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**FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD**

Institut mezinárodních studií

**Ondřej Novotný**

**India-U.S. Relations in the Late 1960s and in the  
First Half of the 1970s**

*Diplomová práce*

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Autor práce: **Ondřej Novotný**

Vedoucí práce: **PhDr. Jan Bečka, Ph.D.**

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## **Abstrakt**

Tato Diplomová práce s názvem - *India-U.S. Relations in the Late 1960s and in the First Half of the 1970s* – se zabývá zhodnocením vztahů mezi Spojenými státy americkými na straně jedné a Indií na straně druhé, tak jak je ovlivňovaly jednotlivé události na konci 60tých let 20. století a v první polovině 70tých let 20. století. Výsledkem, který tato práce přinesla, je potvrzení domněnky, že Spojené státy americké se v zahraniční politice držely striktně principu tzv. *realpolitik*. Díky tomu se ovšem dostaly mnohokrát do konfliktu se zájmy Indie. Jejich snaha o diplomatické sblížení s Čínskou lidovou republikou, ve které hrál důležitou roli Pákistán jako prostředník v jednáních mezi oběma zeměmi, se stala trnem oku indickým politickým představitelům v čele s premiérkou Indirou Gándhiovou. Spojené státy americké, jejichž zahraniční politiku řídil do velké míry poradce pro otázky národní bezpečnosti prezidenta Nixona Henry Kissinger, musely nutně preferovat spojenectví s Pákistánem, což se samozřejmě nelíbilo Indii. Obě zmíněné země spolu vedly několikrát válku a vzájemná nevraživost je provázela již od dob jejich samotného vzniku. I přesto, že se Indie mohla zdát jako nejvhodnější americký spojenec, díky svým demokratickým principům, skutečnost byla naprosto odlišná a duo Nixon/Kissinger se vzdor všem překážkám nevzdalo svého zahraničně-politického cíle a to i přes fakt, že to způsobilo značné trhliny ve vzájemných vztazích s touto jedinou, skutečně demokratickou zemí v Jižní Asii.

## **Abstract**

This MA thesis titled as - *India-U.S. Relations in the Late 1960s and in the First Half of the 1970s* – focuses on mutual relations of the U.S. on one side and India on the other. It elaborates various events, which influenced these relations during the late 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s. The result of this work is the confirmation that the U.S., in its foreign policy strategy, strictly followed the principle of *realpolitik*. Thanks to that their interests, however, often collided with those of India. Its effort of rapprochement with the PRC, during which Pakistan played an important role as the main communication channel between both countries, was a ‘thorn in the side’ of India's top officials, including its Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The U.S. foreign policy, which was mainly in hands of the National Security Advisor of President Richard Nixon Henry Kissinger, had to logically prefer an alliance with Pakistan. This, of course, was not welcomed by India because these two Asian countries waged several wars against each other and had strained relations since their birth. Thus, in spite of the fact that India might seem as the best American partner, given its strong democratic principles, the opposite was true. Nixon/Kissinger, in defiance of all obstacles, did not relent and remained firm in their foreign policy goal, despite their actions caused significant rifts in mutual relations with this only real democracy in South Asia.

## **Klíčová slova**

USA, Indie, *realpolitik*, Kissinger, Nixon, Válka 1971, atomové zbraně, zbrojní embargo

## **Keywords**

U.S., India, *realpolitik*, Kissinger, Nixon, War of 1971, nuclear weapons, military embargo

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## **Prohlášení**

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V Praze dne ...

Ondřej Novotný

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## Introduction

When World War II ended, the entire global geo-political order had changed. Previous to 1939, several strong states decided the conduct of world affairs, however, in the early 1950s; it was only the U.S. and the USSR. Germany and Japan were devastated by the war and had to completely rebuild their economies and to a significant degree, also their societies. France was seriously weakened and lost any meaningful impact on world affairs. The UK was in theory one of the winners of the war, but lacked the capacity to re-emerge to its pre-war status. The USSR was also devastated by the war: it lost significant amounts of its industrial potential and more than 20 million Soviets lost their lives. However, the country was strengthened by its moral victory in the sense that it almost bled to death but in the end, it pushed back the Nazis and regained control of their homeland. The Soviet national identity was as strong as never before and Stalin's grip on power was unquestionable. It had the greatest military might on the continent in terms of conventional armies and military equipment. During post-war negotiations in Potsdam, the victorious powers divided Europe into spheres of influence and the Soviets got most of the central and eastern part. Thus, it was clear that Moscow was the real winner of the war in the Old World.

The other major power to emerge after WWII as an obvious champion, was the U.S. For a long time Washington was an atypical player in world politics. It focused solely on its territory and the Pacific region, with no interest to play a role in other parts of the world. This propensity was especially strong during the inter-war era when it embraced isolationism. It basically did not want to have the burden of playing a role in world power struggles. It tried to be neutral but in practice, however, that was not always possible and it did not evade the reality of having warmer relations with certain countries over others. After the Japanese surrender, there was no immediate clear concrete foreign policy orientation. As one of the key players in the foundation of the U.N., it seemed that the U.S. would want to promote a concept of global cooperation among all countries to prevent an outbreak of another world war. Yet, it did not take long before this line of thinking was abandoned. The U.S. realized that the world was being divided between two conflicting ideologies - Soviet communism and western liberal-capitalism - and it had to be the leader of the second camp. Thus, in the late 1940s, the Americans were forced into a new role as a major player in world politics.

Both factions soon realized that their conflicting ideologies prevented them from any meaningful cooperation. The Berlin Blockade in 1948-49 marked the first open dispute of what is nowadays known as the Cold War. This period between 1945 and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, was characterized by a repeated effort by either the U.S. or the USSR to influence world matters and promote their own principles in the various parts of the globe. The possibility of open conflict was ruled out by the existence of nuclear weapons, which, if used, would mean the complete destruction of the world. Since both superpowers accepted this fact, they engaged in efforts to contain the influence of the other. At least in the U.S., this strategy was called 'containment' (a term coined by American diplomat George Kennan in 1947). The most common action, which characterized the Cold War, was the support of its friends' ideology over its enemies'. This was referred to as the so-called 'proxy wars', in which competed the client states of the superpowers. Both countries also supported puppet regimes, which in the case of the U.S. many times contradicted its domestic values and supported authoritarian, undemocratic and brutal governments. Nonetheless, they were useful partners and so were only rarely subject to criticism.

Probably the most notable presidential administration in the U.S., which refused to follow these principles, was that of Richard Nixon. He and his most important foreign policy official, Henry Kissinger, perceived the struggle against the USSR in a different light. Kissinger came with a fresh new concept in the way the U.S. should conduct policies regarding world affairs. His ideas were derived from the 19<sup>th</sup> century approach called *realpolitik*. Instead of competing with the Soviets on all fronts, it was better to accept the dominance of Moscow in certain arenas and try to respect them in order to achieve world peace. In fact, the primary goals of the U.S. should be the global cooperation of all countries so that they would not compete over power but rather move closer towards each other. This not only included giving more responsibility to revitalized European states (mainly Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain) as well as Japan, but to maintain a dialog with the USSR and establish relations with communist China. Indeed, it was rapprochement with Beijing on which the first Nixon administration centered its foreign policy. It wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China and help bring the country back on to the international scene.

It might look as if Nixon was an idealist similar to those creating a new world order after the Versailles peace conference in 1919. An effort to establish a peaceful international society, ruled by generally accepted principles of behavior, turned out to be the worst mistake in modern history which gave rise to fascism and nazism. Upon examining the president's motives deeper, however, this presumption is profoundly wrong. His thinking was something between neorealism and pure realism. Despite the fact that the main desire of his foreign policy was world stability, he did not perceive it in the same way as inter-war era idealists viewed theirs. Rather, Nixon along with Kissinger had largely on their minds the well-being of Americans. Only if there was equilibrium in the world, Washington could at last focus on itself and on its interests. If other players took responsibility and involved themselves more in the international game, only then could the U.S. limit its role in the world and focus on issues which really did matter to the country. There was no need for Americans to fight in such places as Vietnam, where the communist influence was inevitable given the proximity of China. Since Chinese power in the area was indisputable, it was nonsense to fight against it not only in the way of a proxy war but even by direct military operations, in which thousands of American soldiers would die. The same was true for Moscow and other important players with more or less friendly regimes. Thus, certain honorable goals in the world (peace, stability, equilibrium) were desirable but to achieve them, one had to take into an account the geopolitical realities of the time period and adapt the strategy according to them. In other words and with less euphemism, this basically meant that the U.S. could, without any specific action, watch injustice committed by the most ruthless dictators, but in a quest to achieve peace in the world and avert a possible bigger catastrophe by e.g. dispatching military forces to suppress the regime, "close your eyes" and ignore this obvious reality.

The most notable example of this last sentence is the U.S. role in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and generally its policies towards India in the late 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s. This work will therefore focus on the Indo-U.S. relations in this given period.

I chose the relations between Washington and New Delhi as a case study because, at least in my opinion, there is not a better example of Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy and its practice, than with India. India was (and still is) the biggest democracy in the world, which was devoted to

a similar set of values as that of the U.S. and western liberal countries. It was also likely the only country among the members of the so-called non-alignment movement, which could be considered a democracy with a working system of rule of law, freedom of opinion, press etc. In general it was devoted to peaceful principles which were the foundation of the country's policies. It preserved this status, despite being surrounded by authoritarian states or military dictatorships. Logically, it should be the largest natural ally of the U.S. in spite of the fact that it refused to be anybody's ally whether it be the U.S. or the USSR. All these determinants positioned it clearly as a potential American partner. Nonetheless, when the Nixon administration ruled the White House, it was precisely New Delhi which became a fine example of *realpolitik* in practice. India, with its independent view of the world, happened to be an obstacle in America's pursued policies in the Asian region, mainly the rapprochement with China, and as such, all mutual similarities were put to the side for the more important quest of global stability.

Therefore, the purpose of this work is to elaborate on American exceptional foreign policy, which was typical of the Nixon's administration, and on how it was applied to India. Dedication to principles of *realpolitik* was above all moral and ethical principles. It was the ultimate leading principle with profound consequences on world order and the U.S. position in global affairs. I will try to prove the presumption that no matter how absurd the conduct of the duo, Nixon-Kissinger vis-à-vis India, might have seemed to look, both statesmen knew exactly that their actions served the higher objective. They were criticized, their colleagues opposed their decisions, they had to fight against negative public opinion and image but they prevailed and ultimately achieved what they wanted.

## Sources evaluation

In my original intent, I planned to use for my MA thesis as many primary sources as possible. I wanted to focus mainly on declassified documents, personal statements, newspaper articles and personal diaries and memoirs. I intended to use secondary literature only in cases where the primary documents would be difficult to interpret or scarce in numbers. In general, I think I succeeded with this plan. Overall, a large part of my work was researched solely on the basis of the primary literature. Only a few subchapters are based exclusively on secondary academic books. The remaining text is a mixture of both primary and secondary sources.

The primary sources, which I used, were mainly books (diaries, memoirs, etc.), original academic articles and declassified historical documents. Concerning the first group, I should mention specifically the books called *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-99)*, *China, India and USA, (The Tantalising Triangle)* written by one of the most important Indian diplomats and Foreign Secretaries, T. N. Kaul and the *White House Years* written by one of the most prominent foreign policy statesmen in the modern American history, Henry Kissinger.

In *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-99)*, *China, India and USA, (The Tantalising Triangle)*, Kaul summarizes his years of active service. Mr. Kaul served, as the Ambassador of India to the U.S. as well as Indian Foreign Secretary, and is considered to have been one of India's foremost diplomats. For my work, I used his recollections of dealing with the Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s as well as his memoirs of the War of 1971.

The *White House Years* by Mr. Kissinger was the most important book used in my work. This 1521 page volume is dedicated to his post in the office of National Security Advisor under President Richard Nixon (1969-1972). The comprehensive coverage of various events which happened during Nixon's first presidential term, are recorded in a manner corresponding to the intellect of this man. He is not trying to be objective or critical but presents facts as he sees them, perceives them and answers to them. His interpretations are to a certain degree, subjective. This does not mean, of course, that Kissinger is not willing to admit his wrongs or his mistakes. For every decision, which he and Nixon made, Kissinger provides substantive reasoning and explanation, as to why certain policies were made from his point of view, correctly or incorrectly. He presents arguments for and against and explains the grounds upon which a particular action was taken. In some parts, he seems to be over confident while at other times he humbly admits his mistakes. Therefore, in my opinion, the overall impression from this piece of literature is positive. In my thesis I used the book for the theoretical part and in the chapter on the War of 1971 (Bangladesh Liberation War). The value of the book for the theoretical part is especially significant since there is arguably, not any other better source of elaborating on the statesman's ideology than his own work.

As for Richard Nixon, I used one of his annual reports on the state of foreign affairs, precisely the "*First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.*," and also his famous article "*Asia After Viet Nam*", which was published in the *Journal of Foreign Affairs* in 1967. Both documents were used in the section on theory.

The biggest collection of primary resources in my work comes from the U.S. National Archives, presidential libraries, archives of the State Department, archives of the White House, etc. They are all easily accessible via the web page [www.history.state.gov](http://www.history.state.gov). The server is full of declassified documents of all kinds which deal with various matters of U.S. foreign policy. The website has an easy-to-use structure and anybody is able to search the documents he or she desires. It is the official portal run by the U.S. federal government, so all the documents posted are original and valid. There can be no question about their authenticity. There are three ways as to how to use them. Firstly, simple online transcripts are available. Secondly, most of the documents which have online transcripts are also in the pdf form, except for those which are unreadable or for other reasons, impossible to scan. Downloading them is free of charge, which is different to that of a similar British site, where a researcher must to pay a fee. Thirdly, several collections, covering the entire topic, are available in pdf or some other document reader formats. These are the most practical documents for the entire topic (e.g. Southeast Asia, 1969-1972) is in one huge collection of several hundred pages. Also, it is much easier to search for a certain specific paper in these big collections because the researcher can use common keyboard combinations (ctrl + f) and quickly find everything associated with these typed words. Overall, this website was the most important source for my thesis and I used it in almost all chapters.

For some sections of my work, I was able to find the necessary information in newspapers. The most frequently used in my thesis were: *The New York Times*, *BBC*, *Washington Post*, *India Today* or *Telegraph India*. Some of them were available online but for others I accessed the old articles from the NY Times only with the help of the ProQuest database.

In general, for the purposes of my work, the Charles University ProQuest database was insufficient because, apart from the problems with the NY Times database, certain Indian newspapers in their English versions did not go back as far as the 1960s or 1970s. The databases of these newspapers did not cover the time period of my work. The same could be true for the



Metropolitan Library in Prague as well as other libraries including the National Library of the Czech Republic, which I had tried.

The secondary literature forms only a minority of the sources in my thesis. The ratio is 1:3 or less, of overall numbers used. Given my original goal, I think that this is a good final result. The secondary literature used in my work is almost exclusively the books written by the researchers and experts on the issues under question. These academics are in a huge part from India or Bangladesh. Some of the most prominent include: Bhumitra Chakma (*The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia*), Kalyani Shankar (*Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*), Brij L. Sharma (*The Pakistan-China Axis*), etc.. I think that to achieve any objectivity it was necessary to use literature from some Indian and Bangladesh experts, since if only American authors were considered, the version of events might be one sided. A big help for me in the issue of secondary literature, was the Indian Embassy in Prague. The library which is located there, provides a valuable collection of books on various topics tied to India, including matters of policy, international affairs, diplomacy, etc. I was aided by the local staff which kindly helped me with any difficulty that I came across.

To obtain scientific articles, I used the JSTOR database which I was able to access via Charles University library. I found several important articles for the chapter concerning the Vietnam War there. For example the “India's Vietnam Policy, 1946-1979“ written by Ramesh Thakur was very useful. In general, there is only a limited amount of information, considering the subject of India's role in the Vietnam War. Thus, it was good that I was able to access these articles.

Apart from certain problems with accessibility of specific newspaper articles, I can say that I did not have any major difficulty on the subject of literature and sources for my thesis. During this time, I had access to high quality primary and secondary documents and thus I could focused solely on my writing.

# 1. Theoretical Background of Foreign Policy

*„...the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but...America cannot – and will not – conceive all plans, design all programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world“<sup>1</sup>*

*Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970*

The lost war in Vietnam or better to say a political catastrophe, which the U.S. suffered had to with no doubts influence the course foreign-policy, which the country embarked on at the end of the 1960s. The Tet Offensive that was carried out by the North Vietnamese though, with the biggest burden of fighting done by South Vietnamese resistance units at the beginning of the 1968 ended with a significant victory by the U.S. led allies on the battle field despite the losses of several thousand soldiers.<sup>2</sup> Insurgent forces from the north attacked roughly 100 cities all around the country including its capital Saigon. They even assaulted the U.S. Embassy in the capital. The aggressors were pushed back with casualties of approximately 40,000 in spite of some initial successes due to the surprise strikes.<sup>3</sup> It is not necessary to list the historical details here but it is certain that the offensive was one of the key events shaping public opinion towards the war. While support for the war before the Tet Offensive was close to 50%, according to a Gallup Poll a few months afterwards, it slipped to around 33% of all Americans saying it was not a mistake to go to Vietnam.<sup>4</sup> From the political perspective it was a debacle that predetermined the end of the U.S. presence and the coming of the “Vietnamization” of the war, during which officials from countries of interest; started to talk about the truce and the number of American soldiers in Vietnam begun to decrease.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time when the war in Vietnam was coming to an end, the U.S. begun to pursue a different ideological line in their foreign policy conduct. This shift in policy was on

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Nixon: *"First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's."* February 18, 1970, accessed January 18, 2015

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>

<sup>2</sup> According to DEMA the U.S., South Korea, Australia and South Vietnam lost overall 4324 <http://www.azdema.gov/museum/famousbattles/pdf/the%20test%20offensive%201968.pdf>, accessed January 18, 2015

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Gallup, November 14, 2001

<sup>5</sup> George B. Tindall, David E. Shi, *Dějiny Spojených států amerických*, (Praha : Lidové noviny, 2008) 707-708.

account of two statesmen and these were the newly elected president, Richard Nixon (since 1969) and his National Security Advisor and later on, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

## **1.1 Theoretical Background of the New Discourse**

With the Vietnam War awakening, the U.S. realized that although it was the undisputed dominant world power militarily and politically after WWII, that was no longer the reality in the late 1960s. The United States at this point in time was still a very significant and powerful participant of the world affairs but the time when it held hegemonic status was gone and according to this new reality, it was necessary to formulate a new foreign policy strategy. Howsoever the American power may have seemed almost unlimited, it was paramount to accept that the country was becoming similar to other countries and was reaching its limits.<sup>6</sup>

### **1.1.1 Kissinger and Nixon's Realism**

In spite of many considering the U.S. foreign policy during the Kissinger and Nixon's terms in office as an exemplary form of realism in practice, it cannot always be said that policies of these two men fit into such a category. Rather, the 1970s meant the invention of or more likely renewal of the concept of the so-called *realpolitik*, the theoretical background of which was composed by the German writer and philosopher Ludwig von Rochau in his book called "*Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschland*"<sup>7</sup> in 1853. The main idea behind the concept is to put an idealistic goal into a realistic environment and use realistic means to achieve an idealistic vision. Rochau's thoughts were adopted later by many prominent statesmen (including Kissinger) but these men usually changed their original meaning to adjust it to their own interests and aims. In the U.S. the term *realpolitik* is usually changed and instead politicians use so-called *power politics*. In such perceptions the theory lost much of its

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<sup>6</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (Boston : Little Brown & Company, 1979), 57.

<sup>7</sup> L. A. Rochauch, *Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschlands*, Ullstein (1972), 384 p.

original meaning but still many features can be identified, which are in common with what Rochau created in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

### **1.1.2 Realpolitik**

The whole Rochau's ideology is basically comprised of two ideas. The first lies in the different attitudes as to how approach politics. Each statesman has to be aware of the dissimilarity, which exists between real and ideal politics, or more familiarly between political realism and political idealism. The *realpolitik* then tries to find some common denominator so the political realism will not mutate into the plain pursuit of material interest and similarly political idealism must not end in absurd aims of various players in the international political arena. These players will have to essentially cope with some virtual, and in practice, unbreakable obstacles which limit the possibilities in the enforcement of moral politics. In other words, moral and honorable ideals are important in life as well as in politics and they should play the primary role, however, they cannot determine every single decision because certain situations require putting them aside and acting with clear pragmatism. The second thought is a theoretical foundation of the first one and in the book the author illustrates it on the example of Germany after the failed revolution of 1848. For the purposes of this work, it is better to convert it into universally applicable form. In a disparate international world where there exist so many various ideological currents, so many cultural differences and so many centers of power, it is impossible to unify everyone under only one generally acceptable idea, organization, treaty, pact, etc. The existence of a predominant power, which would be able to absorb all the various influences and factors, is the only tool that could be used to bring them together. It is very important to stress the word 'absorb', because players will never make enough compromises to cooperate so the only way is complete domination of one over the other. It is clear that Rochau's Germany from the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the conflict, which was occurring there and in which several political factions (especially liberal and conservative) competed against each other is in no way a match for such extremely distinct ideologies as, for example, liberal democracy compared to radical Islamism, which recognizes only word-for-word interpretation of Sharia Law. Undoubtedly, these two approaches are not going to find any unifying theme and from the logic of the matter,

they even cannot. Therefore, the *power politics* is not completely similar to the *realpolitik*, because it is focused on an international, not domestic politics and thus, must take into account more determinants, which exist in the foreign affairs environment. At the same time they have common features of both refusing the idealistic concept of the existence of one universally shared idea, politics, goal, etc.<sup>8</sup>

## **1.2 Balance of Power**

The developments in Vietnam were very discouraging at the beginning of the 1970s. Pragmatically thinking President Nixon, who took office after L.B. Johnson, decided that it is necessary to find some solution as to how to end the war without completely destroying Washington's reputation. At the same time, however, he was certain that to prevent such a situation happening again, the U.S. has to change its view on the role which the country plays in the world. While before the change in administration, the opinion shared by many was that it is useful or almost desirable that Washington plays a key role in foreign relations; the unfavorable development in among others in Southeast Asia brought about a remarkable change in this point of view and in formulating a new, much different attitude. From now on the U.S. should not try to remain the only dominant world power but it should try to encourage other countries, especially the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China (PRC), European allies and Japan, to constructively participate in global politics. Thanks to this approach the country could focus more on areas where it had real and justifiable interests and play the leading role there instead of some idealistic effort to command all parts of the world even in cases where there is not any legitimate reason or there is nothing particularly important and interesting for the U.S. If this was put into practice, at least according to Nixon and Kissinger, there would be a higher chance for global peace.<sup>9</sup> Washington should not be any more automatically considered as a 'shield', for providing militarily protection which was a case in practice for many countries every time there

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<sup>8</sup> Henry C. Emery, What is Realpolitik?, *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Jul., 1915), 448 - 455.

<sup>9</sup> James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, (Chicago: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1992), 119 - 120.

was a problem, or as a 'sword', which would solve the difficulty by acting alone or with some limited help from others.<sup>10</sup>

Three key features were identified as to how to achieve the above stated goal. First, it was necessary to establish some kind of partnership with the rest of the world instead of creating an order based on one country controlling everything like some kind of oppressive ruler dictating patterns of behavior and limits, which cannot be crossed. On the other hand, the U.S. should not pull back into complete isolation. It was essential that the country would protect its interests in various parts of the world and would have the power to do so. Last but not least, establishing the partnership was to be preceded by willingness of all to solve mutual disputes, conflicts and disagreements. Nixon identified these principles during his annual speech on the situation of foreign affairs in front of the Congress in 1970.<sup>11</sup>

According to the president, Washington should have in the future focused specifically on establishing an international system where power would be shared with other players but at the same time the U.S. would be courageous enough to protect its own interests by any means necessary including direct military action. Several preceding presidential administrations, especially the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, thought that the U.S. exists because it has to carry all the weight of the world on its back and if its fate is threatened it has to intervene and restore order. After the Vietnam War, however, this attitude needed change radically. Countries of the world had to accept the fact the White House foreign policy was not going to affirm anymore the position of the U.S. as a guardian of justice and peace and that any action in place where the country does not have legitimate interest could come only after regional collective efforts fail and agreement would be reached to send American military to intervene.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 222.

<sup>11</sup> Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970, accessed January 18, 2015

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>

<sup>12</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 120.

Richard Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam", *Foreign Affairs* (October 1967 Issue), accessed January 18, 2015  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1967-10-01/asia-after-viet-nam>

New doctrine thus confirmed that the world became multi-polar and that it was not and would not be only the U.S. and the Soviet Union who would dominate global affairs but that other players in the international field have grown stronger and would join those two dominant powers. The old doctrine of preventing them from playing a more important more role was according to Nixon, unwise as the Vietnam War showed.

### **1.3 International Order**

As WWII ended, it was clear that out of the Big Three (U.S, USSR and Great Britain) only two world dominating powers emerged – the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Shortly afterwards these two great powers started to compete about how to create a new world order and international politics according to the wishes of their leaders. Despite much effort neither of them had much success.<sup>13</sup>

During the 1950s and 60s, there was an endless competition as to who will be more successful in different parts of the world with imposing their ideas, principles, values, etc. The fact that not everyone was pleased by the actions of the two superpowers was clear quite soon. The Soviet Union experienced this in Hungary in 1958, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Yugoslavia and even in its Asian ally PRC, which after the Stalin's death denounced the way how the communist ideology is applied by the new Moscow officials under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. The two countries even fought a short and limited border war with profound political and ideological consequences.<sup>14</sup>

The U.S. found out that despite its massive economic and military power, the country was not able to avert the communist rise in North Korea and subsequent invasion to the South and among a long list of other failed adventures the Vietnam catastrophe threw Washington into big debate concerning how much success it could have in establishing its vision of world order.

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<sup>13</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 121.

<sup>14</sup> See chapter 2.1.1

Henry Kissinger identified the main causes of failure. At first the number of states competing for power increased significantly, which was already described by Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, Kissinger added two important ideas. One was that a huge technological development created big differences in relative strengths of various players on the global scene. Furthermore every new state had naturally different perception of the world and world order. The combination of these two then meant that it was very difficult, indeed impossible, to bring into existence one legitimate direction in world politics, by which all players would be guided. This perspective confirmed the premise of *realpolitik* that it is practically impossible in international relations to find one unifying idea acceptable for all. Thus, Kissinger developed an opinion that the world needs to be bipolar in military terms but at the same time multi-polar so far as political influence is concerned. This of course should not mean to leave liberalism of previous years completely aside (again, the principle of *realpolitik* can be seen). The option how to achieve this is to establish power equilibrium. Nixon held the same opinion but his future Secretary of State Kissinger specified how to put this into practice. The main goal had to be to achieve stability rather than absolute peace as was envisaged by previous administrations. Only the steadiness of international relations is a way how to preserve international peace. Kissinger's opinion stemmed from his persuasion that to refuse war in almost any case in order to achieve absolute peace is wrong. It can happen that certain players who want to get control over everything will be sure that there will not be any counter-measures against their actions exactly because of this reason of refusing war. Peace cannot be enforced for any price in the case in which it could threaten international stability. Two conclusions could be drawn from these premises. First, the peace is possible to end in order to prevent bigger catastrophe in the future and second, the powers should mutually respect their rights and interests as to preserve equilibrium and at the same time they should not apply their visions on the international order, which would break the stability. Any effort to mingle into spheres of influence of other global players is unacceptable because it leads to disruption in stability. Players who were to have the main say in this new system were the already mentioned U.S., USSR, PRC, Japan and the strongest European countries.<sup>15</sup>

From the understanding of the previous text, it should not be surprising that West Europe and Japan were on this list. According to Kissinger, however, the United States could not and

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<sup>15</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 121-123.



should not anymore work as a warrantor of peace for these countries. As a consequence of their economic development they became almost equal to the U.S. (not in military terms) and therefore it was necessary that they would share the responsibility together. In the first post-WWII years, some people in Washington thought that Great Britain should be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons. They claimed that Britain was not a superpower and that only superpowers should possess such an arsenal and technology. Kissinger was very critical of this attitude since it would mean another limit to the formation of more power centers and it would put the U.S. into a role of guardian.<sup>16</sup>

Every newly created player in this international system must take care of his traditional sphere of influence and in the case of interference by some other power, the rest must strive to punish the wrongdoer. Punishment can be different. For example it might be an economic embargo/sanctions, support of the internal opposition and of course in extreme situations also military action. Kissinger, thus, created a new attitude towards American foreign policy. The U.S. will overall limit itself in enforcing western values in the world and at the same time the USSR and People's Republic of China will stop supporting international communist revolution in countries where they have not had any vested interest historically. It is also important to mention that in the case of any significant event inside a specific state (e.g. executions of anti-regime activists in the USSR), the behavior from outside, that is the behavior of other states towards the country experiencing a domestic shift, will not change and therefore any sanctions or suspension of disarmament talks is out of question. Players must in any case focus only on mutual relations on the international field.<sup>17</sup>

#### ***1.4 The Role of Diplomacy and Power in an International Field***

From the historical point of view, the new generation of American leaders which entered office almost immediately after their country won independence and replaced the so-called Founding Fathers, forgot how important the role of diplomacy was during the Revolutionary War

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<sup>16</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 69.

<sup>17</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 124.

period and in the following years. The successful Treaty of Alliance signed with France during the American Revolutionary War, which was concluded due to the diplomatic skills of Benjamin Franklin, or the so-called Jay Treaty, for which Alexander Hamilton takes credit, and which settled relations with Great Britain and was supposed to prevent further battles in the time during the French Revolution, are great examples of early American diplomacy. Over the next years, however, this perspective changed significantly and the opinion that negotiation and dialog is a way to run into even more problems than any constructive solution, prevailed. International treaties and alliances were considered a trap, which could pull the country into quarrels and disputes, which were of no importance to the U.S.<sup>18</sup> Humorist and comedian Will Rogers summarized this quite sententiously, when he said:

*„America never lost a war and never won a conference.”<sup>19</sup>*

No wars or conflicts changed the trend. Despite its participation in the WWI, the U.S. did not plan to reverse its new strategy and Washington promoted even more isolationism. WWII was a diversion from this strategy but the primary role was given to the policy of the so-called “*containment*”, which was focused on pushing back communism without giving significant space to diplomatic means. Henry Kissinger described it as wrong from three reasons. Primarily, too much emphasis was put on military power. Instead of dealing with the Soviet Union as the main face of world communism after the WWII, too much emphasis was placed on reliance on military superiority, which gave Moscow enough time to obtain its own nuclear arsenal. Despite, the fact that the U.S. at that time had a nuclear monopoly, it was not able to use this monopoly diplomatically for some practical purposes since it was not willing to negotiate a better post-war settlement. Even Winston Churchill was aware of this, when he claimed that while the West has nuclear technology at its disposal, which was an extremely powerful weapon, it should use it as a bargaining tool in dealing with the USSR and push forward some agreement on long-lasting peace that could avert or at least slow down the outbreak of the Cold War and thus prevent unnecessary conflict at the time when it was still possible. Secondly, when the Soviets succeeded in producing enough nuclear weapons to come close to American capacities and

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<sup>18</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 59.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

therefore were able to significantly weaken the U.S. in a possible conflict, the possession of the massive amount of weapons in America did not present such a threat to the USSR as before. Here it is again apparent, that there existed a good opportunity to take advantage of this initial nuclear supremacy if diplomatic means were used and not ridiculed. Finally, the conflict against communism became much more ideological than militarized and so any effort to limit the spread of this political idea by force was unimaginable because it would have to mean to wipe out whole nations which were sympathetic to communism, and this was unrealistic.<sup>20</sup>

To summarize the aforementioned, Kissinger believed that previous administrations were too much preoccupied by military strength and very often forgot that conflict resolutions should mainly be achieved through diplomacy. In foreign relations, diplomacy should be the number one option to solve mutual quarrels. Negotiation among statesmen is an essence of stable international order because its preservation is the main goal and the number one priority is to prevent any effort to destroy it.<sup>21</sup>

Kissinger did not consider political idealism as the main principle, which should direct foreign policy. Even he knew that in preserving international order, diplomacy plays a key role only until a certain moment and its efficiency is directly related to the power of the country. This power is of course primarily measured by the size and quality of its military forces. Diplomacy exists for a reason, to ward off demonstration of power by military means.<sup>22</sup> At the moment when one party in the international political arena stops accepting diplomacy as the pillar of stability, it is necessary to use military force against the player who is trying to violate stability and change international order but at the same time continue negotiating to resolve the situation peacefully. Furthermore, a country must be always be ready for the possibility that with certain players, it is impossible to agree on specific terms and thus the situation in which conflict is imminent must not be a surprise. The force used should be equal to the danger because excessive military efforts could lead to future grievances, which could lead to more problems and disputes.

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<sup>20</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 59-62.

<sup>21</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 124.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 195.

In short, the moment when to use force must be carefully considered and in case this happens it is necessary to be even more careful in deciding how much of it should be used.<sup>23</sup>

### **1.5 Differentiation between Domestic and Foreign Politics**

Any decision concerning an international politics has to be done only on the basis of geo-strategic goals and not influenced by any secondary aspects. For example, the U.S. can advocate certain moral values at home but these should not be leading principles in its foreign policy. The American version of moralism as applied by the previous administrations (which in reality was enforcing and imposing an American, or in a wider spectra Western values on the whole world) was unacceptable according to Kissinger. Plural democracy, rule of law, respecting human rights etc., cannot be the key determinants in any foreign policy of the country. If this happens, it means disturbing stability, because such an interpretation is not applicable for all countries. Historically, they have different traditions and any effort to change them from outside, without their consent, will work as a trigger, which will provoke anger towards the country which is promoting this. On the other hand, the U.S. foreign policy must not forget its values. Washington had to transform its idealism and to stop using it as an excuse for failed actions abroad. Here again we see the principle of *realpolitik*, when it is possible to achieve these objectives by realistic means, that is to spread domestic values in a way, which will not be perceived as offensive to others. On the contrary, the U.S. should evoke a perception that the behavior, which is usual inside its borders, leads to an increase in prosperity and general happiness of the population. It is fundamental to renounce the idea that imposed adherence to democracy or rule of law will have similar sympathies as enforcing these values indirectly, via the recognition of the internal state of affairs of other players on the international field.<sup>24</sup>

In the same spirit, in which domestic values should not be forced upon others without their consent, the absence of these values in domestic policies of others cannot be an obstacle for mutually open and by domestic events unimpaired relations. In spite of the consequences of domestic policies of one state (e.g. detestable violation of human rights and people's liberties, the government being undemocratic and authoritarian and the possibility that there will be very

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<sup>23</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, (Toronto : George J. McLeod, 1974), 59.  
McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 125.

<sup>24</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 119 – 123.

little prosperity) these should not be an obstacle for mutual communication and respect among specific players. Domestic policy thus must mean logically less than the country's foreign policy. The key principle, which the U.S. should accept, must be the respect towards the foreign policies of other countries even if these countries follow the rules which the Washington administration does not like.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 125.

## 2. The Context in which the Indo-U.S. Relations Were Formed

As can be logically presumed, the relations between Washington and New Delhi were not evolving in a political vacuum. They were influenced not only by various events but by geo-strategic realities of the given era in Asia. Several of them must be mentioned. Mutually bad relations between India and Pakistan and India and China and warm relations between Pakistan and China forced India to move closer to its ideologically close counterpart the Soviet Union, which on the contrary had bad relations with its communist rival China. With an aim to establish relations with China, the U.S. forged close relations with Pakistan, which worked as the main communicational channel between Washington and Beijing (after the efforts to use Romania as a communicational channel failed). Naturally the Soviet-American competition should be also kept in mind. As such, it can be said that there existed two blocs of powers. The first involved India and the USSR and the second was the coalition of Pakistan and China supported more or less by the U.S.

### 2.1 Indo-Chinese Hostility

The history of Indi-Chinese relations goes back several thousand years ago. For the purposes of this work, however, the important period is from the India's independence (1947) and China's communist victory in the civil war (1949) until the border war in 1962. The earliest mentions of Beijing as being possible future enemy of India date back to the 1950s in the aftermath of the Tibetan military conflict, during which China incorporated the territory into its state. In his letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel on the 7<sup>th</sup> November 1950 first warned about possibility of China as a potential enemy in the region.<sup>26</sup> In 1949, Tibet recognized India as a successor of British India. By that act it also explicitly renounced the claims on certain border territories, which were under control of India (Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh...). The problem was that if Beijing was to incorporate Tibet into China, it might lay claim on these regions.<sup>27</sup> Tibet eventually came under Chinese control in

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<sup>26</sup> Arjun Appadorai, Mannaraswamighala S. Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers Private Ltd., 1985), 115 - 116.

<sup>27</sup> Jayanta K. Ray, *India's Foreign Relations, 1947-2007*, (New Delhi : Routledge, 2011), 228.

1951. After the PLA (People's Liberation Army) invaded Tibet and defeated local resistance, the governments of both countries signed the so-called Seventeen Point Agreement. Under this document, the sovereignty of Tibet was handed over to the PRC.<sup>28</sup>

India wanted to maintain peaceful relations with China. The first attempt to achieve this goal was made in 1954 by the declaration of the so-called Panch Sheel Treaty, which was part of the Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India. Its main provisions were, however, very vague. Apart from peaceful coexistence, mutual non-aggression, non-interference and respect for sovereignty, no mention was included about the territorial dispute in Tibetan region.<sup>29</sup> The agreement was signed for the duration of only eight years. As Indian ambassador to China T.N. Kaul noted in his diary, the time frame was designated by Chinese purposely. Originally, they required only five years and only after talks agreed on eight. Despite the fact that the country was by that time stronger than India, it wanted more time to consolidate its grip on Tibet, strengthen its positions on the border line and then talk to New Delhi from the position of the more powerful player. Kaul transmitted his notes to Nehru who did subsequently the same to the ministries. However, no major department believed that China is the threat. They considered Pakistan to be more important enemy. This proved to be a mistake few years later when the agreement validity expired.<sup>30</sup>

An additional factor in bad relations between both countries was the Chinese refusal to accept Indian policy of non-alignment. For Beijing it was only the way how to mask capitalist intentions. There could not have existed any third pattern.<sup>31</sup> It is necessary to stress that the U.S. followed the same line. Washington also did not believe in non-alignment. Most of the ex-colonial countries, which gained independence after the WWII, did not want to belong to any power-bloc. Neither of these countries wanted to be under the influence of their ex-masters again. The U.S. was hugely skeptical of the alleged non-involvement. In fact, there were signs that it might be right. Much of the criticism from the non-aligned movement was directed

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<sup>28</sup> "Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet." Council on Foreign Relations, accessed March 18, 2015

<http://www.cfr.org/tibet/seventeen-point-plan-peaceful-liberation-tibet/p16006>

<sup>29</sup> Appadorai, Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, 115.

<sup>30</sup> Triloki N. Kaul, *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-99) China, India and USA (The Tantalising Triangle)*, (New Delhi : Macmillan India Limited, 2000), 62-65.

<sup>31</sup> Brij L. Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, (London : Asia Publishing House, 1968), 124.

towards capitalism than socialism. Also, many members had very warm relations with the communist countries such as the USSR and later on, Cuba and/or Vietnam. Therefore, the position of the U.S. should be seen from a different perspective than that of the PRC.<sup>32</sup>

### 2.1.1 Border War and its Aftermath

In 1956 Chinese construction workers began to build a 12,000 km long road connecting Xinjiang and Tibet. Two years later, Indian officials complained to Chinese Ambassador that part of the road at the time under construction goes through the Indian claimed territory. Two years later, Chinese soldiers intruded into Ladakh region of Kashmir and visited and occupied Khurnak Fort without any fighting. At the same time they arrested Indian patrol units in Aksain Chin. One year later also in Ladakh, nine Indian soldiers were killed in a fire fight with Chinese units further penetrating the territory.<sup>33</sup> Also in 1959, India warmly welcomed the Dalai Lama who escaped Tibet accompanied by thousands of his followers who were given asylum in the country. If relations were previously worsened by the military incursions, this event cooled them even further.<sup>34</sup>

Situation reached its nadir in 1960 – 1962. Further military incursions, growing partnership between China and Pakistan as a way how to further weaken India, angry notes exchanged between both governments, criticism in the press etc. All of these aspects marked the slowly approaching inevitable solution of war. This finally happened on October 19, 1962 when Chinese units launched a massive offensive in the border regions. Armies of the PRC marched deep into Indian Territory on both the Western and Eastern Sectors of the border. Indian forces were no match and they had to surrender most of their posts. On October 24, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai proposed a ceasefire and a plan for a peaceful settlement. This was, however, refused by India. China responded by further attacking deeper in Indian Territory. India asked for international help but with no significant effect. Fighting continued for a few more weeks with

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<sup>32</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 101.

<sup>33</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, White Paper, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Government of India and China 1954-1959*, 22, 26.  
Appadorai, Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, 120.

<sup>34</sup> Kaul, *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-99) China, India and USA (The Tantalising Triangle)*, 72.



the Indians were suffering higher casualties than the PLA. When the PRC reached its territorial objectives and consolidated them, it declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21 of that year. India was in no mood for additional fighting and entered into peace negotiations period. China retained control over the Ladakh region, which it had occupied and this was the only significant territorial result of the conflict.<sup>35</sup> The psychological effects were, however, huge. India was humiliated, while Beijing proved to be key player in the region. The important discovery was also that India cannot rely on western help, especially in case of the U.S. Despite Washington's enmity with China, it expressed only verbal support to India. It refused to provide any lethal weapons (tanks, airplanes etc.) and sold to Indians only few mountain guns and ammunition. Despite being well aware of bad Indo-Pakistani relations, the U.S. representatives tried to persuade New Delhi to join a military alliance with Pakistan, which was rather perceived as an insult rather than serious suggestion. Thus the war's aftermath was not positive for the Indo-American partnership.<sup>36</sup>

## **2.2 Indo-Pakistani Enmity**

India and Pakistan formed for a long time one united country. The separation came only after the process of decolonization begun and British rulers left the territory. The conflict between the countries is, however, much longer and lies in conflict of religion. Pakistan is of Muslim majority, while India is predominantly a Hindu country. In 1951 almost 85% of the Indian population was Hindu while in Pakistan was, in 1947, around 75% Muslims.<sup>37</sup> The partition in 1947 brought the first military conflict over the territories in disputed region of Kashmir. Another war came in 1965 but did not also bring any significant solution to the territorial dispute.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Appadorai, Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, 138 – 140.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 76 – 77.

<sup>37</sup> "Census: Hindu share dips below 80%, Muslim share grows but slower", Indian Express, January 24, 2015  
Farahnaz Ispahani, "Cleansing Pakistan of Minorities", Hudson Institute, July 31, 2013, accessed March 18, 2015  
<http://www.hudson.org/research/9781-cleansing-pakistan-of-minorities>

<sup>38</sup> "The 1947 – 48 war", BBC

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in\\_depth/south\\_asia/2002/india\\_pakistan/timeline/1947\\_48.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1947_48.stm), accessed February 18, 2015

Strained relations, which many times reached enmity levels continued during the whole period, on which is this work focused.

### **2.3 U.S.-Pakistani Relations**

The U.S. post-war foreign policy was based on the theory of containment. The basic premise was to prevent communist ideology to be spread in the world. As such it covered various tools how to achieve the goal. One of them was support for regional alliances, which would fight against communism.<sup>39</sup> Pakistan was one of those countries, which were very important from the strategic point of view in the Middle East/South Asia. Close alliance with Turkey would mean strong bloc of countries in the region vulnerable to the Soviet intrusion. As a matter of fact it could also justify American arms shipments to Pakistan since if the country was a friend of a NATO's member it would put it into a position of an ally of all members. For Pakistan, the seeking of the Western friendship was motivated not by the fear of communism but by the fear off India. The first step was the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed with the U.S. Subsequently, Pakistan joined SEATO and later CENTO.<sup>40</sup> SEATO or in other words the so-called Manila Pact was signed by: the U.S., France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The purpose of the organization was to prevent the spread of communism in the Southeast Asia, which was in question since only two membership countries lied in the region. The U.S. also used the organization to legitimize its activities in Vietnam during the war after it included South Vietnam under the protection of SEATO and thus obtaining the legal framework for its involvement. CENTO or in other words the Bagdad Pact had a similar aim as the Manila Pact. It wanted to counter the Soviet expansion into the Middle East, which had valuable oil resources. Historically the region was often the target of Czarist Russia imperialism and this legacy continued under the USSR. Eventually both organizations

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<sup>39</sup>“The 1965 war, BBC

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in\\_depth/south\\_asia/2002/india\\_pakistan/timeline/1965.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1965.stm), accessed February 18, 2015

<sup>39</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 51 – 52.

<sup>40</sup> Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact)

[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/usmu003.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp), accessed March 18, 2015  
Baghdad Pact

[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/baghdad.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/baghdad.asp), accessed March 18, 2015

were not particularly successful and after a few decades were both dissolved. For Pakistan, however, in the time of tensions with India, being a member of both was an important strategic step to ensure security.<sup>41</sup>

The U.S. provided Pakistan with military and economic supplies. These included money transfers, surplus debts, loans and also weapons arms including Patton tanks, F86 and F-104 jets, air-to-air missiles, ground-to-air missiles etc. The U.S. stressed many times that arms shipments were not provided to Pakistan to use them against India. However, this did not prevent the country to use them in 1965, which provoked strong counter-reaction from the U.S. in the form of complete embargo on lethal weapons supplies. Yet, the same was valid for India, which regarded this step as unfair since in New Delhi's eyes it was Pakistan, who provoked the whole conflict. Even more damaging was the partial lift on the embargo, which permitted delivery of non-lethal weapons and spare parts. Pakistan was able to repair its military equipment, since majority of it was from the U.S. For India, the situation was different, since the country possessed only small amount of American weapons. Overall, the move was clearly advantaging Pakistan over India. Therefore, it is not surprising that this issue had bad impact on relations between New Delhi and the U.S.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the disappointment with Pakistan concerning the war, the U.S. did not plan to leave its ally. It had already invested heavily in the country's defense capacities and economic growth. Another reason for preserving mutually warm relations was China factor. Pakistan was during the 1960s moving closer to China and soon became the key ally of Beijing in the region. This process will be elaborated in the next chapter. For the U.S. it meant two key things. Firstly, it did not want to leave a free hand to Beijing to make Pakistan dependent on its military help. Secondly, the prospect of improving relations with the communist state, which was particularly important in Kissinger/Nixon years, was too important for these statesmen that to preserve good relations with the key communication channel, Pakistan, was of more value than anything else,

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<sup>41</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, 53 – 54.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato>, accessed March 19, 2015

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102693/Central-Treaty-Organization-CENTO>, accessed March 19, 2015

<sup>42</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, 57 -58, 146.

including to exasperate India. Therefore, Pakistan was privileged over other players in Asia for the years to come.<sup>43</sup>

## **2.4 China-Pakistan Relations**

Since its independence, neither country considered the other as a potential ally. Until the 1960s, Pakistan was skeptical and critical towards China and vice-versa. The country voted against China being represented in the U.N. and China hated any potential (if almost unrealistic) chance for Indo-Pakistani alliance against communist Beijing. Still, in 1959, Pakistan moved to try to settle its disputed border with China in Kashmir, Ladakh region. It was the act of opportunism in a time of mounting Indo-Chinese enmity. It came even after the reports that no Chinese claims were made concerning the Pakistan-held territory in the area. Therefore, decision to start negotiating was taken in the absence of any serious threat of border incursion. At the same time, however, Pakistan wanted to prevent any future possible disputes and move its attention solely towards India. Border settlement was finished in 1961.<sup>44</sup>

The connecting point for both countries to come closer was the desire to seize some parts of Indian Territory. Both wanted to weaken India. Pakistan also saw in alliance with the PRC the opportunity to press the U.S. for its further military and economic aid. If Washington did not want the country to become dependent on Beijing, which would certainly disturb balance in SEATO and CENTO, it had to be responsive to Pakistani requirements.<sup>45</sup>

The relation towards Pakistan from China was different. If the former saw Beijing as its equal partner, the same cannot be said of Chinese. For them, Pakistan became only an instrument of their policies. Since the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and 60s, Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, wanted to replace the Soviet Union as the world's leading social power. As part of this goal, he needed to subvert the Non-Aligned Movement led by India and impose its ideology over the countries. Since most of them were located in Asia and Africa, he

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<sup>43</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, 147 – 149.

Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 853.

<sup>44</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, 85 – 87.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

was keen to reach them. One of the tools how this was possible to achieve was to use Pakistan as some kind of extended hand. With the promise of helping the country against India, Pakistan became China's way how to connect with African countries. For example, Chinese ships used Pakistani southern ports to trade with Black continent's states. Pakistan's embassies and trading posts in Africa were used to spread Mao's propaganda and to establish business connections. Pakistan broadcasting was targeted on multiply Muslim countries and minorities except the Uighurs in China. President Ayub Khan remained silent after Uighurs population was repressed in 1962 and tens of thousands of them fled to the USSR. Similarly, despite previous criticism coming from Pakistan of possible use of nuclear material in military technology, the country welcomed Beijing's successful nuclear test in 1964 as a most impressive achievement of the Chinese people. China also used Pakistan as its 'protective shield' in SEATO and CENTO where it constantly defended the former. Shortly, Pakistan's enmity towards India played into the Chinese hands and with the pretext of equal partnership it used the country as a tool in its geo-political and geo-strategic game.<sup>46</sup>

## **2.5 Sino-Soviet Enmity**

When Chinese communists in 1949 took control over the whole continental China, the reaction of Moscow was welcoming. It seemed that the biggest country in the world (at least in terms of population) would join the Soviet Union in the creation of a world super communist power bloc. It cannot be said that this prediction was ever completely fulfilled but at least during Stalin's rule, the relations between both countries were generally warm. However, when Nikita Khrushchev denounced his predecessor and called for revisionist policies in the communist world, Chinese leader Mao was shocked and overwhelmed. Consequently, he started criticizing the way how Moscow wants to spread the socialism and the countries engaged in the quest for dominance over the socialist camp. When Beijing's leaders under Mao announced the policy of the Great Leap Forward, the Soviet leadership was equally critical of their plans. In addition, the policy of D tente, which characterized later Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's administration, was

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<sup>46</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, 132 – 145.

also a ‘thorn in the side’ of China. Therefore, it can be said that within ten years after the Stalin’s death, the USSR and China became competitors rather than allies.<sup>47</sup>

Soviet Union was in the 1960s and especially in the second half of the decade moving closer to China’s hated neighbor, India.<sup>48</sup> The climax of the worsening relations, which turned into open hostility, can be considered the Sino-Soviet border war in 1969. Rather than war, the event can be described as conflict with limited amount of casualties. Still, the political and ideological effects were huge. Schism was finalized and with improved relations between China and the U.S., the whole world became tri-polar instead of bi-polar as previously. The struggle between communism and capitalism was amended with the two communist blocs emerging, instead of the only one.<sup>49</sup>

## **2.6 Indo-Soviet Relations**

The visit of Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in 1955 was a major event in early Indo-Soviet relations. He was warmly welcomed and a mutually good relation had begun. In the following years, both countries engaged in close economic and industrial cooperation. Moscow wanted to have India on its side since New Delhi, as the main representative of the Non-Aligned Movement, was an important ally in the world. The economic policies of India, (planned economy) were close to the Soviet’s, which brought the countries close in their industrial goals. In the 1950s and 60s, India’s economy was rapidly industrializing, which was realized with the Soviet help. Without it, the pace would not be as fast. Still, it cannot be said that the cooperation was ideologically motivated since political differences between both countries were enormous. Therefore, both players engaged in a purpose-built cooperation rather than a political partnership. Moscow backed New Delhi in its dealing with ex-Portuguese colonial possessions of Goa, Diu and Daman. Also, Soviet arms were crucially important for India during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965. In fact, the USSR was almost the sole provider of military equipment to the country. A closer alliance between China and Pakistan and the increasingly strained relations between

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<sup>47</sup> Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the communist world*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 46, 63, 132 - 139.

<sup>48</sup> See chapter 2.6

<sup>49</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 92 – 94.

Moscow and Beijing<sup>50</sup> were the main reasons why both countries moved closer together. India wanted a strong ally in case of a renewed Chinese attack and for the Soviet Union, the partnership was another way encircling China and limiting its efforts to become a leading world communist power. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1970s, Moscow stood firmly behind New Delhi. On the other hand, the Soviet grip on India was not so strong as to completely subordinate it and the country kept its neutrality.<sup>51</sup>

## **2.7 Sino-U.S. Relations**

Ever since mainland China was taken over by the communists, the U.S. did not formally established any diplomatic relations with Beijing. Instead, Washington recognized The Republic of China, which fled to the Island Taiwan as the sole representative of the country. In the following 20 years, there was only limited high-level activity between both sides (the U.S. and China) to improve their mutual relations. Out of the 134 meetings, between the highest officials, only one can be considered a success. It was the agreement signed on September 10, 1955 that solved some issues of compensation of U.S. citizens whose assets were seized in 1950 when they escaped from the People's Liberation Army. Relations were often hostile. For example, Chinese soldiers fought against the U.S. led coalition in the Korean War.<sup>52</sup>

Several explanations were stated previously as to why the attitude towards Beijing should be changed. To sum up, China was just a too big and too important player in the world scene to be left out. With a population of over several hundred million people, with a nuclear arsenal and with a political philosophy of supporting Marx's and Lenin's true principles, was unwise to ignore the country. The effort to retain the status quo was further infuriating Chinese leaders, which was bad for world peace. The U.S. might have hated the ideological preferences which were in practice in Beijing; however, in the long run it was unrealistic to think that China might accept the rules of the U.S. led international order, without being treated as an equal partner.

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<sup>50</sup> See chapter 2.4, 2.5

<sup>51</sup> Vinod Bhatia, *Indo-Soviet Relations, Problems and Prospects*, (New Delhi : Panchsheel Publishers, 1984), 21 – 24.

<sup>52</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 165.

Thus, one of the priorities of Nixon/Kissinger foreign designed policies was to open talks with Beijing.<sup>53</sup>

To open talks with the PRC, it was necessary to find a communication channel, through which the first contacts could be made. Two countries were considered: Romania and Pakistan. When Nixon met with Romanian leader Ceausescu in the early months of his first term in a presidential office, the topic that Romania could serve as a mediator between American and Chinese leaders was raised. The same was repeated in 1970, when Ceausescu visited Washington in October. Indeed, some communication was carried out. During his meeting with the Chinese, the Romanian deputy foreign minister was informed that the PRC is interested in establishing relations but nothing specific was added. This ambiguity symbolized the untrustworthiness of Romania.<sup>54</sup> The problem for the U.S. and China was that Romania was to a certain degree dependent on the USSR. Neither country wanted the Soviets to be briefed on the development of their efforts to establish political relations. Thus, in the early 1970s, Pakistan was preferred over Romania as a more trustful and therefore more important communication channel.<sup>55</sup> So it happened, that Pakistan became a key mediator between the U.S. and China. The former had very good relations with both countries. To preserve the relations, the U.S., had to support Pakistan in any situation. The country became a tool as to how to reach Beijing and since this was the primary goal, all other things had to be put aside. One of them was the level of importance ascribed to relations with New Delhi. Therefore, Washington was often caught in a dilemma either to work with the military leaders of Pakistan or rather to support its more natural counterpart, democratic India. The best example was the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971.

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<sup>53</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 164 – 165.

<sup>54</sup> United States. 2006. *Foreign relations of the United States. 1969/76,17, 1969/76,17*. Washington: US Gov. Print. Off. P., 52, 239 – 240.

<sup>55</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 704.



### **3. Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (the Bangladesh Liberation War)**

The military conflict, which took place at the end of 1971, was the most serious challenge for the good Indo-U.S. relations. If the war in 1965 was the result of Pakistani provocations, the 1971 war was the result of India's desire for vengeance. Certainly, Pakistan's behavior in the eastern part of the country (present day Bangladesh) was shameful, however, the aggression of India in the west, with its support for Bengali rebels and its refusal to solve the crisis diplomatically, all contributed to the eruption of war. The war was also one of the key examples of U.S. idealism being sidelined by the realism of Nixon's administration.

#### **3.1 Reasons for the War**

The division of British India, which created two states, was based on the desire of the two different religious groups to have their own states. The first country, which emerged was India. It was a unified state with no territorially separated parts and with one major ethnic group living within its borders and with one major religion. The same cannot be said about Pakistan. Beyond the religious part, it was divided into two separate units with each having completely different ethnical structure. The western part was populated by several ethnic groups, mostly: Punjabi, Pashtuns, Sindhis, etc. The eastern part was predominantly Bengali populated. In addition, between both parts lay hundreds of kilometers of Indian soil. Therefore, the only element unifying both parts was the fear of Hindu oppression.<sup>56</sup>

##### **3.1.1 America's Position on India and Pakistan**

The U.S. position and its perception of both countries varied. While pragmatic Nixon and his administration in the White House favored Pakistan, the Congress and the U.S. public had much more sympathies for India. For the president, Pakistan was a way to help the U.S. establish

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<sup>56</sup> Jyotindra N. Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond, Indi-Bangladesh Relations*, (New Delhi : Konark Publishers, 1999), 8 – 9.

relations with China. Also, it was a question of respect and popularity. When he went to Pakistan he was welcomed and had a good understanding with its leaders. Contrary to this, the public perception of Nixon in India was not good. When he went there he was not warmly accepted and he felt negative feelings from the official political representatives. This was especially true for Prime Minister Gandhi.<sup>57</sup>

This was exactly the opposite situation as to how the Congress and American public felt. The refusal to accept an undemocratic Pakistan was contrary to the positive view of India as the world's biggest democracy so similar in its values to the U.S. It was not a problem to provide New Delhi with generous aid (\$4.2 billion in the period between 1965 and 1971).<sup>58</sup> Opinion making groups leaned towards India and this encouraged ordinary U.S. citizens to see it in a similar way. Therefore, when the war erupted it was no surprise that persistent Nixon/Kissinger efforts to promote a peaceful solution and their refusal to condemn Pakistan for its treatment of Bengali people and their unwillingness to stand on the side of India, was met with strong criticism by many politicians, people and even the president's own secretaries.<sup>59</sup>

### **3.2 Bhola Cyclone**

In November 1970 the deadliest cyclone ever to strike the East Pakistan coast, the Bhola Cyclone, hit with its full power. The overall death toll was assessed at over 500,000 casualties. It was the worst natural disaster which the country experienced in its modern history and the triggering point for the crisis which caused the Bangladesh Liberation War.<sup>60</sup>

By the time the catastrophe hit the country, the opposition Awami League, which stood for an independent eastern Pakistan, was gaining ground among the people. Its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was a powerful figure with plans to gain autonomy for the eastern part of the country. Partly, as a consequence of the central government's bad response to the situation,

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<sup>57</sup> See chapter 3.3.3.1.

<sup>58</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 848.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 848 – 849.

<sup>60</sup> 1970- The Great Bhola Cyclone, Hurricanes: Science and Society  
<http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/storms/1970s/greatbhola/>, accessed February 23, 2015

which occurred when the cyclone died down, the Awami League won a landslide victory in the December elections and took 313 seats in the National Assembly. It had a majority. Soon afterwards, the party proposed a six-point program, which would result in the transfer of most power from the officials in Islamabad, to a provincial cabinet, with certain exceptions in defense and foreign policy. Country leaders, including President Yahya Khan, feared that this would be de facto partition of the country and viewed such a proposal as unacceptable. Their decision, however, proved to be crucially unfortunate since for Mujibur and his colleagues it was a signal that the government in the West was is not interested in a constructive solution. Therefore, over the following months, tensions were increasing. The real crisis, however, took place after President Khan issued an order for martial law to be instituted in the East with the aim to suppress the Awami League and to arrest Rahman. While the arrest was successful, the suppression was not. There were only 40,000 soldiers stationed in the East. With the overall population being around 75 million people this number of units did not have any chance to fulfill president's orders and civil unrest took place.<sup>61</sup>

### **3.3 Civil War**

Soon after the Pakistani repressions of Bengalis began, the U.S. was put into an unfavorable position. It was traditionally expected that the country, which is guided by certain human rights will be the first who condemns atrocities committed on the Bengali population.<sup>62</sup> The problem was that if it did so, it would aggravate the leaders in Islamabad. To do this would mean to threaten the rapprochement process with China, since as previously mentioned Pakistan was the main communication channel to Beijing.

Before any decision could have been taken by the president, the State Department moved on its own and removed the partial lift on the U.S. weapons embargo on Pakistan as introduced in 1966. Also economic aid was limited, again without any Nixon's consent.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 850 – 852.

<sup>62</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d19>, accessed February 26, 2015

<sup>63</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 854.

India, which began to feel the burden of Bengalis refugees escaping from East Pakistan, was firmly on the side of the Awami League's representatives. Moreover, the rebellion was a chance how to weaken Pakistan. New Delhi wanted to humiliate its old enemy and get revenge for the unsuccessful 1965 war. It wanted to show Pakistan it was the regional superpower. Thus, it soon embarked on a course of covert actions. It helped to establish a Bangladesh exile government in Calcutta and reports from the secret service agencies stated that it was training guerrilla fighters, the so-called Mukti Bahini, to fight against Pakistani soldiers. These reports also stated that the Pakistani force was small and thus it was not necessary to equip any huge numbers of these guerrillas. Their limited, but very well armed units could cause serious troubles to the regular army and thus prevent any meaningful solution of the situation. All indicators showed that this was precisely what India wanted.<sup>64</sup>

India's true intentions began to surface very soon. On the one hand, the country complained of the burden of refugees. In her letter to President Nixon, Prime Minister Gandhi stated that almost three million Bengalis left the country and were now in India.<sup>65</sup> The U.S. agreed that it will provide substantive aid to help. However, and that is the other hand of the issue, India said that without a political settlement, there was not any solution for the problem and no amount of money could bring such a solution. Moreover, India was willing to fight if necessary and sent this message to Pakistan. Reliable sources informed the U.S. government that Mrs. Gandhi ordered her generals to plan a possible takeover of East Pakistan. This information was supported by a buildup of military units (aircraft and combat units), on the frontier.<sup>66</sup>

When Nixon was presented with this information, he reacted firmly. In his conversation with Kissinger on May 23, 1971 he stated regarding India's actions:

*...if they go in there with military action, by God we will cut off economic aid.*<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71–15 May 71

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d36>, accessed February 26, 2015

<sup>65</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d46>, accessed February 26, 2015

<sup>66</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 856.

<sup>67</sup> Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 396, Telephone Conversations, Home File, May–Nov 1971

However, Indian commanders realized that China, as an ally of Pakistan, could intervene and attack their country from the north. Pakistan was also likely to get a large amount of military supplies from Iran, who was the recipient of the U.S. weapons. Teheran was an ally of Washington which provided the country with the most advanced military assets and supplies at that time. Pakistan could, therefore, access such a technique despite the embargo. Because the Soviets were not reliable in resupplying India with a comparable arsenal, New Delhi's position could be weakened. Finally, any effort to bring a war to its end might involve an occupation of Pakistan itself, which was impossible. It was also expected that Beijing would come to help Pakistan. Generals eventually agreed to postpone further military actions until the winter time, when crossing the Himalayan border region would be very problematic for the Chinese.<sup>68</sup> Thus, the Chinese factor as well as the possibility of American weapons in the hands of the Pakistanis were the main reason why the U.S. president at least this time did not have to carry out his threat.

The American public was not seriously interested in this South Asian problem until June 22 of that year. On this day, the *New York Times* reported that a Pakistani freighter sailed from New York City to Karachi, full of military supplies in spite of the ban on weapon deliveries imposed by the U.S.<sup>69</sup> Two additional freighters departed from the east coast of the U.S. in the following days. The amount of criticism, which this news provoked, was enormous. Critics labelled such a step as ignorant and deceptive. The issue showed in public the huge rift between the White House and other parts of the U.S. government. This was especially true of the State Department led by William P. Rogers.<sup>70</sup> The Secretary of State did not stand behind his president and among other things he ordered the creation of a special study group to investigate how the ban was implemented by the administration.<sup>71</sup> Futile attempts were made by Nixon and Kissinger to legitimize the sale. They did not try to apologize for the breach of the ban since the concerned equipment on the board of freighter was purchased under licenses which were issued before the embargo was introduced and thus, neither president nor any of his staff could have possibly done

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<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d55>, accessed February 26, 2015

<sup>68</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 857.

<sup>69</sup> "U.S. Military Goods Sent To Pakistan Despite Ban; Military Equipment, Sold by the U.S., Is Shipped to Pakistan Despite Ban", NY Times, June 22, 1971

<sup>70</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 859.

<sup>71</sup> "3d Arms-Cargo Ship to Pakistan Noted", NY Times, June 25, 1971

anything to prevent the delivery. However, all critics were deaf to these explanations and nothing could have appeased them.<sup>72</sup>

In the summer of 1971 Kissinger, partly as a reaction to the exacerbating situation, left on a planned trip to India to meet Prime Minister Gandhi and other high-ranking government officials. During his visit he invited the Prime Minister to go to the U.S. so Gandhi and President Nixon can talk about the situation. However, Mrs. Gandhi was in no mood to talk or to reconcile the differences. The principal problem for was still the same: U.S. insistence on a peaceful solution and its support of Pakistan. She urged Kissinger to disassociate his country from its Muslim ally because of the improper treatment of the Bengalis. This was an unprecedented move since it was a clear breach of non-alignment principles because Mrs. Gandhi was trying to persuade one of the two superpowers to abandon one of its allies. This and the overall behavior of the Indians during his visit left the National Security Advisor with only one conclusion; the country was ready to start a war.<sup>73</sup>

Kissinger continued his trip to Peking where he met with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who informed him that if India attacks Pakistan, his country would come to Pakistanis aid. The situation was becoming catastrophic.<sup>74</sup>

The division within the U.S. political scene remained. The president was not able or willing to fight with the State Department. Its different views did not lie in an inclination to India over Pakistan because of some political reasons (one being democracy the other authoritarian state). According to Kissinger, the more serious was its ignorance of the China factor. In one of the analytical summaries, which was prepared to provide several options as to how to react to the situation in South Asia; one of the options mentioned was to provide military assistance to India in the case of a Chinese involvement on the side of Pakistan. Such a step would absolutely contradict the strategy pursued by Nixon and would thwart the possibility of Sino-American rapprochement. Kissinger and Nixon, both well aware of this, repeatedly said that the U.S.

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<sup>72</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 859.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 860 – 861.

<sup>74</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1971 thru 6/20/74  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d103>, March 17, 2015

should lean towards Pakistan because the primary objective of its foreign policy was to get closer to China. Their calls, however, were mostly ignored. Despite the huge amount of military and economic aid to Pakistan that was already cut off, further proposals were coming, which wanted to stop this completely and to express support for India.<sup>75</sup>

### 3.3.1 The Bangladesh Officials

During the summer, one interesting option emerged. The U.S. was contacted by several Bangladeshi exiles that they are interested in the diplomatic solution. This was not possible without at first informing Pakistan because the country could perceive it as a betrayal. Therefore, the Americans decided that it was better to inform President Yahya. His reaction was surprisingly positive. Given the fact that the U.S. wanted to establish contacts with a “government” of a “country” which was seceding from Pakistan, it was an extraordinary show of trust made by Yahya. Furthermore, he offered extended amnesty to many Bengali rebels and the replacement of a martial law administrator in East Pakistan by a civilian authority. He was willing to reconcile and solve the crisis by an accommodation. As expected, this was not in the interest of Mrs. Gandhi who wanted Pakistan on its knees. Thus, by the middle of September the chances for reconciliation were fading. Three factors contributed to this. Firstly, India moved its forces toward its western border to which Pakistan reacted in a similar manner. Secondly, India sent another 9,000 guerrilla forces from the Mukti Bahini group into East Pakistan. Thirdly, India found out about the direct talks between Washington and Calcutta (seat of the exile government during the crisis) and persuaded Bangladeshi officials to continue the dialogue only through New Delhi. Not only that India’s conduct was counter-productive, but it was deliberately damaging even the smallest progress achieved by the U.S.-Bangladeshi exchanges. In such an environment it was only a question of time when the talks would collapse completely. This happened soon after the Bengali “foreign minister” Khondakar Mushtag Ahmed, presumably under the influence of Indian leaders, presented requirements that the only path leading to ending the violence was the full independence of Bangladesh, the release of Mujib and the establishment

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<sup>75</sup> Smith, Louis J., and Edward C. Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 260, 294.

of normal relations with West Pakistan. Thus, after three months, the effort to persuade both sides to sit at one table was futile.<sup>76</sup>

It is important to stress, however, that those representatives of the “Bangladesh government”, who initiated talks with the U.S., did not represent the majority. K. M. Ahmed did not inform the exile cabinet or the Government of India. It was him and several of his associates who acted unilaterally and hand to pushed back, when their plans were revealed. Therefore, the failure of negotiations should be less surprising if it is considered that the majority of eastern Pakistanis did not want any negotiations with officials in Islamabad.<sup>77</sup>

### 3.3.2 The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty

While the U.S. was providing hundreds of millions of dollars to India to help in the relief of the burden of refugees (more than \$200 million by the end of the summer 1971), New Delhi was planning a significant step towards strengthening its position vis-à-vis with Pakistan.<sup>78</sup> On August 9, 1971, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, with his Indian counterpart, signed in New Delhi the so-called Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation.<sup>79</sup> While it had many vague provisions, its key Article, number IX., stated:

*... In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.*<sup>80</sup>

An easy conclusion could be drawn that both countries concluded a de-facto alliance, which provided for the joint response in the case if one or the other is threatened by an external force. This did not mean automatically that the USSR would attack any country which would

<sup>76</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 869 – 873.

<sup>77</sup> Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond, Indi-Bangladesh Relations*, 69 – 70.

<sup>78</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 866.

<sup>79</sup> Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation

<http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2950.html>, accessed March 24, 2015

<sup>80</sup> Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, Article IX

<http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2950.html>, accessed March 24, 2015



fight against India but it was an affirmation that such a step was possible. The pact was a logical reaction to increasing tensions in the region and changing geo-political realities, particularly the Sino-American rapprochement and the alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan. At the same time, India departed further from its non-alignment policy of the previous years.<sup>81</sup>

Washington did not think of the treaty as a significant game changer since good relations between Moscow and New Delhi existed before. The concern, which troubled Nixon and Kissinger, was the possible psychological encouragement, which India might feel after officially concluding the treaty with the superpower. If India did not have Soviet support in a likely war with Pakistan, the Soviets could stop providing military assistance while their non-involvement could prompt the PRC to intervene on behalf of Pakistan.<sup>82</sup> Regardless, the U.S. had to react somehow, so Kissinger warned the Indian ambassador L. K. Jha that any war between India and Pakistan would significantly worsen already bad Indo-American relations to a level not seen before. His response was that the treaty was in no conflict with the principle of non-alignment and evaded any talks on the subject of the Indo-Pakistani issue. He stressed that Mrs. Gandhi's planned visit in November would bring the opportunity to sort out this question.<sup>83</sup> India was in no mood to settle the question peacefully.

### **3.3.3 Gandhi in Washington and the Pre-War Months**

The situation was approaching war. India and Pakistan were mounting their armies in the border regions, rebellions in East Pakistan continued and the U.S. could do little to appease India while the USSR stood firmly behind its ally. Still, the Americans believed that there was some room to avoid war if they were able to persuade Moscow to use its leverage over New Delhi. This hope proved to be false, however, when Kissinger met the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. The U.S. National Security Advisor received vague statements about the Soviet desire for a nonviolent solution of the Bangladesh crisis and at the same time was informed about Moscow's determination to veto any effort to bring India before the UN Security Council. He

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<sup>81</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 315 – 316.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 316 – 317.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 367 – 369.

also said that if Pakistan or China initiates hostilities against India, the USSR will establish airlifts of military supplies to help New Delhi. Kissinger offered joint cooperation by both powers to mitigate the crisis but Soviet officials did not even consider it as a feasible possibility.<sup>84</sup>

Therefore, in the weeks before Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington, the U.S. had limited tools as to how to prevent the worst. It could not provide Pakistan with military supplies given the self-imposed embargo, it was still fighting a war in Vietnam and the media and Congress were in favor of India. Nixon and Kissinger did not have not much left as how to prevent a conflict except for the Indian Prime Minister visiting Washington in November.

While in history, many statesmen were able to solve the most serious problems despite their mutual unfriendliness, in the case of Nixon and Gandhi, it was an unbreakable issue.

### **3.3.3.1 Nixon-Gandhi Antipathy**

The first official visit made by any of the leaders was Nixon's trip to India as part of his seven nation tour in 1969. Nonetheless, both had met already previously when the future U.S. president made a private trip to India. It was in 1967 and it was not friendly at all. It took only about 20 minutes before Indira Gandhi asked one of Nixon's escort members in Hindi, how much longer the meeting would last. She was bored with him and his words. She considered him the symbol of world capitalism, morally inferior and she strongly disliked him. She acted coldly and aloof. She once expressed that she had excellent relations with every American president except Nixon.<sup>85</sup>

Nixon was critical of Gandhi in a similar manner. He laughed at her moral principles because he thought that in the pursuit of her interests, she was willing to put them aside. He did not believe in her real dedication to neutrality and considered her as an ordinary practitioner of power politics, which was nothing different from what he did. He even admitted during the

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<sup>84</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 874 – 875.

<sup>85</sup> Kalyani Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, (New Delhi : MacMillan, 2010), 8.

summer 1971 that if he was India's prime minister, he would act the same.<sup>86</sup> On the occasion of meeting with Kissinger after Gandhi's official visit to the U.S. was over, he referred to her as a "bitch and witch".<sup>87</sup> In short, neither of them had much sympathy for the other.

Indira Gandhi went to the U.S. in November, 1971 and had two private conversations with the U.S. president. The talks were not held in a hostile atmosphere. However, they were futile in the subject of solving the Bangladesh problem. Most of the arguments presented by either side were met with understanding, which was accompanied by counter-arguments, leaving the key question with no clear answer. Speaking about the motivations of her country for what it was doing, Prime Minister Gandhi said that they were not driven by anti-Pakistani motives but by an effort to restore stability in the region. However, she did not say as to how this was to be achieved. Instead, she began to talk about historical problems caused by the partition of British India and its consequences for the future. She said that shipments of arms to Pakistan created an image of the U.S. as an enemy rather than an ally in the eyes of the Indian public. Concerning the alleged support of guerilla fighters by India, Mrs. Gandhi compared it to the U.S. actions when Cuban refugees launched attacks on their motherland with American support. She did not deny that India was helping the rebels but as for the claim that their activities prevented meaningful solution, she responded that it was unrealistic to think that Pakistan could survive in its present form. Reacting to the claim that foreign observers of the crisis, who operated in East Pakistan and in the refugee camps spread across eastern India, are being prevented from free access to certain places, she responded that this is completely false. Her reasoning for the treaty signed with the Soviets, she said that it was an important factor in deterring Pakistan from a possible military strike against India. To the same purpose should have served also Indian units stationed along the country's frontiers. When asked what she considered the best option as to how to settle the dispute, her answer was vague. She did not give any specific plan but that her primary concern was what impact it would have on India. The private conversation concluded with a firm American statement that if India initiated an attack, it would lose American support,

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<sup>86</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 879.

<sup>87</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 499.

similarly to Israel losing support when it, despite previous warnings made by various leaders in Washington, launched an offensive against its Arab neighbors.<sup>88</sup>

### **3.4 The War of 1971**

While many times, it is easy to determine who the actual aggressor in a war is; the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict is from this perspective somehow different. Pakistan began with violent repressions of its own people in the east. India reacted by training guerilla soldiers in East Pakistan. Several incidents occurred when either side crossed the border. On November 24, Prime Minister Gandhi, for the first time, acknowledged that Indian troops moved into Pakistani territory to quell enemy shelling. This came after a statement made by Pakistani radio two days earlier, which stated that Indian units launched a full scale offensive in the east. In the following days, India was more open to provide information about its military activities, which were supposed to be defensive. The situation was tense and many reports were impossible to verify. Thus, it was difficult to determine the main aggressor.<sup>89</sup>

#### **3.4.1 Situation Evolves**

China observed the developments with increasing anxiety. On November 23, Kissinger met the Chinese for the first time in New York. Huang Hua, who was the Permanent Representative of the PRC in the UN, informed the U.S. National Security Advisor that his country is ready to support Pakistan in the Security Council and will follow Islamabad's course of actions.<sup>90</sup>

Increasing hostilities led Pakistan to send a letter to Nixon invoking Article I of the bilateral agreement signed by both countries in 1959. It was an official justification for the U.S. to live up to its obligation to help its ally. The reaction on this showed again how American

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<sup>88</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 493 – 499.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 536 - 537, 570.

<sup>90</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 889.

politics is divided. Nixon and Kissinger knew that they needed Pakistan; it was an ally of other allies (Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) and especially China. The State Department tried to find every loophole in the agreement, which would give the U.S. an option to evade its commitment. This was not to say that what should have followed was blind adherence to the document, which was signed by one of the previous administrations. On the other hand, however, the superpower should not play down its obligations, since its allies need an assurance that they can rely on it.<sup>91</sup>

To act somehow, Nixon ordered the termination of all remaining licenses on military supplies to India. His instructions were carried out by the State Department on December 3.<sup>92</sup> On the same day when this was announced, Pakistan attacked India. The first person to, officially inform Nixon about this assault was Ambassador Farland, who met with President Yahya. The Pakistani leader informed him that as a reaction to Indian cross-border incursions supported by air cover, the Pakistani air force attacked Indian airfields in the western border region.<sup>93</sup> India's reaction was predictable. In her letter to the U.S. President, Prime Minister Gandhi expressed her regret for the development of events and stressed that:

*We are left with no other option but to put our country on a war footing. We have therefore declared an emergency for the defense of India.*<sup>94</sup>

By this statement, she in fact, declared a war on Pakistan and nobody was in doubt of an Indian victory.

### 3.4.2 Indian Goals

India had three main goals in the war. The first was to help Bengali rebels defeat regular Pakistani army units in the east. This was not difficult since Indian armies significantly outnumbered those of Pakistan despite that Islamabad during the previous months sent additional

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<sup>91</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 894 – 895.

<sup>92</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 593, 595.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 607.

“1971: Pakistan intensifies air raids on India“, BBC News, December 3, 2015

<sup>94</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 631.

thousands of soldiers to the east. Soon after they crossed the border they surrounded Pakistanis and within two weeks more than 93,000 regular and paramilitary units were taken as prisoners of war. East Pakistan was now free of West Pakistani rule. The second goal was to prevent Pakistan from overtaking Kashmir while India was occupied with fighting in the east. Not only was New Delhi successful in avoiding such a scenario but it was even capable of pushing back Pakistani forces from its own territory. When it declared unilateral ceasefire on December 16, it occupied over 5,000 square miles of land in southern Punjab and Sind, official areas of Pakistan. The third and most complicated goal was to win the war on the diplomatic front. India desperately needed to avoid any binding UN Security Council resolution, mandating the end of hostilities. If such type of a resolution passed it would result not only in a strategic defeat for India but probably in the end of Bangladeshi struggle for freedom. Except for the USSR, Pakistan had support of the other four permanent members although France and Britain abstained from voting many times. This resulted in a concerted strong effort to punish India for its behavior. However, as Dobrynin had warned Kissinger during their previous meeting, the Soviet representative vetoed all seven proposals which would initiate punitive action against India. It was a clear victory for New Delhi and significant diplomatic loss for Islamabad. Neither Pakistani justification of its actions on the ground at the UN, nor American lobbying, achieved at least a small political victory for Pakistan.<sup>95</sup>

### **3.4.3 American Efforts during the War**

Kissinger was sure that the U.S. would have to help Pakistan in every possible way. Especially important, was to show the PRC that Washington stood firmly behind its Muslim ally. Since China was fearful of the USSR (and this factor significantly contributed to its willingness to establish relations with the U.S.), it would be a failure if Washington did not use all its leverage to weaken India, which was encouraged in its aggressive behavior vis-à-vis Pakistan, by Soviet support expressed among other things by the Treaty signed in August. For the U.S. to ignore the situation would threaten the prospect of rapprochement with Beijing, the primary

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<sup>95</sup> Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond, Indi-Bangladesh Relations*, 92 – 97.

foreign policy objective of Nixon in Asia.<sup>96</sup> Additionally, no American response could encourage the USSR to adopt similar tactics to weaken friends of the U.S. in other areas of the world. If Washington failed now, the Soviets would ridicule their main ideological foe. Also, Pakistan and Chinese would feel betrayed and other countries, allies or enemies, would make their own opinions.<sup>97</sup> The U.S. had to act with utmost seriousness.

When the war broke out, it found American administration in its deepest divide. Each department had a different position as to how to respond as well as which side to blame and what arguments to use. The State Department proved again to be the biggest obstacle for Nixon. On December 4, the White House ordered Joe Sisco, one of the Secretary of State's assistants, to explain why the president was so critical of Indians. When he dutifully did his job, his boss, Secretary Rogers, was so displeased that he banned him from any further television appearances.<sup>98</sup>

The first initiative by the U.S. was a resolution, proposed by George Bush Sr., which called for a ceasefire and the general withdrawal of all military units. As expected, it was vetoed by the USSR while France and Britain did not take part in the voting, which Kissinger described as: "*another example of the tendency of our West European allies to let us carry the burden of global security alone.*"<sup>99</sup> But even that Moscow was ready to obstruct any creative solution; it was the only player who could press India, since negotiations with New Delhi in the previous months led nowhere. Therefore, the U.S. tried, aside from using the UN to resolve the problem, to talk directly with the USSR. One thing, which was more important for the Soviets than their partnership with India, was the Moscow Summit planned for the spring of 1972.<sup>100</sup> Originally, neither Nixon, nor Kissinger was willing to threaten this major event regarding the relations of both countries. Nonetheless, the president's disappointment was more significant and so on November 8, he suggested to his National Security Advisor that the only card left is actually the summit and maybe it would be fruitful to warn Moscow that the U.S. might cancel it, if it does

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<sup>96</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 228.

<sup>97</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 898.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 897.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 899.

<sup>100</sup> U.S.-Soviet Summit where Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and also the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement

not push New Delhi to end the war. Additional proposals seemed also promising. For example Kissinger offered an option to persuade Jordan to provide its (American) planes to Pakistan or to move one of the aircraft carriers into the Bay of Bengal to make Indians nervous of the U.S. plans. Nixon eventually approved both. Several Arab countries with a quite encouragement of the U.S. provided Pakistan with F-104 planes and the USS *Enterprise* embarked on its journey through the Strait of Malacca. The ship arrived in its place the on December 15.<sup>101</sup> This move, however, proved to be less successful than originally thought. When Indian leaders were informed of the movement of the U.S. ship, they immediately complained to the Soviets. During her conversation with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers, Firyubin and Kuznetsov, Mrs. Gandhi indicated that she is of the firm belief that Moscow would take appropriate steps and react to the new reality. Subsequently, Moscow informed Washington that the Soviet fleet in the Western Pacific had been alerted and would be sent to stabilize the situation if necessary. Despite the fact that some Soviets seemed willing to get involved directly, they knew that if the situation got out of control and Washington would really intervene, it would have grave consequences for US-USSR relations. Of course, this was in no interest to the leaders in Moscow.<sup>102</sup>

In the meantime, Washington pressed its intentions further. During meetings and in letters with various Soviet officials, the White House stressed that all progress between the U.S. and the USSR in their mutual relations, which had been achieved so far might be destroyed if India continues to attack or even try to invade Pakistan.<sup>103</sup> Partially, it was the result of mounting pressure from Beijing. When Kissinger met with Huang Hua again, the Chinese revealed to him the real concern of their country. He said that if the U.S. stayed uninterested now, it would establish a dangerous precedent for world peace that any strong bloc of countries, which involves the USSR, could dismember countries “*ad libitum*”<sup>104</sup>. The National Security Advisor assured him that Washington was ready to take appropriate steps in case of further Soviet unpredictable moves.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 703 - 705, 827.

<sup>102</sup> Dixit. *Liberation and Beyond, Indi-Bangladesh Relations*, 107 – 108.

<sup>103</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 904.

<sup>104</sup> *ad libitum*: do something without restriction or at will

<sup>105</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President's File, China Trip, China Exchanges, October 20, 1971

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d274>, accessed April 1, 2015



### 3.4.4 End of the War

At the same meeting between the Soviets and Indians in New Delhi where the Soviets were told of the U.S. aircraft carrier sailing to the Bay of Bengal, Moscow's representatives indicated that they are not happy with the situation. Despite the fact that the USSR was protecting India on the diplomatic scene, the General Secretary of the Communist Party was not willing to risk any further the prospect of deterioration in the improvement in the *détente* policy with the U.S. In other words, the support of India in the UN Security Council by the USSR was no longer possible because it contradicted certain Soviet interests. Therefore, once India completed operations in East Pakistan, it would stop military activities in the west and declare a ceasefire.<sup>106</sup>

Of course, the U.S. administration could not have known this information. Still in the final days of the conflict it acted with the biggest assertiveness so far. Nixon agreed that if the Soviets attacked China, the U.S. would not stay away and it would help Beijing. This was a very important decision since Washington would undergo a huge risk because of this country, which only a year ago was its main enemy. Therefore, in principal, Nixon showed that he was serious with the rapprochement and as many times in the past, it was Kissinger, who went with their determination in public. On December 15, he made a press statement, in which he said that if Moscow continues with its conduct of the affairs in South Asia in its present form, it would force Washington to reevaluate their relations including the decision to participate in the summit.<sup>107</sup>

While his declaration should not be perceived as the reason why India proclaimed a ceasefire on December 16, since New Delhi already briefed Moscow that military operations should be finished by December 15 or 16, it was a significant indication that the U.S. would not leave its allies (Pakistan and China) alone.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond, Indi-Bangladesh Relations*, 107 – 108.

<sup>107</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 818.

<sup>108</sup> Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond, Indi-Bangladesh Relations*, 108.

### **3.5 Consequences of the War**

Pakistan reacted to India's ceasefire the same day (December 16) and ordered its units to stop fighting. It was the end of the war with a victory for India. Immediately afterwards countries, which had vested interest in this war began to blame each other as to who was responsible for the outbreak. Mrs. Gandhi claimed that the war could have been prevented if certain world powers, especially the U.S., did not ignore her complaints and the horrific treatment of Bengalis by Pakistan. She pointed out, specifically, the demand to release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. She gave the U.S. credit for its help with the refugee problem but at the same time she criticized the White House's lack of concern to search for the reasons for the crisis. Eventually, she summarized these and other complaints in one dramatic letter and sent it to Nixon.<sup>109</sup> The response by President Nixon was harsh. Avoiding any responsibility for the war, he stressed that the U.S. did not ignore anything and indeed came up with numerous proposals as to how to solve the problem. The Americans provided political solutions but these were all rejected by Gandhi's administration. He acknowledged the serious strain existing in the relations of both countries but blamed New Delhi for much of the wrongdoing. The U.S. did not take stand against India by itself but against its actions, which Nixon described as the reasons for the war.<sup>110</sup>

The domestic implications of the war for Nixon were opposite compared to the foreign implications. Because critics at home absolutely ignored the geopolitical interests of the president, they focused only on his allegedly anti-Indian bias, his lack of compassion for the suffering of Bengali people and his decisions for favoring Pakistan without recognizing their moral consequences. The Congress, the bureaucracy and the media opposed his reasoning that if the U.S. had sat idly by it would have had grave repercussions for world peace. Finally, the division within the administration prevailed. For example Secretary Rogers contradicted remarks made by Kissinger made on December 15, when he said that the Moscow summit was not threatened in any case. By the same token, he refuted the notion that the U.S. had any legal obligation to help Pakistan militarily. Understanding these realities, Kissinger said that the only

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<sup>109</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 236 – 237.

<sup>110</sup> Smith, Keefer. 2005. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XI, Volume XI.*, 854 – 855.

thing which the administration could have done at home was to play out the whole affair from a defeat into a net minus.<sup>111</sup>

Concerning the implications from the international relations perspective, it was much less negative. Despite division at home and strong support of the USSR for India, the U.S. was able to prevent the destruction of West Pakistan, save the diplomatic channels with the PRC and avert the possibility that the Moscow summit would be called off. Pakistan's future was uncertain because its military regime was significantly weakened. However, it did not cease to exist and despite domestic difficulties, the country preserved its boundaries and survived. China did not cut off the U.S. initiative to establish diplomatic relations. Talks proceeded and less than 2 months after the war was over, Nixon made a historical breakthrough when he officially met with Chinese leader Mao Zedong on February 21, 1972. Their meeting was described as Nixon's personal political triumph. Finally, the Soviets saw that America was still ready to help its allies and as such should be weary of their subversive actions anywhere in the world where the U.S. had a political stake in the situation.<sup>112</sup>

Indo-American relations were of course strained but immediately after the war could not be described as hostile but rather as seriously impaired. The U.S. recognized India as a regional power but left the initiative to repair their relations to New Delhi since if either country needed the other more, it was India.<sup>113</sup>

### **3.6 Perception of the War in India**

India's perception of the war was completely different from that of the U.S. India viewed Pakistan as an aggressive ruthless dictatorship, refusing to recognize the will of its own people in the eastern part of the country who desired greater autonomy. This was demonstrated by Islamabad's repression of Rahman's Awami League, whose desires, as already mentioned, were to have full autonomy. President Yahya did not listen to the calls for self-rule in the East and

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<sup>111</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 915 – 917.

Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 238.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 240 – 241.

United States. 2006. *Foreign relations of the United States. 1969/76,17, 1969/76,17*. Washington: US Gov. Print. Off., 812.

Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 916.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 916.

ordered a clamp down on Bengali intellectuals, politicians and eventually, also ordinary people when he proclaimed martial law. T. N. Kaul, who visited the eastern border of India, described the behavior of Pakistani forces that were following Yahya's commands, as horrific:

*"I saw men, women and children fleeing with bullet marks on their backs."*<sup>114</sup>

These Bengalis then fled to India and as a consequence, the country faced many difficulties in the area of administration, food and healthcare in dealing with these refugees. Indian diplomats were actively seeking help from world players in Western Europe, in the U.S. and in the Arab world but with no results. India was particularly aggravated by their refusal to deal with the situation of the imprisoned East Pakistan leader, Mujib. President Yahya Khan was in the eyes of New Delhi, a drunken military dictator, who wanted to convert civil unrest in East Pakistan into an Indo-Pakistani conflict with the help of the U.S. and the PRC on his side. In such a situation India searched for allies and found one in its traditional friend, the USSR. Subsequently, these countries signed the already mentioned Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. As a way to protect its own security and a way as to how to respond to Pakistani provocations, it helped to train the guerilla forces, Mukti Bahini. In India's eyes, it was Islamabad, who provoked most of the border conflicts. Lobbying in the capitals of countries like Egypt, Britain, France etc., Prime Minister Gandhi tried to push them to increase the pressure on Pakistan to stop these provocations. She was only told that they could do nothing without the U.S. support. Washington was pushing China to help Pakistan. However, when leaders in Beijing saw that India in 1971 was not the same weak country as in 1962, and moreover was backed by the USSR, it pulled back. India was also not frightened by the U.S. air force carrier *Enterprise*, which was sent to the Bay of Bengal but withdrew after a short while. India's goal in the war was not to dismember West Pakistan as Mrs. Gandhi had declared many times even though the U.S. accused her of it. Instead it only reacted to the situation and aggressive behavior of Pakistan. When the war was over and both countries signed the so called Simla Agreement, India willingly returned those 5,000 square miles of occupied territory back to Pakistan. By this it should have demonstrated that it had never any intention to dismember Pakistan's western part.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Kaul, *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-99) China, India and USA (The Tantalising Triangle)*, 90.

<sup>115</sup> Kaul, *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-99) China, India and USA (The Tantalising Triangle)*, 90 – 95.

It is clear that India's reasoning for the war was to a huge degree opposite to that of the U.S. The only thing that American leaders recognized and which was pointed out by New Delhi, was the problem of Pakistani soldiers' wrongful treatment of the Bengalis. However, Washington needed Pakistan more than it had cared about the suffering of these people because of the Chinese factor. Therefore, moral values were overwritten by geopolitical strategy, which demonstrated the dedication of Nixon/Kissinger to the principles of *realpolitik* as these two statesmen perceived it.

## 4. Vietnam War

As already stated on several occasions, the war in Vietnam was, for the U.S., the most determinative event which shaped its foreign policy course during the Nixon administration. As a non-aligned country, India was logically critical of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which caused some serious misunderstandings between Washington and New Delhi.

### 4.1 India's Stance towards Vietnam

Given its own historical experience with colonialism, India was very supportive of all nationalist movements in the region. A good example can be the case of Indonesia's struggle for independence during which India helped the country by imposing economic sanctions on the Dutch and by refusing to grant the Netherlands' air force and navy access to its facilities as well as by helping Indonesia with medical relief and thereby de facto recognizing the Republic of Indonesia. From this perspective, the situation in Vietnam, where the country began its fight against the French colonial rule, was somewhat similar although lacking the same enthusiasm. Several reasons can be identified. First, communism was not an ideology which found much sympathy in the eyes of Nehru, India's Prime Minister (1947 – 1964). Under his leadership, the country crushed the communist Telangana uprising<sup>116</sup> at home and strongly condemned the Malayan Communist rebellion by describing its participants as "bandits". Second, during the initial struggle for freedom in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the French still controlled several Indian islands and the city of Pondicherry. It took until 1954 when France finally gave freedom to these territories.<sup>117</sup> Third was the close geographical proximity of Vietnam and China and the ideological similarities between Chinese communists and Ho Chi Minh supporters. New Delhi was thus fearful that despite the long distance between India and Vietnam, the powerful communist movement, which could possibly be created there, could spread this ideology much closer to its borders.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Peasant rebellion in Telangana region and Hyderabad (1946-1951)

<sup>117</sup> "France Transfers Pondicherry to India", The New Indian Express, May 16, 2012

"The red revolt", India Today, December 20, 2007

"POISONING THE WATER", The Telegraph, June 8, 2013

<sup>118</sup> Appadorai, Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, 353.

### 4.1.1 Early Disagreement Between the U.S. and India over Vietnam

With its official policy of containment, the U.S. started supporting France in its efforts to counter the influence of Vietnamese communists in the 1950s. While China was doing exactly the opposite (helping Ho Chi Minh), India suddenly felt that this conflict might soon evolve into something bigger than a regional quarrel and could possibly move closer to its own borders. According to New Delhi's policy of peaceful coexistence and the *Panchsheel*<sup>119</sup>, India was more than displeased by this development and since 1954 took more of an active role with regard to the deteriorating conditions in the region. Prime Minister Nehru expressed his persuasion that his country must take steps to avert the spread of the conflict and promote the effort for a political settlement. Of course, this went against the official U.S. position of rolling-back communism. Indian policy was therefore contrary to the objectives of Washington and earned the criticism of American leaders. Keeping that in mind, India, however, did not change its stance in the following years and was constantly promoting a peaceful solution during the entire Vietnam conflict. Washington did not like such an approach and the impact on both countries' relations was not good.<sup>120</sup>

## 4.2 Nixon's Administration

When Nixon took power in 1969, the position of India regarding Vietnam was steadfast. While the U.S., under the new administration, was moving towards the end of its military involvement in the country, the withdrawal could not happen immediately. During the entire year, New Delhi was constantly criticizing America's combative actions in the country. After the air campaign was intensified and the bombing became more destructive, harsh remarks from Indian leaders were even more resolute. Especially bad according to Prime Minister Gandhi were the strikes aimed on targets close to Hanoi and Haiphong since these were the big population centers with many possible casualties. Some sources show that this more radical attitude was caused by a worsening domestic situation in India and by its increasingly friendlier relations with

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<sup>119</sup> Panchsheel Treaty

<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf>, accessed January 29, 2015

<sup>120</sup> Appadorai, Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, 354 – 355.

the Soviet Union. This of course was not favored in Washington.<sup>121</sup> While touring the USSR, Mrs. Gandhi and the Soviet Foreign Minister Kosygin issued a joint statement on July 16, in which they referred to the American air raids and the number of casualties they had caused. They called for an immediate stop and expressed the opinion that the crisis can be solved only within the framework of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.<sup>122</sup> The September 1969 visit of India's Foreign Secretary Dinesh Singh to the funeral of Ho Chi Minh and the subsequent trip of his North Vietnamese counterpart, Madame Binh to New Delhi, also did not help to solve the disagreements between the U.S. and India.<sup>123</sup>

During the following year, India paid much less attention to the American presence in Vietnam. This had much to do with the Soviet Union trying to move closer towards Pakistan. The two countries began to talk about a military aid. Moscow also expressed its disappointment with the progress of socialism in India. When the U.S. carried out another massive bombing of the Vietnam/Cambodia border region, which in effect brought the war into the territory of a different country, only mild reaction was seen on the side of India. The highest officials of the country expressed some regret but remained rather silent in comparison to previous years. Fiery statements were not on the agenda. This, of course, should not be misunderstood as a reverse to its previously held position. Despite the fact that the issue was given less priority on the agenda and criticism was softened, the opinion among the leaders remained unchanged. Therefore, as the end of 1971 approached, New Delhi was still pushing for the withdrawal of the U.S. coalition-led forces with the ultimate goal of a cease-fire and round-table peace talks.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Lloyd C. Gardner, Ted Gittinger, *The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964-1968*, (Texas : Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 250.

<sup>122</sup> Pentagon Papers, NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1, VI.A Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.) Negotiations, 1965-67: The Public Record  
[https://archive.org/stream/thepentagonpapers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-VI-A\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/thepentagonpapers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-VI-A_djvu.txt), accessed January 29, 2015

<sup>123</sup> Ramesh Thakur, "India's Vietnam Policy, 1946-1979", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 10 (Oct., 1979), University of California Press, 965.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 965.



### 4.2.1 Later Years

The year 1971 was dominated by the worsening situation in East Pakistan, which evolved into an open war between India and Pakistan. The question of Vietnam was thus moved completely aside. When the war was over and India emerged as the winner with its most powerful status in the region ever, it began to focus its attention elsewhere. This included the question of Indochina. In early 1972, New Delhi and Hanoi agreed to enhance their level of diplomatic representation from consul to ambassador. In practice this step meant that India recognized the Hanoi regime as legitimate. At the same time, however, the same representation with Saigon remained on the consular level. Indian national officials justified the decision as being driven by geopolitical realities in Asia and by its right to express its sovereign opinion. South Vietnamese reaction was furious. Several violent demonstrations took place in Saigon in front of the Indian consulate and the country's leading politicians denounced the decision taken by New Delhi. India more or less ignored the complaints. Well aware of its new position as a regional power, it did not stop with antagonizing just South Vietnam. In April 1972 the Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, again strongly criticized the military involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam and in May of the same year he asked parliament to condemn the U.S. because its policies went contrary to the peace negotiations. These policies caused immense suffering for the ordinary people and did not have any legal justification. This condemnation was approved later and declared that what the Americans were doing was in defiance of international law as they were using brutal force and attacks on Vietnam and Cambodia only as an act of naked aggression. This step was a huge departure from the non-alignment policy and was probably more serious than when India called on the U.S. during the 1971 war to disassociate itself from Pakistan, an American ally. The selection of words was not as important as the mere fact that India officially condemned the actions of another sovereign state in the international sphere. Nothing similar was seen under the previous Prime Minister Nehru, when Soviet forces brutally repressed the pro-reform movement in Hungary in 1956 or when the Warsaw Pact armies invaded Czechoslovakia to quell similar reform movements in 1968. Now, however, India expressed its clear disagreement with the handling of the Vietnam question by the U.S.<sup>125</sup> If Washington and New Delhi were in a mood to restore their mutual relations, strained after the

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<sup>125</sup> Ramesh Thakur, "India's Vietnam Policy, 1946-1979", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 10 (Oct., 1979), University of California Press, 967 – 968.

1971 war, these statements were hugely counter-productive. In fact, the remarks came despite the American appeal on the Indians to specifically avoid any public statement which would stress the differences between how both countries see the situation in Vietnam.<sup>126</sup> On the other hand, India faced already mentioned domestic problems and therefore its conduct of affairs could be interpreted as an effort to divert the attention elsewhere.

The reaction on the American side following the speech of Minister Singh and the condemnation passed in parliament was of course very negative. Some officials were quite furious. An official complaint was issued. It stated that the comments were an act of unfriendliness, focused on a subject, which is of great importance to the U.S and that it is just another step, which Indian top politicians took to prevent an improvement in mutual relations. In fact, unfriendly gestures in diplomatic terms, is a serious sign that one country perceives certain steps of another state as offensive. The U.S. ambassador was ordered to limit his high-level contacts with Indian officials over the next two weeks and not to attend any social events hosted by them.<sup>127</sup> In further discussions between the U.S. Embassy and New Delhi, Ambassador Keating reiterated how seriously Washington perceived the affair and was very offended by India's behavior. In the eyes of the American administration, the remarks were highly biased and inappropriate. Rebukes were, however, not met with an understanding by the opposite side. Singh reiterated his country's position on the war in Vietnam and he refused any criticism on the part of the U.S. When asked about the possible invasion by the North to South Vietnam, he did not even provide any stance as to how New Delhi would react. As such, India did not depart from its previously held opinion and the relations between both countries reached a new low.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL INDIA-US  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d224>, accessed February 9, 2015

<sup>127</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d252>, accessed 02/09/2015)

<sup>128</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d256>, accessed February 9, 2015

### 4.3 Ford's Presidency

In 1975, India took another step to further aggravate the U.S. political representatives. In her speech to the Indian parliament, Prime Minister Gandhi announced that the government is taking preliminary steps to establish more direct ties to the PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government). This organization was the political hand of the North Vietnamese communists in the South. It was created in 1969 when the NFL (National Liberation Front) joined several leftist groups in the South and together they formed the PRG. Its principal objective was to work as a shadow government with an aim to overthrow the official government in Saigon eventually. As such it was the enemy of South Vietnam and naturally of the U.S as well.<sup>129</sup>

The reaction in the U.S. was firm and direct. The Ford administration announced the cancelation of the president's planned visit to India because of the different views on the two countries on the developing situation in Indochina. The Americans went even further. In a release by the State Department, Washington officials described previous Indian remarks of the U.S. policy as being immature and as having a negative impact on mutual relations. Through its Ambassador, Saxbe, who replaced Keating in 1975, the Americans expressed their concerns directly to Indian government. It is necessary to stress, however, that New Delhi's frustrations came also because of Washington's decision to lift the arms embargo imposed on Pakistan.<sup>130</sup> America's behavior was publicly denounced and ridiculed. For example, in the journal *Statesman*, a cartoon was published depicting South Vietnam wounded with only one leg and telling to Pakistani President Bhutto, "*I was America's ally, too*".<sup>131</sup> India remained critical of American operations in Vietnam until their military units left and reciprocal disagreements brought only further diplomatic quarrels and problems in mutual relations.

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<sup>129</sup> Provisional Revolutionary Government  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/480740/Provisional-Revolutionary-Government>, accessed February 7, 2015

<sup>130</sup> See chapter 6

<sup>131</sup> Ramesh Thakur, "India's Vietnam Policy, 1946-1979", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 10 (Oct., 1979), University of California Press, 969.

## **Relations after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971**

Strained relations between the U.S. and India, which came out as the result of the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, were not in accordance with Nixon/Kissinger's foreign policy discourse. Thus, in the aim to restore them, American officials had to persuade India that their country is not an enemy but a friend. There were two major issues that dominated the relations of both countries in the first half of the 1970s. These were: Indian nuclear program and the question of the U.S. military supplies sent to Pakistan. The following chapters will be dedicated to these problems.

## 5. Nuclear India

On the verge of the incoming news about the Watergate scandal, which meant the end for President Nixon and his presidency, on the morning of 18 May 1974, the message from India arrived, which shocked the whole world. The country conducted its first successful nuclear bomb test and became the sixth nuclear power in the world.

### 5.1 Why India Wanted a Nuclear Bomb

First question, which arose, was: what was the purpose of the test. Naturally, to avoid an accusation that the country wants to increase its military might, all Indian officials claimed that there are no such intentions and that the country wants to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes. However, the head of its nuclear program, which successfully carried out the explosion, Dr. Rajaramanna later stated:

*The Pokhran test was a bomb, I can tell you now... An explosion is an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground... I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful.*<sup>132</sup>

New Delhi's leaders always denied the need for a nuclear bomb. Politicians like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru or Lal Bahadur Shastri were pacifists who despised war and were willing to use violent means only as a tool of last resort. Even Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was not interested in obtaining nuclear weapons in the early part of her term although this was conditioned upon the non-proliferation question.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, even they were aware of several facts, which are inter-connected. First was the Chinese successful nuclear test in October 1964.<sup>134</sup> Second were the increasingly warmer relations between Beijing and Karachi/Islamabad.

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<sup>132</sup> Bhumitra Chakma, *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia*, (Farnham : Ashgate, 2011), 196.

<sup>133</sup> National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-US <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d308>, accessed January 22, 2015

<sup>134</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Mtgs with the Pres, Oct-Dec 1964 [http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/frus\\_30\\_057.htm](http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/frus_30_057.htm), accessed January 22, 2015

Third was the never-ending enmity between India and Pakistan, which only increased after the 1965 war and especially after the 1971 war over the liberation of Bangladesh.<sup>135</sup>

The U.S. had reports as early as the 1960s, from various intelligence agencies that India might be able to obtain nuclear weapons in the not so distant future. Even before this was revealed, there were questions from some Washington highest officials, such as the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as to whether or not India should be given some nuclear technology to counterweight Beijing's potential advantage.<sup>136</sup> Still, the majority in Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, including the president himself, opposed any proliferation of nuclear weapons and were eager to proceed with ideas such as guaranteeing security for India by way of U.S. – Soviet agreement, by all nuclear powers working together to protect India or by security provided by its former imperial ruler, Great Britain. However, none of these ideas ever materialized and India was left without any specific guarantees.<sup>137</sup>

The situation did not improve with Nixon but even may have deteriorated further. Given the efforts of the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with China via Pakistan, it was certain that India will regard this with the highest suspicions. It was made clear in July 1969 that among other things, New Delhi's leaders would be guided in their decision about nuclear weapons by considerations of national security. There could not have been any other more worrying issue for India than the warming of relations between Pakistan, PRC and the U.S. In addition, the Indian government thought of its country as one of the great powers of the world, which should thus be eligible to have nuclear weapons as any other great world player. It was a matter of prestige to be a member of the nuclear club.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 352 – 353.

<sup>136</sup> Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d36#fn1>, accessed January 22, 2015

<sup>137</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 353.

<sup>138</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 354.

## **5.2 Nuclear Test**

Since it is clear that the U.S. was not in favor of nuclear-armed India, it was not a pleasant surprise when Washington heard that New Delhi had conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. The U.S. was not informed prior to the test so the explosion came to Washington as shocking news.

Most of the information obtained by the U.S. in 1974 about India's nuclear development program and how Washington can deal with it came from the Special National Intelligence Estimate published in 1972. To some extent there was a shock as to the result of the test being conducted, yet, this is not to say that the Americans did not consider it conceivable that India is capable of carrying out this action. It was assessed that once the decision was made it will take up to a maximum of one year before the explosion could happen. On the other hand, the country did not have delivery systems to attack any metropolitan areas in China or Pakistan. Its long-range delivery capacities were insufficient and were not expected to reach the necessary stage of development until the early 1980s. The report also stressed that the chances are equal that India could and-or would conduct the test in the time frame of several years. Since the information was provided around the time of upsurge of national pride that came following the victory in the war against Pakistan in 1971, the public was in the proper mood to accept such a nuclear explosion because it would enhance the power and prestige of the country. The pressure from the U.S. and the West in general, would be counter-productive. American officials, however, doubted that during the 1970s, such an explosion of a nuclear device would be conducted. Firstly, the Soviets would be opposed to such an action. Secondly, India would not test a nuclear device because its military nuclear program would be very expensive. And thirdly, it would not match Chinese capabilities for many years to come and also a potential war with China would be based much more on conventional tactics of warfare where long-range missiles are of limited use.<sup>139</sup>

So it happened that at the beginning of 1974, the U.S. did not expect any nuclear test in India. As summarized by American officials in New Delhi, there were various problems for the Indian military in developing a nuclear weapons program including such things as: a lack of

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<sup>139</sup> Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 77'0094, India, 1972  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d300>, accessed January 22, 2015

resources, a weak economy, food shortages, no imminent security threat and overall delays in nuclear development.<sup>140</sup>

### 5.2.1 Time of the Test

While the political support for Mrs. Gandhi was strong after the Bangladesh Liberation War, the same cannot be said of her popularity in early 1974 when the project ‘Smiling Buddha’, as the project was named, was finishing. Previously various reasons were mentioned as to why it was unlikely that any nuclear device test was to be expected in 1974. However, it was probably these reasons themselves that motivated Gandhi’s administration to decide to conduct the explosion. By becoming a nuclear power Gandhi’s government could increase domestic approval ratings which were falling down in the midst of a number of troubles affecting the country. The one who was mainly blamed for the problems was naturally the Prime Minister and her cabinet. Therefore, amid such conditions, India proceeded to conduct its first peaceful nuclear explosion.<sup>141</sup>

### 5.3 the U.S Reaction

For the U.S. there were two main considerations, which they had to take into account when deciding how to react to India’s unilateral move. First was the test itself and its meaning for a nuclear free world. Washington never differentiated between military and peaceful usage of nuclear energy. Once the country has obtained the technology to explode nuclear device, it was a nuclear power and that implied the possibility of making a nuclear bomb. Second was the possible fear of Pakistan would have from a nuclear India.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 45, Subject Files 1974, AE 1 General Policy/Plans 1974

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d156>, accessed January 23, 2015

<sup>141</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 358.

<sup>142</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d161>, accessed January 23, 2015



A few days after the test, Nixon and the Defense and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Aziz Ahmed, met in the naval office. Pakistan's message was clear and quite predictable. It feared what this Indian move might mean for regional security. Nixon's reply was, however, vague. He did not give specific guarantees on how the U.S. would react or if Washington plans to impose sanctions on India. On the contrary, he stressed that their countries must continue a dialogue, which was under way to normalize, relations since it was better to keep some influence over India rather than leave it vulnerable to the influence of the Soviet Union.<sup>143</sup> Kissinger's opinion was even more non-committal. He said that while the U.S. might strongly object, which in fact it did, Washington is not going to further threaten the already strained relations with New Delhi. The Secretary of State also stressed that India, in fact, did not breach any mutual agreement with the U.S. and since it likewise never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is no way it could be punished. He himself was not even opposed to the test and was keen to not having the Nixon administration come down hard on India.<sup>144</sup>

If the Republicans generally speaking only shrugged their shoulders on the nuclear test, the same cannot be said for the Democrats. This was an interesting contrast to the Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) when the White House was probably the only political force in the U.S., which preferred Pakistan over India. The Public, the bureaucracy or the House and the Senate, all were staunch supporter of New Delhi. However, when India exploded its nuclear device, these institutions were disappointed and onwards took much more realistic attitude towards the country. For example, the 93<sup>rd</sup> United States Democratic-controlled Congress passed legislation strengthening the non-proliferation policy as a reaction to the White House neglect of the issue. Such a step was only symbolic, though. In fact, the U.S. as early as June of the same year proceeded with a shipment of installment of uranium to India for its Tarapur nuclear power station. Likewise, there were no restrictions on previously approved economic aid.<sup>145</sup> Talks between both countries' top officials in the months following the test were quite friendly. The Indian Prime Minister even stated that if the comprehensive test ban treaty on nuclear weapons was proposed, her country would not oppose signing it although on the condition this would be a

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<sup>143</sup> Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 4, May 23, 1974  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d164>, accessed January 23, 2015

<sup>144</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 364 – 365.

<sup>145</sup> Shankar, *Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond*, 368.

non-discriminatory agreement upon which every member is equal in nature. As well, for the very first time, Prime Minister Gandhi sent warm regards to President Nixon.<sup>146</sup>

While there might have been some honest intentions of Nixon's administration to improve relations with India and thus not strongly react to its nuclear test, there is another issue which needs to be kept in mind. The summer of 1974 was devoted to domestic problems that the president faced. The final stages of the Watergate scandal were under way and it peaked with Nixon's August resignation.<sup>147</sup> In my personal opinion if the situation at home had been different and the White House was not on the verge of collapse, the handling of the nuclear affair may have had some other outcome. However, domestic events completely overtook the South Asian matters and thus a nuclear India did not have a priority on the president's agenda. Foreign policy was left in the hands of the Secretary of State Kissinger, whose opinion already mentioned.

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<sup>146</sup> National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Decentralized Subject Files 1973-74, Pak/India January-June 1974

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d168>, accessed January 23, 2015

<sup>147</sup> "The Watergate Story", Washington Post

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html>, accessed January 23, 2015

## 6. Weapons to Pakistan

The question of military supplies from Washington to Islamabad was always the hot issue in relations between India-Pakistan-U.S. The situation before the 1971 War was already described in previous chapters. Therefore, this part would be dedicated to the time after the war.

### 6.1 Early Moves

When the war ended, the list of military items banned under the 1965 weapons embargo, was still in place. However, Pakistan was lobbying Washington strongly to resume the sales because it needed to restore its capabilities weakened by the conflict against India. The U.S. officials began to deal with this concern in the months after the ceasefire. While they held the firm belief that caution in decision making is necessary, they knew that they would have to take some stance. On the one hand, the South Asian region was still full of tension. On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger were well aware of the essentiality to help Pakistan, their main ally there. Therefore, the President made several commitments to Pakistani leaders that he would look upon the issue with seriousness. Kissinger argued that there was no need to punish America's ally again. Besides, he was unhappy that while Pakistan was prevented from obtaining military material as well as commercial items, the same was not true for India. New Delhi was only banned from receiving military items but was a permanent recipient of commercial goods worth several tens of millions of dollars. In addition, weapon deliveries were also a sales problem. Several major U.S. military companies were complaining that the current situation was hurting their businesses.<sup>148</sup>

An important factor in decision making for the U.S. administration was also the change in the post of the Pakistani president. After the loss of the war, Yahya Khan turned power over to Zulfikar-Ali-Bhutto, who changed the structure of the government from military to civilian.

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<sup>148</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972-1973  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d210>, accessed April 8, 2015

Army still retained some power, however, compared to previous times only limited. The U.S. expressed its support for the new leader.<sup>149</sup>

Bhutto's effort to change the structure of the Pakistani government was welcomed in the U.S. and as a part of this reaction regarding the new state of affairs; the Department of Defense recommended to slowly lift the embargo. Depending on the progress of the armistice, peace settlement negotiations and domestic development in Pakistan towards limiting the power of military commanders, the U.S. could renew the release of warehouse material and commercial sales items and after additional steps and move towards one-time exception exports. At the same time, the question of lethal weapons, either to India or Pakistan, should be put on hold, given the unstable situation and the continued presence of Indian units in Bangladesh and West Pakistani border areas.<sup>150</sup>

Few months after 1971 War was over, Pakistan proposed an interesting solution to its military problem which could evade the effects of the embargo. President Bhutto offered closer U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation, which would provide for American soldiers and equipment to have an access to certain military facilities in Pakistan as well as the option concerning collaboration in strategic military planning. Sober assessment of his proposal done by advisors in Washington, however, resulted in the opinion that in the current situation when stability is fragile, the U.S. had no interest to use these facilities. If it did, it would in fact establish a new military base in the country. Not long after this proposal, Islamabad made a request to acquire lethal weapons. It wanted the resumption of sales of spare parts, which were already under contract and the release of 300 APC's,<sup>151</sup> ordered in 1969. In addition, Pakistan requested tanks, submarines, trucks, anti-aircraft weapons and many other types of military equipment.<sup>152</sup> Richard

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<sup>149</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/64265/Zulfikar-Ali-Bhutto>, accessed April 8, 2015

<sup>150</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d216>, accessed April 8, 2015

<sup>151</sup> APC = Armoured personnel carrier

<sup>152</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d236>,

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d239>

Nixon did not want to disappoint its ally again but at the same time did not think that it was the best time to start selling weapons. Therefore, he told Pakistani officials that he was not planning to take any action until the presidential elections of November 1972, would be over and so, they should be patient. The Pakistanis accepted his reasoning as logical and promised to wait.<sup>153</sup>

In the meantime, New Delhi regarded Pakistan's efforts to lift the embargo even partially, with huge concern. India realized that spare parts would be sooner or later released, however, criticism was directed at the 300 APC's. Prime Minister Gandhi said that if the sale was realized, it would have a devastating impact on the relations of both countries. India claimed that even a symbolic sale could be seen by the Pakistanis as encouragement for a military buildup, which in the past led to disastrous consequences for Islamabad and to no advantage for U.S. foreign policy. Besides, rearming Pakistan could, according to many in New Delhi, increase public support of the "left totalitarians" in India, who criticized the central government for its weak dealings with Pakistan.<sup>154</sup>

In a sense, it was interesting Indian behavior. If the embargo was in fact removed, it would benefit Pakistan but also India because the 1965 ban applied to both countries. Moreover, the country was well aware that it relies too much on Soviet military equipment. If it was able to diversify its military imports, it would be a strategic advantage. Still, the focus on preventing Pakistan from getting weapons was of higher importance despite the fact that Islamabad was many times weaker compared to New Delhi in military terms.<sup>155</sup>

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National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 PAK

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d239>, accessed April 8, 2015

<sup>153</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 26, 1972

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d243>, accessed April 8, 2015

<sup>154</sup> Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 8 March 1973-11 May 1974

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d115>, accessed April 9, 2015

<sup>155</sup> National Archives, RG 84, Colombo Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 54, Subject Files 1973, POL 3 Organizations and Agreements

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d121>, accessed February 13, 2015

## **6.2 First Sale of Weapons**

The presidential elections in 1972 were successful for Nixon and therefore he was inaugurated for a second term.<sup>156</sup> As promised in the preceding year, he began to deal with Pakistan's request for spare parts and the APCs and lift the embargo. Reports from New Delhi said that India would recognize this sale an unfriendly gesture and believed that it would have devastating impact on Indo-American relations (there was a similarity to the situation, which occurred when India criticized American handling in Vietnam).<sup>157</sup> Being aware of this, Nixon decided that the U.S. will proceed with this limited supply regardless of India's protests. His decision was based upon several factors. Firstly, such a purchase made by Pakistan would not change its disadvantaged position to India. Apart from getting supplies from the USSR, which were several times bigger in volume than what Pakistan received from China, it also had much better military manufacturing capacities. Secondly, Pakistan already paid for the APCs, so it was only a matter of time before it would be necessary to release them. Finally, the U.S. suspended \$87.6 million of economic aid promised to India in 1971. However, Nixon reinstated this economic aid so India could not make a claim that it is treated unfairly. Therefore, in 1973, the U.S. carried out its first big arm sale to Pakistan despite the fact that the embargo was still in effect.<sup>158</sup>

As expected, the Indian reaction to Nixon's move was highly critical. Ambassador Jha, the Indian parliament and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, all stated their unhappiness and grave concern relating to the U.S. decision and its negative effects on mutual relations. Jha questioned the time of the announcement of the decision to sell weapons to Pakistan, which preceded the statement regarding the reinstatement of economic aid to India. He was pointing out that Pakistan was first among the two countries, which clearly showed the U.S. priorities. The economic aid to Pakistan was resumed a long time ago before India received its own and only after the resumption of military help to Islamabad. Logically, this was in the eyes of New Delhi as a sign

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<sup>156</sup> Nixon ran against George McGovern (Dem.) and won a landslide of 520 electoral votes compared to 17

<sup>157</sup> Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 8 March 1973-11 May 1974

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d115>, accessed February 12, 2015

<sup>158</sup> Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 13 September 1971-7 March 1973

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d111>, accessed April 8, 2015

that the Americans needed to find a way how to appease India without seriously aggravating its politicians and public. Thus, the Indians perceived his as an insult rather than an honest effort, to improve relations. If the decision on the economic aid to India had been approved before the military aid to Pakistan was resumed, it would have put the whole affair into a different perspective. However, this did not happen and New Delhi felt slighted, as in many times in the past.<sup>159</sup>

By the time the Watergate scandal began dominating the U.S. domestic policy; CIA reported on India's foreign policy intentions for the future. Not surprisingly, its main fear was still Pakistan. New Delhi was superior to its Muslim neighbor in all military matters but viewed it as its principal enemy and competitor, which posed the main threat to its stability. Especially worrying was its constant effort to strengthen its ties with the strong outside powers like the U.S. or China. Pakistan's main goal in this matter was a political support but also military aid. This concern was India's key foreign policy determinant. Therefore, its main interest at that time was to preserve the status quo and not allow Islamabad to grow stronger.<sup>160</sup>

### **6.3 Ford's administration**

The U.S. was aware of India's foreign policy intentions and therefore did not regard the revoking of the embargo as feasible. On the other hand it knew that Pakistan's military was at a huge disadvantage to its neighbor. Thus, for example on the issue of tank modernization, (Pakistani ones were obsolete) the Americans encouraged Islamabad to cooperate with Iran, which had the technology obtained from the U.S. and was able to help. While the Iranians could provide an improvement in the equipment, it would not be sufficient and would take a long time before completion. Also, there was an increase in military aid from the USSR to India, which made the decision even more urgent. New Delhi received, for example brand new seagoing troop carriers, which could make it easier for a potential invasion of Baluchistan. Pakistan requested

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<sup>159</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL INDIA-US  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d117>, accessed April 10, 2015

<sup>160</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, Box 465, NIAM 31-73  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d150>, accessed April 10, 2015

submarines that were capable of sinking these carriers before they could land on the coast. The biggest fear, however, was nuclear technology.<sup>161</sup> Pakistani feared that India's capacity to develop a nuclear weapon was there and that it could be used against the country. If this was possible is of course questionable, since India was unlikely to wage a nuclear war against the country, which did not match even its conventional capabilities.<sup>162</sup>

During the time period when Nixon was about to resign and Ford was about to take office of president, India made its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974. This brought about a change in the perception of India by the American general public and mainstream politicians.<sup>163</sup> Of course, this put the military embargo into a completely new perspective. The Pakistanis expressed their view that, if India was in dire difficulty it could easily use the nuclear intimidation as a weapon of a last resort. Moreover, on Pakistan's western border there was Afghanistan which was building up its forces and since it was an ally of the USSR as well as India, Islamabad was concerned even more. Therefore, if the U.S. administration with Kissinger in the office of the Secretary of State wanted to provide weapons to Pakistan this was the most favorable period to do this in many years.<sup>164</sup>

New Delhi was worried that Pakistani officials were again lobbying the White House to get arms as they had been since the war ended. The Indians came close to being obsessed that Washington was planning a massive rearmament of Pakistan, no matter how much the U.S. officials tried to assure them that this was unrealistic. When Kissinger visited India and meet with several top leaders of the country, including Prime Minister Gandhi, he was constantly forced to hear India's grave concerns on the subject. The Secretary of State reiterated that there was no such plan for the U.S. to take part in an arms race on the continent and no such effort to threaten India's military superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan, which was apparent. The only option, which was under consideration, was a limited sale of arms on a cash basis, which even would not be significant since Pakistan was short of money. The reasoning behind this idea, at least the one

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<sup>161</sup> See chapter 5

<sup>162</sup> National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, June 1974-8 August 1974

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d166>, accessed April 10, 2015

<sup>163</sup> See chapter 5

<sup>164</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097-2274

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d176>, accessed April 10, 2015



provided to Mrs. Gandhi, was that if Pakistan felt it was in danger and given its lack of proper defense capacities, it would probably want to go nuclear which was certainly in nobody's interest. Finally, if there were any bigger plans to provide weapons or military technology, India would be the first to be informed and would not read about it in newspapers.<sup>165</sup>

What Kissinger said during his visit, however, was in fact only a way of diplomatic courtesy as to how to inform India that there was a plan to resume sales on a cash basis, which in practice equated to a lift of the embargo. The only question was when to proceed with this step. Ford's administration understood that keeping an embargo on its allies was not a good way how to direct defensive alliances as Prime Minister Bhutto had called on President Ford at the beginning of 1975, during his official visit in Washington. Therefore, the issue which was on the table was the timing. Two options were under consideration. The first possibility was that the embargo would be lifted after the visit of Indian Foreign Minister Y.B.Chavan to the U.S., planned for March, 1975. In this scenario, the U.S. would have time to fulfill its promise to the Indians and inform them about its decision before the country would actually proceed with the sale. It would probably provoke less criticism on the Indian side. The second possibility was: to announce the change in the arms policy before Chavan's visit and to risk an Indian negative backlash.<sup>166</sup>

Of course, India preferred the first option and sent via the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi, a strong message, in which it requested that President Ford would postpone his announcement on lifting the embargo after Chavan's planned visit. In the report sent, India took it as a matter of personal and governmental pride to discuss the question again. If the U.S. decided to the contrary, despite New Delhi's wishes, it could damage even further the Indo-U.S. relations.<sup>167</sup> Nobody in the White House however, was willing to listen to India's wishes and on

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<sup>165</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger 1973-1977, Entry 5403, Box 5, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, November 1974

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d180>, accessed April 15, 2015

<sup>166</sup> Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974-15 Aug. 1975

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d188>, accessed April 15, 2015

<sup>167</sup> Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to SecState

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d190>, accessed April 15, 2015

February 24, 1975, Ford announced the U.S. decision to lift the embargo imposed on U.S. sales of lethal military equipment to both Pakistan and India. The declaration included the provision that all purchases must be on a cash only basis and must be reviewed on a case by case basis. The importance must be given to defensive arms.<sup>168</sup> There were two reasons, why the announcement was taken prior to Chavan's visit. Firstly, the U.S. could evade a difficult situation to persuade him that the lift is no danger to his country since it would be probably futile effort. Secondly, Pakistanis thought that they could handle domestic press response much easier compared to a situation if Chavan's was informed earlier.<sup>169</sup>

Pakistan welcomed the press statement while at the same time India strongly criticized it. Chavan attacked the U.S. in the parliament for its alleged effort to create a balance of power in the region by way of supplying arms. He mentioned that India should not have equal relations with both superpowers but it should focus more on the USSR which stood behind New Delhi in the past. That could not be said about the U.S. Several Indian officials labeled America a belligerent state and a threat to their country especially from the sea.<sup>170</sup> However, these were only mild statements. Other, harsher speeches came in the weeks and months to follow. The Indian congressional parties from the left to the right, the state ministers, the state chief ministers and many other high officials branded the U.S. a fascist country and its politicians as imperialists and aggressors. While Washington expected some criticism, this was too much. Via the local U.S. embassy, Kissinger ordered to protest with utmost seriousness against these accusations. The U.S. Ambassador Saxbe took a hard line in the talks with the Indians. Based on Kissinger's recommendations he warned India that negative line of criticism is not welcomed in the U.S. and this would be taken into consideration when deciding upon the subject of future relations. He also noted that this present course of conduct was unacceptable and could have grave consequences for bilateral programs and for U.S. aid programs such as PL-480.<sup>171</sup> If New Delhi had the feeling to speak out on certain issues relating to Washington's policies, it would rather do

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<sup>168</sup> Ford Library, National Security Decision Memorandum 289, March 24, 1975

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm289.pdf>, accessed April 15, 2015

<sup>169</sup> Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974-15 Aug. 1975

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d188>, accessed April 28, 2015

<sup>170</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Exdis. Telegram 5121

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d195>, accessed April 15, 2015

<sup>171</sup> PL-480 was the U.S. food aid program. For India the aid was mostly in the form of grain supplies.

it via official governmental communication channels and not through media. Finally, the ambassador announced the U.S. decision to postpone indefinitely Ford's visit to India. He presented everything in such a way that New Delhi felt the Americans were not bluffing.<sup>172</sup> In addition, it should be stressed that India did not criticize the U.S. only on its arms policy towards Pakistan, but for example, also on its policies in Vietnam as already mentioned earlier.

Saxbe delivered Kissinger's concerns but criticism continued. In the following months, Mrs. Gandhi kept using the U.S. as a target for her grievances. It did not matter if it was to appease the left in the Indian Congress, to appease the Soviets or Bengalis, to justify her domestic policies: her focus was always on the U.S. The arms sales to Pakistan, which had in fact not been carried out in practice yet, was a logical objection, which she could use.<sup>173</sup>

Therefore, by the middle of the 1970s, the relations were basically at the same level as when the war of 1971 ended. India was constantly attacking the U.S. as an imperialistic power which tried to destroy the fragile peace in the region by renewing its policy of supplying weapons to Pakistan. The U.S. of course denied these accusations, but with no meaningful results.

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<sup>172</sup> Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams from SecSta

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d199>, accessed April 15, 2015

<sup>173</sup> National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d218>, accessed April 15, 2015

## Conclusion

The overall conclusion of my thesis is that Nixon's administration was much more loyal to its principles of *power politics* than it would have been to sacrifice its ideological foundation of foreign policy for warmer relations with India. These diplomatic ties were, during the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, strained and sometimes even hostile. Both countries engaged in countless diplomatic quarrels, misunderstandings, mutual accusations, sharp exchanges of opinions and even in personal animosity between their leaders. Each country followed its own goals which were driven by their own national interests and the geopolitical situation of the era. India's foreign policy was focused primarily on Pakistan, with which it had poor relations since the partition of British India in the aftermath of the World War II. Both countries competed for disputed territories on their borders. India engaged in covert operations in the supported of anti-government forces in East Pakistan during the War of 1971. Pakistan searched for allies in its defense against its Hindu-dominated neighbor and found one in India's long time rival, the PRC. India feared such a possibility since it fought a number of intense border scimmages with China in 1962 and felt resentment towards Beijing. New Delhi was afraid of a possible joint attack by Pakistan and China and therefore made an effort to find its own ally. The most promising was with the USSR. The Soviets had their own problems with China, which climaxed in a military conflict in 1969 and thus became an ally of India against the PRC. In the likelihood of such a situation, the U.S. would be the balancing factor, whose help to either side could make the decisive difference. At this time, it was important to remember that one of the key implications from Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy was the necessity to open up China to the world. In such a situation, in which India was naturally the most suitable American ally and Washington was heading towards signing a historical agreement with the USSR on a limitation of strategic missiles, the Americans were expected not to threaten their progress with the Soviets in return for better relations with China. In addition, the PRC was still probably the principal enemy of the U.S. and Pakistan was ruled by a military dictatorship under General Yahya Khan. One would expect that there would be no doubt as to which countries the U.S. would side with. But presumptions might be sometimes misleading as Washington's policies proved that general expectations were wrong and chose Pakistan and China to support.

If the U.S. wanted to establish normal diplomatic relations with Beijing, it could not disappoint the country. Attempting to start talks with the PRC, while at the same time taking a stand against China's foreign allies, would not make a good impression on its leaders. This was exactly the case with Pakistan. Islamabad was an ally of Beijing and thus if the U.S. did not want to disenchant the PRC, it had to support Pakistan. This decision was eased by the fact that Washington itself perceived Islamabad as a partner. It was a member of two U.S. led defensive alliances - the SEATO and CENTO - and also had previously signed an exclusive treaty with the Americans concerning defense. In addition, the most valuable asset for the U.S. was Pakistan's role as communication channel to China. It was Islamabad which helped mediate the initial contacts between Washington and Beijing and continued to be a crucial connection between them. Without Pakistan, Kissinger feared that all the headway made with China, would be lost. Therefore, the U.S. had no other option but to stand behind Pakistan in any scenario, which could happen, including any disputes with India.

The first challenge did not take long to occur. In 1971, Pakistan experienced domestic turmoil, which developed into a civil war. India played a significant role in this smoldering conflict since it provided help to Bengali opposition forces. After months of escalating tensions, during which Islamabad established martial law in its eastern rebellious territory, the end result was the Indo-Pakistani war. India had a huge technical and manpower advantage and after a few weeks of fighting, it fulfilled expectations and defeated Pakistan on all fronts. During the entire conflict, the U.S. stood firmly behind its Muslim ally. This hard stance prevailed, despite several factors which would suggest otherwise. For example, Pakistan refused to grant at least some meaningful autonomy to its Bengali part, in spite of the fact that a regional pro-independence political party, the Awami League, won a landslide victory in the national elections. Also, the government forces during the civil war treated the eastern population with dire brutality and committed atrocities on a huge scale. Moreover, the domestic situation in the U.S. was more than unfavorable toward the policies pursuant of those by Nixon and Kissinger. The U.S. Congress, the media, public opinion and even some of the president's secretaries, were all in favor of abandoning Pakistan. Later, when India was more and more involved including the use of its military against Pakistan, the same people in the U.S. pressed Nixon to support New Delhi and leave Islamabad isolated. It was not an easy situation for him; however, he stayed the course. He

did not ease off, even when the USSR openly embraced India and signed with it the so-called Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty. This pact allowed the possibility of military aid which significantly raised the stakes in the case of radicalization of the conflict and the chance of participation of more countries (e.g. China). Still, Nixon did not relent to the domestic pressure and remained firmly on the side of Pakistan. At a critical time in the war, he ordered the Pacific Fleet to sail to the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate American readiness and commitment to help its ally. Nixon's policies came under a lot of criticism from Indian officials. Specifically it was India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Not only did she disagree with Nixon as to who should be blamed for the outbreak of the war, she was also driven by her personal animosity toward him. Nixon, having the same feeling of ill will towards her, however, did not think about any change in his position. Therefore, the war was the most notorious example to show just how committed Nixon was in his effort to achieve his foreign policy objectives despite the consequence of a significant strain in relations with India.

Pakistan continued to be supported by the U.S. even after the war had ended. By the end of 1971, the arms embargo on both Pakistan and India as introduced in 1965, was still in the effect. However, Islamabad was pressing Washington to lift it. The issue was important, since Pakistan's military capabilities were of huge concern to India. New Delhi was fervently against any weapons delivery from the Americans to Pakistan. Despite its huge numerical advantage in soldiers and a constant supply of Soviet arms, it did not want to allow Pakistan to remilitarize and gain strength once again. The U.S. realized that it was wise not to supply arms to this region. Still, Washington also realized that enforcing a military embargo on its ally is not a good foreign policy strategy. Thus, it happened in 1973 that in spite of the Indian protests, it sold previously promised military equipment including the controversial sale of 300 APCs to Pakistan. Reaction from New Delhi was extremely negative. India felt betrayed and sidelined. It criticized the timing of the sale, which clearly indicated American priorities (the sale was carried out before suspended economic aid to India was resumed). Indians perceived this decision as insulting and offensive and said that this would have a bad effect on a perception of U.S. behavior. In short, a new strain was put on relations between both countries. Even more damaging, however, was the complete end of the embargo which came about in 1975. As part of the mood change in the U.S., as a result of India's first nuclear test, Washington lifted the ban on the sale of lethal weapons to

both countries. Despite the fact that this did not mean any huge arms deliveries to Pakistan, New Delhi's reaction was that of extreme anger. The U.S. was branded as a fascist, aggressive and imperialistic country. Several Indian officials even stated that the Americans were a threat to India. Washington was attacked in the Indian media and by political parties of all orientation. High ranking officials exchanged harsh notes and bitter remarks resulting in relations becoming as bad or worse than immediately following the War of 1971. The U.S., however, again showed that their dedication to chosen foreign policy strategy was firm and nothing could stop it. They made a rational decision to stop harming their ally, no matter how significant a detrimental effect this could have on their relations with India. Thus, the principle of *power politics* played a primary role again and authoritarian Pakistan was favored over a democratic India.

Different U.S. behavior can be observed regarding the issue of India's nuclear ambitions. New Delhi was aware of its new status as a dominant power in the region after its victory in the 1971 war. At the same time, it still feared the 'alliance' among the U.S., China and Pakistan. Therefore, the decision to develop nuclear technology was a matter of prestige as well as national security consideration. India carried out its first successful nuclear test on May 18, 1974. It was seen as shocking news throughout the world since nobody expected that the country would have the capability so early. Officials in the U.S. and Pakistan were highly critical of this game changing action. While the Indo-Pakistani war was taking place in 1971, most mainstream politicians and public in the U.S., stood firmly on the side of India, however these same people were now attacking New Delhi. For example, the congressional Democrats were swift to pass new legislation regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Interestingly enough, the reaction of Nixon and Kissinger was completely opposite. Neither of them were significantly worried of India's new nuclear capacity and Kissinger even expressed an opinion that he was not against India having at its disposal this technology. According to him, New Delhi did not breach any agreement since it never signed any and thus there is no way how it could have been punished. Being well aware of the already strained relations between both countries, this event was not an issue, which should further worsen them. Thus, his actions can be interpreted as a result of his promoted foreign policy discourse. India was a regional superpower and as such it was evident that it would want to obtain nuclear technology. Therefore, it was only a matter of time before its nuclear program would bear some fruit. Because nothing was likely to stop it, it

was better to accept this as inevitable. Overall, India's nuclear program did not bring about a major diplomatic rift between officials in the White House and New Delhi, as some would have expected.

The final issue, which had a profound effect on Indo-U.S. relations, was the Vietnam War. By Nixon's inauguration in early 1969, the U.S. finally realized that the involvement in Vietnam was a big mistake. As part of his strategy, the new president was keen to significantly limit U.S. participation and leave the initiative to the South Vietnamese soldiers. The ultimate goal was to pull out the forces completely. Throughout the entire conflict, India had disapproved of American involvement in it. Officials in New Delhi criticized the U.S. on numerous occasions. In most cases it was focused on the illegitimacy of its actions which caused only suffering to ordinary Vietnamese people. Periods of silence were replaced by condemnation and harsh statements. These were especially severe during the period following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. As already mentioned several times, India felt stronger than ever and its position gave it courage. Certain significance should also be attributed to the domestic problems. India faced a difficult situation at home around the middle of the 1970s and thus there was a possibility that an effort was made to turn attention from them to the international scene. India's reactions could also be justified in the light of its anti-colonial tradition. In the past, it supported Indonesia's struggle for independence from the Dutch. Nevertheless, no matter what the reasons were, it was an issue of particular importance for the U.S. Therefore, Washington viewed India's actions with utmost seriousness. As well as public verbal attacks, New Delhi also recognized the legitimacy of the North Vietnamese regime which was a serious blow to the relations of both countries. Nixon and Kissinger wanted to leave Vietnam but they wanted to do it slowly so the U.S. could save face and negotiate some kind of compromise. This was not, however, India's approach to the war, which required an immediate cessation of American military involvement including the exit of American soldiers. Thus, the Vietnam War in general, was yet another point of concern, further leading to bad blood between the U.S. and India.

Overall, each of the topics elaborated on in my thesis showed that Nixon/Kissinger were solely guided in their foreign policies by the principles of *power politics*, no matter what impact this could have had on American relations with India. Both statesmen focused on: opening China



to the world; positive relations with Pakistan, its policies in Vietnam, however, all of these were a 'thorn in the side' of India. The only issue, which did not damage mutual relations, was India's nuclear program. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger proved to be dedicated to what they perceived as correct and as a matter of fact, their strategy eventually brought fruitful results concerning for example the rapprochement with the PRC.

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