the decision-making along with so called body "Eight Elders" who "collectively" rule the state, giving him power to re-shape Chinese political, economic and military direction.

[26] Chieh-cheng Huang, 2001.

[27] Ibid.

of frontier defence. Frontier defence expected the battlefield within limited Chinese periphery. Thus, Deng changed the key importance of the focus point of military acquisition process regarding the international environment and technological standards necessary for strategic defence.

Limited War Under High-Technological Conditions (LWUHTC)

However, it was for Jiang Zemin, who started with the fundamental change of China's military capabilities when he turned the focus on the highly technological development and progress of military forces. This step was a natural evolution of U.S. engagement in the Gulf War. Military technology has become the pivotal point of interest of military affairs in China since and PLA was the main actor to address the issue of change in modern warfare.

Zemin's approach was to arm Chinese military forces with highly and technologically advanced weapons, which increased the necessities for purchases from foreign sources due to lack of quality of domestic products. Also, this shift was made prior to expectation of a limited use of future warfare. As Chieh-cheng Huang puts it, *"winning local war under high-tech conditions has become a ubiquitous fixture in any discussion on contemporary military affairs in China."*[28]

Although, the expectations were limited, the nature of the warfare was highly intensive and with focus on technologically advanced capabilities led to a possibility of creating vast damage to fighting parties. Regarding military forces building in China in general, the focus changed from quantity to quality of acquired weapons and military capabilities stressing the reliance on technologies over the manpower forces.

This particular shift characterizes Zemin's approach to weapon procurement within the favorable international environment supported by miraculous economic development.

[28] Chieh-cheng Huang, 2001.

Next Regional War Under Conditions Of Informatization

Both successors, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping sustained the direction of Jiang Zemin course. Both tent to concentrate militarily development on informatization of PLA in order to become highly modern military force with the ability to win a regional war.

However, Hu during his government and given to his position, did not exercise full potential of power as senior officials mention the proxy role of his fellow comrades from CCP Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong played. According to sources, proxy officials took over the army's staff affairs right under Hu's nose.[29] For that purpose, China watchers consider Hu's powers over military weak.

This does not, however, imply for Xi Jinping. Xi, after his election, assumed all three key positions - president, party secretary and CMC chairman - at once and obtained factual control over the People's Republic and also its military from very first day. Xi, since he took power, stepped up the efforts to not only modernize China's forces but also to project power and shrink the power gap between China and well equipped, military modern states as he proclaims that China's military forces should be ready to win a local war.[30]

Xi also changed the approach and set the direction of China's military. The current leader introduced a new military reform group to fulfill his given tasks of bringing China back to the super powers club. Xi's current intentions are besides increase of his influence to speed up the acquisition process through faster weapon development of new modern weapons to strengthen the power of PLA. Since Xi took office, the overall picture of PLA has changed and is going to change even more under his direct influence in foreseeable future. The power he exercises gives him strong impetus to rule the military affairs while politically setting the course of CCP. On the other side, his anti-corruption approach within the military creates a fear for non-supporters within the party and military.

[29] Chan, 2015.
[30] RT, 2014.

Xi's overall intentions are to accelerate Chinese domestic military development and until 2020 become modern and capable power projecting force with the ability to protect Chinese core interests. This stance creates pressure not only on domestic industrial complex, but also on defence planners and in greater extend on surrounding countries.d

Understanding Of Doctrinal Differentiation

As it was mentioned above, this differentiation is helpful to understand the weapon acquisition processes due to changing domestic and international environment and Chinese leaders preferences and puts it into the situational perspective of each stage, which mirrors the military requirements. This structural dismemberment not only reflects China's strategic behavior in a changing international environment but also condemns the levels of technology and also answers different stages and types of domestic and international threats as perceived by different period generation leaders.

For this reason, the Stages of Military Doctrines reflect procurement based on the international and domestic environment in which evolves not only the threat perception, but also the decision-making processes, and changing leaders preferences as well as struggle for domestic power. Nevertheless the Military Doctrines do not have to purely determine the acquisition process in general. However it surely set the base for procurement needs and select the direction of the process. Furthermore, the focus will transit, regarding each stage of military doctrine, to identification of various drivers that influence weapon acquisition procedure.

In addition, to provide structured reasons for acquisition process, one must provide explanation according to different war-fighting principles that operationally reflect the stages of military doctrines. Thus, they play significant role not only during the creating process but reflect the leaders priorities, which are in line with security necessities. It's an important particle for identification of the key drivers behind the transition of doctrinal war-fighting principles.

According to Shambaugh, Doctrines are fundamental components of Chinese military modernization. Important fact relies in the Chinese perception of doctrines as the understanding differs that of the Western countries. For China, in Shambaugh's words, *"reforming doctrine has been a catalyst for a vast range of PLA reforms, professionalization and modernization-reconfiguring the force structure, personnel, recruitment, military education, training regiments, hardware needs, research and development, weapons procurement and operational strategy."*[31]

It should be stressed, that the above-mentioned vast particles of the doctrines fully reflect the lesson learned from both, direct Chinese military engagements as well as other military conflicts around the world. Those events are closely spectated by Chinese strategic thinkers as well as political and military officials. In addition to Chinese perception of strategy, it serves to military forces as guidelines for conducting military operations in a broad perspective and its main task is to fulfill political objectives of actual or potential military conflict. Thus, it indirectly links to the procurement requirements due to selected action and operational tactics.

From China's military procurement perspective, it's important to analyze different doctrinal approaches regarding military doctrines to understand China's evolution of weapon acquisition requirements. The findings will serve as an important indicator for validating the role of the doctrine upon which the military acquisition process is based. It will help to identify the priorities and key drivers of the procurement as well.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the purpose of the thesis is not in answering the question of whether the weapon acquisition is conducted in line with different doctrinal period or not.[32] Rather, the doctrinal periods should serve as a base approach and differentiation of China's perception of domestic and international environment in which the acquisition process takes place.

[31] Shambaugh, 2006. p. 56
[32] For the question of suitability of procurement process with China's strategic doctrines see Yao-Zu, 2000.

Methodology

To determine the cause and motivation of Chinese arms procurement and at the same time scientifically confirm the based set of variables while taking into account all the attributes is very difficult, because one change in one variable causes a change of the second variable, which can, in the end, affect the primary grounds of arms procurement and thereby distort the overall primary reason for armaments. It is impossible to precisely in percentage determine what proportion of the total acquisition had security, internal political or normative impulse or even whether it's a combination of at least two if not all three models. However, we can determine upon the empirical bases by process-tracing analysis the key impulses and China's motivation for weapon acquisition or at least the causes of the military procurement process.

David Collier, distinguish professor from Berkeley characterizes the process-tracing approach as a „fundamental tool of qualitative analysis." Afterword, he advocates the approach: *"This method is often invoked by scholars who carry out within-case analysis based on qualitative data, yet frequently it is neither adequately understood nor rigorously applied." … "The reformulation integrates discussions of process tracing and causal-process observations, gives greater attention to description as a key contribution, and emphasizes the causal sequence in which process-tracing observations can be situated. In the current period of major innovation in quantitative tools for causal inference, this reformulation is part of a wider, parallel effort to achieve greater systematization of qualitative methods."* For this purpose it found its grounds within this thesis approach as well.[33]

Nevertheless, to find a reasons for armament and to investigate this issue, we need to set some standards for how the work will be conducted. Nevertheless there are several methodological obstacles. For example, Sagan in his article argued that there is no well-developed domestic political theory that identifies channels of

[33] Collier, 2011.

influence and coalition formation that produce their desirable outcomes. Also normative approach differs from certain point of view and is applicable *per se*.

This thesis deals with the motivation of China's arms purchases in order to discover and offer theoretically overlapping reasons that motivate states to engage in military procurement by spending their budgets on a new military technologies, weapons and weapon systems. To discover particular reasons, the thesis tries to take Sagan's justification model and apply it directly to the issue of China according to the same process-tracing approach. The work is thus guided by the question not merely by pure method.

There are several independent variables in the issue of China's arms procurement. For security model explanation, finding some direct or mediated threat to national security, sovereignty or core interests is revealing. Under the realist scrutiny, if such a threat occurs, security standpoint motivates the state to armament efforts to protect its national security and to counter the risk. The question, as in this case, is how to deal with investments in military modernization, which neighboring countries can perceive as a step towards the security dilemma. Security dilemma is usually interpreted by states in terms of offensive realism theories, therefore, to increase its hard power, which can cause uncertainties and prejudice towards the arming state.

Another independent variable is based on the model of domestic politics. Motivation to purchase arms in explanation of domestic politics motives is characterized by the desire and effort of various stakeholders, or groups that have based their procurement demands upon their self-interests. In other words, to cut a cake and serve it to themselves or their organization in and thereby, increase its influence within the Communist Party, which directly undermine the influence of other actors. To get a particular example of armament due to self-interest reasons, one must focus on particular benefits and self-promotion of domestic actors, which have the power to influence the acquisition process on one side and look for increase of their influence within the party on the other.

In addition to independent variable, normative motivation for buying weapons evolves over time, as well as direct security threats or groups struggling for influence. Great influence is put on quantity of states, which dispose with particular weapon or capabilities that are by others perceived as necessary to obtain higher international status. In the same meaning, those countries which have a leading position within the international system (although anarchical) are being at some point duplicated by other states to possess the same capabilities, which factually give them no or low effect on their national security. Characterize arms procurement on the basis of normative theme is determined by statesmen proclamation of explicit wording that this weapon is needed to ensure that China is seen as a powerful, modern state, and this weapon is a medium to obtain such a statute means.

1 PEOPLE'S WAR 1949-79

1.1 Contextual Overview

The People's War doctrine set the base of the military transformation of People's Republic of China under the rule of Mao Zedong,[34] who was by far, the most influential figure during the period for not only his personal contributions to PRC but also for the sake of Chinese strategic thinking.

China's military power during the People's War evolved considerably. The Sino-Soviet relations indicated and shaped Chines approach from domestic and foreign perspective. During the 50's, China dependent on Soviet transfer of technologies and know-how. After the split, the rivalry shaped the semblance of Chinese acquisition process.

The People's War period could be in one sentence generally characterized as a period of China's military, economic and social struggle. Specifically, Second Sino-Japanese War (1939-45), the Civil War (1946-49) and Korean War (1959-53) rivalry with USSR, Japan and India evoked Chinese leaders the hostile international environment. The military engagement in armed scrimmages with India (1962) and Vietnam (1979) led to increase hostile perception of international environment, which resulted in a strong demand for military capabilities and was crowned by acquisition of nuclear weapon.

Nevertheless, the shortcomings in Chinese defensive industrial segment, in the beginning of the 1950's, naturally turned Mao to Stalin to enhance communist cooperation. After signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1951, the transition of all around Soviet know-how, equipment and personnel started to flow to China.[35]

[34] For an overview of Mao Zedong's backgrounds, thinking, influence and writings see Zhuo 2001.
[35] For illustration, between 1954 and 1963 the USSR provided China with over 24 000 sets of scientific and technological documents and assisted work at 1400 large industrial enterprises, and more than 10 00 Soviet specialist in various scientific fields visited China between 1950-1960. See Gill and Kim, 1996. p. 27

For China, the result of Soviet aid triggered and heightened its dependency on Soviet military industries (and others) as well as dependency on Soviet diplomatic stances and policies. This was reversed after Mao's criticism of USSR leaders, dominantly Khrushchev, for their negative attitude towards Stalin's practices. Consequently, the action resulted in Sino-Soviet split and halted the transition of Soviet weapon supplies and know-how and also stationed the modernization process. The Sino-Soviet relationship evolved from cooperation through rivalry to more hostile one, which set the confining tone of the People's War period.

The consequences implied strong security undertone as China started to directly prepare for total war with the Soviet Union. Her military units were strategically preparing to counter the intervention of China's Northern neighbor, which corresponded with Mao's strategic doctrine of conducting warfare. The hostility between the two countries resulted in boarder dispute and had severe strategic consequences. The hostility forced China to prepare for more serious campaign and expend the limited resources into production of domestic weapons.

Additionally, the Great Leap Forward strategy emphasized the self-reliance in order to compensate the dependence on Soviet import and diplomacy but it resulted in opaque effect. The strategy halted the defence industry production lines and also vanished the military procurement from Soviet Sources.

The withdrawal of Soviet human capital and termination of the transfer of know-how resulted in creation of National Defence Science a Technology Commission (NDSTS) under the command of Nie Rongzhen. The establishment of NDSTS is perceived as a major step forward in Chinese weapon acquisition organization, which set the base for domestic defence industrial complex.[36] Furthermore, NDSTS's role was not only to present China with new military technologies but also to provide the strategic equalizer and balance the nuclear power of the Soviet Union and the United States.

[36] Main focus of NDSTC is R&D of advanced weapons, for more see Ostrov, 1991.

Complementary, the National Defence Industry Office was created to support the NDSTC and domestic defence industries with production of conventional weaponry to tackle the problem of Soviet human resources withdrawal and scarcity and poor quality of military weapons.

The international events shaped Chinese threat perception and set the tone for security explanation of military acquisition. Domestic policies played also major role as Chinese leaders struggled for power within the CCP. During the period, China was also trying to improve her status through modernization of the army, weaponry and domestic industrial complex.

1.2 Introduction Of The Doctrine

People's War doctrine fully resonates with Mao's strategic thinking. Focused on military strategy, Mao's publishing activities in support of his views, particularly "the Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan" (1938) and "On Protracted War" (1939), were incorporated as official operational doctrines for conducting warfare in China's struggle during the WWII against Japanese forces and Korean War. The strategy further outlined the war-fighting principles for the People's War period in general.

People's War principles also reflected the purpose of peasants to support the military forces in time of war and were based on unique relationship between the Chinese military forces, militia and peasants over the continental defence requirements.

Regarding Chinese military strength, in 1950 China's armed forces reached up to 5.5 million troops in total, out of which 5.4 million were assigned to infantry, 38.000 to Navy and 57,000 to Air force, making China the largest military force in terms of personnel worldwide.[37]

On one side, the total power force number endured the priorities of People's War period and functioned as a deterrent formula for potential invasion-thinking

[37] Xiaobing, 2007. p.87

adversaries on the other. However, Zedong's strategy represented extensive financial burden and was revised after the Korean War.

Overall, the emphasis on quantity of personnel are for People's War doctrine characteristic and mirror the doctrinal concept, which, according to China's military culture field guide[38] *"combines Sun Tzu's principles of deception and calculation with the mobile, flexible tactics of guerrilla warfare."*[39] Principles, which were doctrinally imposed by Mao and included components and requirements as following:

- Attrition wars with large, concentrated forces
- Bait the adversary into the homeland and conduct an attack
- Use mass mobilization of the population to resist the enemy
- Find and concentrate your power to the adversary's weakest points
- Be fast and deceptive, conduct surprise attack and stratagem
- When you are not able to conduct a conventional operation, use guerrilla warfare principles[40]

These principles mainly stress the center of gravity of People's War doctrine, which predominantly, during Maoist structure of army, did not emphasized products quality but people's quantity.

Also, geographical diversity played crucial role for Chinese defence forces. The geographical breakdown of military corps within territorial units was established to ease the defence of the Mainland from foreign intervention.[41] This division just put emphasizes on Chinese intentions to modernize all aspects of its security and defense capabilities and enhance the readiness of China's forces as well as

[38] China's Military Culture Field Guide, 2009.
[39] Ibid p.28
[40] Generall principles of People's War doctrine, ibid p.28
[41] The geographical division of forces into the regions were set up in 1955 when the State Council made a decision to re-define the 6 military areas commands in northeast China, north China, northwest China, east China, central and south China and southwest China. The six military areas were divided into 12 military areas commands, namely, the Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Kunming, Lanzhou, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet Military Area Commands to better approach the decision-making procedure within specific area of Chinese Mainland

simplify the communication within the military branches of geography units. The top down approach within the field of military branches was felt significantly and required adjustment in the acquisition process.

The People's War doctrine thus provides guidelines and represents the top-down approach of Chinese leadership to enhance military capabilities.

1.3 Weapon Acquisition Focus

During the People's War period was Chinese military acquisition process carried from both domestic and foreign sources. At the beginning of China's defense industry establishment, China was not able to effectively meet PLA's operational demand for military hardware and weaponry. Not because of lack of effort, rather for perusing maltreating policies.

Major weapon volume flew to China during the 50's as it amounted for 85% of total orders placed.[42] The Sino-Soviet split then strongly affected the after-split weapon acquisition process and increased demand for domestic production.

During the first decade of newly established PRC, China was dependent on major weapon imports from Soviet Union on one side, and was trying to seek forced self-sufficiency on the other. However, having the acquisition focus spread in two different parallel stages factually shaded the potential of effectively spend resources and lowered the desirable outcomes.

The SIPRI's military import database confirms the People's War doctrine objectives by ensuring Chinese sustainable military capabilities acquisitions from Soviet Union. At the same time, the database examined the principal factors affecting China's military requirements. During the period, China placed the total of 85 orders out of which 77 (accounts for 92% of total)[43] journeyed to the Soviet Union. Other countries played during the People's War period marginal role. France requested four, Germany (FRG) two and Albania only one order. SIPRI

[42] SIPRI. Major weapon Import database, Author's calculations, precisely out of 85 orders were 72 made between 1949-1960, Korean War weapon procurement accounted for 36% of the 50's
[43] Ibid.

data stress strong Chinese dependency on Soviet military hardware imports and dependency on foreign technologies in general.



Source: SIPRI

The key purchases from 1949 to 1979 went to specific military areas as follows:



Source: SIPRI

Domestic procurement started to limitedly operate its production capabilities under the recognition as a "third front" during the 60's and the principal objective was to ensure the long-term supplies of weaponry for China's armed forces for deterring possible Soviet or North American intervention into the Mainland. Chinese domestic defence industrial complex could be described as a third-tier. Third-tier means capable of manufacturing only limited type of weapons with usually limited technology. Overall performance of Chinese domestic defence industry lacked the essential technological know-how necessary for the production of more sophisticated weapon systems.

In principle, after the Sino-Soviet split, China's domestic defense industry could not substitute the loss of Soviet weapons supplies due to limited production capacity, but also because of the poor quality of manufactured weapons systems.

During the People's War, Chinese domestic defense industrial complex played also other than security role. The main purpose of techno-nationalistic role is to assure and regular supply weapon systems from domestic sources to satisfy the requirements of PLA. The complementary purpose of Chinese industrial complex is by Bitzinger characterized as techno-nationalism. The complementary purpose is the creation and promotion of the national defense industry.[44] For Example premier Zhou Enlai approached the aircraft industry stressing that *"We could not just rely on buying foreign aircrafts and only carrying out repairs by ourselves,"*[45] stressing the importance of domestic industrial complex and techno-nationalism.

Good example of the situation of domestic industrial complex of China's military industry provides the aviation industry. To produce aircrafts, the industry need to master extremely technologically difficult procedures and know how. Aircrafts also play very essential role and hold very specific status. In fact aircrafts played an essential part of Chinese foreign procurement as it accounted for leading 50 percent of all Chinese procured hardware.[46]

Domestically, China produced its first fighter aircraft J-4 in 1956, which is a type based on MiG-17.[47] However, the difficulties after Soviet engineers withdrawal from China arose on the surface.

China also produced other military hardware from slim domestic sources. It was meant to satisfy the demand of China's armed forces and to support friendly regimes in the South East Asian region and in Africa. Interestingly, not to obtain financial resources to tackle budgetary issues. This is associated with the Sino-Soviet departure and Mao's criticism of both "merchants with death" United States and Soviet Union.

By 1970's China could produce large scale of Soviet-alike military hardware that would possibly meet PLA's quantity requirements. Nevertheless, domestic

[44] Bitzinger, 2011.
[45] Gill and Kim, 1996. p.26
[46] SIPRI
[47] Gill and Kim, 1996.

policies like the Great Leap Forward as well as Cultural Revolution halted any possibilities for strong and effective development and resulted in a set back of the whole Chinese defence industrial complex and Chinese economy in general.

Main products of Chinese defence industries produced between 1949-1979 were patrol ships, tanks, fighter jets, artillery components and some small arms, particularly Shangai-class Patrol boats, J-7 fighter jets (also older models J-5, J-6), light tanks Type-62. However the quality of provided weapons to both ends was unimpressive and could not meet either international military standards or PLA's requirements.[48]

Weak economic base, central five-year planning along with above stressed domestic defence industry difficulties are for the People's War period characteristic as it was, at least in its beginnings, highly dependent on Soviet assistance, know-how and spare parts. China also focused vast resources in order to acquire nuclear weapon and other strategically advanced capabilities. As Shun Zhenhuan stresses Chinese acquisition intentions along with the state of her domestic defence industry: *"Like the Soviet Union, China devoted major efforts to developing the A-bomb, the H-bomb, satellites, and nuclear-powered submarines with limited funds and an inadequate technical force. While some areas in the defense industry came up to advanced world standards, much of our general mode of production lagged. Shortcomings such as high consumption, high cost, inefficiency, and low quality were present everywhere, and some advanced defense technologies were set aside for years. Obviously this is harmful to the national economy."*[49]

The domestic industry focus during the 1960's and 1970's set the tone according to the Soviet model but this turned to be changed after several domestic reform policies undertaken in the second half of 1970's by changed leadership establishment.

[48] For People's War defence industry and export possibilities see Bitzinger, 1992.
[49] Shun, 2008.

China's great People's War success was completed in 1964 when, after the Soviet exodus, China had completed the engineering and development of its nuclear deterrent. China acquired herself not only a strategic super equalizer and powerful deterrent capability, but also gained a strong international status that the holder of nuclear warhead naturally gains. Nevertheless, in Chinese eyes, it was also served as a strong legitimization argument of the Communist party rule. Chinese normative endeavor for international statute was crowned in 1971, when China succeeded Taiwan for permanent member seat of the Security Council of the United Nations.

To sum up People's War period, China's acquisition process is defined by military hardware procurement needs from external sources, primarily USSR, to meet operational efficiency and to established military capabilities of people's armed forces. This is associated with lower performance of domestic defence industries and emphasizes on reverse engineering that without appropriate know-how techniques lacked to meet the domestic demands. Since the sources (financial and R&D) located to them played duplicative role in parallel to foreign procurement sources, the efficiency of such policies with strong emphasis on development of nuclear deterrent crumbled the focus, which directly affected the quality of domestically produced defence products.

SIPRI data source stresses the direction and timing of Chinese military procurement. Timing of military acquisition is directly affected by the Sino-Soviet Treaty as well as Korean War military necessities. The acquisitions processes, mainly from Soviet sources, continued through the 50's and were associated to ensure the short-term to medium-term operation capabilities of Chinese armed forces. However the Sino-Soviet split threatened the implementation as well as sustainability of Chinese armed forces resulting in the strengthening emphasis on self-reliance and for autonomy of its defence supplies through investments into the domestic defence segment.

During the Period, China established itself as a regional power. Domestic activities originally undertaken under the leadership of Mao Zedong set the

strategic course of future direction of People's Republic of China and its military requirements. Short-term objective were narrowed to building only the most important part of the military portfolio and optimize the existing offset industry by transforming it into the full line production in order to gain sustainable self-sufficient industry to satisfy the military requirements of its armed forces.

With regard to the latest developments, Mao's death and international environment development led the PRC transition into more open economy that above all stressed the economic development and peaceful coexistence. New leader Deng Xiaoping decided to update the strategic defence programs. Xiaoping further linked the military acquisition process and military development in line with Chinese economic development. Deng thus began the new chapter of Chinese military modernization.

1.4 Explanation Of The Acquisition Focus

During the People's War, China's acquisition focus was split into numerous directions. This was due to the poor condition of the domestic defense industry as well as poor mechanisms that were responsible for the acquisition of military capabilities from foreign sources. The acquisition process was also influenced by a poor socio-economic conditions. China lacked both, human resources that would be able to resolve the situation, and financial resources that needed to be spend in research and development or to purchase high-quality military equipment.

Mao Zedong's influence was in this period the deciding factor and his position only changed after his death. Policies that were undertaken by Deng Xiaoping altered China's face and gave way to the new direction of the country both domestically and internationally in economic, social and military sense.

1.4.1 Security

The security explanation of the People's War period weapon acquisition of stresses the need for weapon procurement when facing significant military or other major threat to security or national sovereignty. People's War period is

perceived as the most hostile period of Chinese doctrinal phase. It engaged China in external military disputes with boarding countries and also in some domestic issues, which naturally led towards greater demand for military hardware and armament acquisition. In addition major external threat perception during this period was for PRC omnipresent. This was the result of pre-PRC establishment in connection with China's People's War security environment.

Regarding Chinese endeavor of countering interference, major threat for China arose from the Soviet Union, especially during the sixties after the Sino-Soviet split. Chinese leaders were perusing domestic industries to supply military forces with hardware as PLA was preparing for total war to interfere the Soviet invasioninst intentions into the mainland.

First large weapon acquisition of military hardware due to security explanation China realized during the Korean War. Chinese People's volunteers joined the Korean War in 1950 without the much-needed equipment. Armed forces lacked the necessary equipment but the fighting spirit of soldiers substitute the disadvantage. However, heavy losses on the battlefield was not caused because of lack of soldier's will but because of lack of military capabilities and it forced PLA's official Xu Xiangqiian to visit Moscow and seek for Soviet assistance of military hardware to counter the personnel losses. These negotiations resulted in massive direct Soviet transfer of military hardware.[50] Flowingly, Xu, contrary to Mao, was advocate of foreign sources of military hardware. He was, from his position and military experience from direct combat, aware of the Chinese security needs and conditions of domestic defence industrial complex. To support his views Xu often made predictions of imminent Soviet aggression to create a strong threat perception to legitimize the weapon acquisition.[51]

Regarding the military engagement on the Korean Peninsula, defence budget increased significantly during the three-year period stressing the necessary

[50] Gill and Kim, 1996. p.21 Among the major hardware acquisition during the Korean War was 1500 MiG 15bis/Fagot fighter aircrafts, 1250 MiG-17/Fresco fighter aircrafts and 500 Il-28/Beagle bomber aircrafts (SIPRI)
[51] Xu, 1990.

investments into the weaponry needs. Especially the direct nuclear threat during the Korean War (in 1952-53) and then later during the first Taiwan Strait crisis from United States created enormous security pressure on China's leaders to develop their own nuclear deterrent. In this particular case, successful deterrence and direct threat to state's survival from one state led to development of nuclear warhead in order to lower the US deterrence credibility with countering measures.

Moreover, the weapon acquisition process accelerated from domestic sources due to increasing tensions with Soviet Union. During the period of 1968, peaking in 1971, defence industry almost doubled its output from 1967.[52] That was the major shift in the acquisition process regarding the dependency on weapon procurement from Soviet sources as China sought for self-sufficiency during the 1960's. The self-sufficiency and autonomy in military procurement was a natural consequence due to reducing Soviet willingness to transfer their military capabilities and technologies to China.

One major acquisition was made during the People's War period and it has affected Chinese strategic behavior since. Due to US deterrence strategy used in the Korean War and also during the two Taiwan Strait Crisis and increasing tensions with the Soviet Union that led to boarder clashes and proved China's limited capabilities of conventional weapons, China sought to strengthen its national security to counter this strategic misbalance and to equalize the balance of nuclear power. China succeeded in 1964.

The security model does not explain all the strategic requirements of People's War doctrine. For example if all military procurement was due to security reasons, the importance of quality would play more if not the most significant role during the process. As Ronald Bitzinger argues "Early production models of the J-6 aircraft, launched during the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, were so inferior that the PLA refused to accept them."[53]

[52] Shambaugh, 2003. p. 229
[53] Bitzinger, 1992. p. 9

Thus, it would also unite leaders in line with direction of armed forces military requirements. Because of the inability to explain all cases of military procurement and some partly only, domestic military and political leaders preferences of the direction of Chinese armed forces need to be considered as well. The security explanation approaches major external threats but falls short on explaining domestic processes and preferences during the weapon acquisition process and decision-making. Since for realists states are black boxes and since they do not take into an account domestic influences and key actors of the process the security explanation cannot provide desirable all-around outcomes of explaining Chinese acquisition process. To broaden the understanding, domestic considerations as well as normative approach needs to be approached.

1.4.2 Domestic Politics

In People's War period, domestic politics also played significant role during the weapon acquisition process. Both key actors, individuals and newly created military organizations[54] were trying to enforce their parochial interests to boost their influence within the party and increase their powers, in some cases, not respecting the states security requirements.[55]

Due to the increasing tensions with China's northern neighbor, military officials were not fully convinced of operational capabilities and quality of domestically produced weapons. But if closely examined, the threat perception did not play the only major role during the procurement. The question of future routing for PLA was more about the internal influence and power struggle. Particularly between two branches of leaders of Chinese Communist party.

[54] One of the most important organizational foundations on the strategic level was the establishment of the Central Military Commission by Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1954. The Central Military Commission is the ruling organizational body that handles military affairs, sets up strategies and principally disposes by decision-making process and moreover, is responsible for the process implementation. All activities are strictly under direct influence of Central Committee of CPC. It should be noted that the CMCs members are, in most cases, *de iure,* chaired by leader of the communist party, making it strictly a political organization under the rule of the CCP politburo. Nevertheless the CMC organization is doubled and is under political and military branch with, most of the time, identical composition of its leaders.
[55] Defence industry were then highly centralized and implemented orders made by the CCP leaders under its five-year plans

The absence of domestic political theory for weapon acquisition which identifies the conditions under what circumstances key individuals form coalition and encourage their preferred outcomes may limit the interpretation of Chinese domestic reasoning for acquisition process.

During the People's War period key activities were strictly under direct influence of Central Committee of CPC and mostly of the chairman of the party and the standing committee, which was responsible for addressing key questions on China's routing. In this perspective, Central military commission (CMC) of the communist party played essential role while addressing equipment of armed forces and other military related questions.

The commission members are, in most cases, *de iure*, chaired by leader of the communist party, making it strictly a political organization under the rule of key senior leaders of the CCP. This is to ensure the loyalty of armed forces to the party. Nevertheless, the 11-member body is a battlefield for personal power struggle and power execution. Chairman of the party is a head of command of China's armed forces, thus holds major influence due to his "last word" rule while addressing military-related issues. Chinese individuals were responsible and shaped the scientific military industrial complex with preferred outcomes that mirrored the Chinese military requirements.

As Shambaugh's findings stresses, several weapons were produced due to top down order of Chinese communist party leaders influencing the direction of Chinese defence industry, controlling the acquisition process in line with their preferences.

The key role during the both major acquisitions of the nuclear bomb as well as strategically important submarine program, were naturally insulated by senior executive leaders with Mao Zedong as a key executive and the head of the decision-making structure. Members of the politburo – Premier Zhou Enlai, and Lin Bao, who attained key executive role as the defence minister and as executive

of CMC, both accompanied Mao Zedong's decision even boosting his influence and influence of the conservative branch within the CCP.[56]

Some senior military and political officials, particularly Minister Lin Bao, Chief of Staff Huang Yongshen showed dissatisfaction with the direction of the acquisition process during the People's War period and sought for reforms. Their interest was pointed to "electronization" of Chinese army to better-fit international standards and to strengthen national security needs. Still, major influence was held the chairman Mao Zedong, who preferred the standing army-centric military forces and People's War concept. This position indicates that the central cause for transformation of military forces and central focus on military hardware priorities were not the results of the cause of the security reason interpretation. Rather, this struggle was outlined as window of opportunity for the reformist to satisfy and increase their influence over the CCP.

In addition, their threat perception also differed from the Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The reformist identify United States as the main adversary for the period instead of Soviet Union and sought to drive the electronization of military capabilities by creating strong false perception of military threat.[57]

During this party struggle for power, Mao and Zhou backed the standing army-centric military, which sought for increased military output from domestic and partly foreign sources evolving into acceleration of military acquisition process. While concurrently the PLAN and PLAAF along with artillery sought for more resources to flow into the technological segment to satisfy the operational needs of their forces.[58]

The dispute inside the CCP resulted with demission of Lin Bao while Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai strengthened their influence and power within the CCP and willfully suborned the military procurement.

[56] Shambaugh, 2003. p.228
[57] Ibid.
[58] Shambaugh, 2003. p.229

In addition, the key role of the Cultural Revolution was to strengthen Mao's influence over the party and relieve his opponents. The Cultural Revolution not only strengthened his influence over the party but also over the military forces and the decision-making process as well. His powers, but not influence, were halted only by his death in 1976.

The international threats during the People's War period were significant and directly influenced the acquisition process of PRC, but domestic events and inside party struggles certainly proved to be complementary influencer of the process as well as there was not consensus among the communist establishment on the direction of military forces and also due to natural environment of decision-making process. The Chinese domestic politics nature led to forked preferences on military desires of the PRC's armed forces and resulted in sensibly powered weapon acquisition process based on personal preferences of Mao Zedong and his comrades.

1.4.3 Norms

The norms model focuses on a symbolic role, particular weapons serve. For China, it was not only matter of particular weapon but also about the role Chinese defence industry. Legends and Chinese mythology are present through the history of ancient and modern China and it was no difference in the People's Republic of China. The decorations used to enhance the beauty of Chinese furnishings and architecture along with particular symbols some objects play in Chinese culture. During the People's War period, some weapons acquired shared this symbolic meaning and enhanced the status of the People's Republic of China.

Nevertheless, the norm interpretations differ with the geographical scope of the spectators. Domestically, China tried to establish itself as a self-sufficient and independent weapon producer that meets the operational requirements of its armed forces independently on foreign sources. But internationally, it sought for a weapon or military capabilities that would upgrade China's international status.

During the Period, the CCP leadership put all efforts and vast resources into development of three military capabilities, which were identified as necessary for obtaining international status of military superpower – nuclear weapon capability, satellite launching capability and nuclear-submarine capability.

These very capabilities were by Mao Zedong, and Chinese leaders perceived, as a "must have" to became modern military power and obtain stronger international status.[59] For example, senior official Major General Yang Huan argued: *"the development of strategic nuclear weapons is one main aspect in strengthening national defense and is an important symbol of modernization for our military."*

It needs to be stressed that not only these particular military capabilities stand for Chinese leaders perception of a modern state, but they also stressed the importance of self-sufficient and autonomous defence industry, capable of producing modern military capabilities by comprehensive approach of its domestic industrial complex. The ideology of techno-nationalism was during the period omnipresent and the lull of Soviet weapons inflow just put more emphasis on its development.

The acquisition of nuclear weapon and other for China highly modern military capabilities was a matter of symbolism and states identity. Mao with his false Great Leap Forward and other domestic policies brought China into the edge of international "cream of society" and sought to re-claim the status China once had. For that purpose were initiated steps towards the development of nuclear deterrent which would increase the power statute symbol. As Nina Tannenwald stresses, *"nuclear weapons present to national leaders as the "ultimate weapon," a guarantor of national security and a symbol of great-power status."*[60] In 1964 China finally developed and successfully tested nuclear deterrent and joined the limited VIP nuclear club.

Also, China continued to develop new, "modern", conventional capabilities in order to strengthen the international status. The most important events during the

[59] Huan, 1989.
[60] Tannenwald, 1996.

People’s War period normatively (stated by Chinese Ministry of National Defence) reflect, China successfully developed and launched a long-range ground-to-ground guided missile in 1970. Importantly, in 1971 People’s Republic of China replaced Republic of China on Taiwan in the United Nation Security Council. The international role was militarily confirmed and crowned in 1974, when the first independently designed and manufactured nuclear-powered submarine joined the service of PLA Navy. Giving back China the status of military capable and modern power.

Overall, the norms played significant role during the People’s War period. China not only acquired certain weapons and weapons systems, but also managed to complete some domestic production lines, which were designed to cover the loss of the Soviet Union weapon imports. Techno-nationalism has been one of the biggest drivers of China's national defense industry, regardless the quality of finished products and satisfaction rate of military officials.

2 PEOPLE'S WAR UNDER MODERN CONDITION 1979-85

2.1 Contextual Overview

The transition to People's War Under Modern Condition was based upon several internal and also external factors and is based on People's War doctrine. The doctrine follows the base of military transformation of People's Republic of China under the rule of Mao Zedong. His directly inducted successor Deng Xiaoping has started unprecedented reforms that started the miraculous rise of the People's Republic of China and consequently vindicated the beginning of doctrinal as well as operational transformation of People's Liberation Army to currently modern-like armed forces.

In Alastair Johnston words the post-Maoist era, in our case the People's War Under Modern Condition doctrine, is the most benign since the establishment of the CCP and later PRC.[61] Such a benign circumstances must naturally lead to improvement of all-spectrum conditions, if appropriate steps are conducted to support the development.

After Mao's death, his successor Deng Xiaoping engaged China in the process of all-around structural reforms that opened up China's possibilities to the world and the world to China. Military was a large part of this modernization process because China's rise and development needed a strong defender of the process and the Vietnam War did not satisfy Chinese leaders with current military capabilities. For that purpose, steady modernization process, aligned with economical development, undertook the restructuring and resulted in implications for military procurement process.

Xiaoping, who was (s)elected as the Chairman of the CCP and the Central Military Commission at the 6th plenary meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party in June 1981, stressed that the need of peaceful environment

[61] Johnston, 1996.

is not only vital but also desirable and required if China's economy is about to grow and such a phenomenon was acknowledged as the prerequisite for its military rise. This is a major ontological shift away from constant struggle-minded Mao and his scrutinized war-prone international environment. While Deng shifted to more peaceful international and domestic environment.

Despite the Xiaoping's four-modernization proclamation were hierarchically structured[62] and the last place was officially assigned to military, the emphasis put on, were much of a higher concentration. Factually, the military modernization was a central task that has embedded China's PLA in de facto continuous reforms and innovation process of enhanced comprehension, development and provided opportunity for re-equipment.

The ultimate core of the process was by Chinese leaders interpreted as enhancing the national sovereignty and security giving China strong legitimization tool for the military spending increase of the defence industries. Also, Xiaoping was aware of potential economic costs of maintaining People's War doctrine if anticipated in Mao's style. The need for transformation and reliability on armaments rather than people's were a strategic step further to enable sustainability of China's armed forces and efficiency of domestic industrial complex.

During the People's War Under Modern Conditions period (1979-1985) China made substantial adjustments, implemented several reforms, streamlined its military and invested heavily in the restructuring of its strategic and tactical organization arrangements and for the first time, stressed the principal approach of peaceful development.[63]

Chinese doctrinal transformation started after unsuccessful engagement with Vietnam[64] in 1979. While both sides claimed victory, the conflict showed limits of China's strategic and operational capabilities during force execution as much as

[62] Deng Xiaoping's four modernization were modernization program conceived by Zhou Enlai already in the sixties for agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defense
[63] Mao criticized this approach that was undertaken by Khrushcev
[64] See Harlan, 1979.

lack of quality of its defence industry products. The PLA was not only able to carry out a coordinated attack and also lacked the proper strategic stances and military equipment necessary for meeting Chinese political objectives.

In addition, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 only underlined the importance of the transformation based upon new procurement sources. China relied on obsolete Soviet military hardware stocked since 1950's procurement. The short-term security needs requested for advanced products from developed countries and created high demand for advanced weapon systems.

The awareness of the China's vulnerability regarding its military capabilities commenced China's military transformation according to Xiaoping's four modernizations. The importance of the military sector was a top priority of People's Republic of China's development.[65] Chinese acquisition process consequently underwent appreciable changes from both domestic and foreign sources. Due to the recently hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, which was not going to provide China with its new advanced military systems, had to China turn to more expansive but technologically advanced products from the West or to low quality products from domestic sources.

Xiaoping entrusted the reforming process to Marshal Ye Jianying and General Yang Shangkun who were responsible for the modernization full implementation. Their role was to enhance the readiness and operational capabilities of the PLA.[66]

Regarding structural reform, Xiaoping also requested for elaboration of complete rules, regulations working methods and methods of leadership to increase the department's efficiency and further provide resources to hardware modernization that would fulfill the CCP requirements.[67] Because it was impossible to accomplish and implement all requirements at once, continuous modernization process of doctrines, structures of military branches and hard power

[65] The military transformation request is linked with Deng Xiaoping's speech to the enlarged military commission of the central committee meeting in 1982 (and later in 1985) where he expressed unsatisfactory feeling with the current status of the whole military branch and requested for support of the structural reform.
[66] Xiaoping, 1985.
[67] Ibid.

transformation has been inaugurated. This directed and medium to long-term approach of China's military modernization development had the international community worried about the growing military strength. Deng created the backbone of China's military rise.

2.2 Introduction Of The Doctrine

During the period, China transitioned from the most hostile period of People's War to a period of People's War Under Modern Conditions. The main emphasis was put on peaceful development, which directly created a revisionist tendency of doctrinal upgrade of military requirements after the Vietnam War.

The People's War doctrine was thus outdated and did not justify the requirements for possible fulfillment of political strategic objectives. Nevertheless the link to Mao's doctrinal thinking is explicitly connected and some thoughts have remained under the upgraded Xiaoping's version as well.[68]

For that purpose, Deng Xiaoping introduced the People's War Under Modern Condition doctrine, in which he gently reevaluated several concepts predicative for People's War. It was Xiaoping's pragmatic approach to reshape Mao's constant revolutionary war in a changing global environment and, at the same time, respect his strategic thinking while not turning back on him. In fact, not only did he embody Mao's pragmatic views of conducting warfare but also Deng fundamentally changed the role, scope and visage of China's armed forces by gradually transitioning them according to new international standards of conducting warfare.

This transition engaged China to actually re-shape its doctrinal, strategic as much as operational military concepts of conducting warfare. The new ruling Chinese government also invested into domestic defence industries in which China sought to reduce the dependence on Soviet military hardware. China further set the basis for technologically capable modern defence industries to fulfill the CCP's military requirements. However, Western researchers concluded their research on Chinese

[68] See Chieh-cheng Huang, 2001.

domestic defence complex production and R&D by calling the military capacitates *"rife and with weakness and limitations."*[69]

The state of the domestic industrial complex could have been influenced by favorable international and domestic environment. In fact, it reflected the war-fighting principles. Deng's policy of reforms and opening up also influenced the principles of warfare. The fundamental change in conducting warfare transformed from a typology of inevitable full-scale total war to an environment of peaceful development in which the inevitable war can be postponed. This evolution not only relieved pressure from security perspective, but also created a favorable condition for economic development, halting the domestic industrial complex expansion. Additionally, Deng directly linked the defence industry development with Chinese economic growth.

To sum up, War fighting principles were merely introduced by the CCP leader Deng Xiaoping as he set the tone by re-evaluating Mao's People's War doctrine. People's War under modern conditions included components as strategic frontiers (coastal active defence) and strategic defence. Components that gained importance during the Maoist era, which expressed direct continuity of Mao's legacy for the PLA.

For fulfilling current CCP's and PLA's military requirements, Deng updated the doctrine along with war-fighting principles by introducing new components as he transitioned China from the concept of active defence to better suited component of frontier defence.

After the re-evaluation of the strategic doctrines and war fighting principles, naturally, several weaponry requirements were proposed to meet the PLA's operational application all in line with sustainable economic development as a top priority.

[69] See Medeiros and Cliff, 2005, p.1.

2.3 Weapon Acquisition Focus

During the People's War Under Modern conditions period was Chinese military acquisition process carried out from two sides. In parallel from both domestic and foreign sources stressing the needs of modern military hardware to lower the gap and equalize the hardware power in the region.

Key change in foreign supplies underlined Chinese acquisition process not only during current and the Limited War period. Both China and USSR did not agree on terms for military procurement, thus pressing China to modernize its domestic products lines and cover its demand for modern weapons from other then Soviet sources.

Although China extricated from military dependence on the USSR military import she faced a shortage of funds, which could be allocated to the acquisitions from developed Countries. Budgetary restrictions played important role due to the linkage of military modernization to the economic development.[70] From long-term view, in order to secure the sustainability of military hardware China tried to invest in its domestic production lines to supply PLA's military needs.

The SIPRI's military import database confirms Chinese fundamental shift in the procurement process having zero orders placed in the Soviet Union. That is a significant accomplishment due to 93% dependence during the People's War period. At the same time, the database examined the principal factors affecting China's military requirements that were met through foreign sources. During the period, China enjoyed warmer relationship with the West, placing the total of 6 major foreign orders out of which 4 were placed in France (accounts for 67% of total), making it a majority of the orders placed. Other countries – Germany (FRG) and Italy - obtained one order each, earning the total of 17% of the major purchase allocation.[71]

[70] Available online at http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157619.htm
[71] For China-Western military procurement connection see Stuart and Tow, 1982.

Weapon procurement was centered to support China's helicopter base as this segment accounted for all French purchases. Other key segment was an acquisition of 4400 pieces of German-engineered diesel engines, which were meant to be implemented into domestically produced products.



Source: SIPRI

Chinese domestic products however, had still strong Soviet impetus and are generally a copy of Soviet designs. Nevertheless, China was capable of producing to at least some extend, various weapon systems to satisfy not only the military requirements of the PLA but also some third world countries as vast of its production was directed to export to feed the cash hungry Chinese defence sector.

The defence industrial complex was able to supply China and China's partners with battle tanks, APC's, SAMs, fighter aircrafts and AShMs. Important role for PLA ground forces played tank Type-59 (copy of Soviet T-54) when almost 1000 pieces were produced.

Other segment of Chinese defence industrial complex supplying the PLA was surface to air missiles (SAM). The HQ2 is the main SAM missile for China and holds strong similarity to Soviet SA-2 missile, firstly acquired during the 1950's. The PLA's acquisition of SAM played a crucial role for the coastal defence.

The vital role of fighter aircrafts was already discussed in the People's War period. The domestic production of J-7 during the 1970's has been significant and need to be considered as a potential target of Chinese acquisitions. However, a robust portion was produced merely for export to the third world countries to acquire financial resources due to PLAF still-operational preferences of J-6.[72]

It should be noted that the quality of Chinese domestic production lacks behind modern military requirements of the PLA and falls way short behind modern international standards. Domestic production in the PWUMC relied upon the modernization of Soviet type weapons imported during 1950's, putting in questions Chinese reasons for keeping the production lines open. One of the many arguments provided is due to the cheaper acquisition and maintenance costs and possibilities for immediate readiness to export, which is probably one of the most important factors third world countries consider before purchase.

Some qualities of domestic products were found in several areas. For example in missile segment. After first successful launch of independently developed long-range ground-to-ground guided missile in 1970, China put solid effort to enhance its missile technology and coastal defence efficiency. The effort was crowned in the 1980 when China, also focusing on space industry, successfully launched not only a long-range rocket to the Pacific for the first time but also, two years later, in 1982 launched a missile from under the sea, showing that its investments to strategic and tactical missiles capabilities paid off.[73] Missiles, during the People's War Under Modern Conditions played a crucial role and were one of a few domestic defense products that met the PLA's immediate requirements. This was due to defence industry transformation, after China started to focus on small scale and advanced weaponry and scientific research rather than full-scale, through defence industry innovations.

[72] Ibid. p. 10
[73] Shun, 2008.

2.4 Weapon Acquisition Explanation

After the Vietnam War and the doctrinal change, China needed to embrace in changing conditions of potential future conflicts and the shift to modernization was thus, for sustainable development of national security necessary. Although the emphasis on Soviet military imports evaporated, domestic defence industries have not significantly increased the quality of their products to counter the scarcity of weaponry. Factually, the absence of Soviet imports had opaque effect on Chinese overall military capabilities as Chinese government leaders argued for decreased dependence by seeking self-reliance possibilities through increased domestic investments into the military segment.[74] But this is easier said than done. Also, for sustainable military development the importance of dual use capability was stressed as Xiaoping's commercialization reforms, which started to be introduced in line with the four-modernizations proclamations.

The concept of self-reliance was very important from several perspectives and commenced from the beginning of PRC, but ultimately from the nationalistic perspective as techno-nationalism. Mao stressed that self-reliance and autonomy (not only in defense sector) is the major component of becoming modern respected state within the international community.[75]

The acquisition from foreign sources was during the People's War Under Modern Conditions limited. This was due to Chinese experience with the Soviet Union, which resulted in government's effort to abandon any kind of dependency on foreign military sources.

Wendy Friedman argued *"the pragmatically recognized need for a two-track policy which sought to acquire foreign technologies to address specific needs over the short term, while making a commitment to developing and advancing indigenous R&D and production capacities over the long term."*[76] Friedman's arguments underline the condition of Chinese domestic product lines and the

[74] 11th Five-year plan
[75] On sustainability and self reliance see Zedong, Self-Reliance and Arduous Struggle available online at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch21.htm
[76] Gill and Kim, 1996. p.34

quality of domestic weaponry and partly explain the behavior of China's military planners. Furthermore, it stresses the importance of the PLA security requirements, in which the inability of domestic production implied that foreign acquisition process was merely due to security reasons while domestic reasons exceeded in the domestic politics explanations.

Also, it took a while to incorporate strategic military appliances into the new operational capabilities. People's War concept predicated a war within China's territory while Deng focused on frontier defence, which demanded the acquisition focus to modify.

Gill and Kim in their analysis argue that during the period *"China's efforts to build a modern army and defence industrial base continued to be a protracted process."*[77] So was the acquisition effort from foreign sources, which was further slowed down due to high costs. That resulted in 9 actual deliveries out of 25 major arms sales negotiations. This was despite the reformulation and decrease of bureaucratic resistance for arms imports.[78] But the lack of capital crystalized in restrain of the acquisition process itself. Overall, China's weapon acquisition process during the period is characterized as stagnant and resulted in decline in percentage of government spending.

2.4.1 Security

The changing nature of the domestic and international environment naturally influenced the military acquisition explanations due to security reasons. The security explanation is based on the imminent threat perception and by shifting the primary focus to economic development under peaceful coexistence China eased if not shaded the tensions leaving the legitimization of the armament purchases due to security reasons fall behind. Nevertheless, the evolution of Sino-Vietnam War and hostile relationship between USSR and China and given the historical background of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relationships, China could not afford to fall behind in its military development. The overall security

[77] Ibid. p.41
[78] Ibid.

situation is stressed by Cheung, who argues that *"changes in the international environment make conflict on or beyond China's borders increasingly plausible."*[79]

The Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan embarked Chinese leaders to be aware of its near boarder's security conditions. In addition the Iraqi-Iranian War proved China the future likelihood of warfare for which she needs to prepare for. Lastly, one major nuclear development in the area kept Chinese leaders to re-orientate into security issues more intently. After India successfully tested the nuclear weapon, China sough to go over the edge and tried to find a strategic advantage which could leap over the Indian strategic equalizer.

Overall, China was engaged in prioritizing the peaceful development over recklessly wasting money on military spending. Several defence industry restrictions were made to halt the boundless financial losses. Tai Ming in his finding over the domestic defence sector observed the reduction of human resources, mostly of the military establishment and also the production volume of Chinese defence economic sector decreased. Also, major downsizing of overlapped military took part under Deng's requests. The findings tend to be eliminating or at least undermining the realistic theories and emphasize the absence of any direct threat to the sovereignty of state and were a natural result of Chinese leadership priorities.

Despite the downsizing of human capital, volume of military production and reduced defence sector priorities, China's internal and external security remained the top priority. However, the proclamation was not supported by proper resource investment or extensive foreign weapon acquisition. The attention and emphasizes were rather given to increase the quality of domestic products rather than necessary quantity in order to boost the reliability on domestic military hardware while decreasing the foreign defence imports.[80] Also, the process of enhancing

[79] Chieh-cheng Huang, 2001.
[80] Ming, 2008. p.5

domestic sources and combat effectiveness of Chinese domestic products was very doubtful due to limited reliability and quality of domestic products.[81]

In addition, dull and not numerous foreign acquisitions together with low quality production clearly show the absence of serious and imminent threat to China. The possible explanation is due to absence of threat, or at least due to ignoring the threat on behalf of the economic preferences, which dominated the priorities of Chinese leaders.

There were a few segments that earned the reliability of domestically produced weapons. The J-7M fighter jet made merely for export, which with the Western-type avionics could have the same operational capabilities if not better in comparison to MiG-21. This fact only underlined above-mentioned arguments of prioritizing economical development as weapon exports provided China with hard currency while selling the most of its reliable fighter jets. Continuously, APC, SSMs and AShMs are characterized to be modern weapons,[82] thus, meeting the PLA's requirement and partly meeting the security objectives of coastal active defence of China's frontiers.

2.4.2 Domestic Politics

The major influence over the preferences of military procurement relied, most of the time, and similarly to the People's War period, in the hand of one man and few of the selected senior leaders who served with Deng in the Fourth Field Army during the Chinese Revolution.[83] The fact that Chinese CCP leaders held both high positions within military as well as top political seats gave them a great opportunity to influence the acquisition process. Thus, for many of them the eased priority of the defensive sector in behalf of the civilian economic sector could spur tensions within the officials responsible for military procurement. However,

[81] It should be noted that for the third world countries Chinese domestic products could be beneficial. They do not seek for narrowing the power gap between them and global military powers. Chinese weapons fulfill their criteria as they are easy to operate, maintain and importantly, offer a cheaper acquisition opportunity than arms of United States or Soviet Union
[82] Bitzinger, 1992. p. 16
[83] See Mulvenon and Yang, 2000.

Deng's position was rock strong and the exercise of his influence was comparable to Mao's during his period. In terms of gaining support and passing his policies.[84]

Deng's approach to link the military budget to the economical development brought new organizations to compete for influence. Even thought the military expenditures could have positive effects on the overall economic stability boosting bargaining power of the executives of state-owned enterprises.[85]

Chinese defence executive Zhang Aiping supported China's defence industry direction and modernization according to the self-reliance model. However he claimed the necessity to learn from foreign technology in purpose to satisfy the security needs of PLA.[86] Given his background of a military General, his thrive for efficient military modernization through increasing volume of foreign purchases to strengthen Chinese armed forces was not fully supported.

Deng's four modernizations did not leave much financial resources to rely upon foreign weapon acquisition to meet the PLA requirements. Given the position of military modernization, Chinese defence budget significantly decreased and left very few opportunities for any significant weapon acquisition.[87] This was possible not only due to lowered imminent threat, but also due to changing perception of international environment by Chinese communist leaders. In this spectrum, and in the spectrum of war-fighting principles of People's War Under Modern Conditions, the focus was only on limited military capabilities customized to fulfill the limited war objectives.

Shun Zhenhuan observed that *"After the CCP's Third Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee, China's defense industry was steadily reformed, as restructuring of the state economic system was implemented. During the past decade, the State Council and Military Commission of the Central Committee passed a series of resolutions: the State Council governed directly the six*

[84] To get perspective of Chinese factions within the CCP see June Teufel Dreyer, 1985.
[85] For evaluation of military expenditure influencing economic growth in China see Dimitraki and Guy, 2001.
[86] Gil and Kim, 1996. p.35
[87] As Gil and Kim observed, the budget declined during the 1977-1989 period by 50%

departments formerly run by the State Defense Science and Industry Commission but headed by both the State Council and Central Military Commission. According to their special needs, every military department restructured themselves, from the governing body to administrative setup to product structure to internal organization to work patterns and distribution. The variety of changes propelled the defense industry forward. The success and experiences laid a good foundation for further reform."[88] New set up of internal bodies shuffled the established power links as new domestic politics processes needed to be revealed to battle for power within Chinese communist party.

2.4.3 Norms

As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, norms model focuses on a symbolic role particular weapon serves. For China, during the Deng's era of modern conditions, the matter of role of particular weapon play was limited but the role of Chinese defence industry gained techno-nationalist importance.

The Cultural Revolution put shade on the Confucian values and Deng's main task was to keep the Chinese people unified around the communist party and the ideology. During the period, Deng sough to find an ideology that would complement the four Cardinal Values, which would earn the pragmatic nationalistic sentiment on one side, and increase the legitimacy of CCP on the other.

Deng found new ideology in capitalism, although with Chinese characteristics, which gave him a strong argument to highlight his influence within the CCP as a "paramount leader". His four-modernization process began a new era of Chinese nationalism. Chinese defence industry should be the cornerstone of supply for future PLA's requirements and show the self-reliance in defence production. China's defence industrial complex modernization, thus, should symbolically ensure the long-term self-sufficiency. Complementary to ensuring the long-term military self-sufficiency, it is a step forward towards achieving autonomy while

[88] Shun, 2008.

avoiding dependency. And to achieve autonomy in terms of weaponry supplies from domestic sources means to apropos acquire the great power status.

This strategic shift of Chinese perception is given naturally by the doctrinal change given by the likelihood of limited conventional conflict. China focused on fewer but technologically more capable and reliable weapons from domestic sources not on extensive or expensive purchases. The military statute was thus, intended to increase with sole elevation of Chinese domestic defence industries, which were meant to self-sufficiently and independently supply China's armed forces.

However, the quality of Chinese domestic military products was not fully adequate and did not respond to the quality necessary to lead and win an armed conflict. Therefore, there were acquisitions from foreign sources but the step towards autonomy and towards acquisition of higher status was intended through the domestic industry development.

3 LIMITED WAR 1985-91

3.1 Contextual Overview

The intentions to implement large amount of strategic as well as tactical and operational changes came after the game-changing speech of Deng Xiaoping at the enlarged meeting of the Party Central Military Commission in Beijing in 1985. The event also holds major merit for the transition from People's War Under Modern Condition. At the event, Xiaoping not only changed the perception of China's development to peaceful development, where Chinese economy would grow but also transitioned Mao's principal doctrine of major, total and constant people's war (positioned to counter USSR invasion) to a doctrine more suitable for China's peaceful environment perception.

In his speech Xiaoping linked the military modernization along with new and modern hardware procurement needs to the economic development, but he also stressed the importance of research and development for enhancing domestic defence industry all in accordance to economic growth.[89]

Thus the limited war doctrine stressed the importance of technology of positional and mobile warfare capabilities purposely used in geographically limited conflicts. This is based upon the experience from Iraq-Iran military engagement.

Despite the proclamations and proposed policies, military procurement did not take concrete steps to support rapid modernization of China's armed forces during the period nor did the domestic industries. The headline of the Limited War period is in strategic shift of China's threat perception, when the inevitability of total war transmitted into the imminent danger of war. That perception led China to straightly focus on the economic development and as a result to domestic industries development. Also, China tried to start some joint ventures to strengthen its domestic production and also acquire know-how to modernize its military industrial segment.

[89] Xiaoping, 1985.

Military procurement from foreign countries was partly supported, only to counter short-term to medium turn challenges posed by lack of quality production from domestic defence industries.

However domestic challenges posed by Tiananmen Square protests graduated into halting all Western-Chinese military engagements and resulted in imposed all-around arms embargo that prohibits the Western countries to transmit military equipment to China. These events let China re-consider its foreign procurement preferences and put even more emphasizes on the domestic quality and quantity production.

Nevertheless, during the limited war period, acquisition process did not turn to be much of a difference in comparison to the People's War Under Modern Conditions. Indeed, the hunger for foreign military sources were much of a higher concentration but domestic political issues in resemblance of Tiananmen square massacre halted the effort to modernize Chinese armed forces from foreign sources. Also, domestic industry quality issues resulted in inability to immediately make impact for PLA.

Rather, the evolution is seen in Chinese strategic thinking and set direction of future involvement and likeness of China's PLA. Great emphasis were given to economic growth and development, which resulted in limited interest of communist leaders into the military development due to lowered international threat perception after the doctrinal change.[90] However, the events of Gulf War fundamentally changed the functioning of China's perception of conducting warfare but also set major preferences of military procurement placement and resulted in evolution of Chinese doctrinal thinking and extensive taste foreign procurement.

3.2 Introduction Of The Doctrine

Doctrinal change came as a result of transmission of China's operational and tactical behavior that evolved after engagement in conducted war-fighting

[90] On the impact of military spending, arms trade and economic growth see Yakovlev, 2007.

principles practically enforced in Iraq-Iran War. War-Fighting principles for the Limited War period are based in strategic doctrine named Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlüexue), created by Academy of Military Science in 1987. This principles actually did not fully incorporate the strategic ideas and orders made by Deng Xiaoping during his speech at the party enlarged meeting of CMC in 1985, rather the streamed focus strengthen and evolved People's War Under Modern Condition approach and provided guidelines to counter the invasion of potential adversary. Deng's speech at the enlarged meeting of CMC in 1985 set the base for doctrinal thinking transmission and is identified as a key event for China's military evolution from People's War to Limited War.

Iraqi-Iranian War inspired Deng Xiaoping. By observing the conditions of conducting warfare, Deng changed the perception of future conduct from total to limited, highly intensive war.

In Taylor Fravel's words was *"Zhanlüexue focused almost exclusively on ground forces, with little mention of naval operations and only a limited discussion of air operations in the context of strategic air defense when countering an invasion."*[91] Almost directly pointing on adversary with some possibilities of land intervention into the Mainland, which required mobile armed forces in all geographic dimensions, strategic deterrent and second-strike capabilities. The Soviet Union action in Afghanistan gave China's leaders gave strong impetus to mind their boarder defence predominantly and with the highest priority.

Despite the Zhanlüxue did not incorporate Xiaoping's latest proposals made during his speech in 1985[92], major switch from People's War total war concept to a localized (geographically limited in scope but highly intensive) conflicts was made to response to substantial changes of the international environment. The practical example of Iraqi-Iranian war showed its localized and limited scope that replaced the total war as the fundamental concept of international conflict engagement.

[91] Fravel, 2005.
[92] See Fravel, 2005.

The event in China not only spurred the need for effective ground forces and land-attack weapons but also for improvements of Chinese military forces readiness. In accordance to strengthen efficiency and effectiveness of military personnel, forces were downsized by one million.

The war-fighting principles of Limited War period include:

- Active defence principles (as in People's War Under Modern Condition)
- Strategic defence (combination of offensive and defensive capabilities)
- Importance of positional and mobile warfare strategy with the combination of joint forces operational capability
- Strategic counter attack
- Possibly nuclear second strike capabilities

In this type of doctrine, combined armed forces operation would play one of the key roles, rather than the quantity of peoples and arms involved. Limited War doctrine was a first step away from People's War doctrines into the new era of Chinese military. It represents a migration from preparation for constant total war to perception of peaceful coexistence with main focus on economic development. It is noteworthy that peaceful perception does not mean absence of military conflict. It rather stresses the low possibility of total war and shifts to notion of limited war.

3.3 Weapon Acquisition Focus

Domestically, China started a new chapter of its defence industry. The seventh five-year plan of the 6th National party congress stressed the importance of improving economic effectiveness based on enhancing quality of products, in line with quantity and regarding sustainable economic growth rate.[93] Defence sector should have been a key part of it as China's military modernization process and was implied to counter the technological gap in military industrial field of potential competitors.

[93] See 7th Five-year plan available online at http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157620.htm

Chinese leaders often stressed the importance of quality products and increased investments into the military economic segment but China experienced slow progress in this matter. For example, China's planners underlined the importance of self-reliance and thus, tried to purchase only several prototypes of Western military products with intention to reverse-engineer due to its high costs. This selected method was a pure failure of the decision-makers planers for fulfilling a complex acquisition process as a mixture of domestic and foreign sources. Not only Western suppliers were not willing to sell just a handful of their products to China, but also if they intended to do so, the systems and technology were so complex that Chinese engineers could not replicate them without the proper know-how.[94]

This approach to foreign weapon acquisition together with inadequate quality of domestic production resulted in limited acquisition process in sought of enhancing Chinese armed forces. However, large investments were made into the segment of ballistic missiles. In fact, ballistic missiles were one of a few domestic products that fulfilled not only requirements of PLA but also international standards and are perceived to be a success of China's domestic industrial production. Overall Chinese domestic military complex, in Shambaugh's words *"remained a sea of mediocrity, backwardness and redundancy."*[95]

The trend in foreign military supplies kept the trend from PWUMC period in place and underlined Chinese acquisition process also during the period of Limited War. China and USSR did not agree on terms for military procurement for over thirty years but Chinese negative experience within its security environment urged China to reconsider the ignoring stance of military sources from Soviet Union.

Although China tried to extricate from military dependence on any country, its military domestic production fell short to meet PLA's needs, thus continued to seek foreign military products. With the economic and arms embargo implied by

[94] Shambaugh, 2003. p. 230
[95] Ibid. p. 230

Western countries, China was forced and urged to return to USSR military imports to halt the widening Sino-Western, Sino-Russian and Sino-Japanese military gap.

The SIPRI's military import database confirms Chinese trend in acquisition from foreign sources and concurrently return to the Soviet military procurement by ordering 24 pieces of Mi-type helicopters in 1990. Other Soviet purchases were placed to bolster PLA's air force capabilities and strengthen ballistic missiles efficiency. Major acquisition was made in order to purchase 24 pieces Su-27S/Flanker-B fighter jet aircraft to counter Chinese limitations in the air.[96]

Despite Chinese leaders were still pressing to modernize its domestic products lines and satisfy the demand for modern weapons and weapon systems, it did not fully refused to acquire military capabilities from Western sources. The main argument was seen in satisfying PLA's short to medium-term military requirements.[97]



Source: SIPRI

[96] SIPRI import database
[97] See General Liu Huaquing in Gill a Kim 1996. p. 56. And SIPRI import database

During the Limited War period, China placed the total of 23 orders to various foreign countries, including five orders to USSR and later Russia. France received the majority of 12 orders placed (accounts for 53% of all procurement) to acquire military technologies. The main products were electronic weapon systems such as ASW sonars, Air/Sea search radar, fire control radar, anti-tank missiles and helicopters. This acquisitions show Chinese appetite for modern, electronic systems and devices.[98]

3.4 Weapon Acquisition Explanation

During the period, the quality of Chinese domestic production lacked behind modern military requirements of the PLA and fall way behind modern international standards. Domestic production in the Limited War relied upon the modernization of obsolete Soviet type weapons imported during 1950's.

Nevertheless, China continued to purchase several military hardware from foreign sources as well as from domestic one's in order to apply the modern conditions into Chinese obsolete military capabilities. The Limited War period could be characterized as a "pursuit of modern conditions" of Chinese armed forces.

3.4.1 Security

The security explanation of China's military acquisition during the Limited War period is essentially a sequel of the previous purchases that occurred in the previous doctrinal periods and offer a mixture of the need for complex changes for the upcoming period all due to changes in the international and domestic security environment and changing threat perception not only of the state, but more importantly of Chinese communist party.

During the period, Chinese leaders recognized that retention of regional stability is a priority to the national development. For China, the main tool to retain her national security within and beyond its borders was through the armed forces, the PLA and paramilitary forces.

[98] For China-Western military procurement connection see Stuart and Tow, 1982.

Recent Chinese development of opening up showed first results and led to economic and military growth that in many eyes raised suspicion, especially in countries that shared hostile history with China. These suspicions were elevated with great focus of Chinese foreign military acquisitions, created distorted perception of a more hostile environment and brought some countries into the edge of a security dilemma. The main Chinese intention was to increase its powers and modernize its weapon systems and to shrink the power gap between other military forces operating in the region but engage in bilateral confidence building measures to prevent the hostile and aggressive perception.

The furthest China went was with the Soviet Union when both sides agreed to reduce troops along common boarder. It resulted in decrease of imminent threat and tensions between the two countries. China also tried to imply similar approach to former antagonists India and Vietnam in order to improve the relationship. However the relationship with United States, Japan, Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula remained somehow problematic.

With changes in the regional power decomposition, China shifted its key geographical security priorities to the eastern coastline while focusing on land-to-air, land-to-sea kind of weapon mechanisms.

The Northeast Asian region has always been a priority area for PRC. When the security threat from the USSR eased, China has shifted its security interests to repeated rivalry in the Northeast region where potential flashpoints occur - conflict on the Korean peninsula, as well as the sensitive question of Taiwan. The same security priority advocated China's traditional rival Japan.

To monitor the situation, China ordered two ASW sonars from France and put emphasis on defensive-offensive capabilities in acquiring 3000 SRAAM missiles from Israel and 300 from Russia, which was suppose to strengthen its defence shield on the East cost. Further modernization due to growing financial strength and force modernization programs of Northeastern rivals (and trading partners) was ordered.

The game-changer for China's military modernization came right after the Gulf War. China realized not only the lack of capabilities she disposed with, but also that the obsolete training, operational and strategic mechanisms were over-aged and did not meet modern requirements for conducting warfare operations. Large investments in R&D and in technology and defence industries were proposed to strengthen the national security.

3.4.2 Domestic Politics

Within the domestic environment, several bureaucratic bodies as well as senior political and military officials tried to exercise their power regarding military procurement and thus, set the bases for possible power increase or increase of competence in the future. Bodies like COSTIND, Poly, GSD or senior leaders of the military battled for their direct influence. Major institutions playing a key role during the acquisition process were Poly Technologies Corporation and COSTIND. Although Poly's major purpose is to find the potential markets for sales, it also coordinates import activities. Given the reality that General He Ping, the Poly's bureaucratic leader also served the PLA General Staff Department (former PLA Equipment Bureau) and thus, directly influenced the acquisition process had a great chance to increase his powers of both the Poly and the direction of China's military modernization. In reality, bodies and persons responsible for military procurement created a complicated complex relationship between several bureaucratic institutions and principal actors.

During the period, Chinese General proposed to build deep-sea navy – basically redefined China's interest and developed a conception of sea as territory – and extruded the need to obtain required military capabilities by 2025. Shambaugh outlines in his findings, that redefinition of so-called strategic frontiers had major impetus on Chinese strategic defence doctrinal evolution.[99] In addition to Shambaugh's analysis of Xu Guangyu's writings, Xu was responsible for the redefinition of China's interests as he initiated the concept of new national gateways when he argued *"While guarding its existing strategic land frontiers,*

[99] Shambaugh, 2003. p.69

China should fix its ocean gateway at the edge of a three-million-square kilometer zone and embrace a "high frontier" in space."[100] By the obvious example of securitization, Xu broaden the needs for military capabilities to defend the national security, more precisely, the integrity and sovereignty of PRC in all dimensions, including space.

To meet these particular requirements the CCP politburo decided, on behalf of Xu, in 1987 to reshape its armed forces, standing army, navy and air force. As Xu demanded For the national gateway concept to build new modern, three dimensional forces for protection of China's sovereignty, integrity and interests no matter the geographical location. In Xu's words *" it would be a force able to move rapidly over great distances, and able to carry out land warfare on a different scale and of different intensity in all-weather conditions, and it would use long-range detection, interception, and strategic defensive and offensive weapons systems for carrying out prompt counterattacks in space, on land and at sea."*[101]

Such a requirements have to naturally create a great demand for modern weapon systems and military hardware either from domestic or external foreign sources depending on the timetable preferable by domestic actors. It should be stressed that in 1987 should not China directly feel any imminent security threat. In other words, there was not any substantial threat to Chinese sovereignty and it might be due to the presented status as China broadens its strategic frontiers by which purposely enlarged the sovereignty environment claims, which fall closer to the imminent threat perception.

Overall, China's arms imports were placed within hierarchically structured decision-making process just like any other Chinese decision making process. Gill and Kim looked into the domestic politics interests as they observed that Liu Huaqing[102] was important actor broadly responsible for China's modernization of its armed forces. They particularly state that Huaqing given his technocratic

[100] Ibid.
[101] Xu 2006. p.69
[102] CMC and Politburo member and PLA General and long-time protégé of Xiaoping

background and assisting position to former patron of COSTIND Nie Rongzhen influenced the early development of China's domestic defence industries by placing *"his personal loyalties and interests squarely in favor of modernizing the military and military production"*[103] creating high pressure for weapon acquisition while ultimately exercising his influence over the military affairs.

In fact, Liu Huaqing, strong advocate of aircraft carriers, outlined a three-step process and gave a timetable for China's navy to become an ultimate force in the region. First, China should develop sea force operating around the first line chain, then the PLAN should develop its operational reach to the second island chain and last step, projected to be achieved by 2040 contains China's powers as a deep blue-water capable power with large power projection having aircraft-carriers as a cornerstone of PLA Navy's capabilities.[104]

Liu's powers and such a strong proclamations were only possible thanks to his unique and respected position among China's senior leadership and thank to the supreme relationship he enjoyed with Deng. However, Huaqing is known to have also personal interests in some foreign acquisitions to increase his influence within the party. Gill and Kim states that he was directly interested in the acquisition of an aircraft-carrier and ordered Vice-Admiral Li Jing to discuss the possibilities with Ukraine to purchase the *Varyag*. They state that *"Liu directly ordered the formation in 1987 of a training class for future aircraft-carrier commanders"*[105] In result, China bought the *Varyag* and rebuilt it to the operational mode, which only demonstrates the power Liu disposed with.

Some analysts speculated that Liu Huaqing's reputation for reticence and influence over military and political prominence should set the ground for his ambitions after the Deng's-era power struggle.[106]

[103] Gill and Kim, 1996. p.108
[104] Dooley, 2012.
[105] Gill and Kim 1996. p.108
[106] Ibid.

3.4.3 Norms

Due to an "in between" period of restructuring of the domestic defence industries and evolution of China's economy, the norm model is in line with the previous normative chapter.

During the period, China's pragmatic nationalistic sentiment was supported by increase of the gross national product and overall economical situation, which increased the legitimacy of CCP. This trend was used to build a base for future weapon purchases and to increase China's international position.

However, the events of the Tiananmen shaded China's intentions to become adhered internationally and implied embargo halted any possible large purchases from foreign sources. For that reason, for supplies China largely relied on its domestic defence industries.

Chinese military statute and weapon acquisition was thus supported by increase demand from domestic industries to counter the shortage and thus directly increase China's domestic nationalist tendencies arguing that China may be militarily self-sufficient and autonomous. Nevertheless the quality of products has still been an issue and could not secure higher international statute.

4 LIMITED WAR UNDER HI-TECH CONDITIONS 1991-?

4.1 Contextual Overview

The most noticeable and for international community sensible effects of China's military rise comes after 1991. Despite China's top political and military leaders started to recognize and compare China's military power with the power of military technology application in USSR/Russia and the West, the Gulf War proved the power gap still remains as wide as ever or even wider. Chinese political and military establishment realized not only the vulnerability of its military but they also noticed the change in the method of conducting warfare, which assumed synchronized involvement of all military forces together with an emphasis on advanced precise technology.

The United States-led coalition in the Gulf War in 1991 had similar impact at other state's militaries as the dropping of the first nuclear weapon on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This unprecedented hard power showdown made China focused on promoting so called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics and to create new guiding principles of doctrine for conducting warfare under the name Limited War Under High-Technological Conditions.

Shambaugh's observation of Chinese military changes due to the Gulf War only stress the impact it had. Not only was China preparing a new doctrine, structural reforms but also prepared new procurement programs. All action undertaken after the Gulf War required brand new policies and approaches and only a few of them could be traced back to the action undertaken in the 1980's and 1990's. This tendency only highlights current military conduct and state of Chinese military forces. War was a brand new ball game.

Since then states fully realized the value adding power and potential of technologically advanced conventional weapons in conjunction with C4ISR. For

that reason, China's high command intended to transform the PLA from labor-intensive to technologically intensive army in order to win next war under the high-technological conditions.[107]

The Gulf war focus on modern, hi-tech weaponry, different strategy – based on the historical and theoretical perspective and created a new type of warfare. Conflict outcomes now depended on high technological conditions and with limits of scope, geography and political objectives. Since then, Chinese military heavily focused on communication and coordination, C4ISR, and on its forces potential rapid responses to crisis for fulfilling the objectives.

As the fourth approach highlights, China's awareness of international environment along with the power balance transition caused by the termination of CW, stressed the importance of readiness to conduct geographically limited, intensive in scope, high technological capabilities when engaged in armed conflict. For this particular reason has China established its new strategic guidelines of active defence, approach that principally reflects Chinese situation within the global security environment.

The active defence approach entailed to adopt so called three-step strategy of military forces through national defence modernization development, particularly through science and technology, which put emphasizes and stressed the necessity for promotion of dual use technology, vital for sustainable modernization and stable economic development. Such an approach primarily focused on narrowing the technological gap between China and technologically advanced states. For fulfilling the criterion, China had adopted several steps and speeded up the development of military hardware and equipment; strengthen the efficiency of military personnel by reducing the total number while enhancing the skills of soldiers in service.

China took several other steps on the strategic and tactical level, primarily by creation of several strategic documents called Defence White Papers[108], which

[107] Li, 2007.

outline the bases for China's armed forces and furthermore improve military training, which is practically used during peacekeeping missions under the UN. The action is taken in line of balancing economic and military development of the country and strengthening its reliability and combat readiness.

Domestically, China focuses on the evaluation of the defence industrial sector. This evaluation came into several phases and the most important outcome is the necessity to transfer the defence industry into the entrepreneur's hands. That would possibly strengthen the quality of produced weapons that could compete on the global weapon market and could maintain the long-term sustainability of Chinese domestic procurement. The other key transformation of domestic defence industry is to integrate the pure military economy into wider civilian economy to ensure the sustainability and profit over the long run.

4.2 Introduction Of The Doctrine

International events had through the PRC doctrines a revisionist taste for PLA doctrinal strategists as they tend to upgrade the war-fighting and training principles according to the latest standards to maintain pace with the technologically advanced militaries of dominantly the Western countries, especially the USA.

For China, the major international events of the Gulf War followed by intervention of US-led NATO forces in former Yugoslavia and more deeply the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan put major impetus on the revisionist doctrinal thinking and also mirrored the war-fighting principle creating. Weapon and armament acquisition needed to satisfy and support the operational consequences of strategic thoughts and are described in the weapon acquisition section.

As the PLA was lastly engaged in military conflict in Vietnam War, the need for continuous and realistic military training in war-like conditions was necessary if

[108] White papers have been issued by Chinese Ministry of National Defence since 1988 biannually and characterize the national security situation, introduce the defence expenditures, underlines the international cooperation and in general, provide the base for China's military engagement

the PLA is to be effective during combats. For that purpose, the training techniques were modified to strengthen the readiness of Chinese armed forces.

Several important training-related postures were accommodated in recent PLA's training techniques. According to China's Military Culture Field Guide conducted by the United States Marine Corps Intelligent services, the techniques included issues like:

- More mission-focused training
- More realistic training
- More educated personnel to be able to operate under informatized warfare conditions
- Improvement of PLA's joint operations capabilities[109]

It is important to note that such a broad understanding of strategy and war-like military training meant to satisfy the hard power requirements to meet the strategic demands.

In addition, Taylor Concludes that the operational tactics of what has been predicative for both People Wars periods shifted from actually guiding the military operations to rather a strategy-guiding operations of where and at what time the different strategy should be used to achieve political objectives.[110]

Strategically, the war-fighting principles of the most recent Limited War Under High Technological Conditions period is fundamentally encompassed in the Science of Military Strategy and focuses on the security environment aspect important for fulfilling operational requirements. The strategy further mirrors the training techniques and influences the sole weapon acquisition process.

[109] Military Culture Field Guide, 2009.
[110] Shambaugh, 2003. p. 99

The Science of Military Strategy, this time published under the head of National Defence University in 1999, provided Chinese military forces with strategy of three different scopes, namely wartime, peacetime and local war strategy.[111]

Taylor's research points at Chinese widening of understanding military strategy to no only military but also non-military factors that relate to national defence were made substantially due to changing international environment.[112]

The principal changes were in the scope of conducting military operations and consist of four components of military power:[113]

- Operational strength (personnel, weaponry)
    - Professional soldiers, concentration of capabilities rather then mass mobilization
- Operational space (dimension – land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic sphere)
    - Air and sea to be dominating factor rather then ground forces centric
- Operational forms (methods and tactics)
    - Quick campaigns, focus on enemy's strengths, primacy of offensive tactics with joint operations but with defensive posture rather than wars of attrition and guerilla tactics
- Operational Arts (combination of all components to achieve desired goals

Quick resolution of the conflict is desirable to achieve essential goals and reflects the fundamental characteristics of the Limited War Under High Technological Conditions. Key and major role of war fighting is devoted to peacetime principals of deterrence strategy and crisis management to prevent face-to-face military showdown. Such a view of China's military capabilities requires strong presence of modern military hardware for deterrence to be credible and reliable at the same time.

[111] For valuable comparison between the 1987 and 1999 issue of Science of Military Strategy see Fravel, 2005.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Based on Fravel's classification, Ibid. p. 94

Of course this might seem as an odd argument due to Chinese possession of nuclear weapons and more precisely the nuclear triad, but the threat of use of such a deterrent has been loosing credibility since the emerged Cold War.[114] On the other side the risk use is still present in todays world as several international bodies approach the issue through pressuring states to nuclear disarmament participation to achieve a global nuclear-free zone. Whether its inevitable and desirable is another issue.

To have credible deterrence capabilities, it is required to hold sophisticated conventional powers to back up the intentions. The cost of transformation of deterrence strategy requires not only doctrinal (at least internal) and operational change, but also resources to satisfy the credibility requirements.

4.3 Weapon Acquisition Focus

Domestically, until the second half of 1990's has China enjoyed limited success of its design, development and production of its conventional weapons. In Bitzinger's words, which stress the status of the Chinese post Cold War defence and actually underline its nearly fifty year development *"most systems were at least a generation or two behind comparable military equipment being produced at the time in the West or in the Soviet Union, and problems with quality and reliability abounded. In addition, overcapacity, redundancy, inefficient production, and, above all, a weak research and development (R&D) base all conspired to impede the development of an advanced indigenous arms production capability."*[115]

Problems with Chinese productions forced China to turn back, after a few decades of silence, to the Soviet/Russian for conventional weapons acquisition. China's domestic events of 1989 in Tiananmen Square resulted in inability to procure any advanced military technologies and advanced military hardware from European and American sources due to military embargo. Thus, putting even greater

[114] On deterrence see Schelling, 1966. Jervis, 1979. And also see Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, Sam, 2011.
[115] Bitzinger, 2007b.

emphases on the design, development and manufacturing from domestic low-quality sources.

In addition, China was also trying to take a full advantage of a "buyer's market" created after the end of the Cold War. For this purpose, China turned to acquire ex-Soviet weapons for reasonable cost.

Given the influence of the international events and the status of domestic military industries, the weapon acquisition process was shaped according to rapid developments in science and technology as well as (r)evolution of international environment. Currently, hard power capabilities such as cruise missiles and on millimeter precise, guided munitions and other sophisticated weapons caused great challenges as well as renders to technologically advanced states. With ownership of technologically sophisticated weapons could China gain the edge and attenuate the power gap with others, developed countries.

The refusal of participation in military modernization would leave China too vulnerable when dealing with security issues or defending its core interests at home and also abroad. In this regards, China did not over-spend and is still not over-spending, its financial resources to tackle Western military inequality concern. Rather, the military acquisition process of Local Wars Under High Technological Conditions goes hand-to-hand with the proposed economical development and is thus perceived as practical application for satisfying strategic principles regarding broader requirements of the country.

According to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia, the PLA is turning its acquisition focus during its 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) to:

- Space surveillance and warfare systems
- New large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
- Fifth generation fighters and weapons
- Aircraft carriers and larger escort ships
- Helicopter amphibious assault ships
- Third generation nuclear attack submarines

- Helicopters fulfilling naval assault, heavy lift and airborne early warning roles
- Heavy transport aircraft
- Naval fighters[116]

This primary focus is a natural resolution of China's intention to shrink the military power gap and create a projecting military power to in support to defend domestic and international interests.

China increasing the hard power capabilities as a vast array of Chinese weapons are currently under development and have the neighboring states, Japan and USA, observe the military development with concerns. For instance, the development of WU-14 Hypersonic Weapon System could give China operational advantage over its potential adversary. The hypersonic weapons are perceived to be hard targets to shot down as its travel speed is estimated to 3,840 to 7,680 miles an hour. In general, hypersonic weapons are constructively hard to develop and China's limited success proved improvement of domestically designed, produced and mantled advanced weapons while noting the improvement domestic defense industry.[117]

Also, China begun to operate one of its first planned aircraft carriers – the Liaoning - in 2012 and is planning more. In fact, China is trying to build its first indigenous aircraft carrier but is expected to take some time until it reaches a full proficiency and operational service.

It all corresponds with the major acquisition China planned and made after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis and in broader sense with the attempt to close the power gap between China and US (see table 1 below) and with the possibility to bring the Middle Kingdom back to the great power status.

[116] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2011.
[117] More on China going Hypersonic online at http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/30/arms-race-goes-hypersonic/gzqi?reloadFlag=1

Table 1 Major PLA Weapons Packages Purchased Since 1990 as collected by MAJ PENG YAO-ZU

300+ Sukhoi fighters by 2007, many upgraded for multirole missions
Thousands of Russian antiair and precision ground-attack weapons for aircraft
Twenty Russian IL-76 heavy transport aircraft; thirty-eight more ordered
About 1,000 Russian S-3000 PMU/PMU2 SAMs
Twelve Russian Kilo submarines, eight with Club long-range antiship missiles
Four Russian Sovremenniy Class missile destroyers
Russian weapons and electronics packages for four new class of stealthy warships
A Russian-Ukraine aircraft carrier to serve as a transitional platform for the PLAN
Russian 1-meter electro-optical and radar satellite technologies
Partnership in the European Galileo navigation satellite system
Over 200 Russian Mi-17 helicopters
Co-development of an 8-ton helicopter with Europe's Eurocopter

Source: Richard D. Fisher, China's Military Modernization (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), 90.

In addition, SIPRI's data prove us that the Chinese military procurement from foreign, especially Russian sources gained momentum, especially after the 1996-96 years. In relative terms, China procured the total of 89% from Russian sources, which relatively means 82 out of 92 total procured weapons till the end of 2014. It all corresponds with Chinese intention to better target her vulnerabilities, especially in the access denial of American forces into the region.



Source: SIPRI

4.4 Weapon Acquisition Explanation

The majority of China's military procurement is addressed to actually deterring two countries from what they potentially want while being able to obtain what China wants. That is, to deter Taiwan to declare independence, acquire nuclear weapon or to be a part of broader international military alliance and to deny access of US military forces into the near waters.[118] While China might prepare for military takeover across the Taiwan Strait, it needs to deal (or count) with a potential counterattack from the United States. Nevertheless the Taiwanese Act (1979) does not explicitly mention that the US will respond with military power.

China is curently engaged in full-scale comprehensive modernization with primary focus on various elements. The Chinese national plan stressed the motivation to develop full military hi-tech capabilities within 2020. The plan focuses on all Chinese defense segments but specifically at high-end industries, namely aviation, rocket and space engineering, IT industry and similar.[119]

[118] See Sang, 2006.
[119] See an article on China planning for High-Tech army from China Daily, 2006.

To strengthen Air Force, China is developing a fifth generation of fighter jets and carrier-capable fighters J-15[120], for Navy, as the report puts it *"China's naval modernization effort includes wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including programs for ASBMs, ASCMs and LACMs, SAM manned aircraft unmanned aircraft, submarines aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol crafts …"*[121] with main goals, as characterized by Congressional Research Service, of addressing the Taiwan issue through military, if necessary, defending China's interests and claims in the South China and East China Seas, obtain the legal rights to control and rule foreign military activities in the EEZ[122], in addition to displace the US presence and influence in the Western Pacific and lastly, to obtain international status as a leading regional power.[123] For Army, China is developing new battle tanks and overall seeks to build modern army according to current international operational demands. Above all, China disposes with major cyber security capabilities and stresses the informatization of warfare through the modernization and pours vast resources into the space activities as well.

The drivers behind the military spending and reasons for the acquisition processes vary from security perspective, also domestic politics and norms play essential role as the possibility to explain the modernization by pure security reasons vanishes with growing Chinese power.

4.4.1 Security

The end of cold war changed the entire security environment. The multi-polar international environment witnessed the power of the United States and created unprecedented power capabilities gap not only with China but also with the rest of the armed forces out there. China sought to increase its national security and increase its power while stressing the peaceful coexistence arguments.

[120] Chinese version of Russian Su-33s.
[121] O'Rourke, 2014.
[122] Exclusive economic zone is a 200 mile distant space from the coastal cliff where state has the exclusive rights to control the movement.
[123] O'Rourke, 2014. p. 4

The LWUHTC period is characterized by rapidly changing international environment that was shaped by both surprising events as much as planned and strategically undergone ones. Internationally, the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the former Soviet Block mixed with the US-led intervention in the Gulf War in 1991 proved China that national security requirements have to stay in high stakes and the continuation of military modernization is not only desirable but also inevitable to maintain the essential goal. In addition to national security, major quest for China was to shrink the power gap between China and others, technologically advanced states and propose for Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics.

Suddenly, changing international environment resulted in acceleration of the acquisition process, in which security interpretations obtained stronger, eloquent and legitimizing taste. For Beijing, several pressing security challenges arose since the termination of the bi-polar security environment. The after 1991 period is characterized by China's containment of Taiwan's drive towards autonomy, which culminated especially during elections in 2000. For China, the re-unification of Taiwan is one of the core interests of the national strategy and with Taiwan's democratization and differentiation over several policies will the goal be more difficult to succeed in the long-term. To deter Taiwan from any independent action, China is increasing its missiles numbers at the disposal. The number of short-range ballistic missiles (300-600 km) facing Taiwan reportedly reached 1,000 and is increasing. Also a mid-range (2,500 km) ballistic capabilities increased and are complementary a part of a greater A2/AD strategy.[124]

Additionally, the necessaries to closely follow up the global revolution in military affairs requested almost day-to-day results of research and development, which shapes the future PLA operational requirements. According to Tai Ming "China's emergence as a thriving, globally connected, market-oriented, and prosperous

[124] Ding, 2009.

power, coupled with a sharp acceleration in the rearmaments needs of the PLA."[125]

The main threatening element of Chinese national security from the existential perspective can be seen in two perspectives – regionally or globally.

Regionally and also historically, Russia, India and Japan, given its economic, political and military circumstances, are a great challenge for China and will be even bigger in a foreseeable future is Chinese power to ground. Globally, main fear and anxiety to China comes from the United States, which hold the superiority as a broadly accepted world power hegemon and Japan, which is perceived as a historical adversary.

India's successful round of nuclear tests in 1998 implies that any future boarder issue between the two has to be taken cautiously. Given the earlier Indian defeat during the Sino-Indian War that ostentatiously expressed Indian conventional vulnerability, had China need to be worried about Indian nuclear intentions or at least be aware of possible direction of its nuclear deterrent. It should be also noted, that India in comparison to China does not hold the complete nuclear triad, as it possesses two thirds of the nuclear phenomenon.[126] Regarding, this fact, it should be also noted that China, as opposed to India, is a member of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and abnegated its first use policy.[127] Such a phenomenon and denial of its offensive capabilities could leave China strategically vulnerable and set the hunger for nuclear but also conventional improvement.

Globally, but also regionally, since its presence from the end of the WWII, the United States are challenging China, with recently growing tendency. The perception of the challenge is increasing with China's economic and military power gain, which further results in discussions within all structures of American society. Whether the cooperation will maintain as a core of the bilateral

[125] Cheung, 2008.
[126] Farley, 2015.
[127] However, China non-first use policy has its flaws as it confirms the retaliation of an attack, which does not have to come from a nuclear source.

interaction or the necessity of conflict will eventually occur will determine security environment of the 21st centruy.[128]

At full extend, China recognizes the latent for potential military engagement with the USA and does plans its military requirements and so pours the financial recourses accordingly. The strongest advocate of military procurement because of the power projection of USA, lies in so called anti-access, area-denial A2/AD (or in Chinese meaning – the counter-intervention) weapons to exclude US military forces to approach the near waters of so-called First Island Chain.[129] In fact Ashley J. Tellis argues that China's strategy and military modernization has been directly planned towards A2AD capability - that means to prevent any country to access Chinese near seawaters.[130]

Since the breakup of the Cold War and especially after 1996, China is heavily modernizing its navy in accordance to counter the U.S. naval forces operating in the region. China is focusing its acquisition around land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles, land-based surface to air missiles, land-based air force aircrafts armed with anti-ship cruise missiles and land-based long-range radars to detect and track ships at the sea.[131]

In fact, China does already have an experience with US deployment into near sea waters. The ability to rapidly deploy carrier-based airpower during a crisis is a "American thing" and such a phenomenon was spectated during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Such an action is believed to be repeated, if similar crisis occurs in the future. Also, it is a key factor and driver for military procurement-appropriate requirements due to security reasons. For that purpose, China ordered four Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers in 1996 although the first order was placed in 1993 and contained four Kilo-class submarines.[132]

[128] See Congressional Research Service: Pivot to the Pacific, 2014.
[129] First Island Chain consists of the Kuril Islands, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and Borneo
[130] Tellis, 2012.
[131] O'Rourke, , 2014.
[132] O'Rourke, 2014.

This fact is also supported by the US Department of Defence statement from 2011 that *"The U.S. response in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis underscored to Beijing the potential challenge of U.S. military intervention and highlighted the importance of developing a modern navy, capable of conducting A2AD operations, or counter-intervention operations in the PLA's lexicon."*[133]

Major modernization effort has been made within the submarine defensive sector as well as China views is submarine forces as a key element for conducting A2/AD operations against a sophisticated adversary. For that purpose, according to the Congressional Research Service, China acquired and put into the service at least four new class submarines. Namely Jin class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), Shang class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), Yun Class (SS) and another Song class submarine.[134]

Major acquisitions to support Chinese operational likelihood to keep the US distance were additionally also made in accordance of strengthening the air power of PLAF while strengthening the ballistic missile capabilities on the coastline. This also functioned (and still does) as a deterrence factor for Taiwan not to declare the independence. According to Deng Cheng *"PLA analyses have concluded that airpower is essential for the conduct of non-contact, non-linear, non-symmetric warfare. In their view, these three qualities are typical of local wars under informationized conditions, where airpower-along with space and cyber capabilities- will be essential to victory. Consequently, China's efforts in A2/AD are intended to forestall, and if possible defeat, an opponent's ability to engage in sustained aerial attack against key Chinese targets."*[135]

Overall, Chinese motivations of the weapon acquisition, especially from Russian sources were under interrelated considerations. From the beginning of the nineties, the key motivation was to bolster PLA's security deficit, which was created by technologically outdated aging capabilities. Consequently, China did

[133] DOD CMSD, 2011. p. 57.
[134] See Halloran, 2013.
[135] For China's intention countering the US approach see http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/countering-china's-a2-ad-challenge-9099

already have experience with Russian-made technology, thus, was able to immediately patch the short-term security requirements by acquiring Kilo Class submarines, and several Su-27s and other necessary capabilities to strengthen national security and hard power in the region and protect the core interests.

4.4.2 Domestic Politics

Jiang Zemin's slogans of "building an army with quality" (*zhiliang jianjun*) and "strengthening the army with science and technology" (*keji qiangjun*) talk for themselves. Zemin's military modernization approach was a turning point for technologization of Chinese military. After the end of the Cold War, it was due to his personal initiatives to involve in the military modernization. His powers over the military were witnessed even after he stepped down as a chairman of the CCP when he remained the chair of the Central Military Committee, where he could possibly influence the acquisition process due to his parochial bureaucratic interests until 2004. Even after he officially stepped down, Zemin's directly influenced proxies, or vice-chairmen of the committee, were able to exercise Zemin's will and directly influence the acquisition process through his orders.

This was only possible because of Zemin's successor Hu did not exercise full potential of his political power to influence the military and the acquisition process.[136] Hu was not clearly able to set requirements of the PLA as he was isolated by senior military officers as much as several members of the CMC.[137] Nevertheless, Hu was the first leader to bring into the attention China's power projection. As he stressed that the PLA *"must provide a security guarantee for national interests. China intends to project its forces including air, maritime, space and cyber into the global arena. China has and will use procurement, both foreign and domestic, to enhance its capabilities."*[138]

[136] For example South China Morning Post informs that „in 2011, the PLA conducted a surprise test flight of its first stealth fighter jet, the Jian-20, during then US defence minister Robert Gates' visit to Beijing. Gates saw that Hu was as stunned by the news as he was." Article accessible online at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1734663/hu-jintaos-weak-grip-chinas-army-inspired-president-xi-jinpings-military
[137] Ibid.
[138] Yao-Zu, 2011. p. 65

In addition to influence struggle, this might have been the consequence of what Huntington called subjective control, in which Jiang and Hu tried to enhance their political powers through dividing the military from political affairs. The Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era article stresses that Jiang and Hu *"have prevented the PLA from intervening in intra-CCP and intra-societal political struggle, by changing the dominant paradigm of Chinese civil-military relations from subjective control to objective control with Chinese characteristics."*[139]

Since Xi took office as a Chairman of the party, he accumulated power giving him a unique status of the political and military affairs to boost the status of CCP and increase loyalty of the military to the party, thus taking a grip over China's military affairs. Xi's experience as a third vice-chairman of the CMC gave him a great opportunity to establish close relationship with senior military officials giving him a great power of both, their loyalty and ability to influence their decision making.

For example the Sydney Morning Herald came with information that president Xi urged the defence industries to speed up their development of advanced weapons to help to build stronger Chinese army. Xi stressed the emphasis on advanced weaponry is the embodiment of a modern army that gives a crucial support for national security and rejuvenation, moreover *"innovative, practical and forward-thinking to meet the demands of actual combat and fill in the weak spots of China's existing equipment."*[140] Xi used the classical legitimization move of increased investments for military capabilities, boosting his personal powers while strengthening military power of PRC.

Furthermore, he expressed that "equipment systems are now in a period of strategic opportunities and at a key point for rapid development"[141] putting great pressure on domestic defence industries for faster weapon development and opened up for potential bilateral deals for foreign weapon procurements.

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[139] Li, 2010.
[140] Xi's intention of weapon development see http://www.smh.com.au/world/chinas-xi-jinping-wants-faster-weapons-development-to-make-worlds-largest-army-stronger-20141205-120zcc.html
[141] Ibid.

The change of the domestic industrial complex begun with establishment of General Armament Department, which sough to coordinate domestic productions as well as foreign imports.

In China, there are ten major enterprises, which seek to elevate their production capacities as much as their profits and although they are SOE's[142], they battle for influence to supply the PLA's requirements. The companies of Chengdu Aircraft Company, China Aviation Industry Corporation, China National Nuclear Corporation, China Shipbuilding National Corporation, and South China Industries Group Corporation to be the major ones, are keen to maximize their profit. Nevertheless, the intention of Chinese government is to privatize the companies in order to increase potential investors and to further compete on the international markets.

4.4.3 Norms

China, in recent years under the leadership of Xi, strengthened and uses two ultimate weapons – history and nationalism, which are meant to strengthen China's picture abroad and more importantly legitimize and increase government prestige domestically.

China's modernization of its military power is essential for Chinese leaders to gain credibility to support its presence as a militarily capable power. One of the main keys to the current leadership surrounded around Xi Jinping is to raise Han nationalism in China and in broader perspective to develop the Han nationalism in the international community through soft power. The soft power increase is perceived as a window of opportunity for current communist leadership to condemn the world about its peaceful intentions, however latest development has shown its flaws, as already a few Confucianism institutes have been forced to closure after disallowance of free speech and open Chinese communist party support.[143]

[142] State Owned Enterprises
[143] On current Chinese soft power development see Volodsko, 2015. And Shambaugh, 2015. And also for an overview of Chinese soft power ranking see article in Economist, 2015.

In addition widening of the middle class and relying on the economic gains give Chinese leadership a legitimization substance to remain in power without any much of domestic protests. Upon that, with military power increase, China is proving to its citizens it can defend "their" rights not only domestically but also internationally as her hard power potential grows with weapons in stakes.

Current affairs such is, by media and academia often mentioned, Chinese increased assertiveness while dealing with the South China Sea issues and growing aggressiveness within the Xinjiang region proved that there might be a growing sentiment of Chinese nationalism, which if is to succeed, has to be backed by reliable hard power measures.

Raymond Lee in his report on Han Nationalism in Chine for Al Jazeera Center For Studies stresses the military dimension of current Han nationalism sentiment as he points out that *"China launched a series of military adventurism, including commissioning the first aircraft carrier "Liaoning", successfully landing an unmanned probe on the Moon, and enhancing its deterrent credibility by displaying the first nuclear ballistic-missile submarine."*[144] Nearly almost identifying China to approach its goal and to narrow the military gap by ascending its military capability to gain higher international status, which exhibits stronger nationalistic orientation within Chinese citizens.

Additionally to the aircraft carrier capability, there is a pressure from all directions that are in power of the acquisition process, as they tend to build a whole fleet of aircraft carriers, which would symbolically indicate China's rise to the superpower status.[145] While the proponents of the aircraft carrier fleet outline the strategic advantages of such a capabilities, the others question whether China maintains technological and financial resources to meet the proponent's demand. Not even mentioning whether it is necessary to meet the operational capabilities of the PLAN and PLA in general.

[144] Lee, 2014. p.4
[145] Evron, 2012.

If we look closer at current aircraft carrier Liaoning, stationed at port Qingdao where the Northern Fleet operates, we can identify lack of capabilities of its operational standards. For example, it's a conventionally powered ship and its weight is by Jane's Fighting Ships estimated at 59,439 tons, which results in lower cruising endurance. Moreover, Liaoning also lacks aircraft catapults and is rather using a ramp for aircrafts to take off.[146] However, the PLAN stresses that Liaoning should serve as a training platform for future aircraft carriers.

Also, the acquisition of Liaoning was not a matter of pure national security or mere intention of increase of hard power. Several Chinese strategists identify the aircraft carrier capabilities as United State's source of vulnerability and as relatively easy targets[147], which leads to speculations of true motivation of the acquisition.

Part of the explanation is that it could also directly serve as a legitimization procedure of the new Chinese leadership that took power after a dramatic power transition at the 18th National Party Congress in 2013 and even the one before that. Lee provides the same arguments as he observed that *"the advancement of military capability targets to achieve great power status and justify CCP's one-party regime. Assertive foreign policies and tightened security measures are both aiming to maintain domestic stability and prevent any political challenges against the new leadership*."[148]

Another intention evolved from the beginning of a new millennium as China commensurate with its increasing economic and diplomatic status sough to increase its military position in the Asian region, more precisely in the south and also around its coastline by creating a air defence identification zone. In fact, the creation of ADIZ came shortly after the CCP's third plenum of Central Committee in which Xi outlined framework for economic reforms and established national Security Council, which he would lead.[149] Thus it placated nationalist

[146] O'Rourke, 2014.
[147] See Zian, 1996. and Evron, 2012.
[148] Lee, 2014.
[149] Business Monitor International, 2015.

establishment in order to increase the Chinese international status and demonstrate the perception of a capable military power.

In addition to norms explanation, China's senior officials, who seek greater status through the military acquisition and modern building process, support the intention to large and powerful country and call for better-suited military capabilities. Evron observed from interview with China's military expert that *'the air force needs to develop into a strategic air force that is in line with China's status as a major nation [. . . yet] compared to the United States and Russia, it is hardly worthy of mentioning in the same sentence.' To fix the situation, he pointed at various capabilities that China should acquire, including its own global positioning system ('Beidou 2'), precise striking means and strategic bomber platforms."*[150]

Overall, normative approach started gaining momentum. It's naturally given to China's economic influence and international status, which implies also an increased need for self-defense. China rising economically and militarily and increases its international status. Currently, China is viewed as a country that will economically overtake the United States in mid-future. Thereby, will earn a strong position within the international system. The question remains whether it will also eventually supported by a new acquisition process, which should defend China's position. However, prestige is not something that can be bought, it needs to be earned. China is on path to get it.

[150] Evron, 2012.

CONCLUSION

Summary Of Findings

This master thesis addressed two critical questions - one theoretical and one practical. On one side, it dealt with the theoretical framework of reasons of weapon acquisition processes through different principal doctrines of PRC, and on the other it practically dealt with China's military development and more generally, military rise and its weapon procurement through process tracing approach through the history of People's Republic of China.

In reality, the most common answer for the question of why states acquire or build military capabilities is due to security reasons. The security interpretation of military procurement is strongly seen through all four periods and has a strong impetus for procurement as it holds the strongest voice for the purchase legitimization and thus, supports the realist theories that China is strengthening its national security in order to defend its sovereignty and core interests.

Increased Chinese demand for military weapons were especially during the Korean War and after the U.S. engagement in the Gulf War, when China felt the scarcity of military technology. To target these misbalances, China turned to the Soviet Union and Russia respectively, to secure its short-to-medium term security requirements to increase its national security

However, domestic politics reason also appeared in all four doctrinal periods and also play a significant role in fulfilling security objectives by weapon acquisition. Domestic politics contribute to their share in shaping procurement processes according to preferences of several leaders through the history of PRC. For such a reason, individuals responsible for weapon acquisition process intentionally shaped the procurement process in order to also strengthen their position within the party. On one side, the individuals sought to satisfy states security needs, but on the other also influenced the direction of military procurement, which led to bureaucratization of the procurement process in general and increase of their power in particular.

Nevertheless, military procurement and modernization in broader sense needs to be supported by political as well as military elites otherwise the process sinks under the water due to a lack of political will notwithstanding the security requirements of the country.

Moreover, as mentioned above, some military capabilities were acquired due to security or bureaucratic reasons, nevertheless, some capabilities were regarded as symbols of national strength and in political and military establishment reflected modern identity of China, thus postulated the demand. They were constructed as symbols that heighten international prestige and vast resources were spent in order to develop/acquire it. This normative approach was driven by government leaders in effort to obtain more prestigious position within the international system. This approach was most visible during Chinese development of nuclear weapon but also during the industrial complex modernization, which was seeking the self-reliance and long-time self-sufficiency. Normative reasons explanation also fits into the acquisition of Chinese only aircraft carrier Liaoning, by which did China position itself among the 12 members club that dispose with such a capabilities.[151]

However, the reason of the acquisition may vary with second and third purchase for example. Ultimately, if state acquire particular capability or is perceived by other states that are capable of doing so, then the other purchases will not have such a symbolic effect. Rather the reasons will have stronger impetus from domestic politics or security reasons. A senior researcher and general from Academy of Military Science Luo Yuan stressed the need for at least 3 aircraft carriers in order to equalize the aircraft-carrier capabilities of India and Japan in near future and to be able to defend China's maritime and core interests.[152] This proclamation united both domestic politics and security reason to military procurement while abandoning the normative explanation.

[151] The members According to globalfirepower.com (including helicopter carriers) are USA (20), France (4), Japan (2), Italy (2), India (2), Brazil (1), UK (1), Australia (1), Thailand (1), Spain (1), Russia (1) and China (1)
[152] Spacewar, 2011.

To sum up the explanation, the thesis confirms that China in general and state in particular, can acquire several military capabilities due to different reasons. These analyzed reasons, security, domestic politics and norms are for Chinese military procurement visible and supports overall Chinese military rise and thus provide the alternative explanation.

The complementary task and goal of the thesis was also to exhibit if Sagan's interpretation can be used in similar scrutiny, that is, to answer the conventional weapon procurement motivation. The answers may vary according to the view position. If one were to verify and agree that Sagan's alternative explanations of nuclear acquisition to conventional acquisition, one might interpret the findings according to one's will, which can be purposely assigned to demanded position to evaluate and confirm the arguments. On the other side, Sagan tries to provide with some alternative explanations just like this thesis does.

A perfect example of verification of Sagan's theory due to someone's desire can be practically seen in Chinese acquisition of an aircraft carrier. The security interpretation would confirm that this purchase (and rebuilt) was in order to boost national security and defence-offensive capabilities of PLAN. On the other side, domestic politics explanation is based on a strong impetus of the PLAN general Liu who saw to obtain higher position and increase of his personal powers within the communist party. Finally, the norms interpretation confirms that to have an aircraft carrier in your fleet naturally gives you a higher position within the international status because of only limited countries dispose with such capabilities.

Overall, the military procurement process the People's Republic of China has established, created several structures and set the base for its defense industrial complex to target the self-sustainability by domestic acquisition process. Through the PRC's history, the processes were driven by three different phenomena - namely, the security needs, followed by domestic politics and norms requirements - in order to satisfy China's military necessities. People's republic of China had to cope with many strategic, political and economic misbalances, shifts, and rapidly

changing international environments through out history. Moreover, these changes were made in parallel with the technological progress.

China, through its weapon acquisition process, projects its power beyond the second island chain and is planning its procurement accordingly also to ensure its regional core interests and protection of its sea lines of communication. In addition, China, through its force development tries to ensure Taiwan's position as she tries to constrain it from any harming action. Also tries to disallow the United States to enter China's near waters in case of any potential conflict, also tries to constrain Japan and India to avoid any potential regional power struggle. China is also trying to protect its core maritime interests within disputed waters and protect its sea lines of communication to allow the resources inflow and secure its pro-exported economy. Chinese leaders also try to ensure their influence within military planning as struggles for power and corruption lowers the legitimacy of CCP. The communist establishment answers with increased nationalism by building stronger, developed, modern and capable military.

Implications

Today, China is putting more emphasis on its peaceful development but major challenges and opportunities lies ahead of this chosen direction. Regarding China's peaceful development, Wang Yizhou identifies five major military and security challenges China is facing or will face in foreseeable future.[153] The challenges are being approached within a fragile international environment where strategic tensions among major countries currently occur. The eyesore of China's security is the handling of the Taiwan issue and domestic separatism. These issues are by Chinese leaders and China watchers perceived as threats to China's core interests. In addition, resolving sovereignty issues threaten China's national integrity and great emphasis will be given to protecting China's growing interest overseas as well. Also, having a responsibility for peace and security as an international shareholder will bring China towards a greater role in solving international misbalances. These challenges present some opportunities and are

[153] Yizhou, 2014.

carefully evaluated to strengthen China's position within and beyond its boarder. This also brings some responsibilities as well.

Enduing the reaction regarding china military rise, one could analyze the strength shown through Chinese development. Recently, for over twenty years, with steady economic growth and economic development, international stakeholders perceive China as a more military capable country than it actually is. In other words, China's military credibility is growing with its economic power and thus it's perceived to be in line with its military capabilities. But one can be mistaken, as there do not have to always be narrative implication for such a phenomenon. In similar conditions and due to misunderstanding and overestimating it resulted in the First World War and before in the Peloponnese War's as predicted by Thucydides. The monolog needs to be conducted to forego the inevitability of a potential military conflict and to counter Mearsheimer's theories in general.

It's obvious that China is building a modern regionally if not globally powerful navy and army. The growing potential for conducting military or rescue operations beyond China's waters is perceived as threatening not only by China's closest disputant neighbors but also by the USA. In fact, of all nations, China is and will be even a greater geopolitical, military and economic competitor to USA and to the Western liberal international order in years to come. Nevertheless, the CRS study indicates that rather on quantity and military buildup, Chinese PLAN focuses on strengthening quality and reliability of its capabilities.

	1990	**1995**	**2000**	**2005**	**2009**	**2020 Projection**
Ship						
Ballistic missile Sub.	1	1	1	2	3	4 or 5?
Attack Submarines	80	82	65	58	59	cca 72
SSNs	5	5	5	6	6	n/a
SSs	75	77	60	52	53	n/a
Aircraft Carriers	0	0	0	0	0	2?
Destroyers	14	18	21	25	26	cca 26
Frigates	35	35	37	42	48	cca 42

Subtotal	130	136	124	127	136	cca 147

Source: CRS Report on China Naval Modernization

China, in general, is investing vast financial resources in its defence research and development sector and is putting emphasis on satisfying short term needs by foreign military purchases while focusing on sustaining the PLA's medium-to-long term requirements from domestic sources.

Overall China's military buildup should not be perceived as a buildup but rather as continuous modernization in order to strengthen its own national security due to still over-aged equipment and low quality of products. Even the quality is increasing. However, in other scrutiny, China's modernization can be interpreted as a tool to reach further regionally and/or globally.

Recently, military budgets of China have been in absolute terms growing, and steady in relative terms.[154] However it is obvious that the acquisition process goes beyond China's defensive needs[155] and is, on one side postulated in order to either increase the deterrence factor or, on the other, goes beyond the defensive needs due to domestic or norm explanation. This is closely observed by the United States, which are constrained by China's growing power. Also, the regional powers – India and Japan are increasing their political and military ties to balance China's assertive action in the region, while other countries, mostly disputants, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, tend to increase their defence budgets, which may lead to a regional arms race.[156]

To predict China's evolution is to make invalidated assumptions supported by nothing but historical retrospective analysis. However, surrounding states and also the United States have strong legitimization impetus for increased defence spending or increased investments into R&D due to security reasons.

[154] SIPRI
[155] China has the capabilities to **defend** itself from an invader both from land, air or sea as it hold both, enough conventional capabilities as well as nuclear detergent
[156] See Gauba, 2015.

Areas Of Future Research

Rising power of China concerns the international community and its weapon procurement process requires extensive research. To be able to identify and measure China's domestic influence of the acquisition process, it would create a better understanding of weapon procurement in general. It would also show the evidences of the domestic theories. In addition, to research the different normative approach of weapon acquisition it would show the trend of particular weapons. This would bring a better understanding why particular states spend vast financial resources for specific weapon rather than investing into other segments of their economy. Further, some research could be made to compare the international perception of a state before and after the acquisition of specific military capability. To evaluate this trend would help to understand the pros and cons of military procurement and clarify the normative explanation of weapon acquisition.

Final Thoughts

China's ambitions to become a superpower are currently being enhanced by nationalist sentiment. This is implied by the current leadership and is supported by strong R&D investment into military capabilities and weapon procurement.

The Sino-American relationship will probably define the future international and security environment and will provide major opportunity as well as challenges to the other members of the international community.

In recent history, there were two countries engaged in the Cold War and in various races, which resulted in the increase of R&D projects but also created an unsustainable environment. China will not want to challenge the United States in foreseeable future. Rather, China will wait for better opportunity to become the Middle Kingdom again. The future will determine the outcomes of success or failure of current liberal order as well as uncovers Chinese overall intentions and the resemblance of the rise.

APPENDIX

China's Arms Imports (SIPRI)

People's War

Supplier	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/licence	No. Ordered
Soviet Union	M-30 122mm	Towed gun	1949	3000
Soviet Union	T-34/85	Tank	1949	2500
Soviet Union	MiG-15/Fagot	Fighter aircraft	1949	750
Soviet Union	BM-13 132mm	Self-propelled MRL	1949	600
Soviet Union	Yak-18/Max	Trainer aircraft	1949	450
Soviet Union	La-9/Fritz	Fighter aircraft	1949	250
Soviet Union	La-11/Fang	Fighter aircraft	1949	200
Soviet Union	Il-10/Beast	Ground attack ac	1949	150
Soviet Union	Tu-2S/Bat	Bomber aircraft	1949	150
Soviet Union	Yak-11/Moose	Trainer aircraft	1949	50
Soviet Union	ISU-122	Self-propelled gun	1949	50
Soviet Union	ISU-152	Self-propelled gun	1949	50
Soviet Union	Li-2T/Cab	Transport aircraft	1949	50
Soviet Union	MiG-15UTI/Midget	Trainer aircraft	1949	50
Soviet Union	MiG-9/Fargo	Fighter aircraft	1950	372
Soviet Union	IS-2	Tank	1950	300
Soviet Union	SU-100	Self-propelled gun	1950	300
Soviet Union	SU-85	Self-propelled gun	1950	300
Soviet Union	Il-12/Coach	Transport aircraft	1950	50
Soviet Union	Yak-17/Feather	Fighter aircraft	1950	43
Soviet Union	Yak-17UTI/Magnet	Trainer aircraft	1950	10
Soviet Union	MiG-15bis/Fagot	Fighter aircraft	1951	1500
Soviet Union	Project-123/P-4	FAC	1951	70
Soviet Union	Il-28/Beagle	Bomber aircraft	1952	500
Soviet Union	Yak-12/Creek	Light aircraft	1952	50
Soviet Union	Tu-4/Bull	Bomber aircraft	1952	13

Soviet Union	MiG-17/Fresco	Fighter aircraft	1953	1250
Soviet Union	Il-14/Crate	Transport aircraft	1953	50
Soviet Union	Mi-1/Hare	Light helicopter	1953	40
Soviet Union	Be-6/Madge	ASW aircraft	1953	20
Soviet Union	B-34 L/56 100mm	Naval gun	1953	16
Soviet Union	T-54	Tank	1954	3000
Soviet Union	PT-76	Light tank	1954	250
Soviet Union	An-2/Colt	Light transport ac	1954	150
Soviet Union	MiG-15UTI/Midget	Trainer aircraft	1954	150
Soviet Union	Mi-4A/Hound-A	Helicopter	1954	100
Soviet Union	Project-254/T-43	Minesweeper	1954	28
Soviet Union	Project-613/Whiskey	Submarine	1954	21
Soviet Union	Porject-122/Kronstadt	Patrol craft	1954	20
Soviet Union	Artillerist	Patrol craft	1954	6
Soviet Union	Gordy	Destroyer	1954	4
Soviet Union	Project-50/Riga	Frigate	1954	4
Soviet Union	M Type	Submarine	1954	2
Soviet Union	Shchuka	Submarine	1954	2
Soviet Union	S Type	Submarine	1954	2
Soviet Union	BM-14 140mm	Self-propelled MRL	1955	500
Soviet Union	IS-3	Tank	1955	200
Soviet Union	Project-183/P-6	FAC	1955	45
Soviet Union	BTR-152	APC	1956	100
Soviet Union	BTR-40	APC	1956	100
Soviet Union	MiG-19/Farmer	Fighter aircraft	1957	200
Soviet Union	SA-2 Guideline	SAM	1957	120
Soviet Union	Tu-16/Badger	Bomber aircraft	1957	5
Soviet Union	S-75 Dvina/SA-2	SAM system	1957	5
Soviet Union	P-12/Spoon Rest	Air search radar	1957	4
Soviet Union	M-XV Type	Submarine	1957	2
Soviet Union	S Type	Submarine	1957	2
Soviet Union	SET-53	ASW torpedo	1958	250
Soviet Union	K-5/AA-1 Alkali	SRAAM	1958	250
Soviet Union	Yak-18A/Max	Trainer aircraft	1958	150
Soviet Union	MiG-17PF/Fresco-D	Fighter aircraft	1958	100
Soviet Union	SM-4-1B 130mm	Towed gun	1958	10

Soviet Union	D-20 152mm	Towed gun	1958	10
Soviet Union	P-15/SS-N-2A Styx	Anti-ship missile	1959	100
Soviet Union	R-13S/AA-2 Atoll	SRAAM	1959	50
Soviet Union	MiG-21F-13/Fishbed-C	Fighter aircraft	1959	10
Soviet Union	Project-633/Romeo	Submarine	1959	4
Soviet Union	Type-629/Golf	SSB	1959	1
Soviet Union	KS-1/AS-1 Kennel	Anti-ship missile	1960	75
Soviet Union	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	1960	10
Soviet Union	SS-C-2 CDS	Coast defence system	1960	4
Soviet Union	SO-1	Patrol craft	1960	2
Soviet Union	Project-205/Osa	FAC	1964	7
Germany (FRG)	Type-6150L	Diesel engine	1965	1200
Soviet Union	AI-20	Turboprop	1965	40
Albania	MiG-19PM/Farmer	Fighter aircraft	1965	12
Soviet Union	An-12/Cub	Transport aircraft	1965	4
Soviet Union	Project-183/Komar	FAC	1965	4
France	SA-316B Alouette-3	Light helicopter	1967	15
Soviet Union	Il-18/Coot	Transport aircraft	1968	5
France	SA-321H Super Frelon	Helicopter	1973	9
France	SA-321G Super Frelon	ASW helicopter	1973	4
Germany (FRG)	8RL-B66	Diesel engine	1975	3
France	R-440 Crotale	SAM	1978	2100
France	Crotale	SAM system	1978	44

Supplier	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/licence	No. Ordered
France	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	1980	30
France	AS565S Panther	ASW helicopter	1980	41
France	SA-321G Super Frelon	ASW helicopter	1981	12
France	SA-321 Super Frelon	Helicopter	1981	50
Germany	BF8L	Diesel engine	1981	4400

(FRG)				
Italy	A244 324mm	ASW torpedo	1985	40

Limited War

Supplier	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/licence	No. Ordered
France	SS-12	ASW sonar	1986	4
France	DRBV-15 Sea Tiger	Air/sea search radar	1986	10
France	Castor-2	Fire control radar	1986	14
Italy	Aspide	BVRAAM	1986	90
France	SA-342 Gazelle	Light helicopter	1987	8
France	HOT-2	Anti-tank missile	1987	250
Germany (FRG)	MTU-1163	Diesel engine	1987	14
Japan	Jinhou	Tanker	1987	3
France	Compact 100mm	Naval gun	1988	2
France	DUBV-23	ASW sonar	1988	5
France	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	1988	357
France	PA6	Diesel engine	1989	18
Germany (FRG)	MTU-493	Diesel engine	1989	4
France	DUBV-43	ASW sonar	1990	2
France	PA6	Diesel engine	1990	40
Israel	Python-3	SRAAM	1990	3000
Soviet Union	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1990	24
France	SS-12	ASW sonar	1991	25
Germany (FRG)	MTU-396	Diesel engine	1991	4
Russia	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	1991	24
Russia	R-73/AA-11 Archer	SRAAM	1991	300
Soviet Union	Yak-42/Clobber	Transport aircraft	1991	1
Soviet Union	R-27/AA-10 Alamo	BVRAAM	1991	125

Limited War Under Hi-Technological Conditions

Supplier	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/licence	No. Ordered

France	AS-350/AS-550 Fennec	Light helicopter	1992	75
Russia	76N6/Clam Shell	Air search radar	1992	1
Russia	ST-68/Tin Shield	Air search radar	1992	1
Russia	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	1992	2
Russia	S-300PMU-1/SA-20A	SAM system	1992	4
Russia	Il-76M/Candid-B	Transport aircraft	1992	10
Russia	5V55U/SA-10C Grumble	SAM	1992	150
Russia	Project-636E/Kilo	Submarine	1993	2
Russia	Project-877E/Kilo	Submarine	1993	2
Russia	TEST-71	AS/ASW torpedo	1993	75
Russia	53-65	AS torpedo	1993	75
Germany (FRG)	BF-12L413	Diesel engine	1995	100
Russia	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	1995	24
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1995	60
Russia	R-73/AA-11 Archer	SRAAM	1995	3000
Russia	Ka-27PL/Helix-A	ASW helicopter	1996	2
Russia	Sovremenny	Destroyer	1996	2
Russia	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	1996	105
Russia	9M38/SA-11 Gadfly	SAM	1996	150
Russia	Tor-M1/SA-15	Mobile SAM system	1997	15
Russia	9M338/SA-15 Gauntlet	SAM	1997	400
Russia	Kh-31A1/AS-17	Anti-ship missile/ARM	1997	. .
Russia	Krasnopol-M	Guided shell	1997	1100
Israel	Harpy	ARM	1998	50
Russia	Ka-32/Helix-C	Helicopter	1998	3
Russia	Ka-27PL/Helix-A	ASW helicopter	1998	5
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1998	15
Russia	Tor-M1/SA-15	Mobile SAM system	1998	20
Russia	9M338/SA-15 Gauntlet	SAM	1998	500
Russia	9M119/AT-11 Sniper	Anti-tank missile	1998	. .
Russia	Mineral/Band Stand	Sea search radar	1999	6
Russia	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	1999	28
Russia	Su-30MK/Flanker	FGA aircraft	1999	38

Russia	Kh-29/AS-14 Kedge	ASM	1999	100
Russia	Kh-59ME/AS-18 Kazoo	ASM	1999	150
France	PA6	Diesel engine	2000	88
Germany (FRG)	MTU-396	Diesel engine	2000	48
Russia	Il-76M/Candid-B	Transport aircraft	2000	1
Russia	Moskit/SS-N-22	Anti-ship missile	2000	50
Russia	AL-31	Turbofan	2000	54
Russia	RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder	BVRAAM	2000	750
France	PC-2.5	Diesel engine	2001	4
France	Compact 100mm	Naval gun	2001	8
France	PA6	Diesel engine	2001	20
Russia	Fregat/Top Plate	Air search radar	2001	4
Russia	S-300PMU-1/SA-20A	SAM system	2001	4
Russia	MR-90/Front Dome	Fire control radar	2001	8
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2001	35
Russia	Su-30MK/Flanker	FGA aircraft	2001	38
Russia	Zhuk	Combat ac radar	2001	100
Russia	48N6/SA-10D Grumble	SAM	2001	150
Russia	9M317/SA-17 Grizzly	SAM	2001	150
Russia	Zmei/Sea Dragon	MP aircraft radar	2002	1
Russia	S-300FM/SA-N-20	Naval SAM system	2002	2
Russia	Sovremenny	Destroyer	2002	2
Russia	Project-636E/Kilo	Submarine	2002	8
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2002	25
Russia	Moskit/SS-N-22	Anti-ship missile	2002	35
Russia	AK-630 30mm	Naval gun	2002	92
Russia	3M-54 Klub/SS-N-27	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2002	150
Russia	48N6/SA-10D Grumble	SAM	2002	150
Russia	53-65	AS torpedo	2002	150
Russia	9M38/SA-11 Gadfly	SAM	2002	150
Russia	TEST-71	AS/ASW torpedo	2002	150
Russia	9M311/SA-19 Grison	SAM	2002	200
Russia	Su-30MK/Flanker	FGA aircraft	2003	24
Russia	S-300PMU-2/SA-20B	SAM system	2004	8

Russia	Mineral/Band Stand	Sea search radar	2004	20
Russia	AK-176M 76mm	Naval gun	2004	20
Russia	Fregat/Top Plate	Air search radar	2004	20
Russia	MR-90/Front Dome	Fire control radar	2004	80
Russia	Kh-59MK/AS-18MK	Anti-ship missile	2004	. .
Russia	48N6E2/SA-10E	SAM	2004	297
France	PC-2.5	Diesel engine	2005	14
Russia	AK-176M 76mm	Naval gun	2005	4
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2005	54
Russia	AL-31	Turbofan	2005	100
Russia	S-300PMU-2/SA-20B	SAM system	2006	8
Russia	Ka-27PL/Helix-A	ASW helicopter	2006	9
Russia	Ka-31/Helix	AEW helicopter	2006	9
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2006	24
Russia	48N6E2/SA-10E	SAM	2006	750
Russia	MR-123/Bass Tilt	Fire control radar	2009	4
Russia	D-30	Turbofan	2009	55
Russia	AL-31	Turbofan	2009	122
Belarus	Il-76M/Candid-B	Transport aircraft	2011	5
Russia	Il-76M/Candid-B	Transport aircraft	2011	5
Russia	AL-31	Turbofan	2011	150
Russia	D-30	Turbofan	2011	184
Russia	AL-31	Turbofan	2011	123
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2012	55
Russia	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2012	52

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Alternative Explanation of Military Rise of China

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Twenty first century is supposed to be an Asian century and many questions and challenges emerge for scholars and policy-makers around the world. Those challenges all have at least one common denominator – China's rise. As the Western countries are beginning to walk in shadows, China is rising and several questions towards the likeness of development is rising as well. Whether the Chinese rise can be driven by peaceful intentions, or it expresses real security threat for the international community. It is obvious that we, the Western civilization, need to understand the rising China and its contemporary military modernization progress. Should we feel threatened because China has unlike political system of the Western civilization or should we find a way for cooperation?

The thesis will touch the western skeptical view (Mearsheimer 2005), anyway the major focus will be centered on military dimension of China's rise (investing into new modern military systems, acquisition of aircraft carrier, building up a deep sea navy[157]).

The form of Chinese rise increases raises traffic of questions by scholars, policy makers and politician. Its very important to understand rising China from different points of view (global, strategic, economical and so on). The subsequent purpose of the thesis is to contribute to understanding of Chinese military intentions and drivers behind its acquisition process.[158]

The Western community already knows that China is strengthening its military capabilities and distant reach. Also its role in international environment has had growing tendency and many questions touch the causes of why is China investing into its military capabilities and systems, qualitatively and quantitatively, and that is where the most concentration of attention will be. According to the current (2013) Annual report to congress compiled by Department of Defense on its annual report argues that China *"continues to*

[157] China´s investments into military systems has been growing remarkably since 2000: 32,1; 2002: 45,9; 2004: 55,2; 2006: 72,9; 2008: 92,7; 2010:114,3 (SIPRI 2011, in mld USD).
[158] The balance of power, balance of threat and security dilemma as well will be taken into account

pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China's military investment. However, as China's interests have grown and as it has gained greater influence in the international system, its military modernization has also become increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, including counter-piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. Some of these missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, while others could serve more narrowly-defined PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad."(DoD 2013). But the arguments from Department of Defense are based on the Western experience of perception of the international environment. Those arguments are brought up by different perspective. China is very different country with unlike history, culture and has different geographic and demographic characteristics then the Western hemisphere country members.

China's identity is not created by the same bias as the identity of the West. Western identity is understood as an identity of state. Chinese identity is constructed rather by civilization understanding of state then national thus norms play significant role during the process. The main, vital interest of Chinese policy is unity. And by unity China shapes its policy – both domestic and foreign.

The research question is: Why does China build up and improve (an extensive) military capabilities and systems? The international community is afraid that Chinese strategic intentions might hold expansive dimension because it is building up an extensive military systems - new aircraft carrier (already has one), deep blue navy - and many other implications are seen in matter of strengthening the domestic and foreign security.

The work will furthermore show the Chinese perception of international and domestic environment, whether it is friendly or unfriendly to them and what does it mean and how does it motivate their action.

A lot of literature has been devoted to China's rise but not too much on its military acquisition dimension. Among Czech authors with some focus on China are Rudolf Fürst (2002; 2011) and Jitka Evanová (2012). The Chinese military power and modernization was observed by Richard Bitzinger (2011), whose center of focus is military in Asia-Pacific, Pollack (2007) and Cordesman and Kleiber (2007), Blasko and Kleiber (2006). Jeffrey W. Legro (2007) will add some perspective future view for the topic. Also Waldron's article (2005) will be helpful in characterizing the military rise. Waldron distinguishes three aspects of the rise – economic and military development and China's impact on itself. Holslag's article (2009) embraces China´s global security ambitions will meet similar necessities. Another author focusing on China´s rise is Nye (2005), with his article "Peaceful" rise of China. To get to all the required information from the intended research the study of the government's strategic documents such as Obama's doctrine (2010), Chinese military postures, and other strategic documents along with the analysis of Chinese deep sea ambitions in building deep blue navy, and Chinese aircraft ambitions as well. It is to say that the military rise is tight up with economic growth (Felice 2010) so the work will differ from both implications. Other authors with focus on China are Jacques (2012), Hsu (2000) and also Kissinger (2011), who recognized China as a power and restored the US-China relations after more than two decades of isolation. All of them and many others will be mentioned in the work. Notwithstanding the written literature on the rise of China, the researched literature may be limited in its focus on current military rise. Consequently other Chinese literature on analysis of military rise will be added after consultations with scholars and policy-makers in Hong Kong.

Theoretical framework of the thesis is anchored by Sagan's article Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons (1996). The thesis will search for the causes of China's military rise, which will explain the military buildup in three models. Each model also represents one of the three main theories of international

relations – Security model for realism, domestic policy model for liberalism and finally norm model for constructivism. Models are taken over from his conceptualization. Operationalization of above mentioned models are also inspired by Sagan's article. To explain the security model the thesis will look for any significant jeopardy to China, which means to discover its potential (even hidden) enemies and threats that cannot be faced through alternative means but military buildup. Because of the enormous power of other states military, China may seek to maintain its national security in balancing against any rival state that had developed more modern and qualitative military capabilities. Domestic policy model will focus on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage government from pursuing the military buildup. Whether or not the acquisition of modern military systems serves the national interests of a state it may also serve to the political interests of leaders of the state. Military buildup will be in favor in states where individual parties or the mass public favor the military improvements. Third model will focus on norms concerning system acquisition, seeing military buildup decisions as serving important symbolic functions for shaping and reflecting the state's identity.159

Other theoretical scope for the purpose of this research will be given by Eyre and Schuman (1996) and from Schilling and Paparone (2005) and their theory of acquisition of military systems and modularity. The empirical analysis and case study is selected as a method for distinguishing the three main models mentioned above, and obtaining the answer for research question. Certainly the gathering of open data set will focus on available sources such is the governments elites speeches, government websites, strategic documents, Chinese strategic culture, comparisons, data available on SIPRI, Center for Global Development, Future Directions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Military Science, The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, different think tanks, policy makers and scholars.

The thesis will be structured in several chapters and subchapters, where the preface will cover the introduction to the topic, literature summary and

[159] For example Chinese acquisition and buildup of aircraft carrier

research question. The work will be divided into four or five treaties. First emphasis will be brought to the Chinese view on current international environment followed by analyzing recent Chinese military capabilities and future acquisition and investments; third sector could be assigned to the explanations of Chinese military buildup (in three dimensions – security, domestic policy and norms) and its extensive role with strategic implications. All followed by China's contribution to the world peace and security. Conclusion will summarize determined results of the research and the work in general.

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