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**The Role of the Civil Society in the  
Transformation of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia**

*Diploma Thesis*

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## **Abstrakt**

Diplomová práce se zaměřuje na roli občanské společnosti v procesech tranzice k demokracii v rámci možné demokratizační vlny na Blízkém východě také známé jako Arabské jaro. Pro účely této práce autorka zkoumá tři případové studie zemí, kde proběhly úspěšné revoluce – Egypt, Libyi a Tunisko. S využitím metody *process-tracing* se zaměřením na *path-dependency* práce sleduje změny v dynamice občanské společnosti v předrevolučním období, konkrétně v průběhu vlád prezidenta Mubárika v Egyptě, plukovníka Qaddáfího v Libyi a prezidenta Ben <sup>°</sup>Alího v Tunisku, přes revoluce až k post-revolučnímu období. Hlavním předpokladem práce pak je fakt, že původní nedemokratické režimy významně ovlivňují transformační procesy ve všech třech zkoumaných zemích, což platí i pro občanskou společnost jako takovou. Samotná občanská společnost je v této práci definována pomocí dvou paradigmat. První z nich je založeno na liberálně modernizačním rámci a druhé je spojeno se stagnací a socioekonomickou deprivací. Tato unikátní kombinace přispěla k transformaci Egypta, Libye a Tuniska. Dynamika občanské společnosti je pak determinována několika faktory, které jsou: organizace občanské společnosti, sociální média a sítě, vzdělání mladých, ekonomická deprivace, politické prostředí a sociální kapitál. Všechny tyto faktory jsou analyzovány v průběhu určitých časových období. Pro dokreslení celkového obrázku stavu občanské společnosti autorka aplikuje grafickou metodu nazvanou *Civil Society Diamond*. A konečně po potvrzení přítomnosti kauzálního mechanismu, který v tomto případě představuje dynamika občanské společnosti, se autorka zaměřuje na současný proces demokratizace ve zkoumaných zemích.

## **Klíčová slova**

občanská společnost, transformace, Egypt, Libye, Tunisko, demokratizace, Arabské jaro, revoluce

## **Abstract**

Diploma thesis focuses on the role of the Civil Society in the processes of transition to democracy as a part of the possible democratization wave in the Middle East also known as the Arab Spring. For the purposes of the thesis the author examines three case studies of countries with successful revolutions - Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Using the method of process-tracing with focus on the path-dependency it traces the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society in the pre-revolutionary period, concretely during Mubarak's regime in Tunisia, Qaddafi's rule in Libya, and Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia, through the revolutions to the post-revolutionary period. Moreover, the main assumption is that the initial non-democratic regimes have been significantly influencing the transformation process of all three countries and this also applies to the Civil Society as such. The Civil Society, in this thesis, is based on two paradigms. The first is based on the liberal modernization framework and the second is connected with stagnation and socio-economic deprivation. This unique combination contributed to the transformation of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The dynamics of the Civil Society is then determined by several factors, which are: Civil Society organizations, social media and networks, youth education, economic deprivation, political environment, and social capital. All these factors are analyzed over time. To illustrate the overall picture of the state of the Civil Society the author applies the graphical method of the Civil Society Diamond. Ultimately, by confirming the presence of the causal mechanism, by which is meant the dynamics of the Civil Society, the author deals with the current process of democratization in the examined countries.

## **Keywords**

Civil Society, transformation, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, democratization, Arab Spring, revolution

**Scope of the thesis:** 267 132

**Declaration:**

I, Adéla Jiráňková, hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me, that it is the result of work carried out by me and that all the sources used in this thesis are duly indicated and listed in the bibliographical references. I also declare that this work has not been used to earn another degree. At the same time, I agree this thesis to be available for educational and research purposes.

Date: .....

Signature: .....

## **Acknowledgment**

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## List of abbreviations

CSD	Civil Society Diamond
CSO	Civil Society organization
EU	European Union
GNC	General National Congress
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
RMT	Resource mobilization Theory
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US AID	United States Agency for International Development

# 1 INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is one of the most strategic regions therefore any events that happened there have been influencing the rest of the world. Thus it is not surprising that the revolutions in the Arab world, which led to overthrows of decades-long rules of the Arab dictators and to the transformation of the existing regimes, became a new significant phenomenon in the study of the Middle East as well as democratization in general. The imaginary chalice of dissatisfaction of the Arab nations overflowed and it gave rise to huge demonstrations against the ruling regimes and their leaderships known as the Arab Spring. People took to the streets and under slogans such as freedom, democracy, and nationalism fought for changes in the stagnant governments, for which they have been even willing to die. In this context I would like to mention an interesting quote by the Jordan king Abdullah II., who said: “The Arab world is writing a new future; the pen is in our own hands”<sup>1</sup> Despite the fact he said it already in 2005 it clearly mirrors the development of the Arab world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century both before and mainly after the revolutions. The real new chapter of the Arab world history began at the end of 2010.

The massive uprisings, which spilled over the Middle East, like a huge wave, are considered as the fourth wave of democratization, which appeared in this strategic region. And the Civil Society is considered as one of the main players in transition to democracy processes. Thus the main aim of this diploma thesis is to identify the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society, which influenced its role in non-democratic regimes as well as during the revolutions and subsequent processes of democratization in the North African states. Generally, the Civil Society is considered as a driving force, which led to the falls of the authoritarian regimes. For that reason I want to examine the role of the Civil Society in the processes of transformation in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The reason for choosing these three states is obvious because the revolutions were successful there and thus it is possible to observe the whole processes of changing of the Civil Society's dynamics and its influence since non-democratic regimes until nowadays. Moreover, I should not omit to explain why I do not incorporate Yemen, where the revolution was also successful meaning that the old regime of the president Saleh was overthrown. My decision was driven by two reasons. The first one is that

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<sup>1</sup> King Abdullah II. Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at Georgetown University [online]. March 21, 2005 [accessed 2014-3-11]. Available at: [http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en\\_US/speeches/view/id/73.html](http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/73.html).

despite the fact Yemen is part of the Middle East region there is a large distance from the three examined countries, there is absolutely different historical and political background of the country and as I want to compare the countries I need them to have some similarities. The question of similarities is also connected with my second reason, which considers the fact that unlike in the three selected countries in the case of Yemen there has been no sign of transformation of the country in terms of the transition to democracy since the revolution.

In order to examine the role of the Civil Society in the process of transformation of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia I determine the main research question as subsequent: “To what extent and how the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society have been influencing the emergence of the revolutions and the subsequent processes of transition to democracy in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia?” In this thesis I define the dynamics of the Civil Society according to main aspects or key points, which are civil society organizations, social media and networks, youth education, political environment, social capital, and economic deprivation. For grasping the issue of the Civil Society dynamics I choose two paradigms. The first one is based on the liberal modernization framework, which is working with premise that in the context of the inevitable modernization the civil sector strengthens and thus gains enough capacity to become a major driving force of changes. Conversely, the second paradigm is connected with stagnation and socio-economic deprivation caused by the stagnant regimes and their unsuccessful structural reforms. This unique combination of both paradigms contributed to the transformation of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Moreover, there can also be the third paradigm, concretely foreign influences based on the neoliberal pressure from the “West” but I do not take this paradigm into consideration because I focus on the domestic or sometimes inner region aspects of the examined issue.

This thesis is divided into five main chapters and a conclusion. In the first chapter I anchor the topic into the theoretical framework. The concept of the Civil Society is in the core of this framework. And each of the individual elements of the dynamics of the Civil Society is associated with a different theory, on which it is based on. Concretely the first three variables - civil society organizations, social media and networks, and youth education are based on the modernization theory, according to which, factors of these three variables are examined because the context of the inevitable modernization caused changes of these variables. Moreover the variable social media and networks is examined on the basis of the resource mobilization theory.

For the measuring of the variables political environment as well as authoritarian regime, and democratization I use the theory of polyarchy by Robert Dahl, who introduced seven factors by which he defines democracy. These factors are elected government officials; free and fair elections; universal suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of speech; alternative information; freedom of association.<sup>2</sup> The economic deprivation variable is based on the theory of relative deprivation, which points to the connection between economic deprivation and youth violence or in more positive sense of that word – youth activism, which became evident during the revolutions. And finally the last variable – social capital is anchored in the theory of social capital by Robert Putnam.

In the second chapter I explain methodology, which I use for my research, concretely I do process tracing. From process tracing methods I chose so called path dependency in qualitative searching for causal mechanisms regarding the role of the Civil Society in the Arab revolutions and subsequent process of democratization. Moreover, in this chapter I introduce the so called Civil Society Diamond method and operationalize independent and dependent variables. In my thesis independent variables are authoritarian regimes as well as the six individual aspects of the dynamics of the Civil Society as I mentioned above and dependent variable is the process of democratization itself. And the revolutions are intermediary variable. Finally the foreign influences are control variables. However this is only the basic outline of my research, because I explain the main scheme in detail in the second chapter.

In the three subsequent chapters I focus on the three case studies of the states, where revolutions were successful, concretely on Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. In each of the three countries I examine the initial authoritarian regimes and the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society in the pre-revolutionary period through revolutions to the post-revolutionary period on the six aspects, which define the dynamics of the Civil Society in these three cases.

In the conclusion I summarize findings of my research and answer the main research question and other questions, which have been arising from this issue, and which I ask and answer throughout the thesis such as what are the main Civil Society organizations, which have been participating on the transition to democracy? What are the living conditions in the examined countries? What kind of social media contributed to the revolutions the most? And most importantly what is the current development and

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<sup>2</sup> Dahl, 1995, pp. 202.

future predictions in the transition to democracy in examined countries?

## 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 2.1 The Concept of the Civil Society

As it is evident from the preceding paragraphs the main concept of this thesis is the concept of the Civil Society. It should be mentioned that to tackle this concept can be problematic because on the one hand there exist no uniform definition of the Civil Society and on the other hand there are many paradigms and theories regarding this concept, some of them are introduced in the thesis. For the purposes of this thesis two definitions are presented. The first one is operational definition introduced in the book by Helmut K. Anheier: “Civil society is the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests”<sup>3</sup>. The second definition by Francis Fukuyama is related to the democratization, concretely he defined it: “as the realm of spontaneously created social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political institutions”<sup>4</sup>. Basically the Civil Society is located in the middle between the market and the state and interlinks these two spheres. Despite the fact that the concept of the Civil Society has been existing since the Ancient Greece, it gained its momentum with the end of the Cold War, because the Civil Society was one of the most important players, which contributed to the collapse of the communist regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe and to the democratization wave in the 1990s. Since that time the Civil Society is considered as a significant element in the transitions to democracy, because it is strongly linked to democracy itself.<sup>5</sup>

Generally the concept of the Civil Society is really huge, heterogeneous, and complex and it can take many forms such as community or grassroots associations, social movements, labor unions, professional groups, advocacy and development NGOs, formally registered nonprofits, social enterprises, etc. The main features of the Civil Society are voluntariness, self-generation, at least partial self-supportiveness, autonomy from the state, rule-based or shared rules-based. Moreover democratic functions of the Civil Society are, among others, that it has been generating cross-cutting social ties and trust within society itself; it has been spreading information and empowering citizens as

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<sup>3</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Fukuyama, January 1995, pp. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Anheiner, 2004, pp. 1-2.

well as it has been promoting reforms, democracy, and development; and it has been enhancing civic engagement. The Civil Society is connected with the non-profit and voluntary sector and consists of institutions such as democracy, legislative process, human rights, independent media, etc.; organizations as civil society organizations, NGOs, voluntary associations and so on; and individuals, for example activists, volunteers, members, participants, and many others. Moreover it is possible to consider the Civil Society as structure, which consist of individual organizations, that can be mutually interconnected and interacted; as values, norms or identities, which different societies have been professing; space or public sphere, where members of the Civil Society have been expressing their opinions and demands and also have been participating on the political events, which is called associational life; as well as some kind of a mirror, which have been reflecting a state of affairs in the given country, regionally, or even globally, etc. Another typology presented by Larry Diamond dividing CSOs on economic, cultural, informational and educational, interest-based, developmental, issue-oriented, and civic. The concept of the Civil Society is sometimes vague because it can have both positive and negative implications. In the positive sense the Civil Society is considered as a sign of good governance and an important component of democratic regimes. In the negative sense “what was once a conversation about democracy and self-expression has become increasingly technocratic, dominated by elites who seek to shape civil society for their own ends...and practices of businesses and market-based investment”<sup>6</sup>. Moreover in non-democratic regimes there can exist “Civil Society”, whose organizations are sponsored by a ruling regime for the purpose of artificial creation of impression of democracy, which is also known as state corporatism typical for non-democratic regimes.<sup>7</sup>

The Civil Society and democracy are generally two mutually interconnected concepts, as Warren claims: “the correlation between robust civil societies and functioning democracies has been so striking that we have come to understand them as reinforcing one another”<sup>8</sup>. On the other hand the Civil Society does not always breed democracy, it depends on the values, which individual Civil Societies profess, however these were only rare cases such as Weimar Germany for example. In most cases the Civil Society is one of the most important components of democratic regimes in the liberal sense of that concept. Warren introduces three significant factors, how the Civil

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<sup>6</sup> Edwards, 2010, nonpaged cited by Edwards, 2011, pp. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Edwards, 2011, pp. 7-10 and Anheier, 2004, pp. 25 and Diamond, July 1994, pp. 4-16.

<sup>8</sup> Warren, 2011, pp. 377.

Society has been contributing to the democratic nature of regimes, concretely by focusing on individuals in the sense of democratic citizenship; on the Civil Society as a public sphere, as already mentioned, because public is basis for democracy; and finally on organizations of the Civil Society because they supports institutionalism. Moreover the Civil Society has many functions, which have been contributing to democracy as for instance voluntariness, significantly diverse purposes of individual organizations, which make the Civil Society heterogeneous, and many others. Some scholars claim that activism of the Civil Society significantly supports the process of democratization and that: “democracy in the Middle East is dependent on a strong civil society as a precondition to democratization”<sup>9</sup>. Moreover White adds other aspects, by which the Civil Society can reinforce the roots of democracy and good governance. Concretely he suggests the Civil Society is sort of a balance of power between state and society; it plays disciplinary role thereby increasing responsibility of state in relationship with its citizens; it is mediator between citizens and state; and finally it monitors the activities of the state to be compatible with democratic assumptions and rules. However, on the other hand critics of the Civil Society assert that activism of the Civil Society rather strengthen than weaken authoritarian regimes and hinder the process of democratization of the North African states. These contradictory arguments are also the reason why it is important to examine the actual role of the Civil Society in the Arab Spring, how it has changed and whether it is different in the three examined states.<sup>10</sup>

Generally, the Civil Society in the Middle East is associated with the collective ummah, which can be translated as community of believers from the Arabic language. The concept of the Civil Society in the Middle East is complex and unclear because nobody agree on, which organizations or movements are part of it, as for example one of the features of these groups is that they do not seek political power, but Muslim Brotherhood considered itself as a part of the Civil Society but then they entered the political realm. Nevertheless, the main question still remains whether there existed independent Civil Society in the Middle East before the revolutions? As well as what has changed regarding the Civil Society in the post-revolutionary countries? Some scholars claim that there never exists any form of the Civil Society in the Arab countries because the Civil Society and Islam or more precisely the Sharia law are mutually exclusive, others claim that there existed the Civil Society even before revolutions.

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<sup>9</sup> Boose, July 2012, pp. 310.

<sup>10</sup> Warren, 2011, p. 377-385 and Cavatorta and Durac, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and White, 2004, pp. 13-15.



Moreover the third possibility is already mentioned artificial “Civil Society” linked to a ruling regime. Generally, where exist, the Civil Society organizations have been helping people to fulfill their needs and to promote development. The recent emergence of the Civil Society organizations, if we do not count the period of revolutions themselves, is dating back to the 1980s and 1990s, even in that time various forms and types appeared. Some were devoted to Islam, some were secular, etc. Many of the newly established CSOs were focusing on charity, because giving money in favor of philanthropy is one of the five pillars of Islam known as zakat or waqf. Nevertheless, in the majority of the Arab countries the CSOs are more or less subjects of restrictions, repressions, and censorship by the ruling regimes, but despite this fact they do not discourage the Civil Society from strong activism in confronting the ruling regimes. Even though they often operate in secrecy because when they “cross the red lines” the regime can ban them and arrest their members. For that reason Yom in his article labeled the Arab Civil Society as “magic bullet against Arab autocracy”<sup>11</sup>. In the Middle East the Civil Society can take many forms such as membership-based professional groups, NGOs providing social services, public interest advocates, unions, informal social groups, etc. On the other hand the regimes have been creating their own Civil Society in the form of “governmental NGOs”, which are part of the ties of clientelism and nepotism. The “real” Civil Society is then considered as kind of a counterbalance to the ruling regimes. Even though the CSOs in the Middle East are heterogeneous (if not restricted) and normatively pluralistic “this pluralism remains heavily tainted by politically illiberal and socially conservative attitudes among CSOs that are close to the ruling regimes, defend religious values, or simply seek to develop the poor and the unprivileged as passive recipients of charity or foreign aid”<sup>12</sup>. The foreign aid is also big problem, because it is often connected with imposed liberal values considered as liberal imperialism, but this is another story. To conclude this subchapter, it is also important to emphasize that after the revolutions, there definitely is a great opportunity to establish strong Civil Society, which will promote democracy and support transition to democracy.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Yom, December 2005, pp. 16.

<sup>12</sup> Kienle, 2011, pp. 154.

<sup>13</sup> Milton-Edwards, 2011, pp. 184-187 and Kienle, 2011, pp. 146-156 and Yom, 2005, pp. 14-27 and Cavatorta, March 2008, pp. 109-119.

## 2.2 Theories

This sub-chapter introduces theories, which can be applicable on the events and processes in the examined countries. Each of the individual theory mingles with one or more variables of this thesis. The first three independent variables, concretely civil society organizations, social media and networks and youth education are based on the modernization theory, according to which, factors of these three variables are examined because the context of the inevitable modernization caused changes of these variables. The independent variable social media and networks is also based on the resource mobilization theory, as they were one of the most important mobilization tools for the revolutions. For the measuring of the independent variables authoritarian regime and political environment as well as dependent variable democratization the theory of polyarchy by Robert Dahl is used. He introduced seven factors by which he defines democracy. These factors are elected government officials; free and fair elections; universal suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of speech; alternative information; freedom of association.<sup>14</sup> The economic deprivation variable is based on the theory of relative deprivation, which points to the connection between economic deprivation and youth violence or already mentioned youth activism, which became evident during the revolutions. And finally the variable social capital it treated according to the theory of social capital by Robert Putnam.

### 2.2.1 Modernization Theory

Generally, the modernization theory is based on the assumption that socioeconomic changes lead to cultural and religious value's systems changes and with them the requirement for more democratic environment.<sup>15</sup> Some scholars claim that simultaneously with the changes within society, traditional values disappear, however also add that in countries where traditional values, especially in the terms of religion or ethnicity such as Islam in the Arab countries, are strong, they withstand changes and endure, because there are based on path-dependency. The classical modernization theory was based on the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies in the true sense of that word, however, in the current democratization wave it is considered as from

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<sup>14</sup> Dahl, 1995, pp. 202.

<sup>15</sup> Huntington, 1968, pp. 1-7.

authoritarian to democratic regime. “Socioeconomic development starts from technological innovations that increase labor productivity; it then brings occupational specialization, rising educational levels, and rising income levels; it diversifies human interaction, shifting the emphasis from authority relations toward bargaining relations; in the long run this brings cultural changes, such as changing gender roles, changing attitudes towards authority changing sexual norms, declining fertility rates, broader political participation, and more critical and less easily led publics”<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, it also should be mentioned that each state or society is unique, thus the process of modernization is unique in individual countries. On the other hand socioeconomic development has very similar repercussions such as poverty reduction perceived as security of survival in the form of welfare system development; increase in the quality of education and cognitive mobilization; social autonomy and complexity in the sense of emancipation from authority; socially-liberating effect, etc. Modernization can also contribute to greater trust, tolerance, confidence, self-expression, and to recognition of universal values.<sup>17</sup>

Education, especially in the case of young generation, represents important element of modernization. Education support modernization and after that democratization, because higher educated people incline more to modernity and embracing democratic values and thus an influence of traditional, in the case of Arab countries, unequal and religious values has been shrinking. Moreover, in the practical sense children from richer families have often higher education. The political participation and demands for social autonomy of these young educated people are higher and bigger.<sup>18</sup>

The modernization has been also contributing to social participation and activism of the Civil Society because, the already mentioned, emancipation from authority as well as an emphasis on political participation, expressing of opinions, and greater equality, which all are aspects of a democratic regime. Thus modernization can also contribute to increase in the number of the CSOs. However, on the other hand, paradoxically, in post-industrial societies, the status of poorer, unemployed and less educated people can sometimes be even worse than in industrial society, because post-industrial societies has greater demands on people's skills. This assumption is related to

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<sup>16</sup> Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 19.

<sup>17</sup> Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 15-37, 46-47.

<sup>18</sup> Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 37.

the theory of relative deprivation, which is explained below.<sup>19</sup>

After this general introduction into the modernization theory, it should be definitely mentioned that there exist a couple of modernization theories related to democratization, but for the purposes of this thesis, the contradictory theories by Przeworski, Epstein, and Huntington are the most appropriate to mention. Przeworski based his theory on the relationship between economic development and democracy. He claims that economic development of the given country does not have such an impact on establishment of democracy, rather it influences sustainability of democracy. Basically, he asserts that economic development does not cause overthrow of an authoritarian regime as well as it is not so important in the process of transition to democracy. Democracy is not a product of modernization, Przeworski claims. Moreover he adds that on the other hand economic development can strengthen authoritarian regimes, because in that case people would be satisfied and do not want regime change.<sup>20</sup>

The Epstein's theory of modernization challenges the theory by Przeworski, because he returned to one of the first modernization theories introduced by Lipset, who claims that economic development, concretely a per capita income increase has been contributing to the overthrows of authoritarian regimes and subsequent democratization. The increase in per capita GDP is then considered as trigger mechanism for the process of transition to democracy because people with higher incomes more tend to refuse the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, Epstein stresses the problem of partial democracies, because they incline to political instability as well as they can easily slip down back into an authoritarian regime or even into some kind of internal conflict.<sup>21</sup>

Huntington's theory of modernization is based on the premise that political instability and violence is "in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions"<sup>22</sup>. As was already mentioned in the beginning of this sub-chapter, Huntington claimed that socioeconomic development has been causing inevitable demands for political changes, which then have been decreasing the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. The entire process is accompanied by the high level of social mobilization and political participation, with which non-democratic regimes are not able to cope because they are too rigid to be reformed. And "the result is political instability

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<sup>19</sup> Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 43-44.

<sup>20</sup> Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, pp. 155-183.

<sup>21</sup> Epstein and Bates and Goldstone, Kristensen and O'Halloran, July 2006, pp. 551-554.

<sup>22</sup> Huntington, 1968, pp. 4.

and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change”<sup>23</sup>. Huntington also emphasized that modernization pointing towards democracy does have uncertain ends because it is a complicated process often accompanied with violence. Therefore its results can be on the scale from democratization through political decay, which Huntington called praetorianism, towards civil war. Praetorianism is basically an anarchical state of society and politics because political institutions are functionless and only order in the country is within an army thus the army frequently seizes power. The examples of praetorianism can be found in Latin America or Middle East. To conclude he asserted that there are many possible courses and endings of the modernization processes, from which he would prefer gradual sequenced and long-lasting process rather than breakthrough in the form of revolution for instance.<sup>24</sup>

The questions remain, whether a process of modernization has been taking place in the North African countries? And if yes, which type of modernization theory is better applicable on the Arab Spring?

### **2.2.2 Resource Mobilization Theory**

As was mentioned in the introduction to the theories subchapter, the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is used for understanding of the social media and networks variable. The concrete form of the resource mobilization theory in regard with the social media and networks is called cyber-activism. Basically, cyber-activism means “using e-mail, blogs and social networking sites to publicize a cause by disseminating information quickly that is unavailable through normal government and commercial news sources, which may or may not eventually catch up. Cyber-activism can help promote a cause, product, company, politician or a revolution”<sup>25</sup>, etc. However, generally it consists of different types of resources, which social movements have been using for their mobilization, concretely moral, cultural, human, social-organizational, and material resources, which can be gained through self-production, aggregation, co-

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<sup>23</sup> Huntington, 1968, pp. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Huntington, 1968, pp. 1-92, 192-263 and Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order in Egypt: How Samuel Huntington helps us understand the Jasmine Revolutions. The American Interest [online]. May 1, 2011 [accessed 2014-6-10]. Available at: <http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2011/05/01/political-order-in-egypt/>.

<sup>25</sup> PC Magazine. Definition of cyberactivism [online]. Copyright © 1981- 2014 [accessed 2014-6-15]. Available at: <http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/63075/cyberactivism>.

optation/appropriation, patronage, etc. This theory was firstly introduced in the 1970s and its basic explanation is subsequent: “social movement is a set of preferences for social change within a population. Individuals who share those social change preferences are called adherents, while those who contribute resources of various kinds to help movement mobilize are constituents. Those who watch from sidelines are bystanders. A key analytical issue for RMT is understanding how social movements turn bystanders into adherents and subsequently adherents into constituents and ultimately mobilize constituents for active participation”<sup>26</sup>. Bystanders, adherents as well as constituents can be represented both by individuals and organizations.<sup>27</sup>

Social movements are organized, rational groups, which have been making efforts to express their grievances and fight for their interests, however success of their cause has been significantly affected by the environment, in which they have been operating. Their main goal is institutional change, which basically means to get rid of existing institutional power elites. The most important causes for social movement's emergence are, already mentioned grievances, but it can also be access to resources, which is called entrepreneurial theory of movement formation, or finally, simple changes in the opportunities of the given groups. Social movements can be centralized or decentralized. Centralized social movements have often a leader and members have assigned roles, in the case of decentralized social movements, members are mobilized through informal networks and these social movements are often based on ideology and are leaderless. The main task of the social movements is to attract individuals or organizations and thus mobilize members for their cause. For this purpose the resource mobilization theory stresses the importance of media as an intermediary between social movements and public, which should be motivated through media to participate in the social movements. Moreover McCarthy and Zald claim that there exists “crucial importance of social network connections between activists and potential activists in accounting for the likelihood of opportunities for participation”<sup>28</sup>. They also assert that availability of resources has been significantly contributing to a collective action and that conditions (political, economic, social, etc.) of the given environment are important both for mobilization of resources as well as for success of social movements. They add that the main manifestation of social movements is a protest and its intensity is determined by an organizational capacity for mobilization, but this is influenced by,

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<sup>26</sup> Edwards and Gillham, 2013, pp. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Edwards and Gillham, 2013, pp. 1-6 and McCarthy and Zald, May 1977, pp. 1212-1238.

<sup>28</sup> McCarthy and Zald, 2001, pp. 543.

already mentioned, mass media, which has been reducing the costs of a large-scale mobilization. On the other hand they wrote that a general availability is more important than motivations and benefits. Nevertheless, in this regard it should be emphasized that their theory is primarily based on democratic regimes, not on authoritarian ones. And as Jenkins claim, theory's conditions changes in the case of authoritarian regimes.<sup>29</sup>

### 2.2.3 Theory of Polyarchy

In his book *Democracy and its critics* Robert Dahl presented his theory of polyarchy. According to him polyarchy means “the government of many”, which can be observed in the cases of democracies in the “Western” countries or more precisely liberal democracies. He claimed that democracy is ideal state and that polyarchy shows the true state of affairs. Polyarchy can take many forms such as the result of democratization efforts, the political order or regime, the system of political control, and the set of political rights or set of institutions necessary for the democratic process. Despite the fact that Dahl considered all the mentioned explanation of polyarchy as valid, according to him, the political order or the regime is the most appropriate. This political order or the regime has two basic characteristics, concretely: “citizenship is extended to a relatively large proportion of the population and the civil rights include the opportunity to be in the opposition and to repeal the highest officials of the government by voting”<sup>30</sup>. The theory of polyarchy is based on the seven institutions, which are necessary to meet to become or be polyarchy or liberal democracy. They are subsequent: elected government officials and control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials; free and fair elections, in which coercion is quite limited; universal suffrage, which means that practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections; the right to run for office; freedom of speech, concretely citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology; alternative information, which means that citizens have the right to search for alternative sources of information, moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by the law; freedom of association, which means that citizens have an effectively enforced

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<sup>29</sup> Jenkins, 1983, pp. 527-550 and McCarthy and Zald, 2001, pp. 533-560.

<sup>30</sup> Mareš, 2007, pp. 252.

right to form and join autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups. These seven institutions have been affecting governments and if government wants to promote politics against which the majority of citizens protest, these seven institutions make it impossible, because citizens have many opportunities how to actively participate on political processes. Thus polyarchy is the order or the regime, which provides a wide range of freedoms and rights and for that reason no alternatives can compete with it in that sense.<sup>31</sup>

It should definitely be emphasized that the seven institutions have to exist in the state if it wants to meet five, according to Dahl, basic criteria of democracy, which are voting equality, effective participation, understanding based on information, control of the program by demos, and universality. Moreover, Dahl focused on conditions favorable to democracy as well as how to achieve them. They are concretely control of the elected officials over army and police (absence of this control represents one of the biggest threats to democracy); democratic political culture (need for a civic culture and especially political participation); absence of democracy's hostile influences from outside of the given country (foreign interference into internal affairs is also significant threat); market economy (state intervention into economy is often incompatible with democracy); and weak subcultural pluralism (each culture defines itself compared to other cultures, which can complicate mutual coexistence).<sup>32</sup>

Today democracy can be considered as universal ideal among regimes and thus leaders of an authoritarian regime often speak about democracy but in their own sense of that word. They frequently want to create an artificial atmosphere of democratic regime, for example through elections, etc. to gain legitimacy for their rule, while the others claim that their regime is the only true democracy in the world such as the Colonel Qaddafi did in Libya. However, in the non-polyarchic regimes, there often exist demands for the polyarchic regime. Hence the process of transition can be launched from non-polyarchic to the polyarchic regime. In that case there are several models of this transition, according to Dahl. Firstly, if there is favorable political environment, the non-polyarchic regime can successfully change into the permanent polyarchic regime. Secondly, if there are not favorable conditions or they are weak, the non-polyarchic regime endures. Thirdly, if there are mixed conditions or temporarily favorable, which cause the emergence of polyarchy, the newly founded polyarchic regime either will

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<sup>31</sup> Dahl, 1995, pp. 202-204 and Mareš, 2007, pp. 251-254 and Ženíšek, 2006, pp. 22-23 and Dahl, 2001, pp. 35-75, 79-82.

<sup>32</sup> Kopeček, 2007, pp. 127-133 and Mareš, 2007, pp. 253-254.



collapse and another non-polyarchic regime will be established, or polyarchic regime will collapse, the non-polyarchic regime will be established but will also collapse and new polyarchy will endure, or it will again collapse and new non-polyarchic regime will endure. By the favorable or non-favorable conditions Dahl meant the five already mentioned in the previous paragraph.<sup>33</sup>

## 2.2.4 Theory of Relative Deprivation

The relative deprivation theory is based on the social inequality, especially with regard to income inequality, which indicates the connection between the relative deprivation and poverty. Generally, the relative deprivation is a conflict between real life conditions and those, which people consider as achievable in the given situation. Basically, people compare their status with those, who have higher status (economical, social, etc.), which causes frustration, dissatisfaction, and grievances. Thus the relative deprivation has been influencing social behavior of people, but it definitely should be tackled in the objective rather than subjective terms, meaning that if person lives in the economic conditions, which do not threaten his/her life and only wants to be richer, is subjective approach, but people, who live below poverty line and want to be richer for the purpose of survival, this is considered as objective approach. These two approaches were introduced by W. G. Runciman. S. Yitzhaki, in his article, builds on the Runciman's work and described the relative deprivation as: "the impact of deprivation resulting from not having X when others have it is an increasing function of the number of persons in the reference group who have X. In other words, the social evaluation of the deprivation inherent in a person's not having X is an increasing function of the proportion of those who do have it"<sup>34</sup>. Yitzhaki claims that the relative deprivation is connected with the income per capita, hence with poverty and thus he suggests the measurement of the relative deprivation through Gini coefficient, which is also used in this thesis for the measurement of the economic deprivation variable.<sup>35</sup>

The groups of disadvantage people always find another group with more advantages than they possess, with whom they compare. This group is called target of

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<sup>33</sup> Dahl, 1995, pp. 220-221.

<sup>34</sup> Yitzhaki, May 1979, pp. 321.

<sup>35</sup> Fahey, Tony. Poverty and the Two Concepts of Relative Deprivation. Working Paper Series. UCD School of Applied Social Science [online]. July, 2010 [accessed 2014-4-30]. Available at: <http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp15%20fahey.pdf> and Yitzhaki, May 1979, pp. 321-322.

social comparison. The more advantages the target of social comparison has, the bigger is deprivation. And bigger deprivation together with strong in-group identification (identification with own disadvantaged group), and low rate of social mobility then can lead to a collective action of deprived group against the target of comparison, in the most extreme cases to a revolution or a civil war, because the privileged group do not want to give up its higher status. Wright and Tropp summarized four main causes for collective action leading to social changes, they are subsequent: “(a) the individual’s psychological connection with the in-group (in-group identification); (b) the propensity to make group-level social comparisons with a dominant out-group that lead to strong feelings of collective relative deprivation; (c) the individual’s assessment of, and subsequent rejection of, the possibility for individual upward mobility; and (d) the assessment of the in-group’s low status position as illegitimate and controllable”<sup>36</sup>. To conclude this subchapter, it needs to be mentioned that the connection between the relative deprivation and the collective action, became evident during the Arab revolutions.<sup>37</sup>

## **2.2.5 Putnam's Theory of Social Capital**

The last of the theories in this thesis is the theory of social capital, which can have many forms, but for the purposes of this thesis the Robert Putnam's theory of social capital is the most appropriate. Putnam divided social capital into three main elements, concretely moral obligations and norms; social values (trust in particular); and social networks (mainly voluntary associations), which all are mutually reinforcing. Putnam described the social capital as follows: “like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. . . . For example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust”<sup>38</sup>. According to Putnam the good social capital is important for vigorous society and through it for the stable democratic environment. He deliberately emphasizes the “good social capital”, because the social capital can take many forms, both positive and negative, which is obvious. Social capital, in the sense Putnam understands it, should lead to public rather than private

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<sup>36</sup> Wright and Tropp, 2002, pp. 238.

<sup>37</sup> Wright and Tropp, 2002, pp. 200-229.

<sup>38</sup> Coleman, 1990, pp. 302, pp. 304, pp. 307 cited by Putnam, 1993, pp. 167.

good. Moreover the concept of social capital consists of many norms and values such as a tolerance, a confidence, different value and belief systems, etc. Putnam also introduced basic typology of social capital, which is “between bridging social capital (that is, inclusive social networks that cut across various lines of social cleavage, linking people of different races, ages, classes, and so on) and bonding social capital (that is, exclusive social networks that are bounded within a given social category)”<sup>39</sup>. As Putnam emphasizes trust or trustworthiness as one of the most important components of the social capital, he interlinks it with the existence of norms of reciprocity and network of civic engagement. Putnam explains the social capital circle regarding trust: “trust creates reciprocity and voluntary associations, reciprocity and associations strengthen and produce trust”<sup>40</sup>. Moreover, he claims that “stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being. These traits define the civic community. Conversely, the absence of these traits in the uncivic community is also self-reinforcing”<sup>41</sup>. Finally Putnam adds that the already mentioned social equilibria could be path-dependent, which is explained below in more detail.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Putnam, 2004, pp. 669.

<sup>40</sup> Siisiäinen, 2000, nonpaged.

<sup>41</sup> Putnam, 1993, pp. 177.

<sup>42</sup> Putnam, 2002, pp. 3-19 and Putnam, 2001, pp. 1-3 and Siisiäinen, 2000, nonpaged and Putnam, 1993, pp. 163-181.

### 3 METHODOLOGY

This chapter deals with the methodology of this thesis. Firstly, it briefly explains, which type of the process-tracing method is used and how the whole research design is set. Secondly, it explains another method, which is used in this thesis for examining the individual aspects of the Civil Society, and which is called the Civil Society Diamond. This method of the “diamond model” has great relevance in studying the Civil Society among academia. And in the final part all variables are operationalised.

In the introduction to the methodology chapter, there should definitely be mentioned the way of transcription. Thus the correct transcription is supported by publications from James L. Gelvin and Marc Lynch. Translating of the Arabic words is done with regard to the English discourse.

#### 3.1 Process Tracing

In this diploma thesis a process tracing method is applied, concretely its general explanation approach because in that case the main causal relations rather than a detailed study of the process is provided. Generally, the process tracing method can be used for one or small number of cases as it is in this diploma thesis. And as this thesis is theory-centric, the theory-testing process tracing is applied, because it focuses on the causal mechanism between the authoritarian regimes and democratization, where a plausible causal mechanism consists of the dynamics of the Civil Society and crucial event, concretely revolutions. The main aim of this thesis is to test the hypothetical causal mechanism, whether it is present or absent. Moreover this causal mechanism can then be generalized into more cases or more countries, where the Arab revolutions took place. It also should be mentioned that in the case of theory-centric process-tracing, X is not a direct cause of Y, but only contributing one. Hence in the case of this thesis the authoritarian regimes do not directly cause their democratization, but they are not eternal and given to their limited legitimacy, they are prone to changes and given to three waves of democratization<sup>43</sup>, in most cases an effort for their democratization will sooner or later appear, especially after such crucial events as the revolutions definitely are. Finally, as testing of the hypothetical causal mechanism, which means its

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<sup>43</sup> Note – According to Huntington (more in his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*).

examination, whether given causal mechanism is present or absent in the all cases, where Y is the same, a cross-case analysis is applied.<sup>44</sup>

From process tracing methods so called path dependency in qualitative searching for causal mechanisms regarding the role of the Civil Society in the Arab authoritarian regimes, revolutions, and subsequent processes of democratization was chosen because one of the argument of this thesis is that the whole process, which is traced in this work is path-dependent, concretely that democratization in the examined countries is dependent on the previous authoritarian regimes.

Now to the description of the scheme of this thesis as it is graphically illustrated in the picture below. Firstly, independent variables respectively initial key points are determined. It should be mentioned that this process-tracing has bi-causal start, which are derived from the nature of the initial authoritarian regime, and the pre-revolutionary dynamics of the Civil Society. The nature of the initial authoritarian regime is defined according to theory of polyarchy as mentioned above. The second condition is the dynamics of the Civil Society, which is divided into six independent variables and they are concretely civil society organizations, social media and networks, youth education, political environment, economic deprivation, and social capital. These key points are rooted in the dynamics of the Civil Society in the non-democratic regimes as well as in the dynamics of the post-revolutionary Civil Society. Moreover, they correlated with each other. Secondly, the crucial event or phenomenon, which significantly influenced and largely predetermined future development is emphasized, and it is the revolutions that led to the overthrows of the initial regimes in the three examined states and which have changed the dynamics of the Civil Society. And finally the dependent variable respectively outcome of the process, which is in the case of this thesis the transition to democracy resp. democratization and the role of the Civil Society in it, is set. Moreover, despite the fact that foreign influences can affect the Civil Society in the process of democratization they are determined as control variable because the dynamics of the Civil Society as a cause for the revolutions emanated predominantly from domestic environment of the examined states. In the case of control variable it also has to be emphasized that by foreign influences it is meant influences outside of the Middle East region and despite the fact this thesis mainly focuses on the domestic development in the given states it has to take into consideration the influences emanated directly from the Middle East region because states were mutually affecting each other during the


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<sup>44</sup> Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 11-22.

Arab Spring.<sup>45</sup> To sum this thesis's research scheme it should be revised that it has seven independent variables or the initial key points, which are derived from the initial authoritarian regimes, and the dynamics of the Civil Society and that are correlated and they have both direct and indirect effects through the revolutions on democratization or transition to democracy. Basically, this thesis observes how the initial key points have been changing since the pre-revolution period through revolutions and how they influenced current processes of democratization. Additionally the core of this thesis is three case studies, concretely of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

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<sup>45</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Kořan, 2008, pp. 44-46.



## 3.2 Civil Society Diamond

The Civil Society Diamond (CSD) is a method using for the measurement of the complexity of the Civil Society. This method has been currently abundantly using among scholars focusing on topics related to the Civil Society because it consists of several points of view on the Civil Society. The CSD was introduced by H. K. Anheier in his book *Civil Society: Measurement evaluation, Policy* and he described it as subsequent: “it is a narrative that starts with different pieces of quantitative and qualitative information, combines them with descriptive accounts, and interprets the result by searching for patterns and relationships that culminate in some conclusion relevant to users. In other words, applying the CSD approach is to 'tell a story' about civil society with systematic information at hand”<sup>46</sup>. And despite the fact that the author claims that its primary purpose is not to use the CSD in the social science research, it can significantly contribute for better understanding of the Civil Society and its role in the Arab Spring and it serves for interpretation of the key aspects of the Civil Society, which have been playing important role in the transition to democracy in the examined countries. Moreover, in this thesis the CSD is a supplementary method, which should contribute for the higher relevance of this thesis's research.

The label the Civil Society Diamond is related to the result of this method, which is represented by model suggesting a diamond. The model itself is described below in the figure 1. However, firstly the main parameters of the model such as a unit of analysis, which can be macro, meso, or micro level need to be set. For the purposes of this thesis macro level of the Civil Society was chosen, because it has been applying in the cases, in which more societies or countries, which are part of some larger society or an ensemble, are examining. In this thesis it means the Arab societies successfully participating in the Arab Spring. Secondly, it needs to be explained the four dimensions of the Civil Society, which are concretely: “structural, in terms of size, composition and sources of support of the civil society unit under consideration; legal and political space, in terms of the regulatory environment in which civil society operates; impact-related or functional, in terms of the contributions of civil society, generally, or in particular fields; and value-related, in terms of norms and cultural elements”<sup>47</sup>. Basically, they are structure, space, impact, and value. Each of these dimensions consists of many factors

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<sup>46</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 14.

<sup>47</sup> Anheier, 2044, pp. 31-32.



or indicators, which have been chosen in the connection with selected variables in this thesis for the purpose of linking the main method of process-tracing with the CSD. Moreover, each of the variables is linked to one or more from the four dimensions of the Civil Society. Additionally, the CSD of this thesis represents over-time analysis, which means that it takes data from pre-revolutionary as well as post-revolutionary period into consideration.<sup>48</sup>




Figure 1 – The model of the CSD – Source: Anheier, 2004, p. 44.

Now to the selection of indicators for each dimension. For the purposes of this thesis one indicator for each dimension is chosen. The structure dimension is represented by the number of CSOs establishments per 100 000 population. The specific number for the CSD is gained by dividing the number of CSOs in the given country and period by the number of population in the given country and after that by multiplying this result by 100 000. For the value dimension indicator confidence in government was chosen. It is basically percentage of people who have confidence in a government in the given country. Space dimension is examined according to civil liberties. The data are extracted from the Freedom House and are converted to the desired value according to the special key presented by H. K. Anheier (see appendix – Table 3). And finally impact dimension is represented by change in the Human Development Index. The indicators and their measurement are described in more detail in the sub-chapter operationalisation

<sup>48</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 15-42.

of variables.<sup>49</sup>

### **3.3 Operationalisation of the variables**

This sub-chapter is dedicated to the operationalisation of the variables as well as to the explanation of the Civil Society Diamond in more detail. Moreover it also presents data sources for individual variables and for indicators of the CSD.

At the beginning of this sub-chapter it should definitely be mentioned the main shortcoming of this research, which is the data availability. The data for some concrete indicators or concrete time periods of the examined countries are not available; however it is emphasized in the concrete case studies and eventually replaced by another relevant and similar data. This unavailability is caused either by authoritarian nature of the examined regimes or by the novelty of the researched topic. Moreover the data gathering regarding the Civil Society requires long-term and costly surveys.

#### **3.3.1 Authoritarian regime and Democratization**

As it has already been mentioned several times, an authoritarian regime as well as the level of democratization is based on the theory of polyarchy by Robert Dahl. He introduced seven factors, which are the basis for measurement of the level of democracy in the given country. M. Coppedge and W. H. Reinicke build on the Dahl's work and developed the method for measurement of polyarchy in their article *Measuring Polyarchy*. They presented eight principles or basic elements of political democracy, which are freedom to form and join organizations; freedom of expression; the right to vote; eligibility for public office; the right of political leaders to compete for support; alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. From these eight elements they determined four main variables for measuring polyarchy because they united the right of political leaders to compete for support; free and fair elections; and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference into one variable called free and fair elections. They also admit that there do not exist enough information for eligibility for public office, but according to their

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<sup>49</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 38-42, 159, 184, 192, 204.

research, this element is similar to eligibility to vote. Moreover, they marked suffrage as not significantly corresponding to polyarchy and thus did not use it, but for the purposes of this thesis suffrage is included in the measurement. Hence there are five variables for measuring polyarchy<sup>50</sup>:

Categories	Free and fair elections (FAIRELT)	Freedom of organization (FREORG)	Freedom of expression (FREXT)	Alternative information (ALTINF)	Suffrage (SUFF)
1	elections without fraud or coercion	some trade unions or interest groups may be harassed or banned but there are no restrictions on purely political organization	citizens express their views on all topics without fear of punishment	alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. If there is significant government ownership of the media, they are effectively controlled by truly independent or multi-party bodies	universal adult suffrage
2	elections with some fraud or coercion	some political parties are banned and trade unions or interest groups are harassed or banned, but membership in some alternatives to official organizations is permitted	dissent is discouraged, whether by informal pressure or by systematic censorship, but control is incomplete. The extent of control may range from selective punishment of dissidents on a limited number of issues to a situation in which only determined critics manage to make themselves	alternative sources of information are widely available but government versions are presented in preferential fashion. This may be the result of partiality in and greater availability of government-controlled media; selective closure, punishment, harassment, or censorship of dissident	suffrage with partial restrictions

<sup>50</sup> Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990, pp. 51-62.

Categories	Free and fair elections (FAIRELT)	Freedom of organization (FREORG)	Freedom of expression (FREXT)	Alternative information (ALTINF)	Suffrage (SUFF)
			heard. There is some freedom of private discussion	reporters, publishers, or broadcasters; or mild self-censorship resulting from any of these	
3	no meaningful elections (no candidates, no parties)	the only relatively independent organizations that are allowed to exist are nonpolitical	all dissent is forbidden and effectively suppressed. Citizens are wary of criticizing the government even privately	the government or ruling party dominates the diffusion of information to such a degree that alternative sources exist only for nonpolitical issues, for short periods of time, or for small segments of the population. The media are either mostly controlled directly by the government or party or restricted by routine prior censorship, near-certain punishment of dissident reporters, publishers, and broadcasters, or pervasive self-censorship. Foreign media may be available to a small segment of the population	suffrage denied to large segments of the population

Categories	Free and fair elections (FAIRELT)	Freedom of organization (FREORG)	Freedom of expression (FREXT)	Alternative information (ALTINF)	Suffrage (SUFF)
4		no independent organizations are allowed. All organizations are banned or controlled by the government or the party		there is no public alternative to official information. All sources of information are official organs or completely subservient private sources. The media are considered instruments of indoctrination. Foreign publications are usually unavailable or censored, and foreign broadcasts may be jammed	no suffrage

Source: Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990, p. 53-54.

From these coding variables they created the so called Polyarchy Scale, the extent of which is from 0 meaning full polyarchy to 10 meaning none polyarchy. This scale, basically, shows the degree of the public contestation, the main dimension, which reflects polyarchy. The ideal scale types are subsequent: 0 (1 1 1 1); 1 (1 1 1 2); 2 (1 1 2 2); 3 (1 2 2 2/ 2 1 2 2); 4 (2 2 2 2); 5 (3 2 2 2); 6 (3 3 2 2); 7 (3 3 2 3); 8 (3 4 2 3); 9 (3 4 2 4); and 10 (3 4 3 4). The individual numbers are first things first: FAIRELT, FREORG, FREXT, ALTINF. The suffrage is evaluated separately as the second dimension of the measuring polyarchy.<sup>51</sup>

For the measuring of the individual variables of polyarchy, these data sources are used: Freedom House, World Press Freedom Index, Enabling Environment Index, Democracy Index<sup>52</sup>, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Transparency

<sup>51</sup> Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990, pp. 55-56, 63-66.

<sup>52</sup> Democracy Index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, which has been evaluating the rate of democracy on the scale of 0 to 10 according to 60 indicators included in 5 categories (election process and

International, etc.

### **3.3.2 Civil Society Organizations**

The Civil Society organizations (CSOs) variable corresponds with the structure dimension of the Civil Society. Hence it is operationalised according to the indicator – the number of CSOs establishments per 100 000 population. Moreover, other indicators concretely membership in CSOs; paid employment in CSOs per 1000 employed; volunteering in CSOs as a percentage of total adult population, and CSOs fulfilled commitments are add, if data for the concrete country or period are available. These indicators are evaluated over time for the purpose of detection the changes from the pre-revolutionary to post-revolutionary period. Moreover, these indicators are supported by qualitative evaluation of the goals CSOs pursue and how they engaged in the revolutions and whether they currently participate in the process of transition because some of them formed as ad hoc organizations for the purpose of revolutions and currently does not exist or have different goals. Additionally the most important CSOs in each examined country are highlighted.<sup>53</sup>

Membership in the CSOs, in terms of adult population is measured according to the surveys made by national statistical office and other organizations, if available. It is the same with the indicators number of CSOs establishments per 100 000 population; paid employment in CSOs per 1000 employed; volunteering or unpaid workers in CSOs. The indicator fulfilled commitments and goals of CSOs (for the purpose of this thesis fulfilled commitment - democracy was set) is evaluated according to the Freedom House. The generalization of the indicator fulfilled commitment is based on the assumption that democracy, or its associated aspects, is the main goal of the majority of CSOs. Moreover, international comparative indicators examined by the UN and the World Bank are used.<sup>54</sup>

### **3.3.3 Social Media and Networks**

The social media and networks generally brought modernization and through it the

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pluralism, civil liberties, functionality of government, political participation and political culture). States marked with 10 have the highest rate of democracy and those marked with 0 have the lowest one.

<sup>53</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 38-42.

<sup>54</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 140-195.

process of strengthening of the Civil Society started. In this thesis the social media and networks are examined in two ways. Firstly, quantitatively, this means the percentage of users of the individual social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and others in pre-revolutionary, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary period in the given countries. Moreover, the most important groups of the individual social networks, which also have the highest number of fans, regarding social and political topics, are outlined. Data are gained from Socialbakers, which is the Czech company making statistics of social media and networks' users in the individual countries; the Ecco International Communication Network, providing reports focusing on using social media and networks worldwide; the Arab social media report, which is project of the Dubai School of Government, and others.

The second way of research of the social media and networks variable is qualitative, which means that it focuses on the concrete statements regarding the revolutions, regime change, democracy, and other social and political related ones, which appeared and has been appearing on the social networks as well as on the most important videos on Youtube. Moreover, according to the resource mobilization theory, it is also examined the ways how people were and are mobilized during the revolutions as well as the process of democratization. To conclude it should definitely be mentioned that for the detail research of the social media and networks, the discursive analysis would be the most appropriate method; nevertheless, there is not enough space and time to carry out this kind of research in this thesis.

### **3.3.4 Youth Education**

The youth education and generally education is an important element of the Civil Society research especially in the countries, where the literacy rate does not correspond with standards existing in Europe, North America and generally in the developed countries. However, a vigorous Civil Society is highly dependent on the educated people as well as higher literacy rate has been contributing to the transitions to democracy processes to be more effective and faster and newly established democratic regimes more stable and durable. Moreover, youth education is also an important factor determining the dynamics of the Civil Society because the higher literacy rate as well as the higher quality of education, the bigger opportunity for the mobilization of the youth has been existing.

The variable youth education is examined according to educational attainment index, which consists of the adult literacy rate, enrollment, and other aspects such as mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling (“the number of years of schooling that today’s children can expect to have once they grow up, given current enrollment ratios”<sup>55</sup>), etc. Moreover, it is focused on the percentage of graduates of the individual levels of education, satisfaction with education, quality of education as well as access to education. The data on these indicators are provided by the UNDP – Human Development Report, the UNESCO, the Global Competitiveness Report, and so on and so forth. Finally, the overall educational system and education as such are evaluated qualitatively.

### **3.3.5 Political environment**

The variable political environment basically corresponds with the dimension space from the CSD; hence it is evaluated according to civil liberties. Moreover, other aspects are added such as freedom of association; political freedom; and the Corruption Perceptions Index. And it is one of the most important variables related to the transition to democracy processes as well as it has been influencing changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society and for that reason it is evaluated both before and after the revolutions.

The data for the indicators civil liberties as well as political freedom are provided by the organization Freedom House as well as by the United Nations Development Program in their annual statistics and reports. Measuring political freedom is based on five elements, which are political participation, rule of law, freedom of expression, equality before law, and integrity of self. Despite the fact that freedom of association is part of the civil liberties, it is examined separately because, for the purpose of this thesis, it needs to be put greater emphasis on this specific freedom because it is closely linked to the function of the Civil Society. The data for this indicator are again extracted from the Freedom House and are evaluated qualitatively because there exists no special index or ranking focusing on this specific civil liberty. And finally the level of corruption is measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is annually compiled by the Transparency International.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 36.

<sup>56</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 140-195.



### **3.3.6 Economic Deprivation**

The variable economic deprivation is connected to the overall satisfaction of citizens in the given country. For the measuring of economic deprivation Human Development Index (HDI) is used as the primary indicator. HDI consists of life expectancy at birth, education index (mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling), and GNI per capita (PPP). HDI indicator is further supplemented by other aspects such as overall life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, GNI per capita (PPP), rate of unemployment, and additionally also the Gini coefficient, which measures the level of inequality in the given country based on the income per capita, income of family or household and it also includes expenditures. Thus it is obvious that the Gini coefficient also shows how many people live below poverty line in the given country. Some of these indicators are part of the general indicator HDI but they are also emphasized separately for creating of the overall picture of the economic deprivation in the given country. The data for these indicators are provided by the UNDP – Human Development Report and the World Bank.<sup>57</sup>

### **3.3.7 Social Capital**

The variable social capital is linked with the dimension value because, as was mentioned above, Robert Putnam in his theory of the social capital divided the social capital into three main elements. They are moral obligations and norms; social values (trust in particular); and social networks (mainly voluntary associations), which all are mutually reinforcing.<sup>58</sup> For the reason that social networks are part of the other variables, the social capital variable has been predominantly focusing on social norms and values hence it is operationalised on the basis of four indicators – trust; tolerance; confidence in the selected institutions; religion and belief systems. The data for the all indicators are provided by the World Values Survey in its sixth wave (2010-2014). The first indicator – trust means whether people trust the other people in their country. The second indicator – tolerance is measured according to the importance people attribute to this value. In the case of the third indicator – confidence in selected institutions, the institutions which were chosen are subsequent: government, religious organizations,

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<sup>57</sup> Anheier, 2004, pp. 140-195.

<sup>58</sup> Siisiäinen, 2000, nonpaged.

labor unions, police, parliament, and army. Among other data providers for this indicator are the Arab Opinion Index, Pew Research Center, etc. The fourth indicator - religion and belief systems includes several elements for rendering an overall picture of religion in the examined countries. They are a share of believers and non-believers, and opinions on diffusion of politics and religion. The data are provided by the World Values Survey, Arab Opinion Index, the Pew Research Centre, the Government Restrictions Index (“measures government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups”<sup>59</sup>), and the Social Hostilities Index (“measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities”<sup>60</sup>), etc. The last two sources are part of the wider Religious Restrictions Index, which is measured on the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is the best evaluation and 10 the worst one with the highest restrictions on religion.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project. Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion [online]. September 20, 2012 [accessed 2014-6-15]. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/09/20/rising-tide-of-restrictions-on-religion-findings/>.

<sup>60</sup> Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project. Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion [online]. September 20, 2012 [accessed 2014-6-15]. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/09/20/rising-tide-of-restrictions-on-religion-findings/>.

<sup>61</sup> Religious Restriction Index, 2012, pp. 52-64 and The Arab Opinion Index, 2011, pp. 1-87 and Anheier, 2004, pp. 140-195.

## 4 EGYPT

### 4.1 Authoritarian regime of the president Mubarak

In October 1981 lieutenant of the Egyptian army Khalid Islambouli committed attack on the Egyptian president Anwar as-Sadat during the military parade in Cairo. Hosni Mubarak then vice-president became the successor of as-Sadat. Mubarak gained 98,4% in referendum, which ensured him the post of the Egyptian president<sup>62</sup>. In the initial phase of his mandate Mubarak was, given to his experiences from army, considered as the respectable and pragmatic person by Egyptian people and the general notion existed that he is able to consolidate the country, which was politically, socially, and economically disrupted. One of the first steps of the newly elected president was to release political prisoners and start partial liberalization of the country connected with acceptance of the political opposition and with an attempt of economic stabilization of the country through the policy of the so called al-infitah, which was considered as the process of transition to democracy. Nevertheless, this expectation later showed itself as mistaken because liberalization policy was successful only during 1980s in Egypt.<sup>63</sup>

At the beginning of the 1990s the economic situation had been getting worsened, which led to inflation, increase of the state debt and other negative factors connected with it such as upsurge of Islamism. One of the reasons this process did not succeed is the fact the Mubarak was not able to pass structural reforms. Moreover after short term of the liberalization efforts in the 1990s Mubarak began to consolidate his own power because he felt insecure especially from the Muslim Brotherhood. Tactics of the consolidation of power is characterized by significant leaning on the army and the overall coherence of military and political spheres, which was in the case of Mubarak logical step towards the fact the he and his predecessors in presidency came from the military structures. Police and intelligence services were also the important components of his power base and their powers were wide scope due to the state of emergency declared in 1981, in the connection with the assassination of the president as-Sadat, and valid until 2011.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Cook, 2011, pp. 157.

<sup>63</sup> Ismael and Ismael, 2011, pp. 361-367 and Osman, 2011, nonopaged (Kindle edition) and Hamid, 2011, pp. 106.

<sup>64</sup> Ismael and Ismael, 2011, pp. 361-367 and Osman, 2011, nonopaged (Kindle edition) and Mandaville, 2009, pp. 179 and Hamid, 2011, pp. 106.

Osman in his book claims that Mubarak was not the good leader, however, despite this fact Egyptian journalist Al Aswany asserts that: „the minister does not care at all what people think because he does not obtain his position through his competence or his work, but through his loyalty to the president...They all glorify the president and praise his genius and his great achievements”<sup>65</sup>. Mubarak and his political party – the National Democratic Party always had the majority in the Parliament thus Mubarak controlled the whole Egyptian ruling system. The president's orientation on the narrow power elite caused his inability to approach common Egyptian, who did not know anything about Mubarak and his family's private life. People knew him only as public official, who appeared only at state ceremonies during which he behaved strictly in a formal way. His human side was shrouded in mystery. It also can be claimed that in many senses Mubarak was featureless person. Moreover, someone considered him as not too intelligent, who was not able to write himself into the history of Egypt such deeply as his predecessors.<sup>66</sup>

Dissatisfaction of Egyptian citizens with the president Mubarak and domestic as well as foreign direction of the regime fully showed in the 1990s, concretely in 1995 when attempt to assassinate the president took place in Ethiopia and particularly after 2000, concretely between 2005 and 2009, when demonstrations against the regime took place. Cook in his book mentions that: “The self-effacing vice president and air force officer had been transformed over the previous twenty years into a pharaoh”<sup>67</sup>. Mubarak's inability to solve problems in the country as well as to proceed to reforms got his regime to the phase of unsustainability and due to the situation in Tunisia massive demonstrations took place in Egypt which caused the overthrow of the Mubarak's regime. It needs to be mentioned that Mubarak and his ruling elite fatally underestimated the situation. Its solving through command to the army to oppose and disperse protesters was an absolute nonsense, given the fact that Mubarak's influence on the army was not as strong at that time as it was at the beginning of his mandate.<sup>68</sup> At the end of the days Mubarak's authoritarian regime itself caused that he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2012.

It should definitely be focused on the social and political conditions prevailing in the country. In 2010 Egypt gained overall score 3,07, which gave it 138<sup>th</sup> position in the

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<sup>65</sup> Al Aswany, 2011, pp. 13-14.

<sup>66</sup> Osman, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Khalil, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>67</sup> Cook, 2011, pp. 167.

<sup>68</sup> Osman, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

Democracy Index evaluating the rate of democracy in the world. This result classified Egypt as the authoritarian regime. In 1981 the state of emergency was declared, as was mentioned above. It restrained basic freedoms in the country such as ban of political parties, peaceful assembly of people, etc. In Egypt censorship significantly expressed oneself concretely of press and media, which both were controlled by the state. The common practice of Mubarak's regime was abuse of the voting system, frauds during elections, intimidation, arresting and attacks on opposition voters and ban of access to polling stations.<sup>69</sup>

One of the most important causes of the Egyptian revolution was the issue of elections. After the Mubarak's succession the change of the voting law took place in 1983. Subsequent parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987 were one of the most democratic elections in the history of Egypt because they were part of the liberalization process, which Mubarak conducted after he became the Egyptian president. At the beginning of the 1990s he began to incline to authoritarianism mainly due to his fear of Islamist particularly of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1994 Mubarak even banned the Muslim Brotherhood, which represented the only real opposition against the National Democratic Party. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were accused of supporting terrorism and arrested. This act contributed to victory of Mubarak's ruling party in the elections in 1995.<sup>70</sup>

After 2000 judiciary of the Egyptian ruling system represented sort of control of the legislative and executive power. It created signs of democracy given the fact that judiciary controlled elections; these elections can be labeled as satisfactory in the sense of transparency and correctness. In 2005 Mubarak decided to change constitutional article 76 thus accepted another candidates in the elections but simultaneously he formulated this article in the way to assure victory in the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005. Mentioned elections took place in the context of massive demonstrations, when organization, which should control elections, cannot access polling stations. After these elections the ruling regime strengthened its power, significantly restricted opposition and simultaneously judiciary was subordinated to the executive power hence it cannot independently control elections anymore.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Cook, 2011, pp. 66 and Ismael and Ismael, 2011, pp. 361-362 and Marfleet, 2009, pp. 15, 23-27 and Democracy Index, 2010, pp. 7 and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8h0qUD\\_KSo](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8h0qUD_KSo).

<sup>70</sup> Hamid, 2011, pp. 106 and Ismael and Ismael, 2011, pp. 362-363.

<sup>71</sup> Osman, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Ismael and Ismael, 2011, pp. 364-370 and Moustafa, 2007, pp. 210-216 and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2010, nonpaged. Available at:

Another aspect of the Mubarak's regime was brutality of the state security forces. Police and security agencies had the right to take people to custody, arrest them without trial, torture and beat them and last but not least to ban demonstrations. These extensive powers together with Mubarak's adherence to almost two million of state security members was largely due to Mubarak's fear of himself resulting from his presence at as-Sadat's assassination. In 2008 eighteen thousand Egyptians were held in custody as so called "administrative detainees". During uprisings police used tear gas, rubber bullets, etc. against protesters, which was possible to observe in the case of the Arab Spring, however, the similar view appeared also in the case of previous demonstrations.<sup>72</sup>

The conclusion of this subchapter is devoted to measuring the degree of polyarchy of the Egyptian regime under the Mubarak's rule. The evaluation focuses on the last years of the Mubarak's regime because it needs to be emphasized that the degree of polyarchy had been changing over time, especially the first years of his rule had significantly higher degree of polyarchy, due to the already mentioned process of liberalization, than last years of his rule, when on the contrary he was trying to consolidate his power. Thus before the revolution Egypt got 6 on the Polyarchy Scale, which means worse midst (viz. Table 1). Concretely, the variable fair elections is evaluated 3, freedom of organization 3, freedom of expression 2, alternative sources of information 2, and suffrage 1.

## 4.2 Civil Society Organizations

The birth of the Civil Society in Egypt is dated back to 1821, when the first CSO was established. However, this thesis is focusing primarily on the structure of the Civil Society organizations during the period of the Mubarak's regime and its aftermath. Thus first of all it focuses on the Civil Society in the Mubarak's regime. Generally, despite the fact that the pre-revolutionary regime in Egypt was non-democratic and it was significantly restricting the Civil Society, the Civil Society as a whole was vibrant. The expansion of the Civil Society began in the 1990s, concretely in 1991 12 832 CSOs existed in Egypt and their number has been significantly increasing since that time when in 2005 it reached approximately 27 000 CSOs. For the reason of non-democratic

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[http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8h0qUD\\_KSo](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8h0qUD_KSo).

<sup>72</sup> Osman, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and El-Dawla, 2009, pp. 120-135 and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8h0qUD\\_KSo](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8h0qUD_KSo).

regime in Egypt the exact numbers are unfortunately not available, hence this thesis is working with approximate numbers. Inaccuracy in numbers is also due to high number of non-registered CSOs, they were either officially banned or many of them exist only “on the paper” meaning that they were inactive. The beginning of the development of the Egyptian Civil Society in the 1990s was also supported by the UN's International Conference on Population and Development, which took place in Egypt in 1994. Generally, the CSOs under the Mubarak regime were based on the two laws, concretely on the Law on Associations and Community foundations (Law 84/2002) and the Implementing Regulation for Law 84 of 2002. These laws were significantly affecting activities of the CSOs because all of them had to be registered and their work had to be approved by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (the Ministry of Social Affairs) and if they did not follow the rules they were banned and dissolved. Generally, there existed two types of NGOs, concretely welfare organizations and development organizations (community development associations – CDAs). Or more detailed typology is subsequent: Islamic NGOs, Coptic NGOs, CDAs, advocacy groups, and businessman's associations. The detailed typology is based on the specific goals or field of interests of each NGO. In 1999 the number of CSOs members was around 14 million, and about 3% of the CSOs members were volunteers. Moreover, CSOs employed around 630 000 full-time equivalent workers, which was 2,8% of the economically active population. Generally, the Egyptian CSOs suffered from low participation and funding, thus the most common form of the Civil Society participation was charitable donations, which was given by the already mentioned fact, that charity or *zakat*, is one of the five pillars of the Islam and thus they are mandatory for Muslims. The most marginalized groups of the society were poor people, disabled ones, women, youth, and rural inhabitants but CIVICUS data shows that the level of their participation was relatively low; the most active group was youth.<sup>73</sup>

Even though there were obstacles and challenges to the CSOs during the

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<sup>73</sup> Muftah. Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt [online]. May 29, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: [http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD\\_KSp](http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD_KSp) and The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. NGO Law Monitor: Egypt [online]. June 24, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/egypt.html> and CIVICUS Civil Society Index. [online]. © 2009 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.civicus.org/csi/> and Qandil, Mohamed Mokhtar. The role of civil society organizations in the democratization in Egypt. Ahewar [online]. July 28, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.ahewar.org/eng/show.art.asp?aid=1815> and Salamon, Lester M. Global Civil Society: An Overview [online]. September 14, 2006 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.frivillighed.dk/Webnodes/da/Web/Public/Om+os/English> and Civil Society Index Report for the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005, pp. 17-77 and Al-Sayyid, Spring 1993, pp.230-242 and Kandil and Toepler and Salamon, 2004, pp. 217-226 and Abdelrahman, 2005, pp. 5-8.

Mubarak's regime, largely given by the Emergency Law, they were relatively active in their challenging of the regime. One of the most famous movement acting against the Mubarak's regime was The Egyptian Movement for Change also known as the Kifaya, which means "Enough". This movement together with other groups acted under the common label – Movements for Change. Their primary goal was democratization. For this purpose since 2004 it had convened protests, demonstrations, and meetings, which were generally banned in Egypt by the already mentioned Emergency Law. This movement had been keeping the concept of the Civil Society deeply rooted in Egypt through its huge propaganda against the ruling regime, which they conducted mainly through Internet. For their activities the Kifaya's members, who consisted mainly of young people, were persecuted, which was also due to their cooperation with the regime's enemy number one – the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2005 the Muslim Brotherhood also joined socialists and the (Islamist) Labour Party and established the National Coalition for Change. The Kifaya movement together with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups participated on the Egyptian revolution in 2011. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that it is not officially acknowledged whether the Muslim Brotherhood is a group within the Civil Society or it is political group.<sup>74</sup>

Islamism or political Islam is "the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life"<sup>75</sup>. The main representative of political Islam is the already mentioned Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood as social movement or political group was severely persecuted by the Nasser's, as-Sadat's, and Mubarak's regimes with some little exceptions during the beginning of each of Nasser's and as-Sadat's rules, which were always considered as liberalization periods. Anyway after these periods each of the presidents began to fear the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious political opposition force and thus they decided to continually restraining their influence. Mubarak began his presidency with tough approach towards the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamists in general because they participated on the assassination of his predecessor as-Sadat, then he softened his politics but after this short period he went back to the "traditional" approach towards the Islamists. Mubarak began raids against Islamists including large-scale arrest and army deployment. Generally, "the Muslim Brotherhood has been very active in promoting social welfare, particularly in the areas of health care and education. The organization and its supporters run schools, hospitals,

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<sup>74</sup> El-Mahdi, 2009, pp. 87-102.

<sup>75</sup> Berman, June 2003, pp. 257.



day care programs, job training centers, tutoring programs, Quranic instruction programs, after-school programs, and numerous other development and social programs”<sup>76</sup>. Nevertheless, they also has militant wing - jihadists, which is also another reason why they were persecuting by the ruling regimes. This military wing responded to the Mubarak's raids by attacks on state officials, banks, and even tourists. The well known attack was made by Gama'at Islamiyya in 1997 when they killed fifty eight tourists at Deir el-Bahri. After this incident Mubarak broke the jihadists' network, the Muslim Brotherhood went through the process of transformation and remained as the most important Islamist group focusing mainly on politics as well as it remained one of the greatest enemies of the ruling regime and was treated like that. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood needs to be mentioned because it has been playing significant role, sometimes positive and sometimes negative, in the Egyptian Civil Society as well as later in political life with its Freedom and Justice Party, which is described below in more detail.<sup>77</sup>

Among the other important Egyptian CSOs belong Egyptian NGO Support Center approved in 2011 and focusing on youth education, health and sexuality; Association for the Development and Empowerment of Women registered in 1987 and dealing with the right for women; General Federation of NGOs; Care Egypt; Egyptian Center For Economic And Social Rights; Development Support Center; Egyptian Association For Community Participation Enhancement; Youth Association For Population And Development and many other. Generally, the majority of organizations were developmental and religious groups then followed by youth and social clubs, sports clubs, trade and workers unions, etc. Some of these organizations were independent from the state but others were, as Zubaida claims: “not autonomous from the state, but depend[s] on another of its facets: the corrupt bureaucracies”<sup>78</sup>. “While the Mubarak regime tolerated syndicates, unions, business associations and service-based organizations, it continued to harass pro-democracy actors like human rights organizations and non-religious social movements, regularly accusing them of being agents of foreign regimes or “spies” seeking to destroy the Egyptian state”<sup>79, 80</sup>.

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<sup>76</sup> Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 1999, pp. 22.

<sup>77</sup> Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 1999, pp. 21-22 and Naguib, 2009, pp. 103-119.

<sup>78</sup> Zubaida, 1992, pp. 3 cited by Milton-Edwards, 2011, pp. 184.

<sup>79</sup> Muftah. Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt [online]. May 29, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: [http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD\\_KSp](http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD_KSp).

<sup>80</sup> The Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women [online]. 2008 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.adew.org/en/> and Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. Egypt to answer to

The second part of this sub-chapter is devoted to the CSOs' participation in the revolution and their activities after the fall of the Mubarak's regime. Generally, the Egyptian revolution contributed to the significant boom of the already numerous CSOs because the CSOs were the main actors in the revolution. In 2011 there were approximately 45 000 CSOs and moreover probably 50 000 unregistered CSOs. The precise number of members after the revolution is not available, but estimates are 16,1 million members at minimum. The percentage of volunteers to paid workers and full-time equivalent workers to economically active population remain more or less the same.<sup>81</sup>

The most active movements in the Egyptian revolution were already mentioned Kifaya movement, the Youth for Change, and the April 6<sup>th</sup> movement. For the reason that they together with many others CSOs responded to already ongoing revolution and democratization process in Tunisia, these movements were able to prepare themselves well and more effectively therefore the revolution itself was successful. Generally, after the Egyptian revolution, it is believed that in Egypt "people have been taking more control over their lives"<sup>82</sup>, which is a positive step, although with some negative circumstances because one of the reasons is that people know that their fight for freedom and democracy has not ended yet. This fact is supported by behavior of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (power-holder in Egypt after the revolution) which started to arrest CSOs members and activists for various reasons, mainly for, according to them, illegal funding, soon after the Mubarak's regime fell. Moreover, new NGO law or Civil Society law was adopted in 2012. "The draft law poses more restrictions on associational freedoms than law 84/2002. For instance, according to this draft law, associations will only be allowed to work on issues of social justice and development; severe criminal penalties may be imposed on unregistered organizations; and organizations are required to receive prior approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity before accepting foreign funds and affiliating with other foreign

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UN body for ongoing social rights crisis [online]. November 11, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7502&lang=en> and Ford Foundation. Egyptian NGO Support Center [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at:

<http://www.fordfoundation.org/grants/grantdetails?grantid=116433>.

<sup>81</sup> Wahab, January 2012, pp. 71-73 and Kandil and Toepler and Salamon, 2004, pp. 1-13 and US Aid Report, 2011, pp. 9-15.

<sup>82</sup> Oxfam International. Egyptian civil society organizations keep the faith in democracy [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.oxfam.org/en/development/egypt/egyptian-civil-society-organizations-keep-faith-democracy>.

organizations”<sup>83</sup>. This indicates the fact that the Civil Society in Egypt has still a long journey to become really vibrant, effective and mainly independent from the state. However, on the other hand by success in ousting the Mubarak's regime CSOs showed that this journey is well underway. The only thing they have to do is to maximize their efforts in the struggle for democracy in Egypt. The overall role of the Civil Society organizations in the process of democratization in Egypt is described more in detail in the sub-chapter democratization.<sup>84</sup>

In terms of the fulfilled commitments and goals of the Egyptian CSOs it has to be emphasized that each of the organizations have its own goals but for the purpose of this thesis, there is set only one overarching indicator and it is fulfilled commitment of democracy meaning that it evaluates how the CSOs contributed to the process of democratization in Egypt. In the case of Egypt this fulfilled commitment is evaluated as 4 meaning progress but not good enough.

### 4.3 Social Media and Networks

As it has been already mentioned several times in this thesis, the main mobilization tool for revolution in Egypt was social media and networks. Social media and networks or internet in general began to emerge in Egypt with significant delay but it has been very quickly spreading across people, predominantly the youth in the case of social networks and it gained its momentum in 2011 when the revolution started. The significant utilization of social media and networks during the uprising was also caused by the Egyptian government's decision to support and spread internet connection throughout the country for the purpose of development mainly in the social and economic fields more than ten years before the revolution. Hence it can be claimed that the Egyptian government promoted tool, which then was used as a weapon against itself.<sup>85</sup>

Egypt had around 82 million inhabitants and in 2008 it had 12,57 million internet

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<sup>83</sup> The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Restrictive Draft CSO Law Announced by Egyptian Ministry of Social Justice and Solidarity cited by Muftah. Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt [online]. May 29, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: [http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD\\_KSp](http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD_KSp).

<sup>84</sup> Muftah. Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt [online]. May 29, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: [http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD\\_KSp](http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD_KSp) and Morayef, Heba. Why Egypt's New Law Regulating NGOs is Still Criminal. Human Rights Watch [online]. June 11, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/11/why-egypts-new-law-regulating-ngos-still-criminal>.

<sup>85</sup> Hamdy, 2009 cited by Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1212.

users, which is not a large portion but it needs to be kept in mind that there is high illiteracy rate and often poor accessibility to the IT technologies also given by poverty. Moreover, censorship of internet was also widespread as well as “the Egyptian government employed numerous tactics to suppress the uprising’s roots online—including by shutting down internet connectivity, cutting off mobile communications, imprisoning dissenters, blocking media websites, confiscating newspapers, and disrupting satellite signals in a desperate measure to limit media coverage”<sup>86</sup>. The rapid increase can be seen on the fact that in 2011 the number of internet users in Egypt was 29,3 million. From the social networks Facebook is the most favorite of all. Between 2008 and 2010 it had 3-4,5 million users and 78% of them were under 30 years old.<sup>87</sup>

During the revolutionary days internet was totally disconnected several times for the purpose of disruption of protesters' mobilization as well as slowing the spread of news from the country to the world. Censorship of many web pages had been continuing and internet discussions, tweets, and Facebook posts were controlled by police. However, it was not possible to control everything and for that reason internet was completely shut down between 27<sup>th</sup> January and 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2011. Despite this fact people found ways how to connect themselves, also with international help from Google, Twitter, hackers, etc., and overcame these obstacles for internet users and therefore the Egyptian revolution is known as the Facebook or the Twitter revolution. The Arab social media report published in 2012 revealed that 46% of respondents were influenced by social media during the changes in their country and 58% claimed that social media brought them other points of view on the situation and made them more open-minded and tolerant to these opinions. Moreover, 79% of respondents felt greater solidarity, better interactions and connections as well as communication with fellow citizens. In June 2012 number of Facebook users reached 10,7 million, which represents an incredible increase in the last five years. At the same time Twitter had almost 300 thousand users. There were also more than 4 million LinkedIn users. Generally, it can be said that social media “gave powerful weapons to those organizing protests and helped them shape international views of their struggle”<sup>88</sup>. The main advantage of social networks' utilization was rapid dissemination of information among many people either within the country or on the international basis mainly with Tunisian activists. This was

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<sup>86</sup> Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/egypt#.U7LCaCjENFI>.

<sup>87</sup> ECCO International Communications Network Report-Egypt, 2010, pp. 6-8 and Arab Social Media Report, January 2011, pp. 4-18.

<sup>88</sup> Lynch, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

another level of resource mobilization, which is also called cyber-activism. Next to the mobilization tool, social networks also served as a forum for moral support of protests and from the practical side also as source of advices as how to behave during the protests to be safe, or as source of immediate information about the event in the concrete places. And finally, the social media and networks gave people “free voices”, which they were not able to express in other way in the non-democratic regime with significantly limited freedom of speech or expression. The social media and networks became a tool for fighting oppression.<sup>89</sup>

Even when the Egyptian revolution ended, some web pages have been still censored and the social networks has been still monitoring until nowadays. However, the social media became also the new government's tool for spreading information. Concretely, “forced mobile operators to send out messages urging subscribers to participate in pro-government rallies. The government adopted the same tactic with the internet, using public figures to post pro-government messages on their web pages and Facebook accounts”<sup>90</sup>. Moreover, “since 2011, counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt have made highly effective use of the social media in parallel with their efforts to regain control of the traditional state media, which was temporarily disrupted during the early phases of the revolution”<sup>91</sup>. However, using the social media and networks for both promoters of revolution and counter-revolution has been remaining a general trend because all political parties, CSOs, and other organizations and groups began to use social networks for their promotion, for mobilization of members or participants for various events, as an arena for discussions, for reporting events, as a source of information, etc. Therefore generally, it can be claimed that even after the revolution the power of the social media and networks have remained strong but the role of the traditional media should also not be marginalized because they serve for people who do not have access to the new media.<sup>92</sup>

The most favorite group on Facebook regarding social and political life in Egypt has been “We are all Khalid Said”, which is also the most mentioned one and most

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<sup>89</sup> Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/egypt#.U7LCaCjENFI> and Arab Social Media Report, July 2012, pp. 1-24 and Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1212-1218 and Russell, 2011, pp. 1240-1246 and Iskander, 2011, pp. 1226-1235.

<sup>90</sup> Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/egypt#.U7LCaCjENFI>.

<sup>91</sup> Alexander and Aouragh, 2014, pp. 893.

<sup>92</sup> Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1212-1218 and Russell, 2011, pp. 1240-1246 and Iskander, 2011, pp. 1226-1235 and Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/egypt#.U7LCaCjENFI>.

important one for the course of the revolution as well as transition to democracy. Currently, it has almost 3,2 million fans in Egypt, which is also due to its symbolism because Khalid Said was the young Egyptian man, who was arrested by the Egyptian police in summer 2010 and then his miserable body was found. Later, it was found out that he was beaten to death by policemen. And his story became the story of all Egyptians during the revolution. The other favorite group is Abdel Fattah ElSisi with 2,3 million fans followed by group of Muhammad Morsi with 2,3 million fans. Other important groups are official military spokesman of the Armed Forces with 2,3 million fans and the official page of the Ministry of Interior with 2,5 million fans. On twitter Mohamed Morsi has the highest number of followers, concretely almost 2 million, the second one is Hamdeen Sabahi, former activist turned to politician, who was a candidate in the presidential elections in 2012. He has also almost 2 million followers. And the third one is Amr Hamzawy with 1,8 million followers, who is human rights activist and active person in social and political life in Egypt. On youtube the most uploaded videos are of the Freedom and Justice Party (11 million), then the official channel of the presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt (3,2 million), and for example Abdel Fattah ElSisi has 1,5 million uploaded videos. The most favorite Google+ group is Egyptian Presidency with more than 8000 followers.<sup>93</sup>

The social media and networks in Egypt served as a mobilization source for the most important opposition groups such as the Kifaya movement or the April 6<sup>th</sup> movement. The call for demonstrations had many forms such as “Be noble and demonstrate on January 25<sup>th</sup>” or “walk...walk in the street. Walk walk walk... and talk talk talk...”<sup>94</sup>. The most favorite groups on Facebook was already mentioned “We are all Khaled Said”, “ElBaradei for Presidency”, “January 25: The day of revolution over torture, poverty, corruption & unemployment”, etc. The most touching tweet from the revolutionary days are “Tear gas”, “Help we r suffocating”, “Help !!!”, and “Ikve [I’ve] been beaten a lot”, etc.<sup>95</sup> The bloggers were also very active online, the most famous bloggers in Egypt are Wael Abbas, Abdel Monem Mahmoud, Nawara Negm, Maikel Nabil, and Mahmoud Salem. “Collective identity in cyberspace seemed to reach an apex for Egyptians worldwide immediately after the announcement of Mubarak’s resignation. Within seconds, tweets streamed in that expressed jubilation, pride, and emotion. ElBaradei tweeted: “Today Egypt is free. God bless the people of Egypt.” Other

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<sup>93</sup> Social Bakers [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.socialbakers.com/>.

<sup>94</sup> Negm, 2011 cited by Eltanawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1214.

<sup>95</sup> Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1215.



messages were exchanged on Twitter and Facebook, with comments including variations of “Congratulations Egypt, you are free”; “Feb. 11 is Historic day in Egypt. We will celebrate it forever :) Jan25”; and “‘lift your head up high you’re an Egyptian’ pride in Tahrir. Jan25”. Social media technologies enabled the rapid spread of the news of Mubarak’s fall and were major factors in the palpable unity expressed by Egyptians, both on the streets of Egypt and in cyberspace<sup>96,97</sup>.

## 4.4 Youth Education

In terms of youth education in 2010 61% of Egyptians were satisfied with education system and schools. Nevertheless, this trend did not correspond with the adult literacy rate, which was relatively low, 66,4%. Moreover, only 36,1% people had at least secondary education, from this 43,4% women and 61,1% men. In period 2001-2009 primary enrollment ratio was 99,7% (gross) or 93,6% (net). In the case of secondary enrollment ratio it was 79,3% (gross) or 71,2% (net). And tertiary enrollment ratio was 31,2% (gross). Mean years of schooling were 6,5 and expected years of schooling 11,0.<sup>98</sup>

Generally, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Egypt improved conditions for education in terms of accessibility mainly to primary education for both boys and girls also known under the heading Education for All (EFA), which is one of the UN Millennium Development Goals. However, despite this progress there still has been existing many challenges regarding the Egyptian education system for example in 2005 2,8 million children did not enroll to primary education or they did not complete it, this is due to the factors connected with economic deprivation, which are described below. One of the main issues is also overall quality of education and quality of schools equipment. In the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, the quality of education system in Egypt is rated very low, concretely, at 131<sup>st</sup> place out of 139.<sup>99</sup>

In 2013 adult literacy rate in Egypt was 72%, which represents a relatively significant increase in comparison to 2010. The percentage of population with at least

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<sup>96</sup> Eltanawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1218 and Praetorius, 2011 cited by Eltanawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1218.

<sup>97</sup> El-Nawawy and Khamis, 2014, pp. 965-966 and Eltanawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 1207-1219.

<sup>98</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144, 158, 182, 194.

<sup>99</sup> UNICEF Egypt. Education. [online]. 2005 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <http://www.unicef.org/egypt/education.html> and United States Agency for International Development. Egypt – Education overview [online]. May 21, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <http://www.usaid.gov/egypt/education> and Global Competitiveness Report, 2010-2011, pp. 149.

secondary education was 51,2% but on the other hand only 42,6% of people is satisfied with the quality of education. Gross enrollment ratio for primary education was 106%, for secondary education it was 85% and for tertiary education 30,4%. These data reflect the major trend that with the constant improvement in education system in Egypt, demands for quality of education have been increasing. Despite these facts the quality of education is still low; in 2013 Egypt was at the 145<sup>th</sup> place out of 148 according to the Global Competitiveness Report. Next to the issue of education system's quality there exists another significant challenge and it is the Egyptian education system does not reflect demographic factors within the population as well as demands of the market, which then lead to other problems such as unemployment, poverty and overall economic deprivation mainly among young people. Chatham House came up with seven main challenges the Egyptian education system has been currently facing, they are concretely strains on infrastructure, poor teaching quality and dependence on private tutors, over-centralized control, a focus on rote learning for examinations, negative attitudes towards vocational training, the entrenchment of social inequalities, inadequate university access, funding and research capacity.<sup>100</sup> The problems of the Egyptian education system are due to poor reforms regarding education and mainly their poor implementation. However, these reforms are necessary for successful transition to democracy because education is one of the most important aspects of it. Moreover, "it was emphasized that many people – both in Egypt and elsewhere – receive important aspects of their education informally, for instance through societies, clubs or religious teaching. Civil society's role in providing informal education should be recognized and could be a significant resource for future policy development, although as a complement to, not a substitute for, qualified teaching"<sup>101</sup>. To conclude it needs to be mentioned that there are significant shortcomings in the Egyptian education system and there are many aspects which have been calling for improvement but it also needs to be emphasized that in the past thirty years the Egyptian education system has been significantly improving and this improvement can be considered as one of the factors which contributed to the revolution and overthrow of the non-democratic regime. And now the further improvements are even more crucial for the process of transition to democracy in Egypt.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Loveluck, March 2012, pp. 3.

<sup>101</sup> Chatham House, January 2012, pp. 8.

<sup>102</sup> Human Development Index, 2013, pp. 171 and Global Competitiveness Report, 2013-2014, pp. 177 and Loveluck, March 2012, pp. 3, 14 and Chatham House, January 2012, pp. 1-18.



## 4.5 Political environment

In 2010 the Freedom House evaluated Egypt with 5,5, because political rights gained 6 and civil liberties 5. This means that Egypt was not free country as was already mentioned together with more details in the chapter about the Mubarak's regime. In 2013 Egypt had overall score 5,0 because political freedoms were evaluated by 5 and civil liberties also by 5. This score shifted Egypt into partly free country according to the Freedom House. Nevertheless, the situation changed again in 2014 when Egypt became not free country again with freedom rating 5,5. Concretely, political rights evaluated by 6 and civil liberties by 5. More details regarding situation after the revolution are described in the sub-chapter democratization.<sup>103</sup>

As was mentioned in the sub-chapter about individual indicators, there exists no exact ranking for freedom of association thus it is evaluated qualitatively. In the times of the president Mubarak's regime freedom of association was at very low level. This claim is supported by the fact that foundation and existence of the majority of CSOs were significantly limited. Moreover, the expressions of the many CSOs in the forms of protests and demonstrations were harshly punished by the regime. After the revolution, the situation regarding the freedom of association has not changed much. The only significant change was that people began to express themselves more often than before the revolution; nevertheless, expressions of their dissatisfaction were still suppressed. The situation has even worsened in 2013 because the same atmosphere in the society has been lasting but regime started to respond even more harshly, especially in the connection with the overthrow of the president Morsi in the summer 2013. The overall situation led to the establishment of the new emergency law, which again restricted freedom of association. And this all culminated in the ban of the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in October 2013. Moreover new assembly law was adopted in November 2013. This law is again very restrictive because “it effectively grants security officials discretion to ban any protest on very vague grounds, allows police officers to forcibly disperse any protest if even a single protester throws a stone, and sets heavy prison sentences for vague offenses such as attempting to “influence the course of justice”...the law also gives the Interior Ministry the right to ban any meeting “of a public nature” of

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<sup>103</sup> Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U7w1RCjENFI> and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/egypt#.U7xHwyjENFI> and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U7xWQijENFI>.

more than 10 people in a public place, including meetings related to electoral campaigning. The law includes no exceptions for smaller demonstrations that would not cause disruption, or for urgent and spontaneous demonstrations”<sup>104</sup>. This fact shows no shift towards democracy regarding freedom of association.<sup>105</sup>

In 2010 Egypt gained score 3,1 and located itself in the 98<sup>th</sup> place out of 178 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index. The former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had narrow circle of loyal people around him, who supported him. Mentioned narrow circle of “desirables” consisted mainly of the members of the National Democratic Party. Those people gained financial and other benefits from the regime, for example ministers got their ministries according to the field of their interests and businesses, which meant that next to corruption nepotism and clientelism were widespread. Population growth, inflation and unemployment contributed to the high rate of corruption, which spread to the all layers of the Egyptian society. People got used to this system easily and bribes became a matter of everyday life and many people considered them as a part of their monthly income. Some members of the ruling party even claimed that corruption is sort of an element of the relationship between trade and the state.<sup>106</sup> In Egypt something, which can be called institutionalization of corruption existed.<sup>107</sup> Mubarak himself was labeled as “the protector of powerful and corrupt”. In 2013 Egypt gained score 32 due to the new methodology of the Transparency International regarding the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is basically equivalent to 3,2 hence it was located at the 114<sup>th</sup> place out of 177. These data show that the state of corruption is more or less the same or even slightly worsened than before the revolution.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Human Rights Watch. Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law [online]. November 26, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-7]. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>.

<sup>105</sup> Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U7w1RCjENFI> and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/egypt#.U7xHwyjENFI> and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U7xWQijENFI>.

<sup>106</sup> Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results#\\_blank](http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results#_blank) and Amin, 2011, spp. 41-43 and El-Sayed El-Naggar, 2009, pp. 45, 47.

<sup>107</sup> Amin, 2011, pp. 43.

<sup>108</sup> Osman, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>.

## 4.6 Economic Deprivation

The main aim of this sub-chapter is to focus on the overall satisfaction of the Egyptian people with their lives before and after the revolution. According to the Human Development Report published in 2010 the HDI was 0,620 and the overall life satisfaction was evaluated as 5,8. However, other indicators are important in the connection with the economic deprivation as for example the life expectancy at birth, which was 70,5 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank that was 10 360. Moreover, 16-20% of Egyptians lived below poverty line (depends on the source). Gini coefficient was then 32,1. All of these factors and many others described below caused that intensity of deprivation in 2010 reached 40,4%.<sup>109</sup>

One of the other factors was the rate of unemployment, which in 2010 reached 9,7%. Concretely, the unemployment rate at primary education was 4,6% and secondary or above 13,6%. However, this official number did not corresponded to reality; in fact it exceeded 20%. Moreover, this number did not include those people, who exercised unskilled job given their education and thus the quality of their lives was similar to those who were unemployed. In Egypt it was possible to observe rapidly increasing gap between rich and poor people, which created economic grievances in the Egyptian society. The significant population growth also contributed to the state of dissatisfaction, for example since 1970s the number of Egyptians almost doubled. Simultaneous increasing of the unemployment rate as well as inflation of the basic goods and practical non-existence of the welfare system of insurance for unemployed people caused so high percentage of people who lived below poverty line.<sup>110</sup>

In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century 45 million people younger than thirty five lived in the conditions, which can be described as absolute poverty, services in catastrophic conditions, very bad living conditions, medical care of poor quality, and

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<sup>109</sup> Human Development Report 2010, pp. 144, 153, 162, 178, 190 and The World Bank. GNI per capita, PPP [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> and CIA The World Factbook. Egypt [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#_blank).

<sup>110</sup> Evans, Lisa. Tunisia: how does it compare to other countries in the region?. The Guardian [online]. January 20, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2011/jan/18/tunisia-data-store#\\_blank](http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2011/jan/18/tunisia-data-store#_blank) and CIA The World Factbook. Egypt [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#_blank) and El-Sayed El-Naggar, 2009, pp. 42-43 and Amin, 2011, pp. 74-75 and Osman, 2011, nonopaged (Kindle edition) and Ismael and Ismael, 2011, pp. 373-374 and Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 190.

devastation of infrastructure. High rate of unemployment was given by the reforms of the last twenty years and very low quality of education. The majority of youth, who graduated at university and cannot get adequate job were rather unemployed or emigrated to the West. The fields which produce the highest level of deprivation were and still are education at the first place and healthcare at the second one. Some young people fell deprivation of more than one field of their life and their deprivation begin already during their childhood and then can last for a greater part of their lives.<sup>111</sup>

In the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s year's incomes were around 900 US dollars and public debt was constantly increasing. Egyptian economy was not able to support jobs creation. Despite these facts, after Egypt accepted macro-stabilization steps from the IMF in the 1990s the economic growth started, for example private sector constituting 70% of the Egyptian economy was developing very well as well as market economy. Nevertheless, issues such as an unemployment and poverty have been continuing after 2000 and, moreover, economic growth caused significant inflation, which again touched the poorest layers of the society. After 2000 the average year income increased to 2000 US dollars, however, despite this fact around 20% of Egyptians lived for less than 2 US dollars per day. Economic grievances and bad living conditions led to demonstrations or strikes. The world economic crisis in 2008 also contributed to the worsening of the economic situation in Egypt.<sup>112</sup>

The Human Development Report published in 2013 evaluated HDI by 0,662 and the overall life satisfaction by 4,1. The life expectancy at birth increased to 73,5 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 10 850. The unemployment rate was 13,4% at the beginning of 2014 and youth unemployment rate meaning people between 15 and 24 years reached 54,1%. Gini coefficient was 30,8 and the overall national poverty line 22%. These facts caused that intensity of deprivation in 2010 reached 40,7%. These data show that the overall evaluation of indicators influencing economic deprivation of people have not changed much. Some have slightly improved and some have slightly deteriorated. The real rate of unemployment especially regarding youth is still high and the same it is with the number of people who live below poverty line. The intensity of deprivation remains more or less the same but the overall life satisfaction has significantly deteriorated. Thus

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<sup>111</sup> Osman, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Egypt Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 78.

<sup>112</sup> Maitah, 2010, pp. 146 and Cook, 2011, pp. 156-184.

the qualitative evaluation of economic deprivation remains the same as well.<sup>113</sup>

## 4.7 Social Capital

In terms of a trust among people within the Egyptian society World Values Survey in its 6<sup>th</sup> wave of survey covering the period from 2010 until 2014 published that only 21,5% of Egyptians answered that most people can be trusted but on the other hand 78,5% of people said that one need to be very careful in terms of trust and 3% of respondents answered that they do not know. In terms of a tolerance 62,3% of Egyptians said that tolerance is important and 37,7% did not mentioned it. The third examined factor is confidence in selected institutions. In this regard 47,9% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in religious organizations, 26% that they have quite a lot confidence in religious organizations, 13,1% that they do not trust them very much and 12,9% that they do not have confidence in the at all. Only 4,6% of Egyptians have a great deal of confidence in labor unions, 20,7% have quite a lot confidence, 33,5% not very much confidence and 38,9% have no confidence in labor unions at all. In terms of confidence in police 11,1% a great deal of confidence, 39,2% quite a lot confidence, 25,6% not very much confidence, and 23,9% none confidence in police at all. The percentage regarding confidence in police is quite surprising given that fact that the level of police violence especially during demonstrations was high. In regard with government 7,9% of Egyptians have a great deal of confidence in government, 31,8% have quite a lot confidence, 30,5% not very much, and 29,6% none confidence at all. In terms of confidence in parliament 3,9% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in the parliament, 21,4% quite a lot confidence, 33,9% not very much confidence, and 40,3% none confidence at all. The relatively low confidence in the government or the parliament is given by the long-lasting political instability. In terms of the confidence in army 81% of Egyptians answered that they have a great deal of confidence in army, 12% that they trust somewhat, 1% do not trust somewhat and 3% have none confidence in army at all. These data are not surprising because army always has great influence in the Egyptian society, which is supported by the fact that all

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<sup>113</sup> Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145, 153, 160, 176 and The World Bank. GNI per capita, PPP [online]. © 2009 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> and Trading Economics. Egypt Unemployment Rate © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/unemployment-rate>.

Egyptian presidents came from the army with an exception of the president Morsi; however, with the new president as-Sisi this trend has been coming back again. And finally the fourth indicator – religion and belief systems. For 94,1% of Egyptians religion is very important and for 5,7% is rather important and only for 0,1% religion is not important at all. Moreover, 28% of Egyptians strongly agree with the separation of religion from politics, 24% somewhat agree, 17% somewhat disagree, 14% strongly disagree, and 17% do not know. Additionally, in mid-2010 the government restrictions index was 8,7 and the social hostilities index was 7,6, which means very high level of religious restrictions.<sup>114</sup>

## 4.8 Revolution

The revolution in Egypt began on 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011 when huge protests, which consisted of thousands of people, against the ruling regime of the president Mubarak took place in Cairo and then spread across the whole country. However, the main skirmishes between police and citizens took place at the Tahrir Square. The date 25<sup>th</sup> January was not random; on the contrary it was symbolic because 25<sup>th</sup> January is the day of the Egyptian police. And police was a symbol of oppressing people by the regime, which was also possible to observe in the form of police violence during the revolution. Policemen were using tear gas and water cannons against people. As a response people were using stones, cobbles or Molotov cocktails. The day after the revolution began there were first victims and many people injured. And from that time on the number of dead and wounded were increasing almost every day until the end of the revolution. On 29<sup>th</sup> January Mubarak declared, in his speech, that he removes the existing government but he himself wanted to remain in power. Therefore the demonstrations were continuing further hence Mubarak deployed army to protect his regime. It needs to be emphasized that the only purpose of the Egyptian army was to protect not to fight with protesters. Fighting with people was a domain of police. Only in Cairo more than a quarter of a million Egyptians were protesting in the streets and thousands more throughout of Egypt. Simultaneously, strong internal as well as external pressures, which urged Mubarak to resign, emerged. Despite this fact, Mubarak appointed new

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<sup>114</sup> World Values Survey - Egypt, 2014, nonpaged and Arab Opinion Index, 2012, pp. 48, 70 and Religious Restrictions Index. 2013. Pew Research. Religion and Public Life Project. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/09/RisingTide-IndexbyRegion.pdf> and Religious Restriction Index, 2012, pp. 52, 62.

government and continued in leading of the country. However, one concession from the Mubarak's side was followed by another because the president wanted to stay in power at any cost. Thus, Mubarak's decisions not to candidate in the next presidential elections as well as to make amendments in the existing Egyptian constitution were among these concessions. Nevertheless, Mubarak's opponents and protesters were not satisfied with these compromises and number of protesters only in Cairo reached one million and was still rising. However, as the number of participants was increasing, the number of dead and injured was increasing as well because already described methods of fight were supplemented by gun firing. The main representatives of the National Democratic Party, among them the son of Hosni Mubarak Gamal Mubarak as well, step down but the massive uprising was continuing throughout the country supplemented by further concession by the regime such as salaries increase, release of some political prisoners mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood, arrest the head of police who allowed to shoot people, and finally the president Mubarak committed himself to begin a process of transition. However, even this step did not satisfied people who demanded a complete end of the old order. Therefore on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011 Hosni Mubarak resigned for the Egyptian presidency and he handed over power to the Egyptian army and the army gave pledge to arrange elections of a new president and parliament. The whole Egypt began to celebrate the end of one non-democratic era. On 14<sup>th</sup> February the Tahrir square was almost completely empty. The revolution lasted 18 days during which at least 846 people died and 6400 wounded.<sup>115</sup>

## 4.9 Democratization?

As was mentioned in the previous sub-chapter on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011 Hosni Mubarak resigned for the Egyptian presidency. The government was handed over to the army concretely to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces headed by the field marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi. The political situation in the country did not actually change much because the Egyptian army established military junta, another non-democratic type of regime and old power structures had still great influence. Although, on the other hand the CSOs were full of enthusiasm and prepared to participate in the

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<sup>115</sup> Al-Jazeera. Timeline: Egypt's revolution [online]. February 14, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-12]. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html> and BBC. Egypt unrest: 846 killed in protests – official toll [online]. April 19, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-12]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13134956>.



democratic transition of the political environment in the country. However, at the turn of 2011 and 2012 the parliamentary elections were held, in which the Muslim Brotherhood's party The Freedom and Justice Party won with 47% and the second place was taken by another Islamist party al-Nur with 26%. Nevertheless, the parliament was dissolved in June 2012 given to the unconstitutional character of some elections laws. In June 2012 the first really free presidential elections in the history of Egypt took place, in which Muhammad Morsi won and became the new Egyptian president. These events brought change from 2011 when according to the Freedom House Egypt was still evaluated as non-democratic state to 2012, when Egypt became partly free country. In November 2012 Morsi awarded himself by widespread executive powers, drafted new constitution, which was authorized in the December referendum. The general dissatisfaction resulted in Morsi's overthrow by military coup and arrest in July 2013. This coup is sometimes called as the "civil society coup", which means "the handling of governing crisis by extraconstitutional, undemocratic means by such actors as the business community, organized labor, religious institutions, and the media"<sup>116</sup>. However, in the case of Egypt it was the army under the guise of the Civil Society, supported by the Tamarod "rebellion" movement, that again took power and this army was led by the general as-Sisi. During the protests following the military coup almost one thousand people died and the brutality of state forces was marked as "the most serious incident of mass unlawful killing in modern Egyptian history"<sup>117</sup> by the Human Rights Watch. The majority of victims were "Brothers" and the Muslim Brotherhood was banned and at the end of 2013 labeled as the terrorist organization in Egypt. Adly Mansour, who headed the Supreme Constitutional Court, became the interim president of Egypt and with him the army again got great influence. In August the new state of emergency was declared and it lasted until November. In Egypt demonstrations have been taking place constantly, during which protesters are again beaten and killed. The better place of Egypt in the Freedom House in 2013 was thus given by correctiveness of the presidential elections, even though some discrepancies were reported. In terms of the political rights and civil liberties censorship still largely exists; the level of the freedom of press as well as the level of the academic freedoms and freedom of expression have not increased significantly because any critical voices are not allowed and there is huge

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<sup>116</sup> Encarnacion, Summer 2002, pp. 38-39.

<sup>117</sup> Human Rights Watch. Egypt: Security Forces Used Excessive Lethal Force [online]. August 19, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force>.



pro-military propaganda; the independence of judiciary is at a low level; violations of human rights from the police side is still common; gender equality is still at a low level and the sexual violence increased, and so on and so forth.<sup>118</sup>

Therefore it still cannot be spoken about democracy and even nowadays after the second presidential elections, which took place in May 2014. “However, the ongoing political violence and repression, and the increasing likelihood that al-Sisi would run for president, left virtually no space for constructive political debate or other normal preelection activities, dimming the prospects for free and fair balloting”<sup>119</sup>. Moreover, the new constitution adopted in December 2013 declared that political parties based on religion cannot participate in the future elections. The predictions came true and in the presidential elections the general Abdel Fattah as-Sisi won with 96,1%. However, the fairness and freeness of this presidential election are challenged, which is also one of the reasons why Egypt is again evaluated as not free country according to the Freedom House. Many Egyptians also fear that old order will come back with the general as-Sisi and they labeled him as “the second Mubarak”. The majority of people are simply not satisfied because what they expected from the new era simply did not come true. Nevertheless, future development of the Egyptian political scene will be clearer after the parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the second half of 2014.<sup>120</sup>

In 2012 only 67% of Egyptians preferred democracy as a state system. The percentage decreased since 2011 when 71% of people wanted democracy. On the other hand Egypt made a major shift in the Democracy Index because in 2012 it gained score 4.56 and located itself at 109<sup>th</sup> place, which means the hybrid regime.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/egypt> and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/egypt-0> and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U8QPNCjENFI> and BBC. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood declared ‘terrorist groups’ [online]. December 25, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25515932> and Dorman, WJ. Egypt’s ‘civil society coup’ and the resilience of the post-1952 order. Open Democracy [online]. October 10, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/wj-dorman/egypts-civil-society-coup-and-resilience-of-post-1952-order> and Yerkes, Summer 2012, pp. 10-11 and Jandura, Summer 2012, pp. 15.

<sup>119</sup> Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U8QPNCjENFI>.

<sup>120</sup> Kingsley, Patrick. Abdel Fatah al-Sisi won 96,1% of vote in Egypt presidential elections, say officials. The Guardian [online]. June 3, 2014 [accessed 2014-3-14]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-presidential-election-vote-egypt>.

<sup>121</sup> Pew Research Center. One Year Later... Egyptians Remain Optimistic, Embrace Democracy and Religion in Political Life: Muslim Brotherhood and Military Receive Positive Ratings. Global Attitudes Project. [online]. May 8, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-15]. Available at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/08/egyptians-remain-optimistic-embrace-democracy-and-religion-in-political-life/> and Democracy Index, 2012, pp. 6.

The conclusion of this subchapter is devoted to measuring the degree of polyarchy after the Egyptian revolution. The evaluation focuses on the most recent data, because it needs to be emphasized that the degree of polyarchy has been slightly changing over time. Thus after the revolution Egypt is placed at 4 on the Polyarchy Scale, which means better midst (viz. Table 2). Concretely, the variable fair elections is evaluated 2, freedom of organization 2, freedom of expression 2, alternative sources of information 2, and suffrage 1.


## 4.10 Civil Society Diamond

Firstly, the Civil Society Diamond for the period of the Mubarak's rule is described. The indicator of structure, concretely the number of CSOs establishment per 100 000 population, is 32 because in 2010 27000 CSOs existed in Egypt, which population was 84,5 million. So the number of CSOs is divided by population and then multiply by 100 000 because the indicator is per 100 000 population. And the result is 32. The second indicator – values, concretely confidence in government is 40, because around 40% of people had confidence in government according to the World Values Survey in its sixth wave between 2010 and 2014. More precisely it is a sum of people, who said that they have a great deal of confidence (7,9%) together with those, who have quite a lot confidence in government (31,8%) The third aspect, space, concretely civil liberties is evaluated by 67 according to the data published by the Freedom House (see appendix). And the final fourth indicator is impact, concretely change in HDI, which has value 62 because in 2010 Egypt had HDI 0,620, however, this number is multiply by 100 for the purpose of this graph.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144, 185 and World Values Survey - Egypt, 2014, nonpaged and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt#.U8V1UijENFI> and CIVICUS Civil Society Index. [online]. © 2009 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.civicus.org/csi/>.

## Egypt - Mubarak's era




Secondly, the Civil Society Diamond for the period after the Egyptian revolution is described. The indicator of structure, concretely the number of CSOs establishment per 100 000 population, is 52 because after the revolution around 45000 CSOs exists in Egypt, which population is 86 895 099. So the number of CSOs is divided by population and then multiply by 100 000 because the indicator is per 100 000 population. And the result is 52. The second indicator – values, concretely confidence in government is 40, because around 40% of people had confidence in government according to the World Values Survey in its sixth wave between 2010 and 2014. This number is the same because the survey were lasting between 2010 and 2014 as was mentioned above. There can be some changes in individual years but not significant. The third aspect, space, concretely civil liberties is evaluated by 67 according to the data published by the Freedom House. Again there were changes in the years after the revolution, but these are the most recent data. And the final fourth indicator is impact, concretely change in HDI, which has value 66 because in 2013 Egypt had HDI 0,662, however, this number is multiply by 100 for the purpose of this graph.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> US Aid Report, 2011, pp. 9 and CIA The World Factbook. Egypt [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#_blank) and Freedom in the World-Egypt, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U8V8eCjENFI> and World Values Survey - Egypt, 2014, nonpaged.

## Egypt - after the revolution



It can be observed that the indicator structure experienced the greatest change, which is connected with the boom in establishments of the CSOs after the revolution. The Human development Index slightly increased, which means that the overall living conditions have slightly improved. The indicator civil liberties experienced changes towards improvement in 2011 and 2012 but again deteriorated in 2014 to the same level as before the revolution, which points to the fact that the path towards democracy in Egypt will be complicated and there will be anti-waves back toward the authoritarian character of the government. And finally, the indicator values remain more or less the same. While comparing both CSDs there are no major fluctuations in the state of the Civil Society in Egypt.

## 5 LIBYA

### 5.1 Authoritarian regime of the Colonel Qaddafi

On the 1<sup>st</sup> September 1969 king Idris I. was overthrown during bloodless revolution or military coup. Muammar Qaddafi came to power and later labeled himself as the leader of the revolution, which stood over the whole system and thus can indefinitely rule. Qaddafi's revolutionary thoughts were influenced by Nasserism because Gamal Abd al-Nasser was his great ideal and Libyan revolution was similar to the Nasser's revolution in Egypt. At the end of the year 1969 Qaddafi submitted new constitution, which imposed that the Revolutionary Command Council became the main authority in the country. However, the constitution was soon cancelled and the new one was not published until the fall of the Qaddafi's regime.<sup>124</sup>

Qaddafi took the lead of the pan-Arab nationalistic movement after the death of Nasser and guarded his legacy. In the same year he established a political party called the Arab Socialist Union, which main task was mobilization of the masses and increase of political participation. No other political parties were allowed. A year later Qaddafi introduces new way of rule in the form of people's congresses, however, this step was not successful at that time. The situation changed in the connection with so called cultural revolution or people's revolution, which began in 1973 and during which Qaddafi resigned for all his posts but the commander in chief of the Libyan army as well as he gained title of the leader of the revolution. The first coup attempt took place in 1975 after which Qaddafi began to consolidate his power. He started to fight against political, economic, and social activities of Libyan citizens, which was contrary to his previous claims about the rule of masses.<sup>125</sup>

In the half of the 1970s the thought of the people's congresses was renewed and on their top The Great People's Congress headed by Qaddafi stood. Subsequently in 1977 he declared, according to his claim, the only real direct democracy in the world, "the rule of the masses" - Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. According to his opinion, the Western democracies were repressive political systems. In Jamahiriya General People's Congress was the government and political parties were not allowed. In 1977 revolutionary committees began to be established and later they became the core of the

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<sup>124</sup> Oakes, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>125</sup> Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-91.

power and the pillar of the Qaddafi's regime. Their members had many benefits but also were threatened by many purges.<sup>126</sup>

At the beginning of the 1980s economic growth, which was started thanks to the oil shocks, stopped. In that time Qaddafi began his fight against the West, which caused the American bombardment of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986. Due to this reasons Qaddafi's regime leaned towards the support of international terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>127</sup>

At the turn of 80s and 90s the so called green revolution was lasting. It was time when Qaddafi's regime was going through domestic as well as foreign crisis due to international sanctions, diplomatic and economic isolation and inability to promote panarabism. To calm the situation Qaddafi decided to accept some structural reforms. Thus the period after 2000 was in the sign of ending political and economic isolation of the country and returning to the international system. It all began in the connection with the decision to compensate victims of the Lockerbie attack, which is considered as the most significant terrorist attack Libya was blamed of. Moreover, Qaddafi decided to give up nuclear program and take the path of reforms necessary to fully take advantage from the reintegration of Libya to the international system.<sup>128</sup>

Qaddafi controlled everything in the country in a very absolutistic way and nobody could criticize him. Libyan regime as well as the Egyptian leaned on the army and even though Qaddafi himself was only colonel he headed the Libyan army. Moreover, Qaddafi as well as Mubarak surrounded himself by narrow elite of the loyal people. And last but not least Qaddafi wrote *Green Book*, which represented ideological base for his regime.<sup>129</sup>

Colonel Qaddafi build really strong personality cult. All his appearances were carefully prepared. He was obsessed by fashion and his overall appearance. The very interesting aspect of his regime was his security which consisted only of young women because colonel loved women and he even had a harem. During his rule women had many rights. In one of the interviews Qaddafi declared “My people – they all love me! All love me!”<sup>130</sup> Muammar Qaddafi was the longest ruling dictator in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>126</sup> Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-91.

<sup>127</sup> Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-91.

<sup>128</sup> Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>129</sup> Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-118 and Haimzadeh, 2011, pp. 50 and Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>130</sup> Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

Thanks to his integration policy in Africa he gained the title “king of kings” from the African states' leaders. At the end this great Arab or African ruler was not able to avoid massive domino effect of the Arab revolutions and after several months on the run he was killed by the young Libyan rebel in October 2011.<sup>131</sup>

Libya in the times of the Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's rule was considered as the authoritarian regime headed by the dictator. In 2010 Libya took 158<sup>th</sup> place in the Democracy Index with the overall score 1,94. Soon after Qaddafi came to power he cancelled the constitution, banned opposition, which he labeled as illegal. Opposition had to move to exile or was eliminated. Membership in a political party was punished by death. No elections took place with an exception of the elections to the people's committees. Any critics of the regime was banned, there were no freedom of expression or press.<sup>132</sup>

Liquidation of the government's opponents was significant characteristic of the Libyan regime. In the connection with the establishment of the Libyan Jamahiriya extensive repressions against the opposition were launched in Libya and abroad. In 1980 violent suppressing of dissidents began after Qaddafi declared their physical liquidation. In 1984 public executions of the regime's enemies took place in Libya. Political prisoners were held in inhumane conditions and very often tortured. In 1996 more than 1200 prisoners were killed during uprising in Abu Salim prison. Nobody knows, what actually happened there because the regime kept it secret and victims' families never got information about their killed relatives in prison. During Qaddafi's regime it is possible to see cases of disappearances, inhumane punishments including torture, high number of death sentences, restrictions of political and civil rights and even crimes against humanity when Qaddafi ordered air strikes against protesters.<sup>133</sup>

Press was controlled by the state, which means that it was not independent. State owned the most important television in the country, which was “speaking trumpet” of

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<sup>131</sup> Haimzadeh, 2011, pp. 50 and Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and BBC. Gaddafi: Arica's 'king of kings'. [online]. August 29, 2008 [accessed 2014-4-20]. Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7588033.stm#\\_blank](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7588033.stm#_blank).

<sup>132</sup> Gombár, 2007, pp. 25-32 and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-96 and Democracy Index, 2010, pp. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Oakes, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2007, pp. 95-96 and Amnesty International. Libya: Investigation needed into prison deaths [online]. October 10, 2006 [accessed 2014-4-23]. Available at: <http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/346> and Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Human Rights Watch. Libya: New Era Needs Focus on Rights. [online]. October 20, 2011 [accessed 2014-4-23]. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/20/libya-new-era-needs-focus-rights#\\_blank](http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/20/libya-new-era-needs-focus-rights#_blank) and Mirror News. Gaddafi's son Hannibal's nanny tells of scalding torture hell [online]. August 29, 2011 [accessed 2014-4-23]. Available at: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/gaddafis-son-hannibals-nanny-tells-150589>.

the regime. The only internet provider was also under the control of the state and web sites were under censorship. In Libya assembly was banned. The only demonstrations, which were allowed, were those supporting the regime.<sup>134</sup>

In 1973 Qaddafi, in the connection with the already mentioned cultural revolution, published five points program, in which he declared that all existing laws will be cancelled and replaced by new revolutionary laws, all opponents of the regime will be eliminated, all forms of bourgeoisie and bureaucracy will be cancelled, Libyan citizens will be armed to be able to protect the revolution, which caused significant militarization of the society and the last point was that all Western thoughts will be eliminated. In 1988 General People's Congress adopted Great Green Charter on Human Rights, which should assured economic and political liberalization of the country but the opposite became true.<sup>135</sup>

The opposition consisted especially of Islamists, concretely of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Fighting Group. These opposition forces attempted to assassinate Qaddafi several times hence he fought them so harshly. In 1993 the army mutiny took place, which, however, was also harshly suppressed. Other demonstrations against the regime organized by ideological movements or by Libyan tribes were not an exception, but in all cases were surpassed and people died during them.<sup>136</sup>

The center of resistance in the sense of Libyan tribes was Benghazi. Outside Libya meeting of the most important opposition movements took place, however, due to different views they were not able to create strategy for fighting Qaddafi's regime. In 2003 they met again and published the Declaration of Agreement on the Principles, Fundamentals and Objectives of the Libyan Struggle and in 2005 the conference of the seven opposition groups called for non-violent overthrow of the Qaddafi's regime took place. The year 2006 brought other demonstrations against the regime in Benghazi. And after 2000 gradual releasing of political prisoners were launched. To summarize it needs to be mentioned that despite the fact effort to reform and liberalize the Qaddafi's regime such as drafting a constitution were short-lived, which was mirrored in the Qaddafi's constant rejection of the Civil Society. There existed deep inconsistency of Qaddafi's regime in the sense that on the one hand it constantly violated human rights but on the other hand it advocated increasing of the quality of education, medical and social care,

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<sup>134</sup> Freedom in the World-Libya, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/libya>.

<sup>135</sup> Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-96 and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>136</sup> St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Oakes, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).



living conditions, etc.<sup>137</sup>

The conclusion of this subchapter is again devoted to measuring the degree of polyarchy of the Libyan regime under the Qaddafi's rule. The evaluation again focuses on the last years of the regime, even though during the Qaddafi's regime the degree of polyarchy was not significantly changing. However, before the revolution Libya was placed at 10 on the Polyarchy Scale, which means the total non-polyarchy (viz. Table 1). Concretely, the variable fair elections is evaluated 3, freedom of organization 4, freedom of expression 3, alternative sources of information 4, and suffrage 1.

## 5.2 Civil Society Organizations

The evaluation of the Civil Society and its organizations in the Qaddafi's Libya is simple, because generally the Civil Society in the true sense of that word did not exist under the Qaddafi's rule. Thus it is possible to date the birth of the Libyan Civil Society to 2011, some of the charity and humanitarian groups participated even in the revolution and the subsequent civil war in Libya, some of them perished while the others persisted. As Pargeter wrote in his book “The weight of Jamahiriyah was such that civil society organizations, trades unions and all independent bodies were strictly off limits”<sup>138</sup>. In the times of Qaddafi there existed only several CSOs, but all of them were obedient to Qaddafi. In 2010 Qaddafi claimed that: “there is no place for a civil society as Libyan society is already entirely civil”<sup>139</sup>. Generally, throughout his rule Qaddafi was rejecting any hint of the Civil Society and, moreover, he was persecuting any attempt of the CSOs establishment because he feared it would become a breeding ground for opposition, which could disrupt his regime. On the other hand the Qaddafi's son Saif Al-Islam emulated his father, who labeled himself as the leader of the revolution, Saif Al-Islam identified himself as the leader of the Civil Society. He officially established the charity organization called the Qaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, through which he primarily consolidated his power and influence in the country, nevertheless, even though he is considered as the only force supporting the Civil Society. Basically, there existed around 90-95 allowed the CSOs in Libya meaning that

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<sup>137</sup> Oakes, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Freedom in the World-Libya, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/libya> and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>138</sup> Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>139</sup> St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

they were completely subjected to the ruling regime. The two most important of them were the already mentioned leading by Saif Al-Islam and the Watassimo Association for Charity Works leading by Qaddafi's sister. It needs to be emphasized that even though Qaddafi was systematically rejecting CSOs, officially their foundations were allowed according to the Association Act of 1971 but they had to be apolitical. In 2001 adopted Law No. 19 ordered reorganization of the existing CSOs and put many restrictions on the foundations as well as on activities of the CSOs. Generally, during the Qaddafi's regime creation of the independent CSOs were punished by death sentence for all of their members. To conclude for the purposes of this thesis and its definition of the concept of the Civil Society, number of the CSOs and their members during Qaddafi's regime is zero. Basically, "in Libya civil society organizations did not contribute to overthrowing Qaddafi because they did not exist"<sup>140, 141</sup>.

After the fall of the Qaddafi's regime, the CSOs began to emerge in Libya, however, it has been gradual process due to the fact, that there existed no tradition of the Civil Society as well as other elements of democracy, Libyans simply must get used to it, which will definitely take longer time than in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, where the relatively strong tradition of the Civil Society is rooted already in the former non-democratic regimes. However, since the Libyan revolution, many organizations, fighting for democratization of the country, emerged in Libya. Next to democratization these newly established CSOs has been focusing on human and women's rights as well as improvement of the general living conditions in the country. Additionally, some of the CSOs are linked to the Libyan tribal system, which is very strong and deeply rooted in the Libyan society.<sup>142</sup>

After the Libyan revolution, civil war, and the fall of the Qaddafi's regime the first CSOs began to emerge. They were mainly humanitarian a charity organizations, which main purpose was to help people to deal with their complicated situation, mainly with the trauma of the revolution and subsequent civil war. Later these organizations together with newly established ones transferred their interests to different topics such as state-building, democratization, and political and social issues in general. As there is no tradition of the Civil Society in Libya, some CSOs dissolved shortly after their establishment because of variety of reasons. The latest report published by the

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<sup>140</sup> Boose, July 2012, pp. 314.

<sup>141</sup> St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Libya Country Report, 2012, pp. 1-31.

<sup>142</sup> Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

Foundation for the Future<sup>143</sup> this year estimates around 3 000 registered CSOs in Libya, which has been comprising thousands of members. This number represents a significant step in the development of the Libyan Civil Society. On the other hand the majority of CSOs members are volunteers, which has been decreasing the quality of these organizations that also has been lacking clear guidance and experienced staff. On the other hand “so far, civil society has been the most effective channel towards empowering young Libyans and integrating them in the political process. It is expected that young Libyans and their organisations involved in civil society will soon gain the confidence, momentum and experience to increase their political participation and finally reclaim their ownership of the 17 February revolution”<sup>144, 145</sup>.

The Libyan CSOs that are worth mentioning are subsequent: Association of Civil Society Organizations; Council of Women Support to Participate in Decision Making; Libyan Youth Union; Arab Spring Human Rights Organization; Libyan Human Rights Organization; “Limada Ana” Association for Women's Rights; February 17 Organization; and so on and so forth.<sup>146</sup>

In terms of the fulfilled commitments of the Libyan CSOs, concretely fulfilled commitment of democracy meaning that it evaluates how the CSOs contributed to the process of democratization. In the case of Libya this fulfilled commitment should be assess by 3 meaning standing still, which is due to the deteriorating political, social and security situation in Libya, however, if the fact, that before the revolution there existed no Civil Society in Libya, is taken into consideration the final evaluation is the same as in the case of Egypt, concretely 4 meaning progress but not good enough because a slight progress towards improvement of the Civil Society and its contribution for democratization has been made if the current situation is compared to the situation during the Qaddafi's regime. To conclude it has to be emphasized that the Libyan CSOs have been really striving for at least some steps towards democracy.

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<sup>143</sup> The Foundation for Future is a nongovernmental organization, which has been supporting the CSOs initiatives and thus promoting democracy in the MENA countries – more information available on <http://www.foundationforfuture.org/en/>.

<sup>144</sup> British Council, 2013, pp. 43.

<sup>145</sup> Hamza and Zumot, 2012, pp. 5, 17-20 and Foundation for the future, November 2011, pp. 7 and Foundation for the Future, 2011, pp. 2.

<sup>146</sup> Libya Herald. Libyan NGOs call for peaceful celebrations [online]. February 11, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/02/11/libyan-ngos-call-for-peaceful-celebrations-or-demonstrations/#axzz37xcY1HfO>.

## 5.3 Social Media and Networks

Many aspects of the social media and networks' utilization and importance in the Arab revolutions and subsequent processes have been already highlighted in the case of Egypt. However, it needs to be emphasized that the level of autocracy in Libya was far higher than in the case of Egypt. There was almost no freedom of expression. “During the Qadhafi era, Libya’s media environment was among the most tightly controlled in the world”<sup>147</sup>. “Qadhafi’s regime employed a wide range of tactics for suppressing freedom of expression online, including maintaining monopoly control over the internet infrastructure, blocking websites, engaging in widespread surveillance, and meting out harsh punishments to online critics. Such restrictions intensified as the revolt against Qadhafi’s rule gained momentum in February 2011, culminating in an internet shutdown that affected most of the country and lasted until the liberation of Tripoli in August 2011”<sup>148</sup>.

The internet connection in Libya began to spread among ordinary people after 2000 and the main purpose why Qaddafi decided to provide it was the same as in Egypt – socioeconomic development. Nevertheless, internet was under strict control of the regime, censorship was widespread and cyber activists were arrested. Therefore the phenomenon of self-censorship was common in Libya because people were simply afraid of punishment if they break laws. Despite this fact the number of internet users has been significantly increasing from 4% in 2007 to 17% in 2011, which was equivalent to 1,1 million people. When Qaddafi shut down internet connection during the revolution Libyans as well as Egyptians found a way how to connect with help from abroad, moreover, during the civil war territories controlled by rebels had internet connection because they occupied transmitters and thus they were able to provide internet connection free of charge and with no restrictions. Later, free internet was provided throughout the country from November 2011 till March 2012. During the revolution and subsequent civil war social media and networks were using for mobilization, spreading information and moral support. In 2011 around 200 thousand Libyans were using Facebook and about 64 thousand of them were Twitter users. Cyber-activism was also a widespread trend in the Libyan revolution and it has been lasting

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<sup>147</sup> Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#\\_ftn1](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#_ftn1).

<sup>148</sup> Tsukuyama, 2011 cited by [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#\\_ftn1](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#_ftn1) – 2. 7. 2014.

until nowadays. Nevertheless, on the other hand the trend of no-completely free internet is still present. There are cases of surveillance of internet and censorship even though the government has been claiming that internet is free.<sup>149</sup>

In 2010 Libya had 6,5 million inhabitants and from them 260 thousand of Facebook users. 67% of Facebook users were younger than 30 years. In contrast in 2013 around 860 thousands Libyans were using Facebook and it became the most visited page. The social media and networks in general have been still using as a main mobilization tool for protests and for other purposes. One of the biggest protests, after the US ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed on September 2012 and on which around 30 thousand people participated, was mobilized through Facebook event. And there are many others. Moreover, the social networks were also used for posting the photo of dead Muammar Qaddafi, which was the greatest victory for rebels.<sup>150</sup>

The most important Facebook groups regarding social and political issues in Libya are U.S. Embassy in Libya with more than 200 thousand fans, High National Elections Commission with almost 175 thousands members, H2O Team, which is NGO of young intellectuals with 162 thousand fans and Libyan Interim Government with 158 thousands members. On Twitter Libyan Youth Movmnt has 490 followers, British Council has 317 followers and Dr. Mustafa Abushagur, former Deputy Prime Minister of Libya is followed by 124 people. On Youtube the Justice and Construction Party has the highest number of uploaded videos, concretely 18 318. And the most favorite video regarding Libyan revolution is called “Front Lines of the Libyan Revolution (Documentary) with more than 1 million views.<sup>151</sup>

## 5.4 Youth Education

In 2010 adult literacy rate was 88,4%, which is relatively high percentage in comparison with Egypt. Nevertheless, on the other hand education was highly ideological, based on The Green Book. Mean years of schooling were 7,3 and expected years of schooling were 16,5. Moreover, 55,6% of women and 44% of men had at least secondary

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<sup>149</sup> Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#\\_ftn1](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#_ftn1).

<sup>150</sup> Arab Social Media Report, January 2011, pp. 1-18 and Freedom on the Net-Egypt, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#\\_ftn1](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya#_ftn1) and Oakes, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>151</sup> Social Bakers [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.socialbakers.com/> and Youtube. Frontlines of the Libyan Revolution (Documentary) [online]. July 27, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7heWfUeJcS4>.

education. Gross primary education enrollment was 110,3%, gross secondary education enrollment was 93,5%, and gross tertiary education enrollment was 55,7%. However, in terms of the quality of the educational system Libya was at 138<sup>th</sup> place out of 139 places. In spite of this fact the revolution in Libya was waged predominantly by educated people even though many of them, around 100 thousand, fled the country many years before the revolution because of oppression made by Qaddafi's regime. On the other Qaddafi adopted also some positive steps regarding education; concretely he extended compulsory education from six to nine years as well as he was supporting education of women. Moreover, Qaddafi's regime was financing chosen students, who were sent to study abroad mainly to the United Kingdom, the US, France and Canada, for example in 2010 7000 Libyan students studied university abroad. And the number was constantly increasing.<sup>152</sup>

In 2013 adult literacy rate was 89,2%. Mean years of schooling were 7,3 and expected years of schooling were 16,2. Moreover, 49,6% of Libyans had at least secondary education. Gross primary education enrollment was 114,0%, gross secondary education enrollment was 110,0%, and gross tertiary education enrollment was 54,4%. And in terms of the quality of the educational system it even gained 148<sup>th</sup> place out of 148 places. The situation is currently even worse because 40% of schools were destroyed during the civil war and majority of schools have poor quality of equipment lacking the most basic services as access to hygiene facilities or electricity. Generally, increasing the quality of the educational system is a basic premise for the successful process of transition to democracy in Libya. For example, “the Libyan higher education system faces huge challenges after decades of neglect, yet the country has significant resources to draw upon in upgrading its institutions, research and teaching resources. Given the right political leadership and support from regional and international partners, Libya has the potential to transform its system of higher education into a force for change that is capable of producing jobs, eliminating radicalism and reducing reliance on foreign expertise in its technical sectors, the petroleum industry in particular. And recent initiatives from the newly elected government suggest the impetus is there”<sup>153</sup>.

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<sup>152</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144, 157, 193 and Global Competitiveness Report, 2010-2011, pp. 217 and Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Vandewalle, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Clark, Nick. Education in a Transitional Libya. World Education News and Reviews [online]. July 1, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <http://wenr.wes.org/2013/07/education-in-a-transitional-libya/>.

<sup>153</sup> Clark, Nick. Education in a Transitional Libya. World Education News and Reviews [online]. July 1, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <http://wenr.wes.org/2013/07/education-in-a-transitional-libya/>.

Currently, Libya has been cooperating with the UN (UNICEF) and the EU on improvement of its educational system. Within its European Neighborhood Policy the EU allocated 3,1 million euro for the project because as was mentioned above quality education is one of the building stones of democracy as well as of the overall development of the individual country. For Libya improvement of the education system's quality is difficult task with which it needs help from abroad.<sup>154</sup>

## 5.5 Political environment

In 2010 the Freedom House evaluated Libya with 7, because political rights gained 7 and civil liberties gained 7 as well. This means that Libya was not free country as has been already mentioned together with more details in the chapter about Qaddafi's regime. In 2013 Libya had overall score 4,5 because political freedoms were evaluated by 4 and civil liberties by 5. This score shifted Libya into partly free country according to the Freedom House. And unlike in Egypt the situation has remained the same until nowadays. More details regarding situation after the revolution are described in the subchapter democratization.<sup>155</sup>

As was already mentioned there was practically no freedom of association during the Qaddafi's regime therefore expressions of public opinions in forms of demonstrations were illegal or had to be in a favor of the ruling regime. However, the situation changed after the revolution and the civil war in Libya. There has been huge boom in establishment of the CSOs as well as in organization of various events regarding political life and culture in the country. Nevertheless, on the other hand organization of these events has been problematic because of the security situation in the country which has been dire. Moreover, as Libya had the stiffest regime from the all three examined countries meaning that there was no tradition of democracy, the path towards democratization is thus more complicated and will definitely need more time

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<sup>154</sup> Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145, 171 and Global Competitiveness Report, 2013-2014, pp. 255 and UNICEF. Libya School Assessment [online]. February 2013 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: [http://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F\\_WNA7yruVs%3D&tabid=3583&language=en-US](http://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F_WNA7yruVs%3D&tabid=3583&language=en-US) and Libya-Nationwide School Assessment, 2012, pp. 8-54 and UN News Centre. UNICEF and Libya sign agreement to improve basic education system [online]. June 25, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45265#.U7SYwijENFI> and UNICEF. The European Union and UNICEF support Libya's education programmes [online]. March 2013 [accessed 2014-7-2]. Available at: [http://www.unicef.org/eu/files/PR\\_eu\\_unicef\\_033013.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/eu/files/PR_eu_unicef_033013.pdf).

<sup>155</sup> Freedom in the World, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/libya#.U70PdyjENFI> and Freedom in the World, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/libya#.U70PjSjENFI>.



than in other countries because firstly Libyans need to understand the proper meaning of CSOs' activities and of all things connected with them.<sup>156</sup>

In 2010 Libya had 2,2 score and located itself at 146<sup>th</sup> place out of 178 places in the Corruption Perceptions Index, which means the highest corruption rate from the examined countries and the highest one worldwide. Libyan economy is based on oil export. Oil represented the majority of capital flowing into the country from abroad. Nevertheless, the majority of incomes from oil were spent for the army and spectacular projects building. Clientelism and nepotism were widespread in all three countries, in the case of Libya this fact was proved by Qaddafi's family members' appointment to the high government posts and last but not least by providing benefits to the loyal tribes. All important businesses were controlled by Qaddafi and his relatives. Qaddafi dominated politics and economy of Libya and all benefits were redistributed according to his reasoning, which meant that Qaddafi's family lived in an enormous luxury. In 2008 Qaddafi promoted government reforms, which enable to redistribute oil incomes directly to Libyans for the purpose of creating at least partial prevention against corruption; however, despite this fact Libya still was one of the most corrupt countries in the world. In 2013 Libya gained score 15 due to the new methodology of the Transparency International regarding the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is basically equivalent to 1,5 hence it was located at the 172<sup>nd</sup> place out of 177. These data show that the state of corruption even significantly worsened after the revolution.<sup>157</sup>

## 5.6 Economic Deprivation

According to the Human Development Report published in 2010 the HDI was 0,755. The life expectancy at birth was 74,5 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 28 110. Data for Gini coefficient,

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<sup>156</sup> Freedom in the World, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/libya#.U70PdyjENFI> and Freedom in the World, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/libya#.U70PjSjENFI>.

<sup>157</sup> Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results#\\_blank](http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results#_blank) and Gombár, 2001, pp. 84-91 and Rheannon, Francesca. Lesson from Libya: Despotism, Poverty and Risk. Reuters [online]. March 4, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-8]. Available at: [http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/04/idUS108205791820110304#\\_blank](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/04/idUS108205791820110304#_blank) and Lichtblau, Eric and Rohde, David and Risen, James. Shady Dealings Helped Qaddafi Build Fortune and Regime. New York Times [online]. March 24, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-8]. Available at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/africa/24qaddafi.html?\\_r=3&pagewanted=all&](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/africa/24qaddafi.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all&) and BBC. Gaddafi 'to hand out oil money' [online]. September 1, 2008 [accessed 2014-7-8]. Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7591458.stm#\\_blank](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7591458.stm#_blank) and Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>.



the overall life satisfaction, and intensity of deprivation are not available for Libya but around one third of Libyans lived below poverty line.<sup>158</sup>

The issue of unemployment in Libya became really serious when its rate reached 20,7% according to the official sources but the real unemployment rate was estimated at 30% in 2009. As well as in Egypt and Tunisia it concerned primarily young people because the population growth were constantly increasing and the regime was unable to create new jobs.<sup>159</sup>

After his succession Qaddafi decided to lead Libyan economy in the spirit of socialism. In the 1970s given the quick transformation of the Libyan society Qaddafi decided to label private property as theft, which caused extensive wave of confiscations. Private entrepreneurs were parasites according to Qaddafi. And last but not least labor for salary was evaluated as slavery in the *Green Book*. Some people lost all their property in that time. It is not surprise that these steps would normally lead to the collapse of economy. However, Qaddafi decided to use oil as a weapon and initiated oil shocks in the 1970s, by which he increased oil prices and taxes for the mining concerns. These steps led to the significant growth of the Libyan economy. Thus at the beginning of his rule Qaddafi can afforded to finance welfare programs, improving of medical care and the quality of education. For example students had medical care for free and they did not pay tuitions. However, after the establishment of the revolutionary commissions the quality of these services decreased. Simultaneously Libya was characterized by low incomes, which over time slightly increased. Majority of building projects such as highways or houses were not completed and the only important project, which was completed was the Great Manmade River, the system of pipelines, which distributed underground water from desert in the south to cities in the north. Qaddafi labeled this project as the eighth wonder of the world.<sup>160</sup>

Since the beginning of the 1990s liberalization of the private sector took place,

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<sup>158</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144 and CIA The World Factbook. Libya [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#_blank) and The World Bank. GNI per capita, PPP [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD>.

<sup>159</sup> St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Evans, Lisa. Tunisia: how does it compare to other countries in the region?. The Guardian [online]. January 20, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2011/jan/18/tunisia-data-store#\\_blank](http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2011/jan/18/tunisia-data-store#_blank) and CIA The World Factbook. Libya [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#_blank) and Trading Economics. Libya Unemployment Rate © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/libya/unemployment-rate>.

<sup>160</sup> Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

however, it was ended in 1996. In the 1990s production of oil was restrained due to sanctions imposed on Libya for the reason of the Lockerbie terrorist attack. Given the fact that social dissatisfaction was increasing due to bad living conditions Qaddafi decided to revive the Libyan economy. However, he did not want to adopt structural reforms thus the situation remained the same. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century demand for oil increased and sanctions decreased, which meant the oil again began to play significant role in the Libyan economy. After 2001 Qaddafi fought against corruption as well as he again made effort for economic liberalization, privatization, diversification and the overall modernization of the country. In 2003 it was clear that full economic liberalization will last long time thus Qaddafi began to criticize public sector and called for complete privatization of the oil industry and other sectors of industry.<sup>161</sup>

The economic reforms, which were during 1990s and after 2000 progressive, were restrained by the rentier type of the Libyan economy, bureaucracy and incompetence, which meant that the process was lasting only slowly. Moreover, corruption, clientelism and non-transparency endured. However, it needs to be mentioned that someone criticized regimes for the ineffective redistribution of sources and the other claimed that the regime provided access to basic goods and sometimes even premium services to its citizens. When for example regime paid medical care abroad in the cases, in which it was not possible to do the surgery in Libya or the regime paid tuitions for its students abroad, etc.<sup>162</sup>

The Human Development Report published in 2013 evaluated the HDI by 0,769 and the overall life satisfaction by 4,9. The life expectancy at birth was 75 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 28 110. It is the same as in 2010 because the last data by the World Bank are from 2009. The Human Development Index offers another data for GNI per capita in 2010 17 068 and for 2013 13 765. These data show the gap regarding GNI per capita in reports by the different organizations. The official unemployment rate was 19,5% in 2011 but the real one is still estimated at 30%. Data for Gini coefficient and intensity of deprivation are not available. And estimates regarding the number of Libyans who live below poverty line remain the same, concretely around one third of them. Generally, Libya suffers from the lack of data regarding economic indicators. However, available

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<sup>161</sup> Gombár, 2001, pp. 115 and Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>162</sup> Hilsum, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and St. John, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Pargeter, 2012, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

data show that the overall evaluation of indicators influencing economic deprivation of people have not changed much. Therefore the qualitative evaluation of economic deprivation remains also the same as well as in the case of Egypt.<sup>163</sup>

## 5.7 Social Capital

In terms of a trust among people within the Libyan society World Values Survey in its 6<sup>th</sup> wave of survey covering the period from 2010 until 2014 published that only 10% of Libyans answered that most people can be trusted but on the other hand 84,1% of people said that one need to be very careful in terms of trust and 5,2% of respondents answered that they do not know. In terms of a tolerance and respect for other people 80% of Libyans said that tolerance is important and 20% did not mention it. The third examined factor is confidence in selected institutions. In this regard 31,5% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in religious organizations, 15,6% that they have quite a lot confidence in religious organizations, 27,7% that they do not trust them very much and 17,9% that they do not have confidence in the at all. Only 7% of Libyans have a great deal of confidence in labor unions, 13,4% have quite a lot confidence, 34,7% not very much confidence and 27,8% have no confidence in labor unions at all. In terms of confidence in police 32,7% a great deal of confidence, 22,5% quite a lot confidence, 27,3% not very much confidence, and 12,7% none confidence in police at all. In regard with government 13,2% of Libyans have a great deal of confidence in government, 9,3% have quite a lot confidence, 31,8% not very much, and 37,6% none confidence at all. In terms of confidence in the parliament 6,9% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in the parliament, 6,7% quite a lot confidence, 26,8% not very much confidence, and 46,9% none confidence at all. The low level of confidence is as well as in the case of Egypt given by the long-lasting political crisis in the country. In terms of the confidence in army 29,9% of Libyans answered that they have a great deal of confidence in army, 19,5% have quite a lot confidence, 28,9% have not very much confidence and 16,1% have none confidence in army at all. And finally the fourth indicator – religion and belief systems. For 94,9% of Libyans religion is very important

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<sup>163</sup> Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145, 175 and Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144 and The World Bank. GNI per capita, PPP [online]. © 2009 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> and CIA The World Factbook. Libya [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#_blank) and Trading Economics. Libya Unemployment Rate © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/libya/unemployment-rate>.

and for 3% is rather important and only for 0,3% religion is not important at all. Religion is generally very important for people in all of the three examined countries. Moreover in mid-2010, the results of the religious restrictions index, concretely its parts the government restrictions index was 5,8 and the social hostilities index was 0,2, which means high religious restrictions but decreasing.<sup>164</sup>

## 5.8 Revolution and Civil War

In Libya the revolution began on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2011, however, the first important day of the revolution was on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2011, which is called the day of revolt and that brought the first victims of the Libyan revolution, which quickly spread throughout the country. However, the Colonel Qaddafi did not want to give up so easily and decided to use prisoners and mercenaries in his fight against protesters. The Libyan revolution was generally accompanied by the higher level of violence than in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases because Qaddafi ordered to shoot to the protesters, which also made the number of dead and wounded significantly higher than in Egypt or Tunisia. On 20<sup>th</sup> February the rebels dominated Benghazi and other important cities in the eastern part of the country. On the contrary, the fights in the western direction were in favor of the Qaddafi's troops because Qaddafi was using jet fighters during fighting with the rebels thereby he significantly violated human rights. This together with the high number of casualties led to the adoption of the NATO operation Unified Protector, which started in 19<sup>th</sup> March 2011, when non-fly zone over Libya was imposed on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution. The main goal of the resolution and subsequent NATO operation was to protect civilians. NATO also began to bomb Qaddafi's strategic sites, by which it significantly decreased Qaddafi's military advance. During April and May heavy fighting over Misrata took place. The battle was lost by Qaddafi in the middle of May. The first successes of the rebels in the Western part of the country began to emerge during July. Further on 15<sup>th</sup> August the rebels conquered Gharyan thanks to which they were able to encircle Tripoli dominated by the Colonel and his forces. Moreover, the rebels also gained control over oil refinery near az-Zawiyah. On 20<sup>th</sup> August the operation Mermaid Dawn, the fight for the capital Tripoli began. The next day the rebels

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<sup>164</sup> World Values Survey - Libya, 2014, nonpaged and Religious Restrictions Index. 2013. Pew Research. Religion and Public Life Project. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/09/RisingTide-IndexbyRegion.pdf> and Religious Restriction Index, 2012, pp. 52, 62.

entered Tripoli without hard resistance. Despite this fact battle over Tripoli was continuing between the rebels supported by NATO and the remained Qaddafi's forces. Qaddafi constantly urged to fight against the rebels via TV speeches. He even said these words: „I am not going to leave this land...I will die as a martyr at the end ... I shall remain, defiant. Muammar is leader of the revolution until the end of time”<sup>165</sup>. Nevertheless, the majority of the capital was in the hand of the rebels at the end of August. Some of the Libyan cities dominated by the Qaddafi's allied tribes, such as Sirte or Bani Walid, were still not conquered. However, during October even these cities were in the hand of the rebels. And on 20<sup>th</sup> October the Colonel Qaddafi was killed. And after that on 23<sup>rd</sup> October the head of the National Transitional Council (formed from the representatives of rebels already at the beginning of the uprising on February as a predecessor of a future Libyan government) Mustafa Abdel Jalil, declared the liberation of Libya. The National Transitional Council then headed Libya until November 2011. It did not have significant influence hence it was replaced by the interim government consisted of representatives of tribes, businessmen, etc. labeled also as the National Transitional Council. With the Muammar Qaddafi's death the operation Unified Protector also ended. The exact number of casualties of the Libyan civil war is not available but the new Libyan government claims that around 4700 rebels died and similar number was probably also on the side of the Qaddafi forces. Moreover, government also asserts that more than 2 000 rebels are still missing.<sup>166</sup>

## 5.9 Democratization?

In 2011 Libya was evaluated as non-democratic country. The change again came in 2012, when it was evaluated as partly free country by the Freedom House. In July 2012 the first elections into the General National Congress took place, which replaced the

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<sup>165</sup> Black, Ian. Gaddafi urges violent showdown and tells Libya 'I'll die a martyr'. The Guardian [online]. February 22, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-13]. Available at:

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/muammar-gaddafi-urges-violent-showdown>.

<sup>166</sup> Al-Jazeera. Battle for Libya: Key moments November 19, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-13]. Available at:

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/20111020104244706760.html> and Fahim, Kareem and Kirkpatrick, David D. Jubilant Rebels Control Much of Tripoli. The New York Times Law [online]. August 21, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-13]. Available at:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/world/africa/22libya.html?pagewanted=all&r=0> and Freedom in the World-Libya, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/libya-0#.U8MJjCjENFI> and Black, Ian. Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new government. The Guardian [online]. January 8, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-13]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualties-lower-expected-government>.

National Transitional Council. The National Forces Alliance led by Mahmoud Jibril won the elections and Ali Zidan became the prime minister of Libya. The main task of the newly elected General National Congress was to draft a constitution, which will be subsequently approved in the referendum. Libya as well as Egypt moved to partly free countries due to the elections, which were correct, with many political parties participated and subsequent transparency in drafting constitution. Nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned that even though the civil war in Libya is over, the security situation in the country is catastrophic, which is proven by attack on the US embassy, during which the US ambassador died in September 2012. At the beginning of 2013 the dire security situation was continuing and it peaked in October when the Prime Minister Ali Zidan was kidnapped, however, he was released not long after that. Until the end of 2013 several people were killed and suicide attack was committed. In January 2014 the deputy industry minister was assassinated. In February “protests erupt in response to the GNC's refusal to disband itself after its mandate officially expires. The GNC says that it needs to extend its parliamentary term to allow a special committee time to draft a new constitution. GNC chairman Nuri Abu Sahmein pledges that fresh elections will be held as early as possible”<sup>167</sup>. In March the Prime Minister Ali Zidan was withdrawn and the GNC elected Ahmed Maiteg as a new prime minister. In June 2014 the new parliamentary elections took place, which are represented by low turnout, only 18%, and high level of violence. In these elections there were no political parties only individuals, which should lead to a stable political environment in the country which is currently not good because Libya had three prime ministers. This situation can be compared to total anarchy and fragmentation. The results of the elections have not yet been published. During the elections several people died and some polling had to be closed due to the security situation and, moreover, the women's activist Salwa Bugaighis was killed by radicals. Due to bad security situation, supported by fights led by the rebel General Khalifa Haftar, and fragmentation of the Libyan society, Libya is threatened by breaking up. Thus it is really difficult to predict the future development of the country.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> BBC. Libya Profile [online]. May 21, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445>.

<sup>168</sup> Whitaker, Brian and McCarthy, Tom. US ambassador Chris Stevens killed in Libya – as it happened. The Guardian [online]. September 13, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2012/sep/12/libya-egypt-attacks-muhammad-film-live> and Freedom in the World-Libya, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/libya-0> and Freedom in the World – Libya, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/libya#.U8QjpSjENFI> and BBC. Libya Profile [online]. May 21, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14].

In terms of political rights and civil liberties the freedom of press improved only slightly and there still exists many cases of its violations; education gained greater independence but academic freedoms are not guaranteed; judiciary did not gain greater independence; women's rights are still at a relatively high level as were in the times of the Qaddafi's rule even though there are still some restrictions, and so on and so forth.<sup>169</sup>

In 2013 37% of Libyans claimed that the main priority of the state is to assure political stability and public order and 25% of them that the main priority is to disarm militias. Moreover 67% of people thought that democracy is the best form of government for Libya. On the other hand Libya made a major shift in the Democracy Index because in 2012 it gained score 5.15 and located itself at 95<sup>th</sup> place, which means the hybrid regime.<sup>170</sup>

The conclusion of this subchapter is devoted to measuring the degree of polyarchy after the Libyan revolution. The evaluation focuses on the most recent data, because it needs to be emphasized that the degree of polyarchy has been slightly changing over time. Thus after the revolution Libya is placed at 3 on the Polyarchy Scale, which means better midst (viz. Table 2). Concretely, the variable fair elections is evaluated 1, freedom of organization 2, freedom of expression 2, alternative sources of information 2, and suffrage 1.

## 5.10 Civil Society Diamond

Firstly, the Civil Society Diamond for the period of the Qaddafi's rule is described. The indicator of structure, concretely the number of CSOs establishment per 100 000 population, is 0 because no independent CSOs existed in Libya during the Qaddafi's regime as was mentioned above. The second indicator – values, concretely confidence in government is 23, because around 23% of people had confidence in government according to the World Values Survey in its sixth wave between 2010 and 2014. More

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Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445> and BBC. Libyan elections: Low turnout marks bid to end political crisis. [online]. June 26, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28005801> and Al-Jazeera. Libyans mourn rights activist amid turmoil. [online]. June 26, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/libyans-mourn-rights-activist-amid-turmoil-2014626161436740827.html> and Al-Jazeera. Libyans vote for new parliament [online]. June 25, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/libyans-vote-new-legislative-body-2014625161310916224.html>.

<sup>169</sup> Freedom in the World – Libya, 2013, nonpaged. Available at:


<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/libya#.U8QjpSjENFI>.

<sup>170</sup> National Democratic Institute, August 2013, pp. 7, 13 and Democracy Index, 2012, pp. 6.



precisely it is a sum of people, who said that they have a great deal of confidence (13,2%) together with those, who have quite a lot confidence in government (9,3%) The third aspect, space, concretely civil liberties is evaluated by 0 according to the data published by the Freedom House (see appendix). And the final fourth indicator is impact, concretely change in HDI, which has value 75,5 because in 2010 Libya had HDI 0,755, however, this number is multiply by 100 for the purpose of this graph.<sup>171</sup>

### Libya - Qaddafi's era




Secondly, the Civil Society Diamond for the period after the Libyan revolution is described. The indicator of structure, concretely the number of CSOs establishment per 100 000 population, is 48 because after the revolution around 3000 CSOs exists in Libya, which population is 6 244 174. So the number of CSOs is divided by population and then multiply by 100 000 because the indicator is per 100 000 population. And the result is 48. The second indicator – values, concretely confidence in government is 23, because around 23% of people had confidence in government according to the World Values Survey in its sixth wave between 2010 and 2014. This number is the same because the survey was lasting between 2010 and 2014 as was mentioned above. There can be some changes in individual years but not significant. The third aspect, space,

<sup>171</sup> World Values Survey - Libya, 2014, nonpaged and Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144 and Freedom in the World – Libya, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/libya#.U8WEEyjENFI>.



concretely civil liberties is evaluated by 55 according to the data published by the Freedom House. Again there were changes in the years after the revolution, but these are the most recent data. And the final fourth indicator is impact, concretely change in HDI, which has value 77 because in 2013 Libya had HDI 0,769, however, this number is multiply by 100 for the purpose of this graph.<sup>172</sup>

### Libya - after the revolution



The Libyan case shows the most significant change because two of the indicators – structure and space were valued by 0 and thus the CSD was even not complete, which points to the dire state of the Civil Society during the Qaddafi's era. After the revolution the structure increased to 48 and space to 55, which represent major change in the Libyan CSD. The indicator impact does not experience significant change and indicator values also remains more or less the same. On the other hand Libya was the worst case from the all three examined countries therefore this major change is obvious but it does not mean that Libya is closer to democracy then the others, the opposite is rather true because currently Libya is on the brink of another civil war. The improvement of some indicators shows no democracy as well as no authoritarianism, it means anarchy and fragmentation.

<sup>172</sup> Foundation for the Future, 2011, pp. 2 and World Values Survey - Libya, 2014, nonpaged and Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145 and CIA The World Factbook. Libya [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#\\_blank](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html#_blank) and Freedom in the World – Libya, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/libya#.U8WHQJENFI>.

## 6 TUNISIA

### 6.1 Authoritarian regime of the president Ben Ali

In 1987 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power during bloodless coup in Tunisia. Before that Ben Ali held the post of the Prime Minister and interior minister in the Habib Bourguiba's regime. These posts unofficially meant succession after Bourguiba. To assure this succession, which was challenged by some other ministers, Ben Ali declared Bourguiba incompetent. Incompetence of the president was mentioned in the Tunisian constitution, which imposed that in that case Prime Minister assumes presidency. Thus other ministers had to acknowledge this step as legal.<sup>173</sup>

It needs to be mentioned that Ben Ali's Tunisia was economically liberalized and some pseudo-democratic reforms took place in that time, which made Tunisia one of the most liberalized country in the Middle East. Releasing of political prisoners was part of this process. Changes in the Tunisian constitution should create overall feeling that Ben Ali's regime will embark a path to democratization of Tunisia, which did not happen and regime remained authoritarian until the end of his rule. Regime was based on the power pyramid, where the presidential palace, which was on the top, represented the core of the real power. Even though regime declared partial reforms their applicability was really complex. Freedom in the country was restrained and any critics cannot be directed to the president and his family or the ruling regime.<sup>174</sup>

Thus Tunisia can be labeled as the authoritarian regime with the one party's rule, concretely the Constitutional Democratic Rally. The president was the most important person headed the ruling party. Moreover, he appointed the Prime Minister, the commander of the armed forces and he approved laws. The presidential mandate was for five years, however, even in the case there appeared another candidate in the presidential elections Ben Ali always won with majority of votes. Some experts labeled Ben Ali's regime as the so called consensual democracy, which means that government allowed more freedoms and freer expression of opinions.<sup>175</sup>

In 1988 Ben Ali adopted so called National Pact, in which he declared appurtenance of Tunisia to the Islamic legacy and to the Arab world. Last but not least

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<sup>173</sup> Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>174</sup> Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2007, pp. 68-80.

<sup>175</sup> Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2007, pp. 68-80 and Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

in the Pact respect for the human rights, a greater degree of pluralism in the country was declared, however, in fact some political parties were banned. Opposition practically did not have any leverage against the regime. As well as in Egypt and Libya the Tunisian army had significant influence, however, Ben Ali did not care too much about its modernization even though he began his career in the army. The crucial tasks of the army were to protect borders including access from the sea, critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and some troops also participated in the peacekeeping missions. Generally, unlike in Egypt and Libya army in Tunisia was rather marginalized.<sup>176</sup>

Tunisia was the country, which launched the wave of demonstrations in the Arab world. It was this Tunisia, which was considered as one of the most liberalized country in the region, this Tunisia launched the domino effect of the people's fight against non-democratic regimes, which ruled in their countries for several decades. In 2010 Tunisia gained overall score 2,79 in the Democracy Index and its location at 145<sup>th</sup> place labeled it as the authoritarian regime. The Ben Ali's regime systematically violated civil rights and freedoms and "brutally silenced critical voices"<sup>177</sup>.

In 1994 all political parties, which wanted to participate on the parliamentary elections had to be approved by the president. Only legal opposition was accepted to the Parliament, however, it gained only 12% of votes. Simultaneously Ben Ali decided that with all subsequent elections he will increase number of mandates for opposition hence in 2009 25% of chairs in the Parliament were occupied by the opposition. In 2002 Ben Ali established the second chamber of the Parliament; however, the opposition did not have significant influence there. In Tunisia illegal opposition existed, nevertheless, it was disunited. According to Ben Ali Islamists were the most dangerous opposition and thus they were chased and eliminated. The strongest opposition party was Islamist party Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which changed its name to the Hizb Ennahdha or the Renaissance Party and declared denomination to the principles of democracy. However, Ben Ali never fully legalized this party because it was popular and he was afraid it could undermine his regime. Ben Ali also manipulated with the presidential elections. Even though there existed the possibility for opposition candidates to participate on the elections Ben Ali always won with more than 90% of votes. Nevertheless, opposition complained about intimidation, wrong distribution of ballots,

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<sup>176</sup> Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition) Gombár, 2007, pp. 69.

<sup>177</sup> Marks, Monica. Tunisia: zero-sum game?. Open Democracy [online]. November 15, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-15]. Available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/monica-marks/tunisia-zero-sum-game#\\_blank](http://www.opendemocracy.net/monica-marks/tunisia-zero-sum-game#_blank).

inability to present candidates in media, etc.<sup>178</sup>

The Ben Ali's regime was also characterized by restrained civil freedoms, non-existence of the freedom of speech, press, assembly and simultaneously opinions, which were critical to the president or to the regime, cannot be expressed on public. It needs to be mentioned that Tunisia was the first Arab country, which allowed freedom of press and other freedoms. However, neither this previous historical development avoided Ben Ali to establish the authoritarian regime, which these freedoms constantly violated. Almost all televisions and press were controlled by the state and those periodic, which were not, were afraid to criticize him. Web sites and satellite televisions were also under the state control but for instance since 2009 Tunisians were sometimes able to access Youtube, Facebook and other pages.<sup>179</sup>

In the case of women rights Tunisia was one of the most liberalized countries in the Middle East. In 2006 Ben Ali acknowledge that women had the same rights as men and for that reason there was high rate of women education, who can also participate in politics. Complete equality between men and women did not exist in praxis but Ben Ali embarked path to it. For example the famous women headgear hijab was banned in Tunisia. It also needs to be mentioned that Ben Ali's regime adopted several reforms, which supported improvement of living conditions of Tunisians. In Tunisia there is high rate of education, strong middle class and organized unions.<sup>180</sup>

On the other hand in Tunisia persecution of political opponents and activists fighting for human rights was common. Repressive laws were adopted for the purpose of ensure obedience of citizens and for that reason they also restrained the Civil Society and personal freedoms and moreover they protected the president and regime against all accusations. Those, who criticized regime were arrested or punished in another way.

Torture during interrogation, extended arrests, forced statements, long custody, intimidation, blackmailing or eavesdropping should contribute to the atmosphere of fear in the country. In the times of Ben Ali for that purposes the state security forces were used, which got orders directly from the presidential palace. Gombár marked this apparatus as “the state within the state”<sup>181 182</sup>.

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<sup>178</sup> Gombár, 2007, pp. 77-81 and Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>179</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia> and Gombár, 2007, pp. 77-81 and Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>180</sup> Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Anderson, 2011, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia>.

<sup>181</sup> Gombár, 2007, pp. 70.

The conclusion of this subchapter is again devoted to measuring the degree of polyarchy of the Tunisian regime under the Ben Ali's rule. The evaluation focuses on the last years of the his regime, because it again needs to be emphasized that the degree of polyarchy has been changing over time, especially the first years of his rule had significantly higher degree of polyarchy, due to already mentioned process of liberalization, than last years of his rule, when on the contrary he was trying to consolidate his power. Thus before the revolution Tunisia placed at 6 on the Polyarchy Scale, which means worse midst (viz. Table 1). Concretely, the variable fair elections is evaluated 3, freedom of organization 3, freedom of expression 2, alternative sources of information 2, and suffrage 1.

## 6.2 Civil Society Organizations

In Tunisia during the President Ben Ali's regime many CSOs existed hence the concept of the Civil Society was rooted in Tunisia but the CSOs were weak. All CSOs needed to have registration at the Tunisian Ministry of Interior because the regime required control over all CSOs. Moreover, they were not able to legally participate on the political culture in the country. And just as was the practice in Egypt the Islamist groups were often chasing by the regime. Some other organizations did not gain permission for their activities. However, despite these obstacles the number of the CSOs in Tunisia was increasing. It reached 7 321 in 2003 and 9 969 in 2010. The work and labor unions and some humanitarian or women's organizations were exceptions because they were more or less independent on the government. "The Tunisian General Federation of Labor has shown some independence regarding economic and social issues, and it has spoken out in support of a greater measure of democracy. In September 2005, the government closed the office of the Association of Tunisian Judges and banned the congress of the Union of Tunisian Journalists. During 2006, five Tunisian opposition parties, led by the Progressive Democratic Party, have accused the government of harassing activists in civil society organizations in Tunisia. Human rights activists claimed that the

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<sup>182</sup> Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia> and Gombár, 2007, pp. 78-79 and Human Rights Watch. Tunisia's Repressive Laws [online]. November 1, 2011 [accessed 2014-4-23]. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/node/102369/section/2#\\_blank](http://www.hrw.org/node/102369/section/2#_blank) and Vicken, Cheterian. Torture and the Arab system, old and new. Open Democracy [online]. November 23, 2011 [accessed 2014-4-23]. Available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/torture-and-arab-system-old-and-new#\\_blank](http://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/torture-and-arab-system-old-and-new#_blank).

government punished family members of Islamist activists for crimes allegedly committed by the activists”<sup>183</sup>. The history of cooperation between opposition parties and the CSOs dates back to 1988 when they signed the so called National Pact. Existence and activities of the CSOs during the Ben Ali's regime were based on law 59-154/1959 and 95-25/1992, which were significantly restricting the creation and work of the CSOs. One of the most famous CSOs strongly affiliated with Ben Ali's regime was BASMA Association for the Promotion of Employment of the Disabled founded by Ben Ali's wife. This CSO represented one of the tools for creating the image of Ben Ali's regime as democratic. Some CSOs which tended to democracy succumbed to the political setup of the country and began to behave according to the rules of the regime. However, despite these CSOs, which were connected to the regime, many other CSOs were challenging the regime and demanded democratic reforms. These CSOs were organizing protests and demonstrations against the government and it often reacted by sending police and thus deepening violence supplemented by arrests, intimidation, beating and sometimes even torture. Therefore the pro-democracy activities of the CSOs made tradition of perception of the CSOs as guarantors of democracy or revolution in Tunisia. The Tunisian CSOs were and are also characterized by deep interdependence thanks to which networks of the CSOs have been emerging. Thus one of the most important advantages of Tunisia in its way to democracy is the high level of social capital, which is described in more detail below. And just these high levels of interdependence as well as social capital helped the Tunisian Civil Society to unite for a common goal and to overthrow the authoritarian regime of the president Ben Ali. Deane labeled this atmosphere in the Tunisian Civil Society as a “spirit of solidarity” and claims that this was the main engine of the revolution.<sup>184</sup>

In 2013 there were 14 966 CSOs in Tunisia, which is a significant increase if comparing with 2010, the year when the revolution started in Tunisia. “CSOs are associations, workers’ and employers’ unions, professional associations, charitable organizations and other grassroots organizations involving citizens at the local and regional level and in the national debate”<sup>185</sup>. The newly founded organizations have been focusing predominantly on the transition to democracy, they are concretely the

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<sup>183</sup> Zaki, 2007, pp. 171.

<sup>184</sup> Zaki, 2007, pp. 170-171 and Foundation for the Future, January 2013, pp. 7 and Freedom in the World - Tunisia, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/tunisia-0>. and British Council, 2013, pp. 44 and Deane, February 2013, pp. 9-15 and Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>185</sup> Foundation for the Future, January 2013, pp. 8.

Confederation Tunisian General Labour (CGTT), the Union of Tunisian Workers (UTT), the Union of Tunisian Judges (SMT), the Union of Administrative Judges (UJM), the Confederation of Citizen Enterprises of Tunisia (CONNECT) and the Union of Industrialists and Traders Free (UICL), the Association of Young Tunisian Democrats (JDT), the Association for political awareness, the Tunisian Association for Democratic Culture and Citizenship (ATCDC), the Association for Research on Democracy and Development (AR2D), Democratic Horizons, the Association for the Vigilance and Commitment to the Tunisian Revolution and its immunity (AVERTI), the Tunisian Association for Financial Transparency (ATTF), the Tunisian Association of Political Studies (TPES), etc. Other types of organizations which have been founded since the revolution are humanitarian, charitable, and human rights organizations. One of the current trends in the Tunisian CSOs is that the CSOs, which have been focusing on democratization process, are not as active as it is expected; however, this applies mainly to those CSOs, which has been dealing with democratization. The overall picture of the current CSOs shows that the Tunisian CSOs are very active, which is also due to the law 88/2011 adopted in 2011 because it significantly simplifies the foundation and work of the CSOs and increased the level of freedom of association. On the other hand there exist shortcomings regarding the dialogue between the CSOs and the Tunisian government. Moreover, there are other obstacles which needed to be overcome, concretely funding, lack of professionalism, strong links to politics, ideology or religion, low level of connectivity between CSOs in the same field of interests, small number of women, and many others. Among others it should be definitely mentioned the volatility the number of the CSOs members, which is also why no exact number of members is available. However, generally, people in Tunisia “highlight the advantages of having an active civil society as the guardian of the revolution through exerting pressure on the government and shedding light on instances of injustice in the media, such as highlighting the plight of neglected regions”<sup>186</sup>. Moreover, “the Tunisian transition is currently tackling ‘the Twin Tolerations’. The toleration of the religious citizens towards the state, and the toleration of state officials and state law to permit religious citizens to freely express their views and values within civil society and in politics, as long as other citizens’ constitutional rights and the law are respected...Toleration and the accommodation of differences initially enabled Tunisia to integrate important political actors into the transitional process, to hold elections and, thus far, to navigate the

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<sup>186</sup> British Council, 2013, pp. 46.

divisions between secular and religious Tunisians”<sup>187</sup>. To conclude it has to be emphasized that if the revolutionary trend of the high level of social capital and tolerance will endure, the Tunisian path to democracy can be successful. Even despite the fact the initial enthusiasm from the revolution and fall of the Ben Ali's regime had vane and old problems have been going to surface and new ones have been emerging. Therefore as in the cases of Egypt and Libya the CSOs have to make strong effort in the path to achieve their goals as well as the political environment in the country have to be favorable and pro-democratic.<sup>188</sup>

In terms of the fulfilled commitments and goals of the Tunisian CSOs, concretely the fulfilled commitment of democracy meaning that it evaluates how the CSOs contributed to the process of democratization in Tunisia. In the case of Tunisia this fulfilled commitment is evaluated as 4 meaning progress but not good enough.

### 6.3 Social Media and Networks

As well as in Egypt and Libya internet in Tunisia began to spread after 2000. However, as in other non-democratic regimes Tunisia also had control and censorship of internet. Moreover, The Tunisia Internet Agency was established and its main task was to filter unwanted content. In 2009 Tunisia was labeled as “internet enemy”, which was for instance due to blocking of youtube or flickr networks and hackers' attacks on those whose criticized the ruling regime. Nevertheless, in spite of these obstacles the number of internet users has been increasing as well as ways of control bypassing has been developing. Concretely, in 2007 17% of Tunisians were internet users and in 2012 the number reached 42%. In the case of Facebook the number of users between November 2010 and mid-January 2011 increased from 1,7 million to almost 2 million in 10,3 million of Tunisia population. Additionally, 78% of Facebook users are younger than 30 years.<sup>189</sup>

Utilization of the social media and networks during the Tunisian revolution was extensive as well as in Egypt and Libya. And the main purpose was again mobilization

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<sup>187</sup> Deane, February 2013, pp. 6.

<sup>188</sup> Foundation for the Future, January 2013, pp. 7-19, 24-25 and Freedom in the World - Tunisia, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/tunisia-0> and British Council, 2013, pp. 45.

<sup>189</sup> Freedom on the Net – Tunisia, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/tunisia#.U7Uu2ijENFI> and Arab Social Media Report, January 2011, pp. 1-18 and Breuer and Landman and Farquhar, October 2012, pp. 12



of people and spreading information because when the revolution began the regime wanted to hush it up. But thanks to the social media and networks information were spreading in an unprecedented way across the country and also abroad. The utilization of the social media and networks during the revolution was possible also due to the relatively long tradition of cyber-activism (since the end of the 1990s). It can be claimed that the social media and networks created support for the revolution's trigger mechanisms in form of Muhammad Bouazizi's self-immolation because they helped to spread information about his death and subsequent demonstrations in Sidi Bouzid and other neighboring cities. And this is how the revolution in Tunisia expanded throughout the country. For example one of the most favorite hashtags on Twitter was #sidibouzid. "It appears then, that another important role of Facebook and other social media was to span a bridge between hitherto unrelated socio-economic groups, thus providing the basis for intergroup collaboration that facilitated a large cycle of protest to develop"<sup>190</sup>. Moreover Breuer, Landman, and Farquhar claim that "Tunisia's early commitment to ICT infrastructure development created an essential resource for the mobilization of nation-wide anti-regime protests"<sup>191, 192</sup>.

After the Ben Ali's regime fell the accessibility of internet significantly increased but nothing is perfect yet because cases of internet censorship are still reported even though they are not as common as in the times of Ben Ali's regime and, moreover, social networks are still now completely free. On the other hand many laws which support freedom of internet expression were adopted but many old non-democratic laws are still valid, that is also why Jabeur Mejri was sentenced for seven and half years because he posted cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad on Facebook. And there are also other cases of punishment for publishing of inappropriate content on internet. Webpages with political content are another story, there should be no censorship of them, however, on the contrary the ruling Ennahda party has been using internet for propaganda but it is not the only one because there is a major trend of using social media and networks by many political parties, CSOs and others. They have been using the social media and networks for variety of purposes from spreading information, organizing events to expression of people's feelings about concrete situation in their country.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Breuer and Landman and Farquhar, October 2012, pp. 23.

<sup>191</sup> Breuer and Landman and Farquhar, October 2012, pp. 30.

<sup>192</sup> Breuer and Landman and Farquhar, October 2012, pp. 13-14, 18-19 and British Council, 2013, pp. 61-62.

<sup>193</sup> Freedom on the Net – Tunisia, 2013, nonpaged. Available at:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/tunisia#.U7Uu2ijENFI> and British Council, 2013,

In 2012 Facebook had more than 2,5 million users in Tunisia and around 12 thousand of Twitter users. Currently, the groups regarding the Tunisian society with the most fans on Facebook are subsequent: the Ministry of Interior with 400 thousand fans; LearnEnglish – British Council MENA with almost 280 thousand fans; Rached Gnannouchi, one of the founding fathers of the Ennahda Party, with 208 thousand fans, and Barack Obama with 202 thousand fans. In the case of Twitter the group of Moncef Marzouki, the interim president of Tunisia, with almost 200 thousands followers; @MALHACHIMI, pages of Mohamed Hechmi Hamdi, the Tunisian journalist based in the United Kingdom, with almost 107 thousands followers; and Slim Amamou, the Tunisian famous blogger, with almost 72 thousands followers. The US Embassy in Tunis has the highest number of uploaded videos on Youtube, concretely 41,5 thousands.<sup>194</sup>

## 6.4 Youth Education

In 2010 adult literacy rate in Tunisia was 78% and 72% of Tunisians were satisfied with the education system. Mean years of schooling were 6,5 and expected years of schooling were 14,5. Moreover 33,5% of women and 48% of men had at least secondary education. Gross primary education enrollment was 107,6% and net was 97,7%, gross secondary education enrollment was 90,2% and net was 65,8%, and gross tertiary education enrollment was 31,6%. In terms of the quality of the educational system Tunisia was at 20<sup>th</sup> place out of 139 places, which is far better than in Egypt and Libya. This place is supported by the fact that progress in the development of education in Tunisia was really significant during the Ben Ali's regime. Tunisia has been fulfilling the Education for All goal because enrollment into all three levels of education increased and, moreover, many women studied at the tertiary level of education, which led to the decrease in gender inequality in the field of education, even though it was not completely eliminated. In 1999 the president Ben Ali presented future goals regarding education, which need to be achieved in the future. They were concretely “consolidating educational reforms and gains and preventing school dropouts before age 16, strengthening pre-primary education, and promoting and facilitating distance learning;...

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pp. 61-62.

<sup>194</sup> Arab Social Media Report, July 2012, pp. 1-24 and Social Bakers [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-1]. Available at: <http://www.socialbakers.com/>.

investing more aggressively in information technology and telecommunications, and in scientific and technological research;...continuing poverty-reduction measures, including access to basic services and better social security provisions;...upholding women's equality, preserving the importance of family, and promoting cultural activities;...In order to meet these challenges, Tunisian schools will need to be retooled to a major extent so that students emerge better equipped to apply their school learning to problem-solving in the world of work and so they are trained in the types of job skills the Tunisian economy will need”<sup>195</sup> <sup>196</sup>

Generally, education was and still is an important value in Tunisia. Therefore the president Ben Ali focused on this issue very carefully and it is considered as one of the strategic priorities of his government, which can also be seen on the case of the implementation of the compulsory schooling. However, in the case of tertiary education despite the fact the he declared an effort to increase the level of employment mainly for universities graduated students, in fact the situation was not good and there were high rate of unemployment predominantly of the young people (this issue is described in more detail below). Moreover the combination of highly educated people, who want modernization and who have higher demands for quality of their lives and the same people, who are economically deprived and dissatisfied, was one of the trigger mechanisms for the revolution in Tunisia. “The stark reality, however, is that the autocratic regime and its failure to promote economic prosperity were clear not only to a handful of educated critics but also to many members of the expanding middle class and the downtrodden among the population”<sup>197</sup> <sup>198</sup>

In 2013 adult literacy rate in Tunisia was 77,6%. Mean years of schooling were 6,5 and expected years of schooling were 14,5. Moreover, 29,9% of women and 44,4% of men had at least secondary education. Gross primary education enrollment was 109,0%, gross secondary education enrollment was 90,0%, and gross tertiary education enrollment was 34,4%. In terms of the quality of the educational system Tunisia was at

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<sup>195</sup> Lakeberg Dridi, Barbara. Tunisia Education-Summary. State University. [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-5]. Available at: <http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1558/Tunisia-SUMMARY.html>.

<sup>196</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 54, 144, 157, 181, 193 and Global Competitiveness Report, 2010-2011, pp. 329 and Lakeberg Dridi, Barbara. Tunisia Education-Summary. State University. [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-5]. Available at: <http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1558/Tunisia-SUMMARY.html>.

<sup>197</sup> Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

<sup>198</sup> Tunisia Education – Constitutional & Legal Foundations. State University [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-5]. Available at: <http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1550/Tunisia-CONSTITUTIONAL-LEGAL-FOUNDATIONS.html> and Ministry of Education and Training, 2008, pp. 1 and Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition).

71<sup>st</sup> place out of 148 places. These data show that some aspects of education remain more or less the same as in the times of Ben Ali's regime, nevertheless, the other such as decrease of the quality of education pointing out to the still existing problems with education in Tunisia, which are then mirrored in other spheres of the ordinary Tunisians' lives. Generally, there are lack of education effectiveness, lack of trust and motivation, and high level of uncertainty regarding the future assertion among young Tunisians. So these are the main challenges which have to be overcome in the future.<sup>199</sup>

## 6.5 Political environment

In 2010 the Freedom House evaluated Tunisia with 6,0, because political rights gained 7 and civil liberties 5. This means that Tunisia was not free country as has been already mentioned together with more details in the chapter about Ben Ali's regime. The situation changed in 2013 when Libya had overall score 3,5 because political freedoms were evaluated by 3 and civil liberties by 4. This score shifted Tunisia into partly free country according to the Freedom House. The state of the political culture in Tunisia even improved in 2014 evaluation because Tunisia's freedom rating is 3,0, concretely political rights as well as civil liberties are assessed by 3. Despite the fact that this rating still means only partly free country it is a great positive that progress in the case of Tunisia is observable. More details regarding situation after the revolution are described in the sub-chapter democratization.<sup>200</sup>

The freedom of association was anchored in the Tunisia constitution; nevertheless, the practice looked completely different. The CSOs which criticized the ruling regime and their activities were on the illegal basis. No expression of dissatisfaction was allowed therefore all demonstrations and protests against the regime were suppressing. Even after the revolution some demonstrations had to face police interventions and the cases of human rights violations from the police side were not exceptions. Activities of many CSOs were also restricted in terms that “No formal registration process has been instated for these organizations, and their existence is not

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<sup>199</sup> Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145, 157, 171 and Global Competitiveness Report, 2013-2014, pp. 371 and OECD, 2013, pp. 49, 55-57.

<sup>200</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia#.U70xVvjENFI> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/tunisia-0#.U70yEijENFI> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tunisia-0#.U70yoyjENFI>.

protected by a legal framework<sup>201</sup>. In 2014 evaluation by the Freedom House the situation has slightly improved but there are still many aspects regarding the freedom of association which are far from democratic ones.<sup>202</sup>

In 2010 Tunisia was at 59<sup>th</sup> place out of 178 in the Corruption Perceptions Index with the score 4,3, the best one from examined countries. High standard of living of the presidential family and his close collaborators became one of the most serious issues in Tunisia. The president Ben Ali and his family spent huge amount of money for luxury goods and controlled all important businesses in the country. The Ben Ali's regime was based on nepotism and clientelism, which helped people connected with the regime to gain financial benefits and to be prioritized in the all spheres of life. Corruption in the president's family became private secret because censorship banned to write articles criticizing the president. Despite these facts foreign investors were not discouraged by the environment in Tunisia and invested there. It needs to be mentioned that the lack of transparency is broth for corruption, which in higher or lower rate damaging economy meaning that even though the Tunisian economy was increasing the overall growth was slowed by this negative factor. In 2013 Tunisia gained score 41 due to the new methodology of the Transparency International regarding the Corruption Perception Index, which is basically equivalent to 4,1 hence it was located at the 77<sup>th</sup> place out of 177. These data show that the state of corruption is slightly more positive than before the revolution, which is also a good sign that the overall situation in Tunisia has been improving, even though slowly but also surely.<sup>203</sup>

## 6.6 Economic Deprivation

According to the Human Development Report published in 2010 the HDI was 0,683 and the overall life satisfaction was evaluated as 5,9. However, other indicators are

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<sup>201</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/tunisia#.U704mSjENFI>.

<sup>202</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia#.U703NCjENFI> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/tunisia#.U704mSjENFI> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tunisia-0#.U706zyjENFI>.

<sup>203</sup> Global Security. Tunisia – Corruption [online]. August 5, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-8]. Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/tunisia/corruption.htm> and Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010/results](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results) and Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>.

important in the connection with the economic deprivation as for example the life expectancy at birth, which was 74,3 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 9 660. This contributed to the fact that around 15,5%% of Tunisians lived below poverty line. Gini coefficient was then 40,8. All of these factors and many others described below caused that intensity of deprivation in 2010 reached 37,1%.<sup>204</sup>

In the case of Tunisia it is possible to label the aspect of unemployment as the trigger mechanism to revolution and its subsequent spreading to the other states in the Middle East. Just the inability to find job together with seizure of his goods by police led young Tunisian man to self-immolation. In 2010 the rate of unemployment was high, around 14%, according to the official documents but the reality in the non-democratic countries is always higher. This fact together with high rate of inflation caused bad living conditions and social dissatisfaction. Unemployment in Tunisia touched especially young generation, mainly students, who graduated and cannot found adequate job. As was mentioned these reasons led young people to align with Muhammad Bouazizi and go to streets to demonstrate for the structural reforms.<sup>205</sup>

In the first phase of the Ben Ali's rule "liberalization in the economic area simultaneously had been lasting in accordance with economic restructuring, signed with the International Monetary Fund already in 1986". Economic measures pursued stabilization of the public expenditure, exchange rate of the Tunisia dinar, liberalization of the foreign trade, deregulation of the market and beginning of the program of privatization<sup>206</sup>. In 1995 Tunisia became the member of the WTO and also one of the first countries joined the fully partnership with the EU. Thanks to these facts Tunisia embarked the path to the market economy of the export type and increased living conditions. However, despite the slight process of liberalization, the civil war in Algeria gave the legitimacy to the regime and simultaneously created the atmosphere of fear to oppose the regime because Tunisians feared of the civil war's spillover. After the Ben

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<sup>204</sup> Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144, 153, 161, 177 and The World Bank. GNI per capita, PPP [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> and CIA The World Factbook. Tunisia [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-15]. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html> and The World Bank. Tunisia [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-10]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/tunisia>.

<sup>205</sup> The Economist. Tunisia's troubles: Sour young men [online]. January 6, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-10]. Available at: [http://www.economist.com/node/17862305#\\_blank](http://www.economist.com/node/17862305#_blank) and Evans, Lisa. Tunisia: how does it compare to other countries in the region?. The Guardian [online]. January 20, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2011/jan/18/tunisia-data-store#\\_blank](http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2011/jan/18/tunisia-data-store#_blank).

<sup>206</sup> Gombár, 2007, pp. 77.

Ali's succession two crucial goals of the Tunisian economy were set, concretely reduction of the state expenditures and support of the private investments into the economy.<sup>207</sup>

In the 1990s the Tunisian government launched the privatization of the state companies. The overall economic situation was improving during the Ben Ali's regime even though the negative elements slowing the growth appeared. One of them is already mentioned unemployment, which the regime was trying to eliminate by increasing the quality of education and training programs. During Ben Ali's government incomes almost doubled and poverty decreased. Approximately 95% of Tunisians had the access to water and electricity, literacy increased because education, at least the primary one, was accessible. Nevertheless, even though the government was trying to create at least thousand new jobs, the unemployment rate was still high. In the half of the 1990s the Ben Ali's government decides to earmark money for welfare system's development like for example establishment of the social benefits, medical care and education for free. These steps led to the decrease of poverty but not to its complete elimination.<sup>208</sup>

The Human Development Report published in 2013 evaluated the HDI by 0,712 and the overall life satisfaction by 4,7. The life expectancy at birth was 74,7 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 10 960. The unemployment rate increased to 15,2% at the beginning of 2014 and youth unemployment of people between 15 and 24 years was 31,4%. Gini coefficient was 41,4 and the national poverty line decreased to 3,8%. The overall intensity of deprivation also decreased to 31,7% in 2013. Nevertheless, the data show that the overall evaluation of indicators influencing economic deprivation of people have not changed much as well as in the case of Egypt and Libya. However, some indicators changed more significantly as the overall life satisfaction, which decreased. The real rate of unemployment especially regarding youth is still high. In terms of the number of people who live below poverty line there is significant decrease in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period but these numbers are only estimates and the pre-revolutionary number is extracted from the World Bank and post-revolutionary from the Human Development Report, which means that there is no such great gap between both numbers. Moreover, other sources claim that the percentage of people who live below poverty line after the revolution is still more than 15%. To conclude it needs

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<sup>207</sup> Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Gombár, 2007, pp. 77-81.

<sup>208</sup> Abadi, 2013, nonpaged (Kindle edition) and Alexander, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle edition).



to be emphasized that the qualitative evaluation of economic deprivation also has not changed much since the times of the Ben Ali's regime.<sup>209</sup>

## 6.7 Social Capital

In terms of a trust among people within the Tunisian society World Values Survey in its 6<sup>th</sup> wave of survey covering the period from 2010 until 2014 published that only 15,5% of Tunisians answered that most people can be trusted but on the other hand 81,5% of people said that one need to be very careful in terms of trust and 3% of respondents answered that they do not know. In terms of a tolerance and respect for other people 54,9% of Tunisians said that tolerance is important and 45,1% did not mentioned it. The third examined factor is confidence in selected institutions. In this regard 25,6% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in religious organizations, 19,4% that they have quite a lot confidence in religious organizations, 31% that they do not trust them very much and 16,2% that they do not have confidence in the at all. Only 6,2% of Tunisians have a great deal of confidence in labor unions, 12% have quite a lot confidence, 25,3% not very much confidence and 40,1% have no confidence in labor unions at all. In terms of confidence in police 28,2% a great deal of confidence, 30,9% quite a lot confidence, 23,9% not very much confidence, and 12,3% none confidence in police at all. In regard with government 6,6% of Tunisians have a great deal of confidence in government, 11,2% have quite a lot confidence, 29,4% not very much, and 45,1% none confidence at all. In terms of confidence in the parliament 2,4% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in the parliament, 3,5% quite a lot confidence, 23,5% not very much confidence, and 59,9% none confidence at all. In the case of confidence in the state institutions it is the same as in Egypt and Libya. The low confidence is caused by the long-lasting political instability. In terms of the confidence in army 28,1% of Tunisians answered that they have a great deal of confidence in army, 31,8% have quite a lot confidence, 23,7% have not very much confidence and 11,2% have none confidence in army at all, which is quite high given the fact that army was

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<sup>209</sup> Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145, 153, 161, 175 and The World Bank. GNI per capita, PPP [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-9]. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> and Trading Economics. Tunisia Unemployment Rate © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-10]. Available at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/tunisia/unemployment-rate> and Yahia, Fadwa. ADB: 1,6 million Tunisians below the Poverty Line. Tunis Times [online]. June 26, 2013 [accessed 2014-7-10]. Available at: <http://www.thetunistimes.com/2013/06/adb-1-6-million-tunisians-below-the-poverty-line-84482/#>.



marginalized during the Ben Ali's era. And finally the fourth indicator – religion and belief systems. For 95,4% of Tunisians religion is very important, for 2,7% is rather important, for 1% is not very important, and only for 0,6% religion is not important at all. As was already mentioned, religion represents an important part of Tunisians' lives as it is in Egypt and Libya. However, on the other hand only 28% of Tunisians strongly agree with the separation of religion from politics, 24% somewhat agree, 13% somewhat disagree, 15% strongly disagree, and 20% do not know. Additionally, in mid-2010 the government restrictions index was 7,7 and the social hostilities index was 1,0, which means very high religious restrictions and even increasing.<sup>210</sup>

## 6.8 Revolution

The trigger mechanism of the revolution in Tunisia was the young Tunisian man named Muhammad Bouazizi, who self immolated on 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010 in the Tunisian city Sidi Bouzid because he was selling food without permission and when police found out, it confiscated all of his goods and moreover policemen beat him. The regime labeled this act as an exceptional incident, however, thousands of people identified oneself with his act and subsequent street protest spread over the whole Tunisia. The authoritarian regime of Ben Ali began to suppress uprising by repressions against people. On 24<sup>th</sup> December the protests claimed first victims. And on 28<sup>th</sup> December the president Ben Ali made a speech, during which he labeled demonstrations as illegal and called for halting violence. However, state police was also violent in fighting with protesters using tear gas, water cannons, etc. On 5<sup>th</sup> January 2011 Muhammad Bouazizi died in the hospital and uprising was still gathering strength. Therefore the president Ben Ali decided not to candidate in the next presidential elections and moreover he promised some concessions in the form of reforms regarding democratization of the country as for example new parliamentary elections. However, even though anti-governmental demonstrations were continuing beyond. Therefore, he imposed a state of emergency and dissolved the government. This situation escalated, which forced the president to flee the country on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011 to Saudi Arabia, where he probably lives until nowadays. On June 2012 Ben Ali was sentenced in absentia for life sentence for order to

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<sup>210</sup> World Values Survey - Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged and Arab Opinion Index, 2012, pp. 70 and Religious Restrictions Index. 2013. Pew Research. Religion and Public Life Project. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/09/RisingTide-IndexbyRegion.pdf> and Religious Restriction Index, 2012, pp. 52, 62.

kill protesters during the revolution. And finally, the number of people, who died during the Jasmine revolution, how the Tunisian revolution is often labeled, is estimated at 300.<sup>211</sup>

## 6.9 Democratization?

After the president Ben Ali fled the country on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011, Fouad Mebazaa was appointed the interim president of Tunisia and Muhammad Ghannouchi became the interim Prime Minister and was entrusted to form the interim government. However, some members of the new government were former members of the Ben Ali's government and this fact triggered the new wave of protests hence both Ghannouchi and Mebazaa withdrew from the former ruling party. Nevertheless, even though the demonstrations were continuing and for that reason the criticized members of the new government stepped down but protests still did not end. In October 2011 the first elections to the Constituent Assembly took place, which were according to international observers the first correct elections in the history of Tunisia. The Islamist party Ennahda won the elections. Tunisia was already in 2011 evaluated as partly free country and this situation has not changed until nowadays. The Islamist party Ennahda formed coalition with secular parties and it was legitimized that the Prime Minister will be Islamist, concretely Hamadi Jebali, and the president will be secularist. However, the protests and skirmishes were continuing even in 2012. "Progress on the drafting of a constitution and the passage of an election law were hampered for much of 2013 by a political standoff between the governing coalition, led by the Islamist party Ennahda, and secular opposition parties. The February assassination of leftist opposition politician Chokri Belaid by suspected Islamist militants prompted opposition parties to accuse Ennahda of complicity or excessive tolerance of extremist groups. Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali

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<sup>211</sup> BBC. Tunisia's Ben Ali sentenced over protesters' deaths [online]. June 13, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18421519> and BBC. Tunisia suicide protester Mohammed Bouazizi dies [online]. January 5, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12120228> and BBC. Tunisia: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced out [online]. January 15, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12195025> and Crumley, Bruce. Tunisia Pushes Out Its Strongman: Could Other Arab Countries Follow?. Time [online]. January 14, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2042541,00.html> and Rifai, Ryan. Timeline: Tunisia's uprising. Al-Jazeera [online]. January 23, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html> and CNN. About 300 people killed in original Tunisian uprising, U.N. reports [online]. May 21, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/05/21/tunisia.un/>.

resigned and was replaced by another Ennahda figure, former interior minister Ali Laarayedh. The new cabinet led a crackdown on violent ultraconservative Salafi Muslim groups, but political tensions escalated in July, when a second secular opposition leader, Mohamed Brahmi, was assassinated. After many weeks of opposition protests and deadlock in the Constituent Assembly, Ennahda agreed in October to hand power to a politically neutral caretaker government that would be tasked with overseeing elections in 2014<sup>212</sup>. On January 2014 the new interim government took the power in the country after the Ennahda's government, which is generally evaluated as the true practice of democracy in Tunisia. Both the presidential and the parliamentary elections are scheduled for October and November 2014. However, next to the increase in the level of democracy, this also points out to the fact that the security situation in the country is volatile.<sup>213</sup>

In Tunisia freedom of speech, assembly, expression, information, and religion have been increased even though there are still many shortcomings regarding civil freedoms and political rights as for example media freedom, etc. Moreover, some reforms related to judiciary were adopted; however, they have been not fully implemented yet. In terms of the women's rights the level is high but it has been since the Ben Ali's regime. However, there are still reported skirmishes between religious and secularist groups. Despite the fact that it may seem that Tunisia is on its best way to democracy, because the level of civil liberties and political rights has been constantly increasing, it needs to be mentioned that protests for instance for high prices of food and basic goods have been still taking place, etc. Despite these facts, it needs to be emphasized that Tunisia is on the best way to democracy out of all three examined countries because currently it is in the highest stage of transition to democracy even

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<sup>212</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tunisia-0#.U8RqHyjENFI>.

<sup>213</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/tunisia-0> and Rifai, Ryan. Timeline: Tunisia's uprising. Al-Jazeera [online]. January 23, 2011 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/tunisia#.U8RmVyjENFI> and Gall, Carlotta. Islamist Party in Tunisia Hands Power to Caretaker Government. The New York Times [online]. January 29, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-hands-power-to-caretaker-government.html?\\_r=2](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-hands-power-to-caretaker-government.html?_r=2) and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tunisia-0#.U8RqHyjENFI> and Amara, Tarek. Tunisia to hold parliamentary, presidential elections in October and November. Reuters [online]. June 25, 2014 [accessed 2014-7-14]. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/us-tunisia-election-idUSKBN0F01C520140625> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/tunisia#.U8R0QijENFI>.

though some experts have still doubts about the level of democratization.<sup>214</sup>

The majority of Tunisians see the most important aspects of the future development of the country in the quality education and in the vital Civil Society. Nevertheless, in 2012 only 63% of Tunisians preferred democracy as the best state system. On the other hand Tunisia made a major shift in the Democracy Index because in 2012 it gained score 5.67 and located itself at 90<sup>th</sup> place, which means the hybrid regime.<sup>215</sup>

The conclusion of this subchapter is devoted to measuring the degree of polyarchy after the Tunisian revolution. The evaluation focuses on the most recent data, because it needs to be emphasized that the degree of polyarchy has been slightly changing over time. Thus after the revolution Tunisia is placed at 2 on the Polyarchy Scale, which means relatively good place (viz. Table 2). Concretely, the variable fair elections is evaluated 1, freedom of organization 1, freedom of expression 2, alternative sources of information 2, and suffrage 1.

## 6.10 Civil Society Diamond

Firstly, the Civil Society Diamond for the period of the Ben Ali's rule is described. The indicator of structure, concretely the number of CSOs establishment per 100 000 population, is 96 because in 2010 9969 CSOs existed in Tunisia, which population was 10,4 million. So the number of CSOs is divided by population and then multiply by 100 000 because the indicator is per 100 000 population. And the result is 96. The second indicator – values, concretely confidence in government is 18, because around 40% of people had confidence in government according to the World Values Survey in its sixth wave between 2010 and 2014. More precisely it is a sum of people, who said that they have a great deal of confidence (6,6%) together with those, who have quite a lot confidence in government (11,2%) The third aspect, space, concretely civil liberties is evaluated by 20 according to the data published by the Freedom House (see appendix).


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<sup>214</sup> Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2013, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/tunisia> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tunisia-0#.U8RqHyjENFI> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2012, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/tunisia#.U8ROQijENFI>.

<sup>215</sup> British Council, 2012, pp. 112 and Pew Research Center. Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life. Global Attitudes Project. [online]. July 10, 2012 [accessed 2014-7-15]. Available at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/> and Democracy Index, 2012, pp. 6.

And the final fourth indicator is impact, concretely change in HDI, which has value 68 because in 2013 Tunisia had HDI 0,683, however, this number is multiply by 100 for the purpose of this graph.<sup>216</sup>

### Tunisia - Ben Ali's era




Secondly, the Civil Society Diamond for the period after the Tunisian revolution is described. The indicator of structure, concretely the number of CSOs establishment per 100 000 population, is 137 because after the revolution around 14966 CSOs exists in Tunisia, which population is 10 937 521. So the number of CSOs is divided by population and then multiply by 100 000 because the indicator is per 100 000 population. And the result is 137. The second indicator – values, concretely confidence in government is 18, because around 18% of people had confidence in government according to the World Values Survey in its sixth wave between 2010 and 2014. This number is the same because the survey was lasting between 2010 and 2014 as was mentioned above. There can be some changes in individual years but not significant. The third aspect, space, concretely civil liberties is evaluated by 67 according to the data published by the Freedom House. Again there were changes in the years after the revolution, but these are the most recent data. And the final fourth indicator is impact, concretely change in HDI, which has value 71 because in 2013 Tunisia had HDI 0,712,

<sup>216</sup> Foundation for the Future, January 2013, pp. 7 and World Values Survey – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged and Human Development Report, 2010, pp. 144, 185 and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2010, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia#.U8WrdCjENFI>

however, this number is multiply by 100 for the purpose of this graph.<sup>217</sup>

### Tunisia - after the revolution



In the case of Tunisia the indicator space experienced the most significant change from 20 to 67, which means that political environment in the country came through major improvement. The indicator structure also increased, which is again connected with boom in establishments of the new CSOs after the revolution. Even the third indicator – impact slightly improved, which indicates that the overall quality of life increased. And finally, the indicator values remain more or less the same as well as very low because due to the political instability in the country people do not have great confidence in their governments. Nevertheless, Tunisia is on the best way towards democracy as well as the state of the Civil Society is the best from the all three examined countries.

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<sup>217</sup> Foundation for the Future, January 2013, pp. 7 and World Values Survey – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged and Human Development Report, 2013, pp. 145 and CIA The World Factbook. Tunisia [online]. © 2014 [accessed 2014-7-15]. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html> and Freedom in the World – Tunisia, 2014, nonpaged. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tunisia-0#.U8WucSjENFI>.

## 7 CONCLUSION

The Civil Society is an important driving force as well as indispensable component of all democratic regimes. Basically, there is no democracy without the Civil Society. Therefore it always plays a significant role in the process of transition to democracy and changes in its dynamics then determine the course of this transition. So it is in the case of democratization wave that spills over the Middle East. Thus when once again ask the main research question: “To what extent and how the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society have been influencing the emergence of the revolutions and the subsequent processes of transition to democracy in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia?”, the answer is simple: the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia have great and significant effect on the transformation of the three examined countries. However, this statement needs to be supported by evidences.

To evaluate the role of the Civil Society in the transformation of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia we need to start at the beginning of the whole process, concretely with the initial non-democratic regimes because these regimes themselves, whether willingly or unwillingly, created such a political environment that then provided conditions for rooting elements of democracy, in this case the Civil Society, which at the end of the days contributed to their extinction. Thus the main paradox of these regimes was the fact that the majority of the steps they took were for the purpose of strengthening their legitimacy but, on the contrary, they that led to their overthrow. The mix of various factors caused that these regimes were self-destructive. This mix consisted, on the one hand, of the high level of discontent of people and on the other hand with development bringing about higher demands for life and freedoms. In more detail description, dissatisfaction is represented by economic deprivation, unsatisfactory political environment and often also by the low level of social capital. In terms of economic deprivation there was a great gap between rich and poor people. And poor people, living mainly in the rural areas, often did not have access to basic services such as education, health care, electricity, and so on and so forth. Then young people, predominantly those with higher levels of education, were not able to find an adequate job for their qualification and for that reason their social status was decreasing on the ladder of the social mobility and they were threatened by poverty or already lived in poverty. Moreover, political environment showed all the signs of authoritarianism. Basic political rights and freedoms were restricted. And finally the overall dissatisfaction often caused

low level of social capital because the whole society in the given states were fragmented and people were sometimes significantly affected by the atmosphere of fear compaction by the huge apparatus of the state security forces. And then there was the other side of the coin represented by development and modernization. In terms of education, despite the fact that its quality is still low, the major improvement can be observed during the all three regimes. Thus, as was already mentioned, higher educated people have higher demands for living conditions. The existence of the CSOs as well as their constant increase in turn helped to fight for better political environment within the non-democratic regimes. This process was part of an inevitable modernization. Moreover, the development of internet and its spread across the examined countries are considered also as the most recent and again inevitable modernization. Thanks to the great boom in social media and networks the revolutions had a chance of success because social networks became the most effective tool for resource mobilization, without which no revolution would probably take place. Ultimately, this was “the imaginary cocktail” of causes and conditions labeled as the dynamics of the Civil Society, which contributed to the fall of the non-democratic regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Those regimes that presented themselves as democratic and with the most appropriate political, social, and economic conditions for their CSOs, an intermediary, between citizens and the state. Nevertheless, on the contrary the voices of the Civil Society or extension the voices of citizens themselves were not heard, so they took their future into their own hands and began the processes of transformation. However, the complexity of the whole process can be observed from its very beginning because there was huge polarization within societies during the revolutions, the masses of people lacked common leadership and even common vision. This did not hamper them in overthrow of the old regimes, but it can negatively affect the future stages of transformation.

Despite the majority of the Middle Eastern states are labeled as authoritarian, each of them is unique, which means that it is not possible to create the uniform pattern of causes and subsequent processes of their transformations. It is true that in the relatively high number of reasons of the revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, many of them were identical in all three countries; nevertheless, there were also very similar situation for example in Algeria or Morocco, and the revolutions were not successful there. Thus I would like to point out that despite the nature of the regimes and their individual elements being similar, it is not excluded that another factors appears, which at the end of the day causes the defeat of the revolutionary efforts. It all depends on the



circumstances in the given situation. Moreover, it is the same with the transition to democracy in the examined countries, because this process can be similar in the individual states but it always will be unique. Hence, it can happen that liberal democracy will be established in one country and not in the other one or the other way around. Therefore it needs to be focused on the concrete countries.

The main advantage of Egypt was deeply rooted and vigorous Civil Society, which was actively challenging the Mubarak's regime. Therefore it was then able to effectively participate in the revolution. The Egyptian Civil Society even developed in the post-revolutionary period thus became a major player in the political environment and it has been contributing to democratization of the country. The overall dynamics of the Civil Society has undergone significant changes regarding some indicators but on the other hand some important aspects have remained unchanged. Firstly, the base of the CSOs is more robust and vigorous. Secondly, the political environment significantly shifted towards freedom and democracy, especially after the first presidential elections. However, on the other hand the living conditions including economic security, quality of education and the overall satisfaction have not improved much or even deteriorated. Social capital is also at a relatively low level but it is understandable due to the fact that the Egyptian society came through a stormy period in the last couple of years but the changes in identities go hand in hand with changes of the regime. Finally, the last finding is negative because the recent events as well as the recent evaluation of the Egyptian political environment show that since the president Morsi was overthrown the country has been again slipping back to authoritarianism, which is not a good sign. Thus if I create ranking of the three examined countries in terms of their success in the path towards democracy Egypt would be in the third and thus the worst place, which also can be seen on the Polyarchy scale.

Libya is the most interesting and controversial case regarding the topic of this thesis because no independent Civil Society existed in the Qaddafi's era therefore it cannot participate on the revolution hence Libyan people alone had to give an impetus for changing the old rigid regime. Libya is also unique in a way how brutally the regime responded to the demands of people for reforms. The subsequent civil war distinctly destroyed the country. Therefore the birth and development of the vigorous Civil Society is even more crucial in Libya for successful process of transition. One of the most significant changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society is the boom in the CSOs establishments as well as in the political environment because Libya experienced the

toughest regime of all and now Libyans can exercise a certain level of civil liberties and political rights. These significant changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society are clearly visible in the CSD. On the other hand, as in the case of Egypt basic living conditions such as education and economic security have not improved much and also sometimes have even deteriorated. Nevertheless, the most serious problem is security situation in the country, that is dire and Libya is on the brink of another civil war, as I mentioned several times above. This factor together with the fragmentation of the society, visible in the social capital evaluation, predominantly on the indicator of trust, can negatively affect the democratization process. On the other hand, according to the Polyarchy scale as well as ranking, I created; Libya is at the second place.

The Civil Society has a long tradition in Tunisia thus it has been a major player in the Tunisian revolution as well as it is in the process of democratization. In the post-revolutionary period the number of the CSOs increased by almost half. Moreover, the Civil Society in Tunisia is vigorous and has been actively participating on the political and social events. On the other hand some elements of the dynamics of the Civil Society have not changed much; they have either slightly improved or deteriorated. These elements are education, economic security and the overall satisfaction with the living conditions in the country. And social capital, especially the level of trust and confidence in the state institutions, is at a very low level, which is again given to the fact that the last couple of years were turbulent in Tunisia both in the political and social sphere. This trend is the similar to the both previous cases. Although Tunisia is currently not a democratic country, it is considered as the only positive and successful case from the three examined countries. The reason for this statement is supported by the fact that Tunisia has been constantly developing as well as increasing the level of freedom and democracy hence in my ranking as well as according to the Polyarchy scale it occupies the first place. In spite of the fact that Tunisia is on its best way to democracy, the path is and will be complex because the transition to democracy itself is a complex and often long-lasting process. Finally, one of the most important aspects in Tunisia's path to democracy is stable political environment and vibrant Civil Society.

To conclude I would like to emphasize that democratization in the Middle East is a significant phenomenon both from the domestic and foreign perspective. It is also the transnational phenomenon with many common as well as unique denominators. It is on the one hand a chain of reactions because people learn from the other's experiences and on the other hand the trajectories of the transition processes in the given countries are

unique. This process of transition is also interesting because it has already shown its inscrutability, which contributed to our knowledge that it really is complicated and long-lasting process with unclear end in the all three countries in spite of their uniqueness. And in this transformation the Civil Society is one of the most important actors and any changes in its dynamics, which has been determining and influencing it, can totally change the history. Therefore we can only predict the future development, although, according to my opinion, each of the three countries has certain hope for democracy while it does not have to be democracy in the liberal sense of that word. It could be some type of hybrid democracy but stable one with the wide scope of rights and freedoms unlike the current state in the given countries. In terms of the future research I would definitely suggest the same topic as this thesis has, basically, to examine the role of the Civil Society in the process of transformation in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia over time because it is still the ongoing process. The only one question remains and it is the result of the transition process, whether the democratization wave in the Huntingtonian sense of that word has been lasting or whether we are witnessing a mere exchange of one non-democratic regime to another.

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## 9 APPENDIX

**Table 1 – Measurement of Polyarchy before the revolution**

Country	FAIRELT	FREORG	FREXT	ALTINF	SUFF	Polyarchy Scale
Egypt	3	3	2	2	1	6
Libya	3	4	3	4	1	10
Tunisia	3	3	2	2	1	6

**Table 2 – Measurement of Polyarchy after the revolution**

Country	FAIRELT	FREORG	FREXT	ALTINF	SUFF	Polyarchy Scale
Egypt	2	2	2	2	1	4
Libya	1	2	2	2	1	3
Tunisia	1	1	2	2	1	2

**Table 3 – Key for CSD Civil liberties' conversion**

Category	Raw points	Degree of freedom	CSD conversion
1	50-56	1-2.5 'free'	100%
2	42-49		83%
3	34-41		67%
4	26-33	3-5.5 'partly free'	50%
5	17-25		33%
6	9-16	5.5-7 'not free'	17%
7	0-8	Least free	0%

Source: Anheier, 2004, pp. 192.

## SUMMARY

The main focus of the presented thesis is to explain the repercussion of the changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society on the revolutions and subsequent processes of transformation in the Middle East. The concept of the Civil Society is deeply interrelated with democracy therefore the Civil Society is always a significant actor of the democratizations process; however the Civil Society as such is determined by certain dynamics that has been influencing its role in transitions to democracy. Thus changes in the dynamics of the Civil Society are traced using the typical method of process tracing. In this thesis the process tracing focuses on the pre-revolutionary period, revolutions, and post-revolutionary period. Basically, it is an over-time analysis of changes in several factors, according to which, the dynamics of the Civil Society is operationalized. Moreover, this thesis argues that these changes are path dependent meaning that the nature of the initial non-democratic regimes is mirrored in the subsequent processes of transition and the influence on the role of the Civil Society as such. In this thesis the issue of the Civil Society is based on two paradigms. The first one is based on the liberal modernization framework, which is working with the premise that in the context of the inevitable modernization the civil sector strengthens and thus gains enough capacity to become a major driving force of changes. Conversely, the second paradigm is connected with stagnation and socio-economic deprivation caused by the stagnant regimes and their unsuccessful structural reforms. This unique combination of both paradigms contributed to the transformation of countries in the Middle East.

The dynamics of the Civil Society is determined by six factors. They are concretely Civil Society organizations, focusing on their numbers, number of their members, their fulfilled commitments, and so on; social media and networks, dealing with their role as a tool for resource mobilization; economic deprivation, connected with economic security as such; youth education, dealing with literacy, enrolment, accessibility, and so on; political environment, which is basically the space where the Civil Society operates, determined by civil liberties, political freedoms, corruption, and so on; and finally social capital, meaning the state of values in the given society such as trust, tolerance, confidence in certain institutions, and so on. The changes in the the indicators, according to which these variables are operationalized, are also traced over-time. The result of this process should be democratization, which thus represents

dependent variable in this thesis. Finally, for better understanding and visualization, a graphical method for displaying of the Civil Society's state called the Civil Society Diamond, is applied.

For the purpose of examination of the role of the Civil Society in the processes of transition, three cases were chosen – Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The key for this selection was simple – successful revolutions and thus possible democratization of these countries. Since this is over-time analysis, in the case of Egypt a period from the beginning of the Mubarak's era until nowadays is traced; in the case of Libya it is since the Colonel Qaddafi came to power until nowadays, and in Tunisia it is from the beginning of Ben Ali's presidency until nowadays.

Finally, the main findings of this thesis are that the Civil Society has been playing significant role in the processes of transformation because changes in some indicators of its dynamics are distinctive. On the other hand, other important indicators have not improved much or even deteriorated. This indicates that the process of transition is long-lasting, complicated, and with an uncertain outcome.

# **DIPLOMA THESIS PROPOSAL**

## **Title**

**The Role of the Civil Society in the transformation of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia**

## **Introduction and Research question**

In the Arab world a new significant phenomenon – the revolutions, which led to overthrows of decades-long rules of Arab dictators and to transformation of existing regimes, appeared in the Middle East. The imaginary chalice of dissatisfaction of Arab nations overflowed which gave rise to huge demonstrations against ruling regimes and their leaderships known as the Arab Spring. People took to the streets and under slogans such as freedom, democracy, and nationalism fought for changes in the stagnant governments.

The main aim of the proposed diploma thesis is to identify the changes in the dynamics of the civil society, which influenced its role in non-democratic regimes as well as during revolutions and subsequent process of democratization in the North African states. Generally the civil society is considered as driving force, which lead to the falls of authoritarian regimes. For that reason I want to examine the role of the civil society in the the process of transformation in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The reason for choosing these three states is obvious because the revolutions were successful there and thus it is possible to observe the whole process of changing of civil society's dynamics and its influence since non-democratic regimes till nowadays.

The main research question is subsequent:

To what extent and how the changes in the dynamics of civil society have been influencing its impact on the emergence and the course of the revolutions and the subsequent process of transition to democracy in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia?

## **Methodology**


In my diploma thesis I will do a process tracing, concretely its general explanation approach because in that case the main causal relations rather than a detailed study of the process is provided. Generally process tracing method can be used for one or small number of cases as it will be in my diploma thesis. From process

tracing methods I chose so called path dependency in qualitative searching for causal mechanisms regarding the role of the civil society in the Arab revolutions and subsequent process of democratization. Now I am going to describe the scheme of my research as it is graphically illustrated in the picture below. Firstly I determined independent variables respectively initial key points, which are derived from the dynamics of the civil society. They are concretely civil society organizations, social media and networks, youth education, tradition of democracy, economic deprivation. These key points are rooted in the dynamics of the civil society in non-democratic regimes. Moreover they correlated with each other. Secondly I emphasized the crucial event or phenomenon, which significantly influenced and largely predetermined future development, and it is revolutions that led to the overthrow of initial regimes in the three examined states. And finally I set a dependent variable respectively outcome of the process, which is in my case the transition to democracy resp. democratization and the role of the civil society in it. Moreover despite the fact I know that foreign influences can affect the civil society in the process of democratization I determine them as control variable because the dynamics of civil society as a cause for revolution emanated predominantly from domestic environment of the examined states. In the case of control variable I also have to emphasize that by foreign influences I mean influences outside of the Middle East region and despite the fact I will mainly focus on domestic development in the given states I have to take into consideration influences emanated directly from the Middle East region because states were mutually affected each other during Arab Spring<sup>218</sup> To sum my research scheme I would revise that I have five independent variables resp. initial key points, which are derived from the dynamics of the civil society and which are correlated and they have both direct and indirect effects through revolutions on democratization resp. transition to democracy. Basically I will observe how initial key points have been changing since the pre-revolution period through revolutions and how they influenced current process of democratization. Additionally the core of my work will be three case studies, concretely of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

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<sup>218</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, nonpaged (Kindle version) and Kořan, 2008, pp. 44-46.





### **Concept and Theories**

As it is evident from the preceding paragraphs the main concept of my diploma thesis is the concept of the civil society. It should be mentioned that to tackle this concept can be problematic because on the one hand there exist no uniform definition of the civil society and on the other hand there are many paradigms and theories regarding this concept, some of the will be introduced in the thesis. For my purposes I use definition by Fukuyama, who defined it: “as the realm of spontaneously created social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political institutions”<sup>219</sup>.

Some scholars claim that activism of the civil society significantly support the process of democratization and that: “democracy in the Middle East is dependent on a strong civil society as a precondition to democratization”<sup>220</sup>. However on the other hand critics of the civil society assert that activism of the civil society rather strengthen than weaken authoritarian regimes and hinder the process of democratization of the North African states.<sup>221</sup> These contradictory arguments are also the reason why I want to examine the actual role of the civil society in the Arab Spring, how it has changed and whether it is different in the three examined states.

The first three independent variables, concretely civil society organizations, social media and networks and youth education are based on the modernization theory, according to which, factors of these three variables will be examined because the context of the inevitable modernization caused changes of these variables.

<sup>219</sup> Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 7.

<sup>220</sup> Boose, July 2012, pp. 310.

<sup>221</sup> Cavatorta and Durac, 2010, nonpaged (Kindle version).

For the measuring of the independent variable tradition of democracy as well as dependent variable democratization will be used the theory of polyarchy by Robert Dahl, who introduced seven factors by which he defines democracy. These factors are elected government officials; free and fair elections; universal suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of speech; alternative information; freedom of association.<sup>222</sup>

And finally the economic deprivation is based on the theory of relative deprivation, which points to the connection between economic deprivation and youth violence, which became evident during revolutions.

### **Operationalization of variables**

As mentioned above I set five main initial key points, which are derived from the concept of the civil society and its dynamics. They are concretely civil society organizations, social media and social networks, youth education, tradition of democracy, economic deprivation. These variables accommodate the concept of the civil society in broader sense because I want to create a complex picture of the factors, which influence the role of the civil society during the Arab Spring. Now I operationalize these five independent variables. In the case of the civil society organizations I will focus on their numbers, numbers of their members and simultaneously on the goals they pursue and how they engaged in the revolutions and whether they currently participate in the process of transition because some of them formed as ad hoc organizations for the purpose of revolutions and currently does not exist or have different goals. Social media and social networks generally bring modernization a through it lead to strengthening of the civil society. In my work social media and networks will again be examined according to their participation in the revolution and the process of transformation, numbers of members and according the way they have been using since the pre-revolution period. Youth education is also important factor determining the dynamics of the civil society because the higher literacy rate and quality of education the bigger opportunity for the mobilization of the youth. Tradition of democracy in the sense of political participation of the civil society will be operationalized according to, already mentioned, Robert Dahl's theory of polyarchy. And finally by the economic deprivation I mean the rate of unemployment and the poverty of the citizens in the sense of income per capita and unequal distribution.

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<sup>222</sup> Dahl, 1995, pp. 202.

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