

Abstract

The presented thesis examines the process of adoption of new constitutional rule - debt brake - into German Grundgesetz. Germany attempts to establish the debt brake not only on European level, but also recommends other EU states to accept it. The goal of this thesis is to describe and evaluate the process which has led up to acceptance of the debt brake as one of potential solutions to stop the excessively growing indebtedness and which has been by far influenced by the work of II. Commission for Federalism Reform. The thesis strives to answer the questions if there was political, expert and social agreement on the issue, how does it influence budget sovereignty of the federal lands and if it really can be an effective instrument in the effort for stopping of indebtedness increase, alternatively if it brings any effect even before it came into force, for example in the form of preparing of the budgets for 2016 and 2020 respectively. One part of the thesis is dedicated to Swiss debt brake, which served as a model for the German one, especially in terms of its functionality. Even though it is complicated to evaluate the debt brake before it came into force, the results of the thesis showed for example the problematic nature of the relation between debt brake in the Grundgesetz and individual constitutions of the federal lands. Part of them - under a certain amount of political pressure - approved their own debt brakes, but it seems that the new fiscal constitution will be an important part of the discussion about the future of federalism in Germany.