

This thesis seeks an answer to a question of whether social normative systems, particularly law and morality, are consistent with the most recent scientific and philosophical findings. Those in fact often conclude that the human will is not free and that the human decision-making is only a physiological process governed by the laws of physics. Such findings thus, at a first glance, collide mainly with the concept of responsibility, through which law and morality are implemented. Therefore, the paper begins with a brief introduction of the current state of knowledge concerning free will and presents mainly determinism and indeterminism. The conclusion of the first part called Free Will and Determinism introduces a view of the world, which best suits the current state of knowledge and is further referred to as Physicalism. The second part called Law, Morality, Physicalism, briefly presents law and morality as regulators of human behavior, for which the concept of free will is fundamental. The focus of the thesis then shifts towards the institutions of criminal and civil law, that seem to be threatened by Physicalism the most. However, general consistency of Physicalism and the examined normative concepts is concluded, while it is argued that within the physicalistic view of the world, law and morality constitute a level independent of the levels governed by the laws of determinism and indeterminism.