

The present work analyses the theory of error of René Descartes, mainly in the context of his Fourth Meditation. This analyze begins with the exposition of the Descartes' theory of judgment and his notions of understanding and volition. The main question is the following: Is Descartes' theory of error valid, even if we consider all the objections of Descartes' critics? The main objection is: in the explication of error during our judgment as a result of interaction between a limited understanding and an unlimited human will, we have to consider us capable do decide at will what we believe and what we don't, which is not an intuitive position. But this work suggests that this non-intuitive position is sustainable, if we abandon the "strong" version of Descartes' voluntarism, in which the will influences our believes directly, and we see Descartes' theory of error as using the "milder" version of voluntarism (called here "attention" voluntarism), in which the will influence us indirectly, by forcing our attention in the needed way. As a final conclusion, we consider Descartes' theory of error as valid.