

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis deals with the issue of verification of compliance of the treaties on reduction of armaments and disarmament concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) in the period from the beginning of the Cold War until nowadays when the central point of the analysis is represented by the New START Treaty. In the background of study on the individual treaties, as well as of analysis of these bilateral treaties themselves, the thesis aspires to outline the most important aspects of the used verification regimes, their possible limits and apparent difficulties, and therefore contributes to a better understanding of the individual bilateral contractual approaches.

The fundamental thought behind the thesis comes from the knowledge that the issue of verification usually means the feared point of discord in every, not only U.S.-Russian, negotiation between states which is to lead to conclusion of a new disarmament treaty. With respect to this circumstance, the thesis then aspires to prove that the above mentioned and recently concluded New START Treaty is the logical successor to a previously concluded disarmament treaties a that it is also based on experience with the previously applied verification regimes.