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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

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**The Social Construction of a Nuclear  
Threat: The US Nuclear Disarmament  
Discourse, 1945 - 2014**

*Master Thesis*

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## **Abstract**

Nuclear weapons are the key element of the security policy of the United States of America since 1945. Since then, nuclear weapons and related nuclear threats were part of a social discourse of the United States. This thesis examined how these threats were socially constructed within the discourse by individual actors. Then, by discursive analysis, the thesis investigated how the nuclear disarmament discourse responded to these identified threats. The study focused on how these identified threats and the nuclear disarmament discourse influenced each other in each period and how they impacted following periods.

This diploma thesis examined the U.S. nuclear discourse while using a methodological framework of discursive analysis. The diploma thesis operated with the theory of securitization and determined key moments, when particular threat was designated as existential to the security of the United States and when, eventually, this threat subsided.

## **Key words:**

U.S., nuclear weapons, securitization, nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament, security policy.

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## **Abstrakt**

Nukleární zbraně jsou klíčovou součástí bezpečnostní politiky Spojených států Amerických již od roku 1945. Od této doby byly součástí společenského diskurzu Spojených států jaderné zbraně a hrozby s nimi spojené. Tato studie zkoumá, jak byly tyto hrozby společensky konstruovány jednotlivými aktéry v rámci diskurzu. Dále zkoumá diskurzivní analýzou, jak nukleární odzbrojovací diskurz reagoval na tyto identifikované hrozby. Teze se zaměřovala na to, jak na sebe tyto popsané hrozby a odzbrojovací diskurz v jednotlivých etapách působily a ovlivňovaly další vývojové etapy.

Diplomová práce zkoumající nukleární diskurz USA užívá metodologický rámec diskurzivní analýzy. Diplomová práce pracovala s teorií sekuritizace a určovala klíčové momenty, kdy byla daná hrozba prohlášena za životně důležitou pro bezpečnost Spojené států a kdy případně tato hrozba pominula.

## **Klíčová slova**

USA, nukleární zbraně, sekuritizace, nukleární proliferační, nukleární odzbrojení, bezpečnostní politika

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V Praze dne 31. 7. 2015

Marie Pyrihová

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# Institute of Political Studies

## Master Thesis

### 1. Introduction

Our research focuses on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament in particular. Nuclear disarmament covers both reduction and elimination of these weapons to the state of nuclear weapon-free world. Nuclear disarmament debate accompanies nuclear weapons since their origin and their first use in practice. The nature of this discourse has developed into various forms since then. At the beginning, the first aim of this movement was to reverse the course of development of nuclear weapons. By popular demonstrations which usually commemorated the suffering of Japan people, they pressured government officials to stop development of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, these demonstrations were followed by a whole new worldwide concern for a mankind survival. This pushed many pacifist organizations to adopt this nuclear disarmament agenda. Along with changing demands and motives of nuclear disarmament movement, reasoning and justification of the nuclear lobby about a right to possess nuclear weapons are changing as well.

With the widening and broadening of the concept of security, and along with the changing nature of an international environment, this nuclear disarmament movement brought into focuses more and more topics. Several groups of this antinuclear movement began arguing that not only nuclear weapons, but also nuclear energy itself is a serious security threat to human mankind. They began increasing public awareness of nuclear dangers which includes also environmental concerns over a usage of nuclear energy. This development is being further bolstered by several accidents which occurred in nuclear power plants during several last decades. Nuclear disarmament and anti-nuclear debate are usually considered to share the same foundations, but they, in fact, differ significantly. Nuclear disarmament debate includes some very unique elements which leads our research to focus solely on disarmament debate.

In the last decade, the nature of this threat changed considerably. In the U.S., the debate on nuclear disarmament is led not only by non-governmental organizations but also by governmental officials. Currently, U.S. president B. H. Obama plays the key role in shaping this discourse and pushing this disarmament agenda towards future nuclear arms reduction. There are many possible causes for that. Whether a threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations is real or not, it is undeniably one of many reasons standing behind recent nuclear disarmament efforts.

### 2. Research Question

The aim of this diploma thesis is not to provide a detailed development of nuclear disarmament movement or describe a development of anti-nuclear efforts in U.S.

This thesis focuses on a line of reasoning of both non-governmental groups and governmental officials in U.S. which are supporting the nuclear disarmament cause. We will make an



attempt to trace down an agenda and a line of reasoning of nuclear disarmament discourse between 1945 and 2014. In our research we determine tendencies which stand behind this debate. In further reference to these tendencies, we answer our research question: **How has the construction of the nuclear threat changed since 1945?** This thesis addresses three central questions: 1) how the nuclear weapons have been stigmatized and a nuclear threat constructed; 2) which role has the disarmament movement played in the construction of the threat; and 3) how and with the help of which actors the nuclear threat evolved.

Our thesis analyzes nuclear disarmament debate on two different levels, non-governmental and governmental. Nuclear disarmament discourse is constructed by several non-governmental groups and movements. Some of them are active locally and some are supporting their agenda on a global level. This nuclear disarmament movement raises public awareness of the existence of nuclear threat and urges political figures to take actions to create future without nuclear weapons. Current non-governmental groups promoting restrictions on or reduction of nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament are for example *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*, *Global Zero*, *Greenpeace*, *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*, *Mayors for Peace*, *International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons*, or *Ploughshares Fund*. One of the key initiatives, *Nuclear Security Project*, entails actions of the key actors including Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz.

The second governmental level entails particular actions of individual political officials, governments and organizations. We examine how these units contributed to the construction of nuclear threat and how this perception evolved on this level since the start. For example, current U.S. government administration inclines to this trend of nuclear disarmament. However, we cannot determine if it was really in reaction to global disarmament movement or to which extent it is really a decision based on actual strategic interests of U.S. government. We take into account also impact of particular actions of international governmental organizations, however, they are not in the core of this level analysis.

### **3. Literature Review**

Current nuclear disarmament discourse is largely shaped by a debate between Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (Sagan, Waltz: 1995) where both take the opposite standpoint. Waltz argues for a gradual spread of nuclear weapons which creates more stable international environment where states are less prone to miscalculation faults than otherwise. In this environment, where states are more careful due to the unacceptable high cost of miscalculation, nuclear weapons create mutual deterrence of states. On the other hand, Sagan defends the opposite point of view where existence of nuclear weapons is likely to create more instability. This unstable international environment leads to possible failures and accidents resulting in the nuclear war. According to Sagan, nuclear proliferation increases the possibility of the nuclear war and therefore nuclear abolition is desirable. On the basis of these joint questions thrives the public debate whether the nuclear disarmament is desirable and feasible and whether nuclear deterrence is indeed functional or rather imagined. However, the theory of nuclear deterrence is not in the center of our study.

Another field of studies is focused on the power of norms and the process of creation of international norms. We take into account theories explaining the creation of international norms, especially theories of Richard Price, Kathryn Sikking, and Martha Finnemore. Work of Nina Tannenwald, who focuses on the phenomenon of nuclear taboo in U.S., is also a part of this normative discussion. Nina Tannenwald analyzes the phenomenon of non-use of nuclear weapons which serves as a significant element in answering the most intriguing question why nuclear weapons has not been used in conflict since 1945. A

In our research we use the book *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (Perkovich, Acton, eds.) which present the main challenges nuclear disarmament brings. The book *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement* by Lawrence Wittner, who provided a detailed description of a development of nuclear disarmament movement, is also very valuable for the purpose of our analysis. He analyzes how this movement evolved and how government policies often reflect public opinion in this matter. We also use the book by Frank Barnaby *How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s* which provides us useful background to fully comprehend how the understanding of the nuclear threat changed in the 1990s.

#### **4. Theoretical Concepts and Research Method**

Nuclear disarmament debate can be interpreted on the basis of the concept of securitization created by Copenhagen school in the beginning of 1990s (Buzan a Wæver, 1998). According to Copenhagen school, our reality which is formed by speech acts is socially constructed. An actor usually moves a topic onto a political level and labels it as a security threat. In response to this speech act, subsequently, particular phenomenon is considered as a threat and is treated as such. Our thesis is based on an assumption that nuclear threat is created by individual actors and their speech acts.

Diploma thesis is researched through discourse analysis which gives us advantage in uncovering competing narratives which shapes anti-nuclear weapons movement discourse. We understand a discourse analysis to be a research method which requires studying texts as well as international conventions and discourse in overall. We must also take into account the social context to fully comprehend how the reality is constructed (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). With discourse analysis we make an attempt to uncover the way the reality of nuclear threat is constructed and produced.

In this approach we analyze various types of written and spoken language between years 1945 and 2014 which had a significant impact on or contributed to forming of the debate. First, we analyze scholarly articles, monographs, articles from U.S. daily news, and statements made by important non-governmental representatives of disarmament lobby. As second, we analyze documents, articles and interviews of U.S. government officials arguing for nuclear disarmament.

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## List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti Ballistic Missile
CPD	Committee on the Present Danger
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FREEZE	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missiles
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty
MAD	Mutually assured destruction
New START	The New START Treaty
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
SANE	Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S.	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

## Introduction

Since the first use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear threat is significantly represented within the public discourse. Nuclear weapons are inherent components of the U.S. national identity. Nuclear weapons as *ultimate weapons*, how Bernard Brodie termed them, remain to be key determinants of American defense and foreign policy. Nuclear weapons are particularly powerful phenomenon in spite of the fact that they have not been used against civilians since 1945 and their potential use is often considered to be low. A significant part of the nuclear discourse is preoccupied by the key question: How is it possible that since 1945 nuclear weapons have not been used? The public debate often presupposes that one of the most influential factors might have been the presence of nuclear taboo or the non-use tradition, a massive opposition of world opinion toward the use of nuclear weapons, or a result of more willing or rational calculations of leaders of nuclear powers.

A significant part of the debate focuses on the threat of nuclear weapons. Since its beginnings, the strategy of nuclear deterrence played its key role in determining that nuclear weapons represents a security guarantee and their main purpose is to deter other actors from attacking. This strategy suggested that their purpose was to prevent a nuclear war. Since the potential use of nuclear weapons was seen as a national suicide and it was often stated that no rational leader would choose to employ such a devastating indiscriminatory weapon, nuclear balance started to be perceived as a strategy maintaining peaceful relations between countries and as means of ensuring national sovereignty and integrity of nuclear states. By disarmament movement, nuclear weapons were often labeled to be rather a balance of terror. Nuclear strategies of massive retaliation and striking effects of nuclear explosions sparked off a global nuclear disarmament movement. This anti-nuclear force started emphasizing severe threats that nuclear weapons posed to the world, the U.S., to an individual, and the environment.

# 1. Analytical Framework

## 1.1. Methodology of the Thesis

Diploma thesis focuses on the forming of the nuclear disarmament discourse. Discourse is a particular way of conversation and comprehensions which enable us to understand the world. We usually consider discourse to be a form of language use.<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this thesis, we understand discourse as “a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world - including knowledge, identities and social relations – and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns.”<sup>2</sup> Discourse analysis represents an analysis of specific domains, such as cultural and political discourse. These fields of discourses are very hard to define. Our analysis considers political discourse to be speech acts performed by political figures within the political context. Similarly, social discourse is performed by public figures by the use of language which targets the public societal domain. These two areas are very hard to distinguish from each other since it is impossible to draw a clear line between them.

Discourse analysis, as a type of constructivist approach is based, on an assumption that the knowledge of the world should not be considered to represent an objective truth because the reality of the world is inherently inter-subjective. Also, our knowledge about the world is dependent on historical and cultural specifications. Moreover, our understanding of the world is created by social processes. These social constructions of our knowledge produce further social consequences.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the social reality is not predetermined, but constructed socially. Discourse is also not a reflection of reality, but a continual process of social construction. We understand that discourse influences itself and, thus, constructs the reality. The truth and knowledge are created discursively. The aim of the thesis is not to examine the truth of the world, but to examine nuclear disarmament discourse and the construction of the nuclear threat.

We understand language as means by which actors constitute the social reality, social relations, social identities, and common threats. This discursive approach is based on an assumption that meaning of words is not inherent within them, but is dependent on the social

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<sup>1</sup> VAN DIJK, Teun A. The Study of Discourse. In: Teun A. VAN DIJK, ed. *Discourse as Structure and Process*, Sage Publication: *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, London: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, pp. 5-6.



construction which shapes the meaning of these words. Accordingly, signs and symbols acquire their meaning by the discursive process as well. The meaning of these means of communication is not rigid but flexible and changeable. In this sense, discourse analysis represents a method of a study of socially constructive practices, which means by both verbal and non-verbal communication. Discourse analysis could be also considered to be an approach which explores the relation between text, discourse, and context. This approach focuses on how the social construction is created and for which purpose.<sup>4</sup> In this work we will examine most importantly documents, articles, reports, and monographs, but also campaign clips and slogans. Context plays a fundamental role in this discourse analysis.

The thesis examines how the social reality of nuclear discourse was being constructed. The concept of nuclear threat was created diversely within variety of different domains and by various types of actors. The thesis explores how this threat was constructed differently on the government and non-governmental level and how different actors constructed the nuclear discourse. We will explore how different forces on both levels shaped the debate and constructed the nuclear threat. Actors construct the reality themselves and shape the debate according to their interests, beliefs, and goals. According to Foucault, power is responsible both for creating and forming of our social world. Power is both a productive and a constraining force since it sets ways how the social reality can be talked about.<sup>5</sup>

The thesis is based on a qualitative, interpretative, and constructivist approach. Our research takes into account the interpretive structuralism perspective which will focus on the context of the debate and process of social construction of the reality.<sup>6</sup> Social construction of how a nuclear issue was designated as a security threat would represent the main focus of the thesis. The discursive approach enable us not only to analyze the changes of the discourse, but also help us to investigate how different actors use the discourse itself in their attempt to form a social reality and analyze social implications as well. Individuals are both products and producers of discourse.<sup>7</sup> It takes into consideration also how individuals form the interactions and how these actions impact the discourse back. Individuals, through the discourse, constitute the social reality of the world.

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<sup>4</sup> PHILLIPS, Nelson and HARDY, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> PHILLIPS, Nelson and HARDY, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002, p.19.

<sup>7</sup> JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 7.

## 1. 2. Research Question, Structure of the Thesis and Data Processing

The primary question of this empirical study is: **How has the construction of the nuclear threat within the U.S. nuclear discourse changed since 1945?** Research aspires to explain the discourse of nuclear threat and how these threats were socially constructed. The discourse study how in response to particular social changes the construction of threats also altered. The study also attempts to examine which nuclear threat was perceived as prominent in each era. The thesis also makes an attempt to determine when the threat of nuclear proliferation started to dominate the nuclear discourse. **The main argument of our thesis is that the U.S. was forced to change its nuclear strategy in order to cope with increasing horizontal proliferation.**

The study also examines how these socially constructed threats influenced the U.S. nuclear disarmament discourse. In the end, the thesis will be able to determine the dynamics between the construction of the nuclear threat and the nuclear disarmament movement and whether they influenced each other and how they were impacted by other security issues. The thesis will make an attempt to determine whether nuclear disarmament movement ever had enough capacity to significantly raise public awareness in order to substantially alter governmental nuclear policies. We will examine which principal actors played the key role in the nuclear disarmament discourse.

The thesis recognizes disarmament efforts and nuclear threat construction performed by both governmental and non-governmental actors. However, such division on two types of actors is not sharp. In several cases, different actors can be regarded as principal actors on both levels simultaneously. For the purpose of the thesis we will not distinguish these levels of analysis. The thesis examines these key actors chronologically. Their securitizing moves are then incorporated into chapters based on specific major events which substantially shaped the nuclear disarmament discourse.

Disarmament activities on the governmental level are formed by a large variety of actors. The main actors are usually considered to be the President, his office with the National Security Council staff, and the Congress. However, the national security branch could be considered to be much broader.<sup>8</sup> This thesis analyze securitizing moves and activities of a specific scope of actors. Taking the aim of this thesis into account, we will focus mainly on the President, his office and in some cases also particular members of the Congress which

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<sup>8</sup> GEORGE, Roger Z. and RISHIKOF, Harvey. Introduction: The National Security Enterprise. In: GEORGE, Roger Z. and RISHIKOF, Harvey, eds. *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011, pp. 2-3.

significantly shaped the nuclear threat construction in particular meaning or influenced the nuclear disarmament discourse.

Disarmament activities on the non-governmental level are formed by several different organizations, groups and individuals which emphasize threats posed by nuclear weapons and calls for nuclear disarmament and abolition. The study recognizes a large variety of principal actors which might be considered as nuclear disarmament movement activists. The study will regard actors of nuclear disarmament movement to be individuals or groups which made studies, documents, articles, statements, speeches, or addresses in which they expressed their intentions or beliefs to achieve nuclear limitation, reduction, or complete nuclear disarmament. This includes nuclear disarmament groups and individuals, anti-nuclear and pacifist groups and individuals, academic community and in some cases also media. It also includes former politicians who no longer significantly shape the governmental level.

In the thesis, we will use also the term anti-nuclear movement or anti-nuclear activism which describes movement which is not only interested in abolishment of nuclear weapons, but might struggle to abolish any use of nuclear power as well. We will use this term to describe nuclear disarmament movement in its early stages when they struggled to achieve variety of possible future goals and they did not focus solely on nuclear disarmament as their final goal. Analysis focuses on the issue of nuclear weapons, not on the whole problematic of nuclear power.

The thesis is structured chronologically according to major events which occurred within the nuclear disarmament discourse. The first period covers years 1945 to 1954. In the early 1950s the nuclear disarmament rapidly changed due to the end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly and the development of the hydrogen bomb. The 1954 infamous hydrogen bomb test significantly shifted the discourse toward concerns over nuclear testing. Second examined period lasts from the 1954 till the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which also altered the nuclear threat perception significantly. The third period examines discourse between years 1962 and 1981 when the nuclear non-governmental debate again returned into the discourse. The fourth examined period entails years 1982 to the 2001 terrorist attacks. The end of the Cold War represents a watershed in the nuclear disarmament discourse. It also diametrically changed the nuclear threat perception, but for the purpose of this analysis it does not start the whole examined period. The last researched period lasts from 2001 to 2014. In each chapter we will examine critical factors which shaped the construction of the threat and then discursively analyze major nuclear disarmament activities within the disarmament discourse. We then summarize our findings within the conceptual framework of the theory of securitization.

These main themes which the nuclear threat construction comprises from refers to what is perceived as a threat. Firstly, the thesis will recognize **the threat of nuclear war** and annihilation of the civilization. This threat is usually framed as a risk to the world. Nuclear weapons are often securitized as the highest peril which might lead to a global nuclear war and the end of civilization. Secondly, we will analyze the pervasive **threat of the use of nuclear weapons**. Such concerns of the use of nuclear bombs were often followed by framing the possibility of limited nuclear wars and whether tactical nuclear weapons are more usable in the battlefield. It was usually perceived by key actors as a threat to the U.S., potentially to American cities. Limited nuclear war was partly framed as survivable. However, such limited nuclear exchange was being also considered as potentially disastrous due to the risk of spiraling into the global nuclear war.

Third main motive within the discourse is the **threat of nuclear proliferation**. This concern over growing both horizontal and vertical proliferation was framed as a threat to both the U.S. and potentially to all individuals. Such proliferation could be perpetrated by state or non-state actors. In this analysis, we will consider vertical proliferation to be an increase of stockpiles of nuclear weaponry of nuclear states. Also it encompasses improvements and other development-type changes of nuclear stockpiles. Horizontal proliferation is regarded as an acquisition or an attempt to acquire or obtain nuclear weaponry by actor who did not have one already. Therefore, vertical proliferation results in deepening the amount of nuclear weapons and horizontal proliferation signifies widening the scope of different nuclear actors. The fourth type of nuclear threat is **the threat of nuclear testing**. Such threat was usually framed as a threat to the both individual and to the environment. We will consider nuclear testing in different types of environment such as atmospheric testing or underground or undersea testing. We will also distinguish short-term and long-term consequences of such testing. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the author will examine mainly securitizing moves focusing on long-term forecasts.

### **1. 3. Literature Review**

Even though the problematic of this thesis is very relevant and important, author has not found any reasonable research devoted directly to this topic. However, nuclear disarmament by itself is studied by several researchers. We will take into account other researchers whose works are close to studied topic. The main referential resource is *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement* by

Lawrence Wittner which is a particularly valuable introduction into the problematic of the nuclear disarmament movement.<sup>9</sup> It was used as the main reference point for this research. Wittner's detailed description of a development of international nuclear disarmament movement is a very valuable for the purpose of this analysis. He analyzes how this movement evolved and how government policies often reflect public opinion in this matter. His study is nevertheless a description of a global nuclear disarmament movement rather than its analysis.

Other influential work is the book *The Rise of Nuclear Fear* by Spencer R. Weart in which he describes the emergence and development of nuclear fear and concerns and how images creates pressure upon policies.<sup>10</sup> He describes different aspects of a nuclear fear. He presents societal forming of nuclear hopes which gradually transforms into nuclear fears.

In the thesis we will use mainly a variety of primary resources. Subsets of texts examined in the governmental dimension are mainly presidential speeches and proclamations from conferences and addresses. We will also examine significant public speeches, documents and records released by the administration and its officials, as well as presidential campaign clips and slogans. However, we will focus on a form of text as a more accurate form of language. The main subset of examined materials made by non-governmental representatives and groups comprises of monographs, scholarly documents, articles, proclamations, announcements, reports, media news, films, and interviews. Sources used in this level of analysis are primarily *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and scholarly works. However, in certain periods, only a limited amount of literature is available in primary sources. For this reason, we will use also secondary literature from which particular quotes are drawn.

For the purpose of manageability of this work, the thesis will focus on the sources with the most potential of influencing the American population and with the most evidence value. Author understands that such precondition is inherently highly subjective. Therefore, several monographs are used as a litmus paper on whether author should include particular information into this research or not. Even though, author focused on primarily American sources, we also included several foreign sources which significantly contributed to the construction of nuclear threats also within the US discourse. Moreover, author also included several sources, due to its meaningful and useful reference, which could not be regarded as overly influential. In addition, we have to take into account that several notable materials were not accessible.

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<sup>9</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

<sup>10</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *The Rise of Nuclear Fear*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 2012.

The research is written with the aim to contribute to the analysis of nuclear disarmament movement and the construction of the nuclear threat.

#### **1. 4. Theoretical framework: Securitization**

Theoretical framework of this thesis is based on a constructivist theory of securitization, outlined by the Copenhagen school. According to Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde, who represent the Copenhagen school of thinking, international security issue is when “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object. ... The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.”<sup>11</sup> Thus it is a *self-referential practice* because the issue becomes a security issue in response to actors who refer to it as such a threat. In a traditional meaning, it is a tool of legitimization of the use of force as well as means to mobilize the population in order to gain their support. Labeling something as existential threat creates conditions prone to a social change and an opportunity for leaders to justify their certain actions by this perceived need for a change. Labeling an issue as a security threat allows decision makers to employ extraordinary measures to cope with it. These measures can mean particular allocation of resources, violation of rules, or even limiting specific rights.

The process of securitization moves along the spectrum ranging from non-politicized through politicized to securitized. The issue is securitized only when it is considered to be an existential threat and requires emergency measures. “Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.”<sup>12</sup> Whether an issue is politicized or securitized depends on many circumstances such as in which state or in which period it takes place. A threat could be also understood as a threat only in relation to a particular referent object. Something could be designated as a threat because they perceive it as more important than other issues. However, the mere presenting something as an existential threat does not mean the issue is securitized, such process is called a *securitizing move*. The issue is securitized only when the audience accepts it as a threat.<sup>13</sup> This securitization can be considered as successful when population accepts it as an existential threat and possible corresponding extraordinary measures are being

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<sup>11</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WEAVER Ole, and WILDE de Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 21.

<sup>12</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WEAVER Ole, and WILDE de Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WEAVER Ole, and WILDE de Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23-25.

widely tolerated. If it is not the case, we are using the term securitizing move to describe the construction of particular threats. Whether the security issue is being perceived as an existential threat by the audience and securitization is therefore successful depends highly on the power of securitizing actor.<sup>14</sup> More power means that the securitization would be more likely to succeed. The main focus of the thesis thus lies on securitizing moves of state actors.

For the purpose of analysis, author will not focus only on the securitization as a successful process, but will primarily examine different securitizing moves of variety of actors.<sup>15</sup> Thus the analysis will not regard successful securitization and an acceptance of the threat by the audience as a threat as the key factor. Also, the thesis does not analyze only securitizing moves of governmental representatives, but takes into account also actions of framing of issues as security threats by non-governmental figures.

Copenhagen School considers securitization to be a *speech act*, “the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.”<sup>16</sup> Thus it could be regarded as a strong elitist approach. It is therefore not an objective reality but an inter-subjective process constructed by different actors. A naming a certain development as a security threat could lead to the issue being widely perceived as a security threat. The threat is designated as the existential threat by speech acts and their acceptance by the audience. According to Weaver, “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so.”<sup>17</sup> This marks a constructivist approach toward security. We will make an attempt to examine how different actors constructed the nuclear threat and how their securitizing moves were performed. In addition, we will also take into account desecuritization as an attempt to lessen the general perception of the threat.

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<sup>14</sup> WEAVER, Ole. Securitization and Desecuritization. In: LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D., ed. *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 55-56.

<sup>15</sup> SJÖSTEDT, Roxanna. Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia. *Security Dialogue*. 2008, vol. 39 (1), p. 10.

<sup>16</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WEAVER Ole, and WILDE de Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 26.

<sup>17</sup> WEAVER, Ole. Securitization and Desecuritization. In: LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D., ed. *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 54-55.

## 2. Beginning of the Nuclear Age, 1945-1953

“If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.”<sup>18</sup>

This chapter will examine the beginning of nuclear era between years 1945 when the first nuclear bomb was used and 1954 when the nuclear hydrogen testing changed rapidly the perception of nuclear testing.<sup>19</sup> Among the internationally significant events which shaped the nuclear discourse during this period was the first use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. against Japanese cities in August 1945. In 1949, the Soviet Union (USSR) tested its first nuclear bomb which fueled the development of thermonuclear weapons. The first U.S. thermonuclear detonation occurred on October 31, 1952. The United Kingdom tested their first nuclear bomb in 1952. The USSR successfully tested their first thermonuclear bomb in 1953.

### 2. 1. Construction of Nuclear Threats, 1945 - 1953

#### 2. 1. 1. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

The primary aspect of the nuclear threat that firstly emerged within the discourse was a threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Initially, nuclear weapons were considered as a threat to the U.S. if Germany developed nuclear bomb first. Later, the use of nuclear weapons was designated as a threat to the U.S. in response to Soviets developing their nuclear arsenal.

Initial approach of the U.S. government toward the use of nuclear weapons was predominantly positive since they were perceived as another, just a slightly bigger and more expensive bomb.<sup>20</sup> Majority of government officials perceived nuclear bomb as a big weapon

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<sup>18</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, Washington: The White House. Transcript available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12169>.

<sup>19</sup> This first examined period overlaps with the years of presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt who lasted in office from March 4, 1933 to April 12, 1945, with the presidency of Harry S. Truman who lasted in office from April 12, 1945 to January 20, 1953, and with the presidency of D. D. Eisenhower who lasted in office from January 20 1953 to January 20 1961.

<sup>20</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.3.



with no military significance.<sup>21</sup> Nuclear weapons were originally designed to be used as any other military weapons and as such, their use was not overly questioned.<sup>22,23</sup> The government considered nuclear weapons as tools designed to be used and was not overly alarmed by potential negative effects of their use.

Several nuclear scientists initially considered the possession of nuclear weapons by the U.S. as a security necessity and as a guarantee that Germany might not use theirs after they would have developed one. For this reason, physics scientists urged Roosevelt to take an action in this matter and develop nuclear weapons as first in order to prevent the destruction of western civilization by possible German nuclear bomb.<sup>24</sup> However, after Germany surrendered, scientists were in fact the first in line to oppose an actual use of nuclear weapons against Japan.<sup>25</sup> Nuclear scientists first urged the development of nuclear bombs, but later pleaded against its use. They considered nuclear weapons as tools to ensure national security, but tools which nevertheless should never be used in the battlefield.

The U.S. government justified the drop of nuclear bombs mostly with a general narrative that it brought world peace.<sup>26</sup> Truman constructed a public picture of Japan as a cruel and uncivilized nation and the use of the nuclear bomb as the absolute necessity in order to save one million Americans.<sup>27,28</sup> It was a picture of a moral choice between using unfortunately indiscriminate nuclear weapons against Japanese people and saving American lives. Truman repeatedly justified the use of atom bomb as if it was the *least abhorrent* choice, therefore the best available option.<sup>29</sup> However, this rhetorical trade should be understood mainly in the context of a postwar justification of the use. This marks a successful

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<sup>21</sup> Chronology on Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki, *The Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation* [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at [http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/timeline\\_page.php?year=1945](http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/timeline_page.php?year=1945).

<sup>22</sup> STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 98.

<sup>23</sup> MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 45.

<sup>24</sup> EINSTEIN, Albert. Albert Einstein's Letters to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1939-1945, [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available online at <http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtml>.

<sup>25</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. Resisting Nuclear Terror: Japanese and American Antinuclear Movements since 1945. In: SELDEN, Mark and SO, Alvin Y, eds. *War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, p. 258.

<sup>26</sup> Draft statement on the dropping of the bomb, July 30, 1945. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers. Available online at [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9-15.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9-15.pdf#zoom=100).

<sup>27</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Letter to Richard Russell, August 9, 1945. Official file, Truman Papers. Available online: [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9.pdf#zoom=100).

<sup>28</sup> United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War). Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946. Available online at <http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#teotab>.

<sup>29</sup> STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 107.

securitization of Japan as a threat to the world peace. This allowed the U.S. to use nuclear bombs against them. The American population accepted the threat of Japan and then the use of nuclear weapons as using necessary extraordinary measures to stop the threat. The U.S. government began regarding nuclear bombs as a way to project power. They were labeling them the greatest destructive force - *a rain of ruin* against which there is no escape or as the *greatest marvel* and *greatest achievement* of the U.S. scientific community.<sup>30,31</sup> It was crucial for the government to promote positive image of the atomic power and overall usability of nuclear weapons along with their geopolitical deterrent advantages.

This governmental policy of promoting usability of nuclear weapons was being gradually reevaluated during the 1948 Berlin Crisis and the Korean War. Even though Truman stated that the use of nuclear weapons was not entirely off the table, he made a significant securitizing move that nuclear weapons should not be used unless absolutely necessary. He declared his non-use approach and proclaimed that such use would lead to possible total destruction of civilization.<sup>32,33</sup> Truman even stated that if such weapons could *wipe out women, children, and unarmed people*, then such weapons must be treated *differently* from other *ordinary* weapons.<sup>34</sup> Truman framed them as ultimate weapons of the last resort, significantly different from other weapons mainly due to its destructive potential. Because of the threat they posed to the civilization, they should not be used. However, behind this decision was also a scare of the conflict escalation and of destruction of the U.S. image.<sup>35</sup>

The main threat of the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. emerged within the discourse in the possibility of the massive nuclear surprise attack by the USSR. Nonetheless, such an attack was mostly labeled as irrational and highly improbable.<sup>36</sup> It was believed that

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<sup>30</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, Washington: The White House. Transcript available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12169>.

<sup>31</sup> BROSCIOUS, David S. Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S. Truman's Approach to Nuclear Weapons. In: GADDIS, John L. et al., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 15.

<sup>32</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. The President's News Conference, November 30, 1950. Available online at The American Presidency Project: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13673>. See also TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 118.

<sup>33</sup> UNKNOWN. Questions to Be Considered Regarding Possible US Use of the Atomic Bomb to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression in Korea, November 8, 1950. Available online at The National Security Archive: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-5/01.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 117.

<sup>35</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 33.

<sup>36</sup> COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 3.

the nuclear deterrence was credible, and in fact the security of the U.S. was ensured, as long as the U.S. possessed the massive power of retaliation. This threat of massive counterattack destroying the whole society prevents that such nuclear war would happen.<sup>37</sup> This strategy created the widespread image of nuclear weapons being the best guarantee of security.

## 2. 1. 2. Threat of Nuclear War

Even before nuclear weapons were used against Japan, there were warning appeals made by scientific community that it would unleash a nuclear arms race that could open doors to an era of devastation. Many scientists framed the use of nuclear bomb as something that might spiral into the nuclear war and possible annihilation of the whole civilization.<sup>38,39</sup> Nevertheless, the government continuously disregarded such fears and acknowledged such warnings only after the USSR built their nuclear weapons.

The existence of Soviet nuclear arsenal which marked the end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly changed the nuclear discourse rapidly. Accordingly, the U.S. designed its nuclear strategy for the purpose to deter the opponent and prevent such nuclear exchange that might result in nuclear apocalypse. The premise of their nuclear deterrence was that once the U.S. would be forced to use nuclear weapons again, it would be massive and disastrous for all parties of the conflict.<sup>40</sup> The existence of nuclear weapons was being gradually linked to the pervasive possibility of nuclear annihilation of the whole world. The perception of Soviet nuclear arsenal as an existential threat enabled the U.S. to employ strategy of massive retaliation as the extraordinary tool which would be otherwise considered as unacceptable.

Inevitable nuclear arms race also brought into the center of the debate the image of unwinnable nuclear war. The common premise suggested that even if one block won the nuclear war, there would be no one left to claim victory. This narrative became the central part of the discourse after the U.S. announced to built thermonuclear weapons. Truman declared that nuclear weapons newly represented the threat for the whole mankind since they

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<sup>37</sup> BRODIE, Bernard. The Development of Nuclear Strategy. *International Security*, Spring, 1978, vol.2, no.4, p. 65. Originally quoted in BRODIE, Bernard, *The Absolute Weapon*, New York: Harcourt, 1946, p.76.

<sup>38</sup> A Petition to the President of the United States from July 17, 1945, *Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection*, [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at: [https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/79.pdf](https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/79.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. Resisting Nuclear Terror: Japanese and American Antinuclear Movements since 1945. In: SELDEN, Mark and SO, Alvin Y, eds. *War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, p. 258.

<sup>40</sup> ROSENBERG, David Alan. US Strategy: Theory vs. Practice. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1987, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 20.

could destroy a whole civilization.<sup>41</sup> In order to avoid such end, Truman repeatedly ruled out the possibility of nuclear attack: “Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.”<sup>42,43</sup> Also Eisenhower affirmed that with the existence of thermonuclear weapons, war no longer had any sense.<sup>44</sup> Thus thermonuclear weapons themselves were being labeled as an existential threat to the world. Also G. F. Kennan, then the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, stated that thermonuclear weapons lead to total destruction of civilization. He even suggested that a surrender to the USSR would be preferable to igniting a thermonuclear war. According to him, establishing nuclear control was the only way how to prevent such a war.<sup>45</sup>

Soviet nuclear arsenal was also framed as a threat to American society and its indefensible American cities. The administration promoted the idea that building efficient civil defense system would prevent the Soviet attack and if such war occurred, the U.S. society would nevertheless prevail.<sup>46</sup> A civil defense video *Duck and Cover*, as a response to such concerns, therefore instructed people about how to act in cases they would see a *bright flash*. The video shows a symbolical turtle using his carapace as a shelter.<sup>47</sup> In line with this image, nuclear attack was newly being shown as highly survivable. It was being declared that nuclear weapons would not destroy the earth and nuclear attack was highly survivable even without special protection.<sup>48</sup> Thus the government emphasized survivability of the nuclear war and belittled the impact of nuclear explosions in order to calm the public opinion down.

### 2. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear proliferation was mostly regarded as an inevitable process once nuclear knowledge existed in the world. Non-governmental representatives often stressed that the U.S.

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<sup>41</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1950. Available online at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm>.

<sup>42</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1953. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14379>.

<sup>43</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. The President's Farewell Address to the American People, January 15, 1953, broadcast from the President's office in the White House. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14392>.

<sup>44</sup> COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 17.

<sup>45</sup> CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.27.

<sup>46</sup> TRUMAN Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 9, 1952. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14418>.

<sup>47</sup> *Duck and Cover* [film]. Director: Anthony RIZZO, producer: Archer Production, USA: Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1951. Available online at <https://archive.org/details/DuckandC1951>.

<sup>48</sup> EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD, and CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICE. *Survival Under Atomic Attack: The Official U.S. Government Booklet*, NSRB Doc. 130, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 3.

nuclear monopoly was only temporary. B. Brodie warned that since more states will possess nuclear weapons in the future, the primary security assurance of nuclear weapons would be rather fragile and the U.S. will be highly vulnerable to such proliferation.<sup>49</sup> However, since the U.S. had nuclear monopoly, nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms race was not initially framed as a threat by the government.<sup>50,51</sup> Such lack of concern could be explained with the prevalent belief that with their nuclear monopoly and later superiority, they will be still able to set the rules in certain essential post-war matters. The state as a security maximizer preferred own increased security by building nuclear arsenal instead of recognizing nuclear proliferation as an existential threat and choosing limits on nuclear proliferation.

Despite these preferences, there were also several attempts to establish control of nuclear power on an international level. The future end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly and rising nuclear proliferation was being framed as a threat to the U.S. mainly because there was no adequate defense against these bombs.<sup>52</sup> Such international nuclear control was perceived as desirable by non-governmental and even governmental representatives.<sup>53,54</sup> Despite such framing of the proliferation threat, the U.S. government did not consider international nuclear control as achievable and, thus, followed with accelerated nuclear arms buildup to better prepare for a *year of maximum peril*.<sup>55</sup> Such maximization of nuclear deterrence was a

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<sup>49</sup> BRODIE, Bernard. The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker. *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948, no. 55.

<sup>50</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President on Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R., September 23, 1949. Public Papers of the Presidents. Available online at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1234&st=&st1=>.

<sup>51</sup> WALKER, Samuel J. *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*, Revised Edition, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p.17.

<sup>52</sup> Declaration on Atomic Bomb By President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King. Washington: The White House, November 15, 1945.

<sup>53</sup> THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, Prepared for the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy by a Board of Consultants. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, March 16, 1946. See also BARUCH, Bernard. *The Baruch Plan*, Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946. Available online at <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml>. See also STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 99.

<sup>54</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947, January 21, 1946. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12467>. See also TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1947. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12762>, TRUMAN, Harry S. Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference, August 9, 1945. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12165>, or TRUMAN, Harry S. Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy, October 3, 1945. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12327>.

<sup>55</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 32. See also: The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon: The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Evaluation Board For Operation Crossroads. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers, June 30, 1947, p. 10-14. Available online at [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/81.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/81.pdf#zoom=100), or: COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 26-30.

governmental response to the threat of unavoidable nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, a decision to develop thermonuclear weapons, called *superbombs*, was made in a response to Soviet nuclear proliferation.<sup>56</sup> Soviet nuclear proliferation was therefore successfully framed as a threat to the U.S.

#### **2. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing**

Initially, health and environmental effects of nuclear testing were not being emphasized within the nuclear discourse because the debate focused on how to survive nuclear attack, not how to survive own nuclear testing. The government regarded nuclear testing to be a guarantee of national security against the USSR. Continuation of nuclear testing was being regarded as the greater good which could justify risks of nuclear fallout.<sup>57</sup>

### **2. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Discourse, 1945 - 1953**

From the beginning of the nuclear age, nuclear disarmament activities constituted a very broad discourse. The thesis will focus on significant activities following the first use of nuclear weapons and on forming of first nuclear disarmament ideas.

One of the key moments marking the beginning of the nuclear age became J. R. Oppenheimer's remark about perils of nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer was a significant figure not only of the nuclear development program, but he later became the key person of the nuclear disarmament movement as well. After he witnessed the first nuclear test explosion, it is believed that Oppenheimer recalled a part of *Bhagavad Gita*: "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds."<sup>58</sup> Such remarks could be put into comparison with later formulations of his first mental association with nuclear weapons when he stated: "I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds."<sup>59</sup> The anti-nuclear agenda adopted a powerful image of not only

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<sup>56</sup> MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 149. See also TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President on the Hydrogen Bomb, January 31, 1950. Public Papers of the Presidents. Available online at <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=642&st=&st1=>. See also THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68). Washington, President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers, April 14, 1950. Available online at [https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf](https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf).

<sup>57</sup> GOERTZEL, Ted and GOERTZEL, Ben. *Linus Pauling: A Life In Science and Politics*. New York: Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, pp.145, 148.

<sup>58</sup> HIJYA, A. James. The *Gita* of J. Robert Oppenheimer, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 144 (2), June 2000, p. 123.

<sup>59</sup> MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 62 - 63.

*destroyed*, but *completely shattered civilizations*. These words became the mantra of the nuclear disarmament movement since then. They are usually used to acknowledge that immediately after the first nuclear test, many people realized the perils of nuclear weapons and foresaw that they represented total destruction of the world as it brought only death.

This popular narrative started to project a strong fear that nuclear weapons increased a possibility of the end of the civilization. Nuclear scientists, while often feeling guilty for bringing such a disastrous achievement upon the world, started to emphasize perils of nuclear weapons which might inflict a destruction of the world. The existence of the Soviet nuclear capability only fueled this framing. Nuclear scientists brought into the debate a belief that if nuclear weapons were not controlled, the *nuclear annihilation* was inevitable. The emerging anti-nuclear movement started lobbying for a world federation which was labeled as the only way how to prevent a total nuclear war.<sup>60</sup> The need for international control of nuclear weapons was labeled as imperative.

Nuclear power were perceived as a threat to all people immediately after the nuclear bombings over Japan. Nuclear weapon started to be personalized and was often depicted as a mythical creation, a Frankenstein monster, as a horrifying force of the universe unleashed by scientists. During the NBC radio broadcast on the day of Hiroshima bombing, it was famously remarked: “For all we know, ... we have created a Frankenstein.”<sup>61</sup> This quote was shortly after used all across the U.S., even in the U.S. Senate. Nuclear weapons were also often being linked to visions of holocaust, annihilation, or apocalypse. The U.S. media started portraying the use of nuclear weapons against Japanese cities as a *doomsday itself*, as a *cosmic power* or as *sudden rain*, which completely *annihilated* Japanese cities.<sup>62</sup> Slowly, the media began connecting nuclear weapons to the image of apocalypse, idea of a nuclear rain you cannot escape from. This supported the narrative of a threat to all people.

Anti-nuclear activists began opposing nuclear weapons on the basis of its indiscriminate killing of civilians. However, in a response to this growing threat perception, the government began justifying such bombings as a retribution for indiscriminate nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Truman declared that since Japanese government staged an attack on Pearl Harbor, it was only appropriate to respond in a way which would be understood to

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<sup>60</sup> HOLLIDAY, W.T. A World State? *The Rotarian*. June 1948, vol. 72, no. 6, p. 11.

<sup>61</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 104-105.

<sup>62</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 104-106.

them.<sup>63</sup> This response signified that the public debate started differentiating between Americans and Them, between those who represent a group of barbarians, those people outside of American culture. According to this narrative, it was justifiable to use this extraordinary measure against such unnatural threat. It was widely regarded as justifiable because of this narrative of people who knows only violence. The use of nuclear bomb was perceived as the only way Japanese people could understand reason.

However, such an indiscriminate killing provided an agenda for nuclear disarmament movement. They started mobilizing Americans by stressing that nuclear weapons threatened every single American. They released different scenarios of nuclear attacks on the U.S. with the aim to force the public to visualize the real threat and how many millions of Americans would be killed. The premise of these scenarios was that the attacker would aim to kill as many Americans as possible.<sup>64</sup> This image of an existential threat to every American was further strengthened by popular coverage of nuclear explosions and testing. People began feeling the *fear of the unknown*, the *fear of irrational death*.<sup>65</sup> The public still had very limited information about nuclear weapons which even intensified the threat perception. The use of nuclear bomb was also often labeled as a modern type of *barbarism*. According to this point of view, the U.S. should have avoided the use of nuclear weapons on the basis of their Christianity and morality.<sup>66</sup> Nuclear weapons were thus framed as unchristian and inhumane.

To further promote the idea of the need for disarmament, several actors started emphasizing the existential threat of nuclear weapons to the survivability of the civilization. Nuclear scientists together with pacifist groups began promoting the image of the nuclear war which might very possibly occur and which might lead to a total annihilation of the life on the earth. Very symbolical reference emerged in the Chicago Tribune which predicted, that in the future “this earth will become a barren waste, in which the survivors of the race will hide in caves or live among ruins.”<sup>67</sup> The dominant theme was that the mankind faced two eventualities, either to live in peace or to face a total destruction of the civilization. The use of

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<sup>63</sup> TRUMAN, Harry S. Correspondence between Harry S. Truman and Samuel Cavert, August 11, 1945. Available online at

[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-11&documentid=11&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-11&documentid=11&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1).

<sup>64</sup> SCHEIBACH, Michael. *Atomic Narratives and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom, 1945-1955*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2003, p. 157.

<sup>65</sup> SCHEIBACH, Michael. *Atomic Narratives and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom, 1945-1955*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2003, p. 157.

<sup>66</sup> MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 115.

<sup>67</sup> UNKNOWN. The Future, *The Chicago Tribune*, August 14, 1945. Reprinted in *The Chicago Tribune*, June 10, 1968. Available online at <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1968/06/10/page/24/article/the-future>.



nuclear weapons on a larger scale was being widely linked to the image of the earth looking as a *barren waste* when only *caves* could be used as shelters for survivors. In the same spirit, when asked what kind of weapon would be used in the World War III, Einstein's acknowledged this grave fear in his famous quote: "I don't know. But I can tell you what they'll use in the fourth. They'll use rocks!"<sup>68</sup> These quotations bringing the narrative of *living in caves* and using rocks quickly spread across the whole anti-nuclear discourse. It substantially contributed to the current framing of the threat of nuclear weapons as something which might bring about the end of civilization.

We have to take into account also important status of Einstein. Firstly, he was one of few people who significantly contributed to the final decision to develop nuclear weapons. Later, he became a significant proponent of anti-nuclear initiatives. He was later ostracized and his views were essentially disregarded by the government. The U.S. government was greatly concerned over activists opposing nuclear weapons thus they started to contain their anti-nuclear activism.<sup>69</sup> In many cases, American physics scientists were suddenly treated like national enemies. Their loyalty to the U.S. was in question once they started criticising nuclear development. U.S. agencies even made significant efforts to revoke Einstein's American citizenship.<sup>70</sup>

Despite the spreading nuclear fear, the government made a strong pursuit to link the image of a *mushroom cloud* to the idea of *utopian achievement*, progress, and unprecedented power. The image of atomic sensation functioned as an embodiment of the U.S. superiority.<sup>71</sup> Anti-nuclear representatives also began considering nuclear non-proliferation and international nuclear control as the only chance of how to avoid the end of the world by nuclear annihilation. Einstein continued to impact the discourse by warning of dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race. In a 1950 film clip, he expressed his grave concern about the future of nuclear arms race which was portrayed as a *disastrous illusion* and an *impasse*. In addition, he feared that the development of a hydrogen bomb would lead to imminent destruction of mankind. He stated that hydrogen bomb would poison the atmosphere by radioactivity which would lead to the *general annihilation* of all life on the Earth. He emphasized that if it was not possible to maintain nuclear monopoly, it was

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<sup>68</sup> EINSTEIN, Albert. Looking Ahead, *The Rotarian*. June 1948, vol. 72, no. 6, p.9.

<sup>69</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 35-36.

<sup>70</sup> GRUNDMANN, Siegfried. *The Einstein Dossiers: Science and Politics - Einstein's Berlin Period with an Appendix on Einstein's FBI File*, translated by Ann M. HENTSCHEL. Berlin: Springer, 2005, p. 367.

<sup>71</sup> WALKER, Samuel J. *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*, Revised Edition, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p. 98.

absolutely unfeasible to maintain decisive nuclear superiority either.<sup>72</sup> This statement insinuated that because such monopoly was unfeasible, nuclear restraint was essential.

### **2. 3. Summary and Key Acts of Securitization**

We will make an attempt to summarize key events of each separate period. On the basis of analysis of key threats and the nuclear disarmament discourse we identify key acts of securitization according to the theory of securitization based on the Copenhagen school.

Before the beginning of the nuclear era, a widespread threat of a possible victory of Germany and later Japan during the World War II was securitized by Roosevelt. The acceptance of this securitization was overwhelming which allowed him to enter into the war and later provided him with an agenda which led to development program of nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear war with Germany was behind the development of first nuclear weapons. The act of developing nuclear bomb was strongly encouraged by a group of physic scientists who meant to create a powerful deterrent against Germany. This powerful threat mobilization allowed the U.S. government to use nuclear weapons against Japan.

However, the first use of nuclear bomb was not justified by a threat of nuclear war since they were not used against Germany who was the one who was believed to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. government justified it then with a reference to making peace and saving American lives. This justification was initially overwhelmingly accepted. This first use of nuclear weapons was shocking for the whole world, however, among the majority of Americans, it was generally accepted as the least abhorrent choice. Also, we have to take into account that information about nuclear weapons was still very much limited among the public.

Nuclear knowledge was bound to be spread and thus nuclear proliferation by other countries was regarded as inevitable, however, still threatening. Among the most influential actors calling for a control of nuclear power were primarily nuclear scientists, pacifists, and anti-nuclear activists. However, their impact was limited because the government, as a security maximizer, did not favored choosing limited benefits and preventing the USSR from acquiring nuclear weapons of nuclear control over nuclear superiority.

Initially, the U.S. was quite open to possibility of the use of nuclear weapons if it was needed. After the USSR developed their nuclear arsenal, the U.S. chose more cautions

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<sup>72</sup> EINSTEIN, Albert. *Albert Einstein Warns of Dangers in Nuclear Arms Race* [video news report]. NBC News, New York: NBC Universal Media LLC, February 12, 1950. Available online at <https://a248.e.akamai.net/7/1635/50139/1d/origin.nbclearn.com/files/nbcarchives/site/pdf/39895.pdf>.

rhetoric and policy toward possible use of nuclear weapons. Gradually, a new major opponent emerged in the image of the USSR. The U.S. newly had to take into account that Soviet nuclear weapons might be used also against them. The U.S. government subsequently securitized Soviet nuclear bombs as the existential threat posed to the U.S. In the need to maintain their nuclear superiority, the U.S. accelerated their nuclear development program and later also authorized building thermonuclear weapons. This securitizing act marked the beginning of the nuclear arm race. What the U.S. government securitized as a threat to the U.S. homeland, anti-nuclear activists regarded as a threat to the whole world.

The government consistently avoided securitization of nuclear weapons themselves and labeling their use as the existential threat to the world because it would endanger the future of nuclear development program. This development was key in ensuring the security of the U.S. The U.S. government was not forced to securitize other emerged nuclear threats because during the first examined period, non-governmental actors played limited role in constructing nuclear threats. This changed in the second period after the 1954 nuclear hydrogen bomb accident occurred which caused a release of significant amount of information about nuclear weapons among the public.

The governmental approach significantly changed with the development of thermonuclear weapons. It was increasingly clear that they threatened the whole world. Nuclear annihilation was being regarded as more imminent than ever. Also the government was forced to openly acknowledge that the threat of thermonuclear weapons substantially changed rules of the international politics and threatened the whole civilization. The U.S. government started proclaiming that nuclear war must never be fought not only because of problem of escalation, but also because of disastrous effects of hydrogen bombs. Eisenhower later became a significant part of the disarmament discourse when he recognized that nuclear war can never be fought and states should strive for future goal of nuclear disarmament. The main existential threat was stated to be the USSR who might have attacked and totally annihilated the U.S. which would also meant an end the world as they knew it. As the public accepted this securitization, the U.S. government embarked on accelerated nuclear arms race as a measure which should have guaranteed their security. They were forced to modify their nuclear strategy and nuclear employment policy to make nuclear war so self-destructing that it would not be even possible to start it.

### **3. Thermonuclear Weapons, 1954-61**

“The advancement of the nuclear arts has been the work of men of many nations. That is so because the atom itself is nonpolitical. It wears no nationality and recognizes no frontiers. It is neither moral nor immoral. Only man’s choice can make it good or evil.”<sup>73</sup>

This researched period begins with year 1954 when infamous U.S. hydrogen test in the Marshall Islands occurred and ends before the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.<sup>74</sup> During this era, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union already possessed thermonuclear weapons. This fact significantly altered the whole nuclear disarmament discourse. Considering international issues, during this era, the USSR tested their first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957. France tested their first nuclear weapon in 1960. After the USSR declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, the U.S. followed the example and also declared a moratorium. However, in 1961, the USSR violated its voluntary unilateral moratorium and conducted the largest ever nuclear explosion in October 1961.

#### **3. 1. Construction of Nuclear Threats, 1954-1961**

##### **3. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War**

In this researched period, the threat of the nuclear war continued to be in the center of the nuclear discourse. The government continued to address that nuclear capabilities of both the U.S. and the USSR could trigger the nuclear war. Eisenhower declared that the U.S. nuclear stockpile exceeded the explosive equivalent of all explosives used in the World War II. He noted that U.S. nuclear bombs might inflict more damage than was being expected till then.<sup>75</sup> Eisenhower administration brought into the discourse an image of the U.S. capability to wage more disastrous war than ever before. Moreover, such comparison with the damage

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<sup>73</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Message to the United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva, August 8, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10334>.

<sup>74</sup> The second examined period overlaps with the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower which lasted from January 20 1953 to January 20 1961 and the presidency of John F. Kennedy who was in office from January 20, 1961 to November 22, 1963.

<sup>75</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D, Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online\\_documents/atoms\\_for\\_peace/Binder13.pdf](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf).

inflicted during the World War II was something everyone could easily visualize. These declaratory speech acts emphasizing powerful nuclear arsenal thus made a significant impact on the population.

Such a widespread perception of their threatening nuclear potential was further strengthened by the idea of winning nuclear war. Eisenhower believed that the U.S. could win the nuclear war and, therefore, in an event of a Soviet surprise nuclear attack, the U.S. should retaliate with all its power that is available and turn Soviet land into waste.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, the general narrative suggested that the U.S. must be prepared for a surprise nuclear attack from the USSR, not the other way around. This framing of the USSR as the most likely attacker significantly increased with the existence of the Soviet thermonuclear arsenal. The U.S. government performed a powerful securitizing move where the answer for a threatening Soviet nuclear arsenal and their potential surprise attack was a policy of massive nuclear retaliation to completely annihilate Soviets. This securitization was later translated into the nuclear policy of *a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost*, a deterrent of *massive retaliatory power*.<sup>77</sup> Such massive nuclear armament was generally justified by its declared deterrent ability to preventing nuclear war.

The U.S. felt extremely threatened by the Soviet thermonuclear capability which was regarded as something that made the likelihood of nuclear war and mutual destruction far greater. This widespread concern led to a substantial revision the U.S. nuclear policy in order to make it more usable and credible. The government created several limited nuclear war strategies which should have allowed “nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”<sup>78</sup> Eisenhower publicly declared that nuclear weapons should be used “just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”<sup>79</sup> Thus, nuclear weapons effectively acquired conventional status within the U.S. national security.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, Eisenhower also

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<sup>76</sup> CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 36.

<sup>77</sup> DULLES, John Foster. Speech of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954. See also EISENHOWER, Dwight D, The President's News Conference, April 30, 1953. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9832> and FREEDMAN, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 (third edition), 1981 (first edition), p. 81

<sup>78</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p.22.

<sup>79</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 16, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10434>. See also CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 38.

<sup>80</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D, Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online\\_documents/atoms\\_for\\_peace/Binder13.pdf](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf).

removed from military policy plans counting on non-nuclear weapons, thus ensuring that in the case of emerged military conflict between the U.S. and the USSR, the war would immediately become nuclear, possibly thermonuclear.<sup>81</sup> In a response to Soviet thermonuclear arsenal, Eisenhower created a narrative that he would rather see the world destroyed than to be the one who surrenders. The purpose of this declared deterrence, later coined as *brinkmanship*, was to let the world know that every provocation could inflict unacceptable damage. The nuclear war would be so destructive, that it would never happen.

American population felt also extremely threatened by the existence of Soviet thermonuclear arsenal. Several activists began stating that since the U.S. used nuclear weapons against people, it was only a matter of time till somebody would attack them. This feeling of guilt intensified when a threat of thermonuclear attack brought into the discourse the image of a *world's death warrant*, an *impending doom* which hung over them.<sup>82</sup> Americans were helplessly and continuously preparing themselves for the possibility of the attack.

These threat constructions and gradual widespread fear of thermonuclear war induced several changes in governmental policy. Eisenhower felt more and more threatened by the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons and the likelihood of escalation. Estimated casualties of thermonuclear war were reaching up to 65 percent of the American population.<sup>83,84</sup> The hydrogen bomb together with the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) changed the nature of nuclear warfare and significantly altered the nuclear threat perception. The amount of damage thermonuclear war could inflict was framed as unbearable for any society. Thus, the government rejected a possibility of the nuclear war and labeled it as unthinkable and self-defeating.<sup>85,86</sup> Nevertheless, the U.S. nuclear policy remained to be based on massive nuclear retaliation and deterrence as defense.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.45.

<sup>82</sup> GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 21.

<sup>83</sup> ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.106.

<sup>84</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 11, 1959. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11678>.

<sup>85</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 23, 1955, Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10437>.

<sup>86</sup> RHODES, Richard. *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 584.

<sup>87</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 4, 1959. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11672>.

The emphasis was also put on the need to increase the survivability of the population.<sup>88,89</sup> It was believed that even minimal defense would significantly increase chances of survival of many people. However, these civil defense programs met with a strong opposition because of their perceived *calculated ineffectiveness*, while also being labeled as “nothing more than a mean fantasy to fool the public into believing that many Americans could survive a multimegaton nuclear attack.”<sup>90</sup>

### 3. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

By the beginning of Eisenhower presidency, the use of nuclear weapons was being considered mainly in the context of limited nuclear war strategies. The U.S. government initially believed that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in periphery wars would not trigger a total nuclear war. Eisenhower initially regarded nuclear weapons as just another instrument of war while also suggesting they might easily be used if needed. He even considered the use of nuclear weapons in local wars as being quite likely.<sup>91</sup> In the same spirit, Eisenhower encouraged the development of more usable tactical nuclear weapons which were not believed to lead to escalation into a large-scale nuclear war. Thus, out of 18,000 fission and fusion weapons developed by 1960, only 4,000 were designed for strategic purposes.<sup>92</sup> Tactical nuclear weapons were regarded as being more credible and more applicable instrument of power projection due to limited damage they might cause.<sup>93</sup> These strategies dealing with the use of tactical nuclear weapons only supplemented the main policy of massive retaliation.

Such policy caused general fear that nuclear weapons might be really used by the U.S. The threat of the actual use was perceived as quite imminent with each emerged international

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<sup>88</sup> VANDERCOOK, Wm. F. Making the very best of the very worst: The “Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons” Report of 1956, *International Security*, Summer 1986, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 190-191. See also GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 28.

<sup>89</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee. Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, Washington, November 7, 1957, pp.18-21.

<sup>90</sup> GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 64.

<sup>91</sup> ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. ‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.108. See also DIVINE, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 29-30

<sup>92</sup> ROSENBERG, David Alan. US Strategy: Theory vs. Practice. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1987, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 22.

<sup>93</sup> COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 42.

crisis on the horizon. Anti-nuclear activists together with the public formed a strong opposition to governmental strategies suggesting that these nuclear weapons might be used in the battlefield. They often argued that the U.S. as a *moral country* cannot use such weapons. Gradually, they opposed the use of such bombs also on the basis of national and human values.<sup>94</sup>

The U.S. government was later forced to acknowledge that the world would be repelled if nuclear weapons were really used even in limited wars. The government admitted that it would probably ruin their image.<sup>95</sup> Thus the use of nuclear weapons was openly framed as being politically impossible and not feasible due to the public opposition. The opposition of American public also caused that the production of new neutron bombs releasing more radiation whilst not inflicting serious material damage was cancelled.<sup>96</sup>

The use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. was newly understood to be an enormous threat to the U.S. itself also because of the threat of retaliation. However, many political scientists framed this threat as mild. Within the bounds of nuclear deterrence theory, any nuclear surprise attack against the U.S. was regarded as unlikely once the survival of the U.S. retaliatory forces was ensured.<sup>97</sup> This threat was often framed as not being an existential security threat because of the existence of such *certain deterrent*.<sup>98,99</sup> The main narrative of this strategy declared that American society was safe against such nuclear attack as long as the U.S. nuclear deterrence was credible and their second strike capability protected. Moreover, since mid-1950s, the U.S. and the USSR were in the position of the mutual nuclear deterrence, where both countries possessed credible nuclear capacity to launch large-scale nuclear strikes from their homeland against their adversary.<sup>100</sup> This situation represented additional stabilizing moment. Also, the mere existence of thermonuclear weapons and the

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<sup>94</sup> American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence* [online], 1955, pp. viii, 7-9. Available at

[http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicaactions.net/files/documents/Speak\\_Truth\\_to\\_Power.pdf](http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicaactions.net/files/documents/Speak_Truth_to_Power.pdf).

<sup>95</sup> CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.46. See also WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 79.

<sup>96</sup> COHEN, Sam. *F\*\*\* You! Mr. President: Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb* [online], 2006 (3rd edition), p. 186. Available at [http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions\\_Sam\\_Cohen\\_2006\\_Third\\_Edition.pdf](http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions_Sam_Cohen_2006_Third_Edition.pdf).

<sup>97</sup> ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.108.

<sup>98</sup> BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 185.

<sup>99</sup> SNYDER, Glenn H. Deterrence and Power, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, June 1960, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 163.

<sup>100</sup> ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.88.



strategy of massive retaliation could be perceived as making the nuclear war more improbable and unthinkable due to the threat of escalation.<sup>101</sup>

Nevertheless, nuclear weapons continued to be considered as a threat to the U.S. As was often said, this *delicate balance of terror* was feasible, but extremely dangerous due to the danger of accidental nuclear war.<sup>102</sup> The existence of thermonuclear weapons brought into the discourse the imminence of a threat of nuclear attack and also significantly higher risks of nuclear accidents and misjudgments which could potentially produce total destruction of any American city.<sup>103</sup>

### 3. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

The threat of nuclear proliferation was not particularly constructed during this examined period. The debate still continued to encompass the issue of the nuclear arms race. The U.S. government began to recognize that even a vast nuclear superiority and a strong retaliation capability would not avert a surprise attack from other nuclear actors and would not guarantee their security. For this reason, Eisenhower started emphasizing the need for a strong defense system.<sup>104, 105</sup> The nuclear arms race was stated to have only relative importance. Several non-governmental representatives also continued to stress dangerous and superfluous nature of nuclear arms race. According to them, arms race always led to wars. They suggested that building nuclear arsenal with such an uncertain hope that history will not repeat itself was just plain *hazardous*.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> KISSINGER, Henry. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957, pp. 133-134.

<sup>102</sup> WOHLSTETTER Albert, The Delicate Balance of Terror [online], *RAND Corporation*, 6 November, 1958. Available at <http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html>.

<sup>103</sup> BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 176. See also ALSOP, Joseph. The New Balance of Power: War and Peace in a Strange World, *Encounter*, May 1958, pp. 4-5, 10.

<sup>104</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online\\_documents/atoms\\_for\\_peace/Binder13.pdf](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf).

<sup>105</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 2, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10424>.

<sup>106</sup> American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence* [online], 1955, pp. 7, 9. Available at [http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Speak\\_Truth\\_to\\_Power.pdf](http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Speak_Truth_to_Power.pdf).

### 3. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

In this researched period, the nuclear discourse focused mainly on dangers of nuclear testing and its threat to all Americans. The threat of nuclear testing became the key theme of the nuclear discourse due to the thermonuclear test in the Marshall Islands in 1954 which accidentally exposed to radiation twenty three Japanese fishermen on a boat named the *Lucky Dragon* and more than 200 Marshall Islanders. Despite the fact that those people were outside the cleared danger zone, they happened to be exposed to heavy doses of radiation.<sup>107,108</sup> This accident stirred a lot of controversy worldwide and a great domestic anxiety over dangers of nuclear testing. This crucial incident caused massive protests which forced government officials to clarify the purpose and effects of nuclear testing to general public. In a subsequent press conference, the Atomic Energy Commission representative, while trying to belittle the accident, also made a remark that such thermonuclear bomb was powerful enough to destroy any city, even city big enough as New York.<sup>109</sup> This comparison hit the nail on the head when many people started to connect quite incomprehensible thing such as nuclear testing to their everyday lives and how personally nuclear attack would affect them.

Even though government officials were mostly aware of certain health risks that the testing might involve, they mostly believed that these negative effects will be counterbalanced by continuing the nuclear development program. Thus they continually downplayed the consequences of nuclear testing.<sup>110,111,112</sup> Out of fear that disclosure of dangers of the nuclear testing to the public would jeopardize the future of the nuclear development program, the U.S. government even made several assurances to the public that nuclear fallout did not pose any health hazards beyond designated nuclear testing sites. Governmental officials even recalled

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<sup>107</sup> COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 20.

<sup>108</sup> The resettlement of Bikini islanders and subsequent evacuations, following lawsuits, radiation monitoring, and cleanup of the island, were, for more than next 50 years, media-attention issue. Lawsuits and compensation claims continue to be an issue still. The need to permanently resettle these people shows how severely the environment was contaminated.

<sup>109</sup> Excerpts from Press Conference, Participants: Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the AEC, March 31, 1954, [online], accessed 14.10.2014. Available at Nuclear Files: [http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/correspondence/eisenhower-dwight/corr\\_eisenhower\\_1954-03-31.htm](http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/correspondence/eisenhower-dwight/corr_eisenhower_1954-03-31.htm).

<sup>110</sup> STRAUSS, Lewis. Complete Statement After Bravo and the Japanese Government's Response, March 31, 1954. Available at Public Broadcasting Service (PBS): <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/primary/straussbravo.html>. See also HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 279.

<sup>111</sup> VANDERCOOK, Wm. F. Making the very best of the very worst: The "Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons" Report of 1956, *International Security*, Summer 1986, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 186. See also LAPP, Ralph E. Civil Defense Faces New Peril, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1954, vol. 10, no. 9, p. 350.

<sup>112</sup> SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p. 13.

that nuclear tests were not necessarily harmful, but might have been *possibly helpful*.<sup>113,114</sup> Furthermore, several nuclear scientists even labeled possible suspension of testing as a *crime against humanity*.<sup>115</sup> They approached nuclear development program as something which was done for the benefit of mankind.

Despite this belittling of the threat of nuclear testing, the fear of nuclear testing kept spreading. Initially, the debate focused primarily on people living nearby Nevada Test Site who started calling themselves *downwinders*. Despite increased occurrences of radiation poisoning, local people were not being warned and were only advised not to consume local milk and dairy products.<sup>116</sup> The 1954 incident impacted the discourse greatly. Anti-nuclear activists and public figures began asking for details on thermonuclear weapons and the health and environmental consequences of nuclear testing. The issue of nuclear testing was often labeled as *tests on human beings* or as a *catastrophe* for human race.<sup>117,118</sup> Nuclear testing was being perceived as a threat to whole humanity and as a threat to each individual because no one could determine how far could radioactivity reach.

Into the center of nuclear testing debate got the issue of radioactive contamination of food, water, and the environment which were then slowly poisoning human bodies. Radioactive strontium-90 was at first detected in wheat and milk. The public debate focused mainly on the products which were being directly consumed, such as milk and water. Media even often presented the picture of a milk bottle with skull and crossbones.<sup>119</sup> Later, the anti-nuclear activists started emphasizing also dangers and immorality of radioactive poisoning of the air, grass, wheat, fishes, and even rain.<sup>120</sup> The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy (SANE) released a statement *We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed...*, which stressed that all humans had the right to breathe *unpoisoned air* and to work

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<sup>113</sup> HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 286, 294-5.

<sup>114</sup> GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 74. See also WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 74.

<sup>115</sup> DIVINE, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, p.125.

<sup>116</sup> JUNDT, Thomas. *Greening the Red, White, and Blue: The Bomb, Big Business, and Consumer Resistance in Postwar America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 74.

<sup>117</sup> ARNOLD, James R. Effects of the Recent Bomb: Tests on Human Beings, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1954, vol. 10, no. 9, p. 347.

<sup>118</sup> PAULING, Linus. *No More War!*, New York: Dodd, Mead Company, 1983. p. 266.

<sup>119</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *The Rise of Nuclear Fear*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 2012, p. 121.

<sup>120</sup> RICHARDSON, Erin L. *SANE and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Shape U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2009, a Master thesis, The Department of History, Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, p.28 [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at [https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send\\_file?accession=ohiou1257556741&disposition=inline](https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ohiou1257556741&disposition=inline).

on *uncontaminated soil*.<sup>121</sup> They stressed that nuclear testing endangering Americans and poisoning its environment was the true existential threat to the U.S. Americans started to regard nuclear fallout as a *silent killer*.<sup>122</sup> Nuclear fallout was being frequently depicted as something which kills without even being seen.

In the late 1950s, a full-scale scare of nuclear testing was spread throughout the whole culture. There were being issued radioactivity studies and testing of radioactive contamination of cow's milk which proved to be especially dangerous to children.<sup>123</sup> Several agencies began sampling milk and water also began collecting baby teeth from children across the whole U.S. These teeth contained radioactive elements which could emerge in teeth only by nuclear testing thus showing clear evidence of testing dangers.<sup>124</sup> This Baby teeth survey was one of the central initiatives of anti-nuclear activities calling for a ban on nuclear testing. Also one of the key figures of such anti-testing efforts became Dr. Benjamin Spock, who was frequently being shown in news with a girl in order to highlight the statement that nuclear fallout pose an imminent threat to health of all children.<sup>125</sup> Issue of nuclear testing was being publicized as a threat which should concern every responsible parent because everybody was affected by it. What we might call family concerns over children and endeavor to save unborn children of the world became the main theme behind this anti-nuclear struggle.

By the late 1950, anti-nuclear initiatives started requesting ban on nuclear testing. They continually emphasized that such testing was releasing a *burden of radioactivity* all over the world while causing damage that leads "to an increase in the number of seriously defective children that will be born in future generations."<sup>126,127</sup> Furthermore, an important figure of the nuclear discourse Linus Pauling even proved that radioactive fallout causes

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<sup>121</sup> THE COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY. 'We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed...': A Statement for Americans in a Nuclear Age, *The Cornell Daily Sun*, 17 March 1958, vol. LXXIV, no. 102, p. 10.

<sup>122</sup> BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 822.

<sup>123</sup> HACKER, Barton C. *Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p.198.

<sup>124</sup> GOERTZEL, Ted and GOERTZEL, Ben. *Linus Pauling: A Life In Science and Politics*. New York: Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, p.143

<sup>125</sup> BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 823.

<sup>126</sup> PAULING, Linus. U.S. Signatures to the Appeal by American Scientist to the Government and People of the World written 15 May 1957 and presented as a Petition to the United Nations on 15 January 1958 [online], accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/peace/papers/peace5.008.1.html>.

<sup>127</sup> PAULING, Linus. Letter to the President, 4 June 1957. Ava Helen and Linus Pauling Papers [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/MMBBFR>.

mutations which increased numbers of defective children by one percent.<sup>128</sup> Such securitizing moves had a huge impact on general public. However, most of the governmental representatives continued to deny any real danger to people from the nuclear fallout during most of the 1950s. Some of a few exceptions represent the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which acknowledged that there is a possibility that even a small amount of radiation from the fallout in the atmosphere might increase the incidence of cancer and genetic damages.<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, a presidential candidate A. E. Stevenson declared that testing of nuclear weapons threatened the biological future of the species.<sup>130</sup>

### 3. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Discourse, 1954-61

The development of thermonuclear weapons substantially altered both the perception of nuclear threats and the development of nuclear discourse. Also the 1954 thermonuclear test incident significantly influenced the nuclear disarmament discourse and shaped the threat of nuclear testing into a dominant issue within the public nuclear discourse.

The development of thermonuclear weapons compelled the U.S. government to pursue rhetoric of nuclear disarmament. Eisenhower made an extraordinary speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations where he pledged for cooperation and peaceful use of nuclear power. First he warned that in the atomic age, nothing can *guarantee absolute safety*, and the *quest for peace* is the only *sane* solution because there is *no victory in such desolation*. He then declared that the U.S. would seek to achieve *more than a mere reduction or elimination* of nuclear weapons, however such nuclear disarmament was only an imaginary goal. To achieve this end, the U.S. and the USSR must first proceed to build mutual confidence by signing by a series of mutual nuclear non-proliferation treaties.<sup>131</sup> Eisenhower framed the need to cooperate with the USSR. He stressed the need for nuclear disarmament and to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. It was suggested that disarmament was

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<sup>128</sup> PAULING, Linus. *Teller vs. Pauling* [television clip]. Produced by KQED-TV, San Francisco, California, 1958. Transcript available online at <http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/peace/video/1958v.3-mutationrate.html>.

<sup>129</sup> DIVINE, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 124.

<sup>130</sup> LINDEE, Susan M. *Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 218.

<sup>131</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online\\_documents/atoms\\_for\\_peace/Binder13.pdf](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf). This speech is examined within this researched period because of it is consistent with the rest of the discursive analysis in this chapter.

as only *sane* approach. It is significant that he also mentioned that the U.S. “never have, and we never will, propose or suggest that the USSR surrender what is rightfully theirs.”<sup>132</sup> This suggests that states nevertheless have right to possess nuclear weapons and no one could take it from them, thus contradicting with goal of nuclear disarmament.

However, it is disputable whether this disarmament proposal was genuine or whether it was only a propaganda statement. Several sources suggest that such speech was made with the primary purpose of gaining strategic political advantage over the Soviets and as a reaction to Soviet disarmament proposals.<sup>133</sup> Nuclear disarmament was being otherwise openly labeled as possible, but under existing circumstances of mutual distrust and suspicion, highly improbable.<sup>134</sup> In addition, many U.S. governmental officials doubted whether the control or abolition of nuclear weapons really was desirable.<sup>135</sup> Thus, Eisenhower's speech could be perceived as a mere rhetorical race to win the public opinion. Nevertheless, it can still be perceived as a significant sign that according to the government, nuclear disarmament was feasible.

Eisenhower continued with his disarmament rhetoric. He even expressed his desire to abolish thermonuclear weapons for the sake of world population. He insisted that the thermonuclear war could not be won.<sup>136</sup> The main reason behind this was that thermonuclear weapons could easily destroy the civilization. Eisenhower was sure that there would be no winners in the case of thermonuclear war: “The destruction might be such that we might have ultimately to go back to bows and arrows.”<sup>137</sup> Destruction of the enemy now meant the annihilation of the U.S. Till then, they asked how much damage it would cause, with thermonuclear weapons they started asking reversed questions: who will survive and what will be left on both sides. Later, the development of ICBMs only strengthened the perception of imminent and inevitable destruction which might be over within thirty minutes. Such

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<sup>132</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953, p.5. Available online at [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online\\_documents/atoms\\_for\\_peace/Binder13.pdf](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf).

<sup>133</sup> MEDHURST, Martin J. Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” Speech: A Case Study the Strategic Use of Language. In: MEDHURST, Martin J., et al, eds. *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997, p.30.

<sup>134</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p. 10.

<sup>135</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 55.

<sup>136</sup> ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. ‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.107.

<sup>137</sup> CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 45.

concerns further implied the need to nuclear abolition as essential. Furthermore, the reference to bows and arrows could be perceived as an analogy to popular narrative of caves and rocks which was often used by anti-nuclear activists since 1945.

Since nuclear weapons were labeled as a threat to the whole civilization, anti-nuclear activists shifted the debate toward vigorous promotion of the idea of nuclear disarmament.<sup>138,139</sup> The main theme of debate was that nuclear arsenals comprise of so many weapons that they could put an end to all life on earth and there was no defense against such annihilation. L. Pauling often stressed that nuclear arms race would lead only to world catastrophe.<sup>140</sup> Many anti-nuclear movement representatives focused on raising awareness on the implications of nuclear and more importantly thermonuclear war. Article titles such as “How to End a World: The Truth about the Bomb” meant to increase anxiety among the American population about nuclear weapons.<sup>141</sup> Anti-nuclear activist started to appeal to the public with their message that nuclear holocaust is closer than one could have thought. Such concerns were even heightened by a threat over a possibility that nuclear war might occur as an accident and misjudgment of situation of decision makers. Such misjudgment became even a significant part of a much quoted novel *Red Alert*.<sup>142</sup>

In the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, scientific community made a powerful appeal to all human beings that it is imperative that all people should renounce war and abolish thermonuclear weapons. The primary question was declared to be: “Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?”<sup>143</sup> This manifest was significant from several perspectives. First, they appealed to all human being without making any distinction in nationality. All were affected the same. Secondly, the emphasis was put on a renouncement of war in general, not nuclear war per se. The war was stated to be the primary inhumane problem which endangers all humans.

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<sup>138</sup> MEDHURST, Martin J. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” Speech: A Case Study the Strategic Use of Language. In: MEDHURST, Martin J., et al, eds. *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997, p.44.

<sup>139</sup> MOLLIN, Marian. *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, p.77.

<sup>140</sup> PAULING, Linus. *No More War!*, New York: Dodd, Mead Company, 1983. p. 202.

<sup>141</sup> JUNDT, Thomas. *Greening the Red, White, and Blue: The Bomb, Big Business, and Consumer Resistance in Postwar America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 74.

<sup>142</sup> GEORGE, Peter B. (pseudonym BRYANT Peter). *Red Alert: A novel of the first two hours of world war III*, New York: Ace Books, 1958, p.119.

<sup>143</sup> EINSTEIN, Albert and RUSSELL, Bertrand. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto [online], London, July 9, 1955. accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/peace/papers/peace6.007.5.html>.

The general fear of nuclear testing resulted in popular demands for a *moratorium on nuclear testing* as a first step toward nuclear disarmament.<sup>144</sup> Eisenhower himself framed the possibility of the ban on nuclear testing as desirable first step toward more comprehensive agreements with the USSR.<sup>145</sup> One of the most influential figures which shaped nuclear disarmament discourse internationally and influenced the campaign to ban nuclear testing was Albert Schweitzer. He considered international nuclear disarmament agreement to be a necessity. Schweitzer urged to stop nuclear tests as soon as possible due to great dangers of *radioactive poisoning* of both the air and the earth. He stated that a stop of nuclear testing was essential mainly because otherwise there will be a threat of a *continuous destruction* with no winners: “In an atomic war there would be neither conqueror nor vanquished.”<sup>146</sup> He warned that such nuclear war would be suicidal and this continual poisoning must be stopped

By the late 1950s, majority of anti-nuclear actors demanded a ban on testing. Nuclear tests were labeled as a huge health risk to current and future generations and as a threat to whole mankind. In order to gain public support to their cause, the anti-nuclear movement continuously stated that nuclear testing threatened everyone: “Mankind is imperiled by the tests. Mankind insists that they stop, and has every right to do so.”<sup>147,148</sup> Nuclear testing issue was being widely perceived as the threat to individuals and increasingly also to the environment.<sup>149</sup> The SANE as the key anti-nuclear group often called for suspension of testing on the basis of humanity's right to breath unpoisoned air.<sup>150</sup> The testing was also labeled as an experiment which could only turn water into radioactive *witch's brew*.<sup>151</sup> They

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<sup>144</sup> CORTRIGHT, David. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.135-6.

<sup>145</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, June 19, 1957. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10818>.

<sup>146</sup> SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p. 27.

<sup>147</sup> SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p.19.

<sup>148</sup> SCHWEITZER, Albert. A Declaration of Conscience [radio broadcast]. Oslo, April 24, 1957 [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at: <http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/albert-schweitzer-institute/programs-and-conferences/declaration-of-conscience-fifty-years-later/a-declaration-of-conscience/>.

<sup>149</sup> RICHARDSON, Erin L. *SANE and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Shape U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2009, a Master thesis, The Department of History, Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, p.28 [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at [https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send\\_file?accession=ohiou1257556741&disposition=inline](https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ohiou1257556741&disposition=inline).

<sup>150</sup> THE COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY. 'We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed...': A Statement for Americans in a Nuclear Age, *The Cornell Daily Sun*, 17 March 1958, vol. LXXIV, no. 102, p. 10.

<sup>151</sup> SMITH, Linell. Representing victims of atomic testing has brought attorney to a 'Crossroads' Starting from ground zero, *The Baltimore Sun*, June 12, 1994 [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at [http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-06-12/features/1994163161\\_1\\_bikini-atoll-tests-at-bikini-operation-crossroads](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-06-12/features/1994163161_1_bikini-atoll-tests-at-bikini-operation-crossroads).



created a narrative of imminent environmental catastrophe poisoning the U.S. homeland. Such framing put significant pressure to the government to immediately suspend testing. This pressure together with a race with the USSR for a better public image led the U.S. government to declare unilateral suspension of testing.

By the early 1960s, Kennedy often expressed his opposition to nuclear testing and its resumption and even promised that he will make significant effort to secure international ban on nuclear testing. He added that only when all negotiations fail the nuclear testing should be resumed.<sup>152</sup> As the President, he even protested against Soviet decision to resume testing in 1961. He stated that atmospheric testing should be banned for the purpose of protecting mankind from hazards of nuclear fallout.<sup>153</sup> Kennedy also repeatedly urged to halt the continuous contamination of the air.<sup>154</sup> Kennedy administration considered the threat of nuclear testing mainly in the context of the contamination of the environment and health hazards posed to all people. This approach very differed from previous administration which often stated that nuclear testing was harmless.

Despite these significant securitizing moves which emphasized the threat of nuclear testing, the governmental pressure on Kennedy to resume testing was stronger. Several politicians warned that suspension of nuclear testing was damaging the U.S. security and negatively impacting their nuclear development program. In the end, Kennedy decided in 1961 under significant political pressure to resume underground and later also atmospheric nuclear testing despite his rhetoric that often stressed threats of nuclear testing<sup>155</sup> Consequently, this decision gave the U.S. also an opportunity to proceed with neutron bomb development.

Even though the ban was commonly considered as being both advantageous and technically feasible, these efforts resulted only in one year moratorium which did not make much difference.<sup>156,157</sup> Despite limited impact of a one year moratorium, it represented a

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<sup>152</sup> KENNEDY, John F. A Letter by Senator John F. Kennedy to Thomas E. Murray, October 9, 1960, accessed 18.10.2014. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25739>.

<sup>153</sup> Joint Statement With Prime Minister Macmillan Proposing a Three-Power Agreement To End Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Parties: the U.S. and the U.K. Released on September 3, 1961 at Hyannis. Available online at [http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk345\\_61.html](http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk345_61.html).

<sup>154</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address at U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961, Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx>.

<sup>155</sup> SCHEELE, Henry Z. The Kennedy Era: A Retrospective View of the Opposition Party, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1987. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, p.59.

<sup>156</sup> GREENE, Benjamin P. *Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-ban Debate, 1945-1963*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 6.

powerful symbolical gesture of the U.S. willingness to disarm. From this point of view, the moratorium on nuclear testing could be perceived as the first step toward disarmament and as a huge success of the anti-nuclear agenda. Such disarmament efforts were later followed by first non-proliferation agreements such as Antarctic Treaty.<sup>158</sup>

In this researched period we also witness the emergence of a peace symbol which was originally designed as a symbol of nuclear disarmament in the campaign in the United Kingdom in 1958.<sup>159</sup> This popular sign was later internationally used and understood as a powerful symbol of nuclear disarmament and peace. Shortly after its emergence, this symbol significantly boosted the impact of the U.S. nuclear disarmament agenda.

The discourse contained diverse views on thermonuclear weapons. For some its existence was a continual reminder of the imminent and inevitable annihilation.<sup>160</sup> For others, it was a security guarantee that such destruction would never occur and the idea of totally disarmed world was senseless.<sup>161.162</sup> Nuclear strategist H. Kahn has gone even further when he suggested that not only would thermonuclear war not end in mutual suicide, but the attacked country would only be affected economically. Thus maximum deterrence was labeled as essential.<sup>163</sup> To develop this debate even further, he presented the idea of a hypothetical Domsday Machine, which could destroy all human life, while being triggered automatically if certain amount of nuclear weapons exploded over the U.S. This threat of total retaliatory annihilation which would not be under human control or final decision represents the ultimate nuclear deterrent.<sup>164</sup> Such threat of a doomsday machine as a tool of total annihilation soon became important part of the discourse and a further evidence of the need for nuclear disarmament.

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<sup>157</sup> EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Statement by the President on the Expiration of the Voluntary Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing, December 29, 1959. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11654>.

<sup>158</sup> The Antarctic Treaty. Washington, October 15, 1959.

<sup>159</sup> Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. *The CND symbol* [online], accessed 10.7.2015. Available at <http://www.cnduk.org/about/item/435-the-cnd-symbol>.

<sup>160</sup> BRODIE, Bernard and BRODIE, Fawn M. *From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The evolution of the weapons and tactics of warfare*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973 (revised edition, first published in 1962), p.266.

<sup>161</sup> HART, Liddell. *Deterrent Or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, pp. 23-24, 62-63.

<sup>162</sup> SNYDER, Glenn. *Deterrence and defense: Towards a Theory of National Security*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 226.

<sup>163</sup> KAHN, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, pp. 5, 10-21.

<sup>164</sup> KAHN, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, pp. 145-148.

### **3. 3. Summary and Key Acts of Securitization**

The key securitized threat within this researched period remained to be the threat of the nuclear war with the USSR, mainly a threat of Soviet surprise nuclear attack. Also anti-nuclear activists started emphasizing that the U.S. was very much threatened by possible surprise attack by the USSR. Eisenhower was forced to securitize the threat of the thermonuclear war as something which must never happen. The image of a powerful Soviet nuclear and later thermonuclear armament was considered to be an existential security threat. The U.S. population also regarded this threat as existential which enabled the U.S. government to start nuclear arms race. Nuclear superiority was seen as a measure which should have limited the Soviet existential threat. The U.S. government as a security maximizer chose nuclear weapons buildup instead of pursuing the course of international control of nuclear power and non-proliferation.

Furthermore, the threat of Soviet thermonuclear weapons which might have attacked the U.S. also functioned as a justification of the policy of massive retaliation. This policy was seen as an extraordinary measure which should have eliminated the Soviet threat and ensure that nuclear weapons would never be used. Eisenhower administration increasingly securitized nuclear weapons as something which must never be used due to the threat of escalation. Such risk of escalation was framed in the thermonuclear age as unacceptable. Thus Eisenhower became a strong proponent of the idea of the nuclear disarmament.

The 1954 thermonuclear test widely impacted the whole nuclear disarmament discourse and significantly shaped the perception of the threat of nuclear testing in general. After the incident, the threat of the nuclear testing got into the center of the nuclear discourse. People started calling for a stop of the nuclear testing on the basis of dangers such as the radioactive poisoning which threatened future generations and especially children. Baby teeth surveys and milk sampling were the key issues used as a proof of the nuclear testing poisoning and threatening all Americans. Since 1954 thermonuclear test incident, the anti-nuclear movement was particularly powerful and successful in formulating threats and pressuring the government to address them. Due to a significant public opposition to the nuclear testing, the government was forced to recognize the threat of nuclear testing and later also proclaim the nuclear testing moratorium. Even though nuclear tests were resumed after one year, it was a significant example of the U.S. government being forced to recognize the nuclear testing as an existential threat.

## 4. Nuclear Arms Control and Détente, 1962-1981

“Total war ... makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.”<sup>165</sup>

This examined period begins in 1962 when the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred and ends in 1981.<sup>166</sup> The nuclear discourse was influenced primarily by the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Internationally significant was when China performed its first nuclear test in 1964. In 1968 France tested its first hydrogen weapon. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974.

### 4. 1. Construction of Nuclear Threats, 1962-1981

#### 4. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War

The threat of the nuclear war continued to be labeled as the most urgent threat. Nuclear war remained to be perceived as a primary existential threat to the world and the U.S. throughout most of 1960s and 1970s.

Kennedy stated that the nuclear war was a distinct possibility if nuclear weapons were handled carelessly. He declared that he will not be “the President of a nation perishing under the mushroom cloud of nuclear holocaust.”<sup>167</sup> Such promise represented a notable rhetorical

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<sup>165</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

<sup>166</sup> The fourth examined period overlaps with the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. The president John F. Kennedy was in office from January 20, 1961 to November 22, 1963. Lyndon B Johnson took office in November 22, 1963 and left in January 20, 1969. Richard Nixon was the U.S. President from January 20, 1969 to August 9, 1974. The President Gerald Ford took office on August 9, 1974 and left it on January 20, 1977. The Presidency of Jimmy Carter lasted from January 20, 1977 to January 20, 1981. The Presidency of Ronald Reagan lasted from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1989.

<sup>167</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Excerpts of Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, American Legion Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, October 18, 1960. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74095>. We include this quote from 1960 together with several other quotes from 1961 in this chapter for the purpose to coherently examine rhetorical actions of the President Kennedy.

action since Kennedy openly admitted that the U.S. might really be destroyed by the symbolic mushroom cloud after all. He also often remarked that he believed that nuclear war was no longer rational since it could mean the end of mankind.<sup>168</sup> For Kennedy, the nuclear war was both unacceptable and unwinnable. Moreover, he believed that the use of any kind of nuclear weapons would mean great risk of nuclear escalation into general nuclear war.<sup>169</sup> Kennedy performed a securitizing move while focusing on horrors of nuclear war. He stated that it would be preferable to be among the dead than among the ones who survived.<sup>170</sup> In order to improve chances of survivability he announced the civil defense system and a shelter program.<sup>171</sup> Thus shelters were directly linked to the image of survivability of nuclear war.

The key moment of the construction of the nuclear threat in this period was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even before the crisis, Kennedy repeatedly warned that the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba would cause the gravest unease and the U.S. would prevent it by whatever means will be necessary.<sup>172,173</sup> The possibility that the USSR might be placing nuclear missiles in Cuba was often labeled as an existential threat even before the crisis erupted. Kennedy was horrified by prospects of the installment of these missiles in Cuba.

A demand for withdrawal of Soviet missiles through public channels was preferred over more forceful or more covert measures. When Kennedy first publicly announced that the USSR was covertly placing nuclear missiles in Cuba, he put an emphasis on the supposed purpose of this action. He stressed that the aim of such nuclear buildup was to provide a nuclear strike capability against the *Western Hemisphere*. He added that the U.S. was prepared for a full retaliatory response and that they would not risk the costs of nuclear war nor would they shrink from that.<sup>174</sup> Even though the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba

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<sup>168</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address at U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx>. See also SCHLESINGER, Arthur M. Jr. Interview with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, City University of New York, April 1986. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, p.2

<sup>169</sup> STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, p.202.

<sup>170</sup> NASH, Philip. Bear any burden? John F. Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.125.

<sup>171</sup> KENNEDY, John F. The Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961. Available online at <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/kennedy/berlincrisis.html>.

<sup>172</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Statement by President John F. Kennedy on Cuba, September 4, 1962. Available online at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/jfkstate.htm>.

<sup>173</sup> KENNEDY, John F. The President's News Conference, September 13, 1962. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8867>.

<sup>174</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/sUVMCh-sB0moLfrBcaHaSg.aspx>.

represented a threat primarily to the U.S., they were being securitized as the existential threat to the whole anti-soviet bloc.

Nuclear scare was at its peak since an accidental or intentional launch of Soviet missiles against the U.S. was being regarded as very possible.<sup>175</sup> The gravity of the situation was also captioned in the demand to the USSR to openly acknowledge they were placing missiles in Cuba. A. Stevenson famously proclaimed: “I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over.”<sup>176</sup> Governmental rhetorical actions often insinuated that this crisis endangered the whole world. The government was performing a securitizing move where they often indicated that the end of the world might be a near possibility because once military force were to be used, there would be no turning back. In order to prevent such *final failure* from happening, Kennedy persistently rejected military solutions and chose to demand a withdrawal of missiles together with blockade.<sup>177</sup> These securitizing moves regarding the crisis as an existential threat were aimed to deter Soviets and also to justify potential necessary measures which might have been employed against the USSR if needed.

The image of a mushroom cloud scared Americans more than ever before. Panic erupted shortly after the Kennedy’s first announcement was aired. Majority of Americans accepted the threat of nuclear war and started preparing for nuclear catastrophe. Many Americans began fiercely building private nuclear shelters.<sup>178</sup> The anti-nuclear movement together with the general public feared that by forcing the USSR into withdrawal of the missiles, the U.S. moved closer into the nuclear escalation and the end of civilization. This was followed by proclamations indicating that Kennedy’s actions might have *signified the beginning of the nuclear holocaust* and that Kennedy was *gambling* hundreds of millions of lives. However, majority of newspapers supported firmly his decision to stand against the Soviets.<sup>179</sup> Even more, for some Americans, the risk of nuclear war was acceptable as long as it was part of the struggle against the *communist evil*. Slogans such as “Better Dead Than Red” were, in fact, quite common.<sup>180</sup> This signified that people overwhelmingly accepted the governmental securitization of Soviet missiles in Cuba as being the existential threat to the

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<sup>175</sup> STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 56.

<sup>176</sup> STEVENSON, Adlai. Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to U.N. Security Council, October 25, 1962. Available online at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/adlai.htm>.

<sup>177</sup> STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, p.59.

<sup>178</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 259.

<sup>179</sup> GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. xv., 93.

<sup>180</sup> GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, pp. 22-25.

U.S. and the world. People also widely accepted any measures against this threat as tolerable which marks this securitization as successful.

However, the crisis also forced Americans to reassess the real efficiency of civil defense measures and to admit that there could be little defense against nuclear war. The prevalent belief was that nuclear attack was not survivable and shelter program was a cruel deception on public. Usual rhetoric even suggested that those who would survive would envy the dead and there was little point in civil defense measures. Many Americans even agreed with the image that nuclear shelter represents “a coffin, a grave prepared in advance.”<sup>181</sup> Nuclear civil defense measures were framed as ineffective if real nuclear danger occurred.

Such heightened nuclear scare faded away shortly after the crisis ended. Nuclear war was no longer regarded to be the main nuclear threat. This rapid change of the discourse was labeled as “a conspiracy of silence about the threat of nuclear holocaust.”<sup>182</sup> It was being explained that many people refused to deal with the enduring threat of nuclear weapons and turned their attention to the problem of the Vietnam War.<sup>183</sup> Even though the threat of the nuclear war effectively vanished from the public discourse, the government still used it in their rhetoric. President Johnson often used the image of nuclear war to gain political advantage.<sup>184,185</sup> Johnson once remarked: “We intend to bury no one, and we do not intend to be buried.”<sup>186</sup> Such rhetorical actions were meant to keep the threat of nuclear war alive. It also meant to acknowledge continuation of the deterrence policy of *assured-destruction capability* which focused on ability to retaliate after a surprise attack.<sup>187</sup> This policy coined as mutually assured destruction (MAD) was based on the premise that that first strike by Soviets would result in massive U.S. retaliation.

By the late 1960s, the threat of nuclear war was believed to be significantly lessened since the U.S. and the USSR embarked on the course of future peaceful coexistence. There was a shared feeling of a necessity for mutual toleration and disengagement in international

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<sup>181</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 257.

<sup>182</sup> BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 825, 826-836.

<sup>183</sup> WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 259.

<sup>184</sup> *Peace, Little Girl* (Daisy Spot) [Presidential Campaign television spot]. Created by SCHWARTZ Tony, BERNBACH Doyle Dane, USA: Democratic National Committee, 1964, [online], accessed 18.10.2014. Available at: <http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/audio/video.html>. See also DALLEK, Robert. *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 183-4.

<sup>185</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Speech on Vietnam, September 29, 1967. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-4041>.

<sup>186</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787>.

<sup>187</sup> MCNAMARA, Robert, Mutual Deterrence Speech, San Francisco, September 18, 1967. Available online at <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml>.

issues.<sup>188</sup> In order not to be dragged into conflicts, Nixon presented an assurance policy of nuclear *shield* for their allies.<sup>189</sup> Nixon made an attempt to ensure that other nuclear nations would avoid making nuclear or other threats where the U.S. might have its interests. It could be perceived as an attempt to lessen the probability of nuclear war escalation. The trend of lessening the likelihood of nuclear war took also form of bilateral nuclear war prevention agreements which meant to decrease the possibility of accidental nuclear launches.<sup>190</sup> Overall trend to lessen the likelihood of the nuclear war took also a form of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system which meant to protect the U.S. deterrent against possible Chinese or Soviet attack.<sup>191</sup> The key purpose of this ABM system was to secure the U.S. deterrent, not civilians per se. However, despite the aim to lessen the probability of the nuclear war, the ABM induced more instability as Soviets perceived it as a system reducing their first strike potential.

By the mid- to late 1970s, there was an anxiety about the proclaimed Soviet intentions to win the nuclear war. This unease led the U.S. to adopt more credible and aggressive deterrent policy calling for flexible nuclear forces, escalation control, and responsive nuclear pre-planning attacking industrial and urban areas.<sup>192,193</sup> The main purpose of this strategy was to warn Soviets that they could not win the nuclear war and if they had attempted, they could bring utter destruction upon themselves. That the main purpose of the U.S. counterattack “would not be just to kill Soviets but to prevent military victory.”<sup>194</sup> The aim was to deny an enemy the right to win a thermonuclear war.

By the mid-1970s, the anti-nuclear activism again reemerged within the nuclear discourse with the agenda of nuclear weapons endangering the survival of mankind. Nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race in particular were stated to represent an existential threat to the whole human race and all life on earth: “[T]he nuclear peril threatens life, above all, not at

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<sup>188</sup> NIXON, Richard. Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen, July 25, 1969. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>.

<sup>189</sup> NIXON, Richard. Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>.

<sup>190</sup> Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR. Parties: the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Washington, signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971. See also Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Parties: the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Washington, signed and entered into force on June 22, 1973.

<sup>191</sup> NIXON, Richard. The President's News Conference, March 14, 1969. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1951>.

<sup>192</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. Presidential Directive NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons Employment policy, Washington, July 25, 1980, p. 1-2. Available online at <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf>.

<sup>193</sup> BROWN, Harold. A Countervailing View: No, we did not think we could win a nuclear war, *Foreign Policy*, September 24, 2012. Available online at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/a\\_countervailing\\_view](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/a_countervailing_view).

<sup>194</sup> GETTLER, Michael. Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War, *The Washington Post*, August 6, 1980, p. A10.



the level of individuals, who already live under the sway of death, but at the level of everything that individuals hold in common. Death cuts off life; extinction cuts off birth.”<sup>195</sup> Nuclear race was often depicted as an inevitable path leading nuclear war and to *extinction*.

#### 4. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a key moment which brought a high probability of the use of nuclear weapons and a threat of the nuclear war into the spotlight. The crisis is largely covered in previous subchapter since it was constructed primarily as a threat of nuclear war endangering the whole world. In addition, the use of nuclear weapons was constructed as a threat also in the context of nuclear deterrence and nuclear surprise attack against the U.S.

Kennedy declared that the U.S. would never launch a nuclear attack as first. He also often stated that the primary purpose of their nuclear arms was to make sure they will never be used.<sup>196</sup> Thus, their only purpose was to deter and convince potential aggressors that any attack would be futile and retaliation devastating. Kennedy administration approached the threat of nuclear attack against the U.S. also by developing flexible response policy as a more credible deterrent. This strategy was based equally on nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Kennedy also acknowledged that U.S. was willing to ensure safety of its allies by force because it was the way of securing their own vital interests.<sup>197</sup> Kennedy strived to create more credible deterrent in order to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again.

The use of nuclear weapons was regarded as essentially impossible due to negative public reaction which would follow.<sup>198</sup> This prompted the Nixon administration to utilize nuclear weapons primarily as a strong diplomacy tool. Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, believed that weapons do not cause wars and they might even make the nuclear war less likely. As such, they could very much be used for diplomatic purposes and threats of the use of nuclear weapons could bring substantial political benefits. For this purpose, he

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<sup>195</sup> SCHELL, Jonathan. *The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 117.

<sup>196</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>. See also KENNEDY, John F. Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget, March 28, 1961. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8554>. See also KENNEDY, John F. Excerpts of Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, American Legion Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, October 18, 1960. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74095>.

<sup>197</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

<sup>198</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 111.

advocated flexible, creative maneuvers to create a strategy of aggressive nuclear posturing.<sup>199</sup> Nixon strived to create more plausible nuclear deterrent policy reliant on flexible nuclear options. The premise was that *the safest course* of action was to use nuclear weapons *recklessly*.<sup>200</sup> Nuclear weapons were handled carelessly on purpose in order to utilize their diplomacy potential. However, despite the notion that the use of nuclear weapons would be politically impossible and thus nuclear weapons must be used at least as political tools, Nixon's rhetoric suggested that such use was never really off the table.<sup>201</sup>

The new Schlesinger doctrine was thus based on deterrence, control of escalation, and *a wide range of limited nuclear employment options*. Such nuclear pre-planning was directed primarily against economic and military resources essential for the enemy's post-war recovery and against political leadership and military command structure.<sup>202</sup> This capacity for limited nuclear war suggests more flexible nuclear policy with the main purpose to be able to control potential escalation and duration of violence.<sup>203</sup> This substantially enhanced the U.S. nuclear deterrence capability. In order to enhance credibility of their deterrence even further, the U.S. also considered the development of the neutron bomb with enhanced radiation.<sup>204</sup> It was believed that it would not cause escalation of nuclear war and nuclear annihilation because it would facilitate a possibility of a limited nuclear war.<sup>205</sup> By the late 1970s, the use of nuclear weapons was brought into the debate again when President Carter declared not to use them against non-nuclear states which signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>206,207</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> SURI, Jeremi. Henry Kissinger and American Grand Strategy. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 79.

<sup>200</sup> GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 127.

<sup>201</sup> SCHEER, Robert. *Playing President: My Close Encounters with Nixon, Carter, Bush I, Reagan, and Clinton – and How They Did Not Prepare Me for George W. Bush*, New York: Akashic books, 2006, p. 26.

<sup>202</sup> OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, April 3, 1974.

<sup>203</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE, National Security Council. National Security Decision Memorandum 242, Washington. January 17, 1974.

<sup>204</sup> PAUL. T. V. *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 78-79.

<sup>205</sup> AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, p. 53. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

<sup>206</sup> CARTER, Jimmy. Jimmy Carter on Morality and Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, January 2010, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, [online], accessed 24.10.2014. Available at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/jimmy-carter-on-morality-and-nuclear-weapons/>.

<sup>207</sup> PAUL. T. V. *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 79. See also GAILLARD, Frye. *Prophet From Plains: Jimmy Carter and His Legacy*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007, p. 18.

### 4. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

By the early 1960s, the horizontal nuclear proliferation was being gradually regarded as an unacceptable threat which led to signing of the NPT Treaty. After the NPT was signed, the threat of vertical nuclear proliferation started dominating the discourse. Spiraling vertical nuclear proliferation was often considered as inevitable mainly due to the continual Cold War division which did not allow significant alterations.

U.S. governments were often contemplating three possible strategies of how to prevent nuclear attack against the U.S. These were counterattack, civil defense, and missile defense. But none of these were considered to be a sufficient guarantee of the U.S. safety since it was stated to be always easier to build offensive nuclear weapons than to establish an effective defense system.<sup>208</sup> Thus vertical proliferation was often regarded as the best guarantee of the U.S. safety. Building overwhelming numbers of offensive nuclear weapons was sometimes also regarded as the only strategy needed since there was then no need for defensive forces.

Nuclear buildup was often perceived as the best security guarantee. Kennedy depicted the nuclear buildup in a quote which stated: “For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”<sup>209</sup> He perceived nuclear buildup as a measure which guarded them against the Soviet nuclear attack. Kennedy strongly believed that only the nuclear superiority would ensure their survival. Thus he continued to promote additional nuclear buildup. He justified this additional spending by emphasizing a threat posed by missile gap between the U.S. and the USSR. He often stressed the USSR might have been even winning the nuclear arms race and thus, it was stated as absolutely essential to correct the imbalance.<sup>210,211</sup> Kennedy made a powerful securitizing move when he stressed the threat of Soviet massive nuclear armament which might have been bigger than the U.S. nuclear armament. This move functioned as justification for additional defense spending. This additional unnecessary nuclear arms race greatly contributed to the situation of a *nuclear overkill*. Later, the Johnson administration started addressing a possibility of building an anti-ballistic missile defense against possible Chinese nuclear

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<sup>208</sup> SCOBILIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 145.

<sup>209</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntF17SVAjA.aspx>.

<sup>210</sup> KENNEDY, John F. State of the Union Address, January 30, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-006.aspx>.

<sup>211</sup> PATERSON, Thomas G. John F. Kennedy and the World, *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 1987. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, pp. 134-135. See also GIGLIO, James N. and RABE, Stephen G. *Debating the Kennedy Presidency, Debating 20<sup>th</sup> century America*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p.18.

attack.<sup>212</sup> However, the rhetoric implied that the main aim was to force Soviets into negotiations over limits of the nuclear arms race. Johnson wanted to halt the nuclear arms race which was labeled as provocative, wasteful, and not really enhancing security of the U.S.<sup>213,214</sup> However, his actions suggests that such proclamations were made primarily to limit spending, not to limit nuclear arms race.

Although Kennedy often advocated vertical nuclear proliferation because gains overweighed given insecurities, he and other U.S. officials often framed horizontal nuclear proliferation as the gravest threat of their time.<sup>215, 216,217</sup> Kennedy declared that the greatest threat would be “to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be ... no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament.”<sup>218</sup> More nuclear states created more insecurity and a higher chance of accidental nuclear war. Kennedy and also Johnson regarded the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries as the existential threat to the U.S. and as the matter of highest national urgency. There was an assumption that, in order to maintain international stability, nuclear states must prevent further nuclear proliferation to other non-nuclear states. Their securitizing moves and the widespread concern over the spread of nuclear weapons eventually led to signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Throughout most of the 1960s, nuclear proliferation to other countries was framed by the government as a primary threat to the U.S. This concern led to signing of *The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which represents a watershed in the nuclear discourse. The NPT was created primarily to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and, thus, to avert the danger of nuclear war. The treaty dealt primarily with nonproliferation of other states, not with nonproliferation to

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<sup>212</sup> SLAYTON, Rebecca, *Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012*, Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2013, p. 97.

<sup>213</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787>.

<sup>214</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 10, 1967. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28338>.

<sup>215</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC714C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

<sup>216</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Action Memorandum 294: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France, Washington, April 20, 1964. Available online at

<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam294.asp>. See also THE WHITE HOUSE.

National Security Action Memorandum No. 320: Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, Washington, November 25, 1964. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam320.asp>

<sup>217</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, June 19, 1967. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28308>.

<sup>218</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

the extent of existent armaments to stop nuclear arms race. The treaty declared to reach complete nuclear disarmament as a future goal, but it did not place any restraints on any nuclear state and their nuclear armaments.<sup>219</sup> The NPT prioritized the need to stop horizontal proliferation as a more acute threat and as a more achievable goal. Despite such apparent double standards considering unrestrained vertical proliferation, the U.S. government mostly labeled the NPT to be a major non-proliferation achievement that significantly reduced the danger of nuclear war among nations.<sup>220</sup> This narrative that overall danger of nuclear war was significantly reduced was based on an assumption that new proliferators represented higher threat than current nuclear armaments. Anti-nuclear activists regarded the NPT as a measure which safeguarded the U.S. homeland against other proliferators. However, since the anti-nuclear movement was largely in decline since 1963, they were not overly active within the NPT debate either.<sup>221</sup> The threat of nuclear proliferation maintained its position mainly within governmental nuclear discourse rather than non-governmental.

In the early 1970, the U.S. government lost its interest in non-proliferation efforts. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger was willing to sacrifice their political interest in order to halt nuclear proliferation. In addition, they regarded nuclear proliferation as inevitable and potentially desirable because nuclear states would tend to act more cautiously.<sup>222</sup> Nuclear proliferation was framed as desirable because behavior of nuclear states would be more restrained. In the same spirit, they did not address nuclear buildup as overly threatening.

By the mid-1970s, anti-nuclear activists started to emphasize the threat posed by unprotected nuclear material scattered around the world which might get into hands of *terrorists* and *desperate groups*. The nuclear proliferation was regarded as particularly threatening to the U.S. This frightening picture was depicted in the quote: “[I]n a world beset by economic tensions, by vast inequities, mass deprivation and starvation ... nuclear weapons in the hands of desperate or irresponsible groups will mean nuclear weapons used.”<sup>223</sup> Since the NPT encouraged nuclear non-proliferation on a state level, the debate regarding horizontal

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<sup>219</sup> The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (The NPT). United Nations, New York, signed on July 1, 1968, entered into force on March 5, 1970. Available online at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.

<sup>220</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Remarks on Signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-4037>.

<sup>221</sup> BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 828-31.

<sup>222</sup> GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 127-8.

<sup>223</sup> FELD, Bernard T. Charade of Piecemeal arms limitation, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1975, vol. 31, no. 6, p. 9.

proliferation threats slowly shifted to emphasizing horizontal proliferation threats of *irresponsible groups* and other sub-state actors. Thus anti-nuclear groups adopted the agenda of nuclear terrorism. Due to the rise of hijacking and kidnapping by terrorists, the widespread rise of the terrorism scare led many people to fear of the possibility that terrorists might also acquire nuclear material and build a dirty bomb which could be used against the U.S. Anti-nuclear activists often noted that with nuclear materials continuing to be unprotected and being widespread throughout the world, the chance of terrorists acquiring and using such technology in their attacks would be much higher.<sup>224</sup> The anti-nuclear figures started accenting this horizontal proliferation threat, but it was not their primary concern. Majority of anti-nuclear representatives continued to focus primarily on the threat of vertical proliferation.

Carter made a strong securitizing move when he declared that the U.S. must take a resolute position to control *terrorism of all kinds* and not to proliferate nuclear material to countries involved in terrorist activities. He stressed that the spread of nuclear weapons to those states must be prevented at all costs. He specifically singled out Libya and Iraq as the biggest threat among *potentially terrorist countries*: “Ultimately, the most serious terrorist threat is if one of those radical nations, who believe in terrorism as a policy, should have atomic weapons.”<sup>225</sup> This proclamation demonstrated rising threat within the nuclear proliferation debate. He made a significant securitizing move where he connected a threat of rogue states which supported terrorism to issue of nuclear proliferation. They feared that those states and terrorists would not consider the use of nuclear weapons as completely irrational. The U.S. government also proceeded with particular agreements focusing on the protection of nuclear materials in order to avert dangers posed by stolen and used nuclear material.<sup>226</sup>

Besides that, anti-nuclear movement started protesting against the neutron bomb development. Proponents of the development of neutron bomb often called it to be *the most moral weapon ever invented*.<sup>227,228</sup> Neutron bomb was stated to be discriminatory while

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<sup>224</sup> BROWN, Harrison. The Fissioning of Human Society, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1975, vol. 35, no. 6, p.7.

<sup>225</sup> REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

<sup>226</sup> Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. United Nations, signed at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980, entered into force 1987.

<sup>227</sup> COHEN, Sam. *F\*\*\* You! Mr. President: Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb* [online], 2006 (3rd edition), p. 267-68. Available at [http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions\\_Sam\\_Cohen\\_2006\\_Third\\_Edition.pdf](http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions_Sam_Cohen_2006_Third_Edition.pdf).

<sup>228</sup> AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, pp. 8, 12-13. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

killing only people within a certain range and leaving only little material damage.<sup>229</sup> On the contrary, anti-nuclear activists labeled it as *immoral* and *inhuman* bomb. Nuclear disarmament discourse created strong pressure on government in order to halt the development. They called neutron bombs “as immoral a concept as human minds have yet devised.”<sup>230</sup> Anti-nuclear activists actively railed against the production while labeling it a *killer warhead*.<sup>231</sup> This bomb was often depicted as more deadly than ever.

#### 4. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

The threat of nuclear testing was present within the nuclear discourse strongly in the early 1960s till the Limited Test Ban treaty was signed in 1963.

Since 1954, the threat of nuclear testing remained in the center of nuclear discourse. The resumption of nuclear testing in the early 1960s was being translated as danger to all Americans.<sup>232</sup> Nuclear testing was continually constructed as an existential threat to all people. The resumption of testing also significantly revived the nuclear test ban agenda. Nuclear testing has been continually understood as threatening to all individuals, especially to children and endangering also future generations and the environment. The anti-nuclear debate still included concerns over receiving radiation from fallout through radioactive milk, vegetables, and even water.<sup>233</sup> This caused significant drop in milk consumption. Kennedy himself was concerned of a rapid drop of milk consumption. Kennedy chose to calm the public opinion by stating that milk was mistakenly regarded as contaminated food. To further support his statement that there was *no danger from present exposure*, he even theatrically drunk a glass of milk.<sup>234</sup> The U.S. government continued to claim that nuclear testing did not contaminate any food products, and that especially milk was not a health hazard.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, pp. 19, 23. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

<sup>230</sup> COHEN, Sam. *F\*\*\* You! Mr. President: Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb* [online], 2006 (3rd edition), p. 189-190. Available at [http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions\\_Sam\\_Cohen\\_2006\\_Third\\_Edition.pdf](http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions_Sam_Cohen_2006_Third_Edition.pdf).

<sup>231</sup> AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, pp. 38-40. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

<sup>232</sup> SWERDLOW, Amy. Ladies' Day at the Capitol: Women Strike for Peace versus HUAC, *Feminist Studies*, Fall 1982, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 493-94.

<sup>233</sup> WITTNER Lawrence S. Blacklisting Schweitzer, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 51, no. 3, May 1995, p. 60.

<sup>234</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Remarks to the National Conference on Milk and Nutrition, January 23, 1962. Available online from White House Audio Recordings: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-068-004.aspx>.

<sup>235</sup> KENNEDY, John F. President Kennedy's News Conference, January 24, 1962,. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-21.aspx>.

The Cuban Missile Crisis aftermath radically changed the whole nuclear threat perception. It created a momentum for a change toward an international test ban agreement. This momentum was strongly utilized by both the government and non-governmental figures. Consequently, the U.S., the USSR, and the United Kingdom signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and under water but not including underground testing.<sup>236</sup> In order for the treaty to prohibit also underground nuclear testing, there needed to be inspections included, but such proposition was not acceptable for the USSR. Despite only a partial success, Kennedy praised the Treaty as an agreement which reflected a common goal of all nations, *a victory for mankind* free from horrifying dangers of nuclear fallout. He also expressed his belief that the loss of even one life or a *malformation of even one baby* should concern whole population.<sup>237</sup> According to this statement, the nuclear testing represented a danger to all humans.

Kennedy explained that the LTBT was in their national interest so that *Americans could breathe* more easily. The Treaty was also interpreted as an effort toward improvement of the US-Soviet relations which meant preventing nuclear “holocaust of endless death and destruction.”<sup>238,239</sup> The LTBT was regarded to be a tool which helped to preserve the health of all human lives and protect the environment. It was stated to be a significant improvement for future generations which also lessened the threat of nuclear holocaust. Also many non-governmental representatives praised the LTBT as the greatest accomplishment. The LTBT was being perceived as a reasonable step, toward possible future negotiations and other agreements.<sup>240</sup> But since the LTBT prohibited atmospheric testing, it also removed the image of a mushroom cloud from the public discourse and with that also *the visible reminder of the nuclear arms race*.<sup>241</sup> Mushroom-shaped cloud as a symbol disappeared from American daily life. The effects of nuclear testing were no longer visible and therefore unimaginable which

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<sup>236</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (The LTBT). Signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, entered into force on October 10, 1963.

<sup>237</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

<sup>238</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address at the University of Maine, October 19, 1963. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9483>.

<sup>239</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787>.

<sup>240</sup> BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Doomsday Clock: Timeline [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/timeline>.

<sup>241</sup> JOHNSON, Rebecca, Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 54.



led to general lack of interest about nuclear testing. This apathy caused that the driving force to ban all types of nuclear testing vanished.

Even though the concern over nuclear testing was no longer in the center of nuclear debate after 1963, it was to some extent still present within the discourse. The *Baby Tooth Survey* showed that babies born in 1964 had about fifty times more amount of radioactive strontium-90 in their baby teeth than those babies born in late 1950s.<sup>242</sup> These radioactive materials could be found in human bodies only as an effect of nuclear testing. But, nevertheless, the biggest fear was perceived as if vanished with signing of the LTBT. The public considered the LTBT to be a satisfactory success and did not overly worry about the health and environmental dangers of underground testing.

Since mid-1960s and more importantly during 1970s, anti-nuclear activists shifted the debate toward emphasizing primarily environmental dangers of nuclear underground testing. Significant controversy sprung primarily nuclear testing in Alaska which was stated to damage fisheries, wildlife, seals, and the sea otter population. The debate calling for a halt of testing started referring more and more to negative effects such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions which testing might inflict in such unstable geological areas. Nuclear planners often downplayed such concerns and even regarded them as *acceptable* because all damage on environment would be only temporary.<sup>243</sup> When governmental offices also started considering nuclear testing in Hawaii, local people started protesting that the government chose to test nuclear weapons in a wildlife refuge where even hunting was prohibited. This sprung much opposition to these *atomic experimentations* and people even started calling that if such testing was safe, they should “set them off under the Pentagon.”<sup>244</sup> They often stressed the irony of contemplating nuclear explosion in a wildlife refuge and geologically unstable areas. Underground nuclear testing was being labeled as a crucial environmental issue. Anti-nuclear groups such as Don’t Make the Wave Committee and Greenpeace continued to call for a ban on underground nuclear testing and emphasized environmental consequences such as earthquakes, tsunamis, damaged animal populations, depletion of ozone layer, and atmospheric changes. It was also assumed that the increased occurrence of skin cancer was caused by these tests which were called to be a *risky play with the planet*.<sup>245,246,247</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> ALLEY, William M and ALLEY, Rosemarie. *Too Hot to Touch: The Problem of High-Level Nuclear Waste*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 53.

<sup>243</sup> KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 49-53.

<sup>244</sup> KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, pp. 75-78.

<sup>245</sup> KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 101.

Since nuclear testing moved to underground and disappeared from everyday life, the government officials were no longer pressured to acknowledge this as an existential threat. General nuclear apathy among the public allowed governmental agencies to continue belittling environmental damage of nuclear testing as being minimal and repairable.<sup>248</sup> Furthermore, nuclear testing continued to be regarded as absolutely essential to national security.<sup>249</sup> However, despite this rhetoric the government was pressured to sign bilateral agreements putting limits on underground testing while also expressing determination to limit the underground testing to a minimum.<sup>250</sup>

Since mid-1970s the anti-nuclear movement became more and more concerned with nuclear energy and nuclear reactor accidents which could contaminate both people and the environment.<sup>251</sup> In a result, the nuclear power issue was practically inseparable from nuclear weapons problematic. Nuclear power plants were often depicted as *silent bombs* or *nukes*. Nuclear power plant accidents only strengthened this perception.<sup>252</sup> Nuclear activists redirected their attention and rhetoric to nuclear power plants as to more tangible and visible targets for their agenda. After the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, the fear of nuclear power plants spread like wildfire and ignited massive protests and marches. It also led to a release of several reports on negative health effects and environmental dangers.

## 4. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Discourse, 1962-1981

Nuclear disarmament discourse within this period gone through several changes. The Cuban Missile Crisis built a momentum for a change. However, this change in the form of the LTBT resulted in general disengagement of nuclear disarmament movement and apathy over nuclear issues. This resulted in a very limited public debate over nuclear disarmament.

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<sup>246</sup> THE GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL. *Amchitka: the founding voyage* [online], accessed 19.10.2014. Available at <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/amchitka-hunter/>.

<sup>247</sup> GLASSTONE, Samuel and DOLAN, Philip J. *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, Washington: United States Department of Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977 (third edition, 1957 first edition), p. 78.

<sup>248</sup> KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, pp.101-103.

<sup>249</sup> THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, *Health Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Testing*, Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1964, p. 1.

<sup>250</sup> Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. Signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, entered into force on December 11, 1990. See also Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Signed at Washington on May 28, 1976, entered into force December 11, 1990.

<sup>251</sup> DAVIDON, Ann Morrisett. The U.S. Anti-nuclear Movement, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1979, vol. 40, no. 10, p.45.

<sup>252</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 121.

Nevertheless, the government embarked on a course of detente and nuclear weapons control negotiations with the USSR. Nuclear weapons got back into the public discourse after the Vietnam War ended.

The resumption of nuclear testing and general fear of nuclear war brought into the discourse new hopes for nuclear disarmament. Since the beginning of the 1960s, Kennedy often pledged to negotiate peace with the USSR. In his famous speech he titled nuclear bomb as *deadly atom* and nuclear arms race as a race to alter that uncertain *balance of terror*. Kennedy requested “that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.”<sup>253</sup> Such statement created a narrative of spiraling nuclear proliferation which lead only to *self-destruction* unless the U.S. and the USSR negotiate a nuclear control agreement. He acknowledged that nuclear proliferation both vertical and horizontal creates inherently a great security risk which must be reversed. He became a strong proponent of nuclear disarmament. Even before the Cuban Missile Crisis, he continuously framed the need to limit nuclear arms race. He even presented a nuclear disarmament proposal.<sup>254</sup>

The Cuban Missile Crisis represents a milestone in forming of the nuclear discourse. The main narrative which emerged was that during the crisis, nobody knew if they would live to see another day. Organized prayer chains for peace and overall preparations for global nuclear war created an image of desperate panic. Resulting numbness which spread among the population was then depicted in the title of the Saturday Review which stated: “The beginning of the end is adjustment to the idea of the end.”<sup>255</sup> This quote summed up the feeling of the closeness to the nuclear Armageddon.

The key narrative of the post-crisis discourse, however, became a quote reportedly made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk during the crisis. In the critical moment of the *quarantine*, when everything was at stake, it was believed that a Soviet ship near a naval blockade turned around at the last moment. Rusk then allegedly stated: “We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.”<sup>256</sup> This narration of the *eyeball to eyeball* creates a powerful analogy of the image of a staring contest or a *clash of wills* between

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<sup>253</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntF17SVAjA.aspx>.

<sup>254</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address at U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961, Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx>.

<sup>255</sup> GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. xxi.

<sup>256</sup> BLANTON, Thomas. Annals of Blinksmanship, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Summer 1997, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Available online at: [http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba\\_mis\\_cri/annals.htm](http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/annals.htm), accessed 17.7.2015.

Kennedy and Khrushchev where Khrushchev blinked and lost. Even though the reality was far from such an analogy, this narrative later served well in recalling the severity of the moment. It functioned as a reminder that in the context of nuclear weapons, the tough approach was the right one. The image of a sudden death switched to a constructed image of Americans who did not succumb to the possibility of appeasement and did not surrender to the Soviet threat.

The crisis clearly showed that nuclear weapons might bring the world at the brink of the catastrophe, but such development was not inevitable nor irreversible. The crisis confirmed that every nuclear crisis do not end in nuclear escalation and suggested that nuclear disarmament might be a distinct possibility. Kennedy significantly utilized the after-crisis momentum and began advocating nuclear arms control negotiations and general nuclear disarmament. He stated that in the nuclear age, where whole civilization would be destroyed within the first 24 hours, total war made no sense and peace was the only rational end.<sup>257</sup> Kennedy repeatedly warned that the full-scale nuclear war could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, all in less than 60 minutes. To express more clearly the potential devastation, he added that the ones who survived would envy the dead.<sup>258</sup> Kennedy continued with the rhetoric created during the crisis in order to enforce extraordinary measures in the form of nuclear weapons control agreements. These securitizing moves resulted in Limited Test Ban Treaty.

A wave of relief after the crisis created a window of opportunity for nuclear disarmament efforts. The nuclear disarmament discourse started focusing on what was framed as the most urgent nuclear threat after the Crisis which was a threat of nuclear testing. As stated earlier, resulting the LTBT was understood to be the single most important treaty. Linus Pauling, a central activist behind these efforts, was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to the process. The LTBT was labeled as a first step that will lead to the world without wars.<sup>259</sup> The LTBT raised high hopes for future nuclear disarmament agreements.

Although the anti-nuclear agenda declined after the LTBT was signed, nuclear weapons remained to be, to certain extent, still represented within the public discourse. In

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<sup>257</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

<sup>258</sup> KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

<sup>259</sup> MEAD, Clifford, and HAGER, Thomas, eds. *Linus Pauling: Scientist and Peacemaker*, Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2001, p. 209.

1964 two highly influential movies were released. The movie *Fail Safe* depicted the image of a limited nuclear attack when a loose U.S. bomber drops a bomb on Moscow. In an attempt to avert a massive Soviet retaliation on American cities, the U.S. President decided to drop a nuclear bomb on New York as an atonement, since it would be one a city which would be surely destroyed by Soviet retaliation anyway.<sup>260</sup> The movie stressed that since there would be no winners in the thermonuclear war, everyone practically loses. The movie depicted downfalls of MAD strategy and portrayed a widespread fear that nuclear holocaust could happen by miscalculation. Moreover, the movie highlighted that it would be American cities in particular which would be left to be annihilated by the nuclear attack. Such perception dealt with continual guilt over nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such feeling created a narrative that is was only a matter of time till American cities were to be destroyed too, thus emphasizing the necessity to eliminate nuclear weapons all together.

However, the most iconic depiction of the nuclear threat within this era was a satirical comedy *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*. It portrayed a mad U.S. general who by himself ordered a first strike attack which triggered the doomsday scenario.<sup>261</sup> This picture became a significant part of the nuclear discourse and the main portrayal of doomsday scenario ever since. Such popular depictions of nuclear threat had a huge impact on the public opinion and created a widespread belief that complete nuclear disarmament is more essential than ever.

President Johnson also continued to frame the need to abolish nuclear weapons. He followed the policy of Kennedy and suggested that the U.S. should resume negotiations with the USSR concerning limits on offensive and defensive missile systems. Moreover, he wanted to stop nuclear arms buildup even if negotiations with Soviets did not succeed.<sup>262</sup> As mentioned earlier, he considered nuclear arms race to be wasteful. Therefore, such proposals were made most probably with primary concern of limiting U.S. military expenses that out of a belief that nuclear weapons must be abolished completely. However, these negotiations which were inspired by the LTBT resulted in several nuclear treaties.

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<sup>260</sup> *Fail Safe* [film]. Director: Sidney LUMET, prods.: Lumet, Maguire, Youngstein, USA: Columbia Pictures, 1964.

<sup>261</sup> *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* [film]. Director and producer: KUBRICK Stanley, USA, UK: Columbia Pictures, 1964.

<sup>262</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 14, 1969. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-5667>.

In 1966, the U.S., the USSR, and the United Kingdom signed the Outer Space Treaty (OST). The OST prohibited to place nuclear weapons and its testing in outer space.<sup>263</sup> The OST represents another treaty variation to the Antarctic treaty created in order to prevent colonial competition in other areas and adopted for the purpose of establishing peaceful rules of conduct between states. This nonproliferation measure served as an instrument to prevent spiraling nuclear arms race into the area of outer space. In his remarks at the signing of the Treaty, Johnson declared that the treaty was the “step toward keeping outer space free forever from the implements of war.”<sup>264</sup> The rhetoric suggested that the mankind must prevent the outer space being contaminated by such horrible instruments of war.

The primary watershed in this examined period represents the NPT signed in 1968. As mentioned earlier, this treaty created primarily out of fear of nuclear proliferation was based on the premise of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NPT declared to reach complete nuclear disarmament as their future goal, however without placing any restraints on any nuclear state.<sup>265</sup> Such double standards, however, became very problematic in the future when nuclear disarmament efforts continued without any real disarmament results.

By the late 1960s, the debate also moved to concerns over nuclear safety of nuclear weapons which might accidentally contaminate the U.S. population and land. The 1966 accident of the U.S. B-52 bomber, which carried 4 hydrogen bombs, and caused land contamination in Spain created a significant nuclear scare over reckless nuclear safety policy. Media emphasized the environmental damage of this accident and stressed that the U.S. contaminated yet another country and even could not find missing nuclear bombs.<sup>266</sup> Media started focusing on nuclear accidents which might have contaminated the U.S. land and started pressing for more thorough security measures. In the end, the Pentagon was pressured to react and released a list of thirteen potentially disastrous nuclear accidents which occurred between 1950 and 1968.<sup>267</sup> This trend of strengthening nuclear security measures continued throughout 1970s. In 1981, the Department of Defense released another list of 32 significant

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<sup>263</sup> The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. New York, December 19, 1966.

<sup>264</sup> JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Remarks at the Signing of the Treaty on Outer Space, January 27, 1967. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/670127.asp>.

<sup>265</sup> The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (The NPT). United Nations, New York, signed on July 1, 1968, entered into force on March 5, 1970. Available online at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.

<sup>266</sup> STILES, David. A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Winter 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 49-53.

<sup>267</sup> STILES, David. A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Winter 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 49-50.

accidents involving nuclear weapons which occurred between 1950 and 1980. The document confessed that out of all these occurrences, two accidents resulted in widespread nuclear contamination of land.<sup>268</sup> This disclosure of nuclear accident details again served as a proof of reckless handling by governmental agencies of nuclear weapons.

Nixon and Kissinger did not favor the idea of nuclear disarmament or the end of nuclear arms race. They did not believe that the existence of nuclear weapons significantly altered the principles of politics among great powers.<sup>269,270</sup> Despite the fact that Nixon did not believe nuclear limitation agreements could have a substantial impact, the détente process continued to produce nuclear agreements concerning certain nuclear issues.<sup>271</sup> During 1970s, U.S. governments mostly continued to pursue nuclear limitations negotiations in order to limit nuclear arms race, to improve their public image, or for other political gains. Among the most significant nuclear limitation negotiations were The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) dealing with limits on strategic defensive systems and strategic offensive weapons. This effort resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the SALT I Agreement signed in 1972. Their purpose was to limit nuclear arms race and limit numbers of anti-ballistic missiles systems.

The ABM Treaty marked a significant turning point in the U.S. and USSR negotiations. They agreed that each may have only two ABM deployment areas and these systems cannot be deployed for a defense of its territory, but the treaty permits one to protect the capital city and another one to protect a ICMB launch site. There were also limits on the number of ABM launchers and ABM interceptor missiles, ABM radars and the treaty do not permit sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems.<sup>272</sup> The 1974 additional Protocol to the ABM Treaty later limited ABM missile sites to one, either around the capital or the ICMB deployment area.<sup>273</sup> The U.S. maintained its ABM defense of its ICBM missiles. It was in

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<sup>268</sup> DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. *Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1980*, 1981.

<sup>269</sup> PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 11, 16.

<sup>270</sup> GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 127.

<sup>271</sup> The Agreement on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. United Nations, opened for signature on February 7 1971, entered into force on 18 May 1972.

<sup>272</sup> Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972, entered into force on October 3 1972.

<sup>273</sup> Protocol To The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Signed as Moscow on July 3, 1974, entered into force on May 24, 1976.

accordance with Nixon's belief that the ABM defense cannot protect the cities and people in it. The purpose of the ABM Treaty was also to limit nuclear arms race. The logic behind this was that if retaliatory forces were protected, the country would not need to develop its offensive forces in such vast numbers. Also with unlimited numbers of ABM defense sites, the other country would tend to accelerate its nuclear arms buildup to overcome the defense systems of its adversary.

The SALT I agreement froze numbers of strategic ballistic missile launchers and permitted increase of SLBM launchers to certain level only if certain number of ICBM or SLBM launchers were destroyed simultaneously.<sup>274</sup> This treaty did not cover mobile ICBMs, and the issue of multiple nuclear warheads in a missile. The SALT I Treaty was staged to bolster the image of Nixon as a great world leader. Although the SALT I Treaty placed certain limits on nuclear arms, the U.S. continued to depend on nuclear weapons buildup. American public perceived the SALT I Treaty as a public relation trick. It was also often labeled as window dressing, or stage-managed, rather than genuine disarmament treaty.<sup>275</sup> However, the SALT I treaty was not regarded as a sufficient effort and it was being perceived worldwide as a rather *rhetorical exercise* which had little to do with arms limitation.<sup>276,277</sup> B. T. Feld criticized current negotiations as not presenting meaningful outcomes. Furthermore, he even labeled the LTBT to be a mere insult, *an arms control disaster instead of ecological blessing* due to following accelerated underground testing.<sup>278</sup> They frequently stressed the need for more substantial nuclear limitation treaties. Such need was regarded as the only way out of nuclear arms race, the only way how to save civilization.

This détente approach continued also during other administrations. In the context of the additional Vladivostok SALT II agreement, Ford remarked that in the thermonuclear age, there was no other alternative than a peaceful coexistence with the USSR.<sup>279</sup> The rhetoric of

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<sup>274</sup> Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, entered into force on October 3, 1972.

<sup>275</sup> GREENBERG, David. Nixon as Statesman: The Failed Campaign. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 57-58.

<sup>276</sup> BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 827.

<sup>277</sup> GREENBERG, David. Nixon as Statesman: The Failed Campaign. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 57-58.

<sup>278</sup> FELD, Bernard T. Charade of Piecemeal arms limitation, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1975, vol. 31, no. 6, p. 9-12.

<sup>279</sup> FORD, Gerald R. Address to a Joint Session of the Congress, August 12, 1974. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4694>.



this statement meant that in order to keep peace with the USSR, they must work toward nuclear limitation and elimination.

The disarmament discourse rhetoric changed rapidly during the Carter presidency. Carter himself became mainstream of the nuclear disarmament. He considered the nuclear proliferation to be an unnecessary waste and the primary existential threat in the world. He pledged to move toward the ultimate goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons once he would become the president.<sup>280</sup> Carter repeatedly made securitizing moves where he labeled nuclear proliferation to be the existential threat. He proclaimed that nuclear abolition was the only rational course of action when facing unlimited armaments race. Later, he continued to frame nuclear disarmament as the principal issue and even encouraged people to join the nuclear disarmament movement because “success can mean life instead of death.”<sup>281</sup> Nuclear proliferation was often regarded as the gravest threat and the nuclear disarmament as their ultimate goal. In the same spirit, and also in response to strong pressure from nuclear disarmament movement, Carter also deferred production of neutron weapons.<sup>282</sup>

Majority of the Carter administration favored the idea of nuclear disarmament and did not resist establishing informative channels with non-governmental representatives of nuclear disarmament movement. However, on the basis of the growing public disagreement with the U.S. foreign policy, Carter was advised not to proceed with further participation in the anti-nuclear public debate.<sup>283</sup> Nevertheless, on the governmental level, Carter continued to accent the nuclear proliferation to be the biggest threat. He was repeatedly declaring that nuclear arms control was the *single most important issue*. He also made an attempt to depict Reagan as a candidate who will accelerate another nuclear arms race and is against nuclear disarmament.<sup>284,285</sup> Carter also continued the SALT II negotiations which resulted in signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II Treaty). This treaty set limits on numbers

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<sup>280</sup> CARTER, Jimmy. *Why Not the Best?: the First 50 Years*, Layetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1996, (first published 1975), p. 155.

<sup>281</sup> CARTER, Jimmy. Inaugural Address, Washington, January 20, 1977. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6575>.

<sup>282</sup> CARTER, Jimmy. Enhanced Radiation Weapons Statement by the President, April 7, 1978. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30630>.

<sup>283</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 130.

<sup>284</sup> REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

<sup>285</sup> CARTER, Jimmy. Farewell Address, Washington, January 14, 1981. Available online at <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/farewell.phtml>.

of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.<sup>286</sup> Although the SALT II Treaty was never ratified due to Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and significant opposition of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. nevertheless complied with it.

By the late 1970s, Carter's securitizing moves that nuclear proliferation threatened the world and must be stopped substantially impacted whole nuclear disarmament discourse. Majority of people supported these efforts. However, many politicians and public figures also started opposing these nuclear limitation agreements which were being newly labeled as superfluous and counterproductive. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) began strongly demanding immediate nuclear arms buildup and pressured the government to proceed with neutron bomb development. E. Rostow, an influential member of the CPD, stated that nuclear weapons could no longer be limited by nuclear control agreements. Nuclear arms race was said to have passed over the phase where it could be controlled.<sup>287</sup> Reagan, who joined the CPD in 1976, became also a strong proponent of immediate nuclear buildup. He praised neutron bomb to be an *ideal deterrent weapon* because it would force Soviets not to start a nuclear war.<sup>288,289</sup> Later, during his presidential campaign, Reagan was forced to soften his pro-nuclear rhetoric.

While making significant effort to not perceived by the public as a direct opponent of nuclear disarmament, Reagan soften his nuclear armament rhetoric. He based his presidential campaign on the image of a lost strength. Reagan linked the *vision of peace* to the goal of reaching a *realistic strategic arms reduction policy*. He labeled Carter administration as era which made the nation weak. He proclaimed: "We must build peace upon strength."<sup>290</sup> Thus he suggested that he was willing to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons, but such reduction must be equally advantageous for the U.S. as for the USSR. He even stated that his goal was to achieve a nuclear reduction treaty in order for the U.S. and the USSR not to represents a threat to one another.<sup>291</sup> The core of his rhetoric completely changed from confrontational and

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<sup>286</sup> Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Signed at Vienna on June 18, 1979, not ratified.

<sup>287</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 136-37.

<sup>288</sup> BIDDLE, Wayne. Neutron Bomb: An Explosive Issue, *The New York Times*, November 15, 1981.

<sup>289</sup> SKINNER, Kiron K., ANDERSON, Annelise, and ANDERSON Martin, eds. *Reagan, Ronald. In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For America*, The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation Foreword, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, p. 99-102.

<sup>290</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. *Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan "A Strategy for Peace in the '80s"* [televised campaign address]. October 19, 1980. Transcript available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/Reference/10.19.80.html>.

<sup>291</sup> REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

strong statements to cooperative and more moderate approach willing to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons. During 1980 presidential debate, Reagan also criticized Carter for his unilateral nuclear reductions and cancellations of nuclear buildup projects without any reciprocal actions on the Soviet side. Reagan, on the other hand, often proclaimed that nuclear buildup was the only tool which could force Soviets into concessions and restrain.<sup>292</sup>

The discourse started analyzing whether rising Soviet power and confrontational rhetoric really signified greater danger which could lead to nuclear war. Several members of a scientific community, however, continued to argue that the strategy of MAD and the overall nuclear balance would prevent any nuclear escalation. According to them, nuclear balance, not being particularly *delicate*, diminish the threat that the world could be destroyed by nuclear holocaust.<sup>293</sup> As such there was no reason for debated additional nuclear buildup since the situation was stable.

The second part of the public debate which emerged in the late 1970s was occupied by proponents of further nuclear disarmament negotiations and nuclear abolishment. Many influential figures were stressing that the only way how to stop the spiraling nuclear arms buildup and to decrease the likelihood of nuclear annihilation was to sign a significant nuclear arms control agreement.<sup>294</sup> A group Mobilization For Survival began promoting four principal goals among which were Zero Nuclear Weapons, Ban Nuclear Power, and Stop the Arms Race. These slogans often appeared on buttons, bumper stickers, and in other advertisement media.<sup>295</sup> They stressed that the only way how to diminish nuclear threat was by achieving *nuclear zero* which meant banning all nuclear weapons. This zero demand represented powerful yet simple enough message which spread like wildfire.

In order to reach zero, they accented the need to first bilaterally stop the nuclear arms race. This demand led to forming of an umbrella anti-nuclear group Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (Freeze) promoting a united agenda. R. Forsberg released a call to both the U.S. and the USSR to bilaterally halt the nuclear arms race. She demanded a mutual freeze on testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. The proposal urged both sides to stop

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<sup>292</sup> REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

<sup>293</sup> BRODIE, Bernard. The Development of Nuclear Strategy. *International Security*, Spring 1978, vol.2, no.4, p. 69.

<sup>294</sup> GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 128-9.

<sup>295</sup> DAVIDON, Ann Morrissett. The U.S. Anti-nuclear Movement, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1979, vol. 40, no. 10, p. 46.

the race on the basis of the fact that the U.S. and the USSR already possessed 50,000 nuclear warheads, the capacity to destroy all cities in the northern hemisphere within a half an hour.<sup>296</sup> They felt they were not threatened by other state's nuclear armaments as much as they were by the USSR. The fact that movement focused only on bilateral nuclear freeze was striking particularly due to the number of nuclear states by that time. This freeze was considered to be the first step toward disarmament. This call of a majority of anti-nuclear groups for a mutual nuclear freeze was done on the basis that further nuclear buildup was redundant and a dangerous risk. The general rhetoric behind such calls accented mainly the enormous number of existing warheads. Anti-nuclear representatives continuously used this narrative of a nuclear war which might be over within thirty minutes leaving whole civilization destroyed.

The nuclear arms race was being more and more explained as a situation in which states are trapped in a cycle of hostilities which fuels this nuclear insecurity dilemma. Given that nuclear arms race was not something easily imagined by majority of the population, disarmament activists continuously struggled to depict the essence of such abstract spiraling race. The narrative of the need to disarm nuclear weapons gradually changed into the image of *illogical piling weapons* into the absolute *redundancy* and *grotesque dimensions*. G. Kennan described this absurd situation in an interesting quote: "We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, missile upon missile, new levels of destructiveness upon old ones. We have done this helplessly, almost involuntarily: like the victims of some sort of hypnotism, like men in a dream, like lemmings heading for the sea. ... And the result is that today we have achieved ... levels of redundancy of such grotesque dimensions as to defy rational understanding."<sup>297</sup> This statement described the nuclear arms race as something irrational being done is a hypnotism-like state. Such irrational piling only lead to utter destruction and thus logical choice would be to ban nuclear weapons. This depiction of the spiraling nuclear buildup is analogical to a hypnosis or a dream where the body is not actually aware what impact its actions are going to be like. Like *lemmings heading for the sea*, without thinking.

This anti-nuclear agenda impacted the whole country. Anti-nuclear activists even organized many marches and demonstrations calling for nuclear freeze. During 1980 presidential campaign, more than 50 towns in Massachusetts held local referenda in which a

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<sup>296</sup> FORSBERG, Randall. Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze, *Security Dialogue*, October 1981, vol. 12, pp. 417-421. Originally released as pamphlet by Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign in 1980.

<sup>297</sup> KENNAN, George F. *A Modest Proposal* [online], New York Review of Books, July 16, 1981, accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1981/jul/16/a-modest-proposal/>.

clear majority voted for nuclear freeze.<sup>298</sup> However, the outcome of such anti-nuclear activities are ambiguous since in the same elections, people elected the President who openly supported nuclear buildup and opposed every treaty the U.S. has yet signed.

### **4. 3. Summary and Key Acts of Securitization**

This researched period had several significant moments which widely impacted mainly the nuclear disarmament discourse. Even before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy often stressed that nuclear weapons might be potentially self-destructing and encouraged to create certain nuclear control measures. These securitizing moves emphasizing the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons to the world and to the U.S. continued even after the crisis ended. They mobilized the public and suggested that in order to cope with this threat, certain measures must be adopted. This securitization led to several governmental and non-governmental actions which led to signing of the LTBT and later the NPT.

The Cuban Missile Crisis represented a powerful securitizing moment of the nuclear discourse. The crisis was a moment which brought the American society at the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. Kennedy utilized a widespread scare of the USSR and securitized the issue of the crisis as an existential threat to the Western hemisphere and potentially the whole world. It was quite significant that even though the crisis posed a primary threat to the U.S., it was being largely regarded by both governmental and non-governmental actors as a threat to the whole world. People responded to this securitization and widely accepted that they must stand against the threat posed by the USSR even if it meant nuclear holocaust. They accepted the threat as existential and started building shelters and preparing for war. The crisis also showed how nuclear escalation was widely regarded as inevitable once nuclear weapons would be used. The crisis in the end showed that visions of inevitability of a nuclear exchange could be overcome through negotiations and diplomacy. The crisis and averted nuclear catastrophe represented a critical moment which triggered important social changes.

Another significant moment of the nuclear discourse was the nuclear test ban agenda. Kennedy was stressing that nuclear fallout represented a great threat to humanity and nuclear tests should be banned. But he also refused to acknowledge that nuclear testing contaminated food and milk. Gradual release of nuclear scare after the crisis created a great window of opportunity which was used for establishing a nuclear test ban. Only then the government

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<sup>298</sup> KLEIDMAN, Robert. *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993, pp. 144-145.

decided to proceed with the ban agenda. Since the popular demand for the ban was overwhelming, the government saw no other choice than to use the window of opportunity. After the crisis and after the LTBT was signed, the threat of nuclear war and nuclear testing diminished. The anti-nuclear agenda essentially waned till the mid-1970s.

The primary threat was then considered to be the threat of a nuclear proliferation which resulted in signing the NPT. However, since the NPT coped with the threat of horizontal proliferation, the debate shifted to limitation of the threat of vertical proliferation, in this case nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the USSR. Despite governmental rhetoric praising the SALT I Treaty and the ABM Treaty as being beyond doubt successful, anti-nuclear activists regarded such attempts mostly as a mere window dressing. But these agreements and their agendas were bound to be inherently limited due to the lack of trust and rigidity of the bipolar system which did not provide many opportunities for changes. Furthermore, the U.S. government still regarded nuclear buildup as their security assurance.

The end of the Vietnam War substantially revived the nuclear disarmament agenda. Carter used this revival and stated that the nuclear arms race represented an existential threat to the world and nuclear abolition was the only rational way how to diminish this threat. People started massively responding to these calls for nuclear disarmament. People accepted this premise that nuclear weapons buildup was no longer increasing security of the U.S. and might even threaten them. This resulted in a massive anti-nuclear agenda calling for the nuclear freeze and a nuclear zero. The rise of environmentalism also caused that since 1970, nuclear weapons were regarded as significantly threatening to the environment. Since the atmospheric testing and visible effects on human health were no longer within the debate, anti-nuclear actors shifted their focus on how testing changed the atmosphere. The fact that this securitization was particularly successful is evident on a popular acceptance of the cancellation of the neutron bomb and also other nuclear development projects. Also, despite rising of international tensions and Reagan's powerful securitizing moves stressing the need for realistic agreements and nuclear buildup, people still did not accept the nuclear buildup as a reasonable solution. They not tolerated the policy of the nuclear buildup and even organized massive demonstrations against the nuclear buildup.

## 5. Rise and Fall of International Tensions, 1982-2000

“I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”<sup>299</sup>

This period of our analysis starts in 1982 with reemergence of anti-nuclear movement and ends in 2000.<sup>300</sup> The central theme in this period is the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. End of the Cold War caused that the foreign policy of the U.S. administration was no longer framed in the bipolar rivalry and the nuclear balance. The 1996 signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) created a watershed in nuclear threat perception. Besides the end of the Cold War, other internationally significant events which occurred within this period are: In 1981 the USSR announced they began producing neutron bombs. Also France began producing neutron weapons. Furthermore, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was declared in 1985. Also nuclear development program of Israel was revealed. In April 26 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident occurred. Also, during 1990s, Africa was declared as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nevertheless, India and Pakistan continued to conduct nuclear testing.

### 5. 1. Construction of Nuclear Threats, 1982-2000

#### 5. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War

In the early 1980s the scare of nuclear war was often present within the discourse due to worsening international tensions and Reagan's confrontational rhetoric. After the Cold War ended, the focus of the nuclear discourse shifted to fear of nuclear proliferation.

Initially, a majority of Reagan administration officials believed that, if the U.S. built strong offense and defense systems, then the nuclear war was possible and winnable. The

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<sup>299</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

<sup>300</sup> This research period overlaps with presidency of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The presidency of Ronald Reagan lasted from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1989. President George H. W. Bush was in the office from January 20, 1989 to January 20, 1993. President Bill Clinton took the office on January 20, 1993 and left on January 20, 2001.

nuclear attack, however massive, was stated not to obliterate entire population and not to escalate into mutual destruction. Some of them were even recalling that the U.S. could survive a nuclear massive attack, because Japan has “not only survived but flourished after the nuclear attack.”<sup>301</sup> Thus Reagan shifted his attention to building invulnerable defense system. Furthermore, he believed that shelter program would be a sufficient protection against nuclear blast and fallout from even a major nuclear exchange. Such shelters were presumed to significantly reduce both damage and casualties of such a massive nuclear attack.<sup>302</sup> Shelter program was thought to be essential for survival after nuclear exchange.

The debate focused primarily on the theme of *inevitability* of nuclear encounter. Aggressive rhetoric on both sides and rising international tensions caused that the possibility of nuclear war was being perceived as very likely during most of 1980s. According to McNamara, escalating nuclear arms race significantly increased the risk of a preemptive nuclear attack. He stated that nuclear war seemed quite likely and inevitable: “The risk that military conflict will quickly evolve into nuclear war, leading to certain destruction of our civilization, is far greater than I am willing to accept.”<sup>303</sup> Many activists started emphasizing that current situation will lead only to perilous acceleration of hostilities which will end up in unavoidable general nuclear war. Thus, they stressed that there was an immediate need for preventing nuclear war because otherwise there “there will be no other problems to worry about.”<sup>304</sup> They stressed that unless the U.S. and the USSR embark on a more cooperative course, there will be nuclear war.

Since the rise of environmentalism in 1970s, nuclear war started to be considered as a threat not only to the world or individuals, but also to the environment. It was even being suggested that, opposed to severe damage to the environment, a majority of human population would survive a major nuclear exchange rather unharmed.<sup>305</sup> Environmental damage was sometimes being regarded as much more severe than damage on population. It was often evaluated that *nuclear exchange* could cause severe degradation of the atmosphere which could severely damage the global environment. It was also stated that such effects might be

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<sup>301</sup> SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 142.

<sup>302</sup> BROWN, Harold. A Countervailing View: No, we did not think we could win a nuclear war, *Foreign Policy*, September 24, 2012. Available online at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/a\\_countervailing\\_view](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/a_countervailing_view).

<sup>303</sup> MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.3-4.

<sup>304</sup> CARL, Marcy. U.S.-Soviet relations, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1982, vol. 38, no. 8, p. 12.

<sup>305</sup> COMMITTEE ON THE ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS AND RESOURCES, and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. *The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange*, Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, p.1.



the same as after a collision of a large meteor with the Earth 65 million years ago which caused extinction of dinosaurs.<sup>306</sup> The debate included concerns over subsequent widespread dust, smoke, firestorms, change of wind system, drop of temperature of the atmosphere, and a depletion of ozone layer which would significantly reduce the amount of sunlight causing drastic changes to agriculture. In the end, the continuation of agriculture activity after the nuclear war was labeled as impossible.<sup>307</sup> Thus prevention of such environmental degradation should represent a primary national concern. Such *severe long-term climatic effects* would then lead to a harsh *nuclear winter*.<sup>308</sup> A term nuclear winter which symbolized presumed long-term effects of nuclear exchange became a central part of the nuclear discourse.

Widespread nuclear fear and general disapproval with Reagan's rhetoric and policy of nuclear buildup resulted in massive protests and demonstrations. These anti-nuclear demonstrations gained large support from American people. Two of the key themes of this rise against the buildup was development of new types of weapons and also deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe. Especially deployment of these missiles, which were planned to be deployed as a reaction to deployment of Soviet missiles into Europe, stirred a tremendous controversy worldwide.<sup>309</sup> In response to 1982 massive protests calling for nuclear disarmament, Reagan was advised to dramatically change his rhetoric. Reagan subsequently declared that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”<sup>310</sup> He was forced to soften his policy and to reaffirm his commitment to nuclear arms negotiation. He also declared that the U.S. will never be an aggressor and will always use its strength for deterrence and defense purposes.<sup>311</sup> Moreover, he even declared that reliance on MAD with a possibility of total retaliatory annihilation was neither logical nor moral.<sup>312</sup> This remarkable rhetorical shift showed how influential and strong nuclear disarmament movement was in the early 1980s.

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<sup>306</sup> COMMITTEE ON THE ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS AND RESOURCES, and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. *The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange*, Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, p. 2.

<sup>307</sup> CRUTZEN, Paul and BIRKS, John W. The atmosphere after a nuclear war: Twilight at noon, *Ambio*, 1982, vol. 11, no. 2-3, pp. 115-122.

<sup>308</sup> TURCO, R.P., et al. Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions, *Science*, 1983, vol. 222, p. 1290.

<sup>309</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.133, 144-158.

<sup>310</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1984. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205>.

<sup>311</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

<sup>312</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985. Available online at [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/reagan2.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan2.asp).

The end of the Cold War and a rise of new actors and conflicts greatly changed the perception of nuclear threat and forming of the whole nuclear discourse considerably. The U.S. government no longer considered the war with the USSR as realistic and thus the emphasis on the threat of nuclear war essentially vanished.<sup>313</sup> Also most of non-governmental representatives regarded the threat of the nuclear war with Russia as essentially vanished and they started to accent more intensely the threat of horizontal proliferation. This general desecuritization of the threat of nuclear war was further supported by reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. George H. W. Bush even acknowledged that nuclear reductions and non-proliferation significantly enhances stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war.<sup>314</sup> Thus with the end of the Cold War, nuclear reductions were officially labeled as stability building. The threat of the nuclear war was essentially desecuritized.

Furthermore, G. H. W. Bush repeatedly affirmed that for the first time the U.S. bombers stood down and children didn't have to do air raid drills in case of nuclear war anymore.<sup>315,316</sup> The emphasis on *detargeting* and end of air drill were the key theme. B. Clinton later followed this rhetoric of *the decline of the nuclear threat*. The year 1995 marked the first time when “not a single Russian missile is pointed at the children of America.”<sup>317</sup> The threat of nuclear war vanished by symbolical nuclear *de-targeting*, which meant that nuclear weapons now aimed at no country and no nuclear weapons were aimed at the U.S. This policy of detargeting served as an acknowledgement that Russia no longer represented a serious existential threat. Also it was a tactical calculation which should have forced Russia to reduce their arsenal.

As the threat of nuclear war vanished, also corresponding environmental concerns faded away. Many scientists began arguing that rather than nuclear winter, nuclear war might cause *nuclear fall* at most.<sup>318</sup> Nuclear war was generally perceived as not probable during most of the 1990s. However, the 1997 Directive restated the Cold War rhetoric and nuclear targeting strategies which aimed on both Russia and China. The directive restated that nuclear weapons represented a cornerstone of national security for the *indefinite future*. It declared

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<sup>313</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

<sup>314</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

<sup>315</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

<sup>316</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Debate with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

<sup>317</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1994. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

<sup>318</sup> BROWNE, Malcolm W. Nuclear Winter Theorists Pull Back, *The New York Times*, January 23, 1990.

that military “must be prepared to win a protracted nuclear war that would devastate the globe.”<sup>319</sup> They displayed their continual reliance on nuclear weapons. It was being often suggested that Russia will most probably return to its aggressive posture of nuclear deterrence due to its inability to retain vast conventional forces. It was assumed that due to future political and economic collapse of Russia, reliance on aggressive nuclear policy would be much cheaper. It was therefore being presumed, that the U.S. must be prepared for this development and be able to restore its nuclear forces if needed.<sup>320</sup>

### 5. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

During 1980s the threat of a use of nuclear weapons was heavily present within a discourse. Reagan repeatedly spoke about a possibility of a limited nuclear war and that the U.S. must be prepared for protracted war with the USSR over an unlimited period of time. But he also repeatedly stated that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against the USSR except in a response to an attack.<sup>321,322</sup>

Reagan’s confrontational rhetoric often implied that the U.S. needed the nuclear buildup because of the aggressiveness of Soviets. However, the U.S. government representatives repeatedly affirmed that it is purely for deterrent purposes. Reagan admitted that “it is sadly ironic that in these modern times, it still takes weapons to prevent war.”<sup>323</sup> Reagan added: “The more effective our forces are, the less likely it is that we’ll have to use them.”<sup>324</sup> According to his statements, the U.S. needed an excessive buildup to make sure their arsenal is so enormous that the use of nuclear weapons would not be likely and their security would not be challenged by other countries. Nuclear buildup was continuously regarded as a guarantee that they would not be employed.

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<sup>319</sup> SMITH, Jeffrey, Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear Arms: Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop Terms for Long Atomic War, *Washington Post*, December 7, 1997, page A01.

<sup>320</sup> BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 88.

<sup>321</sup> HALLORAN, Richard. Pentagon draws up first strategy for fighting a long nuclear war, *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982.

<sup>322</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence, November 22, 1982. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/112282d.htm>.

<sup>323</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence, November 22, 1982. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/112282d.htm>.

<sup>324</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

In the same spirit, also the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) could have been perceived as a deterrent that nuclear weapons would not be used against the U.S.<sup>325</sup> Other politicians went even further when they stressed that the *only* purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter. McNamara stressed that nuclear weapons “are not military weapons in the traditional sense and therefore serve no purpose other than to deter one’s opponent from their use.”<sup>326</sup> Since nuclear weapons were regarded only as deterrent, the use of nuclear weapons in the battlefield was being considered to be very unlikely.

Such threat reemerged within the discourse in the context of renewed governmental plans to build tactical neutron bombs and their deployment in Europe. Anti-nuclear movement representatives started to question whether the neutron bomb could really represent a blessing or if it brought them closer to potential destruction. The prevalent notion was that deployment of neutron bombs in Europe would make the actual use more than likely and the use of such tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to massive nuclear exchange and the *end of civilization*.<sup>327,328</sup> Such development together with growing international instability led to overall perception that nuclear war was bound to break out within a few years.<sup>329</sup> Extensive nuclear buildup and development of the SDI system created a widespread perception of a nuclear despair and inevitable use of nuclear weapons.

The end of the Cold War did not bring substantial changes in the governmental policy of the use of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration continued to stress the need to deter by presence of nuclear weapons and to build the SDI in order to both deter and also defend such attacks. The U.S. government considered the SDI to be the most effective protection against new proliferators and labeled it as their right of *self-defense*.<sup>330,331</sup> Such a need for a defense system did not vanish since there were new proliferation threats the U.S. had to face.

The potential use of nuclear weapons was brought into the discourse again in the context of the 1991 Gulf War when G. H. W. Bush repeatedly threatened Iraq. He stated that the *future of Iraq* was at stake and that they might pay *terrible price by the strongest possible*

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<sup>325</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

<sup>326</sup> BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 82.

<sup>327</sup> BIDDLE, Wayne. Neutron Bomb: An Explosive Issue, *The New York Times*, November 15, 1981.

<sup>328</sup> OWEN, David. *Nuclear Papers*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009, p. 269.

<sup>329</sup> SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 149.

<sup>330</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Presidential Directive 30: National Space Policy. NASA Historical Reference Collection. (File: 012605). November 2, 1989.

<sup>331</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

response.<sup>332</sup> Several politicians also pleaded for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons and that the U.S. should use *everything at their disposal* if conventional bombing resulted in being ineffective.<sup>333</sup> Bush's statements were often translated as a threat of the use of nuclear weapons. However, Bush later denied that he sought to destroy Iraq nor punish the Iraqi population for decisions of their leaders.<sup>334</sup> It was nevertheless a significant case of nonuse since it was the first major post-Cold War conflict. In response to these processes, even though not openly, the administration rejected the use of nuclear weapons also in future conflicts.<sup>335,336</sup> The U.S. politicians were greatly concerned over the chance of accidentally encouraging other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It was recognized that threats of the use of nuclear weapons would only provoke other states to develop such weapons.<sup>337</sup> The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) later stated that the response to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat or use must be non-nuclear.<sup>338</sup> Such development was even followed by statements arguing that nuclear weapons were obsolete and military does not need to use nuclear weapons because they could rely on conventional weapons.<sup>339</sup> Nevertheless, the 1997 Directive reaffirmed their usability.

### 5. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

During most of 1980s the threat of nuclear proliferation was present within the discourse in the picture of the U.S. additional nuclear buildup. Reagan politicized Soviet nuclear buildup as threatening to nuclear balance. Reagan even questioned whether there was still reason in calling it a balance.<sup>340</sup> He also declared, that while the USSR was in the arms race, the U.S. has not raced. Reagan made a securitizing move where he was often stressing

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<sup>332</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Letter to Saddam Hussein, January 5 1991. In: *Los Angeles Times*, January 13, 1991. Available online at [http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/mn-412\\_1\\_u-n-security-council-resolution](http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/mn-412_1_u-n-security-council-resolution).

<sup>333</sup> RUBIN, Trudy. U.S. Shouldn't Use Nukes On Iraqis, February 15, 1991, *The Inquirer* [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at [http://articles.philly.com/1991-02-15/news/25773242\\_1\\_nuclear-weapons-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-ground-war](http://articles.philly.com/1991-02-15/news/25773242_1_nuclear-weapons-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-ground-war).

<sup>334</sup> BUSH, George H. W. The President's News Conference, February 5, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19278>.

<sup>335</sup> TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 294-6.

<sup>336</sup> MCGEORGE, Bundy. Nuclear Weapons and The Gulf, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 83.

<sup>337</sup> MCGEORGE, Bundy. Nuclear Weapons and The Gulf, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 83.

<sup>338</sup> PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 84-5.

<sup>339</sup> BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 81.

<sup>340</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

the threat of Soviet nuclear arsenal. He created an image of a critical need to *correct the imbalance*.<sup>341</sup> Majority of current governmental rhetoric was done primarily to justify the U.S. additional nuclear buildup and modernization in order to face the soviet threat properly.<sup>342,343</sup> Nuclear buildup served double purpose, it meant to correct nuclear balance and to force the USSR into negotiations. However, such attempt to securitize the Soviet threat in order to justify nuclear buildup could not be considered as successful since it created massive nuclear-disarmament protests.

By the 1980s, the nuclear discourse was recognizing the threat of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. McNamara notably acknowledged that the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation came from both countries and terrorist groups. He stated that the horizontal nuclear proliferation by terrorists was one of the greatest threats to the U.S. and therefore the U.S. could not disarm.<sup>344</sup> He insinuated that because of the terrorist threat, nuclear disarmament would not be as easy as anticipated.

After the Cold War ended, the threat of nuclear proliferation moved into the center of the nuclear discourse. Firstly, the threat of the nuclear war transformed itself into the concern over control of Soviet nuclear weapons and the future of vertical nuclear proliferation. They widely debated if nuclear arms race would be replaced by reductions or nuclear disarmament. G. H. W. Bush initially did not overly favor either one of these scenarios.<sup>345</sup> Secondly, the end of the Cold War brought into the hearth of the discussion the fear of horizontal nuclear proliferation and the fear of new nuclear actors. Both these premises were however perceived as interconnected. In this situation, the need for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament started to be perceived as more acute than ever.

Horizontal nuclear proliferation was being newly perceived as the greatest threat. According to the NPR, the proliferation of nuclear weapons represented greater security risk than existing nuclear arsenal of a hostile superpower. Main threats of proliferation were considered to be especially North Korea, and then India, Pakistan.<sup>346</sup> The U.S. made several

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<sup>341</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence, November 22, 1982. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/112282d.htm>.

<sup>342</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 138, 142.

<sup>343</sup> SCOBILIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 153.

<sup>344</sup> MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, p.5.

<sup>345</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Debate with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

<sup>346</sup> PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 84-5.

attempts to halt North Korean nuclear proliferation. The Bush administration also feared that nuclear warheads would not be secure in newly formed successor states of dissolved USSR and promoted nuclear disarmament of these post-soviet states. Bush was particularly concerned over the fate of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.<sup>347</sup> In addition, the fear of uncontrolled massive Soviet arsenal led U.S. senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to propose the *Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act* as a nonproliferation measure which eventually led to the *Cooperative Threat Reduction program* facilitating also the nuclear threat of post-soviet states.

Non-governmental figures often imitated the governmental rhetoric when they also accentuated the threat posed by unsecured nuclear weapons in possession of post-Soviet states and by rogue states.<sup>348</sup> These *loose nukes*, located on territories of former Soviet republics, were regarded as the greatest threat to the U.S.<sup>349,350</sup> The debate increasingly focused on the risk of unprotected nuclear materials and nuclear weapons which could get into hands of rogue state or terrorists. Also with increasing amounts of nuclear waste from nuclear power plants and unsecured nuclear material worldwide, the disruption of the American security was perceived as being much easier than before. The debate changed considerably from issues inquiring *where* were nuclear weapons of adversary states located to *whether their nuclear-weapons material was secured*.<sup>351</sup> Also Clinton later followed this by stressing the horizontal proliferation threat. It was stated several times that it was essential for the U.S. to safeguard nuclear material in Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet nations in order to prevent that it would fall into the *wrong hands*.<sup>352</sup> Thus the U.S. was involved in facilitating complete elimination of nuclear armament of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.<sup>353</sup>

Clinton continued with Bush's securitization of the nuclear proliferation to other countries and terrorist organizations as being the greatest existential threat: "Our generation's enemies are the terrorists and their outlaw nation sponsors. ... Today, the threat to our

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<sup>347</sup> KOCH, Susan J. *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992*, National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington: National Defense University Press, 2012, p. 4.

<sup>348</sup> TURNER, Stansfield. The case for strategic escrow, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2, p.16.

<sup>349</sup> VON HIPPEL, Frank. Working in the White House on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: A Personal Report, *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, March/April 1995, vol. 48, no. 2.

<sup>350</sup> BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Doomsday Clock: Timeline [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/timeline>.

<sup>351</sup> VON HIPPEL, Frank. Working in the White House on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: A Personal Report, *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, March/April 1995, vol. 48, no. 2.

<sup>352</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 19, 1999. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

<sup>353</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1994. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

security is not in an enemy silo, but in the briefcase or the car bomb of a terrorist.”<sup>354</sup> Clinton insinuated that since states and state-sponsored groups were not to defeat the U.S. conventionally, they would most likely choose asymmetrical assaults through terrorism and the use of nuclear weapons. Thus the government shifted its focus to a reduction and non-proliferation of WMDs to other nations and ensuring that terrorists would not come into a possession of nuclear bombs.<sup>355</sup> The *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism* set the prevention of the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists as their primary concern.<sup>356</sup> The U.S. government took fully into account the need to limit spread of nuclear material and to set nonproliferation as a national priority.

Nuclear disarmament groups such as the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers also campaigned for more thorough security measures concerning nuclear material control. They were concerned that nuclear waste could get into hands of terrorists who could build dirty bomb. They stressed that these bombs could also be *extremely damaging* to individuals and could significantly endanger also future generations.<sup>357</sup>

#### **5. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing**

The threat of nuclear testing was not considered to be a primary threat during this examined period. During 1980s, apart from the continual promise of the Reagan administrative that the Comprehensive Test Ban remained a long-term national objective, this threat was not significant within the governmental discourse.<sup>358</sup> Besides that, several non-governmental groups and individuals continued to stress the threat of nuclear accidents and a need to adopt a comprehensive test ban.

By the early 1990s, the government made a significant effort to improve their image in the public and, therefore, G. H. W. Bush signed *Radiation Exposure Compensation Act* which provided financial compensation to those exposed to nuclear testing and those affected by uranium mining. The government was also increasingly disclosing details about nuclear

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<sup>354</sup> CLINTON, William J. Remarks by President Bill Clinton at the United Nations 50th Anniversary Charter Ceremony, San Francisco, June 26, 1995. Available online at <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=933>.

<sup>355</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, Washington, May 22, 1998.

<sup>356</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, Washington, June 21, 1995.

<sup>357</sup> COALITION TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS, *Nuclear Threats* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.crnd.org/nuclear.html>.

<sup>358</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Decision Directive Number 51: U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy (NSDD-51), Washington, August 10, 1982.



testing effects and accidents.<sup>359</sup> These disclosures confirmed long-lasting concerns of downwind and downstream communities that nuclear testing was slowly poisoning them and the environment.<sup>360</sup> Among other disclosures, it was confirmed that a 1949 nuclear Green Run incident did contaminate a large area along the Columbia River and poisoned several people within, often causing a thyroid cancer.<sup>361</sup> Anti-nuclear groups continued emphasizing that nuclear testing caused environmental contamination which would eventually endanger human population. They also underlined that underground testing sites would be compromised and would not be suitable for humans for over thousands of years.<sup>362</sup> The focus shifted mainly to environmental risks of nuclear testing and nuclear material safety, most importantly a threat posed by nuclear waste and radiation leaks.<sup>363</sup>

The anti-nuclear movement emphasized that governmental nuclear agencies were deliberately withholding essential information about nuclear testing which resulted in substantial underestimation of its damage on the population. The National Cancer Institute revealed that due to atmospheric nuclear testing, American children were exposed to 15 to 70 times as much radiation than previously stated. This caused that they were at higher risk of developing thyroid cancer.<sup>364</sup> It was estimated that overall global cancer fatalities would reach to 2,4 million only from atmospheric nuclear testing between 1945 to 2000, and more than 430,000 cancer fatalities only due to testing within years of 1991 to 2000.<sup>365</sup>

These estimates brought popular support to calls for nuclear testing moratorium and comprehensive test ban.<sup>366</sup> During the 1980s and 1990s, nuclear disarmament movement continuously promoted the ban by staging mass demonstrations and releasing petitions. Nuclear disarmament movement significantly utilized this widespread scare which later

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<sup>359</sup> HANSEN, Chuck. 1,000 more accidents declassified, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1990, vol. 46, no. 5, p.9-14.

<sup>360</sup> UNKNOWN. In brief: Toys in the attic. *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 7.

<sup>361</sup> GERBER, Michelle Stenehjem. *On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002 (second edition), p. 91-92.

<sup>362</sup> INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, pp. 1 - 68.

<sup>363</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 200.

<sup>364</sup> ORTMEYER, Pat and MAKHIJANI Arjun. Worse than we knew, *Bulletin of the Atomic scientists*, November/December 1997, vol. 53, no. 6, p. 46.

<sup>365</sup> INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, p. 40.

<sup>366</sup> VON HIPPEL, Frank. Working in the White House on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: A Personal Report, *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, March/April 1995, vol. 48, no. 2.

forced Bush to agree to limits on underground nuclear testing imposed by the Congress. The Congress also suggested that the comprehensive test ban should be passed by 1996.<sup>367</sup> The U.S. nuclear testing was therefore halted despite the Bush's personal views. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing applied even more pressure on the U.S. government who was unwillingly forced to reconsider their nuclear testing policy and also declare moratorium. Thus, the last nuclear test by the U.S. to this day occurred on September 23, 1992.

The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers campaigned vigorously promote the ban and later its ratification in the Congress. They noted that ratification of the CTBT was essential in order to secure the U.S. natural environment from a nuclear threat. They stressed that damage of nuclear testing on the environment and future generations could be enormous.<sup>368</sup> Also the Abolition 2000 followed such rhetoric and stated that nuclear waste poisoned the environment for thousands of centuries. This *environmental degradation* was stated to be the *legacy* of fifty years of nuclear testing<sup>369</sup> Such rhetorical actions were meant to promote the ratification of the CTBT in the Congress.

## 5. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Discourse, 1982-2000

During 1980s, the nuclear disarmament discourse dealt primarily with the fear of the USSR and new demands to significantly limit and freeze the nuclear arms race. The discourse was also often considering whether nuclear weapons induced more stability or instability. Robert Jervis suggested that nuclear states would tend to act more cautiously to avoid a full-scale war. He declared that nuclear weapons creates stability in the context of nuclear wars, but enable more instability in low levels of violence.<sup>370</sup> Strategists were searching for the reason why these low-level wars, which were fought without the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, prevailed without the followed crossing of the nuclear threshold into the full-scale nuclear exchange. The prevalent idea was that relative nuclear parity and their protected second-strike capabilities allowed only limited outbursts of instability on regional

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<sup>367</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp.178, 201-6.

<sup>368</sup> COALITION TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS, *Nuclear Threats* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.crnd.org/nuclear.html>.

<sup>369</sup> THE ABOLITION 2000. The Abolition 2000 Founding Statement, *Abolition 2000: Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons* [online], accessed 16.12.2014. Available at [http://www.abolition2000.org/?page\\_id=153](http://www.abolition2000.org/?page_id=153).

<sup>370</sup> JERVIS, Robert. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 31.

levels. According to them, nuclear deterrence was considered to be a security guarantee for the U.S.<sup>371</sup>

The principal actor in this debate was also Kenneth Waltz and later also Scott D. Sagan. Kenneth Waltz advocated the position which might be titled as *more may be better*. He argued that horizontal spread of nuclear weapons across countries was inevitable but desirable. He added that both bipolarity of the system and nuclear weapons helped to maintain peace. Waltz assumed that wars are caused by miscalculations, but nuclear weapons prevent such irrationalities and make the system more stable: “They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons.”<sup>372</sup> Waltz also argued that nuclear states tended to wage fewer wars which were also less destructive. According to him, with more nuclear states, the world was going to be also less violent one. Thus nuclear proliferation creates more stability and security for the U.S. But he also acknowledged that nuclear weapon might be fired anonymously from Arab countries. However, he declared it was improbable because such firing could not be anonymous and therefore it would be deterred by the threat of U.S. retaliation.<sup>373</sup> Waltz regarded nuclear proliferation as highly desirable because it creates more stability to the U.S. and the whole world. In addition, he disregarded the emerged threat of nuclear attack from rogue states as highly improbable because it would be deterred.

In the same spirit, due to rising international tensions, governmental representatives were often stressing the need to accelerate nuclear arms buildup by the early 1980s. Furthermore, the Reagan administrative also often considered nuclear disarmament to be unfeasible and undesirable and the Freeze campaign as an unreasonable approach. Reagan strictly opposed any idea of nuclear freeze and labeled it as *a very dangerous fraud* and the mere *illusion of peace*. He declared that freeze would have been only a distraction from achieving major nuclear reductions and on top of that, it would solidified a nuclear lead of the USSR.<sup>374,375</sup> Nuclear freeze was labeled to be counterproductive and even dangerous since

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<sup>371</sup> HARDIN, Russell. Review of The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy by Jervis Robert, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1985, vol. 41, no. 2, p.47.

<sup>372</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.4. We include this analysis in this examined period for the purpose to coherently examine this nuclear instability debate. Also, this debate influenced more this period than the previous one.

<sup>373</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.29.

<sup>374</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the National Association on Evangelicals (“Evil Empire” Speech), March 8, 1983. Available online at <http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/>.

<sup>375</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

*mutual* nuclear reductions were regarded as the main goal. Thus the government was often labeling nuclear disarmament as threatening to the U.S. because it would diminish their deterrence capability. It was an attempt to discredit the agenda of nuclear freeze. Zbigniew Brzezinski, then National Security Advisor, declared nuclear disarmament to be a plan leading to the world full of conventional warfare.<sup>376</sup> McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, warned that, without proper enforcement capabilities, “an agreement for total nuclear disarmament will almost certainly degenerate into an unstable rearmament race.”<sup>377</sup> The narrative of the world full of conventional violence and disarmament producing rearmament was quite often within governmental rhetoric.

Such rhetoric together with the policy of a strong nuclear armament caused massive rise of anti-nuclear feelings. Nuclear deterrence was continually labeled as a strategy which in no way guaranteed national security. If any, nuclear weapons only lessened the security of both the U.S. and the USSR. It was being stated that even if they functioned as security tools, the risk of possession of nuclear weapons alone would still outweigh presumed benefits of acquired sense of security.<sup>378</sup> Non-governmental nuclear disarmament activists harnessed these insecurities and began again emphasizing that nuclear war was very likely. It was stated that if they would not “rise up and cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons,” the U.S. could “sink into the final coma and end it all.”<sup>379</sup> Such proclamations followed the anti-nuclear rhetoric of late 1970s. *Final coma*, in the same way as did *hypnosis*, functioned as an analogy of irrationality of nuclear arms race. If there would not occur real abolishment of nuclear weapons, here the coma signified how quickly the situation could turn into death. The world must be cleansed from the threat.

Dominant nuclear disarmament agenda was united under the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign calling for a *bilateral mutual freeze* of testing and production of nuclear weapons.<sup>380</sup> Such an outcome was considered to be the only way how to stop the nuclear arms race and thus prevent major nuclear war. The freeze agenda ignited massive protests and marches calling for an immediate stop of nuclear arms race and a nuclear free world. Several

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<sup>376</sup> MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, p.6.

<sup>377</sup> MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, p.5.

<sup>378</sup> CARL, Marcy. U.S.-Soviet relations, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1982, vol. 38, no. 8, p. 12.

<sup>379</sup> MUELLER, John. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World. In: LYNN-JONES, Sean M., MILLER, Steven E., VAN EVERA, Stephen, eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990, p.3.

<sup>380</sup> FORSBERG, Randall. Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze, *Security Dialogue*, October 1981, vol. 12, pp. 417-421. Originally released as pamphlet by Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign in 1980.

anti-nuclear groups were also raising awareness of the close possibility of the nuclear war and informed public about the consequences of nuclear war. They also called for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.<sup>381,382</sup>

The June 1982 massive march in New York became the critical point of the nuclear disarmament discourse within this decade. The strong moment of this *peace rally* was the variety of groups and demonstrators who participated in this march. It was no longer a variety of anti-nuclear groups, pacifists, scientists or singers; it was stated to be *everybody*. This massive march against nuclear weapons was said to be “the biggest disarmament gathering in the nation's history.”<sup>383</sup> As such, the march itself was being understood as a gathering calling for nuclear disarmament, but also for peace in general. Thus it accumulated many different agendas which showed how many individuals with different views could step up for this cause. In this meaning, the rally itself also represented everybody and thus, no longer could be ignored. Statements made during this march such as “We shall not suffer silently the threat of nuclear holocaust.” and signs stating “Bread Not Bombs”, “No Nukes”, “Freeze or Burn” often called for the nuclear disarmament on the basis of the threat of nuclear annihilation.<sup>384</sup> They often stressed the imminence of such possibility if other direction was chosen by the government. References to nuclear freeze were also quite often.

In addition, in order to promote the idea of nuclear freeze even further, it became a part of local referenda during 1982 elections in ten U.S. states. It was predicted that the nuclear freeze issue would be the *greatest single issue* in 1982 elections or “the largest referendum on a single issue in the nation's history.”<sup>385,386</sup> The campaign to promote nuclear freeze was considered to be very successful having a huge impact on public perception of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war, however they were stated numerous times to have had *zero impact* on the governmental level.<sup>387,388</sup>

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<sup>381</sup> DIEHL, Sarah J., MOLTZ, James Clay. *Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Book*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002, p. 107.

<sup>382</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp.153-4.

<sup>383</sup> MONTGOMERY, Paul L. Throngs Fill Manhattan To Protest Nuclear Weapons, *The New York Times*, June 13, 1982.

<sup>384</sup> MONTGOMERY, Paul L. Throngs Fill Manhattan To Protest Nuclear Weapons, *The New York Times*, June 13, 1982.

<sup>385</sup> HERBERS, John. Widespread Vote Urges Nuclear Freeze, *The New York Times*, November 4, 1982.

<sup>386</sup> ISAACS, John. The freeze, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1982, vol. 38, no. 8, p. 9-10.

<sup>387</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 157.

<sup>388</sup> SEYMOUR, Richard. *American Insurgents: A Brief History of American Anti-Imperialism*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012, p. 140.

Even before the 1982 rally, Reagan wanted to gain political benefits and, thus, he embarked on bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations which became central part of the discourse.<sup>389,390</sup> By such talks he emphasized that reductions instead of mere limitations were the main aim of his foreign policy. Also by ensuring nuclear reduction they could again close the presumed gap which Reagan was declaring and using as a justification of nuclear buildup during his speeches. He perceived nuclear talks and reductions as a way to regain nuclear balance which would enhance stability of the U.S. However, such a massive support of the 1982 march terrified Reagan and forced him to change his rhetoric concerning nuclear freeze and nuclear disarmament completely. After 1982, Reagan even acknowledged that he believed in zero option for all nuclear weapons and that his *dream* was “to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.”<sup>391,392</sup> Thus not only reductions, but newly the primary aim was to completely abolish all nuclear weapons. The rest of U.S. government was mostly horrified of this *utopian* idea. They often stated that complete nuclear disarmament would be the worst what could happen.<sup>393</sup>

Reagan administrative proceeded to negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) ordering to eliminate an entire class of weapons of missiles.<sup>394</sup> The INF was labeled as a *visionary* treaty which for the first time ordered not *arms control*, but *arms reduction*. The treaty achieved a much publicized *zero option* for intermediate-range missiles. Such *first-ever* nuclear elimination treaty has been said to have “a universal significance for mankind.”<sup>395</sup> Reagan made a strong statement that this treaty was the biggest anti-nuclear achievement ever. The emphasis was put on the zero option which signified that the INF was understood to be the first real step toward nuclear weapons free world.

During most of 1980s, Reagan strived to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence by building defense system capability which was meant to counter the

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<sup>389</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

<sup>390</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE, National Security Decision Directive Number 33: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations (NSDD-33), Washington, May 14, 1982.

<sup>391</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations, January 16, 1984. Available online <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/11684a.htm>.

<sup>392</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985. Available online at [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/reagan2.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan2.asp).

<sup>393</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 186- 187.

<sup>394</sup> The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, entered into force on June 1, 1988.

<sup>395</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks at the Signing of the INF Treaty with Soviet Premier Gorbachev, December 8, 1987. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/120887c.htm>.

enemy nuclear missile attack.<sup>396</sup> He understood the SDI as a measure which would replace offense for defense. Reagan stated that this *security shield* should render nuclear weapons as *impotent and obsolete*. Therefore, in effect, usefulness of nuclear weapons would be diminished and world peace ensured.<sup>397</sup> These statements represent a particularly important rhetorical leap. Nuclear weapons were designated as obsolete if a proper shield against enemy nuclear attacks was installed. More importantly, it was the President himself who articulated such thought and became a prominent part of the nuclear disarmament discourse. Reagan declared that the SDI would protect and strengthen peace because it could deter potential Soviet attacks. In addition, it could also counter massive Soviet nuclear arsenal and intercept it before it reaches land. He labeled it as a vision which brings hope, “hope for our children in the 21st century”, hope that “their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack.”<sup>398</sup> He portrayed it as a visionary mechanism which brings only hope of more security for all Americans. Reagan made a securitizing move where he labeled the attack by the USSR as an existential threat to the U.S. which meant to imply better prevention measures in the form of the SDI.

Despite such a powerful rhetoric, the SDI was labeled as *Star Wars schemes* by Senator Edward Kennedy the very next day after his 1983 speech. E. Kennedy made an attempt to point out that as Star Wars, also the SDI was an unreal vision. It also implied that nuclear arms race might escalate into the space.<sup>399</sup> This coined term quickly spread like across the U.S. Soon, the use of term Star Wars was more common than the use of official SDI term. The name evoking that the SDI was a mere fantasy was universally recognized as an official title of this initiative. Several politicians opposed the SDI and made a significant effort to label it as *killer weapons in space*, with “the response time so short there will be no time to wake a President.”<sup>400</sup> The narrative of killer space weapons and star wars became the central part of the nuclear disarmament debate.

Nevertheless, Reagan still continued with his nuclear defense approach. The SDI was proclaimed to eliminate the threat of nuclear war by *finding a nonnuclear defense against*

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<sup>396</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Decision Directive 85: Eliminating The Threat From Ballistic Missiles (NSDD-85), Washington, March 25, 1983.

<sup>397</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

<sup>398</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

<sup>399</sup> KRAMER, Peter. Ronald Reagan and Star Wars, *History Today*, Vol. 49, 3, March 3, 1999.

<sup>400</sup> 1984 Reagan vs. Mondale, Living Room Candidate, Presidential Campaign commercials 1952-2012, *Museum of the Moving Image* [online], accessed 20.10.2014. Available at <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984/arms-control-5>.

*ballistic missiles attack*. Reagan declared: “Some say it will bring war to the heavens, but its purpose is to deter war in the heavens and on Earth.”<sup>401</sup> The SDI was being framed as a system which would prevent nuclear war and ultimately any use of nuclear weapons. As a response to critique of the SDI, Reagan made an attempt to depict it as a peaceful system which would only destroy missiles and not bring war into space: “It wouldn't kill people; it would destroy weapons. It wouldn't militarize space; it would help demilitarize the arsenals of Earth. It would render nuclear weapons obsolete.”<sup>402</sup> According to these statements, ultimately, the threat of their use would be eliminated. The main emphasis was put on its ability to demilitarize and render nuclear arsenals obsolete. As such, the SDI could not be considered to be an act of next nuclear arms race or an aggressive policy.<sup>403</sup> Reagan's rhetoric implied security shield which meant to secure the U.S. However, the general perception of the SDI implied quite different effects.

The end of the Cold War brought into the nuclear discourse completely different rhetoric. A gradual disclosure of details about nuclear accidents greatly impacted the debate. The evidence showed that the government inappropriately concealed information essential for protecting people and the environment.<sup>404</sup> It also inspired *The Downwinder poem* which became the key part of the discourse. The poem stated: “It's as safe as mother's milk, they'll say ... But mother's milk can be a deadly dish if mom, a downwinder, eats Columbia River's fish. ... So I fed poison to my nursing son with radioactive iodine-131. Just because we lived in the wrong place I maimed my babe for that nuclear race.”<sup>405</sup> Even though the downwinder issue was already part of the debate, this poem nevertheless gained a great significance. This poem insinuated that the U.S. government experimented on their own citizens and lied to them about consequences of such testing and, thus, allowed their citizens to be poisoned. The poem depicted how people affected by nuclear testing finally got explanations for their health problems. It reflected how the movement increasingly regarded environmental damages as being as much important as health effects on population.

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<sup>401</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 6, 1985. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38069>.

<sup>402</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985. Available online at [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/reagan2.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan2.asp).

<sup>403</sup> REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

<sup>404</sup> INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, p. xi.

<sup>405</sup> UNKNOWN. *Downwinder Poem* [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at Hanford Project: <http://www.hanfordproject.com/index.html>.



By the early 1990s, the nuclear discourse shifted toward lessening of international tensions which created a window of opportunity for nuclear disarmament initiatives. The G. H. W. Bush administration was, however, initially very skeptical about possible nuclear reductions and the disarmament. Bush strongly distrusted Gorbachev and his intentions to proceed with nuclear control negotiations. Bush also strongly opposed nuclear freeze and cutting defense spending. He declared that nuclear weapons *kept the peace and won the Cold War* and nuclear freeze could have never brought such peace.<sup>406</sup> Nuclear freeze was being perceived as something which might most probably disrupt stability and peace.

Since the end of the Cold War, the government had to deal with a strong public pressure to continue the Reagan's policy of nuclear reductions. The U.S. government was therefore urged to change their cautious rhetoric and their approach toward nuclear disarmament. Bush gradually grew inclined toward nuclear reductions and non-proliferation because it was believed to reduce risk of nuclear war.<sup>407</sup> This led to negotiated START I and START II treaty which reduced numbers of nuclear weapons.<sup>408,409,410</sup> The discourse included also concerns of nuclear proliferation of other countries such as China but, nevertheless, these negotiations focused primarily on bilateral reductions.

The U.S. government followed his nuclear rhetoric with additional nuclear weapon reductions. George H. W. Bush announced unilateral elimination of particular tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear land mines.<sup>411</sup> This signified their willingness to substantially reduce all their nuclear arsenals while keeping only certain numbers of particular types of weapons which would be available for future deployment if such need should have occurred. Bush also ordered a unilateral extensive cuts in military spending which included changes in their strategic nuclear forces and cancelled several nuclear development projects.<sup>412</sup> Reduction of

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<sup>406</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Debate with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

<sup>407</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

<sup>408</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress, February 9, 1989. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16660>.

<sup>409</sup> Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Signed by G.H.W. Bush and M. Gorbachev on 31 July, 1991, Lisbon protocol signed on 23 May, 1992, entered into force on 5 December 1994. The treaty was to be expired on December 2009.

<sup>410</sup> The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II). Signed by G.H.W. Bush and B. Yeltsin on 3 January, 1993, never entered into force.

<sup>411</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

<sup>412</sup> BUSH, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

nuclear weapons was perceived as a reflection and an accelerating force of changing relationship with the Soviets. He wanted to seize the window of opportunity in order to signify their willingness to improve mutual relations.

Clinton followed Bush with his rhetoric when he repeatedly confirmed that reduction of the U.S. and the Soviet nuclear arsenal was one of the main challenges of the post-cold war world.<sup>413</sup> He expressed his determination to carry on with nuclear disarmament in order to continue with *the decline of the nuclear threat*.<sup>414</sup> He also reaffirmed the government needed to cut significantly *wasteful* military spending because such nuclear programs were no longer needed. He declared that such projects could no longer be justified.<sup>415</sup> Clinton suggested that new nuclear weapons were now obsolete and redundant. Nevertheless the U.S. still retained nuclear weapons which did not decrease in numbers beyond the START II treaty levels.<sup>416</sup> The U.S. nuclear forces remained to deter foreign aggressions and nuclear proliferation. Reductions of nuclear weapons nevertheless indicated a position of the U.S. government that nuclear weapons were bound to have substantially smaller role of in the new international environment. The 1994 NPR confirmed this perception when declared that the U.S. nuclear policy was no longer based on MAD, but on Mutual Assured Safety (MAS). The NPR significantly reduced the U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons.<sup>417</sup>

In response to the easement of nuclear tensions and the governmental effort to disarm certain types of nuclear weapons, the anti-nuclear movement started raising the issue whether the U.S. still needed a massive nuclear arsenal to deter potential aggressors. They also asked if was current strategy of nuclear reductions rational in the situation of many different nuclear actors and future potential nuclear proliferators. They often argued that bilateral reduction lacked logic: “Bilateral agreements make sense if we are certain who our future nuclear adversaries will be. ... We do not want to find ourselves limited by a treaty with Russia in a conflict with another entity.”<sup>418</sup> They stressed that the U.S. must necessarily retain nuclear capability in order to be prepared for any nuclear proliferation threat and not focus only on the

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<sup>413</sup> CLINTON, William J. Debate with G. H. W. Bush and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

<sup>414</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1994. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

<sup>415</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, February 17, 1993. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232>.

<sup>416</sup> PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 83-4.

<sup>417</sup> BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 80.

<sup>418</sup> DOMENICI Pete V. The Domenici Challenge, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54 No. 2, p.43.

fact that Russia was no longer regarded as the existential threat. Also, the word *entity* implied the variety of future nuclear proliferators. According to some strategists, more reasonable than reductions would have been to retain different types of nuclear weapons to counter the threat of WMDs and deter a nuclear war more effectively.<sup>419</sup>

Another central part of the debate focused on the question whether the end of the Cold War changed nuclear stability and the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The anti-nuclear movement struggled with the question whether the change of nuclear deterrence made the use of nuclear weapons more likely or more acceptable than before or whether nuclear taboo will prevail.<sup>420</sup> The proposed concept of mutual assured safety, based on minimal deterrence and nuclear weapons cuts, was regarded as destined to fail because it had a minimal potential to accumulate fear and, therefore, it increased the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons against the U.S.<sup>421</sup> According to them, the elimination of nuclear weapons might have been partially destabilizing to the U.S. and MAD strategy was regarded as stabilizing.

The nuclear disarmament discourse after 1990 could be examined along two main lines of argumentation. First group of anti-nuclear actors argued that *non-proliferation* measures must be the first step to reach future without nuclear weapons. This approach urged the halt on horizontal proliferation on the basis of unpredictable or evil character of nuclear proliferators, such as rogue nations and terrorists. This posture was also often advocated by states possessing nuclear weapons who argued that the nuclear weapons by itself did not present a threat to the world, but the danger came from a variety of proliferation actors.<sup>422</sup> During the Cold War, the NPT was perceived as major assurance of non-proliferation. However, the end of the Cold War brought into the discourse many new actors which caused that the need for horizontal non-proliferation was again substantially raised. The issue of possible strengthening of the NPT and its indefinite extension was brought into the discourse.

The second group called for nuclear *disarmament* as the first and main goal of anti-nuclear efforts. They focused on the threatening potential of massive nuclear arsenals of current nuclear-weapon states. This standpoint was also advocated by non-nuclear weapons

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<sup>419</sup> BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 87.

<sup>420</sup> TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 295.

<sup>421</sup> BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 89.

<sup>422</sup> ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

states who perceived vertical proliferation as the main threat.<sup>423</sup> They perceived nuclear stockpiling to be the primary threat. The end of the Cold War brought into the discourse the fact that nuclear states failed to commit to the NPT clause of their determination of future disarmament in order to prevent stockpiling and to stop nuclear arms race.

The significant part of the nuclear disarmament discourse was preoccupied with the 1995 NPT review conference and its extension debate. The NPT Treaty represented an assurance of the U.S. security and a safety catch which would prevent unlimited horizontal proliferation. Majority of the movement feared that indefinite extension of the NPT Treaty might solidify the situation where nuclear-weapon states could keep their nuclear arsenal forever, while other states would be denied this right.<sup>424</sup> They mostly opposed the in indefinite extension and promoted a short extension because they thought it would encourage states to pursue genuine nuclear disarmament more likely.<sup>425</sup> The idea was that states would chose disarmament when facing the reality of soon to be expired treaty and accelerated proliferation.

Other nuclear disarmament groups such as the Campaign for the NPT argued that short extension of the NPT would force nuclear states into more accelerated arms race with the aim to stay ahead in the race. They therefore pleaded for the indefinite extension because it would be the best guarantee of the U.S. security against the future use of nuclear weapons against their homeland and future horizontal proliferation.<sup>426</sup> They assumed that a short extension would cause unlimited vertical nuclear proliferation which could represent enormous threat to the U.S. In the end, the NPT was extended indefinitely mainly due to an immense promotion of the proliferation threat of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.<sup>427</sup> The NPT review conference failed to commit nuclear-weapon states to nuclear disarmament.

Given that the abolition of nuclear weapons was not on the NPT extension agenda, anti-nuclear activists wrote the *Abolition 2000 Statement*. They declared that lack of political will of nuclear-weapon states is the only true barrier to the nuclear-weapon-free world.

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<sup>423</sup> ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

<sup>424</sup> EPSTEIN, William. Indefinite Extension – with increased accountability, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 1995, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 27.

<sup>425</sup> JOHNSON, Rebecca, *Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 65.

<sup>426</sup> JOHNSON, Rebecca, *Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 65.

<sup>427</sup> TURNER, Stansfield. The case for strategic escrow, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 16.

Therefore they called upon them to commit to certain steps in order to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. The Statement disregarded current attempt to strengthen a non-proliferation regime as futile because it permitted the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. They urged to abolish nuclear weapons in the name of humanity.<sup>428</sup> The rhetoric implied that a world free of nuclear weapons was a common goal and the only way of ensuring survival.

One of the major nuclear disarmament themes during 1990s was a debate about nuclear testing. First, the government announced voluntary suspension of nuclear testing. Second, changes of the end of the Cold War brought into the discourse a chance to agree on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The nuclear disarmament movement often called for a ban on all nuclear testing. They labeled it as an *ongoing nuclear violence* not only on local population, but more importantly violence on the environment.<sup>429</sup> The U.S. signed a multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.<sup>430</sup> Clinton believed that the treaty “will immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing.”<sup>431</sup> Nevertheless, the subsequent ratification of the CTBT in the Senate was very problematic. Several U.S. politicians continuously expressed their concerns that signing of the CTBT would damage deterrence capability and viability of their nuclear arsenal. In overall, the ratification of the CTBT was regarded as a security threat because there were allegedly no reliable verification measures to track nuclear testing of other countries.<sup>432</sup>

Clinton never missed an opportunity to appeal to the Congress to ratify the CTBT. Clinton was constantly asserting the need to ratify the CTBT in order to *end nuclear testing forever*.<sup>433,434</sup> Clinton believed that such ban would inhibit horizontal nuclear proliferation.<sup>435</sup>

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<sup>428</sup> THE ABOLITION 2000. The Abolition 2000 Founding Statement, *Abolition 2000: Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons* [online], accessed 16.12.2014. Available at, [http://www.abolition2000.org/?page\\_id=153](http://www.abolition2000.org/?page_id=153).

<sup>429</sup> NEVADA DESERT EXPERIENCE, *Brief History* [online], 2011, accessed 20.10.2014. Available at <http://www.nevadadesertexperience.org/history/history.htm>.

<sup>430</sup> The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (The CTBT). Adopted on September 10, 1996 by the UN General Assembly, opened for signature on September, 24 1996, not entered into force.

<sup>431</sup> HAQ, Farhan. Disarmament: Clinton Leads CTBT Signing but Experts Doubt Results, United Nations, Inter Press Service, News Agency [online], September 24 1996, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/09/disarmament-clinton-leads-ctbt-signing-but-experts-doubt-results/>.

<sup>432</sup> KRAUSS, Lawrence. It's Time for the U.S. To Finally Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: A recent report removes all of the legitimate scientific objections to ratifying the agreement, *Slate*, April 2012 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at [http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\\_tense/2012/04/comprehensive\\_nuclear\\_test\\_ban\\_treaty\\_the\\_u\\_s\\_should\\_ratify\\_it\\_now.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now.html).

<sup>433</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 23, 1996. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091>.

<sup>434</sup> CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 19, 1999. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

He regarded every limit on nuclear weapons to be a step toward diminishing the threat of nuclear proliferation which was perceived as the biggest threat. Also Madeline K. Albright, then Secretary of State, stated that the ratification of the CTBT would limit nuclear proliferation to other states.<sup>436</sup> The need to ratify the CTBT was emphasized not because of the health threats of testing, but because of the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation.

Even though the CTBT was not ratified, it was a strong encouragement to nuclear disarmament agenda. Among others, also Colin Powell spoke about the eventuality of nuclear abolishment. He stated that there will be “the time when that number of nuclear weapons is down to zero and world is a much better place.”<sup>437</sup> The narrative of nuclear zero was continuously present within the discourse. Also, the nuclear disarmament activists started applying pressure on the government to develop a convention on nuclear weapons which would establish an international regime prohibiting all states from pursuing and participating in the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.<sup>438</sup>

### 5. 3. Summary and Key Acts of Securitization

The key securitizing move of this researched period occurred in the early 1980s when Reagan pursued the policy of the nuclear buildup. Reagan's confrontational rhetoric of the nuclear buildup and the rising Soviet power returned the threat of nuclear war into the center of the nuclear discourse. He declared that the only way how to remain strong when facing the existential threat of the USSR was to continue the nuclear buildup. He even framed the nuclear freeze agenda as an utopian and counterproductive idea. He was continually stating that if the U.S. was to reduce their nuclear armament, it would have to be only if it was within a mutually beneficial agreement. His rhetoric of a strong nation was widely accepted, however, the population did not accept Reagan's securitization of the Soviet threat and protested against the planned nuclear buildup. The U.S. public opinion did not regard the

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<sup>435</sup> MCMANUS, Doyle. Clinton May OK Resuming Underground Nuclear Tests, *Los Angeles Times*, May 16, 1993.

<sup>436</sup> ALBRIGHT, Madeline K. Statement by Dr. Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the CTBT, October 7 1999. Available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/100799albright.htm>.

<sup>437</sup> PARRINGTON, Alan J. Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited: Strategic Doctrine in Question, *Airpower Journal*, Vol. 11 (1-2), AU Press, Winter 1997, p. 4.

<sup>438</sup> THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE. Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), *Nuclear Threat Initiative: Building a Safer World Timeline* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weapons-convention-nwc/>.

additional nuclear arming as a necessity to ensure its security. This resulted in massive protests and demonstrations calling for the nuclear disarmament. Anti-nuclear movement regrouped in the form of umbrella agenda of the nuclear freeze. They emphasized the need to freeze the nuclear testing and development.

Such opposition forced Reagan to soften his hostile nuclear rhetoric and policy. Reagan shifted his attention to nuclear reduction negotiations. His statements often emphasized a zero option for particular types of nuclear weapons as the most effective way how to reduce nuclear weapons. The 1982 marches also led Reagan to merely adopt the rhetoric of the nuclear disarmament movement about the need to abolish nuclear weapons. However, the rhetoric of abolition and the policy of reductions did not lessen a threat of the nuclear war with the USSR. Reagan used this continual fear when he performed a securitizing move that the threat that the USSR might attack the U.S. still prevailed. As a solution, he declared that the U.S. must build preventive security shield. However, the general public saw this initiative as another form of nuclear build up and, therefore, did not accept it.

The end of the Cold War represented a great window of opportunity for both governmental and non-governmental actors. The dissolution of the USSR caused not only a rapid shift in mutual relations and lessening of international tensions, but also a completely different perception of nuclear threats and the corresponding disarmament discourse. Gradually, the long-lasting threat of the USSR was essentially desecuritized. The U.S. administrations was performing rhetorical moves where they stated that Russia no longer represented a threat to the U.S. and the threat of nuclear war diminished. This rhetoric was later followed by the policy of detargeting and the policy of reductions which were perceived as stability building by the government. Clinton declared that since the USSR was no longer a threat, nuclear reduction could no longer be justified by using such rhetoric as has been before.

The accumulated fear of the nuclear war instantly transformed into the threat of the horizontal nuclear proliferation, in this case mainly proliferation of rogue states and terrorists. The threat of nuclear proliferation by rogue states and a scare that nuclear terrorists might acquire nuclear bombs was present within the discourse earlier. However, the desecuritization of the USSR as the main threat after the end of the Cold War produced greatly intensified perception of the proliferation threat. Thus both G. H. W. Bush and B. Clinton securitized the threat of the horizontal proliferation. In this situation, a threat of loose nukes in the former USSR and ineffective control of nuclear material worldwide were labeled as existential threats to the U.S. The public accepted this securitization as the greatest threat which led to substantial nuclear control measures. This dominance of horizontal nuclear threats also led to

enforcing indefinite extension of the NPT. Anti-nuclear movement adopted this emphasis on the horizontal nuclear proliferation and started focusing on the threat of rogue states. The movement emphasized the need to control nuclear material and nuclear weapons.

Third significant moment was when the end of the Cold War also brought back into the discourse the threat of the nuclear testing. Gradual rise of public knowledge about effects of the nuclear testing and a significant disclosure of nuclear accidents and contaminations led many people to revive the agenda of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This led to signing the CTBT, which is yet to be ratified by the Congress due to the concern that it might disrupt their credible nuclear deterrence..



## 6. Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, 2001-2014

*“Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends -- and we will oppose them with all our power.”*<sup>439</sup>

Our last examined period starts in 2001 and ends in 2014.<sup>440</sup> The nuclear discourse within this period was influenced primarily by the 2001 terrorist attacks which dramatically altered the whole perception of the existential threat to the U.S. The subsequent 2003 Iraq war significantly influenced the construction of the nuclear threat and the disarmament discourse. The presidency of Obama marks a significant shift of the discourse. Considering the international context, the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and Iran was very significant.

### 6. 1. Construction of Nuclear Threats, 2001-2014

#### 6. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War

The nuclear discourse continued to follow primarily the course of actions which began with the end of the Cold War. By the beginning of the 21 century, the threat of nuclear war was not distinctly present within the discourse and Russia was not regarded as a threat to the U.S. Several politicians made significant effort to renounce the MAD strategy toward Russia and emphasized that these countries entered the path of partnership.<sup>441</sup> The G. W. Bush administration even shifted their Cold War *threat-based approach* to a deterrence policy *capabilities-based approach*.<sup>442</sup> Thus they replaced their policy of a threat projection by a

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<sup>439</sup> BUSH, George W. President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, United States Military Academy at New York, June 1, 2002. Available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

<sup>440</sup> The fifth examined period overlaps with the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama. Presidency of George W. Bush lasted from January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009. Barack Obama took office on January 20, 2009.

<sup>441</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

<sup>442</sup> RUMSFELD, Donald. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Foreword (cover letter forwarding NPR to the Congress), 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

more moderate approach which should have encouraged mutual confidence building and cooperative relations with Russia. It was considered to be unlikely that the U.S. would be dragged into a nuclear exchange in general. However, regional nuclear war between other nuclear countries such as Pakistan and India was regarded as possible.<sup>443,444</sup> The risk of such nuclear conflict between countries was perceived as higher as the nuclear proliferation grew. Within the nuclear discourse, many activists and scientists often stressed that such regional nuclear war or even a limited nuclear exchange would have caused as many human fatalities as the World War II and disrupted the global climate for a decade at minimum. It was being stated that the civilization remained at risk of nuclear winter and a *global nuclear famine* despite current policy of nuclear arsenal reduction.<sup>445,446,447</sup> Even a small nuclear exchange was considered to cause devastating environmental effects.<sup>448</sup> Nuclear weapons continued to be regarded as the greatest environmental danger to the planet.<sup>449</sup>

The 2002 NPR declared that nuclear strike involving Russia was plausible, but not really expected.<sup>450,451</sup> The 2010 NPR reaffirmed that even though Russia continued to modernize its nuclear arsenal, they could no longer be considered as adversaries of the U.S. Moreover, they called the threat of global nuclear war as *remote*.<sup>452</sup> Russia was being regarded as a partner in nuclear issues. This approach was confirmed by a symbolical pressing of a reset button which was an analogy to renewed relations. However, since Putin's hostile

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<sup>443</sup> GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE. Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 16, 2010 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/regional-nuclear-war-could-devastate-world-population-report-warns/>.

<sup>444</sup> KREPON, Michael. *The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia*, p. 7. [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf>.

<sup>445</sup> STARR, Steven. Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, *International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation* [online], accessed 24.12.2014. Available at <http://inesap.org/node/11>.

<sup>446</sup> GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE. Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 16, 2010 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/regional-nuclear-war-could-devastate-world-population-report-warns/>.

<sup>447</sup> SCHNEIDMILLER, Chris. Limited Nuclear War Could Deplete Ozone Layer, Increasing Radiation, *Global Security Newswire* February 24, 2011 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/limited-nuclear-war-could-deplete-ozone-layer-increasing-radiation/>.

<sup>448</sup> HARRELL, Eben. Why Nukes are the Most Urgent Environmental Threat, *Ecocentric, Time magazine*, February 25, 2011 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://science.time.com/2011/02/25/why-nukes-are-the-most-urgent-environmental-threat/>.

<sup>449</sup> JHA, Alok. Climate threat from nuclear bombs, *The Guardian*, December 12, 2006 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/dec/12/nuclearindustry.climatechange>.

<sup>450</sup> Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>, p. 17.

<sup>451</sup> Nuclear Posture Review released in 2002 is a classified document. For the purpose of our analysis, we examine its excerpts which are available online, its cover letter, and statements to press.

<sup>452</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, p. iv, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>.

rhetoric and his unpredictable actions worsened mutual relations, the new Cold War started to be regarded as a possibility.<sup>453</sup>

### 6. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

The nuclear discourse included the threat of the use of nuclear weapons mainly in the context of the nuclear proliferation threat. George W. Bush refused to declare non-first use policy and even declared a pre-emptive attack doctrine in which the U.S. reserved itself a right to disrupt proliferation efforts of other actors also with the use of nuclear weapons. The 2002 NPR put an emphasis on the possibility that the U.S. might use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear *rogue nations* which aspired to acquire or already possessed nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.<sup>454</sup> Bush reaffirmed the preemptive policy against proliferators threatening the U.S. by statements such as: “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves.”<sup>455</sup> It was stressed that the U.S. must be able to take preemptive actions against alleged nuclear proliferators, primarily *rogue states* and their *hostile actions*. The 2001 attacks enabled Bush to securitize the threat of rogue states and terrorists which threatened the U.S. homeland. His rhetorical actions then allowed him to pursue particular political courses. The atmosphere and general mobilization against issues which were declared to be an existential threat allowed Bush to declare such a radical preemptive approach. However, several U.S. politicians regarded such preventive war policy as a principle which might have *catastrophic consequences*.<sup>456</sup> In a changed international environment with many proliferators, the principle of preventive war was often regarded as a policy which could incite nuclear employment more easily.

Obama feared of what might happen in the field with such many proliferation actors. Thus he radically changed this policy toward encouragement of non-proliferation. The 2010 NPR thus declared not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states who were party to the NPT and in compliance with principles of nuclear non-

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<sup>453</sup> FEITH, D. J., CROPSEY, S. How the Russian 'Reset' Explains Obama's Foreign Policy, *Foreign Policy*, October 16, 2012.

<sup>454</sup> Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>.

<sup>455</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Washington, p. 15.

<sup>456</sup> CARTER, Jimmy. Nobel Lecture Oslo, December 10 2002, The Nobel Foundation 2002, Nobel Media AB 2014 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/2002/carter-lecture.html](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2002/carter-lecture.html).

proliferation. Nevertheless, it was also implied that the U.S. retained an option to employ nuclear weapons against nuclear states not under the NPT or nuclear non-proliferation obligations. But nuclear weapons employment was still regarded as likely only in *extreme circumstances* and in order to defend *vital interests* of the U.S. or its allies and partners.<sup>457</sup> The U.S. could not declare general non-use since it would severely diminish their nuclear deterrence credibility. For this reason, Obama made an attempt to bypass this problem by encouraging states to comply with the NPT in order not to be targeted. The 2010 NPR even declared that it is in the U.S. interest that deterrence would be the sole purpose of nuclear weapons and “nuclear non-use be extended forever.”<sup>458</sup>

### 6. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

After the end of the Cold War, the center of the discourse focused primarily on horizontal proliferation at the expense of vertical proliferation. The horizontal nuclear proliferation became gradually perceived as the primary existential threat. Since the beginning of 2001 and more persistently after the 2001 terrorist attacks, George W. Bush repeatedly accented the threat of a nuclear surprise attack against the U.S. by rogue states and terrorists. He even stated that in order to better cope with these new threats, the U.S. must develop effective missile defense systems and secure nuclear material through counter-proliferation initiatives.<sup>459,460</sup> Bush utilized the nuclear threat rhetoric which allowed him to later withdraw from the ABM treaty.

The debate shifted rapidly after the 2001 by giving the primary emphasis on the threat of nuclear terrorism and rogue states proliferation. The nuclear proliferation debate centered on several states which were regarded as potentially most threatening to the U.S. As most threatening proliferators were often considered to be Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq. It was stated that nuclear proliferation could present “one of the greatest dangers to the stability

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<sup>457</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, pp. viii-ix.

<sup>458</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, pp. viii-ix.

<sup>459</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals, February 27, 2001. Available online <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643>.

<sup>460</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 2005 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58746>.

of society since the dawn of humans.”<sup>461</sup> Such proliferation was mostly perceived as potentially endangering both the U.S. and the world. The debate also increasingly included a threat of nuclear terrorism and the risk that terrorists could have seized nuclear material and might have acquired a radioactive dirty bomb. Thus the issue of safety of nuclear material and securing nuclear power plants became a significant part of the debate.<sup>462</sup>

Bush explained that current ABM Treaty inhibited their ability to protect Americans from future terrorist or rogue state attacks.<sup>463</sup> Withdrawal from the ABM could be understood as an action aiming to protect the U.S. against potential attack by rogue states. Planned National Missile Defense was an initiative which would better protect the U.S. deterrence capability and prevent potential blackmail from rogue states. According to the Bush administration, while missile defenses were considered by some as being impractical and destabilizing during the Cold War, now they considered to be essential.<sup>464</sup> This justification exposed a remarkable shift in the U.S. defense thinking. During the Cold War, the main existential threat behind building missile defense systems was first the USSR and, later, both the USSR and China. Now it was justified by different type of nuclear proliferation. As the primary existential threat posed to the U.S. was securitized to be nuclear proliferation by rogue states and non-state actors attempting to acquire WMDs. Also, when faced with many different adversaries, they expressed the need to start focusing primarily on defensive strategies.

The proliferation debate addressed mainly a need to reduce dangers of proliferation of nuclear material while the principal emphasis was put on the pervasive threat posed by terrorists. Majority of efforts which aimed to strengthen non-proliferation regimes such as the NPT was led by the primary idea of preventing terrorist to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>465</sup> Also the 2002 NPR presumed that terrorists and rogue states possessing WMD would be likely to test the U.S. commitments to its allies and, therefore, the U.S. must improve their ability to

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<sup>461</sup> GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE. Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 16, 2010 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/regional-nuclear-war-could-devastate-world-population-report-warns/>.

<sup>462</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 90.

<sup>463</sup> GARAMONE, Jim. Bush Announces ABM Treaty Withdrawal, American Forces Press Service, Washington: Department of Defense News, December 13, 2001 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44365>.

<sup>464</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

<sup>465</sup> Initiatives such as International Nuclear Material Protection, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Proliferation Security Initiative, Terrorism Prevention Act, or National Implementation Plan for Counterterrorism.

deter attacks of WMD proliferators.<sup>466,467</sup> Bush repeatedly urged that the U.S. must also prevent the terrorists and regimes to acquire nuclear weapons because they would threaten the U.S. and the world.<sup>468</sup> U.S. politicians started to alarm the world opinion by threatening with the image of terrorists possessing nuclear weapons in order to get support for their policies of the war on terror. The threat posed by rogue states focused mainly on their harboring and aiding of terrorists which suggested that the main declaratory reason behind it was a terrorist threat.

Throughout 2002, it was often proclaimed that Iraqi regime, who also harbored terrorists, undoubtedly strived to develop nuclear weapons for over a decade. Bush performed a powerful securitizing move when he warned that Iraq strived to develop WMD and as such, he declared that Iraq was a part of an *axis of evil*, as opposed to *civilized world* which it threatened.<sup>469,470</sup> The emphasis on the evilness was key in his securitization of Iraq as an existential threat to the U.S. He stated that the U.S. will not hesitate to act to prevent such proliferation which they felt very much threatened by: “America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. ... In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”<sup>471</sup> Bush's rhetoric suggested that the risks of Iraqi nuclear proliferation were too high to remain inactive. Bush later proclaimed: “We refuse to live in the shadow of this ultimate danger.”<sup>472</sup> He presented a powerful image of powerful America living in the *shadow* of fear created by another much smaller and much less powerful country. America which cannot be blackmailed or threatened by such danger.

Bush often proclaimed that it was clear that Iraq developed nuclear weapons and that he had evidence that Saddam Hussein aided and protected terrorists, which suggested that he could also provide them with nuclear weapons. He successfully connected the threat of *outlaw*

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<sup>466</sup> RUMSFELD, Donald. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Foreword (cover letter forwarding NPR to the Congress), 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

<sup>467</sup> RUMSFELD, Donald. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Foreword (cover letter forwarding NPR to the Congress), 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

<sup>468</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>.

<sup>469</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>.

<sup>470</sup> Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>, pp.16-17.

<sup>471</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Washington.

<sup>472</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29646>.

*regimes* which seek nuclear weapons to the image of such states selling these weapons to *terrorist allies* “who would use them without the least hesitation.”<sup>473</sup> Such concern was labeled as the *gravest danger*. Thus the war in Iraq was perceived as a necessity because it would counter not only the threat of nuclear rogue state, but also the threat of nuclear terrorism. Bush's strong emphasis on the imminency of the proliferation threat and Saddam Hussein's evil character led many to support preventive action. Bush often validated this approach by statements such as: “Containment doesn't work with a man who is a madman.”<sup>474</sup> Also Brzezinski, in the face of Iraq's supposed possession of WMDs, started supporting forceful measures against this *long-term grave and gathering threat*.<sup>475</sup> The decision to attack Iraq was very much perceived as controversial among the American population, however, Bush's securitization of this issue created mobilization powerful enough to enforce this extreme measure which was also substantially accepted as needed.

Bush later continued to stress that Saddam Hussein did use WMD against its own people and thus the War on terror was justified and imperative. He disregarded as false growing concerns over the real cause of the War which was contributed to intelligence failures and false statements. He continued to reaffirm that “America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons.”<sup>476</sup> The U.S. administration followed their rhetoric about their determination to confront regimes that harbored and supported terrorists and could provide them with nuclear weapons. He increasingly struggled to maintain the general narrative that horizontal nuclear proliferation by terrorists and rogue states represented the gravest threat to the U.S.

Iraq War created a watershed in nuclear proliferation debate. The War sent among others also a message to particular states that either they will manage to develop its own nuclear arsenal and then they would be safe from foreign invasion, or they will negotiate nuclear non-proliferation in exchange for non-invasion promise by which they would become more vulnerable to invasion than ever. Accordingly, Libya, North Korea, and Iran rapidly changed their behavior. North Korea chose to accelerate their nuclear program in order to

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<sup>473</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645>.

<sup>474</sup> BUSH, George W. *Interview with President George W. Bush* [interview]. The Oval Office, February 7, 2004. Broadcasted on NBC's “Meet The Press”, February 8, 2004. Transcript available online: [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4179618/ns/meet\\_the\\_press/t/transcript-feb-th/#.VJFXoyu8020](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4179618/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-feb-th/#.VJFXoyu8020).

<sup>475</sup> MANN, James. Brzezinski and Iraq: The Making of a Dove. In: GATI, Charles ed. *Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, p. 240.

<sup>476</sup> BUSH, George W. Remarks at the National Defense University: Bush's Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, February 11, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html>.

avoid being next to be invaded. Also Iran continued their nuclear development program.<sup>477</sup> Later Bush regarded Iran to be “the world's primary state sponsor of terror.”<sup>478</sup> Libya, on the other hand, cancelled their nuclear development program. Bush stated that negotiations with Libya were successful because the Iraq war caused the threat to invade to be perceived as more credible.<sup>479</sup> The study of Bush's rhetoric shows that he very often intertwined the issue of rogue states possessing nuclear weapons with the issue of terrorists acquiring nuclear bomb. To this inconsistency of his rhetorical acts could be also added common rhetorical changes of the main danger from the threat of WMD to nuclear threat and back. Also, within his remarks on threat of terror we could see that the word terror was often not used in the reference to terrorism or terrorist actions. He often used this word as an ambiguous label of evil in general, as anything that threatened U.S.

The construction of the nuclear threat changed rapidly during Obama administration. Obama acknowledged nuclear terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”<sup>480</sup> Also the 2010 NPR declared that the danger of nuclear terrorism was the most immediate and extreme existential threat. The NPR recognized that the accelerated trend of nuclear proliferation could cause growth in numbers of new nuclear states and an increased likelihood that terrorists would possess nuclear weapons.<sup>481</sup> Nuclear disarmament activists also regarded nuclear proliferation and a rising threat of nuclear terrorism as a grave danger to the world.<sup>482</sup> Anti-nuclear initiatives continually maintained their position that the existence of nuclear weapons by themselves represented the greatest threat to the whole world. In addition, Obama himself altered the governmental rhetoric and that newly also regarded nuclear proliferation as danger to the whole world. The logic behind this shift was that nuclear proliferation activities newly endangered security and stability of the global international system.

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<sup>477</sup> BUSH, George W. Remarks at the National Defense University: Bush's Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, February 11, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html>.

<sup>478</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 2005 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58746>.

<sup>479</sup> BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29646>.

<sup>480</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>481</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p. iii-vi.

<sup>482</sup> BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Doomsday Clock: Timeline [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/timeline>. See also BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. *It is 5 minutes to midnight*, January 10, 2012 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/press-release/it-5-minutes-midnight>.



Obama warned that since more countries possessed nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and technology has spread, terrorists attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear testing continues, the risks of the use of nuclear weapons were far more greater. Thus he stressed the need to strengthen their commitment to continue with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. He noted that “the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.”<sup>483</sup> This perception was caused primarily due to the threat of nuclear proliferation by terrorists. In order to better deter such attacks, Obama also followed plans of previous administration to build missile defense system. He stated that such system and a radar system in Central Europe should better cope with the threat coming from countries such as Iran or North Korea.<sup>484</sup> He also vigorously strived to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.<sup>485,486</sup>

#### 6. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

Since the U.S. did not perform any nuclear test since 1992, the threat of nuclear testing was present within the discourse mostly in the context of reconsidering of the ratification of the CTBT. The Congress continued to label the CTBT as not beneficial for the U.S. Bush administration also declared their opposition to the ratification of the CTBT.<sup>487</sup> On the contrary, Obama promised to vigorously pursue ratification of the CTBT since verification capability to detect nuclear testing significantly improved and the U.S. could retain its nuclear capability without further nuclear testing. He stated that *after more than five decades* of negotiating, it was *finally* time for talks to be concluded and nuclear testing banned.<sup>488</sup>

Within the public debate, nuclear testing was often criticized on the basis of moral considerations while comparing the U.S. refusal to ratify the CTBT to nuclear programs of

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<sup>483</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>484</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>485</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, January 24, 2012 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99000>.

<sup>486</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, February 12, 2013 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=102826>.

<sup>487</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

<sup>488</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

North Korea or Iran.<sup>489</sup> Many nuclear disarmament activists continued to emphasize how nuclear testing and radiation exposure had long-term severe effects on human health and the environment. They noted that nuclear testing will eventually cause 2.4 million human cancer fatalities and have effects on every human for thousands of years. They also protested against development of new types of nuclear weapons which might have been more usable in the battlefield but still regarded as unacceptable.<sup>490</sup> It was stressed what exact impact the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have on enemy's population.

## 6. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Discourse, 2001-2014

Since 2001, the nuclear disarmament discourse focused primarily on constructed threat of the horizontal nuclear proliferation and potential risk that nuclear bomb coming from new proliferation actors might be used against the U.S. These threat perceptions gave a significant encouragement to additional nuclear disarmament initiatives.

Although the threat of nuclear war was significantly decreased and there was no strong nuclear opponent on the horizon forcing the U.S. to disarm or reduce nuclear weapons, the Bush administration to some extent continued with the policy of nuclear weapons reduction. One of these initiatives was The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT).<sup>491</sup> But since the main focus of public debate shifted to the threat of proliferation, the government was not pressured to proceed with genuine reductions and serious nuclear disarmament agreement. Despite their declared attempts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy, nuclear weapons remained central to ensuring their defense against possible nuclear attacks. Moreover, the U.S. national security policy called for flexible response to proliferation threats, and therefore, they sought to develop new types of small and tactical nuclear weapons. The 2002 NPR expressed the need to maintain credibility of their nuclear attack plans and even justified sustainment and modernization of nuclear weapons as essential

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<sup>489</sup> KRAUSS, Lawrence. It's Time for the U.S. To Finally Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: A recent report removes all of the legitimate scientific objections to ratifying the agreement, *Slate*, April 2012 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at [http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\\_tense/2012/04/comprehensive\\_nuclear\\_test\\_ban\\_treaty\\_the\\_u\\_s\\_should\\_ratify\\_it\\_now.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now.html).

<sup>490</sup> INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Testing, and Depleted Uranium Weapons: Medical Consequences and Implications for NPT Compliance*, 2003[online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.ipnw.org/statements/2003-earth-penetrating-nuclear-weapons.pdf>.

<sup>491</sup> Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT). Signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, entered into force in June 2003.

in order to ensure security of the U.S. and their allies.<sup>492</sup> Thus reductions itself were again labeled as potential risks to the U.S. security and to sustaining credible deterrence.

Despite the rhetoric of the Bush administration, the atmosphere was gradually changing toward recognizing the threat posed by rogue states and terrorists and the need to move forward with nuclear disarmament. The continual crisis of confidence in nuclear non-proliferation regime and its inability to make significant progress toward abolishing nuclear weapons was being increasingly criticized in the context of rising threat of nuclear terrorism. Kofi Annan declared that in a situation where non-proliferation regimes are not effective, the threat that terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons significantly increased. Consequently, this significantly increases the danger that these weapons of *self-annihilation* will be used. Annan stated that this represents a “unique existential threat to all humanity” and urged to proceed with complete disarmament and non-proliferation at the same time.<sup>493</sup> He suggested that the debate wrongly focused on the threat of nuclear proliferation while, in fact, it should concentrate on the evilness and threat of nuclear weapons itself.

In 2007, four former American statesmen George P Shultz, William J Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn released an essay titled *A World Free of Nuclear Weapons*. They argued that current reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent was becoming very risky because terrorists possessing nuclear weapons as “the ultimate means of mass devastation ... are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy.”<sup>494</sup> They were primarily concerned that nuclear weapons will get into hands of terrorists who could not be deterred by possible retaliation. This issue was being gradually regarded as a threat which must be prevented at all costs. Their primary logic was that nuclear deterrence works and is stabilizing till there are actors who cannot be deterred. This situation then creates grave threat.

In the same spirit, nuclear disarmament groups and initiatives increasingly focused on the need to achieve *global zero*, a complete nuclear disarmament. The campaign Global Zero, launched in 2008, declared that in order to eliminate nuclear threat and to achieve global zero, it was essential to stop spread of nuclear weapons, secure all nuclear material, and eliminate all nuclear weapons. They stressed that nuclear terrorism was a threat to the world as well as

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<sup>492</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

<sup>493</sup> ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

<sup>494</sup> SHULTZ, George P., PERRY, William J., KISSINGER, Henry A., and NUNN, Sam. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007.

to the U.S.<sup>495</sup> The main emphasis continued to be given to the necessity to secure nuclear material for the sake of not only the U.S., but all people. *Nuclear zero* became a universally accepted symbol of nuclear disarmament goal of the future without nuclear weapons.

Later, Obama administration brought again this idea of complete nuclear disarmament into the center of the nuclear discourse. Obama's Prague Speech about a world without nuclear weapons made in 2009 became the key moment of his nuclear disarmament agenda which also significantly awakened the whole nuclear disarmament discourse since then. In this speech, which launched Prague Agenda, Obama labeled nuclear weapons to be “the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War”, where people lived in a fear that “their world could be erased in a single flash of light.”<sup>496</sup> His rhetoric suggested that such nuclear legacy must be revoked in the 21st century since it threatened to erase the humanity. It was stated that nuclear weapons posed immense threat to all people worldwide and thus needed to be abolished.

Obama stated that since the U.S. is the only nuclear power to have used nuclear weapons, they have a *moral responsibility* to start and *lead the endeavor* to seek a *world without nuclear weapons*. For this reason, they were allegedly prepared to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their nuclear strategy and embark on new bilateral reduction negotiations with Russia. He remarked that it was their *commitment* to seek peace and security and “to live free from fear in the 21st century.”<sup>497</sup> His rhetoric suggested that the main reason for a world without nuclear weapons was that there will finally be *peace and security*, something which was currently missing. In the situation where many actors possessed nuclear knowledge and nuclear material was scattered around the world, it resembled more a *narrative of ultimate survival* than an image of a *world free from fear*. He put an emphasis on their moral responsibility to launch this Prague Agenda to ensure nuclear disarmament in the future and effective strengthened non-proliferation measures.

Furthermore, the Prague Speech clearly showed that the primary concern behind this rhetorical non-proliferation action was fear of terrorists who are seeking to *buy, build or steal* nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them. His consistent rhetoric suggested that the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons by terrorists was the primary reason behind these non-

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<sup>495</sup> GLOBAL ZERO. *Who We Are* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.globalzero.org/our-movement/who-we-are>.

<sup>496</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>497</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

proliferation initiatives. He stated that the threat of terrorist nuclear attack was high and represents “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapons could unleash massive destruction.”<sup>498</sup> This construction of the threat served him in justifying the importance of non-proliferation measures which must be invulnerable to terrorist attempts to steal nuclear material. He suggested that the world without these *ultimate weapons of destruction* was possible, but people must stand together in this effort to secure the material. It was stated as essential that the U.S. must seek a world without nuclear weapons. This remarkable effort even led to Obama being awarded with Nobel Peace Prize.

Obama often regarded nuclear proliferation as not being inevitable. Obama repeatedly declared a vision of a world without nuclear weapons. In order to reach complete nuclear disarmament he stressed the importance of non-proliferation regime. He often stated that this terrorist threat might be suppressed by securing all loose nuclear materials and by a reduction of massive nuclear arsenal of the U.S. and Russia. He also promised to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. security strategy as a first step toward disarmament.<sup>499,500,501</sup> These reductions were promised to significantly contribute to more secure nuclear material worldwide. Obama also made a significant attempt to continue a tradition of bilateral reduction negotiations. These talks concluded in the New START Treaty (New START) which superseded the SORT Treaty. The New START Treaty reduced numbers of strategic missile launchers by half.<sup>502</sup> Obama declared the treaty to be an agreement which will cut number of deployed nuclear warheads to lowest levels since 1950s.<sup>503</sup> However, the government was stating only change in deployed numbers and not did not take into account massive numbers of stored nuclear weapons.

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<sup>498</sup>OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>499</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks in West Lafayette, Indiana, July 16, 2008 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77720>. See also OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 27, 2010 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87433>.

<sup>500</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 2011 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>. See also OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, February 12, 2013 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=102826>

<sup>501</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2014 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=104596>.

<sup>502</sup> The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty). Signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011.

<sup>503</sup> OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate -- Berlin, Germany, 2013, The White House, [online], accessed 04.7.2015. Available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany>.

Obama's substantial revival of the nuclear disarmament agenda triggered several powerful non-governmental disarmament actions. Nuclear disarmament activists mainly adopted the agenda that nuclear abolition and nuclear international control was the only way how to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear material. Anti-nuclear activists often emphasized the importance of nuclear abolishment because of the risk of accidental nuclear exchange. The nuclear disarmament agenda urged that "if these nuclear weapons exist indefinitely, they will definitely be used."<sup>504,505</sup> The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons pressured states to acknowledge that any use of nuclear weapons would "cause catastrophic humanitarian and environmental harm" and that there was a "universal humanitarian imperative" to ban nuclear weapons.<sup>506</sup> They were not stressing the threat of nuclear terrorism per se. They emphasized that nuclear weapons by themselves posed immense danger to the whole world regardless of in which hands they are located.

However, several politicians and journalists continued to oppose the agenda of total nuclear disarmament by warning that Obama plans to transform the U.S. into *nuclear impotent*. Such ideas were also being titled as American utopianism.<sup>507</sup> They also argued that a goal of complete nuclear disarmament was counterproductive and a mere fantasy since it would not suppress proliferation but only risk compromising the U.S. deterrence capability. "[H]ope is not a policy, and, at present, there is no realistic path to a world free of nuclear weapons. ...Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated."<sup>508</sup> According to this view, such efforts would only weaken the U.S. security. For this reason they argued that it is essential for the U.S. to maintain their nuclear capability to deter others. The opposition to nuclear disarmament agenda often regarded nuclear zero as *not feasible* since no state could be trusted in matter of the nuclear disarmament. Kenneth Waltz declared: "With conventional weapons, countries worry about winning or losing. With nuclear weapons, countries worry about surviving or being

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<sup>504</sup> HARRELL, Eben. Why Nukes are the Most Urgent Environmental Threat, *Ecocentric, Time magazine*, February 25, 2011 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://science.time.com/2011/02/25/why-nukes-are-the-most-urgent-environmental-threat/>.

<sup>505</sup> WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 219.

<sup>506</sup> INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *Campaign overview* [online], accessed 24.12.2014. Available at <http://www.icanw.org/campaign/campaign-overview/>.

<sup>507</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p.88.

<sup>508</sup> BROWN, Harold and DEUTCH, John. The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy, *Wall Street Journal*, New York, November 19, 2007, A19.

annihilated.”<sup>509</sup> Nuclear weapons were perceived as the only security guarantee of states. Furthermore, since nuclear weapons are a force of the ultimate survival, a state cannot be expected to give up their most powerful weapon. Waltz assumed that it could not be expected that states would get rid of all nuclear weapons because of the anarchical nature of the world.

With regard to nuclear development program of Iran, the debate also included a consideration whether Iran should have a right to possess nuclear weapons in order to ensure its own security. Kenneth Waltz proclaimed that Iran should have the right to develop nuclear weapons since it would most likely also strengthen a stability of the region because Iran and Israel would have deterred each other. He stated that new nuclear-weapon states often contributed to regional and world stability and international security.<sup>510</sup> He added “Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons.”<sup>511</sup> Thus some influential figures regarded nuclear proliferation as a stability building instrument which the U.S. might benefit from, not be threatened by it. On the other hand, Scott Sagan stressed the need to achieve nuclear abolishment which he considered to be feasible and highly desirable. Sagan stated that the zero state is the only alternative to having many nuclear weapons states. He added that nuclear weapons will be even more dangerous in the future than they were in the past: “The Cold War witnessed many close calls; new nuclear states will be even more prone to deterrence failures.”<sup>512</sup> Sagan suggested that nuclear proliferation created liability which might potentially threaten also the U.S. Sagan also stressed the threat of nuclear terrorism to the U.S. when he noted that with “more nuclear nations, and more atomic weapons in global arsenals, there will be more opportunities for terrorists to steal or buy the bomb.”<sup>513</sup> This statement reflected a widespread concern, that by allowing countries such as Iran and Syria to obtain nuclear weapons, the likelihood that terrorists would acquire these nuclear weapons or radioactive dirty bombs increased as well. Therefore nuclear abolishment was perceived as the only alternative to nuclear terrorism. As opposed to Waltz who regarded terrorists as weak and nuclear terrorism as unlikely.<sup>514</sup>

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<sup>509</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 93.

<sup>510</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth N. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2012.

<sup>511</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010.

<sup>512</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, pp. 91, 94-5.

<sup>513</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 88.

<sup>514</sup> SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 96.

### **6. 3. Summary and Key Acts of Securitization**

The last examined period had three central moments which widely impacted the construction of the nuclear discourse. Initially, the threat of the nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. was generally regarded as not likely. But since the 2001 terrorist attacks occurred, the government started to increasingly securitize the threat of the horizontal nuclear proliferation and the likelihood that such actors might use nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland. The emphasis was put on the threat posed by terrorists and rogue states.

The threat of a horizontal nuclear proliferation posed by these actors was present within the discourse since mid-1970s. However, it was only after the end of the Cold War when the horizontal proliferation started to dominate the discourse. Since then, the emphasis slowly shifted from the threat of rogue states to non-state actors and terrorist groups who could not be deterred by classical strategy of nuclear deterrence. At first, G. W. Bush securitized the threat of rogue states who threatened the U.S. Later, he started proclaiming that not only rogue states, but also terrorists which might also acquire nuclear weapons represented a great existential threat to the U.S. Bush also stressed the threat of rogue states harboring and aiding terrorists which signified a shift of rhetoric. His rhetoric slowly shifted toward securitization of nuclear terrorism as being the greatest existential threat to the U.S. Often he was also shifting the core of the threat when he altered from the threat of WMDs to the nuclear threat. Thus, our research showed that his rhetoric was rather volatile and inconsistent. This inconsistency signifies that these speech acts might have been performed for other political purposes. This powerful securitization allowed him, among other things, to declare War against Iraq who was presumed to have acquired WMDs. It also enabled him to withdraw from the ABM by justifying that the U.S. must face new proliferation threats.

The nuclear disarmament debate continued to stress the threat of nuclear terrorism which was generally regarded to be the greatest security threat to the U.S. Anti-nuclear activists often emphasized the threat of unsecured nuclear material and the threat that it might get into wrong hands. Even before Obama became president, significant nuclear disarmament initiatives calling for total nuclear abolishment emerged.

Obama later performed a very powerful securitizing move when he declared that it was essential to embark on a journey of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He securitized the threat of the nuclear terrorism as the main reason why the world must act now. Obama administration adopted the nuclear disarmament agenda and began rhetorically



promoting complete abolishment of nuclear weapons. He urged that the complete nuclear disarmament was more urgent than ever. He emphasized primarily a threat of the nuclear terrorism which attempted to acquire nuclear weapons and which might not hesitate to use it against the U.S. homeland. Such threat was stated several times by both governmental actors as well as by nuclear disarmament movement to be the key threat the world now pose. Obama became a strong proponent of nuclear disarmament agenda calling for a nuclear zero and a future world without nuclear weapons. This securitization significantly revived the nuclear disarmament agenda. People greatly favored nuclear non-proliferation efforts and declaratory goal of nuclear disarmament again supported also by governmental figures. Obama used the securitization of threat of the horizontal proliferation and also continued to pursue national missile defense projects together with plans to build its bases in Central Europe. Even though these plans were initially tolerated by the U.S. population, Obama, in the end, chose to appease Russia who criticized such plans, and thus cancelled these plans.

## 7. Conclusion

The thesis analyzed the construction of the nuclear threat and the nuclear disarmament discourse. Author recognizes that there is a strong relation between the construction of nuclear threats and disarmament initiatives. First, the thesis determined key nuclear threats which emerged within particular periods. Then, on the basis of this analysis, the thesis determined how with the knowledge of these threats the nuclear disarmament discourse developed. On the basis of these issues which were considered as threats the thesis examined actions of key actors and whether it led to disarmament initiatives. These two analyses were then put together into a summary of the key securitizing acts. This was done for each examined period. Here we summarize findings of this thesis.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, nuclear weapon was regarded to be both a blessing and a peril. Nuclear weapons were by some actors regarded as tools which were meant to increase security. Others regarded nuclear weapons as a risky force which brought more problems than it solved. The discourse on nuclear weapons encompasses many different views and opinions. This thesis focused on the construction of the nuclear threat within this discourse and its impact on disarmament initiatives. The construction of nuclear threats itself generated two main solutions to these threats. First more realist approach was represented by nuclear proponents, who regarded nuclear weapons as a power projection tool. Thus if a particular threat emerged, they tended to find pro-nuclear solution which coped with the threat, such as further nuclear buildup. The second more neoliberal approach was advocated by nuclear opponents, who regarded nuclear weapons as threatening tools creating more insecurity thus they tended to assert measures of nuclear control aiming to reach the world without nuclear weapons. Author focused primarily on the connection between the nuclear threat construction and the nuclear disarmament. Author tried to determine which construction influenced the disarmament and which not and why.

### *Main Argument*

The main argument of this thesis is that *with more nuclear actors, the U.S. is forced to rely not only on nuclear offensive forces, but also on anti-nuclear defensive strategies.* During the Cold War, the government relied heavily on building offensive nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence as the best strategy to ensure its own security. Initially, nuclear weapons were arms against which there was no effective defense, therefore nuclear states chose the strategy of a nuclear arms race. Even after the first plans for building an anti-nuclear defense system were considered and the ABM Treaty was released, the U.S. security still relied on

building nuclear weapons. It was repeatedly stated that it was always easier to build nuclear weapons than to establish effective defense systems. This premise was often used as a justification of the nuclear buildup. Nuclear defense initiatives were a part of the nuclear discourse during 1960s and 1970s, however, they were also regarded as a diplomacy tool which meant to force the Soviet Union into more comprehensive negotiations. Very interesting moment occurred in 1980s when Reagan announced his plan to ensure their security against the existential threat of the Soviet Union by their security shield. This Strategic Defense Initiative proposal was generally not accepted by the public since they perceived it as an additional form of a nuclear buildup and not as a defensive measure.

However, the end of the Cold War represented a major shift of the general perception of nuclear threats and defensive measures against nuclear attacks. The end of the Cold War caused that the threat of the nuclear horizontal proliferation got into the center of the nuclear discourse. Since then, horizontal proliferation was being regarded as the greatest existential threat by both the government and the public. After emergence of new actors and new proliferation threats, the U.S. government started to accent the need to build missile defense systems as a defense measure against new proliferation actors. Gradually, defense measures were regarded as essential in order to really increase the security of the U.S. against future proliferators. Bush even withdraw from the ABM treaty for the purpose to secure the U.S. homeland against actors which could not be deterred. Besides building missile defense, the U.S. also started focusing on non-proliferation approach.

The thesis chose an analytical discursive approach for this thesis as an approach to analyze evolution of a discourse. However, we must take into account the wide-ranging theme and the length of the examined period which caused that our analysis is partly also descriptive. The nuclear discourse went through different periods and this thesis made an attempt to analyze how different actors constructed and influenced the discourse.

### ***Primary Research Question***

To conclude our analysis, we will now answer our research questions. The primary question of this empirical study was: ***How has the construction of the nuclear threat within the U.S. nuclear discourse changed since 1945?*** The thesis examined the construction of four types of nuclear threats and which nuclear threat was perceived as prominent in each era.

*The threat of the nuclear war* was heavily present within the nuclear discourse during the whole researched period. The threat of the nuclear war was constructed largely as a danger to the whole world. In response to particular factors, we determine distinct periods where the

perception of the threat of the nuclear war peaked. The first period where the nuclear threat of a war was prominent was between years 1949 when the USSR performed the first nuclear test and 1962 after the Cuban Crisis ended. This period is significant due to a great unpredictability of the future development of nuclear issues. The second period, significant mainly due to rising international tensions, lasted from 1980 till the end of the Cold War.

*The threat of the use of nuclear weapons* was constructed very differently. There were four significant themes which made an impact on the construction of the nuclear threat. First, the U.S. government continually regarded nuclear weapons as tools functioning as a security guarantee of the U.S. Thus nuclear deterrence was regarded as a strategy which ensured security of the U.S. homeland. Second, the nuclear development projects of new types of nuclear weapons, primarily thermonuclear and neutron bombs, was a key factor within the construction. Introduction of tactical nuclear weapons created a hypothetical possibility of limited nuclear wars. Also, the development of anti-nuclear missile systems significantly impacted the debate about the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S.

*The threat of nuclear proliferation* was not initially regarded as an existential threat to the U.S. since the government relied on the nuclear monopoly and then superiority. The U.S. government initially embarked on a course of the nuclear arms race. Such vertical proliferation was later considered as a potential threat during the whole Cold War, however, the rigid bipolar structure did not allow significant changes. Among the most significant peaks were when the situation was considered to reach an overkill, and then when it was again addressed in the early 1970s and the early 1980s which led to nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks. After the end of the Cold War, nuclear reductions were strongly regarded as measures enhancing stability of the U.S. On the other hand, horizontal nuclear proliferation of states emerged as a significant existential threat in the mid-1960 which led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which banned the horizontal proliferation. Soon after the NPT it again slowly emerged within the discourse in the context of irresponsible states and states sponsoring terrorism. This threat gradually rose till it significantly unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Since then, the horizontal nuclear proliferation the dominant threat.

*The threat of nuclear testing* was present within the discourse only in particular periods. The 1954 thermonuclear test incident triggered a substantial anti-nuclear agenda which led first to a one year moratorium and later in 1963 to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This significant achievement caused that nuclear testing was not the dominant part of the discourse since then, however, still significant. Then the threat of the nuclear testing reemerged in the context of the signing of the CTBT.

Our findings support our assumption that for the most part, there was always one nuclear threat constructed as dominant. Other threats were then mostly not regarded as equally imminent. This caused that other themes regarded as a threat were not perceived as overly dominant within that particular period. The agenda of the anti-nuclear movement always shifted to what was perceived as the most promising to bring results. Whether a construction of the nuclear threat had significant results which impacted or shifted governmental policies, depended greatly not only on governmental policies and whether they were able to address these threats correctly, but it also depended on significant social changes which were in motion within the society in that particular period as well.

In particular, in the late 1950s was a very strong non-governmental pressure to ban the nuclear testing. The threat of the nuclear testing was constructed as the existential threat. This movement clashed with the government who perceived the nuclear testing primarily as their security guarantee which enabled the continuation of the nuclear testing. Despite this opposition, the government was forced to declare nuclear moratorium on the nuclear testing. However, the primary actor influencing this decision was the Soviet Union which declared such moratorium as the first, not nuclear disarmament movement. Later, the Kennedy administration favored the ban on the nuclear testing, however, he was no able to enforce this approach against other politicians. Despite a large public opposition to the nuclear testing and the government who favored such a ban, the nuclear testing was banned only after the Cuban Missile Crisis aftermath created a window of opportunity for such a change.

We have witnessed that several issues were regarded as a threat to more referent objects than what it actually threatened. Designation of several issues as a threat depended not only on an extraordinary situation but also on a limited information about nuclear weapons which got into public. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also a significant example of the securitized issue which was regarded as a threat to the whole world, despite being primarily an imminent threat to the U.S. Moreover, the same threat can be constructed differently with deferent results for the nuclear disarmament. This can be shown on a comparison of placing missiles on Cuba in 1962 and then plans to place missiles in Europe in 1982.

### ***Secondary Research Question***

The second main question addressed *how these socially constructed threats influenced the U.S. nuclear disarmament discourse*. Among the most significant moments where the response to the construction of a threat resulted in the nuclear disarmament approach was first period between 1957 and 1963 which marks first massive calls for the nuclear test ban and

sane nuclear policy which then influenced also the government which led to the LTBT. Second significant period was when a threat of the nuclear proliferation led to the NPT and the SALT talks. Third most important nuclear disarmament moment arose in 1980 in response to Reagan's nuclear buildup rhetoric. This triggered massive demonstrations calling for a nuclear freeze and the disarmament. It also led to the INF Treaty as the first reduction treaty.

In each period, the response to the threat construction was different. Whether the constructed threat was regarded as existential and whether it influenced the disarmament initiatives is a highly socially conditioned process. Whether it leads to disarmament results depends on many factors, such as motives, mobilization, trust between the U.S. and the USSR, or on a stability of the bipolarity. We have seen that several themes entered into the nuclear disarmament discourse and as they were addressed by particular nuclear non-proliferation of disarmament agreement, the theme sometimes essentially vanished from the discourse regardless of whether the threat was really coped with. As it was with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which did not cover the underground nuclear testing which nevertheless continued to contaminate land and people, the popular disengagement of the anti-nuclear agenda caused that this threat was later regarded mostly as a non-existential issue.

The thesis also shown the progress of the nuclear non-governmental disarmament activities. First, anti-nuclear groups focused on the nuclear disarmament as a future goal. In order to reach it, they started urging for a single issue at a time as for single steps toward more important issue. These initiatives transformed later into calls for the nuclear freeze and future nuclear zero as an immediate halt on the additional nuclear buildup. They urged to freeze armaments in order not to destroy each other. Later, these initiatives transformed into calls for a nuclear zero as one singular and universal agenda. The complexity of the issue and diversity of anti-nuclear movements led to campaigns calling primarily for a future without nuclear weapons as one and only agenda.

### ***Other Findings***

The thesis also determined *whether nuclear disarmament movement ever had enough capacity to significantly raise public awareness in order to substantially alter governmental nuclear policies*. The thesis identified three main moments where the nuclear disarmament movement significantly altered the development. First in the context of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Second in the context of the 1982 anti-nuclear rally. As third, author determined a partially influencing nuclear disarmament movement which influenced Obama's nuclear disarmament proclamations. The thesis showed that even Presidents functioned as key parts of

nuclear disarmament movement in particular moments. As the most influential rhetorical actions supporting disarmament initiatives we regard primarily speeches made by Kennedy, Carter, and Obama. The nuclear disarmament movement was often being perceived as not particularly influential. However, there were several periods where it played an influential role impacting also governmental policies and agreements.

The thesis also examined *which principal actors played the key role in the nuclear disarmament discourse*. We have to take into account that this question highly depend on whether these actors had sufficient information about nuclear weapons and their effects. This limitation caused that, initially, the principal actors forming an opposition to the governmental nuclear development were nuclear scientists and later also pacifist groups and individuals. From the start, the governmental response to nuclear threats was mostly an additional arming. Later, the nuclear disarmament discourse joined other groups and many people from the scientific community. This enlargement of the agenda was caused primarily in a response to the 1954 nuclear incident which caused a significant release of information about nuclear weapons. Significant groups such as The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy together with influential individuals such as L. Pauling or Kennedy significantly contributed to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. After the disengagement of the movement between 1963 and mid-1970s, the discourse started to preoccupy groups such as Freeze campaign. Among influential individuals was also President Carter who based his policy on the need for the nuclear disarmament agenda. However, by the early 1980, the nuclear disarmament agenda consists of variety of groups and individuals. By 1982, the agenda became massive representing views of essentially everybody. By that time, the anti-nuclear agenda contained a massive movement calling for a disarmament in general. Reagan administration was later forced to rhetorically adopt the agenda of the nuclear disarmament. After the end of the Cold War and a disclosure of information about nuclear accidents and fallout, the nuclear disarmament movement significantly diminished, however still consists of many nuclear disarmament groups and initiatives such as Global Zero. Obama started to play the key role in this movement after his 2009 Prague speech.

### ***Research in Context***

We also have to take into account that U.S. nuclear disarmament discourse was a part of the foreign and security policy. Nuclear discourse was only a part of the social and political discourse. Nuclear disarmament activities were often the key part of the political discourse. However, nuclear disarmament initiatives were also sometimes utilized for different than

disarmament purposes. For example, Nixon administration regarded nuclear limitation negotiations only as a diplomacy tool which meant to facilitate their political goals. Also we have to differentiate pure rhetoric from politics. In some cases, political actors were using the nuclear disarmament agenda for their own political goals without the aim of reaching any significant agreements. Taking rhetoric into account, it was very interesting to observe how presidential rhetoric differed from policies and how it evolved in different periods. Mostly, Presidents were often declaring the nuclear disarmament to be their ultimate goal. However, as the rhetoric of the Cold War stated the nuclear zero as an ideal goal, their policy often followed the policy of the nuclear arms race. The rhetoric remained the same after the Cold War, however the main policy approach changed to a non-proliferation and a missile defense as main measures which meant to secure Americans against new threats.

Considering the rhetoric, it was particularly significant to examine how the presidential rhetoric of early years of presidency of particular presidents differed from the rhetoric of the late years of presidency. Nuclear weapons were often used during presidential campaigns in order to make a strong statement or to make a strong contrast to the previous administration. Presidents sometimes even stated that once they would become Presidents, they would not hesitate to use them in order to not repeat mistakes of previous Presidents. Often, this rhetoric is softened shortly after they were elected. Often we also witnessed how Presidents in their late years of presidency or in their farewell addresses urged people to pursue a course of the nuclear disarmament.

Researching how actors understand nuclear weapons and how they are willing or not willing to pursue the nuclear disarmament is increasingly significant as new actors are still pursuing to acquire nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons are weapons of the ultimate destruction, it is important to determine what course of actions increases the possibility for future nuclear disarmament and which are counterproductive. The U.S. nuclear discourse is particularly important as the U.S. is the key actor who sets the world nuclear weapons agenda. Moreover, Obama significantly revived the agenda of the nuclear disarmament which significantly impacted and renewed anti-nuclear initiatives worldwide. The nuclear disarmament thus got into the center of the nuclear discourse which is prone to produce significant results.

Research in this thesis has many possible implications. Author researched how the construction of a particular nuclear threat influenced many social changes and sometimes even triggered a massive support for particular causes. Author was then able to determine what was the key moving factor behind these social changes and whether they were strong



enough to impact nuclear disarmament initiatives. Author also examined how nuclear weapons were used for completely different agendas. The study of nuclear disarmament agendas showed how the lack of trust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was often the key factor inhibiting nuclear disarmament initiatives. However, despite the fact that the Cold War ended, the lack of trust between the main nuclear actors still prevailed. This signifies how complex the nuclear disarmament issue grew into. Besides the growing number of potential nuclear actors which hinders the disarmament, states are still security maximizers who strive to maintain its own security at all costs.

This research provides several themes and opportunities for additional research. Currently, the thorough analysis of Global Zero activities would have particular benefits for understanding of current nuclear issues and predictions of the future of nuclear disarmament efforts. Also, the rhetoric of U.S. Presidents should be examined much deeper than current researches show. Since they are the key actors, it would be particularly important to determine how and why their rhetoric differs from the policy in key moments within the nuclear discourse.

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