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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES
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"Dynamics of the Arab States Positions in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Perspectives for Peace"

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Statement of Authenticity

"I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration with others, except as specified in the text and where due acknowledgement has been made."

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Abstract

The Middle East represents a region constantly engaged in multi-dimensional, complex conflicts involving the issues such as ideology, religion, ethnicity, territory, history, and others.

One of these conflicts is that between the Jewish and Arab people which took the violent form after the official establishment of Israel in 1948. This dissertation looks at the Arab perspective of the conflict, particularly, at the dynamics of the frontline states' (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt) positions in the Arab-Israeli rivalry, and the factors which influenced it. The conceptual approach involves historical overview and periodization of the conflict. These approaches allowed seeing the circumstances under which certain stances had been taken in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict; these circumstances stand as the factors of change in dynamics. The analysis of the dynamics is based on the key assumptions of the realist theory of international relations such as centrality of the sovereign states and their self-interests, security dimension, and the relations of states determined by the relative levels of power, both economic and military. In addition, the concept of "balance of power" of game theory is used to aid the understanding of the central question.

The study showed two major trends in the development of the Arab states' positions. First, is the shift from the ideology-based, ethno-national approach to the conflict, to the pragmatic, economically, and strategically-based considerations with the recognition of Israel, implying the realist vision of the conflict by the states. Second, is the strong connection between the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the search by the Arab states for the regional order and the basis for inter-Arab relation, which stands as an important factor on the way to the states' effective policies in settling the conflict with Israel.

Chapter 1.
Introduction

As described by Lesch and Tschigri (1998), the Middle East has long been an area of brilliant civilizations and severe conflicts. Due to the region's strategic location it had attracted the attention of different powers to "seize its valuable territory" (ibid: 3).

It has faced conflicts between different countries and cultures, ideologies and religions. Even though now it seems that the highest tensions are subsided by the efforts of direct and indirect participants it still attracts world attention and is a "staple of the world news" (Yehuda, Sandler, 2002).

One of the most outstanding and devastating conflicts in the region has been the one between the Israeli people and their Arab neighbors.

The Balfour Declaration proposed in 1917 by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour calling for the establishment of the national Jewish home in Palestine was a triumph for the Zionist diplomacy and the realization of the dream of the Jewish people who had longed for their home for many centuries (Shlaim, 2000: 7). The realization of the Declaration into reality came with the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in 1948, after passing by the United Nations of the Resolution 181 in favor of the partition of Palestine into the Jewish and Arab states (ibid: 25) causing the major discontent among the existing non-Jewish community in Palestine, especially the Palestinian Arabs that reflected in the deterioration of the Arab-Jewish relations. The Palestine Arabs rejected the Plan, the action supported also by the Arab League. This was the reflection of the "savage war between the two communities in Palestine" (ibid: 27). This attitude turned into the war of independence, when on May 15, 1948 the regular armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded Palestine. The war showed the weakness and disorganization of the Arab army. Moreover, it served as a sign of the weak Arab solidarity and divergence in the Arab aims in relation to the State of Israel. The Arab states took the Palestinian question to

be their inter-Arab and internal affair and they used it as a means for achieving their own interests.

The Arab countries were determined "to destroy the newborn Jewish state and cast the Jews into the sea" (ibid: 35-36). Jordan with the King Abdullah, had as his aim making "himself the master of the Arab part of Palestine", and Syria intended to dominate the region. The Arab states are sometimes considered to be in most respects more fundamental to the conflict than the Palestinians, who transformed a local communal conflict into an international issue (D. Pipes, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991).

The conflict represents the interplay of different factors and actors. "It is the multiissue, or multidimensional conflict. The attitudes and policies of each participating parties were molded by its own history and system of internal forces and pressures as well as by its interests. These in turn influenced those parties' grievances and ambitions, and the means they used in order to improve or remedy them. As the interests changed over time, so did the policies designed to take care of them" (Rubinstein, 1991: 195).

The crisis meant different things for different people. For the Arabs the creation of Israel in an Arab land was an act of aggression and her survival had been seen as a continuous act of aggression, therefore any action taken by the Arabs against Israel was seen as defensive and any attempt by Israel to resist or oppose such action as aggressive (Lewis, 2004: 297-98).

The conflict has taken many forms. The clash has been military, political and economic. For instance, through the League of Arab States established in 1945, Arab countries organized a boycott of international companies that traded with Israel. Conversely, Israeli diplomats and pro-Israeli lobbyists strove to persuade American policy-makers to deny arms and economic aid to Arab states considered friendly to the United States during the Cold War era (Hinnebusch, 2003: 218).

There are many views on the conflict both in the literature and in the speeches and declarations of officials and organizations, and in general in the world opinion. It is obvious that the conflict has subsided during the most recent years however it still keeps the region a hot-bed and poses political, social and economic instability for the states.

The war of 1948 following the establishment of Israel, ended in the defeat of the Arab armies and the erasure of the name Palestine form the map. The order established on the territory of Palestine was determined by the State of Israel becoming the status

quo power (established by the armistice agreements signed by Israel with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria after the first half of 1949) (ibid: 54).

This phase in the Arab-Israeli relations immediately after the war culminated in the second Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 (here the mention should be made that this war is counted as the third Arab-Israeli war, since the second one was the Sinai campaign; however in the context of this dissertation the Sinai war of 1956 is not touched upon for it did not bring much conceptual impact on the Arab-Israeli relations and it stands outside the time-frame concerned).

The Arab states called Israel in the preamble to their decision in the Cairo Summit of the Arab League in 1964, "the basic threat to the Arab nation in its entirety... if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel" (Shlaim, 2000: 229), thus for the first time collectively declaring an official document with the aim of destruction of the State of Israel. This was the beginning of a new era both for Israel and her Arab neighbors, the one of uncertainty and open hostility.

During the earlier years the conflict was characterized by the Arab world's "refusal to come to grips with the broader question of existence of the State of Israel. Many states perceived the creation of a Jewish state and the displacement of the Palestinian Arabs as two sides of the same coin" (A. D. Miller, 1986: 9).

The first two decades of the conflict were notable for Arab refusal to recognize Israel's existence. Following the 1967 War the attitude started to change, however, without resisting the ideological rigidity and representing the "frozen diplomacy" period (phrase used by Shlaim, 2000) correlating to the "Three No's" of Khartoum Arab summit conference in 1967(no negotiation, no recognition, no peace with Israel) though making implications that they would explore the possibilities of making peace with Israel.

Since the 1970s the conflict started to give way to the more orderly regime of conflict management (Yehuda and Sandler, 2002). The war that took place in 1973 (called the October War, or the Yom Kippur War, or Ramadan War, known in the Arab world (Kamrava, 2005: 131) marked the turning point in the rivalry between the two people and put it on the way of formation of the more realist attitudes of the actors and opened the channels for negotiation and settlement.

The period until the 1973 Yom Kippur War (when Egypt and Syria launched the attack of Israel in Sinai Peninsular and the Golan Heights with the aim of recovering of those territories respectively) was the one of little diplomatic activity and the one with the strong identity and ideology based policies towards Israel. The imbalance in power as well as the political differences between Israel and its Arab neighbors was so extreme that meaningful negotiations proved to be impossible (Lesch and Tschirgi, 1998). The Arab states maintained the stance of regaining all of their lands and refused any negotiations without the fulfillment by Israel of the major Arab demands, implying the return to the borders of 4 June 1967 and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The notion of the Palestinian state was introduced by the Arab states for issuing to the United Nations Security Council and adopted as an official stance by the majority (Noam Cnomsky. Perspective on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Palestine-Israel, USA, Politics, 12/26/2005: left view on the issue, which reflects in general the tendency to see Israel as an "expansionist" state and calls for the stronger international condemnation of Israeli policy and supervision of the implementation of its withdrawal to the pre-occupied areas and realization of Palestinian political and national rights by establishing of the Palestinian state as the eventual outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict, supported by the Arab states).

According to many analysts, in the mid-1970s ideologically and ethnically rooted policies came into the process of giving way to pragmatically motivated approaches on both parts (Lesch and Tschirgi, 1998, p. 107). In the 1970s, economic relations with the West and with the United States in particular became a primary factor in the decisions of Arab states to pursue diplomatic negotiations and peaceful relations with Israel (Kober, 2002: 142).

With the continuous decline of pan-Arab ideologies (Hourani, 2002, Kober, 2002: 46), the commitment of individual Arab states to policy guidelines derived from a collective "Arab identity" followed by the decrease in the hostility of Arabs toward Israel.

Economic development was a more important challenge and a more realistic undertaking than the elusive quest for pan-Arab unity or the liberation of historic Palestine (Meller, 1986: 5).

As Egypt, the regional hegemon, decided to withdraw from confrontation line with Israel, it had a "sobering impact on most regimes' view of their role in the conflict" (A. D. Miller, 1986: 10).

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According to Kober (2002), economic factors also were one of the most important after the resumption of the peace talks after the Madrid Conference in 1991 and following agreements and negotiations.

Up until the end of the 1980s, the calculations of the states' interests were based on the judgments of their power relative to that of their rivals. This fact both encouraged peace and fostered alliances aimed at neutralizing if not breaking the might of rival states (R. Hinnebusch, 2003: 218). The alliances created between the states often served to counterpose the Israeli military might thus creating the heightened security environment and hindering the settlement of the conflict (Kober, 2002). The insecurity feelings of some states (e.g. Syria) encouraged their militarization and separate diplomacy (R. Hinnebusch, 2003: 163).

The end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union left the only external player in the region, that is the USA, and weakened the material capabilities of the Arab countries which were the Soviet Union clients. Moreover, the Gulf War in 1991 showed that the whole Middle East was characterized by substantial instability which especially can be referred to the Arab countries both in the area of interstate relations and instability of regimes of the nation-states (Spiegel; Rienner, 1992: 18). This period in time posed the dilemma to the Arab countries in having to choose between their long-standing and basic anti-Israeli policy and their particular interests. In a way, some of the major Arab countries were siding with Israel against an Arab brother country (ibid: 19). The need for an urgent search for a political solution increased, and without doubt it had an impact on modifying the Jordanian position that time, for instance, and explains Amman's readiness to join the process (ibid:19). Egypt was reinstated as a regional power and put at the helm of Arab politics.

In the beginning of the 1990s it was difficult to give a definite answer as to what future expected the conflict and the region in general. Many analysts and mediators pointed to the reality of the conflict with the structural asymmetry, where Israel had the perception of having to cope with her enemies and her suspicion was that reaching agreement with one of them would not necessarily deliver the other adversaries to the negotiating table (Rubinstein, 1991: 24). To the Arabs, Israel was still a formidable expansionist military enemy that threatened them. Therefore the recognition of Israel was seen by them as a negotiating asset which they did not want to show at the first stages of negotiations (ibid: 24).

"Today Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the PLO recognize each others' right to exist and legitimacy for peace, despite the disagreements concerning certain practical issues. The relations of Israel and the Arab actors stands a good chance of becoming ever more solidly based on pragmatic considerations of national interest rather than being afflicted by ideological differences" (Lesch and Taschirg, 1998: 38). Even if there is a possibility between Israel and particular states (namely Syria) for the armed conflict remains it is not likely for the foreseeable future (Ben-Meir, 1994; Barry Rubin, 1998). According to Osama El-Ghazali Harb the comprehensive settlement appears inevitable (Al Ahram Weekly, 14-20 September, 2000, issue no. 499), and Arab-Israeli war is less likely than at any time during the last half-century (Rubin, 1998).

The decline of the conflict is attributed to several factors, one of which is the nature of the Arab states' formation and paths of decision-making. Since 1990s it became clear that the states' reversed their thinking on the conflict which was precipitated by various conditions. First of all, the attention is paid to the relaxing of the radical regimes (though not their disappearance) and the realization of importance of the material gains rather than ideological chase. Attention is also drawn to the domestic problems of the states and inter-Arab tensions which the regimes have been unable to address in a productive way. Barry Rubin explains the issue by saying that "the conflict engaged more Arab rhetoric than action, partly because it was easier to rail at Israel than to address difficult domestic problems or inter-Arab conflicts. Each Arab regime manipulated the issue for its own interests, accusing others of being too soft on Israel. Within states, rulers and opposition accused each other of being Zionist or Western agents. Syria claimed the land in dispute as its property. Jordan asserted ownership of the West Bank; Lebanese Christians tried to win a civil war with Israeli help" (Middle East Journal, September, 1998).

The internal economic problems of the Arab states and high costs of the conflict pushed most Arab states to reduce gradually their involvement on the Arab-Israeli issue, being unwilling to wage war and unready to make peace (ibid). Even though there are many unresolved mutual issues, the attention draws itself to other parts of the region including Iraqi problem, the growing spread of radical Islam and terrorist organizations. These issues can invest in the regional instability, however, which can express themselves in internal nation-state crises of the states. The latter can be added by still present quest for regional domination but that is highly unlikely to evolve into a major armed Arab-Israeli confrontation but rather remain on the verbal and

diplomatic level. Besides, as is noted by the US National Security Advisor Tony Lake (quoted in Rubin, 1998) there is a tendency that the radical regimes are counterbalanced by the moderate ones: "the extremists will be denied the claim that they are the wave of the future. They will have to confront the reality of their failure [while moderate] governments find the strength to counter extremism at home as well as abroad."

Apart from the bilateral Arab-Israeli disputes, on the general Arab-Israeli level of the conflict the main issue of most of the Arab states is the search for the ways for solution and the settlement of the conflict rather than the issue of the recognition or rejection of Israel, which also points at the changed Arab ideological rhetoric into the pragmatic approach.

Perhaps the most problematic issue in the Arab-Israeli relations is the Syrian question.

Because this is the state that first of all stays as a regional power and has been central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Daniel Pipes, "so long as Syria refuses to come to terms with Israel, the conflict continues." Now in Syria there is the realization that it faces the impossibility of attacking Israel; however, it sees the disadvantages in agreement with Israel: "Syria is uninterested in reaching agreement since even one meeting virtually all its demands would severely damage its interests. Unable to use Israel as a threat, Syria would have a hard time obtaining aid, or influencing Arab counsels. Any diplomatic solution would increase U.S. influence; favor Egypt, Israel, and Jordan over Syria; block Syrian influence on the Palestinians; and make Israel a stronger rival" (Rubin, September 1998). The question remains hard to resolve, especially when it comes to the most important Syrian-Israeli dispute on the Golan Heights occupied by Israel during 1967 War formerly belonging to Syria, and representing the region of vital importance to both countries; the issue remains the subject of speculations on both sides.

Overall, the diplomatic positions of the "radical group" of states have been changed to that of a more flexible approach and all of the most interested states realize the advantage of cooperation with Israel, with the obstacles based on the technical and bi-lateral issues.

By the end of the 1990s the debate as to whether the time was due and the prospects were promising for the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab states' readiness towards accepting Israel and all the rights of the state without her

facing real threats from the Arab neighbors, came to the fore. Many considered and think now that the conflict became the anachronism, and the optimism became the policy (D. Pipes, Washington Times, March 16, 1994). Barry Rubin argued in 1998 that the "conflict was over", and that the Arab states realized the impossibility of its continuation. However, the pessimists pointed to the fact that despite the doubtless fact that over recent decades the Arab disposition towards Israel has changed in significant ways, in some quarters the hatred to Israel had not ceased (ibid). The analysts pointed to the Arab rejectionism in its various forms and the role still actively played by visions, loves and hatreds (ibid). Besides, it is also noticed that the public opinion within the Arab states is still hostile towards Israel, despite their leaders' public rhetoric on the peace.

The debate continues that even if the states realize all the advantages of good relations with Israel and therefore the West, with the following financial and material aid, the threat of loosing the legitimacy of the Arab regimes overweighs this. Sasley attributed the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the Arab states as the one of importance for securing their regime: "as the peace process removes Israel as an external enemy or threat, growing demands for greater political liberalization, even democratization, will grow within Arab states, thus putting at risk the positions of power, perhaps even security or safety, of Arab rulers" (Sasley, 2002).

There are no clear answers to whether the Arab countries are genuinely ready to accept Israel as an equal enemy and take up the comprehensive steps towards the settlement of the most important issues for both sides. The existing evidence suggests different views, both analyzing the official positions of the rulers and the internal situations within countries (economic, social, and political), together with public opinion.

Hence, this dissertation looks at the development and change of the Arab states' positions and attitudes during the Arab-Israeli conflict and towards the State of Israel, and the factors that influenced the dynamics. *Therefore the central question is: What were the dynamics of the Arab states positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict after the 1967 Six Day War? How these dynamics reflect the perspective for the conflict settlement.*

Chapter 2.

Methodology and Theoretical Background

In order to elaborate and discover the issues relating to the central question of how the Arab states changed there positions during the Arab-Israeli conflict in relation to it and the State of Israel, what factors have been influencing this change and with what result on the overall conflict I chose to deal with the period of immediately after the 1967 Six Day War up to the post 1991 years till the recent times. The choice of this period is conditioned by the fact that 1967 was a decisive date in that it pointed to the realization by the Arab countries of their military weaknesses and realization of the changed order in the region of the Middle East and the changed circumstances in which the states now needed to formulate their policies. It was the order of the stabilization of the status quo in the area in favor of Israel. Now the latter became an indispensable part of the political and strategic lives of the states of the region, which influenced both internal and inter-state, and inter-regional relations.

Besides, after the 1967 War, "the Arab's commitment to confront Israel militarily increased in the hope of rectifying the humiliating military defeat and regaining possession of the territories lost during that war" (Kober, 2002: 88). Besides, Arab-Israeli conflict was set in motion, and despite still present rejectionist stances of the Arab states in relation to the State of Israel, the latter was admitted as a political entity and existing reality, even if the one which had to be fought with. During this period the conflict started to be conceptualized by the Arab states as a dispute over the borders and they focused on the economic, military and diplomatic means for restoring these territories (ibid: 88).

For the sake of convenience, the period post-1967 is virtually divided into three periods, which are described in the literature on the topic in an unconceptualized way as the ones that witnessed the events that made the countries rethink (though not always in radical ways) and reformulate their rhetoric and policy-making in the

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context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These periods are from 1967 till the October War of 1973 (or Ramadan War, the term used in the Arab world, or Yom Kippur War), when the fight with Israel was based much on the ideological premises and it was related to the "frozen diplomacy" phase when little had been done in the positive direction. The 1973 war served as a "sobering effect" on the states and allowed the ideological rigidity to transform into a more realist approach towards the positioning and actions taken towards Israel; and the third one dealing with the period post -1990, when the conflict no longer took place in the context of the Cold War rivalry with the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus defining the new priorities of the states and consequently, rethinking of official and unofficial alliances, formulating new strategic thinking and considering more pragmatic stances. The latter was also influenced by the Gulf War of 1991 and corresponding coalitions during the crisis and pointing to the "new opening and need for the Arab-Israeli peace" (Morris, 1999).

The division into periods gives the opportunity of having a look at the dynamics of the Arab states positions, with different factors in specific periods of time influencing these dynamics. The last part which deals with the post-1990 period will help to see the changed attitudes and the degree to which Arab states are ready during the recent years towards accepting the permanent peaceful settlement with Israel.

Here, the clarification should be made in what is meant by the "Arab states". Since the dissertation is concerned with the Arab perspective of this conflict, the states to which the reference is made are the "frontline states", or the "confrontation states" of Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. The term "frontline states" is often used in the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict (e.g. Miller, 1986; Barnett, 1998; Kober, 2002) due to those states' immediate proximity to Israel and the direct interest in the conflict, because all of these states (except Lebanon) lost their territories to Israel and had internal crises influenced by the conflict. All of these states have significant number of Palestinian refugees of both 1948 and 1967 wars, therefore making the Palestinian issue salient in their priorities as a part of the overall Arab-Israeli dispute, and which is used by the Arab states in their own interests, without letting the refugees to settle down. Besides, all of these countries had both direct armed and ideological and political confrontation with Israel. As Rubinstein (1991: 75) notes, "it is them who have borne the brunt of the Arab wars with Israel, they who have the most at stake, and they who most affect the course and character of the conflict." These countries were the major actors during the peace negotiations at different times

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and at these states Israel aimed when seeking a partner for negotiating agreements and as the main states when concerned its own security. Hence, these countries are given the special attention in analyzing the issues connected with the central question of the dissertation, however other states such as Saudi Arabia (which twice proposed the plan for the settlement throughout the conflict), Iran, Iraq and some other countries are mentioned when discussing the coalitions of these countries and inter-Arab disputes which had an impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel have never shot a single bullet at each other (except Iraqi Gulf War campaign) but the former had influenced the "frontline states'" policies towards the latter and they had "un-armed" conflict. As concerns Saudi Arabia, its importance gained in weight in the 1970s with its enormously enhanced military capability (Rubinstein, 1991: 75). Besides, the involvement of the 'non-core states' (that is the states of the Fertile Crescent, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine (Miller, 1986; Sela, 1998) is explained by their attempts to demonstrate the active involvement in the Palestine conflict or in conciliation and mediation of efforts between disputing core actors (Sela, 1998: 16). Like this, besides Saudi Arabia, Morocco can be distinguished among those states, when it was the intermediary during the negotiations between Egypt and Israel leading to their peace treaty. Or Libya's hyper-nationalist policies against Israel and the West, and the Gulf monarchies' official financial aid to the confrontation states and the PLO (ibid: 16).

When it comes to the Palestinian issue it is not discussed separately but when concerns the Arab states' attitudes towards the latter and its role in taking decisions. Throughout the conflict the question of Palestine constituted the pivotal role and was manipulated by the Arab regimes in order to mobilize public opinion, justify different moves done by these states and reach the aims set by them. Hence, the Palestinian question is not discussed separately as an aspect of the overall conflict but within the context of the Arab decision-making, and as a factor of internal Arab countries' crises and tensions, which had the influence on the going of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The relations of the PNA (Palestinian National Authority) and Israel and Arab-Palestinian relations are not discussed in detail either but as the way the Arab states viewed the Palestinian problem and the degree to which they absorbed it as a part of their overall policies both internal, between each other and in relation to Israel. This is not, however to say, that the Palestinian issue is given less prominence in the discussion of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, but just to say that the PLO and its fractions are

viewed as an important factor in the states' decision-taking and the direction of their resources. In addition, the explanation should be given to that it is not undermined that the question of Palestinian self-determination and the creation of the Palestinian state played the crucial role in the conflict, and continues to constitute one of the pivotal demands of the Arab states (the second one is territorial question). However, this issue is dealt with from the angle of the Arab states' attitudes to what had been suggested in order to reach its solution and how they constructed their further stances in negotiation given these conditions.

In addition, the classifications and groupings of the Arab states into different "camps" are used in order to show the role of ideology for different states and the points that were common for the states that halted or advanced the Arab-Israeli settlement. It is essential to differentiate between the radical and moderate states in its importance when analyzing the Arab-Israeli rapprochements or divergence. At the recent stages of the conflict the radical states pose the greatest problem and concern especially in the light of their arms capabilities and hard-line internal regimes that threat the regional stability.

Radical stances of states invest in the halting of the peace process, and make the impasse in further developments. For example, Syria is related to the radical stance, and it is considered the most important state in the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially after the peace agreement of Israel and Egypt in 1979) and without Syria the full-scale peace process is considered by many analysts as unrealistic.

The radical states tended to confront and change the established status quo order; the "moderates" showed more willingness for cooperation with Israel, though due to various reasons (economic, social and political) had to stick to the common positions. Nevertheless these positions were not "frozen" throughout the conflict and the states adapted to the existing circumstances. So, for instance, in the mid- 1970s, Egypt, from a radical position turned to the more pragmatic stance by rapprochement with Israel and joining the "moderate" such as Jordan, or during the Gulf War in 1991, Syria joined now moderate Egypt in coalition against Iraq while Jordan found itself on the other side of coalitions.

As it is the multi-token conflict different moves on different sides had repercussions in the overall Arab-Israeli dispute, therefore of importance are the inter-Arab coalitions during the conflict or as Rubinstein terms them "Arab World's cold war", its division into camps, which was characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s, and the

fragmentation of the Arab world into states which were concerned primarily with their own narrowly defined interests (Rubinstein, 1991: 195). These intra-Arab alliances and rivalries also profoundly affected the Arab-Israeli conflict. The quest of certain states and their leaders for domination and leadership was the feature that cast its influence on the decisions and positions taken. As Ibn Khaldun, the Arab historian (quoted in Rubinstein, 1991: 75) wrote: "every Arab is eager to be the leader. Scarcely a one of them would cede his power to another...The Arabs are the lest willing of nations to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, and eager to be the leader. Their individual aspirations rarely coincide." This sheds the light on why their attempts at unity in most cases ended in not very successful enterprises, and also the tendency of certain states to take up realistic stances diverging from the often used, especially earlier in the conflict, pan-Arab postulates.

When trying to analyze the states' positions and actual actions in the conflict, one needs to pay attention to the issues concerning the specificities of the Arab policy-making, historical standing and legacy, and inter-Arab relations. These represent important elements in explaining the events and the reactions to them, decisions taken in relation to those events and the following outcomes.

With the changing course of the Arab-Israeli conflict the debate went on whether the pursuit of national interest tended to be a greater stimulus to an Arab state's policy than pan-Arabism, an important aspect in analyzing the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Arab nationalism expressed in pan-Arabic movement became the indispensable part of the Arab states since their establishment as independent units, gaining its importance in the 1950s -1960s. The Arab leaders relied heavily on Arab nationalism to legitimate their rule firsthand, and justify their actions and the norms of Arabism (Barnett, 1998). According to Barnett (1998) the Arab leaders were in a social situation defined by mutual dependence because of their shared identity and like this gaining the social approval that came being associated with Arabism (ibid).

The nationalist movement in the region represented the unique structure. Hinnebusch (2001: 153) pointed to the fact that "the Middle East stands out because of its unique combination of both strong sub-state identities and powerful supra-state identities, that together dilute and limit the mass loyalty to the state typical where it corresponds to a sense of nation distinctive from the 'other' (neighboring states)."

The basic concept of pan-Arab movement was related to the ideology and rhetoric of pan-Arab nationalism. Pan- Arab ideology was directed against the institution of the nation-state in the Arab world. The basic belief underlying pan- Arab rhetoric was that all Arabs share everything on all levels and therefore needed to be unified under one, centrally governed nation-state (Tschirgi, Rienner, 1994: 135).

Avi Kober (2002: 41) points out that pan-Arab ideology reflected, and to some degree, reflects today, though in a lesser part, a Middle Eastern reality of state-to-nation ratio. At the initial stages of the movement development, it challenged the legitimacy of the nation-state, propagating the notion of an all-Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*) unifying the Arab nation (*umma*). Pan-Arabism emphasized the belief that all Arabs belonged to one nation and the transcendence of Arabism over state boundaries (Kober, 2002: 41). The regional Arab system has always concentrated around the two issues, especially during the interwar period, and after the establishment of the States of Israel. According to Sela, "the emergence of a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab homeland and House of Islam (*dar al-islam*), in conjunction with other regional processes, played a central role in formation of pan-Arab nationalism and the crystallization of the Arab regional system. The reference to Israel's territory as *Palestine* represents a powerful Arab-Islamic claim for its liberation, underlying the perception that Israel is "in but not of the region" (Sela, 1998: 15).

The Arab political consciousness had been shaped by the themes of pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism that impacted the states' relations with Israel and their positions in the conflict.

Freedman (1979: 90) looks at the kind of dilemma faced by different Arab states during the conflict. He points that the reaction of the Arab states toward the conflict with Israel reflected the struggle between the national interest and that of the pan-Arab one. Freedman continues that to proponents of pan-Arabism, Israel was perceived as a foreign entity in the midst of the Arab world, which must be removed if Arab unity was to be achieved. Here the Palestinian cause became important touchstone of Pan-Arabism, and every Arab was required to aid the Palestinian Arabs against Israel (Freedman, 1979: 1979).

This theme was often interpreted by the states in the light of their historical experience making the Palestinian question significant for them.

To the Arab leader thinking primarily of his own country's interests, Israel was seen as a military powerful state, whose existence was supported by both superpowers, and with whom continued conflict was an increasingly costly and dangerous process which needed to be avoided wherever possible (Freedman, 1979: 90), thus indicating the realist approach.

The Arab leaders in many cases were aware that selfless national dedication to the Palestinian cause would lead immediately to a confrontation with Israel that no Arab states could win alone, even with support of several others. "Nasser urged his people to make considerable sacrifices for the Palestinians, resentment over which ultimately helped pave the way for Sadat's action- his 'Egypt first' policy" (Bill, Springboard, 1999: 225).

The same dichotomy in the Arab states' relation towards the Palestinian issue is reflected by Miller (1986: 3), who distinguishes between the ideal, emotional level and the concrete level. In the first case the states "tended to respond collectively, rallying around time-honored and sometimes genuinely held slogans of Arab unity, independence, and support for the Palestinian rights. Here the 'Arab world' as a whole had a duty to bound the injustices foisted upon Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims by a Zionist movement backed by a colonialist West" (Miller, 1986: 3). In the second case the Arab states reacted not in response to an idealized conception of a pan-Arab commitment to furthering the Palestinian cause, but individually, according to how each perceived its own interests. Here the Palestinian cause and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization, made official representative of the Palestinian people during the Arab Summit in Rabbat in 1974, the role played by Jordan before) were perceived in a more sober light: as a potential threat to these states, or as an opportunity to validate their pan-Arab credentials, outbid their rivals, and rally or distract domestic opinion. This approach, as noted by Miller, was more consistent with the realities with which the regimes had to deal (Miller, 1986: 4). According to Freedman (1979: 90), in this second situation the Palestinian cause was one worthy of support, but not at the cost of his own country's welfare. National interests constituted one of the forces that influenced the Arab decision-making, especially after the 1967 defeat. It showed itself at different points both in the actual policies of separate states and as the matter of manipulation by the Arab regimes. Arab actors began to cultivate local patriotism (*wattaniyya*) among their peoples (Kober, 2002: 41). State-directed patriotism fed on the diverse historical, geographic, economic,

social, and political conditions of the respective states. Each state sought to consolidate its independence and sovereignty and to advance individual interests. Individual states displayed their readiness to cooperate with one another, but on the basis of the existing separate Arab identities (ibid: 42). At the same time, pivotal Arab actors turned to pan-Arab slogans in order to legitimize the cooperation of others under their leadership (ibid: 42).

So, since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the policy of the Arab states toward Israel has fluctuated between the two positions (ibid: 90).

On the initial stages of the conflict the Arab states found it difficult to come to grips with the broader question of the existence of the State of Israel and most of the Arab states perceived the creation of a Jewish state and the displacement of the Palestinian Arabs as two sides of the same coin (ibid: 9). However, as is shown by the dichotomy, the two sides started to be separated from each other based on materialist calculations.

The dichotomy in analyzing the Arab positions throughout the conflict is also present in the debate on which approach could be more suitable, that is constructivist or realist. Despite the fact that as has been mentioned the Arab states rather acted based on realist considerations, the constructivist discourse of viewing certain aspects can not be neglected completely, though the two are difficult to use at the same time. The constructivist analysis gives the opportunity to have the insight into the "micro-processes at the level of actor 'agency' whereby interactions and discourse shape normative change (Hinnebusch, 2001: 163).

When it comes to identity, it is championed by constructivism in opposition to the 'materialist', 'neo-utilitarian' theories (Hinnebusch, 2001: 159). This is even more relevant in the light of supra-state identities (Arabism and Islam) over state conduct at the near-absence of the national states assumed by realism (ibid: 160).

Within the Middle Eastern system, the individual states constitute the semi-permeable autonomous units (Kienle 1990: 9, 27). Due to the uniqueness of this system with the mentioned above spill-over of loyalties, the ideological influences readily crossed state lines, and each state had been highly sensitive to the actions of others and vulnerable to trans-state movements. In this context, according to Hinnebusch, aspirations for pan-Arab leadership were seen as realistic and rival leaders had an incentive to manipulate trans-state ideological appeals against each

other in ways that would be either ineffective or viewed as a violation of sovereignty in a conventional states system.

The constructivist account in the context of the Arab politics deals with the changing balance between the pan-Arabism and sovereignty. And this swinging played a prominent part in defining the pan-Arab identity and the semi-institutionalization of its norms. According to these accounts, the rivalry was concentrated on the establishing of the normative order of the Arab system, and the bulk of this struggle was ideological appeal, where the legitimacy was derived from the norms of Arabism, which gave the power to affect outcomes (Hinnebusch, 2001:162). With pan-Arabism on the ascendancy as the dominant discourse, a process of 'outbidding' began in which rival state leaders sought to mobilize mass support by escalating its standards. This led to demands for more militancy toward imperialist footholds in the region, for greater integral unity between Arab states (e.g. United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt) and later for greater militancy on behalf of the Palestine cause (ibid:162). Barnett (1998) in his "Dialogues in Arab Politics" adopted the constructivist approach which for him, allowed for the possibility that during a dialogue (that is "discussion among the members of the group about the norms that are to guide their relations") Arab states were reconsidering their political identities as they reconsidered the norms that governed their relations. Barnett continued that Arabism and not anarchy provided leverage over the Arab government's central objectives, presentation of self, and strategies; the technologies of power that they employed as they debated the norms that were to govern their relations. Arabism did not simply instruct them to avoid bilateral settlements with Israel; it also helped to construct Zionism as a threat and as a defining element of the Arab national interest. "To contemplate relations with Israel, to violate the taboo of Arab politics, was to invite public ridicule and charges of having betrayed the Arab nation" (Barnett, 1998).

With time the inter-Arab rivalries implied the Arab states to act in a risky commitments damaging to the interests of the particular states (Hinnebusch, 2001: 163). The Arab states opted for the institutionalization of Arab Summits system, the outcome of which was the collective legitimization of a political settlement with Israel in return for its evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967. The growing acceptance of the view that pan-Arab norms had to be defined by an inter-elite consensus in which the interests of the individual states would inevitably be prioritized shifted the normative balance towards sovereignty (Hinnebusch, 1001:

163). This was expressed in Egyptian-Israeli peace, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. According to Barnett (1998), the zero-sum interactions of Arab leaders lead to a norm dissensus that broke the moral power of pan-Arabism over their conduct.

But such approach is not enough to the understanding of the 'macro-level structures' taking into consideration the materialist context.

According to the realist accounts, first of all the pan-Arabism was an instrument of state power used by stronger states pursuing their 'national interests' against weaker ones. Besides, formally, the states were sovereign, and the state of sovereignty was acknowledged by state leaders and the supra-state community, lacking a common centralized authority or effective 'inter-state' regime, appeared highly anarchic (Hinnebusch, 2001: 161).

In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict the situation was defined as the one of the state of belligerency with the State of Israel and therefore determined the interests. According to this approach the pan-Arab movement and the identity issue were used by the states not as the constructs but as the products of the situation in which the states had found themselves in. This also defined the states' central objectives. On the micro-level of realist approach the concept of balance of power is stated, the maintenance of which in the case of the Arab –Israeli conflict can be said as the concerned states' objective.

The formation of this kind of situation is described in the British Foreign Office report written before WWI: "history shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the momentary predominance of a neighboring State at once military powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or influence…", which is indicative of the appearance of the State of Israel that immediately represented the threat and challenge to the neighboring Arab states, and the following military defeats made them take up the stance of further resisting it and maintaining the balance-of-power in order not to let further Israeli expansion. The balance-of-power, as continued in the report is described as "the equilibrium established by a grouping of forces, several countries forming leagues of defense" (quoted in Viotti and Kauppi, 1998: 71). The latter point is exemplified by the attempts by different Arab states to form certain kinds of coalitions to stand against Israel, though it should be noted that the coalitions did not survive long due to the growing states' transformation of interests based on the nation-state rather than common interests, and on the material

calculations which did not often coincided with the collective enterprises. When Israel established its military supremacy in the region, the Arab states sought the co-existence based in part on acceptance of this supremacy (Hinnebusch, 2001: 235). Throughout all stages of the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the co-existence remained the prominent issue.

Realism sees the states acting based on the premises of power relations and identifies the nation-states as the major players, who construct their policies based on security considerations (Viotti, Kauppi, 1998: 6-7). The security considerations constitute the formation of the states' interests that stand as important policy bases. This stands true for the Arab states policies vis-à-vis Israel, as it represented the external threat and they had to apply all their will in order to counterpose it and maintain the balance of power not to allow Israel to take the dominance in the regional affairs. The states acted based on the formation of their interests which in the realist perspective had been formed out of calculations of military parity and the other side's interests, relating to the game metaphor. "The game theory examines the strategic choices among self-interested rational actors who operate under a specified social situation in the context of interdependence of choice among other utility-maximizing actors" (Barnett, 1998). Moreover, the Arab states attempted to maximize their security or power, depending on the actions of other Arab states as well (ibid).

States sought alliances to enhance their capabilities through combination with others, which helped to deter potential aggressor and avoid an unwanted war, to prepare for a successful war if deterrence fails, or more generally to increase one's influence in a high-threat environment or maintain balance-of power in the system (Barnett, 1998: 8).

Here, the described earlier dichotomy is also present in the inter-Arab coalitions in their struggle with Israel which the states chose to participate in based on either ideological grounds or pragmatic considerations, with the latter appearing more applicable to the actual Arab states' positions, which is described by Avi Kober in "Coalition Defection."

The competition between the forces of pan-Arabism on the one hand and national interests of the Arab states on the other, and the eventual prevalence of the latter force, served as a fertile ground for the establishment of multiple but short-lived coalitions, headed by pivotal Arab states (Kober, 2002: 43). The tension between the allegiance to comprehensive Arab interests and commitment to individual state

interests projected onto their position to Israel. On the one hand, pan-Arabism boosted Arab animosity toward Israel by making the conflict with Israel the concern of all Arabs and by forging a collective commitment to the struggle against Israel, which led to their participation in anti-Israeli coalitions (ibid: 43). On the other hand, the effectiveness of the coalitions was damaged by centrifugal forces in the Arab world (ibid: 43).

In this token, these states despite the community of language, culture, religion, and to some extent institutions and way of life did not manage to come together. This inability did not preclude the formation of regional groupings but not more than the short-lasting, unviable entities (Lewis, 2004: 225).

Since the conflict is a compound one and deals with the issues of territory, religion, identity, resources, and history, the nature of this dissertation is rather descriptive and deals with the historical narrative. This nature of approach is influenced by the fact that the academic filed on the topic lacks the theoretical framework within which the discussion can be undertaken, which makes the discussion difficult to integrate with the empirical fact. The majority of theoretical underpinning of this work thus deals with the elements of the realist theory of international relations and namely such its aspects as the "balance-of-power," and the "game theory" (though others are not excluded), and the constructivism which is not dealt with in expanse in this work (see for instance Barzilai, Doron, 1994).

Chapter 3.
"Frozen Diplomacy" 1967-1973

3.1. Initial reactions

The June 1967 War resulted in the loss by the Arab states of the vast territories including the Golan Heights (formerly under control of Syria), West Bank (Jordanian territory), and Gaza Strip (under Egyptian control). This was the most dramatic and devastating failure for the Arab states, both of those who directly participated in the war and those who were at the sidelines. The conflict acquired the new dimension also with the conquest of Jerusalem by the Israelis, and the fact that Muslim and Christian holy places were now under Jewish control (Hourani, 2002: 413).

This was the crucial moment in the developments of the regional affairs which created the situation of uncertainty and confusion both for Israel and the Arab countries. The war marked the beginning of the new era when the regional actors needed to find the ways of how to react and reflect on the events and develop the future strategies of cooperation both between themselves and within the internal realms. It became clear that Israel was militarily stronger than any combination of Arab states, and this changed the relationship of each of them with the outside world (Hourani, 2002: 414).

The June 1967 war redefined the contours of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the possible means to its settlement. Both the Israeli and Arab parties entertained divergent ideas on the modalities of reaching a political settlement (Rabil; Rienner, 2003: 20).

Obviously, the Arab regimes found themselves in a situation where they had to face and admit their weaknesses and inability to unite even in the light of the common cause that they had been propagating so vehemently and which enjoyed the trust of their own people. Now, besides the new stage in the relations with Israel, the Arab states came to the point when they also had to rethink the order of mutual relations and the basis on which they would now construct the policies.

Of course, some states were affected by the consequences of the war more than the others, but none of the regimes could remain still amidst the existing circumstances. Conservative and radical leaders were humiliated alike.

Among the states that suffered the greatest humiliation was Egypt. "Nasser's regime had suffered a near-fatal blow in Sinai. No longer could he claim to be the savior of the Arab world; he had palpably dragged it into abyss. His and the Arab world's bankruptcy was now clear for all to see" (Morris, 1999: 345). In Egypt the demonstrations followed that led to the resignation and even death of several senior generals, though Nasser himself remained in position.

He returned to power after the masses of Egyptians persuaded him back, unwilling to have the Israelis claim another casualty of the war (Barnett, 1998). In the aftermath of the war Nasser reflected: "there is no doubt that what happened in 1967 has affected us all psychologically, morally, and materially" (quoted in Barnett, 1998).

 In Syria the Ba'thist dictatorship had a tight grip, especially on the army and media, but the defeat led to some reverberations. In a two-stage coup in October 1969-November 1970, Defense Minister Hafez Asad-who was directly responsible for the defeat-became prime-minister. In 1971 he became president, with 99.2 per cent of the votes, in a plebiscite (Morris, 1999: 345). His regime emphasized the rebuilding of the armed forces for the "day of reckoning" (ibid: 345).

As Barnett points, one immediate consequence was a new period of malaise, self-criticism, and self-doubt. Within the Arab countries the contemplations on different sides were that what had happened was caused by the lack of radicalization of the societies and that too many compromises had been done along the way (Barnett, 1998). In Egypt, a student movement appeared to challenge the government's credentials. The Palestinians became radicalized, and various factions, like George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, came to the fore; many Arabs now saw the Palestinians as the potential vanguard of the revolution (ibid).

Even though pan-Arabism still played an important role within the states and on the inter-states level, and it was the basis of negotiating of the policy-making, it appeared on the road to decline. Significant point here is that now pan-Arabism started to be used more as a whipping boy unlike in the previous years when it experienced the role of an honored and priority cause of most of the deeds of the Arab states and people. Barnett (1998) gives an account of this feature saying that on the road to the war, the Arab leaders taunted and challenged each other in the name of Arab

nationalism. Nasser took the risks that could lead to an unwanted war in the name of Arabism, and King Hussein, by fearing that he would be remained on the sidelines and loose more if not declaring war on Israel, also made his decisions in the name of Arabism. "Arabism spurred Arab leaders to engage in escalating actions that they believed were military foolish but politically expedient, outbid one another to the point of an unwanted war, and divert resources from the Arab-Israeli conflict and toward inter-Arab feuds" (Barnett, 1998).

By the mid-1960s pan-Arabism had lost its luster. All the unification talks between the Arab regimes had failed and the already existing entities like United Arab Republic ceased its existence.

This was the period when the states started to turn to the direction of conservative, and more pragmatic orientation, and even though they still built their relation toward Israel on ideological considerations, in between the states the shift took place "from ideology to oil, from symbolic capital to economic capital, from the Mashreq and the heart of Arab nationalism to the Arabian Gulf and the periphery of Arab politics" (Barnett, 1998).

The factor that came to play a prominent role in the states' policy-making and the considerations for taking the positions was the one of the shifting balance from the all-Arab orientation toward the nation-state approach. The shift to sovereignty was the initial condition for the states' taking the more realist approach in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which came its dominant, prioritized position in the 1970s and 1980s, and remained at the core after the peace process, started in the beginning of the 1990s.

It cannot be said that the nationalism ceased to exist or started to take the side-line positions in the life of the Arab states, but rather it shifted to the territorial level, when the citizens growingly started to identify with their states. The aftermath events of the 1967 war invested in that trend "encouraged the citizens, however reluctantly and halfheartedly, to transfer their loyalties to the territorial state" (Barnett, 1998). This was accompanied by the reinforcement of the on-going state-building process intended to increase the loyalties of societies to the state and by association to the regime in power (ibid). Like this, the constructivist account of the consequences of the 1967 war with the decline of Arabism and its power to mobilize public opinion directed to the internal situations and the quest for the leadership within the Arab world by many Arab leaders and unification attempts, becomes less useful in

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explaining the Arab states' positions and behavior in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The realist account of the events presents more appropriate explanations to their developments, with the coming into the fore of the balance-of-power notion, where the states sought to make the "scales" go down in their direction.

The consolidation of the nation states therefore was one of the factors that characterized the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the period after the 1967 war (Kober, 2002: 88).

Another important factor of the period was the need to address the domestic socioeconomic problems and the apprehension among Arab states about radical Islamic forces that were perceived as a threat to secular or pragmatic Muslim regimes (Kober, 2002: 88).

However, the theme of pan-Arabism, though with the declined attractiveness to it, had not been abandoned post-1967 period completely, which still remained a potent force in constructing policies in the sphere of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was the basis of the Arab states' rhetoric of how to deal with the State of Israel and construct their relations with it: either based on diplomacy or military means, and either to approach it collectively or unilaterally. The states needed to work out either comprehensive or incremental approaches, choose between cooperation and confrontation.

It was during this time that Abdel Nasser talked about the need to distinguish between the concepts of "unity of ranks" and "unity of purpose." The former referred to the common practice among Arab states of pursuing their own interests while trying to cooperate with the other members of the league. The latter was based on the idea that all the Arabs should work as a team to achieve such common objectives as the return of the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian states. Though a number of Arab regimes claimed to adhere to the principle of unity of purpose, virtually all of them actually started to operate in terms of unity of ranks, indicating the realist approach. The debate was often raised in the inter-Arab talks and the practice often showed the prevalence of the latter trend.

As the future relative to that period showed, the states "chose" to take rather hard-line positions in dealing with Israel. They took up the path which led them to another war in 1973, the result of the irredentist and deterministic stances.

It is understandable that the period was characterized by the "frozen diplomacy", as described by Lesch and Tschigri (1998). But as Eba Eban, one of the time Israeli

cabinet ministers, said: "even the diplomatic activity that is not leading anywhere is better than no diplomatic activity at all" (quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 261). This gave the time for the Arab states to comprehend the situation and think of the ways, especially for the moderate states, to avoid the military action. Indeed, time was still raw for the states to grasp the situation and make rational judgments. To many Arab observers, the inclination was to believe that Israel deliberately provoked the Six Day War in order to fulfill its long-standing territorial ambitions. Therefore, from the very start it was clear that the states would choose to deny any settlement with Israel and will do the utmost in order to regain the lost territories and try the attempts to recover the shattered both self-respect and the respect in the eyes of the broader international community. That the small, young state, inferior in manpower managed to outbid the vast Arab armies could not be accepted kindheartedly by the Arab states and implied for the revenge, if not military then political one.

At first, immediately after the war's end, the Arab states remained silent. They were too shellshocked, as Barnett (998) describes it, to offer much of an explanation for recent events and chart a course for redemption. Though, the realization was that something needed to be done. They realized that Israel, a product of mixed socio-economic, ethnic, and national heritages, had managed to organize itself into a powerful military machine, and thus the need was for a unified Arab stand, but it was not immediately that the states managed to call for a summit in order to make proclamations concerning their future (Barnett, 1998). Yet again, the problem was in their unresolved differences between themselves. They needed to reflect on the causes of their failure and the basis on which they would build their mutual relations. Undeniably, this basis should have been the consolidation of the unity among the states, the lack of which was the main reason for the defeat in the 1967 war, as was proposed by Iraq and Syria in the summer of 1967. Here, the indicative feature is that the debates over the issues were also based on the divergence of positions among the radical states (including Syria, Iraq) and the moderates (Egypt, Jordan). The former called for greater radicalization and unification along this line in order to reverse the results of June (Barnett, 1998). The latter showed signs for reversing the past positions onto the more modest ones, and taking Israel-centered interpretation of the unity in order to come to the solution. The moderation in the Arab perception of the conflict with Israel also expressed itself in their gradual conceptualization of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a dispute over borders and their focus on the military,

economic, and diplomatic means for restoring these territories to Arab sovereignty (Kober, 2002: 89).

The change toward the more moderate stances was conditioned first of all by the devastation felt by the countries after the war, the realization by the leaders of their weakened credentials for realizing past dreams for the "Arab" revolution, and the necessity to concentrate scarce resources towards recovering the territories and not towards harassing the conservative Arab states.

Benny Morris (1999), among the reasons of the Arab failure, points to the lack of motivation of the Arab armies and the lack of understanding for what they had to fight. They fought for the territories they had never been to before, and had no personal relation to them whatsoever. And despite the force of the pan-Arab rhetoric, it did not manage to unite the people of the countries, which was realized by some of the Arab leaders, and invested in the comprehension of the importance of the turning to the nation-states and addressing the country-based problems.

For some states, the unity was better based on the coordination of the efforts in confronting Israel rather than integrating their abilities. "Jordan and Saudi Arabia insisted that a successful confrontation of Israel was premised on inter-Arab 'cooperation,' that is, recognizing the legitimacy of each other's states" (Barnett, 1998). King Hussein stated that the Arab states needed not integration but 'coordination' in order to revert the current mess (ibid). The theme that sounded in the Arab official statements of the moderate leaders and the state media was concerned with the coexistence of different systems that were present in the region, and the respect of each state for adoption of any. During the immediate days of post-June war, the states showed their determination of non-settlement with Israel without the return of the lost territories, the precondition for any talks with Israel. They rejected the decision of the Israeli cabinet of ministers of 19 June, where Israel "proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement on the basis of the international border and withdrawal from heavily populated West Bank" (Shlaim, 2001: 253) (see Appendix 1). The Arab states sent their reply to that through Washington stating that they completely rejected the Israeli proposal. Their case was that Israel's withdrawal must be unconditional, the evidence that from the beginning their positions would be deterministic (ibid: 254).

When the West Bank and Gaza were controlled by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, the Arabs refused to negotiate directly with Israel. After Israel occupied these

territories in 1967, the initial Arab response was to reject the idea of peace and direct negotiations with Israel. Later those Arab governments that accepted the UN Resolution 242 (see Appendix 2) took the position that negotiations within an international forum could begin only if full Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines was assured at the outset. (Report of a Study Group, 1988: 18, 19). The Resolution 242 was ambiguous in its contents referring to "territories occupied in the conflict" form which Israel was required to withdraw, like this giving the room for the states concerned interpret it as they saw fit, as the resolution did not specify the territories for withdrawal. So, Egypt interpreted the resolution as calling for Israel to withdrawal from "*the* occupied territories," prior to any political settlement. The parties concerned found the room to change their attitudes in response to shifting political and military conditions while still agreeing on the resolution as a basis to enter into negotiations (Rabil; Reinner, 2003: 20).

Among the radical states, Syria rejected the UNRSC 242 (though accepted it later). The reason for rejection was explained by the radical position of this state and the fear that bilateral negotiations and settlement with Israel would isolate it from the international affairs.

It claimed that "were the resolutions accepted and implemented, the Syrian regime has said it would enter into a non-belligerency agreement with Israel, but has ruled out the more expansive idea of normalization of relations and full peace treaties. Syria wanted to be involved in any efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue and was not readily agree to limit its role to bilateral negotiations with Israel over the Golan" (ibid: 22). This rhetoric pointed to the still present within the state of the ambitions to rule the region, to realize the idea of "Greater Syria," the element playing one of the crucial roles in stance-taking.

By the time the Resolution 242 was adopted, Syria not only rejected it but had also reaffirmed its commitment to the "people's liberation war" (Rabil; Rienner, 2003: 20). The latter "slogan" allowed Palestinian guerillas to be in the vanguard of the fight.

Syria was also the only country that boycotted the decisions of the Khartoum summit of 1967, and it became suspicious of the resultant merger of the Egyptian-Jordanian axis (Miller, 1986: 48). Here it is the reflection of the tendency of the Arab states relation to the summitry. As Avraham Sela explains, "the dichotomy between the two groups [radicals and moderates] is shown by the consistent high-ranking

representation and attendance of the Gulf monarchies, Jordan, and Morocco at Arab summits, as opposed to the frequency with which radical regimes such as Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Iraq have boycotted the Arab summit" (Sela, 1998: 22).

Throughout the conflict Syria has always pursued the goal to achieve "strategic parity" with Israel in order to have an independent military option in the event of another war with Israel and as a necessary precondition for any negotiations, the mentioning of which came at later stages of the conflict, and can be considered as a much unrealistic option in the years following the 1967 Six Day War till the October War of 1973 (ibid: 22).

The position which this country took was in big part defined by the Ba'thi regime that came to power in the aftermath of the June war, and it was against this background that the developments in its positions took place in the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Rabil; Rienner, 2003: 21). The more radical fraction of the regime denied any role to the Arab states in the military struggle on account of their allegedly reactionary regimes. Another school, led by Defense Minister Asad (who later became president), advocated a nationalist policy that gave priority to strengthening the Syrian defense establishment along the cooperation with other Arab countries, in the interest of the military struggle with Israel. Asad's attitude to Palestinian guerillas was also different whereby he placed them under stricter control, for their actions were seen as provision for Israel with the pretext to strike against Syrian positions (ibid: 21). As a president, Asad broke Syria from the position of regional isolation, and decided to join the proposed Federation of Arab Republics, comprising Egypt, Libya, and Sudan (which did not work). When Asad assumed power, in relations with Israel, he reaffirmed Syria's rejection of Resolution 242 and began in earnest preparing for battle with Israel. The new leader also started to look for the new allies, the most credible of whom he saw in Egypt, led by Sadat after Nasser's, the Egyptian charismatic leader's, death.

Despite the Arab determination to resist Israel by all means possible, there were the leaders that represented the stances ready to conclude a kind of peace settlement with Israel realizing the importance of pragmatism, but the attachment to the "all-Arab" positions did not allow those to act constructively in that direction. By doing so, they risked to arouse the condemnation of the radical states and loose the domestic support for their regimes, and also cause the disturbance in the domestic environment. Besides, among the features preventing their open rapprochement with Israel was the

material dependence on the other Arab states. For instance in August of 1967, at the Arab summit in Sudanese Khartoum, the states established the fund to assist the economics of Egypt and Jordan, the aid that these countries required to remain economically viable. The frontline states agreed that the compensation should be made for the losses of 1967 war, but Syria was excluded from the compensation package because it refused to attend the summit, again showing the radical position like in the case with the accepting the UNSCR 242. The states also established the Joint Arab Defense Council, the inter-Arab coordinating body, to mobilize and coordinate the Arab military effort. However, the emphasis was that military development and planning would be let up to individual countries. This decision influenced the way the states transferred, coordinated and negotiated most resources, which was carried out mostly on the bi-lateral level rather than multilateral basis (Barnett, 1998).

The Khartoum Summit and its resolutions represent the important turning point in deliberations of the Arab states. In Khartoum resolutions they formulated the policies concerning the conflict with Israel, the order that prevailed up until the early 1970s.

This was the first critical meeting of the Arab states, in a way culminating by itself the debates of the Arab states about the mutual relations and the Arab unity and their positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

One of the distinctive features of the summit was that, in the words of Charles Smith (in Fawcett, 2005: 225), "the contradictions found in Khartoum reflected those in Arab alliance on the eve of the 1967 war. Nasser favored a diplomatic resolution of the crisis and sided with Jordan's King Hussein in seeking intervention via the United Nations. Syrian refusal to consider negotiations was consistent with Syrian hostility toward Israel prior to the war as was Palestinian rejection of talks." Even though the states agreed that "the groundwork for the summit would be the unity in the ranks and unified action in the shared struggle against Israel regardless of the differences between Arab states" (words of a Sudanese prime minister Muhammad Ahmad Majhub, quoted in Barnett, 1998), it was clear that the strategies suggested by different states reflected the states' perceptions of their own interests (Fawcett, 2005: 226).

The debates on the Arab unity, the inter-Arab relations, non-interference in each other's affairs highlighted the atmosphere in which the states came to formulating the common position on the matter of Israel. But the fact that they never came to the

stable order of inter-relations reflects the ways in which the Arab states acted in the further years of conflict development and, in a way, explaining the successes, and impasses in establishing the non-belligerent relations with Israel.

3.2. "Khartoum Order"

The order that defined itself after the 1967 war was the one of "no war no peace" stalemate. The regimes did not consider any military option directed toward Israel publicly, but as the events of the beginning of 1970s showed later, the states took the efforts to abrogate the existing order. As Barnett writes, "one hopeful scenario was that it would conclude in much as had the Suez War of 1957: a return to the status quo ante", however the circumstances defined themselves to be different and short of providing the recurrence of the precedent.

For the large part the order had been defined by the Khartoum summit and the following resolutions (see Appendix 3). Eight heads of states (excluding Syria, which refused to attend the summit and called it the "latest podium for the advocates of the liquidation of the Palestinian cause" (quoted in Miller, 1986: 48) came up with the "Three No's". The resolutions of the Arab leaders provided little hope for the settlement of the conflict, and left the room for the parties concerned in the conflict to act according to how they had understood those statements. The Article 3 of the resolutions said that "the Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces form the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab states abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country" (Jewish virtual library). The Article stated by itself the deterministic position, though gave some hope for political rather than military handling of the situation. But the way the Arab states expressed their positions warned the Israeli protagonists and invested in the rigidity of reaching the solution. According to Benny Morris (1999), Arab states' "Three No's" invested in Israel's counterposition which was 'direct negotiations' with the Arab states and 'defensible borders', a euphemism for non-withdrawal to the 1967 lines (Morris, 1999: 346). Arab rejectionism, thus, is seen as responsible for the gradual emergence of Israeli rejectionism and expansionism; the Arab stance prompted the

partial Israeli retreat from the cabinet decision of June 19, which had implicitly affirmed the principle of territory for peace, and its replacement by the concept of 'defensible borders' and the practice of creeping annexation (ibid: 346).

On the face, the declarations showed no sign of readiness of compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them. Here the game metaphor comes into play, when the sides to the conflict calculate their actions on the basis of their perceptions of the interests of opponents and the attempts to come to the zero-sum result. At this stage of the conflict, the two sides had not yet been ready to accept each other in a way to live side by side in security situation. Rather, each wanted to gain as much as possible and be the only power in the region. In a non-zero-sum games, the "players have to understand each other, to discover patterns of individual behavior that make each player's actions predictable to the other; they have to test each other for a shared sense of pattern or regularity and to exploit clichés, conventions, and impromptu codes for signaling their intensions and responding to each other's signals. They must communicate by hint or by suggestive behavior" (Schelling, 1997: 85). In the case of the Arab states they gave a somewhat ambiguous hint for Israel on how they had been planning to approach further relations with the "expansionist" neighbor. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no *formal* peace treaty, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and not *de jure* recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state (Shlaim, 2004: 258).

The document lacked the flexibility, and though it was the common Arab consensus, some states did not agree to its form, but could do little to have it modified according to the individual preferences at the time due to the fear of being charged with "defeatism". On the other hand, the document was considered to be the victory for the moderate states, which had been prepared to go further in the settlement with Israel, for it had the credentials of a prospect of a diplomatic and piecemeal settlement. Among those states had been Egypt and Jordan, to whom Israel turned its attention, after Syria unambiguously denied any talks determined to reverse the order that came about after the war. The latter state saw it as sacrificing Arab nationalism for a new conservatism. When Jordan and Egypt had taken steps toward a peace settlement with Israel, by accepting UNSCR 242 and the propositions of the United Nations special representative Gunnar Jarring, this arouse the anger of those elements of the Arab world, which maintained a total confrontationist position- Syria and Iraq (Freedman, 1979: 95).

In the private spheres the states preferred a more flexible document. The Arab states had private doubts about the "three no's", but once they had publicly pledged themselves to these principles they could not deviate from them without subjecting themselves to ridicule (Barnett, 1998). Even those Arab leaders who might have privately contemplated a political compromise did not hint publicly for such sentiments for fear of being placed outside the consensus (ibid). Even though both sides, Israel and the Arab states realized the necessity of peace, "the taboo made direct contacts perilous for any Arab leader" (ibid).

At Khartoum, Nasser of Egypt and Hussein of Jordan reached a genuine understanding and formed a united front against the hard-liners (Shlaim, 2004: 258). This joint position appears a strange outcome in the light of the fact that Egypt and Jordan have always had suspicions on each others' accounts. The suspicion was caused by King Hussein's traditional "cordial" relations with the Israeli leaders, and later, under Sadat in Egypt the two states would break the diplomatic relations on the ground of Jordan's proposed Federal Plan to incorporate in the federation the East Bank, West Bank and Gaza Strip. The two leaders, the Jordanian and Egyptian, suspected each other of their possible separate deals over the West Bank and Sinai respectively. But at that time the "alliance" was seen as practicable move to further the states' aims. This movement was conditioned by the fact that Egypt found that there was little military action from the Syrian side during the 1967 war, and that Syrian position could once again drag Egypt into an unwanted armed confrontation with Israel (though it was Nasser who launched the War of Attrition directed to Israel in 1968, and was Syria's partner in attacking Israel in 1973). Besides, Nasser compensated for the loss of Syrian ally by drawing closer to his erstwhile enemies, Hussein of Jordan and Faisal of Saudi Arabia (Freedman, 1979: 96). The latter and Egypt had been engaged in the conflict in the North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic). Faisal, in return for an Egyptian pledge to pull its troops out of North Yemen, thus ending a serious threat to Saudi Arabian Security, promised to pay a subsidy of several hundred million dollars per year to Egypt to help compensate it for its wartime losses, including the loss of revenue caused by the closure of the Suez Canal (ibid: 96).

King Hussein expressed the regret on the things that had been said at the conference, however admitted that this document "charged the states directly involved with working toward a political settlement" (ibid: 263). King Hussein, reflecting on the

Summit, said, behind the scenes: "At Khartoum I fought very much against the three no's. But the atmosphere developed there into one where all the people who used to support Nasser turned on him and turned on him in such a vicious way that I found myself unable to continue to take any stand but to come closer to him and defend him and accuse them of responsibility in things that happened. That was the first collision I had with many of my friends in the Arab world" (quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 259). This approach indicates the disunity among the Arab ranks and at the same time dependence of the states on each other, and also the inability to admit by the Arab states that there were abnormal condition of the internal situations of the Arab states and conditions under which they built their "solidarity." The states still paid their "lip-service" to the Arab unity, and showed inability of a state to diverge from the common position and imposing its own will to reach the stated aims.

King Hussein offered that the Arab world was being asked to choose between the two roads. The first was "to continue the negative policies which harm us most of all…a continuation of the old superficial policy characterized by extemporization whose harmful consequences were exposed and experienced by the people. The second road began with shouldering the responsibilities, which made it incumbent upon Arab states to abandon outbidding" (quoted in Barnett, 1998). The unity the King spoke about in reality expressed itself on the rather nominal than practical level in the course of the conflict, whereas the states acted on the grounds of pragmatic considerations. The regimes had different ideological affiliations, the factor that obstructed the efforts to create a unified anti-Israeli front (Kober, 2002: 46).

The Khartoum Summit also marked the "new pragmatism" of the Arab leaders, especially seen in the position taken by Abdel Nasser. He withdrew from the cause of radicalism and dedicated himself to the task of retrieving Egyptian land and Arab dignity, and the conservative states supported the stance. However, at Khartoum he did not speak only about the Egyptian lands, and gave the priority to the resolving of the Palestinian issue and the issue of the West Bank and Gaza (Shalim, 2004: 259).

Nasser adopted a more conservative orientation and supported the view that cooperation among all the Arab states was necessary for preparing for the next phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a way such an orientation was connected with conception of Egypt's and the Arab national interests at the time. The 1967 war was a profoundly demoralizing and dispiriting debacle, and Nasser was ready to do all he could to recoup his prestige (Barnett, 1998).

Therefore, the order that established itself in the immediate months of the June 1967 war was the ground for the political stalemate in the region. Whereas Israel did its utmost in order to preserve this stalemate, because the longer it existed, the stronger its position in the occupied territories would become. The Arab states in their turn were ready to do all they could to reverse the existing situation to avoid the inhibition of the reaching their cause and realization of ambitions, and uprooting the spirit of "defeatism."

On the one hand, the way the Arab states acted showed their willingness to reach a solution to the conflict and avoid the military clashes with Israel, excluding the radical states; but on the other it was also the direct route to another full-scale war. The inability of the Israeli and Arab negotiators to find common grounds that would be accepted by both sides made the further developments in the positive directions impossible. Both sides understood from the outset of making the proposals that these would be denied by the opponents but none could behave in a way that would label them "concessionists," and leave the negative mark in the internal ranks, and on the side of the Arab states within the inter-Arab realm. Subsequently, the events that took place in the years after 1969 invested in the launching of the war with Israel by Egypt and Syria in October 1973.

3.3. The Road to War

The key developments that took place in the years before the 1973 October war can be related to the War of Attrition initiated by Nasser in 1969 continuing till 1970, and the tensions between the Palestinians and their Arab hosts.

The War of Attrition was a reaction of the Egyptian leader on the lack of progress in the Arab-Israeli relations. This was marked by the initiation of tensions and escalation of fighting along the Suez Canal. Like this, Nasser tried to bring about some diplomatic action on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, and also to urge Israel to take more active steps in the direction of Arab-Israeli accommodation, and extract from this state the conditions that could be suitable for the Arab states going in accord with the latter's major demands for territorial redemption.

Nasser's immediate goal was to prevent the conversion of the Suez Canal into a de facto border, as suggested by the cease-fire agreements decreed by the UN after the end of the June War, and to force Israel to withdraw to the pre-war border, as his ultimate object (Shlaim, 2004: 289). The war was launched for various strategic,

political, and symbolic reasons. With this war Nasser had as one of the aims to attract the Arab unity and mobilize the Arab armies and resources for this fight, however, he received little support from his neighbors. The conference in Rabat, Morocco, in December 1969 clearly showed it. Even though the summit itself did not result in any crucial decisions or resolutions, the way the states approached it once again signified their internal divisions. Significant point here is that Saudi Arabia showed continuous dissatisfaction with the Khartoum resolutions and found hard time in reconciling with its commitments towards the summit's resolutions. Besides, it had long-standing ties to the United States and was interested in reducing the Soviet Unions ties to the region and was eager to accept the proposals for peace suggested by the United States and rejected by Israel. This kind of stance raised dissatisfaction among the front-line states and they threatened to stay away from the summit until all Arab states reaffirmed that the battlefield rather than the bargaining table was the means to retrieve the Arab lands and dignities (Barnett, 1998). Nasser used Rabat summit "to excoriate the Saudis implicitly but clearly for their association with the United States" (ibid). During the last session in the summit, Syria and Iraq boycotted it due to their view of the conference's resolutions lack of confrontation towards Israel (Freedman, 1979: 96). The Arab confrontationists who had done nothing to aid Egypt in its war of attrition, denounced the cease-fire agreement, suggested by United States Secretary of State Rogers in June 1970 (see Appendix 4), as did the Palestinians who feared that Egypt and Jordan (who accepted the plan) were planning to sell them out in return for an agreement with Israel which would restore their lost territories (ibid: 97). But this move by Nasser is considered to be tactical rather than permanent one in order to earn for him the breathing space. According to the cease-fire agreement, the two sides, Egypt and Israel, were to respect the "standstill" during the cease-fire: neither Egypt nor Israel were allowed to move their missiles closer to the canal. However, on the day the cease-fire came into force, on the 7 August 1970, Egypt, with the Soviet help, violated the "standstill" agreement and moved its missiles to the edge of the Suez Canal (Shlaim, 2004: 297), which is viewed as a provision by Egypt of a cover for the forthcoming 1973 war for itself.

The War of Attrition did not bring with it the expected results of the rapprochement with Israel, gaining of the lost territories, or Arab unity in the fight for the common aim, but huge losses on both sides. Neither did it remove the political stalemate- the wishful outcome for the Arab side. However, the war is seen by some analysts as a

victory for Egypt, for it concluded in the psychological and international balance to Egypt's advantage. It was also seen as an opportunity for Egypt of a free hand over the next three years to prepare for the great war of October 1973 (Shlaim, 2004: 297). Nasser himself considered the war to be the victory, because he had enlisted the Soviet militarily and the United States diplomatically in the effort to negotiate a solution (Lesch, Tschigri, 1998: 24). From the side of the Soviets there was vast physical presence in the country and fifteen thousand soldiers and several hundred military experts; from the United States the Rogers Initiative. Other Arab officials received the acceptance of the initiative as evidence of potential capitulation and negotiations with Israel. Syria and Iraq painted the initiative as defeatist. The more radical elements of the PLO accused Nasser of treason and of flirting with the political solution (Barnett, 1998). This kind of attitudes of the Arab states prevented Nasser from making further steps towards the peace process with Israel. In addition this was another example of the lack of the Arab states' readiness and the ability at this point to consider the possibility of any settlement with the State of Israel, and putting down their ambitious plans of retrieving the lost lands and accepting Israel as an equal, politically relevant player of the region, and the business partner.

Another factor that played an important role in Arab relations with Israel was the Arab states relations with the Palestinians, especially their representation by the Palestine Liberation Organization established in 1964 by the Arab efforts. In the period of time, the relations reached the tensions which manifested themselves in Jordan, the state where Palestinian guerillas had their established bases. The latter led their fight for the pursuit of their goal of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state. These tensions invested to the changing post-1967 order, and manifested the relationship between the Palestinian nationalism and the Jordanian sovereignty. Jordanian- Palestinian relations have been characterized by the mutual suspicion. The latter was created by Abdullah's (King Hussein's grand father, and former King of Jordan) annexation of the West Bank and near peace with Israel after the establishment of the latter. Besides, both Abdullah and Hussein had been viewed as cooperators with the enemies of the Arab nations- the British, the Zionists, and the Americans (Miller, 1986: 32). Hussein, following the traditions set by his grandfather, maintained both a pro-western orientation and a pragmatic view of Israel. This fact often complicated the relations of Jordan with its neighbors, and conditioned the often hesitant position in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Besides, its economic weakness and fragile internal political situation prevented it from taking the decisions that would have been best suitable to its national interests. Salloukh in his article "State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical Perspective" writes that "permeability of the Arab states system, best exemplified in the spill-over effect of trans-national appeals such as pan-Islamic and pan-Arab ideologies across the state borders, rendered Jordan's domestic arena vulnerable to external (and internal) manipulation, especially by aspiring regional powers." So, as the author continues, "it required of the regime to pursue an 'honorable, just solution' to the Palestinian problem, sensitive to Palestinian public opinion." And the lack of the natural borders and geographic location between contending regional aspirants (Iraq, Syria, and Israel), had often exposed Jordan to the pressures of regional powers, constraining the country's foreign policy options (ibid: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1996). Jordan represented by itself the state that was willing to venture toward an alignment with Israel, but due to inter-Arab constraints it could not afford an official alignment with it (Kober, 2002: 79).

In the wake of the Jordanian crisis in 1970, King Hussein had to balance his sympathy for the Palestinians (who constituted half of the country's population) with the need to maintain his own power and prevent another war with Israel (Lesch; Tschigri: 1998: 23). This underscored the growing division among Arabs over whether they should take an ideological or pragmatic approach to their conflict with Israel (ibid: 23).

In 1970s various clashes between Palestinian guerillas and Jordanian military started, and as a reaction King Hussein ordered his army to disarm and break the power of Palestinian organizations. Fatah, a moderate wing of the PLO sought an agreement with the Jordanian government, unlike other factions such as Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which took a more confrontational line and began openly declaring their opposition to the king and declaring that Jordan was Palestine (Barnett, 1998). The negotiations that followed did not bring any substantial results and in September 1970, the PFLP hijacked a number of planes, flew them to Amman, and blew them up. This act posed the challenge both to the king and Arafat, the PLO's leader, and the defender of the Palestinian cause. Moreover, the crisis led to the disagreements within the Arab ranks. At the height of the crisis, Syria, the vehement defender of the Palestinian cause, intervened in the fight by helping the Palestinians. Syria decided to

support the fedayeen's challenge to King Hussein. Asad, then the chief of the air force, did not oppose the intervention of Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army tanks into Jordan, but he was wary of triggering an Israeli or a U.S. reaction and thus opposed the use of Syrian air support (Miller, 1986: 48) He made the realist calculations, for after the Syrian intervention King Hussein sent an urgent appeal for help to Washington. The latter promised the help, however it was not used because the Jordan's army itself went into action against Syrian invaders (Shlaim, 2004: 299). At the end of the crisis, the Palestinians were defeated, Syria retreated, and King Hussein remained in power. As a result, Jordan earned itself the improved relations with Israel, and the Jordanian-Israeli alliance solidified after the events of the Black September, as the crisis is referred to. This became possible due to the combination of the resolute pro-Hashemite (or pro-government) forces in Jordan and American-Israeli cooperation which included the deployment of Israeli forces along its borders with Jordan and Syria, which deterred the Syrians from conducting military operations and from an all-out invasion of Jordan (Kober, 2002: 94). As a result of the crisis, Hussein came to realize the full significance of the relations with Israel. Since then, the Jordanian-Israeli alliance was motivated to a great extent by "omnibalancing considerations on the part of Jordan" (ibid: 94).

In Syrian case, Asad's reaction to the Jordanian crisis reflected the new pragmatism that appeared in the Syrian foreign policy (Miller, 1986: 49). The new flexibility was based on Asad's belief that Syria could not pursue its goals from an isolated position within the Arab world or by allowing the fedayeen the kind of independence that could destabilize Arab regimes (ibid: 49). Miller (1986) sees the roots of Asad's pragmatism in his understanding both of the limitations under which he was operating as a result of Israel's military superiority and the strengths Syria possessed in relation to the weaknesses of its Arab neighbors.

The consequences of the Palestinian- Jordanian clashes of August-September, 1970 also include the altered Arab state involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian defeat, and subsequent losses in later engagements with Jordanian forces, forced the PLO to move its command structure in 1971 from Jordan to Lebanon. From that time onward, PLO actions against Israel engaged Lebanon more directly into Arab-Israeli conflict and became a major factor in instigating a Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s. The Jordanian civil war had another casualty: Nasser of Egypt died shortly after negotiating a ceasefire. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who,

from 1971-1973, sought unsuccessfully to negotiate with Israel for a settlement involving Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and failed to gain American backing for his efforts (Morris, 1999: 227). He suggested the partial peace in return for Israeli partial withdrawal from Sinai, which would have allowed the Suez Canal to reopen, the initiative which was rejected by Israel (Lesch; Tschigri, 1998: 24).

As had been admitted by the Israeli officials themselves, the Israeli attitude after 1969 toward the Arabs was not much suggestive. They suggested "either full contractual peace without full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories or continuation of the status quo without any concessions" (Shlaim, 2004: 297); the status quo unacceptable for the Arabs, which was maintained by the following "diplomacy of attrition" the one which eventually led to the full-scale fighting in the 1973 war.

The civil war in Jordan was seen by the Arab states not as an internal matter, but as a matter of concern for the entire Arab nation. They went on to state that instead of directing the arms fought in the crisis in the direction of Israel, they fought their fellow people. This was another reason for the intervention of the other Arab states into the war. The other side of the inter-Arab anxiety was that the crisis factor was amidst the continuing swinging in the Arab world between the vested interests of sovereignty and the common cause that they pledged to defend. Here, the national interests played the prominent role, seen in their hesitation to take one side or the other in the crisis (Barnett, 1998). Because to stand on the side of Jordan, would be seen as the betrayal of the Palestinians, to stand on the latter side would be the challenge to a fundamental tenet of a political order (ibid). But that the majority of the interested countries sufficed themselves with the verbal statements instead of the directly interfering in the conflict yet again proved that the states rather preferred to take up the stances that would be of less danger to the regimes they maintained in their own countries, and would spare the condemnation of the radical Arab states and the powers that definitely superseded them militarily, that is Israel and the United States. Besides, it helped to avoid more material losses that could be harmful to the already shattered states' economies.

Another summit, held in September 22 amidst the Jordanian crisis and aimed to discussion of the possible means of halting its development, showed the inability of the Arab states to reach the firm common solution that would be equally acceptable to the majority of the participants. The summit ended in the signature of the Cairo Agreement between the PLO and Jordan. According to Adeed Dawisha, the

conference was a "turning point in the history of inter-Arab relations no less important than the Arab defeat of 1967. It marked the gradual decline of the Palestinian movement as a radicalizing and destabilizing factor in Arab politics" (quoted in Barnett, 1998). The Palestinian factor remained the important factor in the Arab-Israeli relations, however now it could be described as a matter of Arab rhetoric rather than the practical actions. It served as the basis to keep the conflict going and as the means of mobilizing the resources and the leverage to the domination of the region under a leader's rule.

The issue also became problematic for the leaders, mainly of Jordan and Lebanon since the mid-1970s had to find the common grounds in between the Palestinians and the sovereignty of their own countries, the factor that influenced their positions in the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, and invested in their cautiousness in taking political decisions both during multilateral and bilateral negotiations with Israel.

Given these events and the coming of the new leader in Egypt, the region experienced another turning point, though not much dramatic but the one that defined the outcome of the period. Anwar Sadat, who was one of the military members who participated in the coup in Egypt in 1951, unlike Nasser, did not enjoy the prestige and the love of the neighboring leaders and the people correspondingly, the point that in a way rid him of the burden to recover personally from the past defeats. He did not possess the charisma that Nasser had, and was less clear in his future plans in relation to the conflict. At first, he was treated by suspicion by the Arab leaders, but later appeared the one who exercised the continuity of Nasser's policies aimed at the recovering the lost lands and reaching the kind of a solution with Israel. He acted in accordance with Nasser's statement that "that was taken by force cannot be retaken *but* by force."

His arrival brought the changes into the Arab politics, and he showed clearly where his priorities lay (Freedman, 1979: 97). These priorities concerned in most part the national interests. Upon his coming to power, he changed the official name of Egypt "United Arab Republic", still the remnant of the union with Syria, which withdrew in 1961, into the "Arab Republic of Egypt."

At this time, Asad, who showed himself a pragmatist during the Jordanian crisis, became the president of Syria. The two events influenced the realignment of forces in the Arab world and were the direct steps to the war of 1973 (Freedman, 1979: 97).

Despite the attempts of the two leaders to still reach partial solutions to the conflict with Israel, the steps they took were the ones toward peace and war. Sadat was the

first leader who ever mentioned the possibility of peace with Israel publicly. When the UN special representative to the region, Gunnar Jarring addressed Egypt and Israel with the proposals to resolve the dispute between the two, Egypt replied, that it "will be ready to enter into peace agreement with Israel containing all the aforementioned obligations mentioned in Security Council Resolution 242" (Shlaim, 2004: 299). Egypt also made a number of additional demands: an Israeli commitment to withdraw not only from Sinai but also from the Gaza Strip, a commitment to settle the refugee problem in accordance with UN resolutions, and the establishment of a UN force to maintain the peace (ibid: 300). Rabin, at that time the Israeli ambassador to Washington, reflected that this statement was the milestone and that "for the first time in the chronicle of the Middle East conflict, and Arab country –indeed, the largest Arab country and the leader of the Arab world-had issued an official document expressing its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel!" (Quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 3001). However, the proposal was rejected by Israel, the move that made Sadat take up the issue of the preparation for war for serious consideration and turn him in the direction of making the alliances with Saudi Arabia and Syria, the countries formerly the enemies of Egypt. Besides, he needed to gain the personal strength in the eyes of the Arab leaders, because he experienced the grievances of the domestic actors and those of the Arab world on the account of his failure to go to war, which he already mentioned in 1971. Thus, Sadat consolidated the alliance with Saudi Arabia. Besides, he expelled the Soviet advisors from Egypt in July 1972, the move considered by Israel as a fading away of the military option (ibid: 315).

Besides, the relations of Egypt and Jordan started to deteriorate in the light of the Jordanian Federal Plan, under which there would be the federation of the Jordanian part consisting of the East Bank with the capital in Amman, and the Palestinian part incorporating the West Bank and Gaza with the capital in East Jerusalem, with the common administration. King Hussein did not find the endorsement of his plan from any part, and was "caught between his inability to sustain the war with Israel and his unwillingness to make a common cause with the radicals" (ibid: 315).

Sadat also forged the alliance with the radical Syria "and the two nations were able to coordinate their preparations for war" (Freedman, 1979: 98). The two alliances in their turn brought the improvement of relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia, a diplomatic revolution in the words of Freedman, who also considers the reconciliation

between Syria and Jordan whose forces had battled in September 1970, the consequence of Sadat's diplomatic efforts (Freedman, 1979: 98).

One of the reasons why Sadat decided to go to war was that he could not see any other solution to the existing situation in the region in general and in relation to the conflict with Israel. The attack on Israel in October 1973 is considered by many analysts to have been aimed not so much at the infliction of a military defeat on Israel, but rather as a means to break the political deadlock and also gain for Sadat a personal strength that he lacked and which gained him the consolidated position both in the eyes of his fellow Arab leaders and the credentials for the further negotiations with Israel on the further rapprochement with this state and acting on the basis most suitable for the internal country conditions, like this consolidating the nation-state, sovereignty orientation.

Moreover, he managed to mobilize the Arab forces in a more effective way, unlike the previous Arab-Israeli wars, whereby Egypt and Syria had been able to mount a coordinated attack on Israel, with both Jordan and Iraq aiding Syria in the later stages of fighting (Freedman, 1979: 99). The Saudi Arabian decision to impose an oil embargo during the conflict on the United States, Israel's main ally, was further evidence of the diplomatic effectiveness of the Egyptian leader (ibid: 99). Freedman sees a share of irony in these events, for "his [Sadat] ability to wage the war successfully in its initial stages were to provide the Egyptian leader with the domestic support to move toward a peace treaty with Israel in the aftermath of the conflict" (Freedman, 1979: 99).

The atmosphere of defeatism, military weakness, hesitation and the quest for revenge characterized the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period between the two wars: 1967 and 1973. On the one hand the positions that the Arab states took gave a vague hope for some sort of a political settlement with Israel, but on the other the closer look at how the states behaved presents an obvious military outcome. Despite the realistic attitudes of the states towards the handling of the rivalry and inter-regional affairs, the Arab frontline states, and "sideline" states were not ready to conclude any agreement with Israel. Influenced by different factors the states acted rather categorically in their attitudes. They had too much at stake to let Israel take up an equal position among them and be treated as a full-member actor in the regional affairs: their domestic

prestige, economic weakness, fragility of regimes, and still unclear order of mutual relations. With the war of 1967 they had been involved too deep into the conflict with Israel and the defending of the Palestinian cause, in a way unexpected for themselves; so that they had to define what roles they were now to play in these events and on what grounds to formalize the positions. The matter was complicated for the Arab states even more with the uncertainties of relations between each other and in the wake of the heated debates on the relevancy of pan-Arabic postulates and the extent to which this ideology could play in the policy-making. As the states still had been relatively young entities, given only the short period of time since the establishment of their nation-states, the latter concept and that of sovereignty needed to be defined for the countries in the context of their territorial entities.

Another point is that the coalitions that the states started to formalize also took up a somewhat different form, based on the realistic and pragmatic calculations of the participants rather than ideologically determined claims.

Despite the fact that the Arab states tried to present their official stances as the ones of the non-compromising actors, the practice showed for them, that amidst the circumstances, such approach could not work, as they soon realized that they could not boldly stay on a road of realizing of their dream of "wiping off Israel from the surface of the Earth, and throwing the Jews into the see." And that the states launched the October war, as has been mentioned, was a move not to achieve their final aim, but rather reverse the political humiliation of the 1967 defeat. The new stage of the conflict opened up for the Arab states to react to the conflict with Israel from another angle, not completely different though, but with the opening of the channels for the bargaining and compromise.

Chapter 4.

1973- 1980s: The Opening Prospects for Settlement

4.1. Changed Environment in the Region

There exists the agreement in the literature on the topic that the war of October 1973 served as a "sobering effect" for the parties to the conflict. It changed the political deadlock, much desired by the Arab states and established the balance-of-power in the region where the previous assurance of the Israeli invincibility was quite shaken and it gave the hopes for the positive direction in the settlement of the rivalries between the Arab states and Israel. That Egypt and Syria managed to take advantage in the initial stages of the attack to recapture almost all of the territories lost in the 1967 war, and the fact that the Arab states succeeded in establishing the unprecedently working coalition of countries in the fight with Israel, brought the restoration of the lost in the 1967 war Arab pride and superiority of their strategic will, even if militarily Egypt and Syria appeared on the losers' side. It was the psychological "victory" of the Arab states and especially Egypt (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 187). The war reversed defeatism of the 1967 aftermath, and marked the prevailing psychology of the Arab-Israeli conflict as of mutual fear and mistrust, and the realization that the enemy was capable of inflicting serious wounds in any future conflict (Kamrava, 2005: 137). This realization in a way paved the way for the prospects for the hopes of the resolution of the conflict between the Arab and Jewish people.

The period that followed is described as the one where the conflict between the Arab and Jewish people now took place in a different environment, both regional and international. On the international level the situation was of the growing involvement of the conflicting sides of the Cold War into the region as the platform of competition for the influence, therefore new coalitions of states were to be established leaning

though not officially to one side or the other, and enjoying the support and backing of either. As Galal El-Rashidi described, the years that followed "witnessed fundamental shifts in the global as well as Middle Eastern balances of power. The pre-war power alignments have been radically dispersed" and the old order could not be restored (Rashidi, 1977: 73). Rashidi (1977), pointed to the new realities that emerged in the region, one of which was that the members of the region had realized the basic requirements for the durable peace, among which were the new military capabilities of the states, which influenced the choice between the war or peace, and that for more states the continuation of conflict between Israel and the Arab states became unacceptable (ibid: 73).

In this light the states started to rethink their national priorities, which acquired stronger elements of statism, and more states showed the growing trend toward a political settlement with Israel. Most Arab states, including the confrontation states and Saudi Arabia, were more politically and psychologically prepared than ever before to negotiate a final settlement with Israel (Khouri: in Haley; Snider, 1979: 163).

Besides, the financial factor came to play an important factor both in inter-Arab and international relations, which had been successfully used by the Arab states in influencing external powers in order to extract the mediation to the conflict and also played an important role in how the Arab states determined their positions in the conflict with Israel. The financial factor is related to the fact that the Arab states, particularly the oil producing states, and the ones related to the radical camp, for the first time used the oil power to express their influence (Shlaim, 2004; Rashidi, 1977; Sela, 1998). As Sela describes, "the Arab media maintained its trust in the oil weapon as a major source of influence in the international arena and one that needed to be exploited to wrest more territory from Israel, underlying the general desire to proceed the path of diplomacy" (Sela, 1998: 162).

The oil wealth was the factor of how Saudi Arabia came into the position of power and preeminence in Arab politics (Barnett, 1998). "With such power, the Saudis hoped to protect themselves from various threats and challenges from other Arab states through checkbook diplomacy and "political petrolism" (ibid). The country tried to reach an alliance with the United States and Egypt, and such an alignment came into existence after the 1973 war, which was characterized as an "axis" (ibid). The two countries had similar interest in alienating the Soviet Union as a threat to

their interests and acquiring the United States as the potential force in reaching the compromise solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (ibid). The trend points to the states' not directly involved in the conflict with Israel to leverage themselves to it in order to preserve the influence in the region. Such moves point to the materialist and realist considerations of states' policy making unlike the previously ideologically based calculations.

The "oil weapon" was one of the crucial means that brought the United States into the deeper engagement in the regional diplomatic process and developing by the country of the "Arab policy." The latter involvement helped bring about the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria, and the further Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, though condemned by majority of the Arab states.

According to Sela, the powerful effect of Arab oil on world opinion was reflected in a boosted Arab self-confidence, and the feeling that "new era had begun in Arab history" (Sela, 1998: 171). The Arab attitude toward the use of the oil weapon remained firm as long as no progress was achieved on Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory (ibid: 171). However, as Avraham Sela points, Arab oil producers never lost sight of economic considerations, which reflects the pragmatism of these states, and the context of reality which the states took into consideration, and not just acted based on their rabid ideological proclamations. Sela explains that they were to use the oil weapon until Israel retreated to the 1967 borders and the rights of the Palestinians were restored. They were to sustain the oil embargo for as long as the losses did not exceed one quarter of their 1972 revenues, that is, the end to reducing of oil production (Sela, 1998: 171). Political conditions for ending the oil embargo ripened once the Israeli-Egyptian agreement on disengagement of forces was signed in 1974, and the United States made any further brokering between Israel and the Arabs strictly conditional on lifting the embargo. Despite Syria's opposition to that, the embargo came to its official and unconditional end on March 18, 1974, after being virtually approved by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria (ibid: 171).

Another point that can be said to characterize the period and the result of the 1973 war is that the Arab states formulated their central demands: a return to the borders of 4 June 1967 and establishment of an independent Palestinian state (Shlaim, 2004: 328). This was the period when the Arab states formulized the "comprehensive" approached towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the stance which they firmly maintained throughout further negotiations and attempts to negotiations. The unwillingness and

impossibility conditioned by different factors to deviate from this approach served as one of the major reasons for the halt in development of the solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Palestinian issue gained the core role in the conflict, and the PLO received rather substantial authority and political weight and was recognized to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people during Rabat summit in 1974.

Lebanon, the state that to this time had played rather passive role in the Arab-Israeli rivalries, entered the conflict as a "full-scale" participant and became the victim of the internal civic rivalries and the means of the Palestinian fight for the national rights with Israel on the one hand, and the platform of inter-Arab rivalry for regional domination on the other. These rivalries left the state, which heretofore based its political environment on the principle of national consensus, in the condition of internal instability and crisis for many years ahead. It also became the object of both sides of the conflict, Israeli and Arab states' of achieving the zero-sum outcome in their confrontation (for instance Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982). The Palestinians, "desperate and alone, sought solace in violence. And Lebanon, under the weight of its own fragile political system and Fedayeen attacks, imploded into civil war" (Kamrava, 2005: 137).

The states needed to construct now their policies within new circumstances that had to define their interests best suitable to these circumstances and best applicable to the new realities. Even though some leaders still mentioned the pan-Arab and the "common cause" ideals, the majority of them acted on the pragmatic considerations. And even though the states still acted under the umbrella of nationalism, it was more of a declarative nature and the means to achieve their aims while not damaging the survival of the regimes or securing the external help. One state under this category is Syria, where much of the state's legitimacy, as explained by Barnett, derived from its Arab credentials (Syrian identity is considered to be late in making if existent at all), thus fusing the relationship between domestic stability and its Arabism. When Egypt withdrew from the Arab cause after the 1973 war, Syria increasingly portrayed itself as the caretaker and defender of the Arab nationalism (Barnett, 1998).

The countries emerged from the war with interests diverging in some ways or the others from those of their fellow countries', and had different concerns and schedules (Barnett, 1998). For some states, like Egypt, which completely oriented itself towards "state-first" priorities, the political settlement with Israel constituted the first priority,

and therefore Sadat tried to find the ways how to achieve it as soon as possible. The Egyptian president stood on the position of reclaiming the territories by diplomatic means and not the military encounters (ibid). Such desire was attributed to the country's shackled economy and deteriorating socio-economic internal situation, hence its desire to attract the foreign and domestic economic capital. Besides, Egypt was set on its changing role in the world and regional politics, the fact that made it take up the reorientation from the Soviet Union, to the United States (ibid). Egypt was in a better position to seek peace with Israel than any other Arab state, because the Egyptians felt very strong identification with their own past and cultural heritage. They have always seen themselves as Egyptians as well as Muslims or Arabs (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 187). For Sadat the first priority was to establish peace with Israel and the question of Palestinian nationhood was of no urgency for him (ibid: 187).

For other states, like Jordan, the paramount issue was regime survival. Jordan represents the state which has always been in between the regional powers, it beard the largest amount of the Palestinian refugees, and lacked the defined state-national identity (Barnett, 1998). Based on these grounds and unlike Egypt, King Hussein could not completely abandon the pan-Arab symbolism, for it was the basis of his legitimacy. Therefore the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was to be based for him on getting the West Bank and East Jerusalem under his control, which in its turn would consolidate his authority. Jordan was the state to which Israel turned to concluding any sort of settlement after the October war, however, there were no substantial results. King Hussein hoped for a partial agreement with Israel with the partial withdrawal of the latter from the West Bank, and full peace agreement in return for complete Israeli withdrawal (Shlaim, 2004: 331), however it was rejected by Israel, which denied any partial agreement with Jordan due to the fact that the latter did not participate in the military action during the October war (ibid). And for Jordan any final agreement with Israel would have meant the political solution which would have been unacceptable both for his country's people and the fellow Arabs, and be considered as betrayal (ibid).

For the PLO in the new circumstances, the basic interest was their representation at the bargaining table, for Israel refused any negotiations with it. Besides, it faced the divisions within itself, where some groups were prone to reconciliation on the key issues of their statehood, and national determination; and the radical fractions, which

in their turn had been indistinguishable from the Arab states that provided their financial backing (Barnett, 1998).

These varying interests of the states came visibly to the fore when the Arab states held two conferences- in Algiers, in November 1973, and Rabat in October 1974, after the October's war end- in order to negotiate the further approaches toward handling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The states divided in their stances into the "rejectionists", including Iraq, Algeria, and most of the Palestinian organizations, and the moderates, who were willing to try to work out a settlement with Israel, including Egypt, Jordan, Syria and some "moderate" Palestinian factions, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Snider, 1979: 183). But within the latter camp, the states were divided too on the means of reaching that settlement, which complicated the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The divisions within Arab states were conditioned by the territorial gains that the states opted to extract and, as has been mentioned, by the expectations for direct financial aid from the conservative oil producers (Sela, 1998:154).

Due to Bickerton and Klausner, the whole question of Arab unity was one of the major problems of Arab diplomacy (1998: 190). It was believed that agreement among the Arab states was necessary for an enduring peace (ibid: 190).

4.2. Beginning of Political Process

In the aftermath of the October war, Egypt and Israel signed the disengagement agreement (January 1974) which provided for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from both sides of the Suez Canal, and the enhancement of the United Nations force between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula, the agreement, and not the peace treaty, which provided the first step in "reaching a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 338" (see Appendix 5) (Freedman, 1979: 99). This act indicated the beginning of the political process in the direction of the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and gave the promising grounds for the bargaining of the settlement. However, these had been accompanied by complications which cast a shade on the hopes of reaching a solution.

One of them came with the Syrian refusal to sign the similar disengagement agreement with Israel, due to the resistance to any political settlement, especially a unilateral, as it could influence the final settlement and breach the decisions taken at the summit in Algiers in November, 1973 (Barnett, 1998). The summit in Algiers is

important in that it was the forum for the Arab states to discuss their future position on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the light of the newly appeared circumstances. The central issue that the states touched upon concerned yet again the dilemma of bilateral or unilateral handling of the conflict, like during the summit in Khartoum post 1967 war, however, here it was clear that the states now had to make the decision which was in a large way influenced by the power struggle for regional domination. This struggle caused the hindering effect on the states' accommodation with Israel, who by the acceptance of the resolutions 242 and 338, admitted Israel's legitimacy, and implied that the Arabs were willing to end the state of war with Israel (Sela, 1998: 157).

The summit did not sanction Sadat and Hafiz al-Asad to continue their negotiations with Israel but instructed them not to act unilaterally on political issues that might affect a final settlement (Barnett, 1998), however, it had legitimized the use of diplomacy in the pursuit of the Arab goals (Sela, 1998: 155), but not in discordance with the principle of "comprehensive" settlement.

One more achievement of the summit was that the Arab states reached a strategy which was called "the interim goal of the Arab nation," which was defined as the complete liberation of all the Arab lands occupied in June 1967, including "Arab Jerusalem," and the commitment to the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the PLO's decision (Sela, 1998: 156). This strategy, as noted by Sela (1998), created new guidelines for handling the conflict with Israel. That there were no "three no's" of Khartoum indicated that the Arab actors concerned with maneuverability in the diplomatic process that had never been available before (ibid: 156).

Even in the light of such developments Syria still refused to sign the disengagement agreement with Israel, one of the reasons was the defeat on the battlefield, and despite its initial willingness to work out some kind of an agreement with Israel. The Syrians refused to recognize Israel as long as the Golan Heights were occupied (Kamrava, 2005: 137).

For Asad, the peace process was less crucial, either economically or strategically; his regime was challenged by radical opponents at home as well as by hostile radical neighbor Iraq (Sela, 1998: 154). Besides, in Syria, the military elite was politicized and strongly committed to radical pan-Arab ideology (ibid: 154). In Egypt, on the other hand, the military was rather apolitical, and it was coupled by Egypt's weight

and leadership, and centralized decision-making (ibid: 153). Like this, Syria led the strategy of a collective approach in the diplomatic process aimed at preserving "Arab solidarity," which would guarantee a comprehensive settlement (ibid: 154).

But notwithstanding these factors, on May 31, 1974 Syria signed the disengagement agreement with Israel, the move that explained by Rabil and Rienner as an inescapable option, for the country lost in the 1973 war the territories beyond the 1967 cease-fire line. Moreover, as is marked by the authors, "this agreement is important because it was the first one to be signed by Israel and Syria under the auspices of the United States. Besides, it had been scrupulously observed by both parties since its inception" (Rabil; Rienner, 2003; 25). Rabil and Rienner described three factors that were responsible for the success of the agreement that included the one of Kissinger's (who launched the "shuttle" or "step-by-step" diplomacy in the Middle East) backing by the US President Nixon, and he increased the U.S. input into the negotiations. Another one is that the US played the role of the moderator that also advanced its own positions. The third factor was that the US enlisted Arab support for its negotiations with Syria (ibid: 26).

The Israeli-Syrian agreement served as a precondition for Sadat for progress toward and additional Sinai settlement.

Rabat summit of October 1974 concerned the working out of the strategy of reaching the goals that the states agreed in Algiers. The summit's most important resolution spelled the strong objection to any partial political settlement, repeating the "pan-national and indivisible nature of the problem" (Sela, 1998: 163). Here the indicative feature of the situation was that, as Syrian president pointed, there existed the "unity of purpose between the Arab states, but disagreement over methods" (Freedman, 1979): "the issue is not recovering a piece of land, but the way this is recovered…It is preferable for us that our land remains occupied than recovering it at the expense of our national dignity…" (Asad to Sadat, November 1977; taken from Sela, 1998: 151). Therefore, Sadat's peacemaking diplomacy was diminishing Syria's chance to recover its land and threatened its national security (ibid: 163).

This situation led to the emergence of the new coalitions of Arab states who were opposed to the bilateral settlement with Israel and on the terms not acceptable to the Arab states, and the states trying to affect the balance-of-power strategy toward Egypt through alignment with Jordan and the PLO. Both Syria and the PLO strongly criticized the Egyptian signing of the second disengagement agreement with Israel

(Sinai II, which represented a breakthrough in Israeli-Egyptian relations because it included essential political elements) and adhered to a unified Arab diplomacy (ibid: 163).

As is indicated by various scholars, the Sinai II accords arouse unpopular reaction in the Arab world, because it was seen by them as the diminishing of the chances of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied in the 1967 war lands, and that move eroded the political assets (in no little degree collective action) that they gained for the Arab world in October 1973.

Besides, the Egypt's move was perceived as a dividing factor of the Arab world, and the diminishing of the broader conflict to a border conflict. The "rejectionist states" began to meet periodically to publicize their outrage at Egypt's policies and interpretations of Arabism (Barnett, 1998).

Syria after the signing of Sinai II feared that by this agreement the elimination of Egypt from the confronting line with Israel would neutralize Syria's demands for Israeli withdrawal from Golan Heights and participation of the Palestinians in the future peace settlement (Snider, 1979: 185). As Snider explains, without the credible military option Syria was in no position to press these demands, and in the absence of the credible military threat Israel would agree only to "cosmetic" adjustments of the armistice lines which would not disturb the military settlements it had established in the Golan Heights (ibid: 185).

Another significant outcome of the Rabat summit was the endorsement of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" (Shlaim, 2004: 333). The latter fact significantly diminished the Jordanian authority, because this pointed to its inability to experience any success in recovering occupied territory (ibid: 333). This also implied the establishment of the independent Palestinian national authority, led by the PLO on any part of Palestine that was liberated (ibid: 333). This meant that the PLO "abandoned" the claim to all the lands of the pre-Mandatory Palestine, which led to the internal divisions of the PLO. The moderate fractions, namely al-Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, and the Syrian-controlled al-Sa'iqa, concluded that despite the violent opposition of their more militant and uncompromising opponents within the resistance movement it would be more realistic to scale down their maximum demands and goals (Haley, Snider, 1979: 163). The realist positions taken by these fractions allowed the PLO to be accepted to the Geneva conference, which was the turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sela, 1998: 158).

The PLO's final decision to adopt a pragmatic strategy, accepting the establishment of a mini-state in Palestine as a first phase in their national struggle, represented the impact of the main Arab proponents of this strategy on the Palestinian mainstream (ibid: 166). Moreover, as Sela (1998), points out, the adoption of this position demonstrated the fundamental change brought by the war in the Arab world's priorities. This decision gave the PLO the veto power over any decision by the Arab states regarding the conflict with Israel. However, this was not to mean that the Arab states would allow the Palestinians to dictate the course of their policies, after the war in which they had scored unprecedented military and political achievements. Therefore, Sela continues, the underlying rhetoric of this decision was the Arab states' need to legitimize a political settlement with Israel. Furthermore, by casting responsibility for everything relating to the Palestinian issue on the PLO, the Arab states took another step toward disengaging themselves from responsibility for the Palestinian issue and enhancing their own freedom of action regarding bilateral settlements with Israel (Sela, 1998: 166). According to some scholars in the field (e.g. Kamrava, 2005), at this point the Arab-Israeli conflict was equalized with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the major stumbling point in any negotiations concerned the "self-determination" and establishment of the national home for the Palestinian people. This also proved the Arabs' implying positions toward the state interests and manipulation of the issue of Palestine to their own advantage. Obviously, such a decision had been much propagated and facilitated by Egypt, in order to gain a free hand in its rapprochement with Israel.

The signing of the Sinai II accords and the changing role of the PLO invested in polarization of the inter-Arab politics which in its turn nourished the eruption of the Lebanese civil war, which turned that country into a battleground of conflicting ambitions, fears, and frustrated hopes (Sela, 1998: 175). The intensity, duration, and outcome of the conflict, and the gains and losses sustained by the various participants, affected the Arab states' abilities to deal with one another and with Israel (Snider, 1979: 179).

In the light of the Lebanese events Syria was the initiator of the formation of the "Eastern Front", the aim of which was to deter a possible Israeli offensive against Damascus (ibid: 185). The "Eastern Front" referred to a line of confrontation states on Israel's northern and eastern borders comprising Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and PLO entrenched in southern Lebanon (ibid: 185). The latter's presence in the southern

Lebanon as the result of the Jordanian crisis of 1971, was one of the major reasons of the eruption of the Lebanese crisis, for it started as a range of clashes between the Palestinian guerillas and the Lebanese Left. The Lebanese neutrality and passivity in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the principle included in the National Covenant, was aborted by the events that erupted after the signature of the Sinai II agreement which coincided with the crisis' beginning. This accord contributed to the insecurity of the Lebanese Left and Right camps and to the outbreak of fighting (ibid: 182). The consequences of the second Sinai agreement include the Arab consensus that Lebanon must remain an active frontline state in the struggle against Israel.

The Lebanese crisis, which started as the internal inter-communal one and transformed into the major ground of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be said to have served the beginning of the impasse in the political process towards the settlement of the conflict. Syria used the crisis to consolidate its own initiative to enhance the bargaining position. The country adopted the strategy of self-reliance, based on the consolidation of its own standing as a leading regional power (Sela, 1998: 175). For Asad, the Lebanese crisis provided the opportunity to assert control over Palestinian forces and to deter Israel from filling the power vacuum (Schultz, 199: 62). Besides, the decision of Asad to bring the Syrian armed forces into the country brought Syria one step closer to fulfilling its territorial claims as well as to demonstrate that Asad was the most effective leader of the Arab world (ibid: 63). So, Lebanon became the key factor in the Syrian-Israeli deterrence dialogue, and the surrogate battlefield for the Israeli- Palestinian conflict after the PLO's move to Beirut (ibid: 63).

For Syria the dramatic change in the status quo in the country represented the danger for its security, which in its turn could have an uncertain impact on the relations with Israel (Weinberger, 1986: 71). The fear was that Israel would use the crisis as an excuse to occupy the southern Lebanon along the Litani River, which would increase the vulnerability of Damascus in case of war with Israel (ibid: 71). Besides, Israel could use the disorder in Lebanon to discredit the possibility of the realization by the PLO of the concept of a secular democratic Palestine (ibid: 71).

Another consequence of the conflict was that it brought deeper divisions within the Arab world in the second phase of the crisis, which took place in the January of 1976, with the dissolution of the Eastern Front, formed by Syria, where only Jordan remained the member, due to its sideline position and the lack of opportunities to choose from.

The initial position of the Arab states was to object any unilateral interference in the crisis and to prevent its spread into a broader Arab-Israeli confrontation, however, later the idea of the broader Arab role was accepted (including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who opposed it the most) in the absence of another solution. With this they showed once gain the pragmatism of their actions, and by the autumn of 1976 the countries recognized that they had to end the civil war in Lebanon and establish the solidarity among the Arabs to meet the challenge posed by the prospect of a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (ibid: 75). This materialized during the mini-summit in Riyadh (see Appendix 6) which was attended by Yasir Arafat, the president of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The decision taken at the summit was to end the inter-Arab quarreling for the sake of reestablishing solidarity and enabling the Arab states to play a constructive role in bringing the end to the civil strife in Lebanon. The Riyadh summit was followed by the summit of all the members of the Arab League in Cairo (see Appendix 7), which endorsed the resolutions of the Riyadh conference and set up a fund to support an Arab peacekeeping in Lebanon (ibid: 76). The Cairo summit resulted in the resumption of the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Syria coalition, which accounted for the period of outstanding inter-Arab coordination on the diplomatic effort toward Israel (Sela, 1998: 189). The countries represented the counterbalance to the radical states, and set on the promoting of the comprehensive approach (Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, establishment of a Palestinian state, and termination of the state of war with Israel), the goals to be achieved during the Geneva Conference with the participation of the PLO (ibid: 189).

However, the PLO by becoming a full partner in the civil war earned the stamp on its image as a national liberation movement and exposed it to inter-Arab conflicting pressures (Sela, 1998: 179). Such weakening of the prestige of the PLO left the mark on the Arab posture and the comprehensive approach, which later led to the Egyptian unilateral peace agreement with Israel which disregarded the Palestinian issue, and it became isolated from the Arab world political arena until the late 1980s.

Here it is notable that the Palestinian issue became to play an ambiguous role in the overall Arab-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, as has been mentioned above, the frontline states deviated from the Palestinian question and turned to the issues of the enhancement of their state authority, legitimacy, and economic development, which was a more realistic undertaking than the vague quest for the pan-Arab unity or the liberation of the historic Palestine (Miller, 1987: 5). On the other hand, the states

could not abandon the issue completely, since it was a means to preserve those essential aspects they had turned to.

Moreover, since the states now fought for the taking up of the leading positions in the region and maintaining the newly emerged balance-of-power, they needed the Palestinian issue as the means to that end. When Sadat concluded the agreement with Israel, Syria, for instance, dramatically increased the importance it attached to the Palestinian issue. It could not allow the resolution of the Palestinian problem based on a Jordanian option, where a Palestinian entity would fall under the influence of the Jordanian regime and hence under the Israelis, that would reduce its position in the Arab arena and increase its isolation (ibid: 41). This situation carried important implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the states' domestic and regional policies, and also severely limited the flexibility of those states interested in moving into a negotiated settlement with Israel (ibid: 5). This explains the severe reactions of the most of the Arab states on the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement signed in March 1979. The fear of betraying Palestinian interests by negotiating with Israel made it difficult for the regimes to depart from the Arab consensus. The Egyptian case was different because, according to Miller, Sadat's willingness "to go it alone" resulted from unique circumstances difficult for the Arab states to follow (Miller, 1987: 6).

The Palestinian issue was linked to the long-term stability of Jordan and Lebanon and intertwined with Syria's image and interests in the region that finding a solution compatible with these diverse pressures and interests was difficult (ibid: 7).

The most important point of that agreement was the exclusion of the Palestinians and the creation of the Palestinian state from the agreement, seen as the betrayal from the side of Egypt. Besides, the Camp David agreement ignored the thorny question of Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights (Beckerton, Klausner, 1998: 199).

If Jordan agreed to go into negotiations with Israel, it could have been used by the radical regimes to put the Palestinian demands to undercut King Hussein's position (Miller, 1987: 5).

Saudi Arabia, with the strong Islamic traditions in all the sphere of the country's life, could not have endorsed the agreement that did not mention the third holiest city after Mecca and Medina, that is Jerusalem (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 201). Syria, could not agree to any negotiations without mentioning the Golan Heights, and it feared the threat to its own security that grew since the country was rid of the military ally, Egypt, and it perceived the situation as the one that gave a free hand for Israel in case

of the armed conflict. The Egyptian peace with Israel was seen as the threat to the balance of power in the region and led to the alignment of the Arab states in order to maintain it. Such an alignment was detrimental for Egypt, since this and the peace agreement completely broke the state from the ideal of the Arab consensus, and left it isolated from the affairs of the Arab world. In the conference that followed the accords, in Baghdad, the nineteen members of the Arab League issued a communiqué outlining political and economic sanctions against Egypt (ibid: 201). The states broke diplomatic relations with Egypt, it was suspended form the twenty two-member Arab League, the Islamic Conference, and ousted from a number of financial and economic institutions as the Federation of Arab Banks and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (ibid: 202). Besides, the headquarters of the Arab League had been moved from Cairo to Tunis. Another consequence of the Camp David was that the Arab states increased their suspicion of Israel and the United States, and Israel in its turn hardened its attitudes toward the Arabs, that had negative implications on the further resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

4.3. Conflict Shift

With the disappearance of Egypt as a pivotal state in the regional Arab arena, and the events that took place by the beginning of the 1980s, the Arab core concern shifted to a bi-focal conflict system, as described by Sela (1998), with the boosted inter-Arab competition for the resources and relegating the conflict with Israel as secondary on the Arab agenda.

The crises that took place in the 1980s both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli, namely the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 shifted the attention of the Arab states to other priorities and served as an indication of their weaknesses and inability to react constructively to the events.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon aimed at eliminating of Palestinian presence and influence in the country, establishing the new political order there with the strengthening of the Maronite government, expulsion of Syrian troops, and destruction of Palestinian national resistance movement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, turned into a prolonged war, which had an impact on the Arab stances towards the conflict with Israel (Schultz, 1999: 65).

The war produced another shift in the Arab-Israeli conflict where the military option was nullified; it isolated Syria (which now became the major confrontation state in

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the conflict) in the Arab world, and intensified inter-Arab divisions and regional threats to domestic stability (Sela, 1998: 217). Due to its continuous threat of insecurity vis-à-vis Israel, Syria can be said to be the only state among the confrontational states, to be interested in the military clashes with Israel, however, it could not act alone in that direction, and mobilized the efforts towards making a coalition for support. This state became the major opponent of the peace process which was resumed as a result of the Iran-Iraq war that accumulated the Arab and international efforts, which remained the stalemate due to Syria's veto power (ibid: 218) (note 1).

The Arab paralysis on the account of the conflict with Israel and their relations to the PLO was demonstrated by the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982, and put to test the Arab states' commitment to the PLO as a political structure as well as to the region's order and stability (ibid: 247). As analyzed by Sela (1998), the war illustrated "the conditional nature of Arab support for its cause and the treats to its independence from jealous regimes such as Syria's."

Another significant outcome was that the war brought the realism in the states' policy-making, and realization of the necessity of the political and diplomatic means, and flexibility as a means of survival and tangible gains in the Arab-Israeli relations (ibid: 247). As considered by academics in the field, the situation produced by the war was the one similar to the post 1967 period, with the sense of despair, division, and political impotence.

The Arab states' inaction in defending the Palestinian contingent in Lebanon, and its subsequent refuge to other countries was accompanied by the mutual accusations, however, to no realistic and constructive option in dealing with the problems. This factor invested in the shift of the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and shift of the conflict with Israel for the Arab states to the second priority position.

The repercussions of the invasion can be seen in the increase of the Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, regardless of the fact that now the Palestinian leaders had to act from the territories with no direct borders with Israel (namely Tunisia, where Arafat, the leader of the PLO, found the refuge after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon) (Schultz, 1999: 69). The lack of border access to Israel effected the shifting of the PLO strategy towards a more diplomatic level. These two elements in the Palestinian cause, the rising nationalism and at the same time shift in

strategy, made it possible for the Palestinians to gain the international recognition, which together with the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement is seen as the precedent and the basic framework for the peace process that set on going in the beginning of the 1990s.

The distinctive feature of the period was that it was characterized by the appearance of a large number of the conflicts between the Arab states (the most prominent of them was that between Iraq and Iran). This and the changes within the internal realms of the countries (for instance Iran revolution) distracted the attention of the Arab states from dealing with the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, which invested into the appearance of the impasse in the conflict resolution. The conflicts which the region now faced were territorially based and indicated the desire for strategic influence rather than an attempt by a regime to increase its popularity by manufacturing or playing up an external grievance, as explained by Barnett (1998). Here the conflict within the Arab states started to be militarized and the disputes between the states derived from *realpolitik* impulses that can be attached to their growing statism, particularism, and fragmentation (ibid).

As has been noted earlier, the lack of unity, considered to be one of the most important factors in effective relations of the Arab states with Israel, complicated the affairs. Instead the region faced the growing sub-regionalization of relations with the emergence of the new sub-regional organizations, based both on the territorial proximity and economic factors, the issue high on the agenda of the states due to deteriorated economic situation as the result of the numerous conflicts and the fluctuations in the oil prices as another consequence, which negatively affected the countries. For instance, threatened by Iran's Shi'i revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to their national security, the Gulf monarchies established a separate sub-regional cooperation council of the Gulf monarchies (Sela, 1998: 218). The alignments, according to Sela, had been determined by proximity and a threat posed by Iran's Islamic revolution. Besides, as the states turned their attention now to the state interests the Arab League, all-Arab organization was not enough to accommodate those interests, away from the pan-Arab level (Barnett, 1998). This approach questioned the appropriateness of the Arab League, and the states dedicated a lot of attention to discussing on the more effective forums for expression of their localized identities and interests. Another result of such contemplations materialized in the creation of the Arab Cooperation Council in February 1989, formed by Iraq,

Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt (which returned into the Arab arena by the time, due to the Arab states' failure of the sanctions against it). Therefore, the states were engaged in the coordination of efforts and actions between these sub-regional organizations and between them and the Arab League, devoting less attention to the conflict with Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Even though the realignments of the Arab states gave much freer hand for the states in the international arena, the efforts to bring about another peace process did not bring much result. Despite the willingness of some states, namely Jordan, to return to the peace process, they lacked the support of the Arab states, and yet again showed their attachment to the Palestinian issue as a source of their political legitimacy.

Besides, the PLO continued to be manipulated by the states as a leverage to dominate the region and political decisions. In 1985 Jordan and PLO concluded "the dialogue" which was mutually advantageous, for the PLO as a means to regain its strategic position and return its headquarters to Jordan to control the West Bank, and for Jordan it was a chance to get closer ties with Washington through the PLO which had support of the latter, and get the lacking Arab political legitimacy or political backing among the Palestinians to represent their cause (Sela, 1998: 286).

The states still considered the "strategic parity" with Israel as their priority in any proposals for the settlement, and in the light of the rift between the "radical" and "moderate" states, they could not find the common solution acceptable to all the sides. Besides, their reactions to the proposed plans for resolution of the conflict, like Fahd Plan (see Appendix 8), presented by the king of Saudi Arabia, as a pragmatic move in order to secure the Western links, and preserve the national security, and the aim of reducing contradictions between the Arab obligations and links with Washington (Sela, 1998: 174). The states yet again could not come to the common stance concerning the acceptance of the initiative and showed once again their acceptance of Israel as a political entity in the region, however, still had been cautious as to not give up their say in the course of the matters. The plan was to substitute the UN Resolution 242 but seen by the Arabs as the concessionist, and giving the free hand for Israel in the future negotiations (ibid: 279). However, as considered by Sela, the very fact of presenting such plan and Arab consideration of it served as a proof that for the majority of the Arab states formal acceptance, or even a peace agreement with Israel, was in principle no longer anathema (ibid: 280). The Saudi plan was another step forward in the Arab's growing pragmatism toward Israel since 1967.

In the conference that followed in Fez, Morocco, the Arab states eventually came to a common position on the future actions concerning the conflict with Israel, where they assigned the pivotal role to the PLO, however made rather vague statements concerning the recognition of Israel. This made the US and Israel reject the plan, though from the Arab perspective, the plan was significant because it avoided the "use of the war terminology, or intransigent rhetoric, it was also non-transitional, departing from the strategy of phases" (ibid: 284). As Sela also adds, "the final statement refrained form using the traditional phrase of 'the Arab-Zionist conflict,' or its equivalent term, 'the Palestine problem,' which ignored the existence of Israel. Instead, the summit used the pragmatic term, 'the Arab-Israeli conflict,' ambiguously indicating acquiescence in Israel's legitimate existence" (ibid: 284). This kind of an attitude was also conditioned by the shortfall in oil prices and the eroded bargaining position of the states on the international arena. By this kind of statements the states aimed to earn the American consent in order to bring it to the mediating position.

The 1985 "dialogue" between the Palestinians and Jordan deviated slightly from the Fez Plan in that it would confine the peace effort to the Palestinian sector, rather than the comprehensive settlement, it mentioned the framework of a confederation with Jordan as the basis for Palestinian independence, and it provided no reservations regarding Arab commitment to peace and to the instruments of its implementation (ibid: 288). These points pointed to the growing importance of the PLO in the conflict with Israel, which was seen during the concluding of the Oslo accords in 1993, where Israeli leader negotiated directly with Arafat, the first such precedent in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

That the Palestinian issue was an important one and indispensable condition for any productive results in direction of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict proved itself during the summit that followed the "dialogue." It should be said that the efforts of different sides to the conflict to come to a common agreement came to no avail, for the states acted based on the considerations of their own advantages, which often went in disaccordance with the Palestinian interests, which undoubtedly invested into the impasse of the diplomatic efforts during the second half of the 1980s. Moderate and radical states alike tried to use the Palestinian question and the matter of the latter's statehood to extract concessions for them and gain more power over the entity to exercise the regional power. Even though the Amman Accord (i.e. "dialogue") became the basis for diplomatic contacts between Jordan, the PLO, and the United

States, it was underlined by the abstention of such important state as Syria to participate in it, and the proposed international conference. In general, the actions of the Arab states at the time only showed their reluctance to deal with the issue of Palestinian statehood firsthand, the fact which is considered by the scholars to have had the impact on the eruption of the Palestinian resistant movement Intifada (*uprising, or "shaking off"*). The political deadlock that arouse in the region, like in the 1960s, invested in the deterioration of the internal situations within countries, and in the occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza. "The Palestinian society in the occupied territories was in the process of taking a growing role in national affairs at a time of political eclipse of the PLO...and the more the Arab world seemed divided and unable to threaten Israel's national security, the more vulnerable its domestic front seemed to its socio-political core" (Sela, 1998: 294).

The war in Lebanon, the massacres in the refugee camps of Shatila and Sabra during the war, pointed to the inaction of the Arab states. These factors also contributed to the Intifada. After evacuation from Beirut of the PLO the Arab states showed their unwillingness to accept it, and the organization faced further isolation which on the other hand allowed it to become the forefront actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The trend of Arab states' downgrading of the conflict with Israel as the second priority and the political deadlock in the peace process can be said to characterize the dynamics of Arab positions. This trend was well seen during the Amman summit conference where the Palestinian issue was relegated to the lowest point.

The general agreement in the literature is the one that the Arab states showed little response to the Intifada and produced minor help to the movement, both financial and political (Sela, 1998; Bickerton, Klausner, 1999; Rubbi, 2001): "The regimes' official responses were slow and indecisive, attesting to the dilemma with which this unprecedented phenomenon of organized civil disobedience confronted them" (Sela, 1998: 305). For the majority of the frontline states the major concern of the Intifada was to save their countries from the spill over into their own constituencies. With this phenomenon the states tried to maximize their individual benefits from it, both domestically and regionally. Sela makes an example of how the states used the media and public relations campaigns to show the rhetorical nature of their support. "Syria and Jordan conducted an intensive media and public relations campaign in support of the uprising, to improve their credibility and balance their strict measures to suppress spontaneous public manifestations of support for the Intifada. In Lebanon, the Amal's

[Lebanese president, successor of Gemayel] three-year siege of Palestinian refugee camps was lifted, apparently by Asad's directive" (ibid).

The Intifada also influenced the more cautious Arab responses in the context of the conflict, and even though the states still had their ambitious plans towards shaping the regional order many of them had to take into consideration the Palestinian factor. For instance, in 1988 the American Secretary of State Schultz, issued a plan for future negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however it never received enthusiastic acceptance, since it lacked such explicit points as Palestinian self-determination, the creation of the independent Palestinian state, and the acceptance of the PLO as the subject of negotiations (Rubbi, 2001: 219). Jordan and Egypt expressed little concern toward the plan, like this trying to show their solidarity with the Palestinian cause and their attachment to it. However, the Schultz plan had its significance in that it became the platform for the Madrid international peace conference of 1991, indicating the changes that the regional parties' stances underwent following the Gulf war of 1991 (Sela, 1998: 307). The fact that the states expressed their concern for the Palestinian question can be explained by the raised position of PLO and Araft on the international arena, which could allow them to promote their own interests through PLO. For instance, Syria sought close coordination with the PLO because it could put Syria in a better regional position and in view of the American peace initiative, whose possible result in a separate Israeli-Palestinian agreement would effectively diminish Syria's chances of ever retrieving the Golan (Sela, 1998: 308). Syria represents an example of the state, which never gave up its "Greater Syria" ambitions, and sought the solution to the conflict based on the comprehensive approach, so that to promote its own interests and not let Israel gain the more advantageous position which would rid Syria of the ability to recover its territory.

The Arab stances during this phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict reflected the major realism assumptions that point to the selfish, self-centered and competitive nature of states' behavior. The provision of the state security and maintenance of state's integrity and clear boundaries were the key concerns of the Arab states. They determined their behavior based on their relative economic and military capabilities, hence the subsequent decisions for actions. Another such example was Jordan's decision to give up the claims for the West Bank. This decision was made known during the Algiers summit in 1988, dubbed as "the Intifada summit" to indicate its goals to provide support for the Palestinian uprising. With his decision, King Hussein

managed to refute the PLO's claim to represent the Palestinians in the East Bank, and to insulate it from the winds of the Intifada (ibid: 310). The major result of this decision, however, is considered to be elated to the question of the state-formation. According to Sela, the disengagement from the West Bank signaled the "Jordanization" of the Hashemite Kingdom and its consolidation as a sovereign nation-state based on real boundaries and political control (ibid: 310).

The major outcome of the extraordinary summit in Algiers reaffirmed the role of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in any negotiations and pledged its financial and diplomatic support for the Intifada (Shlaim, 2004: 458). The summit is viewed as an indication of the turning point of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the eventual nullification of the military option not only from the side of the Arab states but also by the PLO, where the Palestinian National Council, which had its conference during the same year as the summit in Algiers, officially condemned and rejected terrorism in all its forms (Bickerton, Klausner, 1999: 234). Moreover, the Council determined the independence of Palestinian decision-making vis-à-vis the Arab regimes.

The years of 1988-1990 did not bring much positive results in the direction of the Arab-Israeli peace, though these years served as the prelude to the peace process that opened in 1991.

The years faced a lot of problems and issues on the agenda, many of which had been of an "Arab-Arab" conflict nature. The quest for regional order, dealing with the crises in Lebanon (which faced another civil war by the end of 1980s), Iran-Iraq war, the Palestinian uprising urged the states to convene numerous conferences; but the distinctive and typical feature of these summits was inability of the states to come to common terms and positions, due to the divergent interests both internal and intra-regional with the economic factors also coming to play an important role. The significant feature of these summits was also to reassert and legitimate core actors' alignments and interests, and in this context the Arab-Israeli conflict declined in its importance for the Arab states (except Syria, who throughout the years had as one of its aims to bring back the attention of other states, both frontline states and "sideline states" like Iran and Iraq, to the conflict in order to gain its support in its fight with Israel. Perhaps, Syria can be said the only state that never completely ruled out the military option, despite its official statements towards readiness for the finding the solution to the rivalries with Israel). After the Intifada and the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait the realization of the necessity of a more active diplomatic process came to all the sides of the conflict, and it set in motion the process, which characterized the 1990s until the outbreak of the second Intifada (or Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000.

The new circumstances in the world and in the region marked the new period in Arab-Israeli relations that brought the Israeli official peace with Jordan and lay down the foundations for the independent Palestinian state.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left the only Superpower having its influence in the region. The Superpower rivalry of the Cold War had enabled the Arab states by aligning themselves with the Soviet Union to arm themselves and maintain their opposition to Israel. With the disappearance of the traditional Arab ally, the balance of power in the region changed, accompanied also by the large influx (over 1 million people) of the Soviet Jews; this was perceived as a threat by the Arab states, and especially by the Palestinian Arabs. This led to the reassessment by the Arab states of their relations with the West, and namely with the United States, which came to the fore during the American-led coalition in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis.

The crisis changed the situation in the region. It again reasserted the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its link to the regional politics. Moreover, it showed still present division within the inter-Arab ranks, and the Arab economic and strategic considerations as central factors in their policy-making vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Gulf families felt threatened by Iraq, and supported the Western-led coalition against the latter. King Hussein found himself, as in many previous situations torn between the sides, but eventually joined Saddam, for first he depended financially on Iraq, and second factor was that the Palestinian population in Jordan supported Saddam Hussein (it accounted for 60 per cent of his population) (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 250).

The distinctive feature of the course of the Gulf crisis was that for the first time in the annals of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab states found themselves on the same side of coalition with Israel. The crisis led to the split in the Arab world into those who supported Saddam, and those who opposed him (Schultz, 1999: 82). Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco, Oman, and the United Arabian Emirates supported the US-led coalition to oppose Saddam. Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Jordan and the PLO appeared on the other side (ibid: 83). The reason for Arabs' joining into coalition was that they wanted to reverse the Iraqi aggression, to restore the political status quo and contain Iraq (Shlaim, 2004: 474).

The fact that the Palestinians joined the anti-US-led coalition is explained by the Arab states' inability and reluctance to address the issue of the Palestinian statehood. Hence, the Palestinians turned to the new "protector" of the Palestinian cause, Saddam Hussein, who during the Iraqi Revolutionary Council linked the invasion of Kuwait to the Palestinian question. Hussein suggested, that "Israel withdraw from the occupied territories in Palestine immediately and unconditionally, along with Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and Iranian withdrawal from areas of Iraq. Only then would Iraq be willing to discuss the situation in Kuwait" (ibid: 83).

The link between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf crisis is seen as a byproduct of the ideologically driven difficulties shared by central Arab participants in the international anti-Iraq coalition (Sela, 1998: 302), and also the Palestinian's contrasting the West's prompt action (that is launching the Operation Desert Storm) over Kuwait with twenty-five years' inaction over the occupied territories (Schultz, 1999: 83).

However, in many analyses of the Gulf Crisis and its results, it is considered that Saddam Hussein failed to achieve the "linkage" between the two conflicts-Arab-Israeli and in the Gulf-for one consequence was the increased brutality of Israeli actions, and its new approach which ignored American, Arab and international opinion (Shlaim, 2004; Schultz, 1999).

As considered by the analysts, the Gulf Crisis did not bring significant change in the way of Arab thinking toward the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, it changed the balance-of-power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel and Syria were relatively strengthened, while Jordan and the PLO weakened, and the need for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict was an indispensable part of inter-Arab negotiations. During the summit in Baghdad, following the crisis, the states expressed the realistic pragmatism. Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, who succeeded Anwar Sadat after his assassination in 1981, "urged his colleagues to recognize the changes of the global order and called for cooperation, not confrontation, with the international community, and suggested that the Middle East be made a zone free of weapons of mass destruction" (Sela, 1998: 325).

Since the end of the October 1973 war till the culmination of the Gulf crisis, the Arab states' actions were based on realistic considerations and the primacy of the state sovereignty over supra-national ideologies. The alignments in the latter crisis and the

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crises that shaped the region throughout the years were based on realistic considerations, which in its eventuality led the states to realize that the state of confrontation with Israel and the international world and particularly with the West damaged their own interests. Even though the states did not openly and unequivocally declare their genuine readiness to accept the legitimate right for Israel's existence, with the process that started in the 1990s the state accepted the reality of political and economic life side by side with the Jewish state, even if out of mere pragmatic considerations.

Chapter 5.
Political Pragmatism: From Madrid Conference to the Second Intifada

The new decade of the 1990s represented the "new phase" in the Arab-Israeli conflict development. In the light of the circumstances that arouse in the arena of international relations and in the Middle East region, there appeared real and inevitable preconditions for the sides of the conflict to take up constructive efforts towards the long-needed settlement.

In the Arab perspective, the states now turned their policy-making into one that was based on well-calculated materialist considerations and away from the "zero-sum" approach and the belief that the gain of one party to a conflict automatically translates into the loss of the other party thus making compromise difficult (Schultz, 1999: 136). This was also prompted by the disappearance of such an option from the world scene in general with the vanishing Superpower rivalry. This aspect represents an important factor in the states' positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict and needs elaboration in order to understand the shift in the Arab states' stances. Besides the inter-regional fights for the domination of the region and the quest to gain the overweighting part in the power balances in the area, many analysts attribute this to the reflection of the bi-polar world system, where the combination of forces in the Middle East often represented attachment to one of the rivaling sides, mostly depending financially on one of them. As Gad Barzilai and Gideon Doron in their article explain, in an attempt to connect the two conflicts and their relation, "regional instability in the Middle East was a function of the structural relationship between each superpower and the members of its regional coalition. When members of one coalition were in dispute with members of the other, the potential for the conflict increased greatly, because the communication between the antagonists from different coalitions was mostly indirect." According to the authors, due to the separate agendas of the superpower parties, local disputes tended to be increased rather than suppressed. Like this, when the superpowers had been satisfied with the outcomes on the battlefield they were slow to intervene; or move the members of "their coalition"

in the direction preferable for them and thus having the influence on the outcome. In most cases, the Superpowers encouraged the regional actors economically, hence directing the latter's actions. With the disappearance of the Cold War rivalry and the strategic interest in the region not as high on the agenda, the sole influence of the United States on the direction of the Arab-Israeli conflict invested in the rethinking of choices between "war and peace" of the Arab states.

The Arab countries acquired new hope for addressing their structural economic problems, caused by the war in the Gulf, and in identifying a broker for promoting a negotiating peace with Israel (Barzilai, Doron, 1994). However as is noted, the aftermath of the Gulf War did not change much the internal political setting of the regional players. The rules and traditional modes of relation between the rulers and the ruled remained similar to those existing before the war, but the change occurred rather in the form of the transition from Arab dependency on two rival powers to dependency on a sole superpower with a demonstrated global reach (ibid). This was one of the factors that made the states consider participation in the international peace conference held in Madrid, in October 1991, which was eventually accepted by the Arab states as it presented the opportunity for the realization of their preferable approach to the conflict, that is, in the comprehensive manner. The acceptance of the conference is attributed to the perception of different parties of the conflict, and particularly the Arab states, of the United States as an honest broker, which, according to Barzilai and Doron, could not have happened in the earlier Cold War structure of polarization, when the Arab countries and Israel were subordinated to the status of proxies for the rival superpowers (ibid).

Even though the Madrid conference did not bring much result in the accommodation of the conflict, it indicated the readiness and the need of the Arab states for normalization of relations with Israel. It also pointed to the shift of the conflict away form ideology-based (even though declined already in the preceding years, but still arising at some points in time), to the economy-based, with the states' realization of the need to be integrated to the spreading globalization and modernization of the international economic affairs, without abandoning, however, of the concept of "regional Arab order" (Sela, 1998: 332). The absence of the ideological factor and the total shift to the sovereign state, individual interests was reflected by the absence of the typical for the Arab decision-making practice of the summit meetings (indicative here is the fact that the Arab summits did not take place since the beginning of the

1990s till 1996, the period of "active" peace process, only the summits dedicated to the economic issues) where the states hammered the collective decision toward Israel (ibid: 336). That Syria and Lebanon failed to create a collective decision-making forum particularly under Syrian supervision and inability by the latter to exercise its veto power in order to prevent the bi-lateral agreements, before the Madrid conference, attested to the obsolescence of the concept of collective Arab action in the Madrid peace process (ibid: 336).

The incompatibility of interests and mutual suspicion between the states, especially in the light of the nature of the coalitions during the Gulf War, allowed for the states to turn to individual actions and advance their long-waited goals, and for some states (Jordan) to conclude the official peace agreement with Israel, or establish the frameworks for future relations based on non-violence and low-level diplomatic relations. The situation also made it possible for the states to disregard the other Arab states' opinion, previously at place based on the fear of being excluded, which the states could not have afforded due to internal non-stable political and economic situations. Now the states saw new opportunities in cooperation with Israel and availability of the American aid.

The principles on which the states agreed to base the regional order were reflected in the Damascus Declaration issued in March 1991, where it stated that the states "adhered to the principles of international legitimacy, particularly those relating to respecting states' sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and settling conflict through peaceful means" (ibid: 332). This declaration officially was the proof of the fact that the Arab states officially declared to accept the legitimacy of the State of Israel pointing to the possibility of peace agreement. It also pointed to the pragmatism of the state's thinking for the Declaration mentioned financial aid for Syria and Egypt (which now became the nucleolus of the peacekeeping force in the Gulf region) for their efforts. This position also aimed at the American support, like this gaining for the states additional financial assistance as an encouragement for the participation in the international conference, and advancing the peace efforts that followed. For example, when Jordan and Israel worked toward the signing of the peace agreement, congressional leaders agreed to speed up the relief of the approximately $700 million Jordanian debt by up to $220 million, with future relief dependent on progress toward a final peace agreement, support for the Arab economic boycott, and full compliance with international sanctions against Iraq

(Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 286). Moreover, this reflected the opportunism which the Arab states expressed in order to achieve their old claims. The window of opportunity, as noted by Schultz, is considered an important condition in the search for a lasting peace and stability, and many of the states managed not to miss it and to use it to their own advantage. In this context, Jordan can be said to have achieved its century long desire to conclude the peace treaty with Israel, which the two countries signed on October 26, 1994. That was a pragmatic move of King Hussein who was determined to be a player in the peace process and to consolidate and protect his own interests in the wake of the accord between the PLO and Israel, without waiting for similar progress in Israel's dealing with Syria and other Arab countries. Besides, he was eager for American assistance in rebuilding the Jordanian economy devastated after the war in the Gulf (ibid: 285). By rapprochement with Israel, Jordanian King also made an attempt to raise his position after his participation in the coalition opposing the Israeli-led force against Saddam Hussein, which left the negative stamp on the state's image. This shift in Jordanian foreign policy is explained by the coming of the new government in the country after the elections held in November 1993, the first multiparty election since 1957 (Shlaim, 2004: 539). The election resulted in the government without the Islamic representatives, whose main platform was an opposition to the peace talks with Israel; and the strengthened conservative, tribal, and independent blocs (ibid: 539). Jordan's interest was motivated by practical reasons, both economic and political. Moreover, the regime faced the huge waves of Palestinian immigrants from the Gulf, as the result of their exclusion after the support of Saddam in the Gulf war (Sela, 1998: 335). According to Sela, the shift in the King's policy also represented the regime's traditional alliance with the West and its persistent effort since 1967 to advance a diplomatic settlement of the conflict with Israel.

The agreement was induced by other factors, which relates to the conclusion by the PLO and Israel of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 (see Appendix 9), which was the result of the secret diplomacy between the representatives of the PLO and the Israeli government and the breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian relations, which had been perceived by Jordan and Syria as the undermining of their own influence on the PLO and on the general going of the Arab-Israeli conflict (though the Syrian position did not appear as conciliatory as that of Jordan, due to the still present ambitions to dominate the region and have the last say in the final negotiations, and

unlike Jordan, this state had serious territorial claims). These accords are considered to be the historical opportunity for the sides of the conflict in coming to the final solution of their century-long rivalry.

From the Arab perspective, the accord was perceived with the mixed reactions. Obviously enough, the accord was met with criticism by Syria, though it did not condemn it. The Syrians criticized the PLO for recognizing Israel, for making a separate agreement and far-reaching concessions (Sela, 1998: 337). But the significant outcome was that Syria appeared to have lost its strong influence on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, proved by the fact that it abstained to use force against Palestinian targets in Lebanon (ibid: 337).

 The most important impact of the accord, however, was that it broke the taboo of the Israeli-Palestinian relations, which served as an important landmark along the road to Arab recognition of Israel and the normalization of relations with it (Shlaim, 2004: 520). Since the conflict now was based on the Palestinian dimension as its core, the Arab states needed to rethink their relation to the entity and the State of Israel facing the enhanced ability of the Palestinians to promote their rights and cause on their own.

No less role was played by Egypt, who was the first state to recognize Israel, and it had experienced precedent for such breakthrough. For Egypt any advancement of an Arab-Israeli settlement was seen as reinforcement of its legitimacy and leadership in the Arab world, and the reward economically by the United States (Sela, 1998: 333). Another state that also played the decisive role in changing of the radical states' attitude to the conflict and the means for its resolution was Saudi Arabia, who became close in relations with the United States after the Gulf War, following its particular interests (ibid: 334), that is another indication of consolidation of the "state-first" approaches of the states.

The Oslo Accords, Jordanian-Israeli peace, and the development of Israeli relations with the other countries in the Middle East put Syria to the sidelines and the incompatible position with its leader's Hafez al-Asad career to place Syria at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He managed to gain such role for his country by the beginning of the 1990s, which had been made possible by Syria's military capabilities, which made this economically and politically weak country into a regional power (Schultz, 1999: 88). Therefore Asad had been reluctant to engage in any substantive peace negotiations with Israel, in order not to lose the position.

In the theory of conflict resolution, the mention of 'fear' factor is made, which points to the halting aspect towards any conflict or dispute resolution. This and also still present ideological factor can be applied in explaining Syria's reluctant negotiating strategy. In this context, the fear is related to the Syrian fear of marginalization (ibid: 89), and the centrality of position it took in the region. The figure of Hafez al-Asad and his strategic thinking played important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He called for the Arab strife to master sufficient deterrent power to hold Israel in check (Shlaim, 2004: 531). Failing that, they would have no choice but to submit to its dictates. He saw the only possibility in maintaining of "strategic parity" with Israel (his main concept) in the comprehensive settlement, which would stop the "Israeli encroachment and prevent Israel form picking off the weaker Arab parties one by one" (ibid: 531).

Thus he insisted on the Israeli undertaking to return the Golan Heights first and foremost before any guarantees for peace agreement, and based his formula on the principle of "full withdrawal for full peace" (that is the Israeli withdrawal to the armistice lines of 4 June 1967, and the solution based on UN resolutions). The only reason for expressed concessions was the economic factor as the aim of extracting the American aid. Besides strong territorial reservations, the Syrians were afraid to expose their economy and nascent industries to Israeli penetration when their per capita income was $900 per annum while that of the Israelis was $15000 per annum (ibid: 535), and this is in the light of the Syrian much higher prevalence in the population.

Syrian categorical stance made it impossible for Lebanon to stand on the road to peace negotiations with Lebanon, for the former had strong presence and influence in the country.

Syria was able to use its leverage in the South Lebanon where the activities of extremist Hizbullah was of concern for both Syria and Israel, and both countries were able to use the destabilized situation in the area for their own political reasons (Schultz, 1999: 89). As is explained by Schultz (1999), Lebanon could benefit greatly from peace in the region, for since the end of the 15-year civil war, Beirut has been slowly re-emerging as a financial and business center. Normalization of relations with Israel would position Lebanon at the heart of the Middle Eastern banking, business, service and computing sectors, along with Israel and Jordan (ibid: 89). In the literature, this country is referred to as the "Switzerland of the Middle East" due to its

position and inherent "neutrality" politics. But such prospect for the country was bound to non-realization given the Syrian factor with its ambitious "greater Syria" rhetoric and obsession with the security considerations, and Lebanon considered as indispensable part of it.

The way in which the Arab states acted in response to the peace process that started in the first half of the 1990s can be explained as the strategic and pragmatic choice rather than genuine readiness to accept Israel as equal partner and legitimate actor in the regional world order that the states constantly set on trying to construct and define. Rather than genuinely facilitate the Palestinian cause the Arab states turned into direction of extracting the advantageous deals for themselves, keeping the issue of the Palestinian state on a highly nominal level, and as the leverage to be eligible to any financial deals that related to the conflict.

In the midst of the peace process deterioration during the mid-1990s, after the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and coming to power of the hard-liner Netanyahu much opposed to the Oslo Accords, the states did not change much in the essence of their stances, remaining determined to their previous official statements concerning the conflict. The states expressed their grievances and disapproval towards the Netanyahu government policies (note 2) describing them as "destroying the foundation for peace" (Damascus newspaper, quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 572); or as Saudi-owned newspaper Al-Hayat said: "his [Netanyahu] program was a recipe for wrecking the peace process" (ibid). The reactions of the Arab states were expressed in the first highly-attended summit of the Arab League since the 1990, where the Arab states aimed at restoring the Arab cohesion and sending the message to Israel that the peace process would be halted and there would be no normalization of relations until Israel reverted to the principle of land for peace (ibid: 573). Whereas they made the sharp statements, this summit did not conclude in any novelty of the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and once again proved the fact that they would not change their positions unless Israel withdraws from the territories and the question of the Palestinian statehood be addressed in a constructive way. The final communiqué of the summit stated that the heads of states reiterated that a just and comprehensive peace remained their strategic choice (ibid), and proving their political pragmatism. The states did not make any statements concerning their probable actions in case of Israeli non-compliance, like this taking the "wait-and-see" position vis-à-vis Israel, that has been the characteristic feature of the Arab states

standing in the conflict up until the 2000 (the time of the second Intifada, aggravated by the impasse in the peace process and provocative action of Ariel Sharon (note 3) when the states issued another joint statement on their positions, however not depicting many crucial changes.

The second half of the 1990s, was characterized by another regional debate, the feature that can be said as typical for the Arab policy-making to take up when the impasse in relation with Israel, or turning point in the conflict took place.

The Middle Eastern countries faced the rising threats of the radical regimes, which started to attract growing attention in the light of their growing significance and spread. In the economic field the trend was of growing dependency of the Arab states on food imports, hence on foreign aid, leading to national debt. In 1996 the new Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres mentioned the concept of the "New Middle East", which was aimed at the new order of economic relations in the region and rethinking of the regional order in general. The Arab states, though expressing cautious reactions out of fear of the possible Israeli domination now not only military but also economic, set on the debate too. The two summits were held in Casablanca and Amman, where the debate revealed the strong need for the revival of the Arab regional system based on cooperation and mutual interests of security and economic development (Sela, 1998: 339). With this approach the Israeli idea of "Mideasternism" was perceived along the dividing lines among the Arab states. Syria, fateful to its hard-line stance, saw the new rhetoric as a "cloak for Israel's ambition to dominate the Levant (note 4).

 The Egyptians suspected that Israel wanted to take over their traditional role of principal leadership in the Middle East" (Shlaim, 2004: 553). This debate pointed to the fact that the Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted from the core military confrontation to the economic one, and the resolution or possible settlement included not only the security issues but also the strategic economic relations. The shift represents the traditional divide in the inter-Arab politics. The opposition groups tended to highlight the danger to Arab and Islamic identity in the region that the peace process with Israel entailed (Sela, 1998: 340). On the official level, Israel's acceptance served as an incentive for those Arab states interested in weakening the burden of collective Arab instruments and commitments and fully exercise their sovereignty. The conservative line of thought, both in inter-Arab area and intra-Arab realm, expressed the cautiousness in that the Arab regimes aimed at establishing the

economic and diplomatic relations with Israel in disregard of crucial unresolved Arab-Israeli issues (ibid: 339).

The debate took the Arab attention to the Palestinian question away from the center of their concern. Since the signature of the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the official Arab backing of Arafat and the principle of land for peace and the Palestinian state, the level of actual support for the Palestinian Authority had been remarkably low. The Arab states showed little effort in aiding the Palestinian Authority to overcome the deadlocks in the Palestinian negotiations with Israel, and toughened Israeli negotiating position (Rubin, 1998). The non-compatibility of Arab action and rhetoric on the Palestinian question mentioned by Miller (1986) is clearly visible in these points.

As considered by many analysts, even though the Arab states declared their support for the Palestinian state, and maintained the readiness for the peaceful coexistence with the State of Israel, the lack of real actions could not bring substantial results in the positive development. This lack of action is expressed in both real attempts of the Arab states to work out the comprehensive and structural working principles to negotiate with Israel on the issues of concern for their own countries; and the lack of "normal" material support for the Palestinian Authority to promote the Palestinian nation-state. Such help could strengthen Arafat's bargaining positions and ameliorate tenuous living conditions in the PA territory and consolidate Arafat's rule, necessary to oppose the radical fractions in the Palestinian territories, often operating with the support of the radical Arab states, aimed at halting the peace process.

In general view, the Arab states in the 1990s (except Syria and Iraq) did not pursue aggressive political policies against Israel. Rubin points to this trend by mentioning the Arab League resolutions concerning the conflict, and says that the "unstated goals of [Arab] states vis-à-vis Israel were more moderate and pragmatic in historical terms than ever before: that is, Israel could not realistically be destroyed, it should be compelled to accept a compromise peace" (Rubin, 1998).

The dire situation in the Palestinian territories, lack of political strength and support internally and externally, and the deterioration of the progress in negotiations with Israel led to the eruption of Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, that again brought the Palestinian issue to the core of the Arab concern, however, unlike the Intifada of 1987 it did not bring the crucial turning points in the developments of the conflict or the radical shifts in the stances of the Arab states. The Arab response was expressed in

the Emergency Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in 2000, the final statement of which ruled out any military solution to the conflict and emphasized the need for peaceful resolution of the conflict, and the reiteration that the Arab leaders committed to a "just and comprehensive peace" based on UN resolutions. The Arab response to Intifada was rather passive and brought the issue of public opinion to be an important part in defining the Arab positions towards the conflict. This aspect showed the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the internal situations and the viabilities of Arab regimes. In the light of the public dissatisfaction with Israeli policies and passivity of their leaders in response to the Palestinian failures, the leaders had to adopt to these circumstances, in trying to balance between the official accepting the possibility of making peace with Israel, and domestically giving the statements that condemned that state and promising to undertake the concrete action against Israel; the latter option, however, is denied by many policy-makers and analysts as unpractical and unlikely to end in a realistic outcome.

In 2001, the ruler of Saudi Arabia Prince Abdullah proposed a peace initiative, which suggested the "full normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel, in return for full withdrawal to Israel's June 4, 1967 borders" (Aluff Benn, 2002). The initiative was accepted by most of the Arab states and made the ground for the "Arab Peace Initiative" which clearly stated the states readiness for accepting the state of Israel as a legitimate actor and partner in the region and proved the final stance of the Arab states on the comprehensive "peace for land" principle as the precondition. The Arab Peace Initiative was adopted at Beirut Summit in 2002, based on Saudi Plan, reflected the shift of the Arab position from "normalization" of relations to "peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region" (see Appendix 10). There are deliberations in the discussions on the summit concerning whether the states sincerely adopted the position based on the "sincere" Saudi proposal, or they just needed to raise their image on the world arena. The initiative is considered to be highly unacceptable by Israel (and it did not accept it) and the fact that the Arab states accepted it is related firstly to the fact that they had no other option at the time, and secondly, in order to diminish Israel's posture as trying to present it as uninterested in peace. Irregardless of the real reason, of interest is the official public recognition of Israel by most of the Arab states, and even the radicals including Syria.

If one thinks in terms of scales with ideology on one side and pragmatism on the other, the Arab states stances definitely scaled down to the latter's side. Away from the collective rhetoric of resistance of the State of Israel the states now acted based on the intra-state political context, with the highly improbable military option which confronts the principles of global economy impossible for disregarding by the Arab states. Even though it is difficult to characterize the relations between the Arab states and the State of Israel by the end of the century as normal and mutually-productive, the positive dynamics since the end of the war of 1967 is definitely present, and the future development depends a lot on the commitments of the both parties to work out solutions, and follow the stated principles.

The "extremists" factor came as has been mentioned to play crucial role in the Arab-Israeli relations, which the states are confronted with and cannot disregard in forming their official positions.

From the 1990s perspective, the Arab states had come to recognizing that Israel was there to stay and moved to peace, even though reluctantly in many cases (Morris, 1999: 667). Even though many Arabs might be oriented on the destruction of Israel, but there were no realistic options for such outcome (ibid: 667).

Chapter 6.
Conclusions

The Middle Eastern past century history witnessed complex, multi-vectoral Arab-Israeli relations characterized by mutual hostility, worrisome attitudes, and attempts to come to terms with each other, which have been both successful and doubtful. The Arab states' attitudes, of interest in this writing, are reflected in active dynamics of their stances vis-à-vis Israel, which culminated in the termination of the "classical" rejection of the latter and taking up of the "wait-and-see" non-military position.

As is seen in the historical development of their standpoints in the Arab-Israeli conflict this dynamics was influenced by various factors inherent in no little degree in the inter-Arab relations and politics. From the 1950s and early 1960s ideological rigidity and symbolism, the states transformed their thinking into one based on realist accounts of circumstances, pragmatic development of means of reaching their state interests that appeared to be the paramount concern of the state regimes, and return to the Westphalian regional order, with the prevalence of state sovereignty, and the principle of *raison de la nation*.

The analysis of the Arab-Israeli relations showed strong connection of two processes taking place in the region and their mutual influence and dependence. These processes represent the historical development of states and the rivalry with the State of Israel. This very connection was the force that mobilized these processes.

In the first half of the 19th century the states of the Fertile Crescent had been engaged into definition of their meaning as state entities and attempts to understand their role as regional players. Such efforts had been built on the symbolic meaning of events interpreted within the habitual Arab-Muslim society's tradition, hence the conflict with Israel and precisely Palestinian conflict constituted the centripetal role in Arab discourses. The symbolic meaning of the conflict with Israel served the Arab rulers as

a means to lend credence to the regional status quo and legitimize traditional attitudes on question of Arab normative significance.

The Palestinian cause thus was seen and presented by the Arab regimes as the point of common concern and the unifying force within the pan-Arab rhetoric. Regional Arab politics represented a constant tension between the status quo order and claims for its revision, often serving an egoistic quest for recognition and power (Sela, 1998: 342).

In this environment the Palestine conflict became the most powerful rallying issue in regional Arab politics, which attracted the growing involvement of Arab politics both in the context of state-society conflict and inter-Arab competition for regional leadership (ibid: 342). This conflict served as a theme for revolutionary slogans during the pan-Arab Nasserist era of the 1950s and early 1960s, and was used in ideological campaigns.

The PLO served the Arab states as factor that contained the nationalist criticism and legitimized Arab states' diplomatic efforts to recover their own territories (ibid: 345). The territories had been given the highest priority by the states and institutionalization of the PLO and making of the Palestinian cause a necessary demand in any negotiations was a strategic move of the Arab states in gaining of their interests.

Starting from the late 1970s the Arab support of the Palestinian cause became rather declarative, and connected to the states' fear of its uprising spillover to their countries with this damaging their ruling elites' authority and political stability in countries. This trend is seen in limited financial support for the Palestinians and low action in promoting the independent Palestinian state, provided only verbally and on the rhetorical level.

The period under concern of this dissertation- 1967 till the end of the 1990s- reflects clearly the dynamics of the positions taken by the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These dynamics can be characterized as going in the positive direction in the frontline states development of readiness to accept the legitimacy of the State of Israel and hence the settlement of the conflict. This readiness is manifested by the actual attempts of the states to work out the workable solutions even under the constraint of the elements unacceptable by either of the parties, and by the changed nature of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, that is from the armed confrontation to "pragmatic peace." Here the peace cannot be characterized by the essential meaning

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of the word but it allows for the probable perspective of future cooperation of the Arab states and Israel in that direction.

The present situation presents with the fact that the conflict acquired the circular nature, meaning that the possible resolution of it would be the one proposed in 1947 UN Resolution aimed at the partition of Western Palestine to be shared for establishing of the Jewish and Palestinian states (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 317). The difference is that back in the early years of the conflict the Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab states rejected this decision, and having gone through the complex periods of time, and having reiterated many of the other options, in the 21st century this remains the most viable and realistic decision, accepted by Arab counterparts.

The periods of time described here reflect the factors influencing the dynamics of Arab perception of Israel, which had been formulated and had resulted in what they are now under the flow of events accompanying those periods.

From vehement rejection of Israel by the Arab states after 1967 war and ideological rigidity present in their attitudes, the latter transformed in to the more realistic and "sober" treatment of the Jewish neighbor, which eventually concluded in the pragmatic vision based on the questions of economy and national interests implying the degree of flexibility by the states in order to reach the positive outcomes in those directions.

This direction in the change of the Arab states' positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict is strongly connected to the matter of the search for the regional order by the Arab states and the bases for mutual relations. From the attachment to the common cause exercised on the platform of the Arab League summits, which played a crucial role in formulation by the states of their positions toward Israel, the states developed the sub-regional systems of decision-making. This feature coincides with the states' lessening of the degree of attention paid to the Arab-Israeli conflict, hence indicating the taking of the less confrontationist stance vis-à-vis Israel.

The Arab summits served as the decision-making forum for the states, the basis for choosing between sovereign or collective actions in regard to the conflict with Israel, and as effective diminishing factor for prospects of a total Arab war against Israel (Sela, 1998: 344).

Even though this institute did not cease its existence, with time it started to represent rather a mechanism for legitimating the diplomatic process started in the mid-1970s

and which reached its pick in the mid-1990s. This is explained by the growing control of the domestic political arena by the states, and the decline of the impact of supra-state symbols on Arab societal behavior (ibid: 343). The consequence of this change in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict is that the states enhanced autonomous foreign policies vis-à-vis the State of Israel, which resulted in the "routinization" of the conflict (ibid: 343) and opening of the channels for political process that led to the peace agreements of some of the Arab states with Israel (Egypt and Jordan up to day) and establishing of low-level diplomatic relations with other.

That the states opted for the accepting of Israel as an equal player in the region and its recogntion, even if not genuinely in many cases but based on calculated interests, is also attributed to the eventual consolidation of the sovereign states system in the region which allowed for the states to make independent decisions in most cases positive for the Arab-Israeli conflict resolution. The rules of their political behavior started to be defined on reality and inter-state situations, while the common supra-national interests served for the states rather as a burden. This is reflected in the Arab attitudes toward war in Lebanon, Intifada with the low Arab response.

The economic issues and change in the global international relations stand as another factor that influenced the shift of the Arab states' positions toward recognition of Israel. The states realized that with peace, international investment, both private and governmental, will flow into the area and be beneficial to the countries in the area (Bickerton, Klausner, 198: 319).

Thus, the dynamics of the Arab states' positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict can be summarized as the course that shifted from one marked by coercion and militant ideologies of the post-1967 Six Day war era to one marked by realism and pragmatism. The loss of territories in this war defined the states' stances in terms of zero-sum approach and the quest for the determination of Israel as the factor not compatible with the Arab-Islamic tradition and as an undesirable, alien entity in the region. However, the 1973 October War turned the attitudes of the Arab states away from the ethno-religious total conflict over Israel's legitimacy into one over national territory and boundaries. The oil power, and growing consequential international and regional influence of the Gulf monarchies gave rise to a new social and economic sub-system marked by pragmatic, business-like norms in handling Arab regional relations (Sela, 1998: 346), and hence relations with Israel.

In the light of the 1980s geographic fragmentation, threats from non-Arab actors (namely Iran), economic constraints moved the conflict with Israel to a lower priority on the Arab collective agenda. This is seen by the absence of the theme in the Arab summits of the 1980s.

The gulf war of 1990-1991 brought back the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the states; however, it took up a different shape, the one of the need of finding the ways for its solution rather than means to achieve the zero-sum outcomes. The post-Oslo period is characterized by the analysts (e.g. Sela, 1998; Shlaim, 2004; Bickerton and Klausner, 1998) as the culmination of the "classical" Arab-Israeli conflict including the issues like broad Arab strategic quests for regional domination and high-probability military actions in inter-states rivalries. The period is said to be the one where the conflict is routinized (ibid) with the major concern on the Palestinian statehood, as the core of the conflict.

The problems posed amidst the Arab-Israeli relations can stem rather from the radical contingent of the states, the most vivid of which still remains Syria, and the extremist groupings and fractions both within the territories of the frontline states, the Palestinian Authority, and other Arab states with strong Islamic identities. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the past years became the matter of concern of both regional and international actors, and can be the factor that will move aside yet again the salience of the Arab-Israeli "traditional" conflict in. The rise of the radicalism of the non-Arab regional actors, namely Iran, can also be related to the category of issues that would draw the attention of the parties of the conflict away from Arab-Israeli rivalries.

Even though the anti-Israeli rhetoric is used by the Arab leaders in their own states' realms directed at satisfying the public opinion, that came to play important role in the late 1990s and at present, the real actions are mostly improbable to go in accord with such rhetoric. This would be unacceptable both for moderate states who would not give up their developmentalist policies as that would harm their economies already weak in the light of the high population growth and volatile oil prices; and the radicals whose actual power falls short of their ambitions (Rubin, 1998).

Among these radical states Syria represents the halting point in the furthering of peace achievements in the real terms, the state that still takes up the position of insisting on Israel's return of their land, despite the succession of the Syrian president Hafez Al-Asad by his son Bashir Asad, who is considered to be a more moderate and

pro-Western figure. The inflexibility of Syria and its "strategic parity" principle and the dominating role in Lebanon (even after its withdrawal from the country in 2004), will make it improbable for the Lebanese peace with Israel, for the country has strong influence in Lebanon. So far, the peace process between Syria and Israel has been frozen.

As is noted by Adel Darwish in *The Middle East*, "Syria under Hafez Al-Asad had no wish for normal relations with Israel, and was prepared to postpone getting back his land order to continue to lead the anti-Israeli anti-compromise front." But despite the debate in the Arab countries, that they are not in favor of "normalized" relations with Israel, the Arab states would search to make a deal with Israel in order to regain the occupied land for they cannot achieve it by force, which rules out any military option.

Besides, the region experienced the coming to power in the state regimes of the more pro-Western rulers, for instance in 2000 King Hussein of Jordan had been succeeded by his son King Abdullah; Morocco, and Syria also had similar changes in monarchs thus the countries are governed in a less autocratic and more pro-Western styles (Andrew Album in *The Middle East*) which brings more hopes for Arab-Israeli rapprochement.

In 2006 the Arab states held the summit at Khartoum which was compared to the one held at the same place forty years ago that resulted in "Three No's"; however, this one showed itself as the reversal of positions of the Arab states. As Hassan Nafaa in *Al-Ahram* commented, "the reason for change of heart is that the Arabs have lacked the resort needed to support their continued snubbing of Israel's pleas or, later, to lure Israel and its supporters way from their aloofness in the face of Arabs' new-found supplication."

Under the present circumstances the states affirm the peace settlement in accordance with Beirut initiative, based on the comprehensive approach. For Israel such approach is not satisfactory but the states do not have any other option, and unlike in the post-1967 era they do not have strong regional leadership. Egypt (traditional pivotal state) was absent from the 2006 Summit; they lack the collective will to challenge Israel; the leaders have weaker stances in their own countries. Therefore, yet again, the states face the degrading regional order, which again represents the precondition for their future dealing with the conflict with Israel and other regional conflict present at the time, and as Nafaa suggests, in order to achieve real improvement in relations with

Israel, the states should find a "collective and rational management of the conflict with Israel, in addition to the carefully-planned channeling and deployment of Arab resources. Only then can the Arab countries effectively and rapidly push for a just settlement to the conflict" (Naffa, in *Al-Ahram Weekly*).

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Appendices*

Appendix 1

"Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the international border and the security needs of Israel."

The international border placed the Gaza Strip within Israel's territory. Israel's conditions for peace were: (1) guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; (2) guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal; (3) guarantee of overflight rights in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; (4) the demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula.

The decision proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Syria, based on international border and the security needs of Israel. The conditions for peace were: (1) demilitarization of the Golan Heights and (2) absolute guarantee of noninterference with the flow of water from the river Jordan to Israel.

Source: Shlaim, 2004: 253

Appendix 2

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242   22 November 1967

Following the Six Day War, the United Nations Security Council adopted a British-sponsored resolution aimed at solving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, the need to work for a just lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1.   Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

2.   1.(i) Withdrawal of Israeli arm forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Source: Schultz, 1999: 10

Appendix 3

Khartoum Resolutions   1 September 1967

Following the Six Day War, the Arab states established the framework for policy vis-
à-vis Israel, the Conflict, and the territories occupied by Israel during the war.

TEXT:

1. The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.

2. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.

3. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.

4. The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oilproducing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.

5. The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.

6. The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.

7. The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.

Source: Jewish Virtual Library

Appendix 4

Roger's Initiative:

During the escalation of the War of Attrition launched by Nasser in 1969, the US Secretary of State Rogers put forward, on June 19, the proposal. The proposal had three parts:

1. A three months ceasefire on the Egyptian front; 2. A statement by Israel, Egypt, and Jordan that they accept UNSCR 242, and specifically the call for "withdrawal from occupied territories;" 3. An undertaking form Israel to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan under Dr. Jarring (special UN envoy to the region) auspices as soon as the ceasefire came into force.

The proposal also contained an important provision for a "stand-still" during the ceasefire: neither Egypt nor Israel would be allowed to move its missiles closer to the Canal.

Source: Shlaim, 2004: 295

Appendix 5

UNSC Resolution 338　　　　**22 October 1973**

Following the 1973 October War, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 338 which called for a ceasefire as well as implementation of UNSCR 242

The Security Council

1.　　Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the position they now occupy;

2.　　Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3.　　Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under the appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Source: Schultz, 1999:110

Appendix 6

The ***mini-summit meeting in Riyad*** was attended by King Khalid, the Kuwaiti Emir, Presidents Sadat, Sarkis, and Asad, and Arafat. The two-day meeting of the main parties concerned in Lebanon and the core Arab actors produced an overall agreement, ostensibly responding to the demands of both Lebanon and the PLO. The peace plan for Lebanon entailed a ceasefire and the creation of a Syrian-dominated "Arab Deterrence Force" (ADF) of 30 000 troops, to be subordinated to the president of Lebanon.

The mini-summit's main result lay in the renewal of understanding between Asad and Sadat. The meeting also highlighted the decisive weight of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian coalition in the Arab world, in marked contrast to the weakness of the rejectionist states-Iraq, Algeria and Libya- which responded with ineffectual protests and the dispatch of minister-level delegates to the Cairo summit (which followed Riyad). The agreement reached in Riyad served as a basis for a detailed draft proposal submitted to the full summit in Cairo for the creation, arming and funding of the ADF. The summit also set up a fund to underwrite the ADF, the bulk of which was comprised of Syrian forces.

Source: Sela, 1998: 185-186

Appendix 7

Summit in Cairo, October 25-26, 1976

1. Confirmation of the plan for a peace settlement in Lebanon concluded by the Riyad mini-summit, including the establishment of the "Arab Deterrence Force."
2. Renewal of the Arab financial aid to the confrontation states and the PLO.
3. Extending financial aid to Lebanon for its economic rehabilitation.
4. Reassertion of the Arab commitment to support the PLO's right to establish its "independent state on its national land."

Source: Sela, 1998

Appendix 8

Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Eight Points Peace Plan, August 7, 1981

1. Israel to withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

2. Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 to be dismantled, including those in Arab Jerusalem.

3. A guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in the Holy Places.

4. An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homes and compensation for those who do not wish to return.

5. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip to have a transitional period under the auspices of the United Nations for a period not exceeding several months.

6. An independent Palestinian State should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital.

7. All States in the region should be able to live in peace in the region.

8. The United Nations or Member States of the United Nations to guarantee the carrying out of these provisions.

Source: Jewish Virtual Library

Appendix 9

The Declaration of Principle on Interim Agreement Self-Government for the Palestinians (Israeli-PLO peace accord)

On September 13, 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles (also called Oslo Accords), where the two sides defined the bases for their future relations based on mutual recognition, timeframes for implementation of the points mentioned in the Declaration and the approaches towards the realization of the idea of the Palestinian State.

The highlights of the agreement were as follows:

- A five-year period of limited autonomy for Palestinians in the occupied territories
- A withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the Jericho section of the West Bank and the establishment of Palestinian control of internal affairs in these areas within four months (with Jewish settlements there remaining under Israeli control)
- Palestinian elections in the occupied territories to create a governing body to be known as the Palestinian Authority (the embryo of a future Palestinian state)
- The creation of Israeli financial support for economic development in Gaza and the West Bank

Source: McWilliams, Piotrowski, 2001: 162

Appendix 10

Beirut Declaration, March 28, 2002 (final communiqué, extracts)

We, the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states meeting in the Council of the Arab League Summit in Beirut, capital of Lebanon... have conducted a thorough assessment of the developments and challenges... relating to the Arab region and, more specifically, to the occupied Palestinian territory.

With great pride, we followed the Palestinian people's intifada and valiant resistance. We discussed the Arab initiatives that aim to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the region...

Based on the pan-Arab responsibility, and ...the objectives of the Arab League Charter, the UN Charter, we announce the following:

We will continue to ...protect the pan-Arab security and fend off the foreign schemes that aim to encroach on Arab territorial integrity.

We address a greeting of pride and honour to the Palestinian people's steadfastness and valiant intifada against the Israeli occupation and its destructive war machine.

We greet with honour and pride the valiant martyrs of the intifada....

We affirm solidarity with Lebanon to complete the liberation of its territory and pledge to extend aid to help its development and the reconstruction process.

We take pride in the Lebanese resistance and the outstanding Lebanese steadfastness that led to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the major part of South Lebanon and western Al-Biqa. We demand the release of the Lebanese prisoners, who are held in Israeli jails....

We emphasize our solidarity with Syria and Lebanon in the face of the Israeli aggressive threats that will undermine security and stability in the region.

We reaffirm that peace in the Middle East cannot succeed unless it is just and comprehensive... and based on the land for peace principle.

Expectations from Israel

A. Complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the 4 June 1967 line and the territories still occupied in southern Lebanon.

B. Attain a just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees to be agreed upon in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution No 194.

C. Accept the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.

In return the Arab states will do the following:

Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over, sign a peace agreement with Israel, and achieve peace for all states in the region

Establish normal relations with Israel within the framework of this comprehensive peace

Iraq

The Council welcomes the assurances by the Republic of Iraq that it will respect the independence, sovereignty, and security of the state of Kuwait and safeguard its territorial integrity.

Within the same framework, the leaders emphasize the importance of suspending media campaigns and negative statements to create a positive atmosphere....

The Council calls for respecting Iraq's independence, sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and regional safety.

The Council calls on Iraq to cooperate in seeking a... definitive solution to the issue of the Kuwaiti prisoners and detainees and returning [Kuwaiti] properties.

The Council also calls on Kuwait to cooperate with what Iraq offers with respect to its nationals who are reported as missing through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Council welcomes the resumption of the dialogue between Iraq and the United Nations....

The Council calls for lifting the sanctions on Iraq and ending the tribulation of the fraternal Iraqi people....

The Council rejects threats of aggression against some Arab states, particularly Iraq, and reiterates categorical rejection of attacking Iraq.

Source: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/communique02.htm

Notes

Note 1:

"Syria's Veto Power" is referred to the Syrian preventive policy in light of the Israeli achievements after the war in Lebanon in 1982, and the subsequent American initiative for peace, which confronted the Syrian interests of security, regional domination. In order to fulfill those interests Syria needed the dominant position and control in Lebanon, which had been undermined by Israeli and American actions and even isolated Syria's role in the Arab core issues such as Palestinian problem. To avoid those negative outcomes for itself Syria took up the destructive policy in Lebanon and the peace process in general in the next three years that followed. Like this Syria assumed the unique role as the only actively fighting state in the Arab-Israeli conflict and as the leader of the radical bloc. Thus, within two years Syria managed to regain the initiative in Lebanon, force Israel's withdrawal, and restore itself as the dominant power in the country. Syria could not afford any external intervention in Lebanon as the contradiction to its security needs. This obliged Syria to reduce Israeli influence in Lebanon and undercut the threat to its own security. To realize these goals Syria was ready to use any means or measures, combining political intrigues, terrorism and assassination, guerilla warfare, and even the use of regular forces. It used the Lebanese and Palestinian proxies in order to minimize the risk of direct clash with Israel or the United States. Avoiding direct responsibility for striking at Palestinian or other Arab targets also limited potential domestic political fallout.

Major "veto power" aim was to contain the Maronite-based Lebanese government, facilitated by Israel, and the PLO, and to force Western intervention forces and Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.

Source: Sela, 1998: 266

Netanyahu policies:

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu who came to power after 1996 elections is considered to be the main deteriorating factor of the peace process set out at Oslo, for he refused to implement the commitment of the accords. He demolished Palestinian homes, authorized the building of additional Jewish settlements and Jewish-only access roads in the West Bank, and delayed the previously-agreed upon withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron.

In September 1996, Netanyahu sent a message that Israel alone was sovereign in Jerusalem and that the Palestinians had no choice but to accept what the Israeli government was meting out. He opened the tunnel that ran into the heart of East Jerusalem along the Temple Mount, on which rested two sacred shrines of Islam- the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

Netanyahu showed scant interest in completing the Oslo process. Israel had granted the Palestinian Authority under Arafat only 12 per cent of the West Bank, but the land consisted of enclaves that were not viable economically and surrounded by borders and roads controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces. Israel continued to build settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Between September 1993 and December 2000, settlement construction had increased by more than 50 per cent, the settler population by 72 per cent. The overall settler population reached 380, 000 amid 3.4 million Palestinians. In February 2000, the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak warned that Palestine had become a time-bomb.

Source: McWilliams, Piotrowski, 2001: 165-166

Note 3:

Al-Aqsa Intifada

Officially the initiation of the second Intifada is considered to be the provocative move by Israeli politician Ariel Sharon. On September 28, 2000 heavily guarded by Israeli soldiers and police-men, he walked into Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam; fighting broke out between the Palestinians and security forces guarding Sharon.

This Intifada pitied mostly young Palestinians against Israeli soldiers and citizens. By the end of 2000, over 350- the vast majority of Palestinians- had died in deadly clashes throughout the land. Second Intidada is considered to be of a larger scale than the Intifada of 1987.

This was an expression of a deep disappointment and frustration over the ongoing disrespect and denial of basic rights for Palestinians caused by the occupation including the right to free access to Jerusalem, security and development, and the refugees' right to return. In the wake of continuing violence, hopes of a final peace agreement were abandoned. Most Palestinians saw the outbreak of the confrontations as an inevitable result of repressive occupation and a "peace process" leading nowhere.

Besides, it featured the cruel actions of extremist groupings such as Hamas, and Martyre Brigade, which exacerbated the already dire situation

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Source: www.aljazeera.net; McWilliams, Piotrowski, 2001: 169

Note 4:

Levant is a part of the sub-regional system constituting the Arab world. It is referred to the Fertile Crescent, comprised of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.

Source: Miller, 1986; Sela, 1998.