

Title: Aesthetic judgement from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives

Author: Tereza Hadravová

Department: Aesthetics Department

Supervisor: prof. PhDr. Vlastimil Zuska, CSc.

Abstract: How does science relate to aesthetics? This question usually reads as a question concerning scientific contribution to aesthetics. Philosophers are mostly skeptical about the application of scientific results in their domain, whereas psychologists and, in recent years, neuroscientists are optimistic. In the thesis, I argue that both of these positions, in their extreme versions, impede the mutual enrichment of science and aesthetics. The starting-point of the thesis is George Dickie's radical claim that no scientific information has ever been relevant for aesthetics. The claim, I argue, is firmly embedded in the aftermath of logical positivism: it is related to the effort to "rescue" aesthetics from progressive elimination. As a consequence, most of analytic aesthetics discourse has ignored psychologically informed conception of aesthetic judgement, including some fine distinctions that such a conception enables, e.g. the difference between judgements about pleasure and aesthetic judgements. The distinctions are further elaborated and, in the last part of the thesis, the results of this elaboration are applied to some of recent contributions to aesthetics in experimental psychology and neuroaesthetics. I offer an alternative interpretation of results of the experiments the theories are based on.

Keywords: aesthetic judgement, aesthetic appraisal, pleasure, analytic aesthetics, neuroaesthetics