

Univerzita Karlova v Praze – Charles University Prague

Fakulta Sociálních Věd – Faculty of Social Sciences
Institut Mezinárodních Studií – Institute of International Studies



Cosimo Stahl

**Cleavage politics and Europeanisation-induced
transformation of the national political space**

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The case of the Czech Republic

Master thesis

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Author: Cosimo Stahl

Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Jiří Vykoukal, CSc.

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Abstract

This research seeks to map the national political space and assess the prevailing cleavage patterns in the Czech Republic. Processes of globalisation and Europeanisation have left their imprint in Western Europe – splitting the electorate into *winner*s and *loser*s of globalisation and denationalisation. This *demarcation vs. integration* magnet is also relevant in the CEE region – altering and reshuffling the underlying structure of party competition and EU contestation.

By employing quantitative content analysis of print media the prevailing issue and cleavage dimensions will be reconstructed both during early stages of democratic transition (1996 Parliamentary elections) and after the 2004-EU-enlargement (2010 elections).

While the political discourse and politics in the 1990s are primarily structured by issues of economic transition and post-communist transformation (underlying the classical socio-economic cleavage between market and state), in 2010 also cultural and post-materialist political issues mark the political agenda. Under closer inspection it becomes apparent that the valence issue of *political corruption* is most relevant and addressed by almost all parties in 2010. The expected cultural divide in the European context is visible and potentially conflictive, but for now rather marginal and of secondary importance. Czech political parties, such as the Dawn for Direct Democracy (UPD) have articulated and politicised the cultural divide since the 2013 elections, but it remains to be seen how other parties will react and respond in the near future.

Keywords: cleavages, political parties, political space, transformation, European integration/EU, Czech Republic, media content analysis, correspondence analysis

Abstrakt

Tato analýza mapuje národní politický prostor a vzorce rozporných politických názorů (*cleavages*) v České Republice. Procesy globalizace a evropské integrace zanechaly stopy v západní Evropě a měly za důsledek rozdělení voličů ve smyslu *vítězů* a *poražených* evropské integrace. V zemích východní Evropy je také relevantní distinkce *demarce vs. integrace* (*integration vs. demarcation magnet*). Tyto protikladné trendy proměňují základní struktury soutěže politických stran v rámci jednotlivých zemí i EU jako celku.

Tato práce analyzuje obsah tištěných médií a rekonstruuje převládající témata a rozpory v rámci politického diskurzu na počátku transformace v polovině 90. let. (volby do Parlamentu 1996) a po vstupu do EU (volby 2010).

Hlavním tezí této práce je, že zatímco v 90. letech se politický diskurz zaměřoval především na ekonomiku a společenskou i ekonomickou transformaci (s důrazem na klasický rozpor mezi státem a trhem), v roce 2010 se také nově objevují kulturní a post-materiální témata. Při bližším zkoumání vychází najevo důležitost valenčního tématu *korupce*, který byl od roku 2010 zdůrazňován téměř všemi politickými stranami. Výšší zmíněný kulturní rozpor je v kontextu EU viditelný a potenciálně konfliktní, ale v danou chvíli je okrajovou záležitostí. Politické strany typu Úsvit přímé demokracie nově artikulovaly tento rozpor v volbách 2013, ale zatím není jasné, jak budou téma v budoucnu politizovat a jak ostatní politické strany odpoví.

Klíčová slova: politické rozpory, politické strany, politický prostor, transformace, evropská integrace/EU, Česká Republika, *media content analysis*, *correspondence analysis*,

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

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(Cosimo Stahl)

Charles University Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of International Studies

Key Research Questions	<p>(1) Does the CEE-specific 'traditional' cleavage structure remain stable and unchanged between 1996 and after EU accession (2010)?</p> <p>(2) Do processes of globalisation, denationalisation and above all Europeanisation lead to the transformation of the national space in the Czech Republic – giving rise to (A) new issue dimensions or (B) an issue cleavage?</p>
Brief Description of Theory	<p>The main theory focuses on the classic Rokkean cleavage approach, theory of political dealignment and realignment, agency and structure approaches to studying cleavages, and the micro logic of cleavage formation in CEE.</p>
Brief Description of Methodology	<p>Quantitative media content analysis of print media, <i>sentence-by-sentence</i> coding, issue positions and saliency of political actors and correspondence analysis for the visualisation of data results</p>
Conclusions	<p>While the political space in the 1990s is predominantly structured by a socio-economic cleavage dimension, also cultural and post-materialistic issues and to a lesser degree issue divides emerged in 2010 - indicating a possible transformation towards two-dimensionality. The integration vs. demarcation cleavage is for now (2010) only weakly articulated and thus of secondary importance. The potentially conflictive nature of the cultural divide in a context of European integration is already discernible, and has already been politicised by the UPD party.</p>

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Part I

Theory and Method

As whole societies have been remade since 1989, the two sides of Europe that had officially glowered at each other across barbed wire for decades are now slowly settling down together.

(Fábíán 2007: 18)

1 **Introduction:** Globalisation, denationalisation, European integration - and the transformation of the national political space

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) imply from a social-structural perspective that political parties emerged and configured themselves along prevailing social and cultural conflicts in society – at the moment when key historical junctures (events) and processes of political and industrial modernisation produced major socio-political cleavages. These societal splits often manifested themselves in terms of class, religion/faith and in some cases ethnicity, and divided societies in organised groups with an own collective identity, which were later to become political parties (cf. Rokkan 2000).

As a result of profound socio-economic change and societal transformation the West European electoral market has been subject to considerable change, weakening traditionally strong cleavages, such as the religious cleavage in consequence of secularisation, and the class cleavage in the wake of a growing middle class. These electoral changes were accompanied by an increase in political fragmentation and voter volatility due to the general decline in traditional party identification (Dalton 2003, Dalton et al. 1984, also Smith 1975). As a direct consequence political parties evolved by disengaging from their up-to-then traditional voter and party profile, gradually opening up towards a more heterogeneous, culturally and socially diverse groups in society (*catch-all parties*). In the light of these developments a number of authors were already announcing the ‘partisan decline’ (Dalton 1984, Dalton et al. 1984, also Dalton 2003) and ‘end of ideology’ and political parties (Kirchheimer 1966, also Lipset 1981, Panebianco 1988, Katz/Mair 1995, Smith 1989).

Aside from the destructuring of old cleavages, also new conflicts and cleavages have formed: with the cultural and educational revolutions of the 1960s and 70s, and the emergence of new societal forces and the *New Social Movements*, some authors hold a profound change in societal values (Inglehart 1977) accountable for the emergence of new political conflicts (also Kitschelt 1995, Knutsen/Scarborough 1995, Bornschieer 2009).

Moving further up in time, Kriesi and colleagues (2005, 2006, 2008; also 2012) identified a globalisation and Europeanisation-induced new structural conflict

throughout Western Europe splitting the electorate into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of European Integration and globalisation through a new cultural cleavage between *integration vs. demarcation*. Vaduchova and Hooghe (2009, also Vaduchova 2011) postulate a demarcation vs. integration *magnet* for new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe as a direct consequence of EU leverage and Europeanisation – fundamentally altering and changing political competition and EU contestation on a cultural-economic axis *similar* to that identified by Kriesi.

The impact of European integration and Europeanisation on politics and the national has been subject of considerable debate in Western Europe (see Goetz/Hix 2001, Bartolini 2005, Hooghe et al. 2002, Zürn 2005). More recently its role and influence has also been discussed for the new democracies in Eastern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in particular (cf. Lewis/Mansfeldová 2005, Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005), where the recently ‘freed’ electorate was already highly mobilised, relatively independent and almost without any strong and socially anchored partisan identity (Mair 1997). There is still disagreement on the overall assessment and extent of EU impact on national politics: some emphasise its rather limited overall effect the resilience and pervasiveness of party systems (Anderson 2002, Mair 2000, Haughton 2011), others do recognise a profound and pervasive, but indirect influence on national policies, political institutions and processes (Marks/Wilson 2000, Goetz/Hix 2001) and again others stress the potential of political conflict rooted in the process itself (Marks/Steenbergen 2004, cf. Lewis 2005).

This research project not only seeks to reconstruct and map the national political space and detect the dominant cleavage patterns in the Czech Republic, but also aims to identify the effects and implications of Europeanisation for the structuration of national and partisan politics. By adapting the methodological model developed by Kriesi and colleagues – namely quantitative Content Analysis of print media and Multidimensional Scaling – but tailored to the CEE-specific context, the exact issue dimensions according to media discourses will be identified – detecting old and potentially *new* cleavages in the context of European integration.

The research is divided into two parts: During Part I all relevant theories and the method is presented. The first Chapter introduces the topic by illustrating accounts of the post-communist transition process and its implications for the configuration of political parties and the national political space. Also introductorily discussed are the impact of globalisation and Europeanisation and its effects on Western and above all

Eastern Europe. Chapter two describes the research design in detail including the main theory and the methodology. Furthermore the most recent literature on cleavage formation in Eastern Europe is summarised before presenting research questions and hypotheses. Part II comprises the case study and the analysis of cleavage change in the Czech Republic. Chapter 4 presents the case of the Czech Republic, reviews indigenous literature on Czech Politics, presents the findings and in-depth analysis of the structure and changes of the political space. Final Chapter 5 concludes.

1.1 Post-communist transition and the configuration of political parties in East Central Europe

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s a new research area emerged pending processes of transition, reform, social transformation and democratisation. In the CEE context ‘transition’ refers to the transformation from a planned economy to a market economy, and from authoritarianism to democracy (Böner et al. 2003). While some scholars focus on economic aspects and the market as the most important stage of transition (Drahokoupil 2009, see also Przeworski 1995), others emphasise its institutional and systemic character (Jacoby 2003, see also DiMaggio/Powell 1999) or speak of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington 1991) thus stressing the socio-political and societal purport of the transitional demonstration and diffusion effect (cf. Linz/Stephan 1995). Offe (1992) speaks of a ‘triple transition’ in CEE region since the process includes processes of democratisation, marketization/economic transformation as well as state building.

For Gunther et al. (1995: 7) democratic consolidation of a regime is achieved, if all relevant political actors adhere to the constitutionally established democratic rules of the political game and only resort to the political key institutions as the only legitimate framework for political action. Although processes of transition and consolidation are two distinct aspects of democratisation¹, they may at some point overlap depending on either minimalist or maximalist definitions of the concepts (Ibid.). According to Kitschelt’s (1996: 460) rule of thumb 20 years of democratic rule are usually enough to consolidate democracy and accept democratic rules as the only legitimate framework for political action². Karl and Schmitter (1991: 271, 274ff)

¹ Transition marks the period of regime change towards a democratic regime and the establishment of a political system. Political institutions, where consolidation is a process, are established and consolidated. ² In the case of a democratic regime after more than 20 years (ibid.).

conceive democratisation as a “complex historical process with analytically distinct, and empirically overlapping stages of transition, consolidation, persistence, and eventually deconsolidation”. Political transitions “are *produced* by actors who chose strategies that lead to a change from one kind of regime to another” (cf. Novák 2001 for critique). Huntington’s (1991) typology for transition on the other hand is threefold comprising ‘transformation’, ‘transplacement’ and ‘replacement’.

Bielasiak (1997, 2002) distinguishes between a *substance* and a *process* approach to studying CEE party systems: the former analyses mostly ideological posturing, policy spacing and issue relevance/saliency as a result of socio-economic transformation to delineate party positions and voter placements, whereas the latter stresses the role of political processes, agency and action that help transcend the initial conditions of post-communist transition in order to consolidate a pluralist and polyarchist party system. Given the volatile and fluid nature of political transition in the new democracies the author emphasises the role of political choice in influencing the formation of political cleavages. The conjoint study and merging of both approaches contributes to a better understanding of CEE party systems and the nature of post-communist consolidation. Thus key to a consolidated democracy is stability, which according to the author (23) is a function “of well-defined social cleavages represented by political options through clear issue and programmatic [positioning]” (cf. Evans/Whitefield 1993). Therefore the nature of post-communist transition bears directly on the assessment of party system formation (ibid.). Political cleavages not only provide the bases of support for parties (cf. Dalton et al. 1985, Dalton 2003) but also structure the content of party competition and political conflict more generally – themselves contributing to democratic stability by solidifying party-public ties and increasing the predictability of political outcomes (Whitefield 2002: 181f).

There are two opposing perspectives when it comes to theorising post-communist party systems:

The *tabula rasa* hypothesis (Kitschelt 1992, 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999) or alternatively called the ‘*missing middle*’ perspective (Evans/Whitefield 1993, 1998) emphasises the devastating impact of Communism and thus the uncertainty, inexperience and ineptness of the new democracies to establish a strong and stable party system³. Mair (1997) concluded that given the lack of stable cleavage

³ Sztompka (1992, 1993) speaks of civic or “civilisational incompetence” as a result of the communist experience due to excessive legal positivistic over-compliance and subservience to authority,

structures party systems in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe are bound to be significantly different from Western Europe and characterised by high levels of voter volatility, as well as controversial and conflictive (rather than consensual) party competition.

A second approach is far more optimistic and focuses not only on structure but also agency and political interaction in defining party systems of the new states. Much more credit is given to political actors for their ability to learn and adapt to external and internal change (cf. Bielasiak 2002). Kitschelt (1995), who criticises the *tabula rasa* approach as far too conservative, states that three important correlative factors and preconditions influenced the extent of programmatic structuring of party systems in the new democracies: *system time* (programmatic party competition as a 'signalling game' needs 'time to learn'), the *political structure* (power sharing, diffusion and decentralisation mechanism to undercut clientelism and patronage), and a certain 'healthy' degree of partisan fragmentation. Also important is the nature and structure of previous *authoritarian rule* and the *mode of democratic transition*, which is itself highly correlative with the previous type of communist regime (452). In this context he distinguishes between patrimonial communism, national consensus communism and bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. For the present analysis the third type is most important, during which political contestation and interest articulation were rather limited, but the level of rational-bureaucratic was elevated due to the establishment of rule-governed administrations. On the eve of the communist dissolution these imploded and collapsed abruptly – suffocating any communist-elitist claim and entitlement to political co-determination during the democratisation process. As a result the liberal-democratic opposition chose depersonalising and power-sharing institutions, such as parliamentarianism and proportional electoral representation. The Czech Republic according to Kitschelt is a "prime example of this type of socialism" (453).

Both Kitschelt (1992, 1995) and Evans/Whitefield (1993, 1998) recognise that processes of democratic transition and political consolidation may vary and therefore require country-specific analyses. Therefore the character and pattern of cleavages varies considerably across the region; and variation in political competition, ideological partisan blocs and partisanship is often explainable by country-specific cultural legacies, specific forms of communist rule, distinct modes of transition, as

excessive political entrepreneurship, fluidity of property rights and international economic constraints (cf. Kitschelt 1995: 451).

well as different social, societal and institutional structures (Whitefield 2002). Following this logic, cleavage politics should not be assessed regionally, but rather country-specifically. The *comparative communism approach* and (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 2000) or alternatively called *structured diversity perspective* (Rohrschneider/ Whitefield 2008) constitutes a third alternative to studying cleavages in the region seeking to identify the general thrust of party competition⁴: on one side it takes into account CEE country-specific institutional and cultural factors, and on the other it recognises a certain common historical background (i.e. due to common communist legacy and transition/marketization experience). It also acknowledged the probability of a regionally common reform dimension and rather country-specific socio-demographic realities (e.g. ethnicity).

Evans and Whitefield (1993, 1998, 2000) not only show that socio-economic differentiation in relation to partisanship is evident in the region, but also a variety of identities and ideologies (e.g. class, ethnicity, left-right) is present, although in great regional variation and complexity. The only cross-regional commonality lies in the sources of division and the limited extent of diversity with similar cleavage patterns appearing only in countries that share common characteristics. There is strong evidence for social and ideological cleavages, but mostly relevant to political choices.

During the following years of democratic transition, pluralisation of the party system has slowly been achieved, to which processes of politics have significantly contributed by shaping the supply and demand side of politics by articulating political interest and partisan identity (Bielasack 1997). When Bielasack (2002) examined the institutionalisation of the development of the electoral system (including set of party rules, electoral regulations and norms) in 2002, still no clear coalescence of competitive politics around established parties with strong constituencies was identifiable – with the exception of the Czech Republic, where average voter volatility declined and an effective number of electoral parties was maintained. This indicated a growing attachment and identification of the electorate with political parties. Bakke and Sitter (2005) claim that a remarkable degree of party system stability in terms of internal organisation and patterns of party competition was achieved in the V4 (Višegrád 4) countries by the end of the 1990s, and above all in Hungary and the Czech Republic where party strategy and political choice have significantly

⁴ There is again a minimal, but important difference between the two: the comparative communism approach is rather society-centred emphasising the importance of social division, whereas the structured diversity perspective stresses the salience attributed to CEE-specific and nationally conditioned party-political stimuli, such as transition, democratisation or ethnicity (Rohrschneider/ Whitefield 2008: 287).

contributed to the development of a Scandinavia-like left-right bloc competition. Enyedi (2006) concludes that democratic politics in CEE by and large equals party politics.

Cholova and Bochsler (2011) note that after initial phases of polarisation and fragmentation during democratic transition more pluralised and 'decently' polarised party systems emerged throughout the area. Despite overall high levels of voter volatility and the absence of stable and strong *structural* partisan cleavages in society, the ideologically transformed party systems share a high degree of stability and party competition with even a certain degree of structure – though, unlike Western Europe, entirely based on party interaction, partisan strategies and issue competition (cf. Sitter 2002, Deegan-Krause 2006, see following Chapter 2.2).

Hayoz et al. (2011: 10ff) conclude that CEE countries after more than 20 years of transition turned into market and rule of law oriented democracies, the transformation of which was significantly speeded up by EU membership aspirations and later membership in a “plethora of contemporary European and international institutions” (such as EU, OECE, OSCE and NATO). The OSCE and NATO membership may serve as an ultimate “litmus test of successful transformation, sealing the process with growing respect of the international community for various political and technical achievements of transformation”. Under the auspices of the EU partner states numerous sustaining reforms had been implemented, and political will and social capability demonstrated while the process of Europeanisation has lent important support. According to the authors these processes of transition and transformation can also be simply called ‘Europeanisation’. Similarly Pridham (2005) attributes a great deal of leverage to the process of Europeanisation, which shares an intrinsic interactive relationship with processes of democratic transition and consolidation.

1.2 Globalisation, denationalisation and European Integration

Bornschier (2010: 26) refers to the phenomenon of globalisation as the “spatial widening and intensification of regional or global economic and cultural interactions” (cf Goldblatt *et al.* 1997), whereas Anthony Giddens (1990: 64) defines it as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”. For him globalisation causes a change and diminishment in the scope of

action and range of influence of traditional institutions, such as the nation-state, the family or also the church: their capacity and ability to solve globally scaled problems, grant a sense of security and stability, or provide a framework for meaning and action through the provision of norms and rules is therefore limited. In a globalised, highly connected and interdependent world we are now confronted with a new sort of security and stability dilemma despite the fact that we are fully aware of the “riskiness of risk”, *i.e.* the consequences of our own ‘man-manufactured risks’ as a result of the seemingly uncontrollable advancement of science and new technologies (global warming, Chernobyl/Fukushima). The process of identity formation is now subject to ‘detraditionalisation’ insofar as primal and native cultures, societies and traditions are exposed to influxes of other, sometimes differing (and often perceived as ‘foreign’) cultures and traditions (migration, multiculturalism). This brings with it the need for constant ‘reflexivity’ – namely permanent evaluation, reassessment and contextualisation of the close living environment in a globalised world (Giddens 2002).

The impact of the globalisation process and its concomitant effects on the social and political life is equally vast and far-reaching – altering, challenging and affecting not only the traditional structure and understanding of the nation-state in the Westphalian sense – sovereign with regards to its internal affairs and non-interfering in its relation with other coexisting nation-states – but also the international system, democracy, the welfare state and other modern political institutions (Zürn 2001, 2001; also Bartolini 2005, Beck 2003). The actual political process set in motion by the phenomenon of globalisation is denoted ‘politics of denationalisation’, which encompass the reconfiguration of national politics as the result of the new political challenges and issues raised by globalisation and state interdependence. A direct consequence are new policy cleavages and instruments to meet those challenges, as well as changes in the traditional spheres of influence and power of political interest groups, and the traditional structure of societal coalitions (Walter/Zürn 2005). Therefore the process of globalisation and denationalisation does not only affect the mere nation-states as the basic unit of all polities, but has significant implications for the national political space - involving any number of political and societal actors and groups of actors, such as political parties.

With denationalisation and the opening of national borders *mobility* becomes a new factor of societal stratification (Bayman 2002), and only those given an ‘exit-option’ (e.g. through education and resources) are mobilised enough to take a profit

(Bartolini 2005). The free movement of people that accompanies these processes is closely linked to increasing *economic* (sectorial and international), *political* (between nation-states and inter-/supranational political actors) and *cultural* (due to massive migration) competition accounting for the new cleavage between *integration* and *demarcation* (Kriesi 2006, cf. Bartolini 2001, 2005; Hix 1999). The transformation of political space and political party competition along this new line of conflict results in an intensification of political conflicts, the triggering of new potentials for political mobilisation, and an increase in political fragmentation (Ibid.).

One of the new potentials constitutes the opportunity of new linkages between social groups and political parties through the articulation and politicisation of identity ('identity politics') and ideology. By targeting an ideologically homogenous group of traditionalist-communitarian voters and 'losers' of globalisation and European integration at the extreme right end of the political spectrum, neo-populist right-wing parties throughout Europe have successfully seized and exploited new issues of conflict, such as European integration and immigration (Bornschiefer 2009). The combination of authoritarian ideology and free-market ideology is denoted as the 'winning formula' (Kitschelt/McGann 1995).

Interestingly in Western Europe peripheral political parties in the context of European integration are now faced with the following dilemma: since the *left* is traditionally socially libertarian, but economically populist favouring market regulations and state interventionism, and vice versa the *right* generally supports economic liberalisation and at the same time social populism/conservatism, the willingness of both to open up towards economic and cultural integration varies (Marks/Wilson 2000). The radical Left views the European integration project as an elitist capitalist project that often excludes the citizenry from the decision-making process empowering giant corporations, whereas for the radical Right this supranational elitist giant poses a direct threat to national autonomy, identity and tradition (Marks et al. 2006). According to Zürn (2005) peripheral parties use this opportunity to mobilise 'losers' of globalisation: the previously mentioned neo-populist parties politicise and support *cultural protectionism* whereas the new left take rather socio-economic *protectionist* stance – often manifest in political Euroskepticism on both extreme ends of the political spectrum (Taggart 1998, Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004). Particularly the cultural dimension is said to exert a significant effect on the positioning and the agenda setting of political parties with respect to European

integration (Hooghe et al. 2002). The reasons for opposing or supporting European integration are the same in Eastern and Western Europe (Vachudova/Hooghe 2009).

Hooghe (et al. 2002) discovered that support for European integration and EU politics, including cohesion, environment and fiscal policies, is structured by two domestic dimensions of contestation: the left-right conflict constrains support in a linear fashion with the two extreme sides being the most Eurosceptic. The *New Politics* dimension (green/alternative/libertarian [GAL] vs. traditional/authoritarian/nationalist [TAL]) determines the variation on issues resulting from European integration with the TAL pole being the most articulated. When comparing East and West following the 2004-EU-enlargement the authors claim that although the logic of support and opposition between East and West is the same shaking and moving parties in a strikingly similar fashion, the outcome is completely different since political interaction occurs on an axis of party competition *orthogonal* to the West producing distinctive patterns of party support and opposition within the national political space (Marks et al. 2006).

1.3 The imprint of Europeanisation and globalisation in Central and Eastern Europe

Globalisation as the main driving force in economics, international relations and culture has also significantly affected the CEE region and contributed to its transformation into a globally interconnected community based on values of democracy and liberal markets despite the continued importance of cultural and national delimitations. These globalisation-induced transformations are rooted in and affected by domestic and global environments redefining the traditionally strong and centralist role of the state in relation to its European neighbours and an increasingly interdependent international environment: The entry of CEE countries into global economic streams including their adaption of neo-liberal economic practices and policies has produced advantages and disadvantages during the painful and rocky path of economic transformation, as well as new perks and challenges during the process of European and international integration. Interpretations of security and development with regard to these processes are at the same time interwoven with different national interests, own political agendas and distinct self-expressions in international affairs (Fábián 2007).

According to Brusis (2005) the study of Europeanisation gives new insights on the effects of globalisation and international interdependence, *i.e.* denationalisation. In line with Schmidt (2003) I will treat Europeanisation and European Integration as a regional variant of globalisation.

From a socio-historical perspective von Hirschhausen and Patel (2010: 2ff) define Europeanisation as a “variety of political, social, economic and cultural processes that promote (or modify) a sustainable strengthening of intra-European connections and similarities through acts of emulation, exchange and entanglement, and describe this phenomenon as an unsteady, multidirectional and deontological process, with no fixed geographical boundaries and not only involving ‘just’ Europe. Radaelli (2003: 30) on the other hand ascribes to Europeanisation the “processes of (1) construction (2) diffusion and (3) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared belief and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structure and political policies.” Werner Landecker (1951) proposed four aspects of European Integration: cultural (through consistency of cultural standards), normative (through the popular adaption of those cultural values), communicative (through informational and communicational interconnectedness of European societies) and functional (through functional, institutional, socio-political interdependence). The functional and transactional model has influenced European integration the most.

Studies with a focus on the functional and political dimension of Europeanisation concentrate on the effects on *politics* (such as the party systems), *politie*s (political institutions and norms) and *polici*es (domestic policy-making in relation to the EU context) (Musil 2005). Similarly Marks et al. (2006) characterise the 2004-EU-enlargement as a geopolitical process of extending European norms, and by extension peace and economic growth. Political Europeanisation may thus be fostered by three factors: external EU incentive and pressure backed up by EU conditionality of rewards and sanctions (top-down) (cf. Grabbe 2001, 2006), a process of social learning during the socialisation and internalisation of shared European norms and values, and domestically (bottom-up) by political actors themselves during the policy-making process. According to Zvěřina (2005) most of CEE and the Czech Republic in particular quickly implemented European norms and adjusted national legislation matters and mechanism to EU standards (politie)s).

Grabbe (2001, 2006) states that the EU Eastern enlargement and its impact on the governance structure of CEE countries goes well beyond the mere adaptation of norms, procedures and institutions. For Kopecký (2004) a complete system of governance has been adopted. Europeanisation in CEE in its early stages is therefore more likely because incomplete consolidation facilitates the incorporation and institutionalisation of rules and norms without causing fundamental institutional or cultural alteration and change. The institutional set-up and electoral rules of government on the communal level was consolidated through subsequent local elections during the 1990s (Brusis 2005: 24). Similarly Lewis (2005), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) state that the impact of Europeanisation in the 2004-EU enlargement countries may be quite different and stronger, since CEE party systems are less static and EU's influence on CEE domestic politics is far more pervasive.

The EU through negotiations and EU conditionality (Copenhagen criteria) has had a profound impact (Pridham 2005; Grabbe 2001, 2006) according to one strand of authors, has affected party systems and significantly structured party competition – giving way to differentiated political spectra exteriorly and logically similar to that of Western Europe (Brusis 2005, Vaduchova 2011, Marks et al. 2006, Jasiewicz 2003). Party positioning on European integration is said to not only reflect but also reinforce CEE party competition, which suggests that contention of Europeanisation is aligned with the major dimensions of political conflict (Marks et al. 2006: 167f). The combined casual effect of EU leverage through accession negotiations and EU-conditionality on one side and the impact of communist legacy in terms of party organisation and ideology on the other has compelled major CEE parties to bring their economic and political agenda in line with EU standards (Vaduchova/Hooghe 2009) – even transforming the very nature of CEE party systems through several waves of *adapting* a pro-Western agenda (Vaduchova 2011). Signs of convergence between Eastern and Western party systems are also evident in the patterns of party organisation (van Biezen 2003), political action and interaction (Pridham 2005) and most importantly party competition (Kitschelt et al. 1999) resulting in the diffusion of distinct party ideologies and Western-style policies throughout CEE (ibid.).

The emergence of Eurosceptic sentiments all throughout Europe is indicative of this development (Brusis 2005). Taggart (1998) distinguishes between *hard* (outright rejection of the entire EI project) and *soft* (contingent qualified opposition) party-based Euroscepticism, which is strategically taken up by parties to address European integration as a 'second-order issue'. Nearly the entire CEE region exhibits

degrees of soft Euroscepticism as an integral minority component of the party systems and mostly on grounds of concerns for specific EU policies and partisan strategic relevance (Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004). Kopecký and Mudde (2002) attribute more leverage to the role of partisan ideology in explaining Euroscepticism and party positions on the EU when suggesting a fourfold ideal-type categorisation of Euroscepticism on two dimensions: *diffuse* support for/opposition to the *ideas* of European *integration* as opposed to *specific* support for/opposition to of the *practices* of the European *Union*⁵. For Marks (et al. 2006) Euro-scepticism in CEE unlike the Western European is unipolar, since it often combines values of the Left/Right and GAL/TAN in one party family (mostly Communist parties).

A somewhat different stance is taken by Haughton (2011) and colleagues, who delimitate the direct impact of EU membership – hence *after* EU accession and enlargement – on CEE party politics to mostly the field of government *policy* whereas the influence on party organisation and programmes (*politics*) is rather limited despite the fact, that the EU may act as a constraint (e.g. continuation of EU conditionality through the Maastricht criteria), a source of spillover (EU policy opportunities and challenges) and a point of reference (European standards). For them the EU for both Eastern and Western Europe alike “does not appear to be the driver or navigator of party politics [... but rather] the conductor of fellow passenger” (12).

According to Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2011) the difference in opinion and disagreement over the extent of EU impact on political systems lies in epistemologically different perspectives and expectations of Europeanisation leading to different ways of theorising EU impact (with different weight on stability vs. change): the ‘dynamic representation’ approach emphasises external and internal *change* depending on context specific conditions (e.g. communist legacy, CEE context-specific aspects of party competition and organisation during post-communist democratic transition and European integration including EU conditionality) as a stimulus for consequential adaption and change of relatively new, organisationally ‘flux’ political parties – whereas an alternative ‘comparative’ perspective stresses the importance of representational consistency, partisan programmatic coherence and party systems stability in line with broader comparative party literature.

Although most CEE party systems today reflect a consensus on the benefits of European integration (Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004, Vachudova 2011), demands of EU

⁵ The resulting four categories Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Europragmatics and Eurorejects more accurately describe CEE party positions on Europeanisation (ibid.)

conditionality had also begun to produce levels of discontent (Lewis 2006), because unlike traditional EU member states, which can influence EU rules and veto or postpone their implementations, accession countries had meet all conditions (Copenhagen criteria), and compliance was subject to EU discretion (Grabbe 2001, 2005). After EU accession TAN parties have increased at the cost of hardliner leftist parties (Left-TAN), but no increase in the number of Eurosceptic parties has been registered (Vachudova 2011). According to Vachudova further research 'beyond conditionality' will explore how EU and European integration further influence national politics, especially seeing as political parties post-conditionality have now more freedom in setting their economic and political agenda: European integration may still *temper* CEE party politics.

2 **Research Design:** Analysis of party preferences and issue saliency by means of media content analysis

The theory is threefold: the classic Rokkean approach is used to explain party configurations throughout Europe, including Kriesi's new *demarcation vs. integration* cleavage in an era of globalisation and European integration. To bridge this predominantly Western European theory with the CEE context, and to establish its applicability for post-communist CEE countries some epistemological adjustments and incorporation of CEE-specific theoretical accounts are necessary.

2.1 Theory (i): Rokkan's Cleavage theory and the new *integration vs. demarcation* cleavage

According to Rokkan (Lipset/Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 2000) the exact type of party system in Western European countries was determined by those socio-structural cleavages, that prevailed during processes of consolidation of the national party systems since the second half of the 19th century. A cleavage is defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213ff) as a political divide with three components: (1) a social group or *collective* with an own shared (perceived) collective identity and a set of beliefs and values ('normative' element), (2) a certain degree of *organisation* or

organisational manifestation and commonly shared interests ('institutional' element), and (3) a *socio-structural* core based on certain features or traits, such as religion, class, ethnicity or language ('empirical' element). The latter serves as a structural base for a cleavage constituting a latent political potential while splitting a group of people into two opposing camps, and, once articulated and organised, is given manifest political meaning and expression (ibid.). The cleavage concept combines the behaviouralist micro-approach of agency with structural, macro-institutional aspects of the political system (Kriesi/Grande 2012). For Bornschier (2010: 55, 65) cleavages denote a "durable pattern of political behaviour of socially or politically defined groups" linked to political organisation thus representing a political structure as a property of *behaviour* in David Easton's sense. Two crucial processes of political, as well as social and economic modernisation are the starting point in Rokkan's model, since they each produced four critical moments⁶ — giving rise to a fundamental political *cleavages* between two opposing groups in society: (1) the centre vs. periphery cleavage between diverging nation-building cultures in the centre and ethnically, linguistically and denominationally different peripheral cultures, (2) the *secularist* cleavage between the centralising, mobilising nation-state and the historically privileged church over earthly dominion and the monopoly on education, (3) the *urban vs. rural* cleavage between diverging agricultural and industrial interests and traditional and industrial modes of production (land vs. industry), and (4) the *class* cleavage between worker/proletariat and owner/bourgeoisie. While the first two are cultural-territorial and the last two are economic-functional cleavages (ibid.), they eventually boiled down to two residual dimensions: the cultural (religion) and the socio-economic (class) one (Kriesi et al. 2008: 13). Along the 'battle lines' of these four historical cleavages modern political parties, party families and party systems came into existence in Western Europe.

As stipulated in their famous *frozen party thesis* (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) these lines of conflict remained remarkably stable and unchanged allowing them to fully develop into political identity and party affiliations – corroborating evidence for this can be found in Bartolini and Mair's (1990) aggregate analysis of electoral

⁶ Namely the reformation and counter-reformation movement in the 16th and 17th century, the French Revolution in 1789, the industrial revolution throughout the 19th century, and the Russian and German revolutions after WW I (ibid.).

volatility between and within ideological party blocks⁷ or in the relatively low variation in the shares of votes over time (Mair 1993: 126ff).

The new *integration vs. demarcation cleavage* (by Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008)

Given socio-political, societal and cultural change Rokkan's four traditional cleavages are most likely to change in relative leverage and relevance with direct consequence for the structuring of political party systems: traditional cleavages either transform and change in structure and content, or new cleavages are formed (Dalton et al. 1985, Dalton 2003). As a result of the cultural revolutions ('Silent Revolutions') and student movements in the 1960s (see Inglehart 1977) a new post-modern cultural and value-based conflict and antagonism emerged between a more traditional, authoritarian and materialist camp, as well as a libertarian, liberal and post-materialist group in society who demanded a change in norms, values and traditions (Inglehart 1977) – (cf. Kitschelt 1994). According to Kriesi et al. (2005, 2006, 2008) these cultural revolutions constitute one of two *new critical junctures*. Bornschier (2010: 63) emphasises the educational content of said revolutions, since "higher education socialises individuals with universalistic values" (cf. Stubager 2008, or Lipset (1981) on the 'liberalising effect' of education). The newly expressed political affiliations and opportunities were later to become new political parties (e.g. greens or the new left) (Kriesi 2008, see also Kriesi et al. 1995, Della Porta et al. 2009). These new parties usually take a more liberal, culturally open and universalistic stance, and traditionally represent the interests and values of the traditional working class and 'socio-cultural professionals' of the heterogeneous new middle class⁸ (Oesch 2006; see also Evans/De Graaf 2013).

The second critical moment according to the authors was not until the 1990s, when the process of globalisation initiated the second big transformation process (Hix 1999. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). New globalisation-induced potentials are exploited mostly by right wing and neo-populist parties also forming a

⁷ Bartolini and Mair (1990) observe three types of volatility and stability in Western European countries between 1890-1985: the total volatility of party systems which remained stable, the ideological class volatility between left-wing and right-wing party blocks diminished, but the internal volatility within one of the two blocks increased.

⁸ As a result of modernisation and the expansion of the welfare state the middle class has significantly grown and now encompasses more heterogeneous shares of different social strata of society according to logic of work and, as a result, political orientation: (1) rather conservative *technocrats* – from administrative, technical and judicial professional environment; and (2) tendentially more libertarian socio-cultural *professionals* – from social and cultural professional backgrounds (Oesch 2006).

countermovement to the Leftist resurgence of the 70s (Bornschieer 2010: 25ff). The new right-wing movement was able to form a novel partisan identity in adopting a pragmatic traditionalist-communitarian ideology often directly opposed to their rival leftist counterpart. Right-wing parties of this kind not only appeal to the old share of middle class voters (farmers, petty bourgeoisie, liberal professionals), but also to the technocrats of the new middle class (Kriesi 2010, see also Oesch 2006).

Due to these ideological shifts, the transformations of partisan alliances and changes in the electoral market, the bi-dimensional political spectrum of the political space is somewhat altered and their underlying meaning and lines of conflict changed: along the economic/class dimension the free market and the welfare state still constitute the opposing poles between state interventionism/market regulation versus the free market economy/deregulation (Adam Smith). On the cultural dimension on the other hand the change is far more palpable: instead of religious vs. secular values the antagonism is now predominantly between libertarian and authoritarian value systems (Kriesi et al. 2008).

Voter mobilisation on both peripheral sides of the political spectrum – new left and green parties since the late 70s and neo-populist right-wing parties since the late 90s/early 2000s – successfully completed the new structural divide – thus polarising and splitting the national political space into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of *globalisation*, *European integration* (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008) and *modernisation* (Bornschieer 2010). This new cultural conflict in the context of European integration is called a *demarcation* and *integration* cleavage⁹. Bornschieer (2010: 9, 63) holds a slightly different view due to his nuanced emphasis on the role of collective identity and values as a result of the *educational* revolutions rather than socio-structural factors: the antagonism is *identitarian* between *libertarian-universalistic* and *traditionalist-communitarian* conflicts of *values* (*identitarian cleavage*). Since the functional cleavages have been weakened and destructured at the national level through the opening of borders in an increasingly integrated Europe, globalisation only indirectly “feeds into the new cultural conflict [...] by weakening the state-market cleavage”. European integration on the other hand directly reinforces the cultural antagonism. According to Vaduchova and Hooghe’s (2009) Kriesi’s demarcation-integration antagonism has created what they call a *bipolar magnetic field* in CEE as well,

⁹ The new cleavage can alternatively be referred to as conflict between independence and integration (Bartolini ct. in Kriesi et al. 2006:9, Hix 1999).

inducing political parties to align on single economic-cultural axis spanning from Left-TAN to Right-GAL.

With the emergence of this new conflict, new politically charged issues of values, traditions and identity ('lifestyle politics', 'new politics' dimension) were brought onto the political agenda (Dalton et al. 1984, see also Inglehart 1977, Kitschelt 1994, Hooghe 2002). The mobilisation of new groups of voters particularly by the neo-populist right (Bornschieer 2010) – namely 'losers' of globalisation and European integration on the short end of the stick – ultimately implies and presupposes the political de- and realignment of a significant share of voters (Dalton 1984, Mair et al. 2004).

2.2 Theory (ii): Political de-/realignment and the role of political agency

De-alignment occurs when traditional voter affiliation and party identification, as well as links between socio-political and societal groups and political parties are significantly altered and as a result weakened, due to which social group of voters lose their identification with a party. We speak of *structural* de-alignment when long-term processes of social transformation and modernisation resulting in the evolution of social structures shatter and weaken the bond of social groups into which an 'old' conflict was anchored; whereas *behavioural* de-alignment denotes the alteration and weakening of traditional linkages between social groups and ideological party blocks (e.g. left vs. right), the roots of which lie in 'old' conflicts and specific core issues. In times of change, these either pacify and lose relevance – or stronger new issues and divisions rupture and rearrange 'old' cleavage patterns (Martin 2000, Lachat 2007; see also Bornschieer 2009).

Mair (et al. 2004) treat structural de-alignment as one of several key elements that might be involved in electoral change – in addition to socio-structural change, decline in party identification, change in value orientations (e.g. post-materialism) or market-conditioned factors during issue competition with other political parties¹⁰.

Logically re-alignment occurs when a highly salient new issue, which does not fit into the existing cleavage structure of the political space, is being brought into the political agenda, politicised and articulated by parties adapting and reacting to that change (Martin 2000, Dalton 1984, Dalton et al. 1985). While de-alignment denotes

¹⁰ Accordingly it is up to the individual parties to identify and politicise new key issues of relevance in competition with others (ibid.).

“the weakening of the established structure of conflict, by realignments we mean the process of forging new links between parties and social groups” (Bornschieer 2009: 1). According to Mair (et al. 2004) party responses to market change are manifold: they can either ignore the problem (no-response), they may change their internal party organisation (e.g. decentralisation/centralisation, professionalization [see Mancini 1999] and mediatisation of [see Mazzoleni/Schulz 2001] party politics) or they may react strategically vis-à-vis voters and other parties (by rethinking the electoral target group/intensification of traditional voter base; negative campaigning of rivalling parties) or programmatically, ideologically and policy-oriented (by changing specific policy positions and incorporating key issues). A response may also occur in the form of the promotion of institutional reforms (e.g. push for direct-democratic decision-making mechanism, such as referenda).

For Martin (2000) the cleavage concept relates to the phenomena of party system change insofar as not only structural potentials and changes as the result of long-term evolution, but also new political potentials and issues produce cleavages, whose articulation and adaption by political parties contribute to establishing new links and identities between social groups (behavioural de- and realignment). According to Borschier (2009) attention must thus be paid to new issues and their relationship to traditional conflicts, and possibly to the interaction of the structural and behavioural basis of political alignments and parties. In this perspective there are thus two approaches to studying political cleavages: the *bottom-up* approach through analysis of the socio-structural basis of party choice, and the *top-down* approach emphasising the role of agency and political parties (ibid). According to Evans and De Graaf (2013) the top-down approach proves far more suitable for explaining changes in cleavage patterns and values since it attributes these changes to social blurring and increased socio-demographic heterogeneity as a result of societal transformation. For Zürn (2005: 6) the analysis of political agency is an essential prerequisite for an accurate understanding of the dynamics of globalisation and globalisation-induced policy change.

The role of political agency and collective identity

For the study of cleavage formation and the pertinence of Rokkan’s cleavage theory for CEE it is necessary to focus less on social determinism and the relevance of structure and critical junctures, but ascribe more leverage to the role of voluntarist

agency and especially political parties and elites due to their ability to shape and structure politics (Sartori 1968, Bornschier 2009, Enyedi 2005). According to numerous authors (among them Whitefield 2002, Evans/Whitefield 1993, Kitschelt 1995) political cleavages are in all likelihood present in the region, advocating the comparative study of cleavages in democratic politics including the Rokkean approach for CEE. Within the given institutional norms political actors set up interpretative frameworks according to which the political public makes sense of differences in political interests and perceived social conflicts ultimately determining the final configuration of cleavages by crystallising opposition lines. Socially and institutionally constrained parties as “political actors [...] combine interests, values, cultural milieus and social networks” (Enyedi 2005: 699). The overall cleavage structure of a political society results from the interplay between three factors: political entrepreneurship, which according to Lewis (1994) fosters and foments the formation of the party system, as well as pre-political preferences (communist legacy), the structures of a society (as raw material) and the constraining institutional framework, such as electoral thresholds and rules/norms (Enyedi 2005). Hence cleavages can also be thought of as “strongly structured and persistent lines of *salient* social and ideological division among politically important *actors*” (Whitefield 2002: 181). Articulated interests are crucial markers for political identities even in uncertain conditions of post-communist transformation (Bielasack 2002: 191). According to Agh (1994) even weak CEE political parties have a significant impact on the structuring of party systems and transitional politics. During the formation of party system in CEE political parties are thus the primary agents in formulating, articulating and politicising substantive structural cleavages (Sitter 2002) by translating cleavages into party competition (Sartori 1968). In this sense the party system, once developed, perpetuates itself, contributing to its own stability, the development of which is thus primarily driven by the strategies taken by the parties (Sitter 2002). Parties may politicise the social structure of political cleavages through value-based cleavage voting (Bornschier 2009, Tóka 1998). With this reasoning the explanatory emphasis shifts from long-term evolutionary process of structural transformation as key critical junctures to the agency of political actors; “in short, parties have stolen the show (Sitter 2002: 448)”. Tóka (1998) applies Knutsen and Scarborough’s methodology of value cleavage formation to the central Eastern European context, according to which value reference and individualistic value voting more effectively sustain party choice and loyalty than ‘pure structural voting’ – ultimately contributing

to the formation of ideological cleavages along a line of value conflicts (cf. Knutsen/Scarborough 1995)¹¹. For Tóka (607f) direct party appeals to ideology (i.e. calling for allocative efficiency and fairness of public policy favourable to everyone) invite ‘value voting’, whereas direct appeals to group interests and *identities* induce ‘structural voting’. The ideological approach thus focuses on ideological self-placement as an alternative for partisan/political identity and the content of issue space formed by dimensions of issue attitudes and values (Budge/Farlie, ct. in Evans/Whitefield 1993: 525). Hence party positions, political alignments and issue divisions may be guided by their ideological location in domestic opposition including party positioning on European integration. Especially in CEE ideology seems to structure party attitudes to European integration more strongly (Vaduchova/Hooghe 2009).

As a result of this shift in focus and conception Bartolini and Mair’s three-fold definition of a full cleavage becomes not obsolete, but difficult to adhere to. Therefore Deegan-Krause (2006) dismantles a cleavage into three possible conceptual levels and elements – *institutions*, *attitudes* and *structure*¹² – that postulate different key cleavage relationships, namely a *difference* (one lone element), a *divide* (two elements) or a *full* cleavage (all three elements). The second classification ‘cleavage divide’ seems most suitable to describe ‘something less’ than Bartolini and Mair’s cleavage. If differences are both structural (e.g. age, gender or class) and attitudinal (such as differences in more established socio-economic issues, but for example also post-materialist *attitudes* and values) then so is political alignment and we may speak of a *position divide*; if on the other hand they are structural and institutional a *census divide* (alignment of group identity and political choice) is more accurate, whereas an *issue divide* is given when both attitudinal and institutional interests are ‘differential’. The latter two are most likely for CEE. Deegan-Krause and Enyedi (2010) state that when researching the role of agency both the *positional* (alignment) and *temporal* (stability over time) cleavage *structure* should be addressed and ascertained in relation to the political (party choice), social (socio-demographics, values and group-consciousness) and temporal context. There is a need for a more accurate research design at measuring cleavages, which departs from the common

¹¹ For Knutsen and Scarborough (1995: 493f) cleavage politics entails “that members of an identifiable social group adhere to the values associated with that group and vote for a party identified with that group and advocating those values”.

¹² *Structure* refers to *empirical*, *ascriptive* and *demographic*, *attitude* to *normative/value* and *institution* to *political*, *organisational* and *behavioural* categories (ibid.).

'triangular' cleavage model and dedicates more attention to patterns of group relationships and conscious alignments that are not or not only anchored in socio-demographics, and focuses on inter and intra party bloc stability over time. Agency through *elite action* may directly and indirectly influence political institutions, society and positional alignments and by extension the nature and structure of cleavages in many different ways at different moments in time. The most important areas of agency leverage include (1) the institutional sphere of rules and options (rules of the game; party, party bloc and coalition building), (2) instances of shifted salience attributed to particular societal and socio-demographic characteristics, (3) (actively) contributed changes in societal values, interest structures and identities, and of course (4) in moments of crisis (new critical junctures) when agents use this window of opportunity to undercut existing structures for their own purposes.

Both agency and dealignment must be considered together: Representational parties according to Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) ideally fulfil three main functions: they offer policy choices, comprehensive party programmes, and channel citizens' preferences into the political process. Representation in line with the dealignment model occurs when mostly independent or dealigned (ex)partisan voters are appealed to on the basis of their contemporary interest, but not structural socio-political divisions as their reason for partisan choice. Since representation is achievable either one way or the other (dealignment model by targeting the independent median voter vs. partisan model by appealing to the partisan voter), political parties are faced by the dilemma of representational strain (in relation to contextual factors and circumstances).

Another possibility is to put emphasis on the character of collective political *identification* as the defining element of *identitarian* cleavages (Bornschieer 2009, Sitter 2002, Knutsen/Scarborough 1996) and the social (imagined) construction of collective partisan identities, social boundaries and group consciousness (Eisenstadt/Giesen 1995, Polleta/Jaspers 2001; also Banton [2007] and Anderson [1991] on social groups and *imagined communities*). For reasons of space I cannot go further into detail. Due to late democratic transition and consolidation in the context of an already mobile, highly individualised and stratified society strong partisan identities in CEE are in any case rather unlikely (Kopecký 2006).

2.3 Theory (iii): The *micro-logic* of party cleavage formation in post-communist democracies

In the absence of societal anchorage of historically grown party loyalties and identification (Agh 1994, Lewis 1996, Bielasiak 1997), and due to the lack of lengthy socio-structural processes as basis for partisanship, issue cleavages and social divisions associated with political parties will therefore be the focus of party conflict (Evans/Whitefield 1993: 535). According to Kitschelt (1995: 447ff, Kitschelt et al. 1999) any research on party cleavages and post-communist party systems should deal with the extent of programmatic cleavage politics around which political parties centre, and verify if the content of cleavages is actually represented by programmatically competing political parties. The programmatic structuration and organisation of the political space along socio-cultural and economic division lines in post-communist party systems – as the key property of and indicator for a party cleavage – is highly dependent on the exact type of political party that has emerged during the process of transition, and the socialisation and consolidation of one type of political party that established itself as a legitimate political actor: namely highly coordinated and competitive programme-based parties which are willing to take high coordination costs to mobilise, persuade and rationally motivate voters with intelligent choices and based on consensus.

Kitschelt (1995) formulated the micro-logic of political cleavage formation in post-socialist regimes which predicts two basic programmatic cleavage dimensions and three major divisions that most likely form in CEE countries: an (1) ethno-cultural dimension concerning questions of citizenship, as well as concepts of statehood and nationhood (universalistic vs. culturalist); a socio-political dimension which yields two types of conflicts over socio-political and life-style politics – (2.1) social liberalism and (2.2) political liberalism; and (3) an economic dimension revolves around distributional issues of income/property and the regulation of markets (i.e. the classic division between the market and the state). CEE party competition in the region is likely to evolve firstly and predominantly around a socio-economic base, which “is inscribed in the multidimensional space defined by the three problems of democratic politics” (1991: 14): citizenship/nationalism (ethnic liberalism), political procedures/governance (socio-political liberalism) and resource distribution (economic liberalism).

The market-state dimension in CEE is different to Western Europe, because it does not split the electorate into the traditional side of libertarian and cosmopolitan market liberals, and the pro-state authoritarian protectionists as predicted by simple economic theory of political preference formation and party alignments¹³. As a result of differential opportunities due to different economic transitional experiences in terms of economic development and according to sectorial/occupational affiliation and societal class ('winners and losers of transition'), the political space is unidimensionally split into three camps conforming to the three problems: (1) mostly younger urban market-liberals who profit from the democratic and economic transition due to high education and specific skills (e.g. business owners or professionals), but who are not necessarily universalists and cosmopolitan (see Evans/Whitefield 2003); (2) CEE redistributive libertarians who favour state interventionism, redistributive policies and market regulation, but are ethnically tolerant and cosmopolitan (e.g. educated employees, but also formerly traditionally protected officials of the old system), and (3) a third camp of nationalists or Christian parties who either support authoritarian political strategies or restrictive ethnic policies, but do not express unqualified support for the market (e.g. less educated workers, peasants and pensioners). The latter two have the least capacity to take advantage of market liberalisation (Ibid. 459). Therefore the socio-economic axis comprised of pro market vs. pro-state/pro liberal vs. nationalist authoritarian dimensions is crosscutting due to the economic, social-libertarian divisions and thus shifted 90° in comparison to that of the West. According to Ishiyama (1995) post-communist or neo social-democratic parties, although socially relatively libertarian, express a mild support for economic populism and interventionism. Interestingly traditional CEE communist parties today no longer appeal to the classic worker/voter, who nowadays usually vote for moderate Christian or nationalist parties (cf. Tóka 1996, 1998), which emphasise authority, order, morality and "populist corrective to market-place and national autonomy" (Kitschelt 1995: 462). The communist legacy has forged an affinity between the Left and traditionalist-authoritarian values in CEE (Kitschelt 1992, Kostecky 2002, Vachudova/Hooghe 2009). For Marks (et al. 2006: 159) the combination of liberal capitalism since transition and the communist legacy in terms of economic equality and authority contribute to this phenomenon, since

¹³ Which predicts that market liberals/libertarians also prefer socio-cultural liberalism (e.g. political participation, universalist citizenship). The cleavage 'anomaly' is due to the fact that social libertarianism is not only a product of economic self-interest, but educational sophistication as well (Kitschelt 1995: 460f, cf. Evans 1994).

losers of transition trying to blunt reform emphasise the polar opposite (economic equality and traditional authority) whereas the winners reject any form of authoritarianism and economic state control “seeking a clean break with the past”. With on-going transition and marketization, proponents of the free market and liberal democracy converged to the opposite pole (Vachudova/Hooghe 2009).

Evans and Whitefield (1993: 536) do not entirely agree with Kitschelt’s reasoning to associate libertarian/cosmopolitanism with anti-market positions and the support of redistributive strategies, but rather predict a classic Left-Right structure: “in east-central Europe, in contrast, libertarians are pro- rather than anti-market. Clearly therefore, voters possess social identities and issue preferences which provide a stable basis for party competition”. Kitschelt’s use of communism-inherited, socio-structural, but highly heterogeneous categories for explaining intra-group value and interest differentiation coherent to the specific form of socio-economic organisation is problematic, since there are unlikely to remain static and coherent as sources of political interest with proceeding marketization, modernisation and democratisation.

A multi-dimensional political space with a variety of distributional cleavages – related to ethnic, institutional and economic factors – is more likely. The pattern of issue positions adopted by parties is often consistent with the combination of economic, ethnic and nation-building influences on cleavage formation. Therefore the understanding of partisan issue clusters (*issue cleavages*) is important to identify ideological interests and partisan identities, as well as the parameters of political competition among élites. Unlike Kitschelt who prognosticated and generalised a uni-dimensional *crosscutting* ideological *structure* of party competition, Evans and Whitfield emphasis the importance of political *actors* and *issue* dimensions along questions of economic development, state-building and ethnicity/nationalism. These issues are thus to translate into three important ideological bases and categories of mass partisanship, namely economic, social and ethnic liberalism – which most likely structure the main axis of political competition¹⁴.

Zarycky (2000: 856) uses Kitschelt’s classification to reinterpret the Lipset-Rokkan approach suitable for the study of party system development in CEE by successfully applying it to the Polish context. He argues that it is possible “to draw a connection between the Lipset-Rokkan and Kitschelt models of cleavage systems”,

¹⁴ The exact shape and content of these issue dimensions have significant implications for the path and direction of democratic development and the consolidation of the party system, during which the country-specific diversity of economic, ethnic and institutional constraints can be used to construct a typology of party base competition (ibid.).

seeing as most of the conflicts identified by Kitschelt (and for that matter by Evans and Whitefield as well) can be classified as developed mainly on the basis of the classic model by Rokkan and Lipset. Following his logic of thinking, the cleavages present in the Czech Republic may similarly be interpreted in the framework of the Lipset/Rokkan theory.

Kitschelt and Evans/Whitefield alike recognise the importance of questions of economic distribution, the role of the state and matters of ethnicity/nationalism and statehood – though with a different weight on the role of structure and agency, and a slightly different idea about the dimensionality of three issue dimensions: namely economic liberalism, socio-political liberalism and ethnic liberalism. They also detect the preponderance of a main axis of domestic party competition, but at a 90° angle to that in the West (Evans/Whitefield 1993, Sitter 2002, Kitschelt 1995).

In the context of Europeanisation and following Kriesi's reasoning, the communist legacy and the EU accession impact has generated in CEE a 'demarcation magnet' bundling left-wing economics with cultural traditionalism on one side, opposed by an 'integration magnet' with market-liberal economics and cultural liberalism on the other. Although the communist legacy forged an economically left-wing and culturally traditionalist affinity, the EU accession process through conditionality-induced agenda pushing melded market-liberal economics with cultural and political liberalism into a polar ideological programme coherent with Kriesi's model. Although subject to variation depending on the timing and extent of reform of national Communist parties in CEE countries, the predicted party pattern of hard left hard TAN parties in the CEE region and its respective hardliner agenda (Evans/Whitefield, Kitschelt) has to a certain extent been abandoned due to the causal weight of transition/democratisation (in relation to the Communist legacy) and European integration (through EU accession and conditionality); therefore there has been a significant shift towards the Western pattern of party competition (Vaduchova/Hooghe 2009, Vaduchova 2011). Crucial is whether and when the majority of parties in post-communist countries distanced themselves from the hardliner affinities (hard left and TAN) of traditional communist parties after regime change (Vaduchova 2011).

2.4 Methodology: Kriesi's model for the measurement of the new cleavage

Kriesi and his colleagues (2005, 2006, 2008) developed a quantifiable model to measure the role of new conflicts in stabilising or transforming national cleavage structures by incorporating patterns of programmatic partisan conflict in party competition and pragmatic points of discord in party alignment into the cleavage model (see Bornschier 2010, Kriesi et al. 2012). Through close quantitative content analysis of the public media along a previously established thematic economic vs. cultural demarcation line, the general structure of party interaction during major election campaigns, the exact interplay of already established and institutionalised cleavages and possible new partisan divisions may be re-enacted – ultimately allowing for the detection of a new bi-dimensional structural cleavages within the national political space. The finalised methodological model focuses on the supply-side (political parties) and the demand-side (voters) of politics, as well as on national and European elections. The main assumption here is that “the structural change linked to globalisation is articulated by the issue-specific positions taken by the parties in electoral campaigns as well as by the salience they attribute to different issues” (Kriesi et. al. 2005: 15, 2006, 2008: 65, also Kriesi/Grande 2012). The model consists of *quantitative content analysis* of major newspapers, the coding of the relationship between *political actors (parties)* and previously defined *key issues* according to *direction* and *salience*, and is based on **four important model-theoretic assumptions** (2012: 5) which indicate that globalisation, denationalisation and European integration transformed the basis of politics and the national political space by giving rise to a new *'integration vs. demarcation'* cleavage:

- i. *Processes of increasing **economic, cultural and political competition** linked to globalisation have created latent structural potentials of globalisation 'winners' and 'losers'.*
- ii. *The **mobilisation of 'losers'** by new challengers of the liberal & conservative right has provided the key impetus for the transformation of the party system.*
- iii. *The success of the new challengers lies in their appeal to and ability to politicise globalisation-induced **cultural anxieties** (real or potential) of the 'losers', which given their heterogeneous economic interests provided the lowest common denominator for their mobilisation.*
- iv. *The mobilisation of the globalisation 'losers' has not added a new dimension of conflict to the existing bi-dimensional national space but instead transformed above all the existing dimension of cultural conflict – therefore **embedding** the new cleavage into the existing economic-cultural structure.*

Note that for the present research I will only make use of the original model employed by Kriesi (et. al. 2005, 2006) in which only the supply-side of the political

arena is longitudinally analysed: namely main political parties and their strategic party political stances in relation to and competition with the other important parties¹⁵.

Kriesi's method foresees the content analysis of two major daily newspapers selected according to format and reader coverage two months prior to critical elections: one *quality* paper which according to the authors may be interpreted as the leading medium of political coverage, and one *tabloid* paper which reflects voter attitudes towards the main political parties during electoral campaigns (Dolezal 2008: 66f). Given high media coverage and information density in Western European quality newspapers (such as *The London Times* or the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*) a sampling method was used to select articles on only three days.

For the present 'trial analysis' I will analyse the political content of only one Czech quality paper, namely *Hospodářské Noviny*, during *one* month prior to two critical elections. If this particular method shows promise in terms of feasibility and outcome, the tabloid paper *Blesk*¹⁶ might be included in a future analysis to further differentiate the outcome. All articles excluding commentaries (recording unit) with content related to the campaigns, political parties or key debates ('politics' in general) are carefully selected and its headlines, the 'lead' and the first paragraph quantitatively coded *sentence-by-sentence* – making use of Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings' (2001) relational method of CA for the measurement of partisan preferences and positions (content unit) in print media. Coded will be the relationship between political actors (according to party affiliation) and their respective directional (either positive or negative) stance on key political issues as reflected and reproduced by the print media during political campaigns (Dolezal 2008: 65ff). The longitudinal analysis entails one critical national elections in the Czech Republic – the parliamentary elections to the Chamber of Deputies (*Poslanecká Sněmovna*) in 2010 – as well as the parliamentary elections (chamber of deputies) in 1996 (electoral contest). The 1996 elections introduce a period of stabilisation and concentration of the party system, following a rather restless period of transition and discontinuity (Klíma 1998). According to Blahož (et al. 1999) classical structural cleavages only emerged after the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The 1996 Czech legislative elections thus fulfil the function of 'founding elections' after a long period of totalitarianism/authoritarianism and political unrest – and are thus suitable as a point

¹⁵ Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) further extended their original model for the analysis by including the demand side, voter preferences, and political protest in the analysis.

¹⁶ *Blesk* has the highest share of readers nation-wide (GFK 2013). *Hospodářské Noviny* the other hand was selected to ensure a fair degree of media objectivity.

of departure for future analysis on other CEE countries and on the region as such (see Jungerstam-Mulders 2006:5). The raw results of the content analysis will primarily be interpreted according to valued direction and saliency, but they will also be visualised by the mathematical method of correspondence analysis (SPSS).

For each category the position (according to direction/quality) of each party is computed by averaging over all core sentences indicating a relationship (mean of signed values) dealing with that party's position on that issue. The saliency of an issue for a party is simply indicated by the relative frequency with which a political party takes a stance on a specific category and can thus be operationalised as the percentage of all *issue*-statements by all parties that deal with the position of that party on that issue¹⁷ (Kriesi et al. 2008, Kleinnijenhuis/Pennings 2001). The results are summarised in Tab. 3.1 (issue position) and Tab 3.2 (issue saliency) and visualised in Fig. 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendix. Kriesi only calculated the position and saliency for a party/category if at least 30 observations (n) were collected. Seeing as they considered two newspapers during two months prior to elections, and given that I only analysed one newspaper during one month prior to collection, I fixed the threshold for the present analysis at 8 observations per party and category¹⁸.

Both aspects have to be considered conjointly, since they are both relevant for an adequate description of the national political space. Parties may take different stances on an issue, but also attribute a different priority to some issues over others. Also important is the size and relevance (according to overall percentage of votes) of political parties in relation to others: "for a given campaign, large parties and key campaign issues determine the configuration of the political space more heavily than marginal parties or secondary issues" (Kriesi et al. 2008: 71).

For Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) the systematic distinction between issue position and issue salience is crucial and highly context dependent, since the foci for salience in new democracies is directly related to sources of economic and social divisions and political development, and thus most likely associated with unresolved conflicts and issues. One of the principal mechanisms of political parties

¹⁷ If k stands for political party and i indicates the category, then the relative frequency with which a given political party takes a stance on a category can be calculated as the absolute frequency of a party per category (f_{x_k}) divided by the number of observations of all parties on that category:

$$\frac{f_{x_k}}{\sum n_{ik}} = \frac{n_{ik}}{N_i}$$

¹⁸ I calculated the values for all parties according to issue and category, provided there were any observations. 'Insignificant' values are marked in light grey.

to shift parties' positional alignments is the effort to change the relative political saliency of a particular characteristic (Deegan-Krause/Enyedi 2010: 10).

System of categories and CEE-specific control categories

Kriesi et al. (2012: 58ff) developed a system and basic set of twelve exhaustive categories that encompass political issues related to *Western* European politics in the age of globalisation, and are thus suitable to measure the extent of issue saliency and issue position taken by political parties. The basic categories are summarised in the Appendix (Tab. 1). Note that Kriesi's first three categories – welfare, budget and economic liberalism – denote the traditional economic cleavage between pro-market vs. pro-state positioning (economic dimension). The following six categories – cultural liberalism, Europe, culture, immigration, army and security – refer to the cultural cleavage dimension. The last three additional categories – environment, institutional reform, infrastructure – do not 'automatically' belong to either one of the major two dimensions. Hence only the first nine of Kriesi's categories measure the cleavage structure and thus extent of transformation and possibly convergence (if any) between 'East' and 'West'.

According to Jasiewicz (2003) predominantly the socio-economic and the cultural dimensions seem to structure the political life in post-communist countries. While the socio-economic dimension is quite similar in East and West, the cultural dimension rather mirrors a division between particularism and universalism (ethno-cultural dimension), sometimes expressed in secularism vs. confessionism, modernity vs. tradition, pan-Westernism/Europeanism vs. nationalism. Similarly Marks et al. (2006) diagnose the same Left-Right and new politics dimension in both East and West – although with internal variation due to diverging histories of political party development (Vaduchova/Hooghe 2009) and different politicisation of *transition losers*.

Blahož and colleagues (1999: 128ff) have identified the most important public and political issue divisions in the Czech Republic, some of which surprisingly fit quite well the framework proposed by Kriesi and can thus be easily integrated: issues of *economic transition* regarding mainly distributional issues, economic reform, privatisation and as well as the role of market and state (economic liberalism), matters of *social security* and welfare including the redistribution of resources (welfare). The economic dimension reflects the classic conflict between state-

interventionism and the free market and is relevant in both Eastern and Western Europe (Jasiewicz 2003); therefore I can simply integrate these issues into Kriesi's economic dimension¹⁹. Other issues are politics of *ecology* especially with the appearance of the Green Party (environment) and the *assurance of national security*, including the participation in security alliances and the rapprochement towards the EC/EU and NATO for security purposes (army) and in the context of European integration (Europe). Kriesi's categories have been complemented and amended accordingly (**). I added the issue of *human rights* as a topic of the NSM to Kriesi's cultural liberalism category (C4).

Two rather CEE-specific issue clusters are identified by the authors which relate well to two of the predicted issue dimensions by Kitschelt and Evans/Whitefield (socio-political and ethnic liberalism): the *relationship between civic society and the political system*, values of *civic freedoms and individual autonomy* as opposed to state authoritarianism and interventionism, and the *German question* and the call for historical elucidation of the post-WWII era and the expulsion of ethnic Germans under Beneš. For these issues I formulated to CEE-specific control variables: socio-political liberalism (K14) and ethnic liberalism (K15).

A third CEE-specific category comprises the valence issue of post-communist transition, which was only partly compatible with Kriesi's system of categories. Therefore I split this issue cluster up into three parts: all matters of economic transition and marketization are added to category E3 (economic liberalism), whereas questions regarding the nature of democracy and the institutional framework of the new state including decentralisation are integrated into category M11 (institutional reform). For rather CEE-specific transitional matters, such as the political process of transition in general (including speed, efficiency and role of the state), restitution of property formerly expropriated by the communist regime, as well as the role of foreign and public participation during the process I created a third CEE control variable (post-communist transition, K13). Note that for the last category negative values do not indicate reluctance to transition, but rather the inertia, inefficiency and exclusiveness of political actors and the state administration during the process of transformation²⁰.

¹⁹ This also includes CEE-specific distributional issues as well as attitudes towards the West and Western institutions (excluding the EU) in terms of economic integration and mainly prior to EU enlargement.

²⁰ For example, the KSCM also earned negative values due to their unwillingness to restitute state property to the church.

These three additional variables are CEE-specific and can therefore serve as CEE control variables, which, although indicating patterns of CEE specific cleavage formation on both an ethnic and socio-political line, do not militate for a new demarcation vs. integration cleavage in the context of globalisation, European integration and post-materialism, but rather to specific internal matters of transition, stateness/governance, statehood and citizenship.

The formulation of exhaustive categories is crucial. I do realise that the cutting line between cultural liberalism on one side and ethnic liberalism on the other is not always crystal clear and often requires a 'judgement call'. While cultural liberalism includes *new politics issues*, including questions of international cooperation, solidarity, peace, disarmament, anti-patriotism, religious tolerance, gender, human rights, gay rights, tolerance, etc. in short the goals of the NSM (Wüest 2010), in contrast ethnic liberalism concentrates on *ethno-cultural* and nationalist matters and issues *within* the state, and often involves the treatment of *national* minorities, ethnicity as one key aspect of national culture, including questions of citizenship and state-/nationhood on ethno-cultural grounds.

To keep the two apart when coding sentences I must ask myself *whom* ethnic or cultural policy positions are directed at, and in *which context* and on *what grounds*²¹.

Sentence-by-sentence coding and the logic of political language

Each sentence within the headlines and the introductory paragraph is reduced to its grammatical core structure ('nuclear sentence') indicating the subject (political actor), the object (issue) as well as the predicate (strength and direction of relationship between the two). The direction is quantified on a (-1;1) contra-pro scale with three intermediary positions (-0.5; 0; 0.5) indicating a 'potential' or a neutral relation²². Political actors are coded to party membership, and each political issue is allocated to one of the 15 categories and accordingly coded (Kleinnijenhuis/Pennings 2001).

²¹ For example to favour a restrictive and exclusivist citizenship policy that articulates the importance of Czechness during the 1990s is rather an ethnic-protectionist matter, and so are anti-Roma stances (a *national* minority) and the opposition to the historical elucidation of Czech-German relations during/after WWII (e.g. *Odsun Němců*), since both are matters of an *old* dispute that has nothing to do with politics of denationalisation. On the other hand the call for the loosening of citizenship laws or the advocacy of equal rights for homosexuals on post-materialist grounds (both specific NSM goals) is a clear matter of cultural liberalism in the context of the new cultural/value divide.

²² A politician might be in favour (0.5) or against (-0.5) a certain position, or have no opinion at all (0). Unlike Kriesi and Co. I only assigned strongly negative or positive (-1;1) values, if there was grammatical and semantic 'evidence' (signal words).

Only the most important parties represented in the Czech Chamber of Deputies are considered for each election²³. A coding sheet is developed in accordance with Rössler (2010) and attached in the Appendix (first page only) for verification.

The ideas for this coding method lie in statistical associations and network theory, as well as in advances of part-of-speech tagging and grammar parsing in discourse analysis. Ludwig Wittgenstein set the foundations for the relational logic (asymmetric xRy-relation) of the *subject-object-predicate triple*, in which “the subject and the object are either animated entities which we will label actors [e.g. political parties], or circumstances and other non-animated entities, which we will label as issues [e.g. party positions]”. The *predicate* in political language diagnosing the stance within a belief system (or in our case a system of categories) can thus be mapped on a *positive-negative* continuum and according to *magnitude* (frequency, saliency) and *angle* (direction). With the direction of a predicate several statistical moments could be calculated and indicated, i.e mean, variance, skewness and curtosis (Kleinnijenhuis/Atteveldt 2014: 3f).

The crucial role of language in politics was already thematised by Machiavelli (see Marti 2008) in *Il Principe* when talking of the *virtue* and *fortune* of political leaders dealing with socio-political issues and conflicts in a pragmatic political environment and real world developments. Political issues have to be recognised, *verbalised* and decided upon by the political leader (virtue) in relation and with regards to the close socio-demographic environment, political situation, and the natural developments he and his people are facing (fortune). Language thus plays a crucial role at every moment of the political process and the political game, and so do disagreements about issues further fuelling political debates. From a Rokkean perspective “disagreements about issue positions mirror the historical conflicts and cleavages between actors” (Kleinnijenhuis/Atteveldt 2014: 2), such as competing political parties and the public media, who according to agenda-setting theory emphasise and centre huge attention around key critical issues (especially during election campaigns) – ultimately attracting huge attention of the public as well (Ibid). According to Jones and Baumgartner (2005), politics in media-driven and highly mediatised democracies (see next section) can be called *politics of attention*²⁴.

²³ Only those parties overcoming the 5% threshold with at least 8 issue positions are considered (cf. Dolezal 2008), with the exception of the Green party (SZ) and the Christian Democrats during the 2010 elections.

²⁴ For the role of **politics and media**, consult Schulz (2008), Almond/Powell (ct. in Mazzoleni/Schultz 2008: 250), Mazzoleni/Schulz (2001), Manin (ct. in Kriesi 2004) on: mediation through politics,

Correspondence Analysis

Instead of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) and Weighed Metric Multidimensional Scaling (WMMDS) I decided to use Correspondence Analysis, which allows for the representation of the issue saliency of parties on a two-dimensional space. The Figures are only computed to supplement the raw data by visualising the data outcome and should be interpreted together with issue positions (and the sign value in particular). Since the focal point are the issue positions in direct relation to the issue *saliency*, the lion's share of interpretation is done on the basis of the raw data according to Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001). Correspondence analysis as a statistical technique provides the graphical representation of cross tabulations (Yelland 2010).

In line with Kriesi's method the economic line of conflict is arranged horizontally and the cultural conflict vertically. Crucial is the relative distances of a party to an issue: a strong saliency is given if the distance is small. This method allows for the identification of issue clusters according to relevance/saliency and political party. For the direction of the relationship the data sheet must be consulted. The cumulative proportion of inertia as a measurement of quality of the model is attached to the Appendix (Tab.4).

2.5 State of research, research question and hypotheses

Before presenting the research questions and hypotheses, I would like to summarise further findings of a selection of the most recent CEE research on the topic. I decided not to dwell on rather 'early' literature that is characterised by the previously mentioned scholarly divide between a pessimistic (*tabula rasa*) and an optimistic and optimistic strand of authors who therefore often present opposite and contradicting findings (e.g. Miller et al. 2000, Innes 2002; a critical overview of the early literature [1990-2000] is given by Tucker 2002), but rather focus on the more specific literature on cleavages, issue dimensions and party competition.

Evans and Whitefield (1998) confirm their postulated pattern of issue clusters along economic, ethnic and nation-building lines of conflict when analysing the ideological base of party politics and mass electoral behaviour in the Czech Republic

mediatisation of politics, 'media substitution of politics', 'audience-democracies' and 'media-driven republics'.

and Slovakia, which, despite common institutional history and communist legacy, seemed to have taken rather different paths after the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Through national survey data on voting preferences the authors were able to find out, that party politics and partisanship in the Czech Republic centre mainly around economic issues of distribution and attitudes towards the West, whereas in Slovakia party politics are far more conflictive and primarily structured by the Hungarian and the 'national' questions. These important differences mirror the divisions between the political elites and the masses in both countries, who framed political issues differently by putting more weight on and assigning a different meaning to economic (CZ) and ethnic liberalism (SK) in close relation to country-specific socio-economic characteristics (such as the level of economic development).

Through OLS regression of electoral volatility and institutional, structural and economic variables, Tavits (2005) concludes that economic voting is most important in explaining CEE party system development still characterised by electoral volatility, whereas the effects of cleavages are less forward: an urban-rural divide was significant only during times of economic downturn, and ethnic cleavages across the region are rather weak and of low political saliency. This indicates the possibility of socio-economic cleavages becoming more prominent, and the lasting influence of the communist past on voting behaviour (having eroded social cleavages). This is contradicted by Whitefield (2002: 197) who states, that "communist rule did not destroy social identities of class, religion, region and ethnicity."

Marks et al. (2006) analyse the structure and causality of party competition in the context of European integration and rule that the former is explicably different while the latter shares a single underlying logic in East and the West, making Western theory of party positioning applicable to Eastern Europe: while positions on European integration is aligned with the major dimensions of political conflict under the same logic of support and opposition, the axis of party competition is orthogonal to Western Europe (left-TAN vs. right-GAL).

(Rep.) Vachudova and Hooghe (2009: 180ff) note that the communist legacy has created a *demarcation* magnet on one side bundling left-wing economics with cultural traditionalism, but the post-communist transformation and EU experience has generated an *integration* magnet pulling parties in the opposite direction towards market-liberal economics and cultural liberalism. As a result a bipolar magnetic field has induced political parties to align on a single axis from left-TAN to right-GAL due to the twin effect of post-communist transition (and the reform of the communist

parties in particular which determines the strength of the demarcation magnet in the Eurosceptic left-TAN quadrant) in conjunction with the leverage of EU accession (through EU conditionality and constrains). Although there has not yet been a significant shift to the Western pattern of party competition, there “are reasons to expect party competition in the CEE states to change after accession, and perhaps converge to the west” (207).

Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) analyse the representational capacity of political parties in both Eastern and Western Europe and their ability to appeal to two different camps of voters – partisan and independent – in relation to contextual factors, the balance of partisan and independent voters, and above all their organisational capabilities (party characteristics). They conclude that both the East and West are faced with considerable constrains in their capacity to represent growingly *diverse* voters – which the West, in addition to the complexity caused by the two-dimensional political space (socio-economic plus new-politics), is able to mitigate thanks to successful mass party organisation. The East on the other hand, though lacking any mass party organisation and thus an efficient party-independent voter linkage, is confronted by a far lesser extent of representational strain due to the overwhelming majority of independent voters on one side, and because of the simplicity brought upon by the predominant one-dimensional political space. This indicates that CEE politics still remain framed by the communist past.

Several years before the authors (2007, also 2009) had analysed the party representation process with regards to party stances on European economic and political integration, concluding that CEE party representation also functions in this issue area and more importantly proving the applicability of cleavage accounts in understanding party stances about integration appropriate (1143). Whereas in CEE the lines of conflict that form the basis for integration stances evolve around questions of democratic consolidation and to a lesser extent the socio-economic dimension, in the West the divisions are mostly socio-economic and material-postmaterial. Most important issues that best capture the cleavages in the region are (in order according to salience): the welfare dimension and the economic system, issues of nationalism and the nature of democratic institutions (the last three involve regime-level issues). Also here and there regionally relevant are ethnic issues, social rights, the communist past and religiosity. Aside from the cross-regional preponderance of the socio-economic dimension another cross-national non-economic pattern is identifiable that regionally structures party competition: the

democracy dimension. What East and West most certainly have in common is the socio-economic divide (2009: 290f).

Note that the authors here, unless otherwise specified, have all made use of *expert survey data* for their analysis, which have been criticised by Budge (2001) for the lack of validity and reliability of the produced measurement of party positions. According to Mair (2006: 162) “a much more systematic, inductive and largely *bottom-up* comparison of political discussions at the national level” is necessary instead of relying on the “crude and easily accessible data” provided by expert surveys and party manifestos (cf. Helbling/Tresch 2011). According to Helbling and Tresch (2011) media data converges with traditionally used measurements in terms of party positions, but the salience indicators seem to measure different constructs. Media analysis offers advantages when analysing party competition, party-voter linkages and party positions on sub-issues and intra-party dissent (181). This research thus offers an alternative measurement of cleavages in the region.

In line with the presented literature and different accounts on the extent political competition and the formation and nature of cleavage dimensions, I can postulate the following research questions and hypotheses:

Research Question (I)

Does the CEE-specific ‘traditional’ cleavage structure with its underlying one-dimensionality remain stable and unchanged between 1996 and after EU accession (2010)?

Hypotheses:

- (1) The 1990s are structured by the valence-issue of post-communist transition, as well as marketization and socio-political transformation along a predominant socio-economic cleavage with crosscutting socio-political, institutional and and ethno-cultural issue clusters.
- (2) In 2010 party competition is structured on both a cultural as well as economic dimension, leaving the issue of post-communist transition behind.

Research Question (II)

Do processes of globalisation, denationalisation and above all Europeanisation lead to the transformation of the national political space in the Czech Republic - giving rise to a (A) new cultural issue dimension and (B) cleavage?

Hypotheses:

- (1) The transformation of the national political space characterised by increased competition and a new structural antagonism, will result in an intensification of political conflicts, the triggering of new potentials for political mobilisation (which may be articulated and politicised by political parties and may thus be formulated as salient political issues), and an increase in political fragmentation.
- (2) The most important indicator for this trend is a polarising two-dimensionality of the national political space with a cultural and economic dimension, whereas the cultural exceeds the economic dimension in terms of saliency.

3 Conclusion: Part I

Instead of summarising the relevant theory and methodology, at this point I would like to defend my 'choice of research' and justify applicability of Kriesi's theory and methodology for the study of CEE despite the concerns expressed by the authors:

Kriesi and his collaborators only excluded East European countries in their analysis (2005, 2006, 2008, cf. 2012: 37), because the process of democratisation and transition in CEE had not yet been completed at the time when the contemporary globalisation process was accelerating (cf. Dolezal 2008). This would have made a comparison of transitional East European party systems with established liberal democracies due to fluid and volatile voter alignments difficult. Kriesi's reasoning is clearly substance and structure oriented, and may easily be juxtaposed in opposition to a more process and agency focussed way of thinking – making Western cleavage theory including Kriesi's theory (demarcation vs. integration) equally suitable and legitimate for CEE analysis of party systems. According to Jungerstam-Mulders (2006) the CEE-EU-member countries have become comparable after EU-enlargement that postulates that all members share similar basic characteristics, such as representative democracy, respect for human rights and more or less comparable living conditions. Following Evans and Whitefield's (1993) *comparative communism approach* each country should be looked at individually before making a 'snap judgement'. In line with mostly Czech indigenous scholars, I beg to claim that transition and to a fair extent consolidation (in Gunter's sense) has been completed in the Czech Republic more than 20 years after communist rule. Therefore this country – long overhauled by the contemporary process of globalisation and above

all Europeanisation – fulfils Kriesi's criteria of a most similar system design (regime stability, consolidation of institutions and stable party system) to a fair extent and is thus suitable for cross-national comparison beyond the East-West 'border' in the future.

Part II

The Czech Republic – a case study

In a world of growing complexity, in which traditional alignments of parties to voters are being eroded, where parties must regularly consider how to re-arrange themselves to rebuild ties to voters increasingly diverse in nature, and where the growing number of independents often exercise centripetal pressure on party position, is party composition increasingly likely to focus on valence issues rather than differences in policy substance and programmes?

(Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 179)

4 Data analysis: the case of the Czech Republic

First the Czech political party landscape is presented and indigenous literature reviewed. For the analysis of the results and the discussion of the data I will first present and address each election individually. I will start by discussing the number of observations, direction and saliency according to dimension, as well as the overall saliency and position values according to category and political party. Within each dimension 'outsider' parties and party blocs are scrutinised (left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right). The data is also contextualised with the relevant political debates and issue-stances of the political parties. For each election and the in-depth analysis the saliency output has been visualised through correspondence analysis (Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3). The four 'ever-presents' is given additional attention. In a second step the data outputs of both elections are critically contrasted to assess continuities, discontinuities and changes in terms of issue position, issue saliency of political parties and according to dimension and significance.

4.1 Country profile: the Czech Republic

According to Klíma (1998, cf. Vodička 2005, 2010) the party system in the Czech Republic started to stabilise after the parliamentary elections in June 1996 – slowly creating a hierarchical pattern of mutually aggravating cleavages, dominated at the top by national conflict, and dispersed across a left-wing/right-wing spectrum. After years of discontinuity, dissolution and marked regrouping of political forces, a phase of gradual internal consolidation of the main political parties and the establishment of a multi-party system based on proportional representation was finally entered strengthening the bonds between political parties and society and contributing to moderate fragmentation of the political system – favourable for democratic consolidation (Merkel 1997). Voter fragmentation and electoral volatility have gradually decreased (especially from an intra-CEE perspective), the system stabilised and voters are growingly more experienced (Kopecký 2006). Similarly Hloušek and Šedo (2007) discern a high level of stability including stabilisation of programmatic party competition by the mid 1990s between an effective number of electoral parties resistant to charismatic leadership and significant voter volatility,

giving above all rise to a predominant socio-economic left-right issue cleavage after a period of cleavage structuring in the early 1990s (cf. Kopecký 2006). Aside from this strong socio-economic divide, an 'axiological' counter-cleavage between liberal and authoritarian political, and cultural and social values emerged, the importance of which has been growing steadily since the late 1990s. This relatively stable cleavage pattern is also confirmed by Blahož (et al. 1999) and Vodička (2005) who, aside from the strong socioeconomic cleavage, also identify two minor/secondary cleavages: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (regarding EU/NATO membership and attitudes towards the West [especially Germany], foreign influence, and ethnic minorities/asylum policies), and a weak structural cleavage (role of civil society/socio-political liberalism). This cleavage structure was crucial for and during the configuration of the Czech party system (Vodička 2005): all ideological party families are discernible in the Czech party system (Mareš, ct. in Vodička 2005: 290) along a left-right axis (Klíma 1998) and a relatively stable party dominance of two major parties emerged: the Czech social democrats (ČSSD) and the democratic civil party (ODS). Klíma (1998) categorised three types of political parties: (1) traditional parties – permitted during socialism, (2) traditional parties – banned during socialism and (3) new parties without any historical roots. Note that only parliamentary parties are considered for the analysis (ibid.), since only these can be considered relevant (Hloušek/Šedo 2007: 10).

To the first category belong the *Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)*, which after the dissolution of the Soviet Union remained rather strong and is the least reformed communist party in Central Europe; as well as the *Christian Democratic Union/Czech People's Party (KDU-ČSL)* which exiled to London during the German occupation and was rather muffled by the Communist Party during Socialism. These two parties can be characterised as mass parties in terms of membership base, organisational structure and party identification profiting from their organisational legacy and long-term uninterrupted existence prior to transition (cf. Kopecký 2006). The ČSSD forming the largest opposition party on the left side of the spectrum belongs to the second category. And to the last category belong all other parties, including the *Civic Democratic Party (ODS)*²⁵. The first two together with the KDU-ČSL have formed the ruling government coalition since 1992. While the ČSSD as well as the ODS are classifiable as catch-all-parties being oriented towards a

²⁵ The former *Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)* and the *Civic Movement (OH)* also belong to this category.

specific target interest group, but with an important link to society; the ODA comes closest to resembling a cartel party given its tenuous membership and identity base, and its weak organisational structure (ibid.). The ODS, ČSSD, KSČM and KDU-ČSL are the four 'ever-presents' of the Czech party system due to their relatively stable persistence and voter shares over time (Hloušek/Pšeja 2011). The Green Party (SZ) did not appear until the 2006 elections reflecting "a growing demand by parts of the Czech electorate for post-material values" (Hloušek/Šedo 2007: 8) and has not made it into Parliament ever since. Judging by the media coverage of the Green party and green issues, the party seems to be occupying an important space in the Czech political landscape because of their role to push green or greenish issues onto the political agenda. Although Czech political parties are losing their traditional voter bonds similarly to the trend in Western Europe (Klíma 1998), and despite the astronomical drop in partisan membership (aside from the KSČM enjoying a relatively stable membership base of pensioners), political parties by reinforcing their power monopoly are the key players in Czech politics. Nevertheless party politics differs greatly from Western European mass party politics, since the party system came into existence in an entirely different socio-political climate when Czech society had already been mobile, highly individualised, and increasingly stratified by the markets – making mobilisation on the base of strong, socially anchored partisan identities rather unlikely (Kopecký 2006). The Czech state traditions are not only shaped by historical legacies, but also by different modes of government constitutionalised during democratic transition: the country has developed "a role model of a politically weak and constrained government [and strong political parties] on the background of the transition experience with a powerful but tightly controlled state administration and a strong civil society movement seeking to institutionalise citizen and parliamentary supremacy over the executive" (Brusis 2005: 30f).

4.2 The 1996 elections

The 1996 election turnout was at 76.4%. The ODS remained with 29.6% the largest party, but was now rivalled by the social democrats (ČSSD), who, with 26.4% of the votes, quadrupled their share. The other coalition parties KDU-ČSL and ODS registered a slight increase in votes. The centre-right government coalition of ODS, ODA and KDU-ČSL lost their majority in Parliament despite a slight increase in terms of their overall gained votes from 41.9 to 44.1%. The Communists (KSŠM) lost 3.7%

and the Republicans (SPR-RSŠ) achieved a modest gain; both retained their parliamentary representation. The ODS won 68 and the CSSD 61 seats, followed by the KSŠM with 22, KDU-ŠSL and SPR-RSŠ with 18 each, and the ODA with 13 seats (of total 200 seats in the Czech Chamber of Deputies) (CSU 2014).

The elections introduced the fourth and last period of political development identified by Klíma (1998), namely the *stabilisation* period of the party system after May and June 1996. The previously internally gradually consolidated Czech political parties, who had established themselves in society as well as in the political arena during the last four years, had now entered a new and far more balanced political situation further strengthening the previously crystallised *multi-party system* – but now with two dominant parties on the left and right of the political spectrum: the ČSSD (with a 20% increase in votes since 1992) on the left and the ODS on the right. The KSČM and SPR-RSČ were situated at the extreme ends of the political spectrum and remained rather marginal. A minority government was formed in the form of a right-centrist government coalition between the ODS, the ODA and the KDU-ČSL. The Czech party system with the PR system in effect is henceforth more concentrated and balanced out of the power ration between left and right (similar to the German ‘two-and-half’ system) (ibid.), and growingly simplified and more transparent in terms of the relevant political parties in the political space: the total number of relevant parties shrunk to six and formed two left and right camps centred mainly around issue of economic transformation, stabilisation and competition. This socio-transformation cleavage was to strengthen further in the years to follow. The solidifying left-right axis emerged as the most important aspect and factor in party identification and preference further shaping the electorate’s value and partisan identification (Hloušek/Šedo 2007). In light of the Velvet Divorce roughly three years earlier, “it was not only the Czech Republic’s first election, but also the first normalised and routine election here, and as such a testimony to the stability of the Czech Republic” (Fitzmaurice 1996: 579). Aside from the significant concentration of the party spectrum and effective democratic opposition emerged with the moderate left-wing party CSSD, which in style and substance more and more closely resembled a mainstream Western-style socio-democratic party. Not only was this in itself a sign of a certain political maturity and stability, but a potential core of future alternative majority (other than the ODS) was given (cf. Brokl/Mansfeldova 1999). A solid majority and serious opposition with the potential to become an alternative

government in the near future are essential prerequisites for a stable and healthy democracy (ibid.).

Some go even so far and explain and associate this remarkable vote bump for the left with a transformation-induced process of class-party realignment due to the increasing role of class interests accounting for a growing identification and association of social class with political partisanship (Matějů/Řeháková 1997). This is contradicted by Brokl and Mansfeldová (1999) who claim that Czech voters had many diverse reasons for their voting preferences and were thus neither guided by the left-right placement nor by social class criteria, since the two main parties despite their party-typical self-image of economics (ODS) and social justice (CSSD) are both competent and complementary in many areas (209). Similarly Gijsberts and Nieuwebeerta (2000: 421) conclude that the only effect of social class in the region is on attitudes about social justice, but not on party preferences, at best mediating the relation between social class and voting behaviour.

The Political Debate (1996)

The political issues addressed by the political parties during the 1996 election campaign according to the media²⁶ were issue of housing (*bydlení*), public transportation and infrastructure (*dopravy*), the health care system (*zdravotnictví*), the agricultural sector (*zemědělství*), the state administration and autonomy of the Czech counties (*statní správa a samospráva*); taxes (*daně*), public finance and the market (*finance a kapitálový trh*). The housing issue mainly involved problems due to scarcity and limited availability, and as a result the need for renovation and the construction of new houses; as well as the regulation and deregulation of privatisation and matters of legal ownership and property rights. Similarly the issue of public transportation not only centred around question of modernisation of the up-to-then underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. motorways, railways), but also the privatisation and regulation of the Czech Railways (*České Drahy*) and various airports (such as Prague Airport). The quality of health care and the extent of social and health benefits was also much debated about, as well as privatisation of hospitals and the regulation of the health care system in general. In the agricultural sector and forestry industry the imprint of Communist collectivisation was still palpable therefore stressing the need for restructuration and reform, not only in

²⁶ *Hospodářské Noviny*, 30 May 1996 – 30 June 1996.

matter of legal ownership, but also in terms of management, exploitation and national marketization. Also interesting was the debate about state decentralisation of the traditionally strong centre, and the empowerment and autonomy of the Czech counties (*kraje*), which unlike prognosticated by Blahož (et al. 1999) was rather relevant according to the media. The status and rating of individual autonomy and the extent of state interventionism and control in the socio-political and private sphere was another salient issue at the time. Another important topic was the national economy, public finances (including taxes) and the market: it seems like the economic transformation of the country had not yet been completed in 1996 and had so far brought with it various downsides and problems in terms of social justice and security. These were mainly picked up by political parties on the left side of the political spectrum in opposition to rightist parties pushing for further deregulation, marketization and economic liberalism. Contrary to my expectations matters of foreign policy, including the European integration process/ EU membership aspirations, as well as issues of ethno-cultural relevance, such as the emotive *German question* and the conflict with Germany over their call for historical elucidation of the annulment of the Beneš decrees were all in all of secondary importance.

Data analysis (1996 elections)

When looking at the 1996 data outcome it becomes apparent that the ODS by far accounts for the highest number of observations ($n_k = 274$). This is partly due to the fact that ODS party matters as the most important national party prior to the 1996 elections was given more attention by the media. At the same time statements and utterances by Vaclav Klaus, then PM of the Czech Republic and head of the ODS party, and other ODS members of Parliament and Government, were most densely dispensed across the political media coverage of the paper. This means that in 1996 by far the largest proportion of news was devoted to the ODS and socio-economic and market issues. Second comes the ODS with 201 observations, followed by the KDU-ČSL with 186 and the ČSSD with 168 observation. The KSČM has relatively few observations (97) and reporting on the Republicans was unfortunately rather limited. According to Hanley (2008) the ODS and KSČM will soon put the Republicans, who will almost disappear after 1998 (Kopecký 2006), out of business by dividing some of their populist and xenophobic appeals between each other.

Given their low number of observations I decided not to consider the party at all, since any outcomes on that party cannot be regarded as representative given the low number of observations (for that matter, secondary data shall fill the void). Judging by the relatively few number of observations these two parties seemed to be playing a rather marginal role in Czech politics (cf. Fitzmaurice 1996). One observation corresponds to one party-issue statement; an overall of 964 observations have been collected for the 1996 elections during the entire month of May prior to election days on May 31st and June 1st, 1996. Almost half of all observations are dedicated to the economic dimension (447), 233 to the miscellaneous and 207 the CEE dimension.

The economic dimension had an overall saliency of 46.4% and a direction of 0.42 indicating a positive direction in favour of economic policies. Within the economic dimension I am able to identify the classic market-state cleavage between the left and the right. The right clearly favoured market and state deregulation, privatisation and economic liberalism, whereas the left stressed the importance of solidarity, social justice, and welfare state interventionism mostly to counter the downside effects of economic transition and marketization (cf. Kopecký 2004, 2006). The ODS and the ODA in 1996 were the most economically liberal parties (0.59 and 0.54 respectively, with a saliency of 35.7% and 29.7%), pushing for greater market liberalisation, less state interventionism and the significance of the free market. While the ODS clearly focused on further market stabilisation and deregulation leaving rather little room for welfare policies (0.17 and 13.3% respectively), the ODA turned out to be far more 'humane' attributing at least some importance to welfare state expansion (0.32 with 18.8% saliency). The most social parties were clearly the Social Democrats and the Communists with a positive direction of 0.63 and 0.68 respectively (and 24% and 15.9% issue saliency). These parties were taking up the slack of economic transition appealing to mostly the losers of post-communist transformation (Fitzmaurice 1996). The KDU-ČSL – locatable in the centre of the spectrum – constituted the social arm of the centre-right bloc with 0.59 direction and a 23.6% saliency clearly favouring welfare state interventionism, but giving less importance to market liberalism and budget rigidity (0.11 and 12.6% vs. 0.36 and 19.3%). In matter of housing and health care, the ČSSD and KSČM clearly demanded a most active role of the state. The state should guarantee the quality of the health care system and support the needy through the provision of a wide array of social and security benefits. Similarly the housing scarcity problem should primarily be addressed by the state through active construction of flats to be made available to

the public. The KSČM even demanded the instalment of communal housing. The ODS on the other hand sought to partly privatise and retrench the welfare system making it more efficient, and regarded the housing situation as a private matter which is to be solved individually. The KDU-ČSL was not in favour of privatisation of the welfare system and demanded an active role of the state in solving the housing dilemma. At the same time it agreed with the ODS and ODA on the need for further privatisation and marketization, but muffled and with more consideration of the socially weak in society. ODS and ODA both wished to lower the tax base of citizens and entrepreneurs and further liberalise the market with the aim to foment business and consumption. Budget rigor and an efficient management of state budget and finances seemed most important to the ODA (0.69, 31.6% saliency), followed by the ODS (0.58, 31.6% saliency, and KDU-ČSL (0.36, 19.3%). Only the KSŠM had a negative value for economic liberalism (-0.8, 13.5%) indicting its distain for further uncontrolled and unguided deregulation and liberalisation of the market. The party even demanded partly reversal of the marketization process and more state regulation of the market. The CSSD on the other hand privily recognised the need for privatisation and market liberalisation, but during the 1996 decided to stay out of the debate. While social justice and a functioning welfare system were prioritised the most by the ČSSD, the state budget and the marketization was most important to the ODS.

The miscellaneous dimension and the CEE dimension has to be assessed conjointly, since the issue of transition directly involved questions of institutional setup of the state, decentralisation and the nature and organisation of state administration. First of all it becomes evident that the CEE dimension, and above all the variables post-communist transition and socio-political liberalism, constituted important political foci during the 1996 elections. With an overall score of 0.51 and dimension saliency of 21.5%, rather CEE-specific issue clusters were addressed in an active manner. The same applies to the miscellaneous dimension (overall 0.50 in direction and 24.2% dimensional saliency) and the institutional reform variable in particular, which all parties considered important, but with a slightly different weight on the extent and nature of reform.

The efficiency, speed and the status of transition and stabilisation had valence character for all political parties, but was prioritised with a different weight on either the nature of post-communist transition, including the role of the state, as well as public and foreign actors. Also agreed upon was the need for restitution of previously

expropriated property to its rightful owners and the solution of unresolved legal matters of ownership (e.g. between the state and the church). In line with Blahož et al. (1999) divisions regarding social transformation did not polarise or break up the horizontal structure of politics and the overall picture is that of continuity. All parties considered the matter of transition equally important with the exception of the Communists due to their reluctance to property restitution and inertia. While some parties emphasised the role of the state and pushed for greater efficiency and speed of the process while stressing the importance and inviolable civic freedoms and the right of public participation during the process (ODS, ODA, ČSSD), others concentrated on the necessity for reform of the state through decentralisation, some even called for federalism and the implementation of the subsidiary principle (KDU-ČSL, 0.63 and 21.1%). For the ODS almost equally relevant was to further accelerate and complete the transition and transformation process as soon as possible (0.66, 31.7%) while calling for civic freedoms and individual rights (mostly related to property rights and the free market). Also deplored was the inefficiency and non-transparency of public administration mostly due to over-bureaucratisation of the state machinery as inherited by the communist past (0.28, 22.6%). The ODS was the party that prioritised the issues of institutional reform, infrastructure, transition and socio-political liberalism the most during the 1996 election campaigns. Another central issue was the restructuration of the agrarian sector and the modernisation of the rural under-developed areas of the country. While ODS and ODA favoured a market-led transformation of the agrarian sector, ČSSD and KSČM demanded a state-led restructuration, including welfare interventionism and support for the disadvantaged rural population through welfare policies (the KSČM called for a planned economy altogether). Within the CEE dimension, the category ethnic liberalism, and more specifically the German question was only addressed by Vaclav Klaus, who mostly rejected any German critique on Czech handling of the issue and dismissed the 'Sudeten affair' as a part of the past. All parties with the exception of the KSČM called for the improvement and modernisation of the country's infrastructure, including public transport, and the national network of motorways and rail tracks. This issue was highly prioritised above all by the ODS (39.2%, 0.55). The Christian Democrats were the only party to address the issue of ecology calling for a more environmentally friendly industrial policy and the improvement of the living environment (0.58, 50%).

The most eye-catching observation is the relative absence of cultural issues throughout the 1996 elections. The only party, who addressed one cultural issue dimension, namely Europe, is the ČSSD as the most euro-enthusiast party of the Czech Republic (Kopecký/Muddle 2002). All other parties showed relatively little interest for any other of the cultural issues. The cultural dimension achieved an overall value direction of 0.29 with a 7.9% dimensional saliency, but due to the low number of observations (77) was hardly 'significant'.

The graphic representation (Fig. 1) of political parties and issue positions confirm the saliency of the economic variables, as well as institutional reform and infrastructure by the majority of parties, whereas the categories environment and Europe are further out the central issue cluster and only close to the two parties they are addressed by. The clearly discernible issue cluster of the variables transition, institutional reform, welfare, infrastructure, budget and economic liberalism confirm the topicality of marketization and transition.

4.3 The 2010 elections

The election turnout in 2010 was at 62.6% and dropped slightly since 2006 (65%). Both ČSSD and ODS lost substantial support: the former suffered a loss of 10.2 percentage points and received a total of 22.1% whereas the ODS's drop in votes was with 15.2% to a total of 22.1% even more dramatic. Together they lost over 1.4 million votes. The KDU-ČSL received only 4.4% and the Greens only 2.4%. Their bad performance was mainly attributable to internal party conflicts and defections. The KSČM is with 11.3% the only party with a remarkable degree and pattern of consistency over time²⁷ (CSU 2014).

Out of nothing emerged two newcomer parties: TOP09 formed in 2009 and led by the popular Karel Schwarzenberg, and the protest party *Věci Veřejné* (VV) headed by the investigative journalist Radek John. Both parties played on the popularity of their leaders and offered unsatisfied voters an alternative to the main parties and a possibility to express their discontent. TOP09 stressed the importance of financial balancing through budget cuts and the introduction of university tuitions and health care deductibles; and largely profited from KDU-ČSL defectors who were unhappy with the latter's leftist drift. VV on the other hand established itself as a strong anti-

²⁷ Due to its ageing voter core and unreformed party profile the party is more likely to decline (Stegmaier/Vlachová 2010).

corruption platform demanding more political transparency and the end of 'political dinosaurs'. The former won 16.7% and the latter 10.9% of votes and both made it straight into Parliament and government (Stegmaier/Vlachová 2010, Haughton et al. 2011).

The 2014 Czech legislative elections presented an interesting and most unexpected case causing a dramatic upheaval in what had been a relatively stable political landscape (Stegmaier/Vlachová 2010). With the Greens and the KDU-ČSL - members of the ODS-led government coalition since 2006 – falling below the 5% electoral threshold and the appearance of the two newcomer parties TOP09 and Public Affairs (VV) taking their place, the pattern of bare majority or minority government was not only broken, but the first significant centre-right parliamentary majority in 12 years formed. In opposition to the new centre-right government coalition of ODS, TOP09 and VV, the winner ČSSD was paradoxically turned into the election loser. With the KDU-ČSL excluded from Parliament, the pattern of the 'four ever presents' came to an end. As a result the overall party strength was more equalised than before, and with the emergence of the two new centre-right parties the coalition formation process proved significantly easier than in the past. At the same time the two main parties ODS and ČSSD were now facing two important rivals. The newly formed government declared itself as one of 'fiscal responsibility' promising a balance in budget and the reduction of the public deficit, political and pension system reforms and the battle against corruption and for more political transparency (Stegmaier/Vlachová 2010, Haughton et al. 2011).

The 2010 political campaign and debate was far more manifold than its 1996 counterpart. The political topics covered by the media²⁸ included taxes and public debt (*daně a zadlužování*); the pensions, reform of the pension system and social benefits (*penze, důchody a sociální dávky*), business and company taxes (*byznys a firemní daně*); public transport and infrastructure (*dopravy*); security and justice, including corruption and the efficiency of the legal system (*bezpečnost a justice*); education, culture and the media (*školaství, kultura a média*); ecology and the living environment (*ekologie a životní prostředí*); and last but not least the EU and foreign politics (*EU a zahraniční politika*) – though with less relevance compared to the other issues.

Before going any further with the critical evaluation of the 2010 electoral outcome, I would like to consider my own findings from the content analysis first and

²⁸ *Hospodářské Noviny*, 27 April 2010 – 28 May 2010.

contextualise the data outcome according to party/party bloc and socio-economic and cultural developments.

Data Analysis (2010)

For the 2010 elections a total of 1017 observations have been collected one month prior to election days on May 28th and 29th. Unlike the 1996 elections, the media coverage and reporting on the most important parties was more balanced this time: for each party between 130 and 140 observations have been collected. The two main parties ODS and ČSSD account for a slightly higher number. This allows for a better interpretation of the issue saliency of one political party in relation to others. This time the highest number of observations falls within the cultural dimension (394), followed by the economic dimension (364) and the miscellaneous issue cluster (205). The CEE dimension only registered a total of 54 observations and has therefore become rather marginal.

The economic dimension has an overall saliency of 35.8% and thus slightly decreased in importance since 1996; the direction of 0.20 suggests a greater more intensified divide and discord between the political parties on the three economic issues. The ODS continues to be one of the most market-oriented parties (0.57, 23%) but is now rivalled by Schwarzenberg's TOP09 with a similar economic profile; the latter is by far the biggest defender of the free market and a liberalised economy (0.70, 13.5%).

In light of the highly topical Euro crisis and the recently witnessed Greek case of bankruptcy one of the main issues of the campaign was the public debt and state finances. The ODS and TOP09 expressed their concerns and called for a drastic retrenchment of social benefits (including partly commercialisation of the health care system, introduction of deductibles, lowering of pensions) in order to balance the state budget: both parties favour extensive welfare state retrenchment (ODS -0.02, 13.3% vs. TOP09 -0.31, 11.8%) in favour of a more balanced and rigid budgetary policy (ODS 0.58, 19.5% vs. TOP09 0.58, 21.8%). These two centre-right parties are counterbalanced by the ČSSD (0.55, 24%) and KSČM (0.77, 17.2%), who maintained their profile of social justice and redistribution, high taxation of the propertied and moneyed layers of society, as well as state interventionism and market regulation. The ČSSD and KSČM sought to defend the welfare system at all costs even calling for its further extension at the benefit of pensioners, the sick and

the unemployed. The KSČM was by far the most and 'militantly social' of all demanding further extension of the welfare system. While the two centre-right parties did not wish for further taxation of businesses or for an increase of the VAT), the ČSSD (-0.50, 20.7%) and the KSČM (-0.79, 13.8%) called for a vast increase of the tax base, corporate and individual taxes alike (the KSČM even earmarked a maximum tax rate at 40% and over). Both parties also vehemently opposed further market deregulation and economic liberalisation at the expense of the weaker parts of society (-0.39, 17.6% and -0.80, 13.5% respectively). The socio-economic cleavage clearly gained momentum.

The KDU-ČSL on the other hand agreed to some cuts in social benefits providing that the core of society, namely families and children were not affected (0.23, 13.8%). The Christian Democrat stance on the free market remained moderately positive (0.08, 16.2). The Green Party generally supported a generous health care and welfare system (0.54, 11.8%) but also emphasised values of gender equality, the importance for the investment in human capital and the quality of the working environment. It did not seem to care much about issues of finance and economy, but directed its attention to other issues.

The newcomer VV on the contrary, although a member of the centre-right parties, took an economic 'middle way' (0.00, 10.8): although generally in favour of a decent amount of welfare benefits and state regulation, it endorsed a stronger control of the flow of social benefits in order to detect and punish freeloaders (0.06, 8.5%).

Moving to the next dimension: cultural issues increased significantly both in proportion (394), relevance and saliency. The relatively high overall dimensional direction of 0.37 suggests valence character of the cultural dimension at the first glance. With a dimensional saliency of 38.5% cultural issues even overhauled economic issues by roughly 3%.

The most important categories almost addressed by all parties are culture and security: in terms of culture much was debated about the quality of secondary schools and the accessibility of tertiary education. Also relevant was the maintenance of the national heritage including the promotion of arts. The ODS, TOP09 and also VV, although well aware of the importance of education and research, called for the introduction of university tuition. Only the most gifted and only the best were to be promoted (including through study abroad stipends). This explains the lower values for the two centre-right parties (ODS: 0.30, 18.3%, TOP09: 0.36, 17.5%) in contrast to the ČSSD (0.67, 12.5%), KSČM (0.54, 20.8%), KDU-ČSL (0.56, 15.0%) and the

Greens (0.65, 14.2%), who all agree on the fact that tertiary education should remain free and accessible to all. Almost all parties advocated the quality assessment of secondary education and routine evaluations of the teachers to enhance and improve the school system. Also remarkable is (was) the high degree of consensus among the parties about the maintenance and preservation of the cultural heritage, including monuments, museums and the promotion of the Czech art scene. The category culture clearly takes on valence character, and most importantly the call for the improvement of education and culture clearly constitutes a post-materialist value (Lipset 2000), which all Czech political parties have picked up more or less conjointly. For Marks et al. (2006: 164) the new politics dimension also addresses issues engaging in lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory decision-making and national culture. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) express concerns about a material interpretation of party stances, since the Green call for greater participatory elements within the framework of liberal-representative democracies (C4) should not be confused with the CEE participatory demands for more affluence and firmly established liberal-representative institutions. I excluded the democratisation characteristic (C4: 411)²⁹ from the category cultural liberalism altogether, and instead included the call for collective governance structures and broader public participation into categories M11 and K14 to rule-out any misinterpretation.

Another 'huge' issue picked up by almost all parties, and by VV in particular was the endless topic of political corruption and non-transparency of the decision making process. Within the same category fall the issue of security, the quality (and efficiency) of the justice system and the police force (at some point the VV called for public order patrols and the banishment of homeless people from Prague city centre). Predominantly addressed by the party of Public Affairs (0.61, 26.7%), other parties followed quickly (ODS: 0.50, 12.1%; ČSSD: 0.43, 18.1; KSČM: 0.56, 6.9%; TOP09: 0.36, 19%; SZ 0.55, 9.5%).

The only issue marked by a weak divide between leftist parties on one side and rightist parties on the other was the debate about army and national defence, including the role of the NATO (including Afghanistan), transatlanticism and the American Radar/European Missile Defence System. While both the ODS (0.56, 17%) and also the VV supported stronger ties and partnership with the US and NATO in terms of national defence issues, the ČSSD, although in favour of the NATO, aimed to withdraw all Czech soldiers from NATO operations and missions (0.03, 18.1%),

²⁹ See codebook for details (Wüest 2010).

and the KSCM demanded to opt out of the Atlantic alliance altogether, rejecting any dispatch of Czech soldiers other than for the defence and security of the own territory (-0.77, 20.8%). The Christian Democrats and the Greens did not seem to take issue on this category. Paradoxically neither Europe nor army were subject of considerable debate in the 1996 elections 14 years before.

The new cultural categories relevant for the new cultural divide in European context are cultural liberalism, Europe and immigration. The latter was as good as entirely absent from the debate (12 observations only), indicating that immigration so far had not been an issue yet. Unlike Hanley (2004), who announced a shift in direction of nationalism (especially by the ODS), in 2010 I only measured a certain degree of 'cultural liberalism/illiberalism', but which was only picked up by three other parties and overall remained of secondary importance³⁰: the KDU-ČSL mostly because of their emphasis on traditional, family and Christian values, but also due to their reluctance to consider Turkey as a potential EU member for mostly cultural/religious reasons earned a negative value of -0.40 with a saliency of 22.2%. Similarly the VV was with -0.50 and 17.8% saliency rather culturally illiberal due to their opposition to Turkey, some rather clumsy and slightly racist remarks uttered by VV chairmen about Ukrainian construction workers and the Roma minority in the country. The only party significantly supporting (0.56) cultural liberalism with a 35.6% saliency, including the rights of homosexuals, gender equality, and their emphasis on ethics and post-material values were the Greens. Please keep in mind that the party only won 2.44% of the votes. Therefore cultural and post-material values were so far still only of secondary importance in the Czech Republic.

Similarly the category Europe was only sufficiently addressed by the ODS, who with a -0.08 and a saliency of 27.1 can be classified as mild Eurosceptics: while the party clearly favoured economic European integration and the idea of a European single market, it opposed cultural and above all political integration and preferred a closer partnership with the US over European military cooperation. The KDU-ČSL was clearly in favour of the EU (0.55, 22.9%) and the most Euroenthusiast of all parties were again the Greens (0.75, 16.7%) and the ČSSD (though less salient).

At this point I still want to look at the values for these categories and the other parties. For the first I was able to collect 45 and for the second 48 observations. The data output already allows me to draw a vague picture of what the cultural dimension

³⁰ For an issue to be considered relevant at least 7.5 (8) statements per party were necessary. For 2010 I set the threshold at 52.5 (53) per category, since 7 political parties were analysed during the campaign.

would approximately look like in case the issues of cultural liberalism, Europe/ European integration and even immigration become more relevant in the Czech political scene. On side we have the centre-right parties ODS and VV: Both have negative values for cultural liberalism, Europe and immigration. Each of these issues has been picked up by the parties at some point, but so far only at the margins of the political campaign. So we have one camp of parties on the right side of the political spectrum, which is rather critical towards European integration, and the side effects of Europeanisation and globalisation. In contrast the leftist camp of political parties, ČSSD and KSČM that is, exhibits positive values for the three categories (cultural liberalism, Europe and to a lesser extent immigration). The stance of TOP09 – although far more optimistic about the European project – is not really assessable since no observations for the other two categories have been made at all. The Greens are by far the most European party of all, since they come to resembling other European Green parties the most in terms of party profile and values. Also quite European are the Christian Democrats – who consider themselves a mainstream European Christian Democratic Party (cf. Fitzmaurice 1996): despite their emphasis on traditional and moral values of Christianity (-0.40, 22.2%), they are clear Eurooptimists and belong among the most Europe friendly parties of the Czech Republic. In this regard the KDU-ČSL is the true and only centrist party so far. An interesting case make the unreformed communists: at one point during my data collection they explicitly call for the fight against any display of neo-Nazism, discrimination, and hatred towards foreigners (*potírání jakýchkoli projevů neonacismu, diskriminace a nenávisť vůči cizincům*), but at another point they accord and call for the defence of national sovereignty (*zdůrazňujeme suverenitu, ohrazujeme se proti militarismu*)³¹. This observation is consistent with Kitschelt's prognosticated pattern of CEE redistributive libertarians, who favour strong state interventionism and pacifism, are ethnically tolerant and cosmopolitan, and in the case of the KSCM also tendentially isolationists. Interestingly the KČSM seemed to have come to terms with the EU (0.13, 8.3%) as the 'lesser of two evils' (the greater evil being the NATO).

Moving on to the next dimension: the issue of environmental protection and the living environment during the 2010 elections was more or less relevant for all political parties, and expectedly for the Greens in particular (0.72, 28.9%). The only

³¹ *Hospodářské Noviny*, 12 and 13 May 2010.

party with a negative value for this category (13.5% saliency) is the ODS, since for them the economy clearly comes first. Both ODS and VV consider nuclear energy an eco-friendly policy and therefore earned negative values. Not only were the ecology, the eco system and pollution subject of considerable debate, but also the quality of the living environment in the countryside and the cities. With a pronounced emphasis on the categories environment and culture, the Czech political scene has embraced two important 'new politics' issues (cf. Lipset 2000).

The matter of institutional reform was still a relevant issue for almost all parties (except for the left-wing parties), and the Greens and VV in particular (0.5, 18.5 saliency each). This category mostly evolved around calls for reform of the justice system and court administration, ministerial reforms, the fight of bureaucracy and a new and simplified civil code. The infrastructure was predominantly a topic of the right wing (ODS: 0.44, 19.2%, TOP09: 0.56, 17%) calling for the improvement of the country's network of motor- and railways, as well as regional public transport. The Greens, for obvious reasons, are the only party that strictly opposed further construction of motorways (-0.20, 21.3%), but rather focus on the improvement of the country's railway network to promote the use of public transportation. They also demand a vast increase of motorway tolls.

The CEE category in 2010, including socio-political liberalism, had almost entirely lost significance (cf. Blahož et al. 2009): only 54 observations have been collected, and an overall direction of 0.02 and saliency of 5.3 has been calculated. The only two topics that were marginally relevant within this dimension were the old topic of property restitution between the state and the church (the KSČM was the only party to oppose the finalisation of the restitution process) and the role of politics and the media, or more precisely the influence of politics (mainly the Chamber of Deputies) on the content of public service media (TV and radio) through the allocation and composition of the relevant boards. While mostly the KDU-ČSL and the Greens sought to delimit and reduce the influence of politics on the media, the two main parties ODS and ČSSD endorsed the status quo given their up-to-then 'privileged' position in Parliament. I decided to code this issue as a topic of socio-political liberalism.

The second SPSS output (Fig. 2) for the 2010 elections the cluster of issues is not as dispersed as before indicating a more equalised issue articulation. In the middle cluster of issues and parties the economic variables which all parties are relatively close too, as well as the two newly important cultural categories (red):

culture, security. Also close is the environment, infrastructure, institutional reform and cultural liberalism, surrounding the Green party. The data output concurs with my interpretation of findings. Fig. 3 depicts both elections at the same time (2010 as point of reference). Visible in this plot are the movements of parties between 1996 and 2010, in case the saliency was shifted or directed at other/new issues (for example KDU-ČSL).

4.4 In-depth analysis: 1996 vs. 2010

During the 1996 elections the socio-economic is the dominant and only dimension (cf. Jungerstam-Mulders 2006), but also issues of state-building/governance, state institutions and to a minimal extent ethnic issues were part of the political agenda (though picked up by the ODS only). The ODA and the ODS in particular are both economically liberal (E3) and libertarian (K14), but not necessarily cosmopolitan if the weak value for category C4 is any indicator (ODS). On the other side is the ČSSD in favour of state interventionism but also libertarian. In this regard, the classic left-right divide between pro-market/libertarian/cosmopolitan and pro-state/authoritarian/protectionist does not fully apply. This pattern of party competition rather matches the structure postulated by Kitschelt. When taking category K14 as an indicator for authoritarianism, then the only slightly authoritarian party (hard left-TAN) is the unreformed KSČM, which corroborates findings by other authors (Vachudova/Hooghe 2009). All in all ethnicity does not seem to play a role at all in the Czech Republic given the relative ethnic homogeneity of the country. The 1996 political space is thus characterised by a main socio-economic dimension with crosscutting socio-political and democratic-institutional issues of transition. In light of these findings Kitschelt's model of party competition seems more accurate. For the socio-economic cleavage we can identify a structural difference between parties/voters: the KSČM's voter core mainly comprises aging proponent of the old regime, and the party together with the ČSSD appeal to 'losers' of economic transition from a distinct 'social class' with a specific level of education and from a certain professional background (cf. Kitschelt). In line with Keegan-Krause (2006), this cleavage has an attitudinal base due to differences in socio-economic issues, an institutional element through party choice and political articulation, and also a structural difference (if class is any indicator).

In 2010 the economic conflict had further exacerbated and continued to be the only true cleavage. When looking at the values of the parties individually and comparing them to 1996, all parties except for the Greens and VV participate in the political debate evolving around all three economic issue-categories. The values for issue position and saliency of the CSSD and KSČM have increased significantly, indicating the overall importance of the economic development and the strong effect of market liberalisation on Czech society since transition. Marks (et al. 2006) and Vachudova/Hooghe (2009) stipulated a right-GAL and left-TAN economic-cultural axis of party competition. Right-wing parties are ODS, VV and TOP09. The only right-GAL party in the Czech Republic could be TOP09 (unfortunately no observation for category C4 have been made). VV and ODS rather follow the classic Western right-TAN pattern if categories C4 and K14 (although relatively weak) are considered. The ODS even has a negative value for the category environment. On the other side of the spectrum we have CSSD, KSČM and SZ, which all favour state-interventionism/the welfare state and market regulation, and have positive values for cultural liberalism, the environment, and socio-political liberalism (though weak). This would rather suggest the Western left-GAL structure. The KSČM, who according to the authors should be leftist and TAN, has a positive value for cultural liberalism though not for socio-political liberalism. KDU-ČSL with its negative value and emphasis on cultural liberalism is leaning towards right-TAN. Does this mean that the Czech political parties slowly converged towards the Western European pattern of party competition? I do not intend to 'jump the gun' here, since this is a trial analysis and the observations gathered on the relevant categories are not numerous enough.

Moving further to the cultural dimension: before discussing the relevance of 'cultural issues' I would like to briefly address the issue of Europe and Euroscepticism, which according to many authors the Czech Republic is a prime example for (Kopecký/Muddle 2002, Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004, Vachudova/Hooghe 2009, Přebal 2012). The authors also claimed, that the EU and the European question as an 'umbrella ideology' would increase in saliency becoming an important subject and object of CEE politics and as a result a marked divide between eurosceptics and eurorejectionists (i.e. ODS) on one, and euroenthusiasts and europragmatics on the other. This did not seem to be the case for 2010: the EU, although thematised by three parties, rather remained a 'second-order issue' – for now. The EU politics was treated as a part of foreign politics topic (Hloušek/Pšeja 2011), just like the NATO.

Although 'cultural' issues have won ground and gained in importance, but at a closer look, cultural issues constitute two important, but rather *internal* political issues with valence character: corruption and culture. While culture can be regarded as a post-materialist issue that is picked by all parties in 2010, the issue of corruption has to be considered in relation to contextual factors and circumstances of the 2010 election. After a rather wakeful period of political unrest and corruption scandals under the Topolánek administration (since 2006), the VV as a protest party picked up and politicised this hot issue and thereby appealed to a disappointed, dissatisfied and growingly apolitical Czech electorate. The party hit the 'sweet mark' in the sense, that it was able to mobilise a great share of independent voters longing for political change during a moment of internal crisis. Similarly TOP09 made it their priority to articulate the need for change and presented itself as a viable alternative to the ODS 'free from corruption and scandal'. In the language of 'agency approach' these two parties leveraged instances of crisis by shifting the saliency to the issue of corruption (especially the VV).

Another display of agency during the 2010 election could be the dramatic increase in the importance of preferential voting, thus an unexpected result of a party-induced change to the electoral rules, namely the return to 4 preferential votes (instead of two) along with a 5% threshold in order to move up the party list, which was had been proposed by the Topolánek government (ODS) "as a step toward increased personalisation of elections and more open lists" (Stegmaier/Vlachova 2010). By allowing the citizens to alter the proposed candidate lists, deputies can benefit from building up personal reputation in their constituencies and counter eventual party attempts to thwarts re-nomination (Kopecký 2006/2006). Yet another form of agency during the 2010 election campaigns was the tactical use of facebook and the social media as a campaigning platform to address a specific demographic target group: young voters (cf. Haughton et al. 2011).

In dealignment/realignment language, an already mobile and independent electorate 'committed' behavioural dealignment by detaching from ČSSD and ODS in particular, and realignment by voting VV and TOP09. This type of de- and realignment is not anchored in socio-demographics or structure, but rather in the agency of political parties. Therefore the category 'security' cannot be attributed to the effect of globalisation or Europeanisation. Since these two categories have valence character, we cannot speak of a cleavage or issue divide either. Another

party that realigned itself attitudinally between 1996 and 2010 are the Christian Democrats (cultural liberalism).

We can also interpret the dramatic upheaval of the 2010 elections with Rohrschneider and Whitefield's model of representation (2011): given the rudimentary erosion of the CEE-specific uni-dimensional socio-economic space and the emergence of cultural issues and above all the valence issue of corruption indicating the unfreezing of the 'traditional' cleavage structure, the main parties ODS and ČSSD, which lack Western-style mass party organisation to mitigate the bridge between party and predominantly independent Czech voters and were no longer accommodated by the simplicity of the up-to-then uni-dimensional political space, and thus no longer able to successfully appeal to Czech voters: as a result they were and still are faced with a remarkable degree of representational strain, which accounted for their dramatic loss of a share of voters in the 2010 elections. The KSČM on the other side, with their traditionally stable base of older partisan voters (it is the only party with a more or less constant share of voters during the last 6 elections), was hardly affected at all.

When comparing the two elections, it becomes clear that the socio-economic cleavage has slightly lost of relevance compared to the 'cultural dimension' due to the saliency of the 'corruption' issue. At the same time the CEE dimension and matters of post-communist transition have lost complete relevance. This development could be interpreted in line with Rohrschneider and Whitefield's (2008) argumentation on the importance of contextual factors: 20 years of economic transition have led to a higher level of economic development in the country, making the economic issues/economic dimension and above all the CEE dimension lose in relevance. In line with Kriesi's reasoning, who views the capacity of the national political space to pick up and process new political issues as a 'zero sum game' (new issues can only be accommodated if old issues were solved or lost relevance) (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), 'free room' for new policy issues had been made. This line of argumentation is replicable when looking at the changes in values for dimensional saliencies between 1996 and 2010. If this was the case, and judging by the irrelevance of the CEE dimension in 2010, one could argue that the communist past, which is said to be still framing CEE politics (Rohrschneider/Whitefield 2012), is maybe starting to gradually move into the past. Another indicator for this might be the only true mass-party KČSM and 'debris' of the old regime – the decline of which is

inevitable due to its ageing voter core and its reluctance to internal reform (Stegmaier/Vlachova 2011).

(Rep.). The actual cultural conflict I was looking for is expressed by three categories: cultural liberalism, Europe and immigration. For now (2010) this divide is rather weak and marginal at best. In 2010 only three rather marginal parties emphasised two of the three variables. What becomes clear from the data output, is that the potential for conflict is there: we can already recognise a value and issue divide between left/Green parties on one side and right/centre parties on the other and make assumptions about what a possible cultural divide would look like in the Czech Republic.

According to Deegan-Krause's typology (2006) for 'something like cleavages' the cultural European integration conflict would be an issue divide, since a party's and voter's stance on cultural liberalism has an attitudinal base – for example stemming from traditional and religious values in case of the KDU-ČSL, and post-materialist and internationalist values in case of the Greens – as well as an institutional base (through the political choice to vote either one of these parties). The same would apply to Europe and immigration.

Just like with the issue of corruption, the cultural conflict in the European context during the 2010 elections had not been articulated and politicised (enough). Despite the relatively high saliency placed of these categories by KDU-ČSL, Greens and also VV, given their low electoral outcome, European integration is still a secondary issue. It remains to be seen how these issues are going to be articulated and politicised by parties in the near future.

Going back to the 1996 elections, the issue environment was only important for one party (KDU-ČSL). The Greens appeared on the Czech political scene in 2006 (unfortunately I could not include the 2006 elections in my analysis and have no data to verify shifting values for saliency on the issue). In 2010 every single party takes issue on the environment. My read is that the issue was articulated over time firstly by the KDU-ČSL, then the Greens in 2006, and soon other parties followed – and at the same time this process was most likely influenced by Europeanisation-induced diffusion of environmental policies during and after EU accession.

Back to the cultural divide: for now it remains marginal, but since the 2013 Czech elections the political landscape has experienced further unusual 'shocks'. Two new protest-parties rose almost ousting entirely the VV party: the centre-right

neo-liberal ANO 2011³² on one side, and even more interesting the right-wing neo-populist party *Dawn of Direct Democracy (UPD)*. The former won 18.65% of votes, and the latter 6.88% (thus comparable to other Western European right-wing parties) (CSU 2014). Turnout was at 59.48%³³. According to the party programme³⁴ the UDP specifically targets issues indicative of the new cultural divide, including Europe, immigration and cultural liberalism (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 in the Appendix). In line with the agency and dealignment perspectives, the UDP party might be politicising the typical demarcation vs. integration issues by using the current crisis and instability of the Czech political scene, by shifting salience to these particular issues, by calling for institutional reforms, including the referendum in matters of EU legislation (a typical move for neo-populist parties to respond to electoral change) and by actively contributing to changes in societal values, interest structures and identities through the ‘winning-formula’ appeals. The party is trying to politicise a potential issue divide through agenda-pushing and voter mobilisation. It is not yet clear, if the three issues, including Europe/Euroscepticism are to become a party ideology or a strategy (cf. Kopecký/Muddle 2002). It is though highly likely that other parties, especially the ones with opposite attitudinal programmes, such as the Greens and KDU-CSL, will soon respond. Seeing as I can already estimate the individual party stances on the three issues according to the 2010 data outcome in terms of issue positions, a formation of a cultural cleavage of the sort Kriesi and colleagues postulate cannot be foreclosed.

What precise role is the process of Europeanisation playing during all of this? I cannot exactly explain its impact with policy diffusion like before. The citizenship and immigration laws in the Czech Republic are already tough. Besides, the country is not yet a typical immigration country like other Western EU member states, and the number of foreigners in the country is rather modest. Nevertheless the substance and style of the UPD resembles Western neo-populist parties, which are currently on the rise all throughout Europe. Staying at the level of cleavages and agency leverage, maybe the EU in its ‘transformative’ power through mimetic diffusion of ideas and *attitudes* (Börzel et al. 2009) is motivating CEE parties, such as the UPD, to act as norm- and policy entrepreneurs (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998) driven by the Europe-wide ‘identitarian turn’ (Betz ct. in Bornschier 2009), and to incorporate the

³² Ano means ‘yes’ in Czech, and their party slogan ‘ano, bude líp!’ (Yes, it will be better!), source: <http://www.anobudelip.cz/cs/> [15 MAY 2014]

³³ Since 1996 the number is dropping constantly indicative of political apathy.

³⁴ Source: <http://www.hnutiusvit.cz/program-hnuti/> [15 MAY 2014]

Europe-wide phenomenon of *new identity politics* (Bornschieer 2009) during 'favourable' instants of national crisis into its own political agenda. The UDP, as a party among many in one competitive Czech (national) and European (current European elections) electoral market (Mair et al. 2004), seizes the Europeanisation-induced opportunity (*potential*) in relation to the national political, social and temporal context to 'actively' (agency) open a new 'political chapter' by politicising a hitherto unarticulated 'hot issue', possibly paving the way for a future demarcation vs. integration issue divide. With this I offered one possible interpretation of the current events in the Czech political landscape. If an appeal to identity is as successful as it is in Western Europe, remains to be seen. Seeing as the reality of party politics and partisan identity differ from Western European mass politics, the mobilisation through appeals to identity is rather undermined (Kopecký 2006, Rohrschneider/ Whitefield 2012).

The research on cultural European integration, the deeper socio-cultural and identitarian processes involved in Europeanisation is rather neglected (Musil 2005).

At this point I wanted to discuss possible advantages and disadvantages of the method, as well as limitations, aspects of validity, reliability, the probability of human (while coding) and media biased, and important methodological differences between the coding scheme and rules I developed, and the Kriesi's method. The model fit of the visualised data outputs should also be briefly discussed. Due to the limited space I will defer further discussion for the oral defence.

5 Conclusion: Part II

According to my findings I can summarize the following: First of all the socio-economic market-state conflict remains the only true cleavage in the Czech Republic. In 1996 the socio-economic dimension was crosscutting with political topics of governance, reform, socio-political liberalism and of course the valence issue of post-communist transformation. Ethnic, cultural and also the European questions were of minimal importance.

In 2010 an intensified socio-economic cleavage continues to structure Czech politics, but equally salient cultural and post-materialist matters made its appearance. At a closer look these concentrate on valence issues of culture on one side highlighting the importance of post-materialist values in Czech society – together with the variable ‘environment’. Previously relevant CEE issues, such as socio-political liberalism and post-communist transition, have almost entirely lost relevance.

The cultural variables indicative of the demarcation vs. integration Europeanisation-induced cultural divide are only weakly and marginally articulated, but already allow to draw a picture about the potential ‘conflictivity’ of this divide – in case it will be fully politicised by parties and processed by the political space in the near future.

The predominant CEE-specific socio-economic cleavage structure remains stable, but *not* unchanged between 1996 and 2010. With the emergence of cultural and ‘new-politics’ issues on the political agenda – although for now mostly in the form of valence issues – the Czech political space is heading towards bi-dimensionality. The term cleavage is only meaningful if there is persistence over time (Whitefield 2002), which is clearly the case for the socio-economic cleavage.

A new issue dimension is so far given, in that cultural issues appeared on the political scene, but given their valence character, any form of cleavage can be ruled out. Culturally motivated attitudinal divides on the other hand have emerged (cultural liberalism, to a lesser extent Europe) but remain rather marginal. Although new political potentials have been triggered and even though the political space is characterised by increased fragmentation and instability, the latter is above all attributable to the valence issue of corruption and growing political apathy, but not to globalisation and European integration. A possible transformation towards two-dimensionality of the political space is by no means ruled out.

The 2010 elections present an interesting case, because the country is experiencing moments of internal crisis; at the same time the process of Europeanisation through its ‘transformative power’ is exogenously wielding influence on the national space: the combined effect has opened up windows of opportunity for cleavage formation through agency on the national and European electoral market, if the current UPD campaign is any indicator. The current instances of crises and unrest are already being used by newcomer parties, such as the UPD, to present potentially appealing party programmes that differ from the usual pattern of socio-economic party competition, among them the populist appeal to cultural protectionism in the

context of European integration. In line with the (behavioural) dealignment and realignment theory other parties are highly likely to respond in the near future, potentially politicising a new cultural issue-cleavage dimension along a cultural and value-loaded line of conflict.

The current events in the Czech Republic present the opportunity to deepen and elaborate the study of political cleavages, and the possibility to better understand the role and patterns of agency and partisan de-/realignment involved in the process of cleavage formation in the region. At the same time research on the political leverage of Europeanisation may be extended to the cognitive dimension of ideas, attitudes and identities.

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7 Appendix

Tab. 1: Codingsheet sample (own illustration)

CODINGSHEET (2010 elections)											
MED.	DATE	page/ article	Content unit: RELATIONSHIP PARTY-STANCE (SENTENCE-BY-SENTENCE)						DIRECTION/ STRENGTH	CATEGORY - DIMENS.	
			S. #	Act.	SUBJECT (y)	PREDICATE (R)	OBJECT (x)	signal word			
HN (1)	020510	1/1	L	1	my	ušetříme	miliardy		0.5	E2	
			1	1	snižování rozpočtu	vzdát se	zvyšování daní	úplně	1	E2	
			2	1	ODS	bát se slibovat	škrtý v platech zaměstnanců, sociálních dávkách	velké	0.5	E2	
HN (1)	020510	2/1	L	2	my	snížíme	schodek		-0.5	E1	
			1 [5]	2	ČSSD	slibovat	vyplacení 13. důchodu, zvýšení přídavků, investice to nemocnic, ...		0.5	E2	
HN (1)	020510	1/2	3	1	dodržení programu	byl	snížení schodku		1	E1	
HN (1)	020510	4/1	L	8	radikální škrtý program	byl	snížil zadlužení státu	radikální	-1	E2	
HN (1)	020510	4/3	1	8		snížovat	schodek	rychle	1	E2	
						nepomáhat si	zvyšováním daním		0.5	E2	
			2	8	TOP09	navrhnout	snížení platů veřejných zaměstnanců, rodičovské dovolené, výrazné omezení sociálních příspěvků, ...		0.5	E2	
							snížení			-0.5	E1
			3	8	strana	chce snížit	náklady státních úřadů, výdaje na veřejné zakázky		0.5	M11	
HN (1)	020510	4/3	2	4	KSČM	chutnat	zvýšení daní a pojištění, snížení DPH	razantní	-1	E2	
HN (1)	020510	4/4	5	4	komunisté	slibovat	zvýšení rodičovské		0.5	E1	
			6	4	oni	mít	plány vědy, kultury		1	E1	
			1	7	VV	snížíme	schodek		0.5	E1	
HN (1)	020510	5/3	3	7	(VV)	je	snížování počtu úředníků	třeba	0.5	C7	
			H	7	VV	podpora	9 měsíců (nárok na podporu)		0.5	E2	
			L	7	VV (Kamil Jankovský)		nárok na podporu nezaměstnanosti		0.5	E2	
HN (1)	020510	6/2	H	7	VV	naplnit	Sociální solidarita		1	E1	
HN (1)	020510	6/2	L	1	Klaus (ODS)	vetovat	Zvýšení mateřské		-0.5	E1	
HN (1)	040510	4/1	L	1	firmy	mít	ODS	rádi	0.5	E1	
HN (1)	040510	4/4	L	1	vláda	posvětit	ekozakázku	obří	1	M10	
			L	3	"	"	"	"	1	M10	
			L	9	"	"	"	"	1	M10	
			L	1	"	"	"	"	1	M10	
HN (1)	040510	6/1	EX	1	ODS	zvýhodnit	preventivní prohlídky	chtít	0.5	E1	
				8	TOP09	"	"	"	0.5	E1	
				1	ODS	neprivatizovat	nemocnice		0.5	E1	
				1		motivovat	preventivní programy		0.5	E1	
			EX	1		zavést	standarty/nadstandarty, připojištění		-0.5	E1	
				1		"	připojištění		-0.5	E1	
				2	CSDD	nabízet	přípravek		0.5	E1	
				2		vrátit	,ujmu' za poplatky		0.5	E1	
			EX	2		zrušit	poplatky		0.5	E1	
				2		zabránit	privatizace		-0.5	E3	
				3	KDU-CSL	zavést	komerční připojištění, nadstandarty		-0.5	E1	
				3	Veřejné pojištění	neplatit	banální nemoci		-0.5	E1	
			EX	3		nezvyšovat	spoluúčast		-0.5	E1	
				3		neprivatizovat	pojišťovnu		0.5	E1	
				8	TOP09	regulovat	výdaje		0	E1	
				8	pojišťovna	skládat	úcty		-0.5	E1	
			EX	8		zvýhodnit	prevenci		0.5	E1	
	8	Limit na spoluúčast				-0.5	E1				
	9	SZ	vyhodnocovat	vliv znečištění	pravidelně	1	M10				
	9	Zákaz kouření, zdražení				0.5	M10				
EX	9	c.	vypracovat	zebrčky nemocnic	pravidelně	1	E1				

Tab. 2: System of categories (own illustration)

Category	Abbreviation (code)	Description
Economic dimension		
Welfare	welfare (E1)	Support for expansion of the welfare state; defence against welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character, calls for employment and health care programmes; valence issues (if addressed through interventionism), **matters of social security/redistribution of resources for the welfare state/social policy (type of model [paternalist vs. liberal], role of state vs. market)
Budget	budget (E2)	Support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit; cuts in expenditures; reduction of taxes without direct effects on redistribution
Economic liberalism	ecolib (E3)	Support for deregulation, more competition and privatisation; opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy; valence issues (if resolved through deregulation), **economic reform
Cultural dimension		
Cultural liberalism	cultlib (C4)	Support for the goals of the new social movements, with the exception of the environmental movement; support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (excluding the European Union and NATO), **support for life-style politics and human rights; support for the United Nations; opposition to racism; support for the right to abortion and euthanasia; opposition to patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and to traditional moral values; support for a liberal drug policy
Europe	europe (C5)	Support for European integration, including EU enlargement [...]; **rapprochement to the EU/EC (political integration)
Culture	culture (C6)	Support for education, culture, scientific research and the **media
Immigration	immigr (C7)	Support for a tough immigration and integration policy
Army	army (C8)	Support for the armed forces, for a strong national defence, and for nuclear weapons, **intensification of regional (V4) and supra-regional security cooperation (including NATO)
Security	security (C9)	Support for more law-and-order, the fight against crime, and denouncing political corruption, call for transparency **call for a more efficient justice system and police force
Miscellaneous		
Environment	environ (M10)	Support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy, **ecological vs. industrial policy; **call for the improvement of the living environment
Institutional reform	iref (M11)	Support for various institutional reforms such as the extension of direct democracy, <i>modifications</i> in the structure of the political system, such as federalism and decentralisation; **issues about the <i>nature and organisation of democracy</i> : support for decommunisation, as well as inclusive, decentralised and collective governance structures and procedures (decentralisation); call for the efficiency of government and public administration, **less bureaucracy, and new public management
Infrastructure	infra (M12)	Calls for the improvement of the country's road, railways, etc.
CEE control categories*		
Post-communist transition**	transit (K13)	Questions centring around the valence issue of reform, transition and stabilisation: role of the state (exclusive/passive vs. Inclusive/active), efficiency and speed of the process, restitution of property, and the right of public participation and role of foreign investment
Socio-political liberalism*	sopolib (K14)	Support for civic freedoms, individual autonomy, individual rights and beliefs - other than the goals of the NSM; **role of civic associations/organisations, **call for broader public political participation (e.g. during state-building processes)
Ethnic liberalism*	ethnlib (K15)	Call for universalist and inclusive concepts of citizenship and nationhood, protection of national minorities and minority rights, support for asylum policies, opposition to ethno-cultural nationalism, hot issues: 'Gypsies policy', **German question (call for historical elucidation of the past [e.g. Sudeten] vs. nationalist populism)

Sources: Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012); *Kitschelt (1995) and Evans/Whitefield (1998), **Blahož (et al. 1999)


Tab. 3.1 Issue position (direction) including number of observations (N, n) and percentage (%) of votes according to political party and election

	economic dimension			cultural dimension						miscellaneous			CEE-specific			Σn_k (N)	% (votes)
	welfare (E1)	budget (E2)	ecolib (E3)	cultlib (C4)	europa (C5)	culture (C6)	immigr (C7)	army (C8)	security (C9)	environ (M10)	iref (M11)	infra (M12)	transit (K13)	sopolib (K14)	ethnlib (K15)		
<i>ODS</i>																	
1996	0.17	0.58	0.59	[-0.50]	[-0.50]	[0.07]	[-0.50]	[0.50]	[0.50]	[-0.25]	0.28	0.55	0.66	0.57	-0.32	274	29.62
2010	-0.02	0.53	0.57	[-0.50]	-0.08	0.30	[-0.50]	0.56	0.50	-0.21	0.56	0.44	[0.50]	[-0.50]		164	20.22
<i>CSDD</i>																	
1996	0.63	[0.00]	[-0.10]	[0.5]	0.50	[0.50]			[0.50]	[0.5]	0.44	0.61	0.61	0.57		168	26.44
2010	0.55	-0.50	-0.39		[0.8]	0.67	[0.10]	0.03	0.43	0.54	[0.64]	[0.5]	[0.50]	[-0.13]	[0.50]	177	22.08
<i>KDU-CSL</i>																	
1996	0.59	0.36	0.11		[0.50]	[0.50]			[0.5]	[0.50]	0.58	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.59	186	8.08
2010	0.23	0.06	0.08	-0.40	0.55	0.56			[0.5]	[0.61]	0.46	0.50	[0.33]	[0.50]	[0.50]	138	4.39
<i>KSCM</i>																	
1996	0.68	[-0.10]	-0.62			[0.50]					0.35	[0.50]	0.18	[0.17]		97	10.33
2010	0.77	-0.79	-0.80	[0.21]	[0.13]	0.54		-0.77	0.56	0.54	[0.50]	[0.50]	[-0.67]	[-0.63]		128	11.27
<i>SPR-RSC</i>																	
1996	[0.60]	[0.50]	[0.34]	[-0.50]					[0.50]	[0.50]	0.73	[0.50]	[0.13]			38	8.01
-																	-
<i>ODA</i>																	
1996	0.32	0.69	0.54		[0.50]	[0.50]			[0.50]	[0.50]	0.57	0.58	0.64	[0.64]		201	6.36
-																	-
<i>VV</i>																	
-																	-
2010	0.06	[0.21]	0.00	-0.50	[-0.63]	0.29	[-0.67]	[0.60]	0.61	0.30	0.50	[0.40]	[0.13]	[-0.50]	[-0.50]	131	10.88
<i>TOP09</i>																	
-																	-
2010	-0.31	0.58	0.70		[0.50]	0.36		[0.83]	0.57	0.46	0.14	0.56	[0.50]	[0.63]		134	16.7
<i>SZ</i>																	
-																	-
2010	0.54	[0.08]	[-0.13]	0.56	0.75	0.65		[0.00]	0.55	0.72	0.50	-0.20	[0.50]	[0.5]		145	2.44
Σ_{sal}																	
1996	0.50	0.49	0.32	[0.05]	[0.18]	[0.37]	[-0.50]	[0.50]	[0.42]	[0.39]	0.49	0.58	0.56	0.54	[-0.32]		
2010	0.33	0.05	0.03	[0.01]	[0.30]	0.47	[-0.29]	0.10	0.55	0.48	0.48	[0.32]					
$\Sigma \Sigma_{dim(i)}$																	
1996		0.42				[0.29]					0.50			0.51			
$\Sigma n_{i(1996)}$		447				77					233			207		964	
2010		0.20				0.37					0.43			[0.02]			
$\Sigma n_{i(2010)}$		364				394					205			54		1017	

Tab. 3.2 Issue saliency (rel. frequency, %) including number of observations (n, N) and percentage (%) of votes according to political party and election 89

	economic dimension			cultural dimension						miscellaneous			CEE-specific			N_k	% (votes)
	welfare (E1)	budget (E2)	ecolib (E3)	cultlib (C4)	europe (C5)	culture (C6)	immigr (C7)	army (C8)	security (C9)	environ (M10)	iref (M11)	infra (M12)	transit (K13)	sopolib (K14)	ethnlib (K15)	(N)	
<i>ODS</i>																	
1996	15.4	31.6	35.7	[18.2]	[31.6]	[30.4]	[100]	[40.0]	[38.5]	[15.4]	22.6	39.2	31.7	28.3	100	274	29.62
2010	13.3	19.5	23.0	[8.9]	27.1	18.3	[33.3]	17.0	12.1	13.5	14.8	19.2	[9.1]	[14.3]		164	20.22
<i>CSDD</i>																	
1996	24.0	[7.0]	[7.1]	[54.6]	42.1	[26.1]			[38.5]	[23.1]	18.1	12.2	16.1	26.4		168	26.44
2010	23.7	20.7	17.6		[10.4]	12.5	[41.7]	34.0	18.1	11.5	[13.0]	[14.9]	[13.6]	[14.3]	[25.0]	177	22.08
<i>KDU-CSL</i>																	
1996	23.6	19.3	12.6		[15.8]	[17.4]			[30.0]	[7.7]	50.0	21.1	20.1	17.5	20.8	186	8.08
2010	13.8	9.2	16.2	22.2	22.9	15.0			[9.4]	[7.8]	13.5	16.7	[12.8]	[13.6]	[14.3]	138	4.39
<i>KSCM</i>																	
1996	15.9	[8.8]	11.5			[4.4]					9.8	[1.4]	11.9	[11.3]		97	10.33
2010	17.2	13.8	13.5	[15.6]	[8.3]	10.8		20.8	6.9	12.5	[5.6]	[4.3]	[27.3]	[14.3]		128	11.27
<i>SPR-RSC</i>																	
1996	[2.4]	[1.8]	[3.3]	[27.3]					[15.4]	[3.9]		8.3	[1.4]	[5.6]		38	8.01
-																	-
<i>ODA</i>																	
1996	18.8	31.6	29.7		[10.5]	[21.7]			[30]							201	6.36
-																	-
<i>VV</i>																	
-																	-
2010	8.4	[8.1]	10.8	17.8	[8.3]	11.7	[25.0]	[9.4]	26.7	9.6	18.5	[10.6]	[18.2]	[10.7]	[50.0]	131	10.88
<i>TOP09</i>																	
-																	-
2010	11.8	21.8	13.5		[6.3]	17.5			[5.7]	19.0	10.6	13.0	17.0	[9.1]	[14.3]	134	16.7
<i>SZ</i>																	
-																	-
2010	11.8	[6.7]	[5.4]	35.6	16.7	14.2			[3.8]	9.5	28.9	18.5	21.3	[9.1]	[17.9]	145	2.44
Σ_{sal}																	
1996	100	100	100	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	100	100	100	100	[100]		
2010	100	100	100	[100]	[100]	100	[100]	100	100	100	100	100	[100]	[100]	[100]		
N_i																	
1996	208	57	182	11	19	23	1	10	13	26	133	74	143	53	11	964	
2010	203	87	74	45	48	120	12	53	116	104	54	47	22	28	4		1017
$\Sigma \Sigma_{dim(i)}$																	
1996	46.4					[7.9]					24.2			21.5			
2010	35.8					38.5					20.1			[5.3]			

Fig. 1: 1996 elections (correspondence analysis output)



(own illustration)

Fig. 2: 2010 elections (correspondence analysis output)





Fig. 3: 2010 elections (correspondence analysis output)



(own illustration)

Fig. 4.1 UPD campaign poster (i)

PETICE ZA ZPŘÍSNĚNÍ IMIGRAČNÍ POLITIKY EVROPSKÉ UNIE

NECHCEME U NÁS NEPŘIZPŮSOBIVÉ
CIZINCE NEBO NÁBOŽENSKÉ FANATIKY



Organizuje
Hnutí Úsvit přímé demokracie
Tomia Okamury

source: <http://www.protext.cz/zprava.php?id=20437>

Fig. 4.2 UPD campaign poster (ii)

PODPORA RODINÁM NE nepřizpůsobivým



PRÁCI NAŠIM
NE imigrantům
Máme 650 000 lidí bez práce!

VOLTE



source: <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article127645916/Tschechien-kommt-mit-EU-Foerdergeld-nicht-zurecht.html> [10 MAY 2014]

Tab. 4: Cumulative proportion of inertia (summary)

Year	dimension	singular value	inertia	proportion of inertia		SD	correlation (2)
				accounted for	cumulative		
1996 (Fig. 1)	1	0.569	0.324	0.475	0.475	0.19	0.135
	2	0.401	0.160	0.236	0.711	0.26	
2010 (Fig. 2)	1	0.627	0.393	0.420	0.420	0.25	0.35
	2	0.590	0.349	0.373	0.793	0.19	
1996 - 2010 (Fig. 3)	1	0.569	0.324	0.475	0.475	0.19	0.135
	2	0.401	0.160	0.236	0.711	0.26	

(own illustration)