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The Division of the Middle East under the British as the Roots of the Problems in Iraq

The undersigned certifies that the work contained within this research is his own and that all sources have been duly cited.

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Abstract

The division of the Ottoman Empire will echo infinitely, and the study of it is vital for understanding the current issues of the modern Middle East. This essay shows in historical detail the British division of the Middle East and it highlights the mistakes, or bad seeds that were planted by the British. It shows the three most prominent mistakes that the British made and how this effects the current rebuilding process. The essay concludes that the state of the Middle East, specifically Iraq is now in a similar state than it was just shortly after World War I, and there are chances for Americans to make the same mistakes Britain made or to fix them. This essay shows the roots of the major issues in the Middle East and displays how they formed.

Preface

The question I am interested in, is can there be a correlation between the actions of the British regarding their dealings with the Middle East during and shortly after World War I and the problems that are currently in the Middle East. This essay attempts to show that current health of the Iraqi Government, resources and State are not solely a modern turn of events. The policies the British implemented specifically the time the modern Middle East transformed from the Ottoman Lands.

The essay is an analyses of the history of the Middle East in hopes of uncovering and perhaps suggesting where the British might have planted a bad seed through its policies during the formation of Iraq. The method that I employed in this thesis is that of historical approach. The historical method of research is "the process of learning and understanding the background and growth of a chosen field of study or profession that can offer insight into organizational culture, current trends, and future possibilities." I feel this thesis offers examples of all three. In particular the second part of the thesis uses the historical method to show and give background to the current trends in Iraq, and suggests future possibilities.

I am following the steps Charles Busha and Stephen Harted detail in order to achieve a reliable result. The first step they demand is "the recognition of a historical problem or the identification of a need for certain historical knowledge."² I feel that the recognition of the diplomatic moves The English made in the Middle East, particularly Iraq during the fall of the Ottoman Empire deserve research, for the problems they went through could easily be

¹ Research Methods in Librarianship, pg.90 ² Research Methods in Librarianship, pg.90

repeated again, and many of the current issues regarding Iraq are rooted in the British diplomacy of the day.

Another step towards a reliable result is, "if appropriate, the forming of hypothesis that tentatively explains relationships between historical factors." My hypothesis is that the British diplomacy in the Middle East roughly between 1914 and 1924 has a measurable impact on the current situation.

The selection, organization, and analysis of the most pertinent collected evidence are key to the historical method of research. Regarding my research I chose the qualitative variable in the collection of historical information over the quantitative variable. That I found the best sources and deeply investigated them, as opposed to finding a lot of sources and coming up with a shared view.

The resources I worked with vary, but the heart of my work comes from history books.

A Peace to End All Peace, The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern

Middle East, by David Fromkin, gives a detailed description of the British in the Middle East.

The books main statement was that between 1915 and 1922 the British foreign policy changed so much that its goals regarding the Middle East at the beginning of World War I were not of those when the Middle East was divided.

For a detailed account of the post-war treaties that affected the Middle East, none was more insightful than, *Paris 1919, Six Months That Changed the World* by Margaret Macmillan. The book is rather scholarly and accurate in its detail but the message I received was that while little was actually signed regarding the Middle East question regarding Arab

³ Research Methods in Librarianship, pg.90

independence, the impact on the eventual creation of the Middle East was huge. This book was particularly helpful in explaining the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its impact on the policies that affected the Middle East. The most insightful book regarding the Arab independence movement and the Arab Revolt was T.E. Lawrences's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. This book was a first hand account of the Arab Revolt and subsequent battles, written in first person by Lawrence himself. The descriptions of the characters of the Arab or Sharifian Forces are something a history book would leave out. I found these descriptions vital for understanding the culture of the time. I used many more books that are sighted through out the thesis and a full list can be seen in the appendix.

I also used many scholarly articles in my research, of which most were retrieved on line from Jstor and Ebscohost. I found that these articles were either a scholarly analysis of the period I was looking for, or they were based on precise military movements. In the second half of the essay I show that the Iraqi Government, Resources and State (in the first part of the 21st century) are an area of concern. The literature that I choose to cover this were again books and articles. But I felt that there were so many conflicting 'point's of view' that books were more helpful. I at least had one point of view for a few hundred pages as opposed to a handful of articles that often contradicted each other. This essay is written with historical accuracy and the claims are backed up with as much literature as possible with as few personal conclusions I could use.

1.1 Introduction

Government, resources and State are the most key components of a nation. This essay will show that when the Ottoman Lands were being conquered and then divided by the British in the early 20th century they planted seeds that have grown into problems for Iraq. The essay is easily divided into two main sections, the first part will give a historical account of the British and their interaction in the Middle East beginning at the outbreak of World War I and ending as the Cairo Conference came to a close in 1922. The second section then relates these seeds to modern Iraq.

The topics that I cover regarding the current issues in Iraq are; the question of an independent Kurdistan. The issue of Iraqi natural resources, specifically oil, and a modern Iraqi constitution or a three state solution. What I would like to contribute is to show where the roots of these problems stem from and show that the two time periods have some similarities.

In chronological order, first to be presented is the start of World War I and the Imperialist Ideology that was affluent in Europe during that time. The essay then moves on to explain the early British position regarding the Middle East, highlighted by the attempts to control the Arab's by installing a new religious leader in hopes he could stir up a revolt against the Turks. The essay then goes through the birth of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the McMahon letters and shows the possible mistakes of these documents. The essay continues to look specifically at the role T.E. Lawrence had in the Arab Revolt and Middle East. The essay gives a detailed account of the British invasion of the Middle East and argues

that their policies during occupation of these lands were divided between those that were directly in charge of the occupation and the politicians in Britain. The essay picks apart the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 in which the once secret Sykes Picot Agreement comes to disorganize the touchy occupation. The first section continues with the Arab Revolt of 1920 and the impact of the English monarchy on the people of Iraq. The first section ends with a critique of the British policy roughly between 1915 and 1924 in the Middle East.

The second part of the essay looks at these highlighted mistakes and shows how they affect Iraq of the early 21st century. This section explains the Kurdish independence movement, the issue of a unified Iraqi state (as opposed to a three state solution) and the issue of oil in Iraq, being a very valuable resource.

2.1 Leading up to World War I

The Ottoman Empire was on its heels leading up to World War I, while the European powers were just waiting for its fall. To be presented in this section is how World War I began in the Middle East, and a detailed description of the political stance the British had towards the Middle East at the time. This section will show that the British first sought to engage the Arab population by harnessing the Muslim religion and its Caliph in hopes that the British could start an Arab Revolt against the Turks, who found themselves at war against the British. When this revolt did not live up to initial hopes the British shifted their strategy which can be seen in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. But more importantly at this time that the division of the Middle East had started. The mistakes that were made during this period that can be linked to the current state are many. Two of the bad seeds that were planted stem from when the British pushed to divide the religions in the Ottoman Empire and the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

The British were arguably the biggest and most advanced empire of the day with control over the seas and its empire that stretched around the world. By the end of 1921 Britain would rule over one-quarter of the world's population. The Russian Czarist Empire had also been expanding, "until the decade before the First World War, the Russian Empire had been expanding at the expense of its neighbors at a prodigious rate and for a long time. It has been calculated that, at the time, the Russian Empire had been conquering the territory of its neighbors at an average rate of 50 square miles a day for 400 years." The Austro-Hungarian Empire was also land hungry. The Empire had recently taken the northern Balkans

⁴ A Peace, pg. 475

from the retreating Ottoman Empire. The German state was rather new to the game, only being united in 1871, but its massive build up of railroads contributed to its quick rise in power. "The development of railroads radically altered the strategic balance between land power and sea power to the detriment of the latter. ... The railroad network of the German empire made the Kaiser's realm the most advanced military power in the world, and Britain's precarious naval supremacy began to seem less relevant than it had been." The rise of Germany's power was around the same time as a momentary decline in Russia's power. The Russian defeat by Japan in 1904-05 and a revolutionary uprising in St. Petersburg and throughout the country in 1905, suggested that the Czar's armies were no longer to be a cause of concern regarding the Eastern Question. Germany was a very large concern for the British, and these two powers were about to clash. The political atmosphere during this time was that of expansionism and the Middle East was seen as one of the last places where imperial control seamed inevitable, during the early 20th century.

By the turn of the 20th century it became clear that the Ottoman Empire would collapse in time, this is known as the Eastern Question. The 'Eastern Question', in European history, encompasses the diplomatic and political problems posed by the decay of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). "The expression does not apply to any one particular problem, but instead includes a variety of issues raised during the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, including instability in the European territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire." The European powers were racing after the fallen lands. "This assumption that when the Ottoman Empire disappeared, Europe would have to take its place proved to be one of those motors that drive

⁵ A Peace, pg. 31

⁶ Jstor

history." The major powers that were competing for the declining Ottoman lands for a century or so were Russia, from the east and north. The Austro-Hungarian Empire from the west, in particular through the Balkan countries. The British turned its eyes towards the southern lands in the Middle East recognizing the value it had connecting the Mediterranean Sea to India. The French looked towards regaining its historical ties with Christian areas of the Ottoman Empire, in particular the areas of Lebanon. Interest in the Middle East from European powers was not a current phenomenon; in particular France and England's historical ties date back hundreds of years. For example the French stated that the Eight Crusades of 1270 gave important ties that could be used to why one government should have control over one section of the Middle East over another during the Paris Peace Conference. With the so called inevitable decline of the Empire the great European powers were sure to clash in attempt to take hold of the area the Ottomans were sure to loose.

The Ottoman's main political support was in Constantinople (today's Istanbul) that the Turks captured in 1544. From that year on the Ottoman Empire had been a major force in Europe. At the beginning of World War I the Ottomans were loosing ground quickly and were lagging in industrial development compared with the rest of Europe and Britain. The Ottoman government was controlled by a Sultan, but around the turn of the twentieth century a political group known as the Young Turks or Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P) began to fight for government power in a quasi-democratic system. During this time the Ottoman Empire had control over what is today northern Greece, Turkey and the Middle East.

In 1911 the Ottoman Empire asked for a military alliance with Britain and they denied the opportunity, but they were still diplomatically open and friendly towards each other. The

⁷ A peace, pg.32

Ottomans had ordered two modern battle ships from the British Naval Yard. The names of these ships were to be the *Reshadieh* and the *Sultan Osman I*, and within weeks of their completion scheduled for August 1914, the decision was made not to deliver them. These were no ordinary ships, in fact the "Osman I mounted more heavy guns than any other battleship ever built."8

The First Lord of the British Admiralty at the time was Winston Churchill. Churchill realized how valuable the war ships that were being built for the Ottomans were and personally chose not to deliver them to Constantinople, and gave them their money back on August 1, 1914. Britain obviously felt that it needed theses two ships, for their enemy Germany had the second largest navy in the world. But Germany surprisingly had only two warships in the Mediterranean at the start of the war. The name of the two German ships were the Goben and the Breslau, they were commanded by German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon. "No other single exploit of the war cast a shadow upon the world as the voyage accomplished by their commander." In a daring tale the British and French chased the Goben and Breslau throughout the Mediterranean and had many opportunities to destroy them but were never given the order from above. Souchon knew he could not make it to Gibraltar. He decided to make for Constantinople regardless of orders to the contrary. His purpose, in his words, "was quite definite: 'to force the Turks even against their will, to spread the war to the Black Sea against their ancient enemy, Russia."10 The British waited outside the Straits and did not pressure the ships any further because of the perceived Ottoman neutrality.

A Peace, pg. 54
 The Guns of August, pg. 161

¹⁰ The Guns of August, pg. 180

The Ottoman Sultan, his government, including the C.U.P and especially the citizens were upset at the British for not delivering its battleships. The Germans, stuck with two of its battleships in a neutral port (with inevitable destruction if they left) quickly arranged an agreement for the Turkish purchase of the German battleships. The ships were sold to the Turks and renamed the Jawus and Midilli. The Ottomans and the Germans began official relations with each other which heated the British, for if Constantinople and the Dardanelles Straits were to fall into the hands of the Central Powers it would heavily effect Russia's contribution to the war (whom the British were allied with). "The Dardanelles had been Russia's one ice-free maritime passageway to the west. Through them she sent 50 percent of her export trade, notably her wheat crop which, in turn, enabled her to buy arms and ammunition for the war." 11 Between late August and November 1914 there was a diplomatic war between the British, Ottomans and the Germans. The Ottomans would not officially side with the Germans and declare war on the British. "Turkey postponed the deceleration of war for which Germany was pressing. Instead, they themselves began demanding from the allies an increasing price for their neutrality." Russia and France would pay, Britain and Churchill would not.

On October 28, 1914, the former Goben and Breslau under Admiral Souchon's command sailed with several Turkish torpedo boats into the Black Sea and shelled Odessa, Sevastopol and Feodosia. The British demanded that the Ottomans expel the Germans, and remove the German officers and men from the Goben and Breslau. "When the Turks did not comply, Churchill did not bother to refer the matter back to the Cabinet; on his own initiative he dispatched an order to his forces in the Mediterranean on the afternoon of 31 October to

¹¹ A Peace, pg. 67
¹² The Guns of August, pg. 180

'Commence hostilities at once against Turkey'."¹³ On November 3, (the leading commander of the fleet did not carry out Churchill's orders immediately) British warships opened fire on the outlining forts of the Dardanelles. On November 4, Russia declared war on Turkey. On the Morning of November 5, 1914, the British formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

It was commonly seen by the British public that Churchill solely brought the Ottoman Empire into war against the British, and he lost a lot of support because of this. But what he did not know was that the Turkish and the Germans had already signed a secret alliance the first day the war broke out. This was the first step that led to the eventual demotion of Churchill. "Thus the one thing which British leaders foresaw in 1914 with perfect clarity was that the Ottoman entry into the war marked the first step on the road to a remaking of the Middle East: to the creation, indeed, of the Modern Middle east."

2.2 The Battle for Gallipoli

The British foreign policy was for ever affected by the battle of Gallipoli. The first battle to gain Constantinople should have been easy when the British sailed up through the Dardanelles in March of 1915. But bureaucracy kept the battle from being short and sharp, just as Churchill had wanted it. The British and the French were mainly concerned with the battle front in continental Europe during World War I. It was in Europe that most of the troops and resources were allocated. The Battles that happened in the Middle East fell in the shadow of the great battles on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It was difficult to justify taking troops off the European front and shipping them to the Middle East. Therefore most of the troops fighting for the Entente Powers in the Middle East were conscripts from India, New

¹³ A Peace, pg. 72

¹⁴ A Peace, pg. 76

Zealand and Australia. But more importantly the battle tactics of the day favored the defenders heavily. To no surprise the Turkish turned their military force over to the Germans on March 18. In late April, the British armies landed on Gallipoli and immediately dug trenches instead of advancing quickly.

The Battle for Gallipoli turned out to be a disaster in which over five hundred thousand men (from both sides) died. It was one of the bloodiest military engagements in history. The Allies withdrew 259 days later. Winston Churchill "appeared to be the man who had brought the Ottoman war about, and the man who had caused Britain to suffer one defeat after another in that war." Churchill was made the scapegoat. On May 19, 1915, a new government was announced and Churchill was removed from the Admiralty and given the minor position of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The failure of the Battle for Gallipoli and the eventual retreat from the Turkish soil forced the newly formed British government to reorganize their Middle East strategy. From this moment on the British committed themselves in the Middle East permanently. The new government was headed by David Lloyd George as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Lord Kitchener was in charge of drawing up the policies for the Middle East with his aid Sir Mark Sykes.

2.3The Birth of the Arab Revolt

It was under Kitchener that Brittan first moved diplomatically into the Middle East.

"The West and the Middle East have misunderstood each other throughout most of the twentieth century; and much of that misunderstanding can be traced back to Lord Kitchener's

¹⁵ A Peace, pg. 159

initiatives in the early years of the First World War." Kitchener thought it was necessary to seize the Middle East for the British Empire by trying to seize the Muslim religion. He believed that Mohammedanism was the central authoritarian structure. "Kitchener and his colleges believed that Islam could be bought, manipulated, or captured by buying and manipulating its religious leadership." Kitchener believed that whoever controlled the Caliph, Mohammed's successor, controlled Islam. With no surprise, in 1914 the British believed that the Caliph had fallen into the hands of the Germans and the Jews and that after the war the Caliph might fall into the hands of the Russians and this would destroy the influence Britain had with India, thus an immediate importance was placed on finding a suitable Caliph that would work with the British.

Kitchener proposed to lure Arabia away from the Ottoman Empire and use them against the Turks. The British proposed restoring the Caliph in Hussein Ali ibn, or more commonly know as Hussein the Sharif of Mecca. Hussein was popular with the Sultan in Constantinople, and had great relations with him. Hussein could even trace his heritage back to the Profit Mohammad, and was groomed to be the religious leader of Mecca after his time in Constantinople. As the C.U.P. began to take control of the government Hussein quickly lost his influence. The C.U.P. or the Young Turks also began to push forward with the construction of the Hejaz railroad that would give them direct control of Medina and Mecca. This railroad would make Hussein into a mere subordinate of the Young Turks and their government by being able to transport its military quickly thus have direct influence over the southern lands. Realizing his position Hussein began to move closer to the British.

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¹⁶ A Peace, pg. 96

¹⁷A Peace, pg. 97

Hussein and his family are major players in the division of the Middle East. Hussein had two very politically active sons that eventually would become rulers of Syria, Iraq and Transjordan. Abdullah, his favorite son was a deputy from Mecca in the Ottoman Parliament. Abdullah quickly went along with the ideas that the Arabs could side with the British and achieve Arab independence. His other son Feisal was a deputy from Jeddah, and openly supported the idea of an Arab revolution. Kitchener proposed that Hussein and his sons should lead an Arab revolt against the Turks. Thus with supporting an Arab revolution Kitchener planted a seed of Arab independence that previously was not as strong.

2.4 McMahon Letters

The official relations at this time between Hussein and the British are known historically as the McMahon Letters. "McMahon, in what has remained a highly controversial correspondence with the Sharif, promised that, if the Arabs rose against the Turks, they would have British assistance and, more importance, their independence." Hussein stated that he was in contact with secret societies that were able to lead the revolt. The influence that Hussein had, as history has shown has been widely exaggerated and the vast Arab conspiracies waiting for his signal were very limited. Thus "the Arab Revolt had begun on false pretences. To gain the Sherif's help our Cabinet offered, through Sir Henry McMahon, to support the establishment of native governments in parts of Syria and Mesopotamia, 'saving the interests of our ally France. The last modest clause concealed a treaty (kept secret, till too late, from McMahon, and there fore from the Sharif) by which France, England and

¹⁸ This planned revolt would effectively take the Turks out of the war for many of the soldiers that the British were now fighting against were Arabs.

¹⁹ A Peace, pg. 387

Russia agreed to annex some of these promised areas, and to establish their respective spheres of influence over all the rest."²⁰

As far as the British knew Hussein did have the Arab support. Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi, a 24-your-old Arab Ottoman staff officer from Mosul had one of the most interesting effects on the planned Arab revolt. Al-Faruqi was a soldier sent to the Gallipoli front, where death was almost guaranteed. Al-Faruqi quickly deserted and crossed over to Allied lines. He claimed to have important information for British Intelligence in Cairo. Whatever his motives, he acted on an impulse of his own: nobody had entrusted him with a mission. Under interrogation he claimed to be a member of the secret Arab military society al-Ahd. The British quickly believed him even though he was not a member of any secret society. What gave him his credit was he knew the details of what Hussein had planned regarding his correspondence with Britain, and he also claimed he was able to rally mass support for the Arab revolt. Al-Faruqi demanded that the British back an independent Arab state with in the frontiers that Hussein wanted in order for an Arab revolt led by al-Ahd. "Presenting an ultimatum, the young man gave Britain only a few weeks to accept the offer; otherwise, he said, the Arab movement would throw all of its support behind Germany and the Ottoman Empire."21 Cairo and the British were seized with excitement and truly believed in a strong force behind enemy lines! He was released and the revolt did not instantly start.

The importance is that Britain's policy towards the Middle East was that of internal division between the Turks and the Arabs, but the results were not as fast as the British wanted. This political stance led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

²⁰ Seven Pillars of Wisdom pg 282.

²¹ A Peace, pg. 211

The British government and especially Lloyd George began to question the validity of the Arab Revolt. The British knew that it would be hard to divert resources away from the Western Front, and it would be even more of a challenge to gain French approval for action in the Middle East. What they offered France was an agreement on the future disposition of the Ottoman Empire as a deal to let the British move resources away from the Western Front. The first major official accord regarding the future of the Middle East was the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. At the time it was published it was kept secret, the only governments to know of it were Italy, Britain, France and Russia.

2.5 The Sykes-Picot Agreement

The Sykes-Picot Agreement is a treaty between Britton and France that secretly divided the Middle East between them before the war was over. The British thought at the time that they needed land access to India. With the perceived threat that Russia would expand its territories down through the Caucus regions and possible take Constantinople, the British proposed to give the French the land between them and the imposing Russians. This land of what is today Syria, Palestine and Lebanon was to act as a buffer zone to offset the major powers in the Middle East. The British carved out Transjordan and Mesopotamia for themselves. This treaty agreement would also let Britton use more of its forces in the Middle East, and fight for both France and England's interest.

Between 1915 and 1917 the Sykes-Picot Agreement had little influence on British policy, it was kept secret. T.E. Lawrence did not even know about it, although Russia did.

During the Bolshevik revolution the Agreement was published as the old government was overthrown. The importance of the Sykes-Picot Agreement instantly became binding, years

after it was signed. For example its influence at the Paris Peace Conference was monumental, even though the politicians from both sides despised its clauses. Also another impact the Agreement had for the future of the Middle East is that the Agreement did not allot any land for the Jewish homeland, but proposed an international zone around Jerusalem that spread to the coast. This *lack of* recognition raised the question if the recognition of a Jewish Homeland was possible and if so, was it profitable for the British.

Concluding this section, the British division of the Middle East had begun. The first division was due to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was an enemy of the British when it easily could have been allies. With a surprising defeat at Gallipoli, the British found themselves engaged in the Ottoman lands but due to the unexpected costs of the war on the Western Front it could not commit a sufficient number of well trained troops and resources to the Middle East. The subsequent policy was that they opted to gain a foot hold by supporting an Arab Revolt, this then led to the British supporting a division based on religious lines. The British supported Hussein and his two sons, Feisal and Abdullah in hopes they could revolt against the Turks, or at least bring them out of the war against the British. British policy in the Middle East began to change. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was made secretly and during the middle of the war. It allowed the British to physically enter the Middle East. Its influences on the Middle East had just begun, it would be an obstacle for years to come.

A further division occurred at this time but it would not surface for quite a while, that being the effect of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and how it would eventually lead towards the different protectorate countries; France supporting Syria and Lebanon, and the British behind Palestine and Mesopotamia. Although the official treaties that divided the Middle East were

not ratified until 1922 or later, the division had already begun early in World War I and the impacts went below the surface of the eventual boarders, and are still a major issue today.

3.1 The British invasion

On June 2 1916, Lord Kitchener embarked on the armored cruiser *Hampshire* that was to sail to the Russian port of Archangel for a conference. Halfway there the ship struck a German mine and sunk, almost all hands were lost. Between 1914 and 1922, Britain changed, and British politicians changed their minds, so much so that by 1922, the British now formally committed to the remaking of the Middle East, no longer believed in it. These changes that the British went through irrevocably influenced the creation of the Middle East. The crisis in the Middle East today stems from the destruction of the old order in the region and the lack of conviction Britain had in implementing its policies. The British government of 1914, 1915, and 1916 was completely different in terms of who was running the government and the political practice they represented. The earlier government of Kitchener looked to take control of the Middle East by controlling the Caliph, the religious leader, and this can be shown with the hopes of an Arab Revolt and the McMahon Letters. The next British stance welcomed a French presence in a post war Middle East, such as that outlined by the Sykes-Picot, in order to keep the Russians in the north of the Ottoman Empire.

As this next section will show one of the major goals of the British regarding the Middle East was to get out of the Sykes-Picot agreement, thus its policy changed again. Another major change the British went through was the trust and enthusiasm for the Arab movement, in particular for the Hashemite family, and how this turned into a failure and distrust.

After the defeat at Gallipoli and a defeat in southern Mesopotamia, coupled with the death of Lord Kitchener the British changed their tactics towards the Middle East. The Sykes-Picot Agreement allowed for Britain to use more resources to mount an attack beginning in Cairo that would sweep north as far as Damascus. This section shows that the physical capture of the Middle East, and the resulting split in ideas on what to do with the captured land. That the thought of Arab independence that Lord Kitchener, Mark-Sykes, T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Stein and others hoped for were met by contrast ideas of those that actually occupied the Middle East.

3.2 Changes in Government

There was a large change in government and its subsequent policies as the British government elected a new Prime Minister. David Lloyd George took office in the fall of 1916, he immediately became more aggressive in their Middle East policy. One of the first moves he did was to assign a new Chief on the Expeditionary Army, and a new Secretary of State for India with a new commander-in-chief of the Indian Army. This change was among other things a result of the "blundering incompetence of the Government of India in conducting the Mesopotamian campaign."²² In particular the British invasion of Bagdad in late 1915 that ended in retreat and the surrender of the British Indian Army at kut el-Amara. The British wasted no time and in December of 1916, they launched an attack up the Tigris and captured Bagdad on March 11, 1917.

While the British were fighting in the historic land between the Tigris and Euphrates the Arab revolt was starting to emerge in the Arabian desert around Medina. The Arab Revolt

²² A Peace, pg. 305

had sunk with Kitchener and the new Government of David Lloyd George went on the offensive, regardless of the Arab revolt.

3.3 T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt

The retreat of the British forces from Gallipoli gave uncontested control of the Dardanelles to the Turkish and Axis powers. The Turkish Navy with its two new warships had access to the Mediterranean for the first time in the War. In February of 1915 the Turks attack the (British Controlled) Suez Canal, but were easily repelled. Through out the summer of 1915 the Turks controlled the land of Middle East. The Hejaz railroad was the backbone of their control on the land. The Arab fighters or Sharifian Forces that had been supported by the British could not afford to attack a garrison of fortified Turks. There needed to be a change of tactics if the Arab Revolt was to start, and T.E. Lawrence was destine to lead the Sharifian Forces to victory.

Thomas Edward Lawrence was born in Wales in 1888 and educated at Oxford. In the summer of 1909 Lawrence traveled extensively throughout the Middle East. He enlisted in the British Military in 1914 and was assigned to the General Staff of the Geographical Section, he was eventually commissioned a 2d lieutenant interpreter and transferred to Egypt. Lawrence worked for the Arab Bureau that had received official approval from the British Cabinet on January, 7, 1916. The Bureau's official function was to "harmonize British political activity in the Near East and to keep the Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty Office, and War Office simultaneously informed of the general tendency of German and Turkish policy." Behind this façade the true work of the Arab Bureau "assumed responsibility for formulating and implementing British policy concerning the Arab revolt. This duty, coupled with the

²³The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba (Jstor)

collection and dissemination of tactical, military, and political intelligence data, became the true mission of the Arab Bureau." ²⁴

On June 10, 1916 Sharif Hussein fired the symbolic first shots in Mecca, and the great Revolt began. "The initial prospect for the success of the Revolt did not appear exceedingly bright. ... During the first months of the revolt the Sharifian forces were little better that a disorganized rabble." By the time Lawrence became involved in the Arab Revolt, Britain had been supplying the Arabs with shipments of arms and money. Yet, the Arab leaders knew little about the military tactics that were common at the time. In October 1916 Lawrence was sent on a fact finding mission during which he first met Hussein's son Abdullah, Lawrence saw him as an incompetent leader. Lawrence then met Hussein's other son Feisal. Lawrence wrote that, "I felt at first glance that this man was the man I had come to Arabia to seek—the leader who would bring the Arab Revolt to full glory." After his mission Lawrence reported back to the Bureau in Cairo where he was appointed liaisons officer to the Arabs in charge of coordinating their desert revolt.

Lawrence immediately returned to the desert and on the night of January 3, 1917, partook in his first small raid it was the first time Lawrence was in combat. On March 15, 1917, Lawrence arrived at Sharif Abdullah's camp near Abu Marka northwest of medina. Lawrence had recently learned that the Turkish army intended to transport most of its two hundred and fifty thousand troops north to attack the British in Palestine. At Abdullah's camp Lawrence became ill and was restricted to bed for ten days. It was during this time that Lawrence conceived a theory on how to fight the Turks. "We decided that to regain the

²⁴ The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba (Jstor)

²⁵ The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba (Jstor)

²⁶ Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pg 92.

initiative we must ignore the main body of the enemy, and concentrate far off on his railway flank."27 The Sharifian Forces under Lawrence's plans were to expose the vulnerability of the Turks extended Hejaz rail line by strategically blowing up little sections at a time. Although Medina was never captured it was effectively neutralized. The Turkish garrison received just enough supplies to survive but not enough to attack.

After neutralizing Medina, Lawrence captured the coastal oasis town of Waih of which was a staging point for the attack on the port of Aqaba. Aqaba lies on the coast in a northern finger of the Red Sea. It is heavily fortified, but its guns only face the sea. Lawrence planned on attacking from the lightly guarded rear but to do this Lawrence had to trek six hundred miles through the desert with fractious Bedouin tribesmen to get there.

T.E Lawrence published his book; Seven Pillars of Wisdom in 1922. The book is written in first person and gives a detailed account of Lawrence's actions and thoughts of his time in the desert leading the revolt. Of value is the in depth insight of the Arab people of the time. Lawrence described the Bedouin as a "people of black and white, not only in vision, but inmost furnishings: black and white not merely in clarity, but in apposition. There thoughts were at ease only in extremes."²⁸ The book is of immense value for the cultural descriptions of Arabs as a "civilization that had been of an abstract nature, moral and intellectual rather than applied... they had performed real service in preserving something of a classical past for a medieval future."²⁹ His cultural insights are of value in order to see that the Arab people were at the time very divided socially, and as Lawrence saw, bringing them together was a difficult task, even with a common enemy, the Turks.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pg 116.
 Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pg 36.

²⁹ Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pg 42.

The attack on Aqaba was a huge success, only two Sharifian soldiers were killed at the expense of one thousand two hundred Turkish defenders being killed or captured. Lawrence and the Arabs owed their success to surprise and mobility. Shortly after the attack Lawrence and two Arab guides departed for Cairo to tell of their success. The trip took four weeks.

At the Bureau of Arab Affairs in Cairo, Lawrence was directed by Brigadier General Clayton. Clayton "gathered around him several of the British experts on Arabian political, social, and military affairs. This group of officers and intelligence agents became almost totally responsible for the administration of British policy in the Near East." Clayton told Lawrence he would support his desire to push North towards Damascus. In the campaign of 1918, the Arab forces were part of the overall Middle Eastern campaign. By March, the Arabs took control of the entire region between the Dead Sea and the railway. The Arabs sought to solely damage the resources of the retreating Turkish Army. Meanwhile in mid-December 1917, the Turks withdrew from Jerusalem and the British declared Marshall law.

3.4 Attack on Palestine

In the spring of 1917, the British army launched its campaign to capture the city of Gaza after they took Bagdad. The British tried twice for Gaza and were repelled both times. The British then planned an attack on Palestine that was scheduled for the fall of 1917. The British chose General Sir Edmund Allenby for the task of capturing Palestine. Allenby was a man who "set his command tent at the front, earning the admiration of his soldiers... he was a

³⁰ The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba (Jstor)

professional soldier, fifty-six years old, a great believer in feint, surprise, and the power of the horse."³¹

in mid-November Allenby's forces then moved northward, where they captured Jaffa and Tel Aviv. Then Allenby turned towards Jerusalem, and the battle began on December 11, 1917. A few days later Allenby and his officers entered the Holy City of Jerusalem, and proclaimed Marshall Law.

Until then the Sykes-Picot Agreement had granted the city of Jerusalem to the French. "The British entered Palestine to defeat the Turks; they stayed there to keep it from the French; then they gave it to the Zionist because they loved 'the Jews' even as they loathed them, at once admired and despised them, and above all feared them. They were not guided by strategic considerations, and there was no orderly decision-making process." Under Allenby the ultimate fate of Palestine was on hold. The military regime set up in Palestine lasted two and a half years.

Meanwhile Feisal, Lawrence and their forces were able to successfully campaign in Transjordan, with hit and run tactics. Allenby was planning to use them in his next advance. He planned to march on Damascus and then to Constantinople to deliver the final blow to the Turkish Army. But just at this time the Germans had planned a major attack in France. This attack was made possible by Russia's withdrawal from the war. As a consequence of the Russian revolution the Central Powers were able to pull troops from the Eastern Front and move them to the Western Front

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³¹ One Palestine, pg. 22 ³²One Palestine, pg. 33

Allenby as well as Lawrence and the Sharifian Force attacked the Turkish front lines outside of Damascus on September 19, 1918, and eventually took Damascus on the September 25. The attack on Damascus was an incredible lopsided battle of forty five thousand troops against eight thousand Turks not counting the use of four hundred British cannons and planes. As Allenby's forces marched on Damascus the question of what to do about Arab independence became more prevalent. Or more accurately, were the British forces going to honor Arab independence? On one end of the spectrum there was Sykes who believed in honoring Arab independence, of which he was a major architect for. . "Damascus would symbolically complete not merely the British occupation of the Arabic-speaking Ottoman Empire, but also assure Britain's place in the line of legitimate succession from the ancient world conquerors whom had sealed their triumphs by achieving mastery of the oases of Syria."

3.5 British Imperialism under an Arab Headdress

Under the urging of Clayton the British thought best to keep the Middle East more or less to itself. The way it did this was to show that it was respecting Arab-independence in order it keep the French out. Thus the period of British imperialism under an Arab headdress began. The first flags that were raised over the captured Damascus were not the French flags, which should have been the case under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but the flags of Hussein's Arabia, (that paradoxically had been designed by Sykes himself.)

The British saw there political position in Europe shift to a stale-mate. That "even the destruction of Germany would not meet Britain's needs... that Germany had to remain a substantial power in order to uphold the European balance of power, which it was in Britain's

³³ A Peace, pg. 315

vital interest to maintain."³⁴ The change in tactics was also in part due to a change in government resulting in the death of Kitchener. Changes were also due to the failures of the British army in previous Middle East campaigns. The value and demand of oil and the Russian revolution were also ingredients in the decision to launch a full out attack in the Middle East. Thus Britain sought to shift its aim towards the Middle East, and its aim in the Middle East was shifted.

The British immediately proposed that Feisal, son of Hussein should be the Arab leader of Syria, with British assistance. But the French stood firmly to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The diplomatic battle over the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the removal of Feisal had begun. The British argued that it saw no reason to hand Syria over to France, it had done all the fighting in the Middle East. The Brits felt they no longer needed a buffer zone against the Russians after the Bolshevik Revolution. The English diplomats began to claim that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was completely out of date. The Brits quickly saw, "that the only way to break the agreement was to operate behind 'an Arab facade' in appealing to the United States to support Wilson's theories of self-determination." Thus the Entente Powers began to no longer trust each other.

The change in politics Britton had gone through resulted in it having an unclear position heading into the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The issue surrounded the fact that the field leaders wanted something else than what the politicians wanted. That those that were in direct charge of the occupied forces, like Allenby, had different ideas that the politicians in Britain.

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³⁴A Peace, pg. 301

³⁵ A Peace, pg. 343

When World War One concluded the division of the Middle East had begun. The British had successfully campaigned in Palestine, parts of Mesopotamia and Syria where they proclaimed Marshall Law on the defeated cities. There were three major treaties or official correspondences to come out of the war period, first were the McMahon Letters that supported an Arab revolution, and outlined the boarders for an independent Arabia. But what is more important to come out of the McMahon letters was the official relationship that had begun with the Hussein family, including Feisal and Abdullah. The second major treaty was the Sykes-Picot Agreement that gave a rough sketch of how the division of the Middle East would look after the war. But the Sykes-Picot Agreement soon became a major thorn in the side of the British policy makers, they now turned and tried to undue its legitimacy and was a major issue for the peace conference The third was the Belfour Declaration, this declaration gave official recognition towards the quest of a national Jewish homeland. But the agreement was so vague it left many questions in the air that would be looked at during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. What these three agreements have in common is that they all represent a different political ideology that Britain had towards the Middle East, because British policy morphed.

4.1 The end of World War I and The Paris Peace Conference

With the retreat of the Ottoman Army and Turkish rule from Damascus, Bagdad,
Basara, Beirut and what is commonly referred to today as the Middle East changed the world.
The Entente Powers had completely smashed the existing structures that had supported organized and even peacefully cohabited for centuries. The Allies tried to replace religious leaders from far away lands. They pushed for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine not knowing its implications. They created a state system without suppressing the opposition. These are the seeds that the British planted early on that are still issues today. This next section will show how the Middle East made the postwar transition. The first to be introduced is what happened to the Middle east at the Paris Peace conference of 1919.

When the thought of signing a treaty regarding what to do with the Middle East at the Paris Peace Conference arose, they quickly brushed it away and put in the back of the line. Surprisingly, not much concerning the Middle East was signed there, but the Conference has one of the largest impacts on today's Middle East. To come out of the Paris Peace Conference was the decision to honor the Sykes-Picot Agreement after a long debate. The end result was that France was allotted Syria except the area of Mosul. The first monarch to rule Syria was Feisal, who eventually was dethroned and became the first Monarch of Iraq. The decision to put Feisal's brother Abdullah on the Jordanian thrown was also decided. Not to say the debate about Arab independence was given up. In fact the United States President Woodrow Wilson fully supported Arab independence, but because the United States never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, which put itself in a passive position defending Arab autonomy. The British

actually claimed to a certain degree that it was supporting Arab independence, but it was simply using it as a mask. Another consequence of the Paris Peace Conference was that towards the end of the conference the alliances between the allies fell apart. France and England disagreed about issues concerning the Middle East and politics in general. The Paris Peace Conference also raised the issue of an independent Kurdistan, the creation of Iraq and the value of oil, each of these topics has its own section further in the essay.

The major players at the Peace Conference for the Entente powers were; Lloyd George for the United Kingdom, Clemenceau for the French and President Woodrow Wilson for the United States. Out of all the issues that were brought up at the conference the issues around the Ottoman Empire were last to be concluded. "In all it took nearly two years to conclude the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire; at the outset Lloyd George had predicted that it would take about a week."

The U.S. represented by Wilson heavily pushed for the independence of all the countries that were being formed from the pre-war boarders. This affected the British in two ways; it gave them an excuse to undermine the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and also gave them a valid excuse of putting their puppet leaders upon the thrones.

As the Peace Conference began the British public was war weary and broke. The Public no longer would support the government for keeping its troops abroad, especially in the Middle East, therefore the British government had an incredibly hard time justifying to the public the need of keeping its troops to 'maintain order' in the Middle East. On January 30, 1919, Lloyd George mentioned the Ottoman Empire briefly (during the time of heated debates regarding Germany) saying, "the Turks had been so bad at governing their subjects peoples,

³⁶ A Peace, pg. 403

Arabia itself. Since the Arabs were civilized but not yet organized, they would need outside guidance."³⁷ On February 6, Feisal with Lawrence as his interpreter (it is rumored that Feisal spoke from the Koran while Lawrence delegated the terms), addressed the Supreme Council. Feisal claimed that the Arabs wanted self-determination, while respecting the exceptions to Palestine and Lebanon. Feisal stressed that the "Arabs preferred unity and independence. Of the powers decided on mandates, then, he hinted, his people would prefer the Americans to anyone else."³⁸ Other major dates are March 20, where President Wilson tried to find a compromise between the quarreling French and British to what the Arabs really wanted for themselves in the Middle East. It was during this day that the French claimed support for Syria, where it had traditions of 200 years. It was during this day that Wilson ordered his own fact finding mission to the Middle East that eventually departed in May and returned too late to have any effect. On February 26, an Armenian delegation appeared before the Supreme Council to briefly remind the peacemakers that the Armenian question needed to be settled.³⁹

4.2 Withdraw from Syria

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³⁷ Paris 1919, pg. 375

³⁸ Paris 1919, pg. 391

³⁹ Of the many issues that the Peace Conference looked at, the issues regarding the former Russian territories of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were decided on. In these areas the British thought that Italy, France or with a great amount of hope America could defend these newly independent countries. But the U.K. lacked the men and resources to undertake the role of protectorate, and eventually had to pull its troops back and were forced to abandon the countries to their own fate. The Peace Conference also looked at the creation of an independent Turkey, where under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, he and the Turkish forces rallied to resist Allied peace terms, in which they eventually won independence. The Turkish Independence movement is an essay in its own. The importance for this essay is what decisions were made regarding the southern parts of the Ottoman Empire, that being Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia.

The diplomatic battle for Syria had begun as soon as the English under Allenby entered and proclaimed Marshall Law in Damascus. The French regarded the Sykes-Picot Agreement as a valid claim to their rule in Syria, the British argued that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was outdated especially now they no longer needed a buffer zone between them and Russia. The British had already proclaimed that Feisal would be the installed ruler in Syria. The British were unable to completely relieve themselves of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the pressures to send troops home resulted in the British withdraw from Syria. On September 13, 1919, the British government announced that withdraw would take place in November, leaving the French and Feisal to settle matters between themselves. The British therefore could also claim that it was honoring both the Arabs and the French as was stated in the Sykes-Picot agreement.

The French decided that they would accept Feisal as ruler in Damascus so long as he could maintain order. He returned to Damascus in January of 1920 to find a deteriorating situation. The Arab nationals were being quite belligerent with the French troops. Behind the scenes in Syria there was a lot of pressure from the Arabs on Feisal to make a deceleration of independence. Feisal reluctantly went along. On March 7, 1920 the Syrian congress proclaimed Feisal king of Syria. But not the Syria drawn out by the British and the French but Syria in its 'natural boundaries,' including Lebanon and Palestine and stretching east to the Euphrates. The Lebanese did not want to quarrel with France and on March 20, 1920 the Lebanese proposed their independence and chose their flag of the French tri-color with a Lebanese cedar in the center.

In July the French sent Feisal an ultimatum for "acceptance of the French mandate over Syria and punishment of those who had attacked the French." Feisal could not comply and went into exile on July 24, 1920. Thus the French no longer had relations with Feisal and set up their own mandate. To Bring Syria under control the French shrank it, most notably they in increased the boarders around Mount Lebanon, which resulted in Thousands of Muslims living in a Christian dominated land. Today this can be seen as a mistake by the French, but now Syria was completely out of British hands.

4.3 The question regarding Mosul

One issue that the British did have with the French before Syria was handed over to France was the quantity of oil that was believed to be in Mosul. World War I had changed the value of oil immensely. Oil was the fuel of the future and Britain realized this. The consumption of oil quadrupled between 1900 and 1919. Lord Curzon stated that the Allied cause "floated to victory upon a wave of oil." The British fuel minister at the time of the Peace Conference stated that "oil was the blood of victory." The French relinquished their claims to Mosul under the terms of the Long- Berenger Agreement, but still were guaranteed a small part of the product. Mosul now became the northern most part of Mesopotamia that stretched down through Bagdad and Basra.

The question regarding Mosul did not stop there, soon after the end of the war,
Russian backed Turkey claimed Mosul belonged to them. The Turkish claimed that, Mosul
was still part of Turkey since the British seized much of this territory after the signing of the
Armistice. The British claimed that Mosul was historically tied to Iraq, and that Iraq would

⁴⁰Paris 1919, pg. 407

⁴¹ Paris 1919 pg. 395

loose its viability without its northern half. Mosul was captured by the British two weeks after World War I ended, and was the leading prospect for oil. The debatable issue was what country Mosul' belonged to. Britain would loose the oil rights to Mosul if it was incorporated within the Turkish boarder, but if it were within Iraq; Britain would there for have a monopoly on the Mosul oil. Lord Curzon of the British argued that the policy "was not in anyway related to oil, that instead it was guided by the desire to 'protect the interest' of Iraqi people." An agreement could not be made between Ankara (Turkish) and the British, there for the matter was appointed to the League of Nations (that was created directly after the war). In December of 1925 the League of Nations decided to accept the 'Brussels Line' which included Mosul in the boarders of Iraq. Ankara had to reluctantly accept the council's decision, and Brittan gained complete control of Mosul oil.

4.4 A Fall in Alliances

As the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 wound down, the alliances between the Entente Powers disintegrated. The Russian revolution and the eventual Communist take over changed their diplomatic relations. After the war Soviet Russia quickly sided with the Turks. The United States dropped out of European affairs between 1919 and 1920. While President Wilson had great idealistic plans for Europe and the Middle East, the U.S. government would not back him. The United States would not support the treaty of Versailles nor the League of Nations, although its influence towards the creation of the Modern Middle East can be measured.

Wilson's ideology of sovereign states at first influenced Arab nationalism that was previously not united (in at least the boarders that the British proposed). Wilson's ideology or

⁴² http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/oilhistindex.htm

Wilsonism, allowed the British to mask their imperialistic goals. Wilson's idealism consequently kept America out of having a mandate anywhere in the Middle East, as well as having any say over the division of it. One point in Wilson's '14 Points' did address the Ottoman lands. Point XII reads, "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." Like most international treaties its wording is very vague by what 'unmolested opportunity' and 'autonomous development' mean, and like most treaties it is up to the interpretation of the words.

France pulled out of the alliances with Brittan. Unable to support its troops in Cilicia, a southwestern part of Turkey, coupled with the retirement of Clemenceau, French policy changed. With Clemenceau out, Aristide Briand became Premier in January of 1921. Later that year on October 26, France and Turkey signed the Angora Accords that ended the hostilities between them. The British saw it as a betrayal. It was no surprise to the British that the French left all of their munitions and weapons as they pulled back. Thus the two sides found themselves on the opposite end of the stick as England backed Greece that was fighting the French backed Turks.

The fall in alliances had one of the hardest impacts on the Middle East. The restructuring that Britain and her Allies set off to create, while half the time not knowing what their policy was, smashed the existing structure indefinitely. When the time came for the

⁴³ Paris 1919 pg, 496 (appendix)

restructuring, the alliances split apart and there was little money put towards aid and growth. The Middle East stood as a pawn with new teams of players. Russia, Turkey's age old enemy was now her ally. France and Britain no longer were on the same diplomatic wave that they had during the time of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Britain was in alliance with, the Hussein's from Arabia, even though it did not want to be. They were also looking for any way possible to pull out of its investment into a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, The fact that the British public no longer supported the occupation troops did not give the politicians much choice or room to breathe.

There are quit a few of issues that arose during the Paris Peace Conference that are very valid today such as the value of oil and the question regarding of Mosul. Another problem that the British made during the Paris Peace conference was the ideological division between the American and the British. There was also the fact that the alliances were unable to stick together that also influenced the modern Arab states.

5.1The creation of an independent Iraq

This next section looks at the creation of an Independent Iraq. During the creation of Modern Iraq one must mention the influence of Gertrude Bell. In 1915, she became the first woman to work for British intelligence in the British expedition to Mesopotamia. One of her best friends was Lawrence, Feisal and for a time Arnold Wilson. "She threw herself into her work in Mesopotamia. 'We shall, I trust,' she wrote to her father, 'make it a center of Arab civilization and prosperity. The Arabs, she assumed at first, would play little part in their own government."

11 1919 Arnold Wilson sent Bell off to Cairo, London and finally to The Paris Peace Conference to find out what was happening regarding Mesopotamia. Bell quickly found out that the fate of Mesopotamia was directly linked to the settlement over the dispute regarding Syria and in particular Mosul. Bell lobbied fruitlessly for an independent state at the Conference, but the Paris Peace Conference ended with not much in writing regarding the Mesopotamia.

The British Administration in Mesopotamia at this time was headed by Arnold Wilson, with the British Indian troops in occupation. Wilson believed that Basra, Baghdad and Mosul should become a single unit for administrative purposes. In Mesopotamia in 1919, "there was no Iraqi people; history, religion, geography pulled the people apart, not together. Basra looked south, towards India and the Gulf; Baghdad had strong links with Persia; and Mosul had closer ties with Turkey and Syria." Putting the land together was a mistake. The divisions in the country were religious; with about half the population Shia Muslim and a

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⁴⁴ Paris 1919, pg. 399

⁴⁵ A Peace, pg. 397

quarter Sunni, with other minorities such as Jew and Christian. On top of that, half the inhabitants were Arab and the rest Kurds (from Mosul), Persians or Assyrians, There was never any Iraqi nationalism only Arab induced nationalism. Towards the end of the war the Mesopotamian people thought or hoped for a larger Arabia under Feisal not a separate state. Arnold Wilson did not foresee throwing such diverse populations into a single state. He was a paternalist and assumed Britain would remain for generations.

5.2 The 1920 Rebellion

In the summer of 1920, rebellions broke out over a third of Mesopotamia. Britain began to wonder if it was worth the cost and how it could restore order. Gertrude Bell suggested finding a pliable Arab ruler, "Conveniently, they had Feisal, to whom, after all, they did owe something. At a conference in Cairo in March 1921, Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, agreed to make him king. As a second prize, his older brother Abdullah, 'a sensualist, idle, and very lazy,' would get the state of Transjordan."⁴⁶ Under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain and further completed on April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Bell designed Feisal's flag and arranged the ceremonies to proclaim him king. On August 23, 1921, Feisal was crowned King of Iraq. The kingship regarding Transjordan was also officially confirmed.

The 1920 Rebellion had two main effects on Iraq's future. First it brought the various communities together in a common fight under specific Iraqi slogans, "it enhanced national consciousness and broadened the ideological appeal of the independent movement."⁴⁷ Second, the uprising forced the British to alter their policy of direct control. "This, of course, meant

⁴⁶ Paris 1919, pg. 408 ⁴⁷ Iraq since 1989, pg.12

that the emerging states would suffer from serious limitations to its independence, a condition guaranteeing a continuation of tensions."⁴⁸

In 1921 Winston Churchill reemerged and quickly became influential in the final division of the Middle East. Churchill most importantly found new life and support from the English citizens by the fact that for the first time Women were able to vote, as well as convincing the public he could rule the Middle East using armored cars and airplanes when public support would no longer support large numbers of troops supporting an occupying force. Churchill claimed the use of airplanes could especially cut the cost in money but also it would require far less people to support it. When Churchill took office as Colonial Secretary he, "brought with him a broad strategic concept of how to hold down the Middle East inexpensively." Churchill's ideas for the Middle East came through at the Cairo Conference that began in 1922. One of the first decisions that Churchill supported was that Feisal was to be offered the throne of Mesopotamia where every effort would be made to make it appear that the offer came from the local population rather than from Britain.

The year of 1922 can be seen as the completion of the current boarders in the Middle East. Transjordan 's boarders were set in 1922. In the same year Britain also imposed frontier agreements upon Ibn Saud that established borders between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait. Thus Winston Churchill came full circle from being publically chastised at the beginning of World War I to becoming the public's choice as whom was to wrap-up World War I. "No man played a more crucial role—at times unintentionally—in giving birth to the Middle East we live with today than did Winston Churchill... A curious destiny drove Churchill and the

⁴⁸ Iraq since 1989, pg. 13

⁴⁹A Peace, pg 500

Middle East to interfere repeatedly in one another's political lives. This left its marks; there are frontier lines now running across the face of the Middle East that are scar-lines from those encounters with him." ⁵⁰

The great Hashemite kingdom that the British had pushed for died out. Hussein Sheriff of Mecca lost his throne in 1924 when the Ibn Saud family took over, which was also backed by Britain. Feisal and Iraq pushed for independence and in 1932 Iraq joined the League of Nations as an independent state. Feisal died the fallowing year, his son died in a car crash in 1939. Feisal's grandson died in a coup of 1958 which made Iraq a Republic. The only Hashemite kingdom that still survives is Jordan, Abdullah's great-grandson is now king.

The actual boarders of the Middle East roughly fallowed the boarders of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. With France occupying the Northern lands of and protected Syria and help support Lebanon. Brittan had Palestine, Transjordan and the patched together Iraq to go on its long list of protectorates. Except for a few disputed areas the modern boarders were drawn in 1924 at the conference of San Remo.

⁵⁰ A Peace, pg. 25

6.1 The British Mandate in Palestine

The British mandate in Palestine lasted from essentially 1917 until 1948, within this time the Jewish homeland of Israel emerged. The impacts the British had on its birth and in some respects to the current issues between Israel and the Middle East today are measurable.

Regarding the Ottoman Empire, the British believed that "the political life of the empire was driven underground where secret societies proliferated." In particular it was thought that the CUP was infiltrated by the Jews. The British investigated this group and issued a report on May 29, 1910. The report concluded that the CUP "was a Latin-influenced international Jewish Freemason conspiracy... [where] The Oriental Jew is adept at manipulating occult forces... and through it had taken control of the Ottoman Empire.

Amongst the ringleaders of the Jewish Freemason conspiracy was the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Oscar Straus, whose brother owned the New York department stores Macy's and Abraham &Straus." The Jewish conspiracy theories do not stop there. That "when the C.U.P., once in power, moved the Ottoman empire into the German orbit, its policy was seen as an example of the effectiveness of the Jewish alliance with Germany." But at the time the British did not know that they had been supplied with a warped view of Ottoman politics. While in clear light of history these theories were absurd, the impact they had on clear headed British politicians at the time was very real.

Jewish attempts to create organized autonomy go back to the time before the First World War. Sir Mark Sykes proposed for a Jewish Bureau earlier in the war. The Jewish

⁵¹ A Peace, pg. 40

⁵² A Peace, pg. 42

⁵³ A Peace, pg. 466

Bureau or Agency would cooperate with British administration in social and economic issues concerning development of the 'Jewish National Home'. The Agency's main missions were to ensure Jewish immigration, to help develop Hebrew language as well as culture and to obtain new land in Palestine

From 1916 the Zionist, had planned on gaining support from Britain and constructed a plan in which the main goal was the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine under either British or French mandate. It soon became clear that the French would disagree with such a plan and thus the Zionists, for their own good, declared their will that they wished to be solely under the British mandate in Palestine. The Zionists convinced Britain that if it would still support Jewish immigration, they would, in return, safeguard the way to India and to protect the Suez Canal

The Jewish Zionist made their first proposals in July 1917, shortly after the British captured Jerusalem for a National Homeland and a draft was submitted requesting Palestine 'as the National Home of the Jewish People'. The first proposal was sent on July 18, 1917, where there was no mention of the original inhabitants. The text was amended several times and eventually signed by Arthur Balfour on November 2, 1917, and issued to Lord Walter Rothschild. Since the resolution was signed by Balfour, it became known as the Balfour Declaration. The Declaration stated: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish

communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." ⁵⁴

In the mid-1930s, tension between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was on the increase (again) and escalated into a great Palestinian uprising, which lasted from 1936 to 1939. The death toll reached several thousands. British colonial politics once inclined to believe one side and later the other, always changed depending on its interests in the Middle East. Yet, the severe situation in Palestine caused Great Britain to issue another White Paper on May 17 1939. The English government pledged in this document to establish an independent Palestine state within 10 years, where Arabs as well as Jews would have shares in governing it. "It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of selfgovernment which are exercised by the people of neighboring countries. ... It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured."55 The government also promised to reduce immigration for five years. The ultimate number of new Jewish immigrants was supposed to be 75,000 by 1945. After this date, no other Jewish immigration should take place, only with permission of the Palestinian Arabs. "Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which ... will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one -third of the total population of the country. ... After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it. "56

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⁵⁴ The Hidden History of the Balfour Declaration (Ebscohost)

⁵⁵ The Arab-Israel Disputes, pg. 248

⁵⁶. The Arab-Israel Disputes, pg. 248.

The Zionists put their proposal to the British Government on May 22, 1945, where they required the proclamation of Palestine as a Jewish state, "That an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine 'undivided and undiminished' as a Jewish state to commend new immigration to the Jewish Agency. That the Jewish Agency be invested with the control of Jewish immigration into Palestine; free entry to all Jews who wish to live in Palestine, That free international facilities be provided for the exit and transit of all Jews who wish to settle in Palestine" ⁵⁷The British government, however, continued with the Political thinking of the 1939 White Papers and did not accept such proposals. The motion was not carried partly because it wholly showed Zionists' intentions regarding the coexistence with Arabs in one state. Soon after the denial of the Jewish request armed attacks were conducted by Jewish gorilla fighters against the British Mandate administration. A number of offenses took place against British troops, between 1945–1946, where terrorists made several bomb attacks against the British administrative buildings, killing British policemen, soldiers, and also they murdered the Secretary of State Lord Moyne in Cairo, because of his defense of anti-Zionist policy. "The British troops responded by seizures of suspicious persons and deported anyone who attempted to penetrate Palestinian land without permission."58

Such rough action from the British, however, went astray. Only six years after issuing the White Papers, which was to restrain further Zionist expansion and to guarantee abiding Arab rights, the Zionist movement was stronger than it ever was. Even though there were only a hundred thousand new immigrants to Palestine, there might have been several million if the British had not issued their 1939 White Paper. However the goal of the World Zionist Organization – creating a Jewish state in Palestine – became more real. It was largely because

⁵⁷ Great Britain and Palestine pg. 139

⁵⁸ Bitter Harvest. Pg 60.

Zionists changed their political course during World War II that they begun to orientate themselves towards the United States. That was why, under the pressure of the USA and disconsolate situation in Palestine, the British government decided to cease its mandate.

6.2 May 15, 1948 the end of occupation

The mandate of the United Kingdom was held until May 15, 1948. There was no legal authority in the country at the time the mandate ceased, which the Zionists turned into profit and their armed organizations made considerable efforts to capture the administrative and industrial centers. First they annexed cities Haifa and Jaffa and some other important districts. The British administration, shortly before its recession, tried to embroil and evoke disruption and thus show that their government in the Middle East was irreplaceable. This proved to be wrong since they did not take into account the perfect Zionists' preparedness. On May 14 1948, one day before the official termination of the mandate, Ben Gurion, in the name of the General Zionist Congress, declared the creation of a Jewish State called Israel. Ben Gurion became head of the administration and he invalidated the White Papers from 1939 by first orders and announced unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine. Namely, he said: "The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration". 59

Concluding this section the British were so adamant about supporting the Jewish at first because the perceived power was that they greased the wheels of every major government in the World. The British none the less wrote the Balfour Declaration that supported the Jewish National Homeland. In the diplomatic support of the formation of Israel Britain made a few errors. First, it did not specify say what exactly was meant by a National Homeland. Second, it did not appease the Jews and Arabs nor treat them equally in the

⁵⁹ the Arab-Israeli Conflict pg. 222.

Balfour Deceleration accompanied with a growing resolution towards each other the Jews and Arabs were doomed to debate over boarders that should have been clearly defined before. The British should have also stuck with one policy regarding their exit strategy from the Palestine Mandate.

A variety of reasons coalesced in the 1940's to create the state of Israel. These include "British withdrawal from the Mandate and from Palestine, the United Nations petition resolution on Palestine in November 1947, American diplomatic and financial support for Israel, profound differences within the Arab world about the future of Palestine, a fragmented Palestine Arab community, a stubborn Zionist leadership and dedicated cadre of Jewish nationalists, and a moral imperative to take positive actions after the holocaust in Europe. But these reasons could not have enabled a community to declare statehood in 1948 without the acquisition and establishment of Jewish national territory upon which a state could function and in which a population could survive."

⁶⁰ The Land Question, pg. 212

7.1 Section II, Consequences

The fallowing sections shows that the health of Iraq specifically regarding its

Government, resources and State. It shows that from the time Iraq was divided from the

Ottoman Empire and through the reign of the British installed monarch there were bad seeds
that the British planted, and their sprouts can be seen the early 21st century Iraq. First to be
examined is the issue of an independent Kurdistan, hence the issue Iraq has with its 'State.'

Regarding the health of Iraq's resources, the issues(and history) of Iraqi oil is presented.

The Final section looks at unification, hence the health of the Government. This section
shows the problems that the monarchy planted and how that affects the unification of Iraq, as
one state or a federation.

The essay will relate the bad seeds the British made and show the current dilemmas that they are causing. Such as how the British policy changed so often through the division of the Middle East that its direction was unclear in its policies lacked confidence, that the tear between the people and their trust in the government was minimal. Another bad seed that emerged in the first part of the thesis was how Brittan completely mishandled the issue of religion, particularly how they tried to control the Caliph leading up to and during the Arab Revolt. The diplomatic issues that had during the division of the Middle East is a strong tie between the last section and the next. That on more than one occasion the British were bound to their agreements that they made, and later on had no desire to be connected with, hence the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. The British also failed at the Paris Peace

Conference, that it failed to resolve some of the issues in an international manner. This next section looks at the question of an independent Kurdistan and the problems of Iraqi oil. Both these issues were brought up during the Paris Peace Conference and were dealt with in the wrong manner.

Regarding the historical approach to research, the first section gave historical background to the issues at bay. The next section will look toward current trends and future possibilities.

8.1 Independent Kurdistan

The Kurdish national movement has always been a thorn in the side of both the Iraqi's and the British monarch, and currently plays an important part towards restructuring a modern Iraq. This following section puts stress on the importance of the Kurdish movement presently and throughout the history of the British mandate and modern Iraq.

In July 1920, sixty two tribal leaders of the region, called for independence of Kurdistan under a British mandate. The initial objection of the British to the Kurdish self-rule was driven by the fear that the success of the Kurdish area will tempt the two Arab areas of Baghdad and Basra to follow suit, hence endangering the direct British control over all Mesopotamia. The Kurds were the most distinct of all the non-Arab communities and always have represented the greatest challenge to national integration.

The biggest problem that the Kurds themselves have faced from the end of World War I through the 1990's is that they were politically divided. On one side there is the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). And on the other side the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP, formed in 1946 by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who announced that the KDP wanted Kurdish national rights in Iraq, including the right of self-governance, but his request was dismissed. In the 1958 Military Coup (or revolution) "brought about a growth in political activism throughout Iraq and, as a result, the KDP quickly developed into a prominent organization." As the KDP grew, competing ideals emerged. The main disagreements were about independence and whether the party should support Socialism. Factions were usually

⁶¹ Iraq since 1989, pg 79

divided by region (Irbil versus Sulaymania) social background (urban versus rural) and religion.

In 1961 the Kurds led an armed rebellion against Iraq, this violence continued until 1975 when it was crushed by the Baath Government of Iraq. Shortly after 1975 the KDP faced internal strife and again split. This led to the establishment of the PUK under the leadership of Talbani. The PUK gained power quickly as the leader of the KDP Mullah Mustafa grew ill and died in exile. Mullah Mustafa's sons took over the party and reorganized it along more modern party lines. During the late 1970's both parties began to re-establish guerilla fighting networks in the mountains of the north, though they tended to fight more among themselves that against government troops of Iraq.

Another split between the KDP and the PUK took place during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's. The KDP was more pro-Iranian in hopes the Iraq regime would be overthrown. The PUK on the other hand, was mainly located on the Iranian boarder and feared Iranian domination, and tried to negotiate a deal with Saddam Hussein. "These differing approaches, when added to their old rivalry, often led to serious conflict boarding on all-out civil war in Kurdistan. By 1988, it became clear to all that Saddam was no longer on the defensive and that the end of the war would surely bring an attack from Baghdad."62 With the urging of the United States the KDP and PUK and six other groups formed the Kurdistan regional government. "The elections, the first-ever fully democratic vote held in Iraq, were a moving testament to the idea of democracy."63 Turnout exceeded 80 percent. The elections yielded an exact parliamentary divide between the KDP and PUK, which was one of the worst scenarios

⁶² Iraq since 1989, pg. 80

⁶³ The End of Iraq, pg. 155

because no party could claim legitimate power by majority. This new Kurdish regional government then announced its intention of forming a federal union with Arab Iraq. "This replaced the old demand for 'autonomy' and placed greater emphasis on independence without going as far as complete secession."⁶⁴ The Kurdish parties then agreed to split Kurdistan territories between themselves, the PUK would govern the East and the KDP represented the West of the Kurdish speaking lands. The power sharing agreement fell apart in 1991 over disputes about sharing revenues. In 1993 fighting broke out that escalated into a full-fledged civil war lasting to 1997. Then in 1997, the United States forcefully moved in to mediate, the following year the two parties agreed to return to the formula of territorial division and the sharing of customs revenues.

In 1998 the peace between the KDP and the PUK began to increase. The PUK still was very popular in the East with its main support in Sulaymania and the KDP in the west in Erbil and Dahuk. America was still backing Kurdistan and Turkish peacekeepers who were set up as a buffer between the two 'patrolling the no mans land. At the end of 2002, the PUK members allowed the National Assembly to return to Erbil, which enabled it to function once again as the legislature for the entire region.

As the Second Iraq War was on the horizon in 2002, "many Kurds feared that Saddam's fall would mean the end of their American-protected freedom, and that the Americans might allow more democratic Iraqi government to reduce their independence." The Iraqi war produced one of the best possible outcomes for the Kurds. The United States removed all opposition to the Kurds. The United States not only removed Saddam but also the

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⁶⁴ Iraq since 1989, pg. 81

⁶⁵ The End of Iraq, pg. 157

foundations of Sunni Arab rule in Iraq, the Army, the Baath Party and the intelligence service. Kurdistan quickly consolidated their power for their own independence. In 2005, the KDP and PUK jointly supported Massoud Barzani for President of Kurdistan and in 2006 formed a single cabinet under Prime Minister Nechiuvan Barzani.

In January 2005, the Kurdish proposed a referendum for peace and independence, two million Kurds supported the referendum and ninety eight percent chose independence. Article 1, Section 1, of the special Provisions for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, states that "the Kurdistan Region is a self-governing region, with its own laws and government." The referendum also calls for its own security force and police. Ownership of its own natural resources, its own taxation and other calls for independence. Most importantly in Article 5 states, "The Permanent Constitution of Iraq, or any successor law to this Transitional Law, shall be valid in the Kurdistan Region only if approved by a majority of the people of the Kurdistan region voting in a referendum." Kurdistan desire for independence will continue to overshadow all other aspects of its relationship with Iraq. The United States Pentagon has strong ambitions to build a unified Iraq but to the Kurds this idea is unrealistic and undesirable. "The Iraqi Army was the only enemy the Kurds have ever known, and they were never going to give up the peshmerga to an Arab-dominated army supposedly reformed by the United States." The Kurdish have a strong say in what they want as being the only stable and pro-American part of Iraq, especially with the poor state the occupation is in.

The Kurdish movement contributes heavily towards the outcome of a new Iraq. The calls for independence have always been there for the Kurdish, even before the creation of

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⁶⁶ The End of Iraq, pg. 226

⁶⁷ The End of Iraq, pg. 229

⁶⁸ The End of Iraq, pg. 163

Iraq. The British made their mistakes by not dealing with the Kurdish movement. The United States have put themselves in a peculiar position by supporting the Kurdish movement in the early 1990's but now opting for a united Iraq and a one state constitution, while the Kurds openly declared they would only accept a constitution if it was voted in by the Kurdish people. The Issue of Kurdistan challenges the Iraqi State, the issue of Kurdish independence is a seed that they British planted in the 20th century.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ There are a few questions that need to be decided regarding Kurdish independence; the question of what powers would belong to Kurdistan and what powers would go to the central government in Baghdad? How would the Kurdistan government be funded? But the most important questions were; who would own the oil of Kurdistan, and who would be in control of the police and security forces?

9.1 OIL

When the British began to become 'involved' in the Middle East, their aims were imperialist in nature, although what they exactly wanted to do or 'get out,' of the Middle East changed during this time. When the value of oil was realized during World War I, Britain found a new use for the Middle East, oil extraction.

Oil was first discovered in 1908 at Masjid-I Suleiman, in today Iran. The Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) was founded in 1911 as the first oil concession in Mesopotamia. The TPC was composed of the British, German and Dutch. The first time TPC drilled in Mosul there was a 'blowout.' The British lost control of a live well, oil drenched the entire countryside, and a bloom of gas loomed in the air. The disaster took nine days to control and officially killed two people. There was more oil in Mosul than the TPC knew what to do with, hence the fight for Mosul during the Paris Peace Conference.

The United States of America chose not to get involved in the Middle East after world War One, *except* in the oil market. On April 27, 1920, at the Conference of San Remo, France and Britain struck a secret agreement, "in effect to monopolize the whole future of Middle Eastern oil between them." The US press began to denounce the Anglo-French accord as old fashion imperialism. In the summer of 1920, the San Remo agreement was made public. The United States was now able to politically protest. Not surprisingly, "British officials suspected that American oil interests were behind the anti-British insurrection in Iraq and the Kemalist

⁷⁰A peace, pg. 534

movement in Turkey,"⁷¹ and immediately they began talks with the Americans. Regarding the concessions of American interest in Iraqi oil, Allen Dullas filed the reports for the American Government. Dulles was chief of the Near Eastern Affairs Division of the Department of State. Dulles suggested that the U.S. oil companies "would be much better off negotiating a partnership with British interests rather than attempting to operate their own."⁷² On June 22, 1922, seven United States oil companies had proposed to participate in the British-owned concessionary corporation in Iraq. Under the conniving political knife of Allen Dulles, America inserted itself in the spoils of Mesopotamian oil. The US entered under the 'Red line agreement,' which stated that IPC was to be divided as follows; French and Dutch would have twenty five percent share, but could not produce it; five percent went to a wealthy Armenian, Grumkin, but he had no voting rights; the fallowing seventy percent of the IPC was equally divided between two British, and two American companies, whom controlled all the production. In 1929 the TPC became the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), with two subsidiaries; the Mosul Petroleum Company and Basra Petroleum Company. This completed the monopolization process of Iraqi oil deposits. In April 1932, British Oil Development Company obtained a 75-year oil concession for territory lying west of the Tigris and north of the thirty third parallel. In December 1938 Basra Petroleum Company obtained a seventy five year oil contract for the rest of Iraq.

After World War II, a pair of American companies out bid IPC in oil rights for a promising sight in Saudi Arabia outside the Red line Agreement. These companies were Social (later Chevron) and, the Texas Company (later Texaco). These two then merged with the existing two American oil companies, under the supervision and close support of the

⁷¹A peace, pg. 535

⁷² A Peace, pg. 536

American government. This created a mild problem, for the Red Line Agreement contained a clause that stipulated that no new companies would be aloud into IPC and it prohibited any of its shareholders from independently seeking oil in the ex-Ottoman territory. The Americans would have to nullify the Red line Agreement, and did so by 'supervening illegality' claiming that World War II had rendered the agreement void. The Red Line Agreement was scrapped, but IPC continued its operations as a full-fledged monopoly, without the Dutch, Germany or Grumkin.

Saddam Hussein wanted to make his country a better place, and one way he would be able to improve his homeland would be to control the Iraqi oil. The Russians looked to counterstrike in the diplomatic Cold War, thus a relationship was born. In April of 1972, Iraq signed an alliance with Communist Russia, which led to the nationalization of Iraqi oil. The treaty guaranteed Soviet access to Iraqi air bases. The Soviets agreed to provide training for thousands of Iraqi officers in Soviet military academies. The Baathists would take orders from Moscow on issues such as Iraq's votes at the United Nations. Also in return the Soviets agreed to help keep the Baathists in power, and help them with their nationalization. It was stipulated that the Soviets would buy the Iraqi oil, and France would decline to join an anti-Iraq boycott as so long as French interest were not harmed. Two months after signing the pact with Moscow the Baath party nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company. Saddam Hussein claimed June 1, 1972, as 'Victory Day.'

The Arab world imposed the 1973 oil embargo against the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The price of Middle East oil was drastically increased, as the Shah of Iran, whose nation was the world's second-largest exporter of oil and the closest ally of the United States in the Middle East at the time, said. "Of course [the world price of oil] is going to rise,"

the Shah told the New York Times in 1973. "Certainly! And how...You [Western nations] increased the price of wheat you sell us by 300 percent, and the same for sugar and cement... You buy our crude oil and sell it back to us, redefined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you've paid to us... It's only fair that, from now on, you should pay more for oil. Let's say 10 times more."

The Arab-Israeli conflict became violent during the Six Days war of 1967. Directly after the war Arab states formed the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that united all the Middle East oil producing countries. The Yam Kippur War of 1973 solidified any doubts regarding the future of OPEC oil. The Arab nations were "furious at the emergency resupply effort that had enabled Israel to withstand Egyptian and Syrian forces." Most of the money that OPEC generated for its emerging states fell into the hands of elites who reinvested it in the West or increased their social status.

At the same time of the oil embargo Iraq began an eight-year war with Iran, its neighboring country. Henry Kissinger and his 'full spectrum dominance' regarding Arab oil, negotiated with Hussein. In 1974, President Richard Nixon sent Kissinger to negotiate an Egypt-Israel cease-fire and the resumption of the shipment of oil to the United States. Although the embargo ended only a year after it began, the OPEC nations had quadrupled the price of oil in the West. The embargo opened a new era in international relations. It was a political and economical achievement for Iraq and the Arab nations.

In the 1980's Iraqi oil faced a few financial problems. One was caused by an eight year war with Iran. Iraq suffered economic losses of at least \$100 billion from the war. The

www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/oilhistindex.htm
www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/oilhistindex.htm

hostilities ended in 1988. Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, also led to international economic sanctions and military action beginning in January 1991. The United Nations Oil for Food program began in December 1996. Iraq would be aloud to sell its oil in exchange for humanitarian goods, such as food, water and medicine.

9.2 Early 21st Century situation of Iraqi resources

Fallowing the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the economy to a great deal shut down. This caused problems for the United States because the, "the United States produces nearly 10 percent of the world's oil but consumes 25 percent." Thus the United States has kept with its view of keeping Iraqi oil in its hands. As a chief of Iraq, Paul Bremer issued a series of orders designed to restructure Iraq's broadly state owned economy. "Order 39 laid out the framework for full privatization in Iraq, except for 'primary extraction and initial processing' of oil, and permitted 100% foreign ownership of Iraqi assets. Other orders established a flat tax of fifteen percent and permitted foreign corporations to repatriate all profits earned in Iraq. Privatization of the oil industry, in addition to around 200 other state-owned businesses, was scheduled to begin sometime in late 2005." Opposition from senior Iraqi officials, together with the poor security situation, meant that Bremer's privatization plan was not implemented during his tenure, though his orders remain in place. Within the Iraqi constitution, that is supposedly drafted by Iraqis states in regards to oil that, Oil is defined as the property of all Iraqi people (Art. 109) and is to be managed by the federal government in conjunction with regional and provincial governments, Article 110 attempts to define how oil revenue is to be

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⁷⁵ The Opportunity, 131

⁷⁶ en.kikepedia.org/wiki/Economy of Iraq

distributed among the country's regions and provinces; however, beyond stating that it be done 'fairly', the constitution does not go into specifics. It also could be read as referring solely to "current" oil fields, not ones opened up in the future.

In 2005 the Federation of Oil Unions of Iraq was formed and is the largest independent union consortium in Iraq. The Union has remained independent of any political parties and influences from the foreign occupation. "Unfortunately, oil and gas are often found in countries where stability and production cannot be taken for granted. Nearly two-thirds of the world's known oil and gas is found in the greater Middle East." The problem of oil in Iraq is obvious, it always has been foreign controlled. This essay has shown in many places how oil has effected the decisions of the powers and how they sought control of the Middle East oil, and have caused unknown damage in controlling the Middle East oil. If these mistakes are to be discontinued the oil must be given back to its local government. The issue of oil is one of the largest concerning the natural resources of Iraq and stems from how the British and other foreign powers have handled the resource in the past.

⁷⁷ The Opportunity, 132

10.1 Iraqi Government

This next section shows how the recent history plays into the modern state of the Iraqi government. The section continues with the history of the British installed Monarchy. It shows that the division between the people and the Government was so grand that it has presented grave issues for the modern state. This section then examines the choices that the Iraqi people have made after the American led invasion regarding the makeup of their government. The section specifically looks at the U.S suggested Constitution of 2005 and also examines the option for a Federal government consisting of three regions. This section shows that the history of the formation of Iraq has greatly influenced the health of the modern Government.

10.2The Fall of the Monarchy

The problem towards a unified Iraq stretches deep into the creation of a monarch and the unplanned unification of Iraq. The Monarchies under direct British guidance were never able to unify the people. The roots of the problem with the British installed Monarchy stem from the period directly after World War I, where the British were caught between their quasi-promise made for Arab independence, the public pressure that the citizens were putting on the government calling for the return of British troops and the idealistic desire to keep parts of the Middle East as imperialist protectorates. The British concept of Imperialism under an Arab headdress backfired on them. The British hesitated and changed Middle Eastern policies towards the occupation to often, they failed in never uniting the people or never realized how different the people were. At the time of division, "the country's 2.5-3 million

people were still deeply divided along religious, ethnic, linguistic, regional, and tribal lines.

About 53 percent were Arab Shi'is inhabiting the regions south of Baghdad; 20 percent were Sunni Kurds in the northern part of the country along the Turkish and Iranian boarders."⁷⁸

Between 1932 and 1958 "the monarchy achieved much in the way of social and economic development but failed spectacularly in building a social base of support." The Iraqi citizens continued to see themselves in communal or sub-national groups. During the early years of the monarchy large tribal confederations paid little attention to the newly formed state of Iraq. The tribes saw no use in the drawn boarders from interrupting their centuries old migration routes. During the period of the monarchial rule there were laws and rules set in place that would severely hinder the economic strength, and keep the people at ends with their government. Such laws as the 'Rights and Duties of Cultivators Law' of 1933 and the 'Lazma Law 'of 1952, both these laws effectively bound the peasants to the land and gave landowners exemption from most taxes. "By 1958, about 80 percent of the peasants were landless, and only 1.7 percent of landowners owned over 63 percent of all cultivated land. Burdened by such a structure, Iraq's peasantry was regarded as among the world's most destitute with a life expectancy of no more than thirty-five to thirty-nine years."

Hoping to promote integration and independence King Feisal and his successors constantly increased the size and strength of the Iraqi Army. Most of the officers were from middle-level Sunni backgrounds. But the Iraqi army started to move away from the king, and gain strength. In 1936 there was a coup led by General Sidqi in which the Army gained the role of 'political arbitrators, but failed.' In 1941 during World War II the Iraqi Army in a

⁷⁸ Iraq since 1989, pg. 13

⁷⁹ Iraq since 1989, pg. 15

⁸⁰ Iraq since 1989, pg. 19

challenge to the British presence, attempted to establish ties with the Axis powers. Though this failed its results were an increased British presence.

As far as infrastructure is concerned, Iraq did improve under the early monarchal system but it did not allow for any growth to go its own direction. For example education levels were increased, schools and colleges were built, and an increasing number of professionals were trained in all fields. Paradoxically it was these trained professionals that demanded sovereignty from the monarchy, as they formed the leadership for new political parties. The Iraqi Communist Party, formed in 1932 and by the late 1950's was to become the largest and best organized political organization in the country. "Other than opposing the government, it was noted for its ability to form non-governmental institutions such as unions for its labor, women, students, youth, artists, and others. While the party eventually failed to seize power, it nevertheless played a crucial role in the development of civil society and a broad political awareness among ordinary Iraqis."81 Other parties that formed during this time were the National Democratic Party and the Independent Party. These parties were supported by a massive movement of people from the country side to the city as Baghdad grew eightfold between 1919 and 1960. The rip between the government and the people continued through the 1950's. Within the atmosphere of the Cold War the Communist and Arab Nationalist tended to lean towards Russia and the east, while the Monarchy was controlled and looked closely to the west. In 1956 Iraq became a founding member of the Baghdad Pact, in attempts to contain Soviet influence, paradoxically the popularity of the communist party in Iraq continued to carry public weight. The Monarchy would fall in the 1950's, the people despised it.

⁸¹ Iraq since 1989, pg. 71

The Monarchy did eventually begin to realize that it was being separated from the people and responded to this by renegotiating its oil agreement with the Iraqi Petroleum Company in a last ditch effort to close the gap between the leader and the people. In 1952 the British supported monarch greatly increased its oil revenues with a new fifty-fifty profit sharing agreement. This shifted the country from an economy based on agriculture exports to oil. "By 1958, a full 62 percent of state revenues came from oil." This meant that the state became less reliant on any of the country's social class because it did not depend on taxation, which increased the government's alienation from society.

The 1950's Middle East also saw many radical changes that contributed to the downfall of the Monarchy. The defeat of the Arab and Iraqi Armies in Palestine in 1948, fallowed by the instillation of a radical government in Iran of the same year further agitated change in Iraq. The charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt had a big effect as well with his calls of "overthrowing the 'corrupt' monarchies, the elimination of foreign hegemony and the enactment of social welfare policies." The Iraqi people needed a leader to follow.

The monarchy in Iraq in the early 1950's was led by Abdul-Ilah and the Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id, they responded to this pressure by rigging elections and increasing political repression. On the morning of July 14, 1958 the Army carried out a coup de grace. The Monarch was overthrown, from that day on Britain was 'officially' out of Iraq.

The problem with the monarchy that the British set up was that it was never powerful enough to control the people. The British first made the mistake by believing the religious power the monarchy had that even though it could be directly traced back to the Profit Mohammad

83 Iraq since 1989, pg. 18

⁸² Iraq since 1989, pg. 18

would unite the people. The second mistake the British made was to not give them any profits from the oil. The third mistake was that the monarchy was supposed to unite a country with too diverse of a population.

10.3 Early 21st century situation regarding the Iraqi government

"Although President Bush proclaimed America's mission was to bring the blessings of freedom to the Iraqi people, his administration was reluctant to trust them with democracy," this is reminiscent of British times. The Bush administration proposed to limit the choices of the peoples of Iraq by having the country's permanent constitution written by Iraqis selected by the Americans. The hand-picked Iraqis would then be assisted by American constitution advisors who would ensure that the constitution would live up to western demands. But the thought of a new constitution is hindered by the embedded problem that, Iraq's people do not share a common vision of the Iraqi state nor do they have common values. "Inevitably, making an Iraqi constitution would more closely resemble the negotiation of a peace treaty than the design of a blue print for a state."

The United States entrusted the formation of a new Iraqi constitution to Paul Bremer. Bremer arrived in Iraq in May of 2003, and was shortly appointed chief executive authority in the country as U.S administrator of Iraq and was in charge of overseeing the U.S occupation of Iraq until the country was deemed to be in a state in which it could be self governed. He was empowered to issue decrees to modify Iraq's infrastructure, including such notable decrees as removing all restrictions on freedom of assembly, suspending the use of the death penalty, upholding Saddam Hussein's anti-worker union laws, and establishing a Central

⁸⁴ The End of Iraq, pg. 136

⁸⁵ The End of Iraq, pg. 138

Criminal Court of Iraq. He was responsible for setting up Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, which would be the predecessor to the Iraqi constitution.

One of the first major issues Bremer and the US ran into was that Iraq is currently divided with the Shiites looking to Iran, the Sunnis looking to their fellow Arabs and the Kurds looking to the West. The Shiite religious parties want an Islamic state with many features of the Iranian model. The Kurds unanimously wanted an independent country, and if this would not happen they would want a loose federal system that gave Kurdistan as close to full independence as possible. The Secular Arabs want a unified country with some powers devolved to provinces defined by geography and not ethnicity. The Sunni delegates have no support among the Sunni Arab population became evident in the January and December 2005 elections, and were not represented on the Governing Council but they generally wanted the centralized Iraq that they once ran. These divisions can be traced back 80 years and are a by product of British intervention have affected how Iraq's communities see such issues as control of natural resources, the role of the Iraqi Army, control of international borders, the role of Islam, the rights of women, and where Iraq stands in the Islamic world.

It raises the question if the Americans are making the same mistakes as the British made in creating Iraq. The Americans want a unified Iraq where the central government would have control of Iraq's oil and water, have a monopoly on military force, and be responsible for the country's boarders and an effectively 'limited role of Islam.' In drafting the constitution for Iraq the United States included clauses on control of natural resources, the central government's monopoly on military power taxation, telecommunications, the role of Islam, and the applicability on the bill of rights. As far as choosing a new Iraqi leader, President Bush had one overriding concern, that Iraq's new leader should be publically

grateful to the United States. Bush said, "it's important to have someone who's willing to stand up and thank American people for their sacrifice in liberating Iraq."86

The United States proposed to bring Iraq together with an Iraqi constitution proposed on August 22, 2005. The Bush administration proposed that Zalmay Khalizad lead the mediation for the constitutional talks. Khalilzad began his job as Ambassador to Iraq on June 21, 2005. He was credited for helping negotiate compromises which allowed the ratification of Iraq's Constitution in October 2005. Khalilzad also worked to ensure that the December 2005 elections ran smoothly and played a substantial role in forming the current government which allows for the partitioning of Iraq into different regions along ethnic lines. "If Khalizad arrived in Baghdad still believing in the Bush Administration's formula of a 'democratic, federal, pluralist, and unified Iraq,' he swiftly caught on to the reality. Shuttling from faction to faction, he approached the process of drafting a constitution not so much as an exercise in 'nation-building' but rather as a negotiation of a tripartite peace treaty, which is largely what it was."87 These factions that Khalizad approached were the divisions that separated Iraq's Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Arabs. The Kurds saw the constitution as a threat to their independence, and examined every issue through that light. The Shiites, who were responsible for drafting of the text, "and whether through inexperience or self-serving intentions, they often simply disregarded agreements others thought had been reached."88 The Sunni Arabs practically rejected everything that had been proposed so much so the Shiites and Kurds stopped negotiating with them.

The End of Iraq, pg. 142The End of Iraq, pg. 193

⁸⁸ The End of Iraq, pg. 194

The Sunni opposition to a unified Iraq by constitution was not positive. The Sunni representatives were dominated by former members of the Baath party that were noisy opponent of the constitution. "In particular, the Shias and their Kurdish allies have not done enough to allay the fears of the previously dominant Sunni minority that they are being excluded and disadvantaged under the new constitution" Regarding religion the ruling Shiite parties had a common agenda, they wanted Iraq defined as an Islamic State, and the Sunni want the Sharia law to replace the Marjah, Iraq's former civil code. The Sunni also want a constitutional court established to review legislation for its conformity with Islam. These constitutional courts proposed by the Shiites, would include respected clerics who could overrule for reasons of religious doctrine the decisions of the elected parliament and government.

On August 11 Abdul Aziz al-Hakim proposed that all non- southern Shiite governments form a single region, exercising similar goals as Kurdistan. "A single Shiastan would be a formidable force in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf region, controlling some 80 percent of Iraq's oil, 40 percent of its people and Shi Islam's two most holy places."

The drafting and adoption of the new Constitution was not without controversy, however, as sectarian tensions in Iraq figured heavily in the process. The deadline for the conclusion of drafting was extended on four occasions because of the lack of consensus on religious language. In the end, only three of the 15 Sunni members of the drafting committee attended the signing ceremony, and none of them signed it. Sunni leaders were hoping for the electorate to reject the constitution in the 15 October referendum, but were overwhelmingly

⁸⁹ Economist, <u>Don't do it</u>. 12/9/2006, Vol. 381, Issue 8507

⁹⁰ The End of Iraq, pg. 198

rejected by the voters. Thus the constitution was passed but its validity is in question, and there is still open hostility towards it.

Another option is the three- state solution that advocates splitting Iraq along ethnic and religious lines, creating three independent states: a Kurdish north, a Shiite Arab south, and a largely Sunni Arab central Iraq. This so-called three-state solution would be a natural continuation of a divide that has already happened on the ground. This three state solution would still leave the federal government to a handful of issues; foreign affairs, defense policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, postal service etcetera. The three state solution has weight behind it. Kurdistan left Iraq in 1991, and is not coming back. Iraq's Shiite revolution and Sunni Arab-initiated civil war have split Arab Iraq along sectarian lines. Iraq's constitution does not provide a structure for Shiite and Sunni's to form their own institutions for self government. The constitution does also recognize that the civil tensions between these groups in Iraq and offers a solution to the problem. But on the critical side, "such a solution would not work in central Iraq, because it is not religiously or ethnically homogeneous. For example, Baghdad, home to about one-fourth of Iraq's population, has an almost even number of Shiite and Sunni Arabs. Christians, ethnic Kurds and Turkmens also live in the capital."

The British installed political systems never allowed the people to believe in its government because the government did not represent its people. The Iraqi people have little trust in governments as a result and the lesson learned is that a new government must represent its people. The failure to set up a viable government has left the country divided, a bad seed planted by the British that bears fruit today.

⁹¹ http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2006/061009-iraq-solution.htm

11.1 Conclusion

The original question I wanted to answer was; are there correlation between the actions of the British regarding their dealings with the Middle East during the early 20th century and the problems that are currently in the Middle East? The answer is yes there are. This essay has shown that the health of the Iraqi government, resources and state in the early part of the 21st is directly tied in with the British and other powers and how they have diplomatically dealt with the Iraq, from its creation as a modern country.

The major links that were made were that the British divided the Middle East and then regrouped them into boarders that were based on an Agreement that they themselves wanted to disregard. Particularly that during the later part of World War I the British first wanted to support an Arab Revolt which divided them along religious lines; it was the Arabs against the Turks. Then during the occupation of the Middle East, the British installed their idea of a government dividing the people from its politics. This was extenuated by those in direct control of the occupation had different ideas than the politicians in England.

This essay has made links between the current issues surrounding the question of an independent Kurdistan and Iraqi oil that were not addressed properly at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The section about T.E. Lawrence and his dealings with the Arab Revolt offer insight into organizational culture. The section also supports the fact that British policy at the time was not concentrated towards one goal, for Lawrence did not even know about the Sykes-Picot Agreement that eventually set the boarders for the Modern Middle East.

Lawrence was under the assumption that the Arabs would receive their independence, which was suggested in the McMahon Letters.

The value of this thesis is that in the Middle East and specifically Iraq, for better or worse we are at a time where reorganization is possible. Iraq is currently in a state where those that are rebuilding Iraq have a chance to abandon the mistakes made by the British or repeat them. The British of the early 1920's or earlier and the Americas face a similar situation regarding Iraq and the Middle East. They both have smashed the existing power structure and have taken it upon themselves to install new ones. This essay has shown in depth the mistakes that the British made and America finds itself dealing with these same problems.

The similarities are that both are dealing with religious separation. Britain enhanced it by trying to control its religious leader and install a puppet Caliph. While America has its hand full with this problem currently and has faintly supported a Islam state formation. America and Britain have both opted for a leader that would publically show thanks for the occupation and control, and would easily obey the recommendations from the west. America should realize that because that the people and government have been divided when a foreign controlled ruler was installed.

The Americans and British have both run into the issues that influence the Iraqi Government, resources and State. As was shown, one of the major mistakes made by the British(and it looks like the United States might handle it differently) was the possibility of the three state solution. The history of oil in Iraq was also presented and showed how its importance is still very relevant today, if the American's continue to monopolize Iraqi oil, they could face

similar issues that the British faced. There are also ties that have been shown between how the British installed the Iraqi government and how America leans towards installing a government.

These seeds that the British planted turned out to be major contributors to some of the problems in Iraq and the Middle East. That the Sykes-Picot Agreement affected the division of the boarders, hence the Kurdish problem, Britain made a mistake by underestimating the desire of the Kurdish people and should have given them their own state during the division. Also the Sykes-Picot Agreement also hindered British development in Middle East, and kept them from building a stable foundation on which it could install its rule.

Although this previous section does not continue on with the Israel Palestine problems, its importance is still prevalent. Israel is a major player in the peace for the Middle East and it could not be left out. The section looking at the British mandate in Palestine adds to the overall picture of British policy in the division of the Middle East. In particular it showed Britain failed to completely understand Israel's power, they grossly overestimated the perceived influence that the Jews and Zionist movement had. The mistake was affirmed by not firmly enforcing or firmly stating the expansion policies for the Jewish and the rights for the 'native Arabs' in Palestine when it was a British protectorate.

Another lesson that can be learned from the British is that it needs to have a clear goal of what its intentions are that the British stuttered in its policies during the division of the Middle East. At one moment, under Lord Kitchener the British wanted to control the Muslim religion, then it turned towards an Arab revolt, which was epitomized in the Al-Faruqi incident. The British wanted to give the northern half of the Middle East to France under the

Sykes-Picot Agreement, but the commanders in the field wanted it back. There are lessons to be learned about the British setting up governments.

The British installed a monarchy that never represented its people (but then it would not be a monarchy), when the leftist, socialist parties were making progress for its people, the monarch was signing anti-Soviet pacts to squash these parties. The military dictatorship to succeed the monarch in Iraq was far from what Britain had in mind.

This essay has shown that there have been a number of bad seeds that were planted by the British in the Middle East during and after World War I, and at this current stage in time the growth from these seeds has been uprooted and it is up to the political botanists to make sure these mistakes are not made again.

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