

Abstract

The thesis addresses the topic of lifeworld in the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The first part describes the context surrounding the genesis of the notion of lifeworld in Husserl. The notion came about as a reaction to the crisis of sciences as perceived by Husserl, characterized by the loss of meaning, as science can no longer answer the substantial questions of human existence. A return to the natural world is then enabled by the transcendental *epoché*. The second part is devoted to Merleau-Ponty for whom lifeworld does not denote the realm of original self-evidences, as in Husserl, but a space of lively communication to which we are led by modern art, especially painting. According to Merleau-Ponty, modern art evinces ambiguity that rests in its inconclusiveness and multisidedness of its potential interpretation. The aim of the thesis is to show that this ambiguity corresponds to the ambiguity in lifeworld, the latter being constituted by the opposition of the seen and the seer that are subject to unending reversibility. The structure of lifeworld corresponds to the structure of modern art as understood by Merleau-Ponty.