

Abstract

This thesis deals with public procurement of mobile network operators services and analysis of institutional and procedural characteristics under which public authorities are able to reach lower prices than regular retail customers. The applied model attempts to explain a variation in final price of high consumption mobile services consumer basket. The variation is explained as a function of estimated price of consumer basket, year of tender, length of contract, supplier, governance structure of public authority, number of bidders and use of electronic auction.

The results indicate that usage of electronic auction brings lower final price of mobile services by 8.6 %, T-Mobile is more expensive than O2 and Vodafone on average by 8 % and each additional bidder decreases the final price on average by 6.1 %. We found that there exists statistically significant difference in the final price with respect to type of public authority. The final price of mobile services is decreasing in time, on average by 9 % per year. Together with insignificance of the variable measuring length of contract, it follows that long term contracts are not cost-efficient.