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**Growing importance of energy and military security
of the Visegrad Group**

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Abstrakt

Práce zkoumá, zda v rámci Visegrádské skupiny vzrůstá význam energetické bezpečnosti a vojenské bezpečnosti a jestli nedávné krize vedou k prohlubování spolupráce. Práce také zkoumá, zda bezpečnost v těchto oblastech je sekuritizována a jestli je Rusko vnímáno jako hrozba. Práce používá metodu obsahové analýzy národních bezpečnostních strategií, strategií energetické bezpečnosti a vojenských nebo obranných strategií, a také diskurzivní analýzu oficiálních materiálů ministerstev a vlád států Visegrádské skupiny. Rovněž jsou analyzovány materiály zveřejněné samotnou Visegrádskou skupinou.

Analýza diskurzu v případě států je zaměřena na krizová období. V oblasti energetické bezpečnosti byly vybrány tři krize: plynové krize v letech 2006 a 2009 a ropná krize z roku 2008. V kapitole o vojenské bezpečnosti byly vybrány dvě události: konflikt v Gruzii v roce 2008 a vojenské cvičení v roce 2009.

Jak výzkum ukazuje, spolupráce v oblasti energetické bezpečnosti již probíhá a spolupráce ve vojenských záležitostech v podobě battlegroup je naplánována. Zejména v oblasti energetické bezpečnosti, může být na základě výzkumu nalezena souvislost mezi nedávnými krizemi, jejich sekuritizací a spoluprací států Visegrádské skupiny.

Abstract

The thesis researches whether in the Visegrad Group there is growing importance and securitization of energy security and military security leading to further cooperation based on recent crises. The thesis also researches whether Russia is perceived as a threat. This is done through content analysis of national security strategies, energy security strategies and military or defence strategies, as well as discourse analysis of official statements presented by ministries and governments of the Visegrad Group states. In the text, also materials published by the Visegrad Group as a whole are analysed.

The discourse analysis in case of the states is focused on moments of crises. In energy security field, three crises were chosen: gas crises of 2006 and 2009, as well as oil crisis of 2008. In the chapter about military security, two events were chosen- conflict in Georgia in 2008 and military exercises in 2009.

As it is presented, cooperation in energy security is already taking place and cooperation in military affairs in form of battlegroup is planned. Especially in energy security, a link between recent crises, their securitization and cooperation might be seen based on the research.

Klíčová slova

sekuritizace, Visegrádská skupina, V4, energetická bezpečnost, vojenská bezpečnost, plynová krize, energetická spolupráce, vojenská spolupráce

Keywords

securitization, Visegrad Group, V4, energy security, military security, gas crisis, energy cooperation, military cooperation

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Prohlášení

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- Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne 4.1.2013

Natalia Kierczak

Poděkování

Ráda bych zde poděkovala za odborné vedení a vstřícnost při konzultacích této práce
PhDr. Michaelu Romancovovi, Ph.D.

List of tables

Table 1- gross inland energy consumption.....	53
Table 2- content analysis of energy security strategies.....	59
Table 3- military forces.....	100
Table 4- military forces in International Security Assistance Force.....	101
Table 5- content analysis of military/defence security strategies.....	104

List of abbreviatons

ACER- Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators

CS- Copenhagen School

EU- European Union

GAERC- General Affairs & External Relations Council

IEA- International Energy Agency

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RSCT- Regional Security Complex Theory

V4- Visegrad Group

List of contents

List of tables.....	7
List of abbreviatons.....	8
Introduction.....	12
Chapter 1. Research framework.....	16
1.1 Goals of the thesis.....	16
1.2 Research questions and hypotheses.....	17
1.3. Operationalization.....	18
1.4 Methodology.....	24
1.5 Sources.....	27
1.6. Limitations of the research.....	28
Chapter 2. Concepts used in the thesis.....	30
2.1 Constructivist approach.....	31
2.1.1 Anarchy.....	33
2.1.2 Security.....	34
2.1.3 Cooperation.....	35
2.2 The Copenhagen School.....	36
2.2.1 Security and its sectors.....	36
2.2.2 Securitization.....	38
2.2.3 Regional Security Complex Theory	40
2.3 Widening the Copenhagen School approach	41
Chapter 3. Energy security.....	45
3.1 Conceptualization of energy security.....	45
3.2 Energy security- Copenhagen School approach.....	49
3.3 Energy security- V4 definitions.....	50
3.4 V4 energy security- statistics.....	53
Table 1- gross inland energy consumption.....	55
3.5 V4 cooperation in energy security.....	56
3.6 Content analysis- energy security strategies.....	59
Table 2- content analysis of energy security strategies.....	61
3.7. Energy security- speeches and statements.....	63
3.7.1 2006- gas crisis.....	65
• The Czech Republic.....	65
• Hungary.....	66
• Poland.....	66
• Slovakia.....	69
• The Visegrad Group.....	70
3.7.2 2008- oil crisis.....	71
• The Visegrad Group.....	72
3.7.3 2009- gas crisis.....	75
• The Czech Republic.....	75
• Hungary.....	78
• Poland.....	79
• Slovakia.....	82
• The Visegrad Group.....	89
3.8 Energy security- summary.....	90
Chapter 4. Military security.....	92

4.1. Conceptualization of military security.....	93
4.2. The Copenhagen School approach.....	95
4.3. V4 definitions of military security.....	97
4.4 Statistics.....	102
Table 3- military forces.....	103
Table 4- military forces in International Security Assistance Force.....	103
4.5 Cooperation.....	103
4.6 Content analysis of the strategies.....	104
Table 5- content analysis of military/defence security strategies.....	106
4.7. Speeches and statements- crises.....	107
4.7.1 Russo-Georgian conflict 2008.....	108
• The Czech Republic.....	108
• Hungary.....	113
• Poland.....	114
• Slovakia.....	117
• The Visegrad Group.....	118
4.7.2 Military exercise 2009.....	119
• The Czech Republic.....	120
• Hungary.....	120
• Poland.....	121
• Slovakia.....	121
• The Visegrad Group.....	121
4.8 Military security-summary.....	122
Conclusion	124
Bibliography.....	127
Thesis Proposal.....	146

Introduction

Energy and military security are crucial for states. The thesis will research whether the content analysis of strategies and discourse analysis of official statements of the Visegrad Group (V4)¹ states as well as documents of the Group indicate growing importance and securitization of energy security and military security. The thesis will focus on the time of crises. Moreover, it will research whether securitization of the crises leads to cooperation within the Visegrad Group and whether Russia is perceived as a threat.

The thesis is going to be based on the application of securitization concept. Securitization is one of the central concepts for the Copenhagen School (CS). In the thesis, securitization will be presented from the Copenhagen School perspective but also additional elements offered by other scholars will be used to give better understanding of the concept and possibility to apply it in the case of the V4.

It is important to emphasise that for the purpose of the thesis two moments of securitization were chosen, in particular moment of speech acts and to lesser extent implementation of extraordinary measures, in order to compare the approach of the V4 states to particular crisis and to research whether securitization (if it appears) in particular states leads to cooperation.

There is a need to research on what might lead to a closer cooperation within a group of Central European countries. The Visegrad Group has become recently more active in fields of energy and military cooperation so this topic is current and worth researching. The Visegrad Group is a platform of cooperation and it is important to understand steps of its members in those fields as well as of the whole Group.

As it will be presented, cooperation in energy security has been already taking place and cooperation in military affairs in form of battlegroup is planned. Examples of cooperation in energy security affairs are construction of Polish-Czech and Czech-Slovak gas pipeline interconnectors, as well as a planned project of a gas connection between Slovakia and Hungary and between Poland

¹ The Visegrad Group, known also as the Visegrad Four and the V4, consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

and Slovakia.

The thesis will argue that military security and energy security are linked because those two spheres are both essential for national security. Linkage between military and energy security affairs in the V4 might be seen in their geopolitical position, geographical proximity to Russia, historical context, and strategic importance of both military affairs and energy security to their security. Topics of the military and energy security are relevant for the V4 states and comparison of cooperation in these two fields might bring interesting results presenting approaches of the states to different sectors of security. Those fields of cooperation of the V4 are especially worth analysing as they are relatively new.

The thesis is going to work with three hypotheses and several research questions.

According to the first hypothesis, deepening cooperation among the V4 states depends on their common interests in military and energy security fields. The questions linked to this hypothesis are as follows: Why have the V4 countries decided to form a battlegroup outside of NATO? What may lead them to closer cooperation in energy security? What are the successful examples of energy security cooperation within the V4?

The second hypothesis focuses on energy security cooperation. It says that energy crisis of 2006-2009 presented increasing recognition of vulnerability of the V4 states and became an impetus to develop energy security cooperation.

Following research questions are connected to this hypothesis: What are the interests and common interests of the V4 countries concerning energy security? How can they protect them? Are they prepared to share critical infrastructure? What are the differences among the V4 states in terms of energy security?

The third hypothesis focuses on theoretical approach and research methods. The hypothesis says that constructivism offers analytical tools which can be employed to explain cooperation in military and energy security affairs. The research question that are going to help working with this

hypothesis are: How might military cooperation and energy cooperation be analysed in terms of constructivism? What does content and discourse analysis tell us about cooperation in energy security and military affairs? Are the crises securitized?

Energy security and military security are extremely popular topics with wide range of literature. Literature is both theoretical and linked to practice and is going to be presented in the chapters about energy security and military security.

Securitization is also covered in many books and academic articles written by the authors of the Copenhagen School, especially in their book *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, and by other scholars interested in this approach, such as Kristine Kurze and Matt McDonald. Their articles were chosen to be used in the thesis as their approach is applicable in the case of the V4 and brings interesting insights to securitization approach. As the CS is linked to constructivism, brief overview of several concepts important for the thesis will be presented from the constructivist perspective. The relevant authors are for example Emanuel Adler, Stefano Guzzini and Maja Zehfuss.

The literature on methods of text analysis is various and the author decided to combine several approaches. The authors of the Copenhagen School believe that securitization might be studied directly from the discourse. However, in order to be able to compare the four V4 states, the author had to make the conditions of analysis more precise. The principles of discourse analysis are stated in the article by Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods". An article by Nik Hynek and Vít Strítecký was especially valid for establishing analytical categories of the analysis.

For the purpose of discourse analysis, only the official statements presented on the websites of the respective institutions (ministries, governments and the V4) were chosen. As it is going to be discussed more in details in chapters on energy security and military security, some institutions do not present statements from the last years. In this case it is mentioned in the analysis in order to explain why materials might not be analysed. In general, the number of materials is relatively high-

4 most recent national security strategies, 7 energy security strategies in the chapter on energy security and more than 60 statements presented by the national ministries and governments. In the chapter about military security, 4 national security strategies (the same as in the third chapter) and 7 military strategies are analysed as well as more than 40 statements from the websites. 13 declarations and statements presented by the Visegrad Group are used in both chapters.

As most of the internet links to articles published on the ministries' and governments' websites are long and would take much space in the footnotes, all of the links used in the thesis are going to be listed only in the bibliography in order to assure that the body of the thesis is well-arranged.

Discourse analysis was already applied to the topic of energy security in the V4 states for example in the article by Lukáš Tichý and Petr Binhack about Czech discourse on it.² However, the analysis of the discourse in the four Visegrad states taking into account both energy and military security might present interesting results and perspective on the four states separately but also together as a group.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter is going to present the research framework of the thesis. The first section explains goals of the thesis, section 6.2 presents research questions and hypotheses. The following section is devoted to operationalization of the concepts used in the thesis. 1.4 presents methodology, 1.5 sources and the next section shows limitations of the research. The second chapter is focused on the concepts used in the thesis: the first section presents constructivist approach divided into sub-sections about anarchy, security and cooperation. The second section summarises the Copenhagen School approach to security and its sectors, securitization and Regional Security Complex Theory. The last section of the second chapter, 2.3, presents approaches widening the Copenhagen School concepts. The third chapter researches on energy security: the section 3.1 is about conceptualization of security, the next one presents the CS approach to it, the 3.3 presents definitions of energy security according to V4 states. The section 3.4

² Lukáš Tichý and Petr Binhack, "Česká debata o vnější dimenzi energetické bezpečnosti a národní zájem", *Central European Political Studies Review* XIV, 1.

presents brief statistics concerning the V4 energy issues while the following section is focused on cooperation. The section 3.6 analyses content of latest energy and national security strategies in order to see how the states understand their energy security and which threats to it they see. The section 3.7 presents discourse analysis of relevant ministries, governments and the V4 concerning three crises presented in three sub-sections: gas crisis of 2006, oil crisis of 2008 and gas crisis of 2009. The section 3.8 summarises findings of analysis. The chapter four is divided into similar sections but focused on military security- 4.1 conceptualizes military security, 4.2 presents the Copenhagen School approach while the following section presents understanding of military security and threats based on the latest national and military or defence strategies. The section 4.4 presents brief statistics concerning armies of the V4 while the next section presents cooperation in the form of battegroup. Content analysis in the section 4.6 is focused on last two, in case of Hungary one, military or defence strategies. Discouse analysis in the following section is devoted to two events- conflict in Georgia in 2008 and military drill in 2009. The last section summarises the findings of the chapter. The conclusion presents whether the hypotheses were confirmed and mentions whether all the research questions were answered.

Chapter 1. Research framework

The chapter is divided into following section. The first section presents goals of the thesis, the section 1.2 is focused on research questions and hypotheses. The section 1.3 presents operationalization of the concepts used in the thesis while the next section is devoted to methodology. The section 1.5 briefly describes sources. The last section of the first chapter lists and explains limitations of the research.

1.1 Goals of the thesis

The thesis is going to present the topics of energy security and military security in the V4 states from the Copenhagen School perspective. The thesis aims to analyse cooperation of the V4 states in

energy security and military affairs and to see whether those issues are securitized, meaning that an issue becomes a security issue. Those two topics are going to be analysed together as an interconnection between energy security and military security in the V4 might be seen in their similar geopolitical position, geographical proximity to Russia, historical context and strategic importance of military and energy issues for the states.

The thesis aims to briefly present and analyse the case studies of energy security and military affairs cooperation from the last years. The case studies and statistics will be used to give background about the developments, but the main goal is to test whether energy security and military security are securitized and whether it leads to the V4 cooperation. Moreover, it is going to be analysed whether there are chances for further cooperation based on the case study analysis of past and current developments and decisions. It is also going to look for reasons why the V4 decided to cooperate in certain issues and whether they perceive threats in similar ways, especially whether Russia is perceived as a threat. The thesis is going to present a link between traditional military security and geopolitics in energy security in the case of V4 states based on the analysis. To address those issues, the concepts of securitization and speech act developed by the Copenhagen School based on a constructivist approach will be used. The focus will be on the discourse and how the issues of security are presented. The goal is not to state whether particular crises or events were threatening security of the V4 but to see whether they were presented as such. The methods of content analysis applied in the thesis to work with the concept of securitization will be presented in the following sections.

1.2 Research questions and hypotheses

The thesis is going to work with three key hypotheses. To each hypothesis there are a few research questions that are going to help to test the hypothesis and bring further insights.

First hypothesis is as follows: deepening cooperation among the V4 states outside other

international organizations depends on their common growing interests in military and energy security fields.

There are three research questions linked to this hypothesis: Why have the V4 countries decided to form a battle group outside of NATO? What led and may lead them to closer cooperation in energy security? What are the successful examples of energy security cooperation within the V4? The second hypothesis focuses on energy security cooperation: energy crises 2005-2009 presented increasing recognition of vulnerability of the V4 states and became an impetus to develop energy security cooperation. Following research questions are connected to this hypothesis: What are the interests of V4 countries concerning energy security? Which interests do they have in common and how can they protect them? Are they prepared, in political and technical terms, to share critical infrastructure? What are the differences among the V4 states in terms of energy security? How are those crises presented in the political discourse and whether they are securitized?

The third hypothesis focuses on theoretical approach and research methods: constructivism offers analytical tools which can be employed to explain cooperation in military and energy security affairs. The research questions that are going to help working with this hypothesis are: How might military cooperation and energy cooperation be analyzed in terms of constructivism? What does analysis tell us about past, present and future cooperation in energy security and military affairs? Are the crises securitized?

The hypothesis and research questions will be used in the thesis according to their topic, as energy security issues and military affairs will be presented in separate chapters.

1.3. Operationalization

The thesis is going to use the approach offered by the Copenhagen School. The authors of the CS

believe that they bring a new framework for analysis in security studies as they include both traditionalist and wider agenda of security.³

The authors define the difference between nonpolitization, politization and securitization. In case of nonpolitization, a state is not involved in an issue. By politization it is understood that an issue becomes a part of national politics and some resources are used and decisions are taken. Securitization means that an issue is presented as an existential threat and extraordinary means are justified to address the issue. In case of securitization, an issue becomes a security issue even though it does not have really to exist, but it is presented as a threat. An issue might be placed on different stages of this nonpolitization-politization-securitization spectrum. It varies according to the states and time.⁴

How securitization can be tested or analysed? According to the scholars from the Copenhagen School, "securitization can be studied directly, it does not need indicators".⁵ Securitization is studied from political discourse. It looks for details on several issues, such as structure of an argument, its effect on an audience, a willingness of the audience to tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not be accepted. If some rules were broken due to arguments about existence of an existential threat then it is a case of securitization.⁶ For understanding securitization, a speech act is needed as "by saying the words, something is done"⁷.

The thesis is going to use the concept of securitization, as it is very useful in testing whether an issue becomes an existential threat or not. The speech acts of the key politicians from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and statements presented by their ministries and governments will be analysed, as well as national, energy and military security strategies, in order to examine whether the topics of energy and military security are securitized and how it influences their policies. However, the thesis will use broader approach to securitization according to which

³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998), vii.

⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 23-24.

⁵ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 25.

⁶ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 25.

⁷ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 26.

securitization does not have to break the rules but it can also lead to cooperation among states as it is going to be discussed more in details later.

It might be seen as a kind of extraordinary action to answer to the threat but in this securitization does not lead to any conflict or argument but to cooperation among states that face the same threat.

The Copenhagen School offers a very useful framework for the research as it does not give strict rules and methods. It gives a framework that might be filled by the researcher, according to their needs.

Moreover, it is important to mention that broadening the approach of the Copenhagen School might bring interesting insights into the analysis.⁸ The Copenhagen School concept of securitization will be applied in the thesis but other perspectives on it will be taken into account as well. First, the author will use the approach claiming that securitization might lead to cooperation as Kurze states in her article that is going to present in the second chapter of the thesis.⁹ Second, McDonald presents an opinion that securitization might be done not only through speech acts, but also through other acts.¹⁰ According to McDonald, securitization might be studied in different moments. In the thesis there will be a focus especially on speech acts and partly on implementation of extraordinary measures.¹¹ In the context of the whole V4, securitization in individual states will be analysed also from the from Kurze's perspective of mobilizing effects of securitization.

The framework for examining securitization is going to be presented shortly, as the main concepts are going to be presented more in details in the second chapter.

Three types of entities included into securitization and security analysis are referent objects, securitizing actors and functional actors.¹²

The referent objects are entities that are threatened and have a right to survive, usually that are

⁸ The topic is going to be discussed broader in the section about the Copenhagen School, here the main points are presented.

⁹ Kristina Kurze, "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security. A New Impetus for Energy Policy Integration in the European Union?" *Transatlantic Research Papers in European Studies (TraPES)*. No. 2. (2010).

¹⁰ Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (4) (2009): 573.

¹¹ Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", 575.

¹² Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 35-36.

states and nations.¹³ For the thesis, the referent objects will be the members of the Visegrad Group- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as their energy and military security might be threatened. Energy security seen as reliable supplies of oil and gas is important for the population, infrastructure, services and industry of all modern states so lack of supplies might be seen as an existential threat according to the author. Existential threats are also linked to military security.

The securitizing actors are those who securitize an issue as they claim that a referent object is existentially threatened¹⁴ A securitizing actor "is someone or a group, who performs the security speech act."¹⁵ Usually securitizing actors are politicians, bureaucracies, governments, or pressure groups. They are usually not the referent objects because they do not need to protect their own existence. They claim that there is a need to protect the security of a state, nation or some other entity.¹⁶ The authors of the CS notice that identifying those actors might be complicated as different levels of analysis might be included. Often individuals speak on the behalf of the collectivities so there is a question whether they should be seen as individuals or rather like speakers of bigger groups. However, the most important is the logic behind the action than who performs a speech act. According to the authors, the organizational approach is probably the most proper way to identify who or what is the actor.¹⁷

For the purpose of the thesis, the securitizing actors will be as follows: Prime Ministers and Governments in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, their Foreign Affairs Ministries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as Ministries of Economy (in Poland and Slovakia, in the Czech Republic - Ministry of Trade, in Hungary - Ministry of Development) and Ministries of Defence, offices and bureaucracies preparing ministerial statements and strategies.

Functional actors influence the dynamics of a sector. They are neither referent objects nor actors but they have an influence over decision taken in the sector.¹⁸ In the economic sector, the functional

¹³ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

¹⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

¹⁵ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 40.

¹⁶ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 40.

¹⁷ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 40.

¹⁸ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

actors are mainly companies appearing as the CS authors call it "the demon or savior"¹⁹. However, for the analysis of cooperation in military and energy security affairs those functional actors will not be analysed. Obviously, they exist (for example multinational gas and oil companies) but according to the author they do not influence heavily the decision-making of the governments of the V4 concerning cooperation. Moreover, it is besides the abilities of the thesis to present research on all possible influences. The goal of the thesis is to analyse cooperation among the governments and the reasons for it, and the author is convinced that it might be done without taking into account the functional actors.

Before the analysis, there is also a need to define at which level the analysis will take place. According to the CS, levels are "referents for where things happen rather than sources of explanation in themselves"²⁰. The most common-used levels are international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals.

International systems is the largest unit of "interacting or interdepending"²¹ units and currently in means the whole world.²²

The next level, international subsystems, are groups of units operating in the same region, but it is not a rule. Within an international subsystem there are interactions among the members and they are dependent on each other. Examples of such subsystems are international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The third level is a level of units. Units are made of many different groups, organizations, individuals. Such units are, for example, states and nations. On the fourth level there are subunits. The subunits are groups or individuals that influence to affect the behaviour of the unit, for example bureaucracies. The fifth level is formed by individuals.²³

From the CS point of view, this conception of levels is proper, but there is no reason to privilege

¹⁹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 103.

²⁰ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 5.

²¹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 5.

²² Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 5.

²³ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 6.

states over other levels and other units should be taken into account as well.²⁴

For the thesis, following levels of analysis will be used. First, international subsystems as the members of the V4 interact among themselves in the framework of the regional organization and on other forums. Second, the level of units- states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Thirds, the level of individuals as some of the statements made for example by Foreign Affairs Ministers might be seen as influenced by their personality and opinions.

The level of subunits will not be analysed, as the author believes that in the discourse analysis documents that are presented do not influence the decision-making of the state but they are results of such decisions. The level of international systems will neither be take either into account, as it is too broad to analyse cooperation of four states from the same region.

Securitization examines how a topic can be transformed into a security issue. The thesis will use a broaden understanding of securitization, as in traditional meaning it suggests that securitization leads to extraordinary means and non-standard actions. The author of the thesis believes that successful securitization may lead to cooperation among states if they perceive similar threats and can respond to them collectively. This point is going to be analysed more in details in the section 2.2.4 in connection to the article by Kritina Kurze and energy cooperation in the EU.

To examine it, there is a need to use speech act analysis. Politicians express their ideas through language, so by analysis of their statements it will be possible to see what their attitude to threats and potential cooperation within the region is. The analysis will help to discover whether their attitude towards cooperation and understanding of threats have changed during the time.

Two kinds of analysis will be used. First, quantitative content analysis of national security strategies will be applied. It will present whether some particular words are used more often and whether it means growing importance of a particular topic. It will be examined whether it can be seen as securitization of a particular topic. Second, qualitative discourse analysis will be used in order to test whether the V4 states share common perception and are willing to cooperate. In discourse

²⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 7.

analysis the author will work mainly with statements published online, and speeches or interviews with the key politicians published on the websites of the ministries and governments and to lesser extent with the strategies.

As the topic is very broad and the amount of materials is numerous, the author acknowledges that the result might not form a full picture of securitization of energy security and military affairs in the V4 states. However, as securitization of those topics within the V4 is not an often researched issue, this map of strands of the political discourse might bring interesting results and be analysed further. The author decided to focus on key moments concerning energy security in last years- especially the gas crisis in 2006, the oil crisis in 2008 and the gas crisis in 2009. In the chapter about military security, Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008 and Russian military exercises in 2009 will be analysed. In this way, it is possible to compare speech acts of key politicians from the four countries concerning the same issue at the same time. The national, energy and military security strategies will also be analysed. In order to have fair comparison, the author decided to compare two last energy and military strategies from each country. They were published in different years, but the author is convinced that it is the best way how to compare them. It would not be possible to do it in another way, as the author wants to see changing trends in perception of energy security and threats, so in order to see a change at least two documents from each country are needed. Obviously, it can be argued that comparing strategies of for example Czech Republic from 2004 and Hungary²⁵ from 2012 might be misleading. However, the reason of this comparison of the strategies is to see whether the perception changes in each state separately, so in this case the emphasis will be given on comparison of the Czech strategies from 2004 and 2010.

1.4 Methodology

According to the Copenhagen School securitization can be studied directly from the political

²⁵ From Hungary, only one energy and one military strategy is going to be analysed as it is going to be explained in sections 3.6 and 4.6.

discourse. The thesis is going to use this approach, however, there is a need to give details how the analysis will be done.

In the two separate chapters about energy security and military security there is going to be the same approach. First, based on conceptualization of energy security and military security, and the Copenhagen School approaches to them, as well as the definitions of those concepts from the V4 states strategic documents, statistics concerning energy and military affairs and examples of cooperation within the V4, the key words will be identified.

The key words are going to be chosen according to the approach taken by Nik Hynek and Vít Střítecký.²⁶ In their understanding, thematic analysis is based on qualitative searching for topics that characterize an issue. This approach is close to multiple reading of sources. Discovering figures of content organisation is a key. As a result analysed topics become analytical categories.²⁷

The timeline for the strategic documents in national, energy and military security will be 2000-2012 as in each country they are published in different years. For the reason of comparison, the author decided to choose two last energy and military strategies from each state. In this way, it will be possible to test whether the importance of particular issues is growing in each country. The key words will be crucial for testing whether the V4 states see the potential threats in the same way and whether those shared understanding might be a reason for cooperation in energy security and military affairs.

Second, they key words will be searched in strategic documents of the V4 states to see whether the perception of potential security issues is similar and whether the importance of those issues is growing within years. This approach will be based mainly on quantitative approach to analyse whether the importance of the key words and topics connected to them is rising. In this case, content analysis is quantitative and applies a frame, in this case of key words, to objectively analyse

²⁶ See: Nik Hynek and Vít Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnost podle českých atlantistů" in *Hledání českých zájmů. Mezinárodní bezpečnost*. Petr Drulák, Vít Střítecký a kol. (Prague: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2010), 80-101.

²⁷ Hynek and Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnost", 86.

text.²⁸ Content analysis is usually described as quantitative but inspired by the approach taken by Hynek and Střítecký it will prove that if a term chosen in qualitative way appears more often in the discourse it has greater importance.²⁹

Third, qualitative discourse analysis of the official statements and key politicians speeches will be presented. In the discourse analysis the key words will be taken into account, however also other quotes will be used if the quotes concern the researched subjects. As discourses from constructivist point of view produce reality, it is important to see how the discourses concerning energy and military security influenced it. To see how the crises were presented, the speech acts are going to be presented in order as they were published on the official websites.

To see how the discourse analysis will be applied in the thesis, it is important to present points defining theory of discourse. Jennifer Milliken presents three aspects of discourse analysis. First, discourses are "structures of signification which construct social realities".³⁰ It means that people construct meanings mainly by language but also by other systems.³¹ Second point is about discourse productivity. According to this, discourses are able to define but also to silence by limiting authorized subjects such as experts only to some groups. Moreover, discourses enable to product or reproduct those things that were defined by the discourse.³² Third, commitment to discourse productivity leads to researching on main discourses.³³

In case of the thesis, language will be crucial but also some significant events concerning the topic will be taken into account, such as opening of gas interconnector. The fact who was present there will suggest significance of the event. Discourses presented by the states' authorities- governments and ministries will be analysed. Discourse analysis of the main and official discourse will be presented what means that less popular and unofficial discourse will not be taken into account.

²⁸ Cynthia Hardy, Bill Harley, Nelson Phillips, "Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?", *Qualitative Methods*, Spring 2004, 20.

²⁹ Hynek and Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnost", 87.

³⁰ Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol 5(2), (1999): 225-254, 229.

³¹ Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations", 229.

³² Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations", 229.

³³ Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations", 230.

Discourse analysis was chosen as it focuses on construction of an issue.³⁴ Analysis of the texts shows whether some issues gain more importance or are downplayed what might lead to presenting frameworks leading policies of the states.³⁵

Based on the approach applied by Grindheim in her article, the discourse analysis presented in the text will be a combination of two approaches- text-oriented and abstract. Text-oriented analysis focus on a few texts while in abstract approach the focus is broader.³⁶ In the thesis, in each section concerning particular crises different number of texts is going to be analysed. Each text concerning crisis is going to be analysed separately, with an emphasise on key words and other quotes linked to a crisis. An element of abstract approach used in the thesis is broader focus and summary of all texts. It presents "way of talking and thinking in a certain context and in a certain period"³⁷ what is going to show whether the crises were securitized.

The materials for discourse analysis will be chosen based on data of gas and oil crises in recent years- the analysis will be based on the sources published shortly in the month after the crises. The reason is to compare statements from all four Visegrad Group member states. In the case of the V4, the materials will be chosen from the whole year as the joint statements and relations about common meetings are not presented often as those meetings take place rarely.

1.5 Sources

The thesis is going to use two kinds of sources. On the one hand, it is going to work with primary sources, such as energy and military security strategies as well as with national security strategies³⁸ of all the V4 states. Speeches of key politicians and statements of national ministries and governments will be also analysed. Moreover, on the intergovernmental level, the statements

³⁴ Astrid Grindheim, "The Scramble for the Arctic? A Discourse Analysis of Norway and the EU's Strategies Towards the European Arctic", *FNI Report 9/2009*, Fridtjof Nansen Institute 2009, 4.

³⁵ Grindheim, "The Scramble for the Arctic?", 5.

³⁶ Grindheim, "The Scramble for the Arctic?", 6.

³⁷ Grindheim, "The Scramble for the Arctic?", 6.

³⁸ The thesis uses statements from the official websites of governments and ministries. However, in case of the strategies, in a few cases they were not available on the website of the respective institutions and they were downloaded from different websites and the addresses are stated in the bibliography.

presented by the representatives of the V4 states on the V4 meetings will be analysed. On the other hand, secondary sources, such as works about notions of energy and military security will be used. Materials from newspapers, news agencies and websites of energy sector companies will be used for case studies of cooperation within the V4. As the analysed crises are recent, the thesis uses high number of online sources. Moreover, all primary sources are also available online.

The theoretical part of the thesis is formed by the work of the authors of the Copenhagen School and other scholars who work with the concept of securitization. Moreover, the theoretical base for methodology is formed by authors writing about principles of discourse analysis, such as Jennifer Milliken, and applying discourse analysis in practice, such as Nik Hynek and Vit Střítecký.

1.6. Limitations of the research

The author is aware of some limitations of the research. The author decided to analyse the official materials published on-line from all V4 states- Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia- in order to analyse the dynamics within the group and understanding of energy security and military issues within each country. However, some states present limited number of sources and in their case the analysis is shorter and less detailed. Some ministries and governments do not have on their websites for example materials from January 2006 but only from later years; the materials from January 2006 are not archived. In this case it should not be analysed or explained in a relation to the energy and military security topics as it can be caused by technical issues or establishment of a new website without an archive from the previous one. However, if the press releases, statements or other materials from the beginning of 2006 are available but the crisis is not mentioned there, it might be taken into account as an interesting notion. It might be argued that those topics were not crucial for the states or the analysed units (ministries and governments) and they did not address them due to the different reasons. Again, it might be linked to changing websites or other technical reasons. However, it is also possible to assume, even though there are no other ways how to support

this statement by using speech act analysis of the mentioned sources, that the gas crisis of 2006 was not at the top of the agenda if it was not mentioned in any statements of the available ones in January in particular states.

Second, the content analysis takes into account only officially published materials by ministries and governments for the better and fair comparison of the speech acts from four countries. The official websites are reliable and they bring the official statements. Moreover, the author wants to analyse how the states perceive the situation and compare it in a fair way. Due to that, the decision to use only official sources seems to be a proper one as the author would not be able to look for, use and analyse sources in Hungarian and most of the interviews, statements etc. from Hungary are not available in English and the author is not a Hungarian speaker³⁹. It might be assumed that interesting insights would be present in private conversations of politicians or non-formal meetings as during giving the speeches they have to conduct and speak according to some strict rules. However, such materials are not publicly available and the thesis is going to analyse only the official public discourse.

Third, the thesis is limited by taking into account speech acts only from short periods of time around the crises and intergovernmental meetings within the V4 scheme. It is caused by availability of materials from the all states that might be compared. However, to have wider picture in a longer time perspective, national, energy and military security strategies of all countries are going to be analysed. They were published in different years but the author decided to analyse them as they bring insights into changing perception of some security issues in particular states. The original idea was to present also annual statements of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of all V4 states. However, Hungary does not have such speeches and due to that annual statements from other states will not be taken into account in order not to present an unbalanced picture.⁴⁰

³⁹ In order to assure that the speech acts presented by Hungary are treated in the same way as of the other states, it was researched whether in Hungarian a wider number of articles is presented. However, on the analysed websites in both language versions the number of materials useful for the thesis is in general similar so the materials from Hungary analysed in English-language version are satisfying for the purpose of the thesis.

⁴⁰ E-mail to author from László Nagy, counselor of the Embassy of Hungary in Slovakia, 9.11.2012.

Fourth, the thesis focuses only on the dynamics within the V4 and within the V4 states. It does not take into account developments in the EU as it is behind the scope of the thesis. The author recognizes that the dynamic within the EU might be also an important factor for the V4 cooperation in energy and military affairs but decided to focus only on the V4 for the purpose of the research.

Fifth, the thesis is also limited by language issues and availability of the materials. The original idea was to work with media materials linked to speech acts of politicians concerning energy security. However, as it was mentioned already, some states present very limited number of statements and do not present any speeches on their official websites. In this case, such analysis is not possible, especially in the case of Hungary- due to limited number of materials and the language issues. In such case, it was decided to use media coverage only for short case studies, in order to assure that all states are presented in the same and balanced way.

Chapter 2. Concepts used in the thesis

The first section will present some of the main principles of constructivism in International Relations that are crucial for the topic of the thesis. Those aspects are anarchy, security and cooperation. The constructivist perspective has to be presented at the beginning, as the concepts of the Copenhagen School that form the theoretical approach of the thesis are influenced by the constructivist thinking.

In the second section ideas of the Copenhagen School, such as sectors of security and securitization, will be presented. The main emphasis will be given on securitization, as this concept is central for the thesis and will be used in the other chapters. This section will also present reasons why it is useful to broaden the Copenhagen School understanding of securitization and apply it also to the cases of international cooperation. They were briefly mentioned in the first chapter but in the second one they will be discussed more in details. Moreover, the chapter is going to present new interesting perspectives on securitization that are going to be used in the thesis.

2.1 Constructivist approach

Main ideas of constructivism that are important for the topic of the cooperation of the V4 will be mentioned in this section. Those concepts are anarchy, security and international cooperation. However, the thesis is going to apply the approaches of the Copenhagen School and its ideas of securitization and speech acts connected to securitization are going to be analysed deeper in the next sub-section. A brief introduction to the main concepts of constructivism will be given as the Copenhagen School is influenced by this theoretical approach. The CS is going to be discussed more in detail in the third section of this chapter.

Constructivism appeared in the international relations in 1980s and it has potential to influence the way how we understand social reality.⁴¹ At the beginning, it must be underlined that constructivism is not a united approach. There are some internal divisions, such as concerning existence of truth according to conventional and critical constructivists which are going to be presented briefly later, but there is also common ground for all constructivist approaches in International Relations. The common foundations might be defined as a "social construction of meaning (including knowledge)" and "the construction of social reality".⁴² It means that knowledge is used on a daily basis for construction of reality, but at the same time knowledge in forms of theories or concepts is used by scientists to interpret social reality. It can be also said that the material world has different kind of meanings- social reality and scientific knowledge. For constructivism the objects of our knowledge are dependent on our interpretations and language.⁴³

It might be summarised by stating that our knowledge is not objective because it is impossible to divide world from collective constructions by observers and actors. Because of that, our knowledge

⁴¹ Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 96.

⁴² Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations* 6:2 (2000): 149.

⁴³ Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", 95.

about world politics is also subjective.⁴⁴

According to the constructivists, the world should not be taken for granted as it is, because the world is a project under construction, changing constantly.⁴⁵ This approach in International Relations challenges the idea that the reality of international politics does not change.⁴⁶ Constructivist scholars believe that foundations for knowledge exist because not all the statements have the same value.⁴⁷

It can be stated that constructivism is interested in researching the links between the social constructions and political actions. It also researches the interests and identities of actors as well as about bases of social action and social order.⁴⁸

Moreover, according to constructivists, identities and interests are socially constructed.⁴⁹ It must be also mentioned that constructivism gives an emphasis on processes of constructing individuals, groups and threats as "social facts" and how those constructions influence security concerns.⁵⁰ Social facts are understood as facts that do not exist in the physical object world but they depend on human agreement that they exist and usually require human institutions in order to exist. Examples of social facts are money, property rights or sovereignty.⁵¹ According to other scholars, social facts emerge as a result of interaction between the material world and knowledge.⁵²

As it was mentioned at the beginning of the section, there are some internal divisions within constructivism connected to its different variants. An example of such division is approach to truth mentioned already. Constructivist scholars reject the existence of "objective truth" as no one can find truth about the world that applies at any time and space, but they make "truth claims" about

⁴⁴ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods", *Mershon International Studies Review* 40: 2 (1996): 243.

⁴⁵ Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", 95.

⁴⁶ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4.

⁴⁷ Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", 95.

⁴⁸ John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization* 52:4, (1998): 862.

⁴⁹ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?", 856.

⁵⁰ Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies", 242.

⁵¹ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?", 856.

⁵² Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", 95.

their researched topics even though they mention that such claims are always partial. Critical constructivists believe that it is not possible to say what is true and divide the truth from the power.⁵³

However, the features that are going to be discussed below, such as understanding of reality as social construct, the idea of social facts, knowledge and security as subjective terms, are common for constructivism in International Relations field. Constructivism brings norms, identities and meanings into the field.⁵⁴ In general, social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality are seen as a common ground for constructivism.⁵⁵

Those concepts as well as concepts analysed in the next three sub-sections are going to be helpful in the next chapters of analysis of cooperation of the V4 states in the fields of energy and military security affairs. They might help to understand this cooperation.

2.1.1 Anarchy

What is crucial for constructivism in International Relations, it is a famous statement by Alexander Wendt saying that anarchy is "what states make of it".⁵⁶ Wendt refuses the neorealist approach claiming that anarchy must always lead to self-help. In his view, it depends on the ways how the states interact.⁵⁷ As such, anarchy does not bring self-help and power politics. They can be features of anarchy, but self-help and power politics are also institutions.⁵⁸ According to Wendt, collective understanding and knowledge form the structures. Those structures influence our actions. Taking part in collective meanings gives actors their identities- their roles and expectations.⁵⁹

It leads to a conclusion that the social world is not given but it is constructed because outcomes are

⁵³ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen. *Introduction to International Relations. Theories & Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),165.

⁵⁴ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?", 884.

⁵⁵ Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", 111.

⁵⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization* 46: 2 (1992): 395.

⁵⁷ Jackson and Sorensen. *Introduction to International Relations*, 167.

⁵⁸ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", 395.

⁵⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of It", 397.

influenced by practice in International Relations.⁶⁰ From this perspective, changes are possible as the world is not locked in the structure of anarchy. New norms can be created and they can differ from the old ones.⁶¹ States change their interests and identities. Interpreting those changes and understanding their influence becomes crucial.⁶²

It is also worth to mention Guzzini's approach to anarchy. He claims that the international system is often seen as anarchical because there is no central world government. However, there is a system of rules created and used by people. Those rules "give meaning to international practices"⁶³, international anarchy does not give this meaning.⁶⁴

To summarise, interests of the states are formed through interaction with other states. In this view, anarchy does not have to cause self-help system as it is a possible feature of anarchy, not its core element.

2.1.2 Security

For constructivists, security is not an objective condition.⁶⁵ National security "is understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared understandings."⁶⁶ Constructivists research on a process how threats are presented in the political sphere- who speaks about security, which issues are mentioned, what are the conditions and effects of this process. The research focuses on issues that are crucial for naming a security threat and what makes the public to accept the threat.⁶⁷ The topic of speech acts and political discourse is going to be presented in the section about the Copenhagen School.

An example of constructivist approach to security might be understanding of the European

⁶⁰ Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality*, 4

⁶¹ Jackson and Sorensen. *Introduction to International Relations*, 160.

⁶² Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality*, 4

⁶³ Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", 155.

⁶⁴ Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", 155.

⁶⁵ Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies", 242.

⁶⁶ Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies", 243.

⁶⁷ Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies", 243.

cooperation. From the constructivist perspective, collective security in Europe is seen as an example of forming a collective identity and defining state's interests with taking into account this new identity.⁶⁸ Identities of the European states are still forming, their security interests are changing, but the states do not have any interests in quitting collective security for a particular price.⁶⁹

A constructivist take on security has also another interesting feature. According to Adler, it has potential to change the way how policymakers think about security, for example by the concept that identities of people form basis for peace and conflict.⁷⁰

The issue of cooperation as seen by constructivists will be presented in the next sub-section.

2.1.3 Cooperation

How cooperation is understood from constructivism approach? This question must be answered as the thesis is going to analyse cooperation of the V4 states in particular fields.

From this perspective, an emphasise is given on identities and interests. During the process of establishing new institutions, new understandings of actors are formed and included and new identities are acquired. It suggests that cooperation means more than only forming some constrains on behaviour of the actors. The actors reconstruct their interests "in terms of shared commitments to social norms".⁷¹ In longer perspective, in case of cooperation collective interests will be based on norms. The norms will be on place not because of costs but due to the fact that the norms are based on commitment to identities and interests of the actors involved. To summarise this point, from Wendt's perspective in constructivism knowledge defining identities and interests in cooperation has its origins in the interactions.⁷²

Many constructivist scholars are interested in the European integration as cooperation is caused not only by national interests, but also by social interactions. Those interactions help to create structures

⁶⁸ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", 417.

⁶⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", 417-418.

⁷⁰ Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", 110.

⁷¹ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", 417.

⁷² Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", 417.

for further cooperation. Even though, there might be some serious disagreements among the states on particular issues, their daily political cooperation helps them to create common perspectives.⁷³

The topic of cooperation is central for the thesis as the cooperation of the V4 states will be analysed. The author believes that the constructivist approach to cooperation based on interests, interactions and shaping common points of view is also valid for the V4 common actions.

2.2 The Copenhagen School

After the short background of the concepts of constructivism presented in the previous section, aspects presented by the Copenhagen School as one of constructivist approaches will be discussed.

The thesis is going to analyse energy and military security cooperation of the V4 states from the perspective offered by this School, so the background about their thoughts is needed.

The term Copenhagen School was used for the first time by Bill McSweeney in 1996.⁷⁴

The Copenhagen School in general focuses on three concepts: securitization, sectors of security, and a regional security complex theory. Theoretical work within the School is done both individually and collectively by its authors. Works of the Copenhagen School focus on three above-mentioned topics, and each of the topics is connected especially closely with one of the main CS' authors. The famous concepts are Ole Waever's idea of securitization and Barry Buzan's idea of sectoral security.⁷⁵ Some of the main ideas of the CS will be discussed in the following paragraphs. For the thesis, the concept of securitization is crucial but other topics of the Copenhagen School will also bring interesting perspective on the V4.

2.2.1 Security and its sectors

Very interesting and useful concepts for the purpose of the thesis appear in the book by the authors

⁷³ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 172.

⁷⁴ Šárka Waisová, "Od národní bezpečnosti k mezinárodní bezpečnosti. Kodanská škola na křižovatce strukturálního realismu, anglické školy a sociálního konstruktivismu", *Mezinárodní vztahy* 3 (2004): 83.

⁷⁵ Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?", *Security Dialogue* 38:1 (2007): 8.

of the Copenhagen School: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. The authors claim that there is a need to broaden security agenda and open it to other than only military threats. The authors research on the logic of security and differentiate between security and securitization from topics that have only political meaning.⁷⁶ Meaning of securitization will be mentioned later in the section.

Security is understood by the Copenhagen School as a concept that changes and is in constant process of construction. Security is influenced by current features of international system and its actors. In the approach of the Copenhagen School, a state is the main referential object but security of a state is connected with security of other states, as well as sub-state actors.⁷⁷

The Copenhagen School presents five main sectors of security- military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security.⁷⁸

For the purpose of the thesis especially military and economic sectors are important in order to understand the dynamics within the V4 concerning their cooperation. The CS authors notice that new topics are presented in terms of economic security. Of the topics they mention, one is crucial for the thesis. The authors claim that there is a possibility that some kinds of economic dependence on the global market, especially concerning oil, will be used to achieve some political goals. In the broader context it touches issues of security of supplies in the conditions when states gave up their ineffective policy of self-reliance and they prefer to rely on uncertain supplies from other states.⁷⁹ As it can be seen, according to this approach, energy security understood in the terms of reliable supplies is one of the aspects of economic security.

It is also worth mentioning that their understanding of military security as the topic of military cooperation will appear in the thesis in the context of the V4 states. The military sector is important for states as they protect their integrity and they take into account regional and intrastate aspects.

⁷⁶ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 4-5.

⁷⁷ Waisová, "Od národní bezpečnosti k mezinárodní bezpečnosti", 82.

⁷⁸ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 27.

⁷⁹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 116.

The regional dynamics of military security is gaining importance.

In some regions military security dilemmas were eliminated, especially in Western and Central Europe and North America. Mutual military threats do not exist among states in these regions.⁸⁰

To analyse military and energy security cooperation it is crucial to explain in the next sub-section what the Copenhagen School authors understand by threats and securitization.

2.2.2 Securitization

The theory of securitization is going to be applied in the next chapter and the theoretical background has to be given first. This theory can present the cooperation of the V4 states from a new and interesting perspective.

The theory of securitization was first formulated by Ole Waever.⁸¹ A few years later, in 1998, the most popular application of this theory was presented in the above-mentioned book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. The theory of securitization is now an important element of Security Studies.⁸²

According to this theory, the concept of security leads the politics to change the rules and present a topic as a special kind of politics or something above standard political decision-making. Securitization might be understood as more radical version of politization. From the theoretical point of view, any public topic can be placed to a scale from depolitized to politized to securitized. Depolitization means that the state is not involved in a topic. The topic is not discussed by the public and there are no decisions taken about it. Politization means that a topic becomes a part of public politics what leads to governmental decisions and using of some resources. Securitization means that the topic is understood as existential threat needing extraordinary provisions and in this case non-standard activities are justified.⁸³

⁸⁰ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 62.

⁸¹ Ulrik Gad and Karen Lund Petersen, "Concepts of politics in securitization studies", *Security Dialogue* 42 (2011): 315.

⁸² Gad and Petersen, "Concepts of politics in securitization studies", 316.

⁸³ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 23.

An issue becomes an international security problem when it can be proved that it is more important than other topics and that the issue should have priority. The issue is solved with usage of non-standard means. The way how the issue is addressed creates a security problem out of it- it does not have to mean that the existential threat really exists, but it is presented in such a way. The authors claim that the definition and criteria of securitization have their source in the construction of existential threat relevant for political life. Securitization can be influenced by geographical, historical and political factors.⁸⁴

To research on securitization there is no need to use particular indicators, as securitization can be studied directly from political discourse.⁸⁵ For researching of securitization, speech acts are analysed. A speech act means that by the use of security language something is done.⁸⁶ This method of analysing speech acts will be used in the next chapters to understand reasons for cooperation in energy and military security affairs within the V4.

Three types of actors are included in security analysis and securitization.⁸⁷ Referent objects are entities that are existentially threatened and have a right to survive. States and nations are traditional referent objects of security. For states survival means keeping their sovereignty and for nations it means keeping their identity.⁸⁸ Other actors of the process are securitizing actors who claim that referent objects are existentially threatened.⁸⁹ The third group is formed by functional actors who influence the dynamics of security in a sector. They influence political decision-making even though they are neither referential objects nor securitizing actors.⁹⁰

In another work of the authors of the Copenhagen School, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Power. The Structure of International Security*, they stress that it is crucial to take into account quality of a security issue. It means establishing criteria in order to avoid seeing everything as

⁸⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 70.

⁸⁵ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 25.

⁸⁶ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 26.

⁸⁷ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 35.

⁸⁸ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

⁸⁹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

⁹⁰ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

security. According to the authors, a securitizing actor positions a security issue as a threat for the survival of a referent object that is believed to have a right to survive, for example a nation or a state. The securitizing actor in such a case claims that it has a right to use extraordinary means or break the rules because in other case it will be too late to act. This approach to security is constructivist, because there is no question whether the issue is a threat, but only when and in which circumstances who securitizes which issue. Naming something as a security issue or a threat transforms the issue that becomes a part of a political process of securitization.⁹¹

Explanation of the meaning of threats and actors taking part in securitization process leads to securitization process itself. It is a characteristic concept for the Copenhagen School and it was needed to be explain it in the thesis before analysis of the V4 case studies in the next chapters.

2.2.3 Regional Security Complex Theory

The Copenhagen School presents also an important theory of Regional Security Complex. Some of the aspects of this theory can be inspiration for the research in the thesis. According to Buzan and Waever the main idea of their theory is that, because most threats move more easily on short distances, security interdependence is designed into regional clusters or security complexes.⁹² It can be also understand in a following way: if conflicts are more likely to appear within a region, a developing system of dependencies is a way how to prevent a potential conflict.⁹³ Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) uses elements from materialist and constructivist approaches- from materialism it takes ideas of territoriality and distribution of power while from constructivism it takes securitization theory.⁹⁴ Moreover, according to the theory, regional systems are dependent on actions and interpretations of actors, so they do not depend only on the distribution of power.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71.

⁹² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 4.

⁹³ Marek Neuman, "Energy as the Defining Component in EU-Russian Relations After the Eastern EU Enlargement", (paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 25 - 27 September 2008 at the University of Latvia), 1.

⁹⁴ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 4.

⁹⁵ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 40.

RSCT takes the regionalist perspective as the regional level of conflict and cooperation between states is a proper level of analysis to research on nowadays security affairs. RSCT uses wider understanding of security than only military one.⁹⁶ Moreover, in this theory security is understood as a realm in which territoriality plays an important role.⁹⁷ The question that rises is whether the threats that are securitised are primarily at domestic, regional, or system level.⁹⁸

To understand the RSCT, it is necessary to present the difference between units and regions. Units have actor quality, while regions are geographically composed of such units. Regions do not have actor quality, but in some cases, for example for the European Union, this distinction is problematic.⁹⁹

According to the authors, since the end of the Cold War in the international system four great powers exist: Russia, China, European Union and Japan and only one superpower- the USA.¹⁰⁰ For the purpose of the topic of thesis the focus will be given on Russia and some of the EU member states- V4. However, it is important to take into account that when the book was published in 2003, members of the V4 were not yet in the EU. Great powers such as Russia do not have to have big capabilities in all sectors but 'there are responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power'.¹⁰¹

According to some researchers, the Visegrad Group is an "autonomous regional security complex".¹⁰²

2.3 Widening the Copenhagen School approach

There is a need to present also other approaches that widen the Copenhagen School understanding of securitization. As it was mentioned in the section on the Copenhagen School, in this framework

⁹⁶ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 10.

⁹⁷ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 11-12.

⁹⁸ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 13.

⁹⁹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 27.

¹⁰⁰ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 35.

¹⁰¹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 35.

¹⁰² Csaba Vida, "The Central European Regional Security Sub-Complex (Security interdependence in Central Europe)", *Aarms*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007): 277.

securitization is usually presented as an existential threat that requires extraordinary steps. Some authors claim that securitization is usually understood as starting conflicts while desecuritization leads to further cooperation.¹⁰³

However, it might be argued that this approach is too narrow and should be broadened. If security is seen as socially constructed concept, the measures taken to counter a threat can be different. Those measures are not necessarily aggressive, hostile, or confrontational. It cannot be assumed that that results of security discourse are always 'negative', as it is normative statement and not a consequence of securitization. The Copenhagen School sees securitization as a practice that broadens the antagonistic logic of security to new policy sectors and due to that, the results of such discourse are understood as negative.¹⁰⁴

In general, the securitization approach does not take into account integrative and mobilizing effects beyond the state's borders. However, it should be noticed that common enemies and threats might have a potential to unite particular actors. Moreover, from this perspective it is worth looking on security discourses in specific conditions, instead of looking for or expecting only negative consequences. An example of changing security discourses might be the evolving framework of the European integration. The aim of those reflections is not to state that securitization is not a proper framework but to stress that its categories of threats, referent objects, and securitizing actors are a base for a constructivist analysis of energy policy issues.¹⁰⁵ However, instead of the negative features of securitization, it is possible to research on possible advantages. Those aspects are especially important if security is seen as unifying policies undertaken in order to counteract some threats. From this point of view, security is not seen as limited only to antagonistic relations between states.¹⁰⁶

Inspired by the approach chosen by Kristina Kurze in her article about the energy discourse and its

¹⁰³ Kurze "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security", 10.

¹⁰⁴ Kurze, "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security", 10.

¹⁰⁵ Kurze, "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security", 10.

¹⁰⁶ Kurze, "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security", 11.

potential impact on energy policy integration in the EU, it can be stated that successful securitization facilitates energy policy integration at the regional V4 level. In the article Kurze applies this approach to energy security and a potential impetus for the EU policy integration in this field.¹⁰⁷ For the author, securitization gives interesting and open framework of analytical categories of threats, referent objects and securitizing actors. With usage of those categories it is possible to research on links between political discourse and political outcomes.¹⁰⁸

In the following sections this statement of successful securitization will be supported by data and speech acts analysis. This perspective gives a new framework and chances to see the cooperation and securitization from an interesting and inspiring point of view. From this perspective, speech acts of the politicians from the V4 states about their understanding of potential threats in military and energy security sector might be presented as motivation for cooperation with other states from the region. In such case, securitization of certain topics would lead to cooperation with other countries and to solving the issues on the international level in a peaceful way. From this perspective, non-standard means caused by securitization of the topics taken by the V4 states might be cooperative and not leading to any international conflict.

Besides broadening the understanding of securitization, there are also some other critical points that should be mentioned. They will help to apply securitization in the thesis and give broader perspective on it.

In the article about securitization Matt McDonald claims that this concept is narrow in several aspects. First, the Copenhagen School relies on speech acts and language is the only form of 'securitization move'.¹⁰⁹ This approach excludes other forms of actions that are results of securitizing speech acts, but they are part of the securitization constructing process.¹¹⁰ This approach might give interesting insights in the case of the V4 cooperation. Events such as opening of new gas

¹⁰⁷ Kurze, "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security", 11.

¹⁰⁸ Kurze, "The Changing Discourse of Energy Security", 10.

¹⁰⁹ McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", 568.

¹¹⁰ McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", 569.

interconnectors are interesting for the research not only as such and for what was said there, but for example as to show which key national politicians were present there. It might suggest importance of the events, their meaning and part in the securitization process.

Second, according to McDonald, securitization can appear in different stages and understanding of it depends on readings of the Copenhagen School works. First, it might be a point of speech act and defining an issue as a security threat. Second, it might be a point when the audience supports the designation of the threat. Third, it might be implementation of extraordinary measures.¹¹¹ This point is an important clarification of understanding of securitization. For the purpose of the thesis, the author decided to focus on two moments of securitization- especially moment of speech acts and partly on implementation of extraordinary measures, also seen as cooperation based on the approach applied in Kurze's article. In this way, it will be possible to compare securitization process within the four states and on the level of the V4 group. There are not enough comparable sources about the audience support for securitization of energy security and military security. Some public opinion polls are available, but cannot form the basic for understanding securitization process as it would not be possible to compare them exactly.

To summarise, broadening the approach of the Copenhagen School might bring interesting insights into the analysis. The Copenhagen School concept of securitization will be used but new perspectives will be taken into account. First, securitization of an issue might lead to cooperation as Kurze claims in her article. Second, McDonald presents interesting thought on securitization that are going to be applied in the thesis, such as securitization is done not only through speech acts, but also through physical acts that are part of securitization process. According to McDonald, securitization can be studied in different moments and for the purpose of the thesis the emphasise will be given especially on speech acts and, to smaller extent, on the implementation of extraordinary measures but also seen from Kurze's perspective of mobilizing effects of securitization.

¹¹¹ McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", 575.

Those issues will be discussed further in the chapters about energy and military security.

Chapter 3. Energy security

The third chapter is focused on energy security. It is divided into following sections. In the first section conceptualization of energy security is going to be presented based on several different definitions and approaches. In the second section, the Copenhagen School understanding of energy security will be shown. The third section presents definitions of energy security of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia based on their national and energy security strategies. The fourth section provides basic data about the V4 states' energy mixes and dependency on gas and oil imports. The section 3.5 presents short overview of energy cooperation within the V4, especially the Czech-Polish gas interconnector and Czech-Slovak reverse flow. The sixth section analyses content of last two energy security strategies from each state based on key words. The section 3.7 analyses speech acts from governments and ministerial websites of all states concerning the 2006 gas crisis, the 2008 oil crisis and the 2009 gas crisis. The last section, 3.8, presents summary of the findings of the analysis.

3.1 Conceptualization of energy security

Energy is central for the economic development, wealth and competition but at the same time it causes political controversy and poses a challenge to the global environment.¹¹²

This chapter will present several approaches to energy security, as well as constructivist understanding of this concept. The conceptualization of energy security is needed as the thesis is going to analyse cooperation of the V4 states in this matter, so the conceptualization is going to form a basis for further research.

Energy security is not a new issue, it has been present since the rise of the industrial society and

¹¹² Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, "Introduction" in *Energy Security. Economics, Politics, Strategies and Implications*, ed. by Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 1.

became clear when before the World World I the British Royal Navy was converted from coal to oil what was a historical step.¹¹³ Energy security is an important topic in world politics and the concept of energy security is crucial for the thesis.

Energy security can be defined in several ways. Different definitions underline various aspects of energy security so it is important to present them in the thesis and choose the definition that is the most useful for understanding energy security issues of the V4 states. It cannot be overlooked that energy security is differently understood by importing and exporting states and that concepts such as dependence and diversification are also seen in various ways.¹¹⁴ Dependence means that a country relies to a high extent on international energy trade. In such case a state has to rely on supplies in order to ensure resources for its economy.¹¹⁵ Diversification is seen as a starting point for energy security as it means ensuring more sources of supply, what is important especially in the case of disruption. Diversification does not concern only supplies, but also energy transportation and infrastructure. Moreover, it creates a more stable market for exporters.¹¹⁶

The definitions of energy security will be presented in order to see different perspectives of the concept.

First, a famous sentence by Winston Churchill states that "Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone."¹¹⁷ It was said in a connection to the shift in the navy from Welsh coal to Persian-Iranian oil mentioned above. This statement can be also applied to other energy sources, not only oil. Safety, certainty and variety of supplies appear also in other definitions of energy security and might be seen as basic features of energy security. It might be also stated that Churchill named the most important principle of energy security and this is diversification of supply.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Daniel Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", in *Energy & Security. Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy*, ed. by Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 52.

¹¹⁴ Petr Binhack and Lukáš Tichý, "Úvod", in *Energetická Bezpečnost ČR a Budoucnost Energetické Politiky EU*, ed. by Petr Binhack and Lukáš Tichý (Prague: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2011), 7.

¹¹⁵ Pascual and Elkind, "Introduction", 4.

¹¹⁶ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 55.

¹¹⁷ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 52.

¹¹⁸ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 52.

Second, according to a paper presented by Chatham House, energy security "has been understood as defence against supply disruption and price instability."¹¹⁹ This definition underlines the importance of protection against problems with supplies and changes in prices.

The third definition presented by Luft and Korin underlines differences in understanding energy security. They claim that states define their energy security according to their own energy situation and their vulnerability to energy supplies disruptions. The authors underline that there are two main sectors for energy usage- electricity and transportation. In the first sector there is diversity of resources as only 5 percent of electricity in the world is made from petroleum. However, the transportation sector is not diversified and oil forms 95 percent of energy used in that sector. The most vulnerable countries are those dependent on the imports of energy sources for electricity and transportation sectors.¹²⁰

The fourth definition also underlines variety of views on energy security what makes it complicated to offer one definition. Energy security might mean protection against supply disruptions caused by political reasons or, on the other hand, by technical problems. However, for others energy security is connected to supply disruption challenges posed by terrorism or is linked to the global warming and consumption patterns.¹²¹

The fifth definition presents new aspects of energy security. Energy security means access to energy resources needed for further development of national power. Supplies of oil and gas have to be reliable, diverse and affordable and their infrastructure must be adequate.¹²² Moreover, the authors claim that energy security does not mean only oil security but it includes also supplies of natural gas.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Antony Froggatt and Glada Lahn, "Sustainable Energy Security", *Chatham House-Lloyd's 360° Risk Insight White Paper*, 6.

¹²⁰ Gal Luft and Anne Korin, "Energy Security: In the Eyes of the Beholder", in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century. A Reference Handbook*, ed. by Gal Luft and Anne Korin (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009), 6.

¹²¹ Andrew Monaghan, "Russian Oil and EU Energy Security", *Russian Series* 05/65, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2.

¹²² Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, "Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy", in *Energy & Security. Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy*, ed. by Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 9.

¹²³ Kalicki and Goldwyn, "Introduction", 10.

In order to get a better picture of energy security, the principles listed by Daniel Yergin will be mentioned. The author underlines the importance of diversification that was already discussed above. He also claims that politicians need to recognise that there is only one market with oil, states are parts of this market and they will not become independent in the near future. Moreover, in order to ensure energy security states need extra supplies that can be used during any supplies disruption.¹²⁴ In addition to this, it cannot be overlooked that the oil market is more flexible than it used to be and it can better adjust to the changes and supply disruptions. Besides that, since the 1980s most of the oil-exporting states have recognised that they need markets while customers need supplies for reasonable prices and the exporters have understood the mutual interests between them and importing nations. It is in the interest of the exporting state to be credible and build stable relations with customers as oil revenues often form a big part of the state's budget. Two concepts are connected to this cooperative approach- "security of demand" meaning stable relations of exporters with importers but sometimes forgotten by exporters when prices are high and "security of supply" that is often forgotten by importers when prices are low.¹²⁵ Similarly to the dialogue between exporters and importers, there is also dialogue among importing nations about topics such as cooperation and creating mechanisms for a case of emergency in the energy sphere. Dependency mentioned above requires security framework built in order to prevent and respond to threats or attacks against the supply chain. It is especially important because in a case of a disruption fear can cause panic of buying. Governments and private sector should calm the public and provide information, as well as better framework for exchanging data in case of disruptions.¹²⁶ As two other authors, Carlos Pascual and Evie Zambetakis mention in their work: "The political aspect of energy, linked to the sources of supply and demand, comes to public attention at the moment of crisis".¹²⁷

The last two points of Yergin's principles of energy security are also important- innovation in energy

¹²⁴ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 55.

¹²⁵ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 56.

¹²⁶ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 57.

¹²⁷ Carlos Pascual and Evie Zambetakis, "The Geopolitics of Energy. From Security to Survival", in *Energy Security. Economics, Politics, Strategies and Implications* ed. by Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 9.

industry cannot be underestimated, as well as research and development in order to achieve diversification and the basis for new energy systems.¹²⁸

According to some authors, traditional definitions of energy security include availability, reliability, and affordability but contemporary understandings has to take into account also a fourth dimension- environmental security.¹²⁹

The concept of energy security has multiple definitions, but also focus of energy security was changing during the times. Energy security was a target in different ways- during the World War II Allies and Axis were disrupting each other's oil supplies; after the oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian revolution 1979-1980 the focus moved to reliability of oil supplies and responses to disruptions. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the focus has become wider and currently includes not only reliable supplies and management of disruptions, but also security of infrastructure and security of the whole supply chain.¹³⁰

To summarise above mentioned definitions, in general energy security is about variety of resources, stable supply, price stability and dependence of a state on imports of energy sources.

However, besides the general definition of energy security, there is also a need to present the Copenhagen School approach to it.

3.2 Energy security- Copenhagen School approach

The Copenhagen School takes oil into account in its analysis of the economic sector. The authors of the CS emphasise that economics influence survival issues of other sectors. It means that a lot of topics from economic security are connected to survival in other sectors. From this perspective, economic dependency of a state on oil supplies might be used for political means. Such dependencies exist within the whole global market.¹³¹ It leads also to another point of security of

¹²⁸ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 57.

¹²⁹ Jonathan Elkind, "Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda", in *Energy Security. Economics, Politics, Strategies and Implications* ed. by Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009):121.

¹³⁰ Yergin, "Energy Security and Markets", 60.

¹³¹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 116.

supplies when states choose potential insecurity on efficient outside supplies over inefficient self-reliance.¹³² The current political discourse about economic security is focused on instability and inequality.¹³³

It is also worth mentioning that the Copenhagen School does not take energy security into account only in the economic sector, but also in the environmental one. Energy issues in the environmental sector are connected to lack of particular resources, pollutions, potential environmental disasters, and uneven distribution.¹³⁴

It might be summarised that the CS understanding of energy security broadens the definitions mentioned above. Variety of resources, stable supply, price stability and dependence of a state on imports of energy sources are crucial for energy security and will be taken into account in the following chapters, but the ideas of the Copenhagen School will be also included. The understanding of energy security based on analysis of the current political discourse will be used in the thesis for the case of the V4 energy security cooperation.

3.3 Energy security- V4 definitions

In order to discuss energy security of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia there is a need to present their official understanding of energy security based on their most recent national security strategies and energy security strategies. The general definitions of energy security were presented in the section 3.1 and the CS understanding was presented in the section 3.2, but it is also important to see it from the state's perspectives.

There are some differences among the V4 member states concerning their energy mixes, but at the beginning it is important to see their understandings of energy security in their strategies.

The strategies are going to be presented in the state's alphabetical order- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In footnotes, the titles of the documents are stated according to

¹³² Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 98.

¹³³ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 97.

¹³⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 74-75.

language versions in which they were analysed. For better orientation in the footnotes, following shortcuts are going to be used for ministries and governments of particular states in the whole text: CR for the Czech Republic, HU for Hungary, PL for Poland and SR for the Slovak Republic.

The Czech Republic addresses the issues of energy security in its official documents. In the Czech *Update of Energy Concept of the Czech Republic* from 2010, energy that is available, safe and at acceptable prices is named as one of the basic condition for existence of democratic society.¹³⁵ From this perspective, energy sector is seen as crucial for security of the state. Another important document, *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic* names providing of energy security among other strategic interests of the Czech Republic. In this context, strategic interests are defined as interests that help to achieve vital interests, such as existence of the state and independence. Strategic interests also provide development of the society and welfare.¹³⁶

In Hungary, *National Energy Strategy 2030* was presented in 2012. It claims that strategic challenges for the 21st century are access to food, water, and sustainable energy.¹³⁷ The strategy does not give a clear definition of energy security, but it focuses more on security of energy supplies. The document sees it as a priority because of Hungary's geographical position and lack of competitive supplies. The strategy recognizes Hungary's vulnerable position due to sources and transit routes.¹³⁸ In general, the issue of energy supplies is stressed in the strategy in different chapters concerning for example nuclear energy,¹³⁹ gas imports,¹⁴⁰ and electricity.¹⁴¹

The second analysed document, *Hungary's National Security Strategy* published in 2012, presents energy security as an especially important element of economic security of the state.¹⁴²

In the Polish *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* from 2007 it is stated that

"A priority of the energy policy is to ensure stable and uninterrupted supplies of energy carriers based on

¹³⁵ Ministry of Industry and Trade, CR, *Aktualizace státní energetické koncepce České republiky*, (Prague, 2010), 3.

¹³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, *Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky* (2011), 6.

¹³⁷ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030* (2010), 9.

¹³⁸ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030*, 38.

¹³⁹ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030*, 75.

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030*, 127.

¹⁴¹ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030*, 73.

¹⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy* (2012), 14.

long-term contracts and with the help of an independent industrial infrastructure directly connecting sources of supplies (including deposits) with Poland's territory."¹⁴³

Moreover, in the strategy it is noticed that risks in the area of energy security are growing because some states use their energy resources to put political pressure on other states. Importance of economic security has been growing and in is the case particularly with energy security.¹⁴⁴ The strategy clearly states that dependence of Polish economy on supplies of oil and gas from one source in the biggest external threat to Polish security.¹⁴⁵

According to a document prepared by Polish Ministry of Economy in 2009, *Energy Policy of Poland until 2030*, the main directions for Polish energy policy are better effectivity, higher security of energy supplies, introduction of nuclear energy, development of renewable sources, development of competition on the energy market and lesser impact on environment.¹⁴⁶ The definition of the security of energy supplies presented in the document has the elements that were analysed above in the chapter about conceptualisation of energy security. According to the document, supplies have to be stable, they have to meet the needs of the state's economy, their prices have to be accepted by the economy and the society. The definition underlines that the state's reserves have to be used in the optimal way and imports of oil and gas have to be diversified.¹⁴⁷

In the Slovak Republic, a document called *Energy Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* published in 2008 starts with following statement:

"Growth in consumption of energy and raw material by industrial sectors and increasing demands on people's quality of life deepen states' dependence on vital resources, including food, and the likelihood of raw materials and energy crises that could lead even to armed conflict".¹⁴⁸

Emphasise is given on diversification "of sources and routes".¹⁴⁹ The strategy also discusses issue of

¹⁴³ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (Warsaw, 2007), 16.

¹⁴⁴ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 6.

¹⁴⁵ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 8.

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Economy, PL, *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030* (Warsaw, 2009), 4-5.

¹⁴⁷ Ministry of Economy, PL, *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030*, 8.

¹⁴⁸ *Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR* (2008). On the website of the government the document is called as proposal but according to an email to author from Ján Petrovič, general director of Energy Department of the Ministry of Economy, it is the latest strategy. Email sent on 18.12.2012.

¹⁴⁹ *Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR*.

prices: "In the case of oil and gas, we see that large contractors tend to look at price as an important tool for implementing policy objectives".¹⁵⁰ The strategy mentions reliable supplies: "In terms of energy security, the EU must have an interest in Russia being a reliable partner and to minimize the risk to the threatening supplies of energy resources to the EU."¹⁵¹

Another document, *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* also mentions energy security issues. In the strategy it is stated that the growth in usage of energy by companies and individuals deepens the dependence of the states on resources and causes the risk of energy crises. High dependence might endanger prosperity and stability of the state, but also its security.¹⁵² Moreover, Slovakia will diversify the resources, use them in an ecological way, and use more of renewable sources.¹⁵³

To summarise, the element that is found in strategies of all the states is reliance of supplies or security of supplies. All the strategies also mention in some way vulnerability or dependence of the states. In some cases it is stated quite openly and concrete, as in the case of Poland claiming that dependence on gas and oil supplies is the biggest external threat for security and in the Czech case stating that access of some states to energy supplies become a tool of making offensive policy. Slovakia mentions issue of prices and its linkage to policy-making and influence of dependency on states' stability. Hungary is aware of its vulnerability because of sources and routes. It leads to a conclusion that all of the V4 states have in some regards a similar perspective on energy security issues and there is a need to research more on this topic.

3.4 V4 energy security- statistics

To understand dependence of the V4 some statistics are needed. The goal of the section is not to give a full picture of the V4 states energy security and not to present technical aspects. The aim is to give a brief background useful for understanding their perspectives on energy security.

¹⁵⁰ *Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR.*

¹⁵¹ *Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR.*

¹⁵² *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky* (2005), 7.

¹⁵³ *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 11.

To analyse energy security situation of all V4 members, first their energy mix has to be presented. The term energy mix is connected to distribution of the consumption of energy sources, such as oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear energy, and renewable energy. For regions and states energy mixes depend on several factors, such as the availability of resource, extent of energy needs, and political choices caused by economic, social, environmental, and geopolitical conditions.¹⁵⁴

It is a general definition. However, different institutions concerned with energy have their own, more precise ones.

For example, International Energy Agency (IEA) uses definition of "total primary energy supply". It presents "inland demand only (...) and excludes international marine and aviation bunker".¹⁵⁵ It operates with very similar number as Eurostat.¹⁵⁶

Eurostat operates with a definition of "gross inland energy consumption". The table presents gross inland energy consumption defined as:

"primary production plus imports, recovered products and stock change, less exports and fuel supply to maritime bunkers (for seagoing ships of all flags). It therefore reflects the energy necessary to satisfy inland consumption within the limits of national territory."¹⁵⁷

Eurostat presented those statistics in 2011, they concern 2009.¹⁵⁸ The last row about the EU 27 is given for comparison with the V4 states.

¹⁵⁴ Planete Energies, "The Energy Mix- Definition, Current Situation and Future Trends", undated.

¹⁵⁵ IEA, "Glossary", undated.

¹⁵⁶ For comparison see for example: IEA, "Oil & Gas Security. Emergency Response to IEA Countries. Poland. 2011", 2011, 4. The table of all the V4 states total primary energy supply is not presented as on its website IEA presents reports from 2009 about Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic while about Hungary from 2012 and uses statistics respectively from 2009 and 2010 so it would not be possible to compare them precisely.

¹⁵⁷ Eurostat, "EU Sustainable Energy Week Share of renewables in the EU27 energy supply almost doubled between 1999 and 2009", 11.04.2011.

¹⁵⁸ Eurostat, "EU Sustainable Energy Week Share of renewables in the EU27 energy supply almost doubled between 1999 and 2009".

Table 1- gross inland energy consumption

2009	Total, in Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent)	Oil and petroleum products, %	Gas,%	Solid fuels, %	Nuclear energy, %	Renewable energy, %
Czech Republic	42,3	22,6	15,9	41,4	16,7	5,7
Hungary	25,3	28,4	36,2	10,1	15,8	7,3
Poland	95,3	26,3	12,6	54	0	6,6
Slovakia	16,8	20,5	26,3	23,1	21,9	7,2
EU 27	1702,4	36,6	24,5	15,7	13,6	9

This table clearly presents some main differences between the V4 states. First, Poland is the only V4 state that does not use nuclear energy. Second, Hungary and Slovakia consume more gas than the Czech Republic and Poland. On the other hand, the Czech Republic and Poland use more coal than Slovakia and Hungary. In case of Poland coal forms more than half of energy consumption. However, there are also some similarities. The importance of oil in all V4 states in gross inland energy consumption is quite similar (20,5%-28,4%). Moreover, position of renewable in energy consumption is very close (5,7%-7,3%).

Those figures might be useful in understanding potential reactions to gas and oil crises. However, it is important also to see whether the states are dependent on supplies or whether they have domestic production.

Dependency is mentioned in the strategies of all the states and it is important to compare it with statistics. For the purpose of the thesis, dependency on oil and gas supplies will be analysed as those resources appear often in the strategies.

First, sources of gas in the V4 states will be presented. In general, the V4 states cannot rely on their domestic gas supplies. Poland has the biggest percentage of domestic gas supplies among all the V4 states and it is 37% of all gas supplies. For Hungary, it is 13% while for Slovakia and the Czech Republic only 2% and 1% respectively. All the states rely mainly on supplies from Russia: on the first place there is Slovakia with 98%, then the Czech Republic with 77%, Hungary with 67% and

Poland with 52%. Other important sources of gas are Germany for Poland (7%), Norway for the Czech Republic (22%) and Turkmenistan for Hungary (18%).¹⁵⁹

From this brief comparison it is clear that all of the V4 states rely on the supplies of Russian gas- some of them almost fully (Slovakia), some of them on half of their gas supplies (Poland). It explains why dependence appears as a topic in their strategies.

It is also worth to analyse the case of oil supplies. In Poland there is very small domestic production of oil and 94% of crude oil imports were provided by Russia in 2009.¹⁶⁰ For the Czech Republic, Russia is also the biggest single source of crude oil imports, it provided more than 2/3 of the total in 2009. The imports from Azerbaijan has been growing, in 2009 it formed 20% of the imports. The Czech Republic does not have big oil reserves and its domestic production makes 3% of total oil demand.¹⁶¹ In Slovakia, all of the crude oil imports are provided by Russia. Slovakia similarly to the Czech Republic and Poland does not have significant domestic oil production.¹⁶² The same situation is in Hungary with 100% of crude oil imports provided by Russia.¹⁶³ Domestic production in Hungary is declining and deepening dependency.¹⁶⁴

To summarise, the V4 states do not have significant oil reserves and they are dependent on Russia's oil exports- Slovakia and Hungary almost fully, Poland to a great extent and the Czech Republic also to a great extent.¹⁶⁵ In case of gas, situation is slightly different with domestic production especially in Poland and to lesser extent in Hungary. However, production in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is low.

3.5 V4 cooperation in energy security

As it was presented in the section above, the V4 states are dependent to various extents on Russia in

¹⁵⁹ Martin Ehl, "Gas Geopolitics. A Small Lexicon of an Immense Issue", *Visegrad Insights* 1/2012, 28-29.

¹⁶⁰ IEA, "Oil & Gas Security. Emergency Response to IEA Countries. Poland. 2011", 3.

¹⁶¹ IEA, "Oil & Gas Security. Emergency Response to IEA Countries. Czech Republic. 2010", 5.

¹⁶² IEA, "Oil & Gas Security. Emergency Response to IEA Countries. Slovak Republic. 2011", 6.

¹⁶³ IEA, "Oil & Gas Security. Emergency Response to IEA Countries. Hungary. 2012", 2012, 7.

¹⁶⁴ IEA, "Oil & Gas Security. Emergency Response to IEA Countries. Hungary. 2012", 3.

¹⁶⁵ For comparison: according to OECD data, the import dependency on oil from Russia is as follows: Hungary 100%, Slovakia 100%, Poland 94% and the Czech Republic 70%. See: OECD, "Sheet 1", undated.

oil and gas imports. It is clear that any disruption of supplies might cause serious problems for each of the countries.

In such case, are the V4 states willing to cooperate in order to prevent or minimize negative effects of potential supply crises? If they are, what are the examples of such successful cooperation? A short background will be given in order to answer those questions. As it has been stated already, the V4 states in general are highly dependent on imports of energy supplies. In their energy and security strategies they mention the issues of dependency. They have similar geopolitical and geographical position but of all the V4 states only Poland has access to the sea and has greater chances to provide energy supplies from other sources such as building a harbour for oil imports and LNG terminals.¹⁶⁶ Other states have to rely only on pipelines that were built in East- West direction.

The V4 states are in the same region and have decided to cooperate in energy security issues. What are the successful cases of such cooperation? Such cases can be found in gas supplies security. First, there is the case of gas pipeline interconnector on the Polish-Czech border. It is first such connection between Poland and the Czech Republic.¹⁶⁷ For Poland it is also second gas pipeline connection with another EU country¹⁶⁸ (the other being with Germany).¹⁶⁹ It is crucial for the Czech Republic and Poland as it connects Polish and Czech gas transmission systems and enables transporting gas between them what was not possible before. It leads to greater gas supplies security in crisis situations for the Czech Republic.¹⁷⁰ This interconnector is meant mainly for imports for the Polish market, but it is designed to enable supplies in both directions.¹⁷¹

In future this gas pipeline interconnector will become a part of the EU North-South Corridor

¹⁶⁶ Petr Lang, Andrej Nosko, Jiří Schenider, "Energetická bezpečnost a Státní energetická koncepce", 30.8.2009, 23.

¹⁶⁷ European Commission, "Gas Interconnection. Czech- Poland Reverse Flow", updated 09.2012.

¹⁶⁸ Gazeta Wyborcza, "Gaz-System uruchomił interkonektor gazowy z Czechami", updated 15.09.2011.

¹⁶⁹ Polish Radio, "Polish-Czech gas interconnector goes online", 14.09.2011.

¹⁷⁰ Polish Radio, "Polish-Czech gas interconnector goes online".

¹⁷¹ Filip Černoch at al., „Energetická bezpečnost ČR a budoucnost energetické politiky EU", updated 20.12.2010, 23.

leading from the Polish LNG terminal in Świnoujście to the Croatia LNG terminal in Krk. This corridor will be formed by existing transmission systems and interconnectors between them.¹⁷²

The new interconnector was officially opened in September 2011.¹⁷³ It was opened by the Prime Minister Donal Tusk and the Prime Minister Petr Nečas.¹⁷⁴ The Czech-Polish gas system interconnector has been operating since April 2012.¹⁷⁵

Are there other cases of successful cooperation among the V4 states? In 2011, the project of reverse flow of gas between the Czech Republic and Slovakia was accomplished. It allows to change the direction of the flow in case of supply crisis and send gas from West to East instead of usual East-West direction. In this way, the gas supplies for Slovakia can be assured quickly.¹⁷⁶ As it is going to be presented in section 3.7.3, this solution was used already in 2009 during the gas crisis.

However, besides those two accomplished projects of connecting gas systems, there are also two other planned projects: between Poland and Slovakia, as well as between Slovakia and Hungary.

The plan of interconnector between Poland and Slovakia is being analysed and the results will be presented in 2013.¹⁷⁷ This connection would give chances for greater diversification in Central Europe and opportunities to transport LNG gas imported to Świnoujście from different countries.¹⁷⁸

As it was stated, this Polish-Slovak interconnection is analysed currently. What is the situation with the last possible V4 interstate connection, Slovak-Hungarian connection of gas systems?

In 2011, the memorandum about the construction was signed by Slovak and Hungarian energy companies. They plan to open the gas interconnector in 2015. The interconnector would support

¹⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Nové přeshraniční propojení", 12.09.2011.

¹⁷³ European Commission, "Gas Interconnection. Czech- Poland Reverse Flow".

¹⁷⁴ Government, CR, "AVÍZO: Předsedové vlád Česka a Polska slavnostně zprovozní plynový interkonektor na česko-polském pomezí", 14.09.2011.

¹⁷⁵ European Commission, "Gas Interconnection. Czech- Poland Reverse Flow".

¹⁷⁶ Net4Gas, "NET4GAS dokončil projekt Reverse Flow", 15.06.2011, 1.

¹⁷⁷ Ministry of Economy, PL, Letter to the speaker of the parliament, 04.09.2012 , 6.

¹⁷⁸ Euroactiv, "Polsko a Slovensko budou jednat o společném plynovodu", 17.01.2011.

greater diversification within the region.¹⁷⁹ This connection has three goals: creation of opportunities for competition in gas market, providing gas supplies to Slovakia, Hungary and other states, as well as participation in the creation of the above-mentioned North-South Corridor.¹⁸⁰ As it might be seen, two cases of successful cooperation within the V4 in connecting their gas systems and reverse flows were accomplished recently (Poland- the Czech Republic in 2011 and the Czech Republic- Slovakia in 2011). It is a big progress in cooperation if one takes into account that a few years ago the Central European states were not connected in West-East and North-South directions.

It leads to the following question: Which interests the V4 states have in common and how can they protect them? To address this question, the content analysis of energy security strategies will be applied in the next section.

3.6 Content analysis- energy security strategies

First, in order to analyse energy security strategies, the key words have to be chosen. The key words are going to be chosen according to similar principles as in work by Nik Hynek and Vít Střítecký.¹⁸¹ In their approach, thematic analysis is based on qualitative searching for key topics that characterize certain issue. This research strategy is close to multiple reading of sources. Discovering figures of content organisation is a key to this strategy and thanks to this analysed topics become analytical categories.¹⁸²

The author decided to choose the key words according to the topics that appear often in connection to energy security in the V4 and partly to energy security in general (such as word "security").

The key words are Russia/Russian Federation, security, crisis, threat, and dependency.

The goal of the quantitative content analysis of the two last energy security strategies from each state is to see whether the key words appear more often with time and whether it can be argued that

¹⁷⁹ Eustream, "Budovanie slovensko-maďarského prepojenia plynovodov podporilo nové memorandum o porozumení", 09.09.2011.

¹⁸⁰ Černoch at al., „Energetická bezpečnosť ČR a budúcnosť energetickej politiky EU“, 40.

¹⁸¹ See: Hynek and Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnosť podľa českých atlantistů", 80-101.

¹⁸² Hynek and Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnosť podľa českých atlantistů", 86.

importance of topics they represent is growing, taking into account also the crises experienced in recent years: the gas crises of 2006 and 2008 as well as the oil crisis of 2008.

First, a short description of each strategy will be given: when it was published, who prepared it, and number of pages as it can influence how often certain words appear.

The first analysed strategy in the Czech Republic was published in 2004. The document *State Energy Concept of the Czech Republic* was prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. It was accepted by the government. It has 50 pages and is divided into three chapters.¹⁸³ The following document is the update of the previous strategy. It was prepared by the same Ministry, it is 97 pages long and consists of six chapters.^{184 185}

In the case of Hungary, only the document published in 2012 is going to be analysed. The earlier document from 2008 is not a strategy but it is a supporting background document for a parliament decree and it is available only in Hungarian. However, according to information received from the Ministry of National Development, there is no earlier version of the energy strategy.¹⁸⁶ The author is aware of the fact that analysing only one document will not bring results whether the importance of the particular topics is growing. On the other hand, the goal is to analyse strategic documents and as in Hungary only one is available, it will be possible to trace whether some topics appear and are recognised. The document published in 2012, *National Energy Strategy 2030*, was prepared by the Ministry of National Development. It has 11 chapters and 132 pages.¹⁸⁷

In Poland, the first analysed document was published in 2005. It is titled *Energy Policy of Poland Until 2025*. The policy was prepared by the Ministry of Economy and Labour and was accepted by the government. The document is not clearly divided into chapters, it is 58 pages long.¹⁸⁸ The second document is *Energy Policy of Poland Until 2030* presented in 2009. It was prepared by the

¹⁸³ Ministry of Industry and Trade, CR, *Státní energetická koncepce České republiky* (Prague, 2004).

¹⁸⁴ Ministry of Industry and Trade, *Aktualizace státní energetické koncepce České republiky* (Prague, 2010).

¹⁸⁵ Two analysed strategies were chosen based on the official website of the Ministry, section "Státní energetické koncepce", 10.05.2010.

¹⁸⁶ E-mail from Miklós Gyalai-Korpos, Strategic affairs officer, Department of Strategy and Energy Policy, Ministry of National Development, 18.10.2012.

¹⁸⁷ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030*.

¹⁸⁸ Ministry of Economy and Labour, PL, *Polityka energetyczna Polski do roku 2025* (2005).

Ministry of Economy and accepted by the government. It is 8 chapters and it has 29 page.¹⁸⁹

In Slovakia, *Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic* was published in 2006. It has 18 pages.¹⁹⁰ The second document, *Energy Security of the Slovak Republic* was presented in 2008. The original text on the website is not divided into pages¹⁹¹ but it has about 200 pages of standard text.

The following table presents how many times the key words appear in the energy security strategies. For reason of comparison, as the analysed documents were published in different languages, only noun forms were taken into account. Moreover, as the languages might have different structure, the numbers how often key words appear might be only compared within one state and language, not among them.¹⁹²

Table 2- content analysis of energy security strategies

	Czech Republic 2004	Czech Republic 2010	Hungary 2012	Poland 2005	Poland 2009	Slovakia 2006	Slovakia 2008
Russia/ Russian Federation	0	4	16	6	1	6	31
security	13	69	53	100	45	27	more than 220
crisis	2	25	20	2	0	0	12
threat	0	1	6	15	3	0	5
dependency	22	27	14	0	0	10	46

It is clear that in the Czech and Slovak documents analysed as the second ones, all of the key words appear more often. It might be argued that this rise is influenced by the gas crises as the states realised that their security is threatened and they are dependent on imports, especially that the second analysed documents were published in 2010 in the Czech Republic after the gas crises and

¹⁸⁹ Ministry of Economy, PL, *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku* (Warsaw, 2009).

¹⁹⁰ *Energetická politika SR* (2006). The year of publication is not written in the strategy but it was stated in an email to author from Ján Petrovič from the Ministry of Economy, 18.12.2012.

¹⁹¹ *Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR*. On the website it is called a proposal but according to an email to author from Ján Petrovič from the Ministry of Economy, 18.12.2012, it is a strategy.

¹⁹² The key words in other languages: in Czech- Rusko/Ruská federace, bezpečnost, krize, hrozba, závislost; in Polish- Rosja/Federacja Rosyjska, bezpieczeństwo, kryzys, zagrożenie, zależność; in Slovak- Rusko/Ruská federácia, bezpečnosť, kríza, hrozba, závislosť. The key words in Hungarian are not provided as the Hungarian document is analysed in English.

in 2008 in Slovakia after the 2006 crisis. On the other hand, the second analysed documents in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia are much longer. It might be argued that similarly to rising number of the key words, rising number of pages of the documents might also present growing importance of energy security issues.¹⁹³ In Poland such trend is not present but it might be also caused by the fact that the second strategy is half shorter. In case of Hungary, it is not possible to compare the strategy from 2012 with the previous one as explained above.

Are the strategies influenced by recent crises?

In the Czech strategy from 2010 it is stated:

"In the framework of energy policy of the EU there is a need to ensure and rise energy security of the EU, what has been confirmed also the experience of the gas crisis in January 2009- at the beginning of half year's Czech presidency of the EU Council".¹⁹⁴

In the Slovak strategy from 2008 it is stated that Slovakia:

"may again become hostages in potential increased international tension between the Russian Federation and certain countries in Eastern Europe, possibly with the intention of keeping the economically favorable oil prices for the Russian Federation."¹⁹⁵

The gas crisis is also mentioned in the Hungarian strategy from 2012:

"During recent years, the Russian-Ukrainian gas debate has repeatedly given trouble in the gas supply of Hungary and the EU, shedding light on the high risks of unilateral dependency on energy import. Since the crisis, however, energy security has become a priority issue within the EU".¹⁹⁶

In those strategies the gas crisis are named as a challenge that the EU and individual states face. In the Polish strategy there is no concrete crisis pointed out. However, there is a need to note that the second strategy is almost half shorter than the first one.

To summarise, there are some visible trends in the key words in the strategies and it might be argued that especially in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the rise in key words is high but it must

¹⁹³ Lukáš Tichý and Petr Binhac. "Česká debata o vnější dimenzi energetické bezpečnosti a národní zájem", 4.

¹⁹⁴ Ministry of Industry and Trade, CR, *Aktualizace energetické koncepce*, 11.

¹⁹⁵ *Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR*.

¹⁹⁶ Ministry of National Development, HU, *National Energy Strategy 2030*, 27.

be taken into account that latest strategies are much longer than the previous ones. However, it has to be underlined that in the case of Hungary any comparison might not be made with the previous strategy and in Poland the second document is much shorter than the first one what might have influence the number of the key word in the text.

This section gave an overview whether importance of particular key words is growing. The section 3.7 is going to analyse whether energy security issues were securitized during energy crises in recent years.

3.7. Energy security- speeches and statements

The section is going to present analysis of materials published online after the energy crises by Ministries of Foreign Affairs¹⁹⁷ and Governments. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs were chosen as they might comment on issues such as energy security if they perceive them as a part of foreign policies of the states. The Foreign Ministers also meet on the V4 forum and their statements from there are going to be analysed. The statements from the Prime Ministers and their offices on both national and the V4 level will show whether the executives see energy security crisis as a security issue.

Moreover, statements by Ministries of Economy (in Slovakia and Poland), Ministry of Industry in Trade (in the Czech Republic) and Ministry of National Development (in Hungary) are going to be analysed. The decision to choose those Ministries is based on the declaration published on the V4 level. In the declaration from 2011 those Ministers are called "V4 Energy Ministers".¹⁹⁸ From this perspective, it might be seen that their statements might be linked to energy security and because of that they should be analysed in the thesis.

For the reason of fair comparison the author decided to analyse only materials on the websites such as "news", "news archives", "statements" etc. A very limited number of analysed institutions

¹⁹⁷ In Slovakia, the full name name of the Ministry is Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.

¹⁹⁸ The V4, *Declaration of V4 Energy Ministers*, 25.01.2011.

presents on their websites wider online archives including interviews from the media given by their Ministers and materials by special representatives for energy security etc. Taking into account such materials could bring an unbalanced picture of energy security understanding in those institutions as some of them do not publish such materials. Due to that, the author decided to focus only on statements, news, press releases sections that are present on all analysed websites but in some cases they are named in different ways.

It has to be stated that issues of electricity and cooperation among the V4 in this sector are not going to be analysed as the author decided to focus on crises and they were caused by oil and gas supplies. Electricity has not caused any international crisis for the V4 and for this reason it will not be taken into account in the thesis.

In the following sub-sections speech acts concerning the gas crisis 2006, the oil crisis 2008 and the gas crisis 2009 are going to be analysed. Those crises were chosen as they are recent cases of energy security crises and all of them concerned the V4- in the case of 2008 it was the Czech Republic, in gas crises most of the V4 members had to face them.

The statements from the websites of above mentioned offices will be analysed, as well as statements of the V4. For the states, the materials until the end of the month when the crises took place were taken into account. For the V4, they were statements from the whole year as the V4 publishes common statements rarely.

The speech act analysis will be based on statements of the prime ministers and ministers following the crises and statements presented on their official websites. Statements including the key words from the previous section will be chosen, but also others if they are related to the topic of crises even though they do not consist any key word.

The states in each sub-section concerning particular crisis will be presented in alphabetical order. For each country, first will be analysed a website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, second of the Prime Minister and third of the Ministry of Economy of Poland and Slovakia, as well as Ministry of

Industry and Trade in case of the Czech Republic and Ministry of National Development in case of Hungary.

3.7.1 2006- gas crisis

The gas crisis in 2006 is seen in the European Union as an event that showed weaknesses in energy security.¹⁹⁹ According to data from the European mainstream media on January 2, 2006, of the V4 states Hungary, Poland and Slovakia were influenced by gas cuts. It was Hungary where the Russian imports were down by 40%, Poland where the Russian gas supply was down by 14% and Slovakia where the supplies were down by one third.²⁰⁰ On January 3, 2006 in Hungary the imports were fully working while some other countries still faced shortfalls. On the next day the supplies were again at normal levels to all the states concerned.²⁰¹

How did the V4 states react in speeches and statements to the gas crisis in 2006?

● The Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic the topic of the gas crisis was not discussed in any official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2006.²⁰² It is not mentioned in the press conference from this period either.²⁰³ The government does not have on its website older materials than from September 2006 so it is not possible to see the statements concerning the gas crisis.²⁰⁴ The Ministry of Industry and Trade on its website has only press releases since 2011.²⁰⁵ However, in the section about energy in the Czech Republic there are materials from the beginning on 2006 and gas crisis is not mentioned there.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁹ Europa.eu, "Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what next?", 09.03.2009.

²⁰⁰ BBC, "Ukraine 'stealing Europe's gas' ", 02.01.2006.

²⁰¹ Jonathan Stern, "The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 16.01.2006.

²⁰² See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Archiv 2006", 10.07.2009.

²⁰³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Záznamy tiskových konferencí", 19.03.2009.

²⁰⁴ Government, CR, "Tiskové zprávy", undated.

²⁰⁵ Ministry of Industry and Trade, CR, "Archiv - Tiskové informace".

²⁰⁶ Ministry of Industry and Trade, CR, "Archiv - Energetika v ČR", undated.

● Hungary

In the case of Hungary, it is not possible to analyse the statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the crisis. On the English-language website listing all the communication there are no statements from January 2006.²⁰⁷ The closest ones are from February 2006 but they are not linked to the gas crisis. On the website of the government, the documents are available only starting on 2010.²⁰⁸ On the English version of the website of the Ministry of National Development the oldest news are from June 2010.²⁰⁹

● Poland

In the case of Poland the situation is different. On the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a short relation about the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller with the Ukrainian president Victor Yushchenko. The Polish Minister emphasised that he is the first minister from the EU who visits Ukraine after the end of the gas crisis (the meeting took place on January 10, 2006). The Minister said "The goal is to become independent from Russia but in such a way of thinking that in the same time takes Russia into account".²¹⁰

On the website of the Polish government the statement from January 3, 2006 says: "The government decided to take urgent actions leading to diversification of gas supplies. The Minister of Economy shall prepare decisions about necessary investments".²¹¹

Another perspective is given by the Ministry of Economy. The first statement about the gas crisis was published already on January 1, 2006. The minister Piotr Woźniak said that there is no risk that the individual customers would notice the lack of supplies and that gas reserves are used.²¹² The

²⁰⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU: "The Ministry's Communications", undated.

²⁰⁸ Government, HU, "Documents", undated.

²⁰⁹ Ministry of National Development, HU, "News", undated.

²¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Ukraina/ Spotkanie Meller-Juszczenko: współpraca w energetyce", 10.01.2006.

²¹¹ Government, PL, "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju priorytetem dla rządu", 03.01.2006.

²¹² Ministry of Economy, PL, "Minister Gospodarki: Nie ma niebezpieczeństwa niedoborów gazu", 01.01.2006.

next statement from the website was published on January 2, 2006. It is titled: "Valid procedures in case of energy threat for Poland". It lists legislation concerning limitation during long-term "lack of balance" on the energy market.²¹³

On the briefing on the same day the Minister said that it was impossible to say for how long the limitations would last. He also said: "There are no limitations or threats for the households". The Secretary of State in the Ministry of Economy said: "Issues of energy security should be considered on the level of the EU, but also on the level of individual states".²¹⁴

On January 3, 2006, the statement of the Ministry reads:

"The Ministry of Economy, in regard to the resolution of the Council of Ministers, informs that it is taking actions aimed at diversification of energy carriers imports to Poland. Especially conditions of LNG imports are analysed, including number of terminals, location and sources of delivery".²¹⁵

On January 4, 2006 the Ministry published a stance of the Polish government for the meeting of the Coordination Group on gas in the European Commission. The official stance says:

"Limitation of gas supplies from Russia through Ukraine poses threat to energy security of the whole European Union. Poland believes that demanding change of gas prices through limitation of supplies is not a part of good practices".²¹⁶

In the Polish statement there is also mention about the Visegrad Group and Austria. The common stance among their representatives was established during the teleconference on January 3. They: "propose to start talks considering diversification of energy carriers to Central-Eastern Europe. Diversification is here understood as gaining access to other than Russian sources of gas and oil and development of the South- North gas connection system. The Visegrad Group concerns that it is necessary that the EU support such activities on both political and financial level".²¹⁷

On the same day, the statement after the meeting was presented. The stance of the Polish delegation

²¹³ Ministry of Economy, PL, " Procedury obowiązujące w przypadku zagrożenia energetycznego Polski", 02.01.2006.

²¹⁴ Ministry of Economy, PL, " Minister gospodarki: system dostaw radzi sobie z ograniczeniami", 02.01.2006.

²¹⁵ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Oświadczenie ministerstwa gospodarki w związku z uchwałą RM w sprawie działań mających na celu dywersyfikację dostaw nośników energii", 03.01.2006.

²¹⁶ Ministry of Economy, PL, " Stanowisko polskiego rządu na posiedzenie Grupy Koordynacyjnej ds. gazu Komisji Europejskiej", 04.01.2006.

²¹⁷ Ministry of Economy, PL, " Stanowisko polskiego rządu na posiedzenie Grupy Koordynacyjnej".

was: "to advocate for far-reaching diversification of sources of energy, including gas".²¹⁸ On the meeting Hungary represented the common stance of Austria and the Visegrad Group that is presented in the paragraph above.²¹⁹

It was the last statement from the beginning of January 2006 concerning the gas crisis directly. However, there is a statement from January 17, 2006 about several meetings of the V4 ministers and Prime Ministers. The Minister of Economy took part in working meetings in Prague, Bratislava and Budapest together with the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. According to the statement:

"The issues discussed on the meetings with the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group focused mainly on the issues connected to energy security. (...) The Prime Ministers emphasised the need to discuss in the frame of the Group the issues linked to energy security. Those talks shall lead to a formulation of a common stance presented in the EU".²²⁰

In the same time there was a meeting in Warsaw of the Secretaries of State with the representatives of Ministries of Economy from the V4 and Austria. According to the statement, they: "also discussed topics concerning energy security, including security and diversification of oil and gas supplies. The sides emphasised necessity and readiness to held further talks".²²¹

In the second half of January (22, 23, 25, 27) on the website statements and press releases about the second limitation of gas supplies on the Ukrainian border were published. Due to that, some chemical industry industrial plants were going to receive less gas supplies.²²² On January 23 the Minister of Economy said during the briefing that there were not going to be any limitations in gas supplies for individual customers.²²³ Moreover, the Minister said that the Polish company responsible for gas supplies asked the Russian side to send the missing gas supplies to another crossings as the pressure was falling down only on the one crossing.²²⁴ However, "the contracts

²¹⁸ Ministry of Economy, PL, " Informacja po zakończeniu posiedzenia Grupy Koordynacyjnej ds. gazu Komisji Europejskiej", 04.01.2006.

²¹⁹ Ministry of Economy, PL, " Informacja po zakończeniu posiedzenia Grupy Koordynacyjnej".

²²⁰ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wizyta ministra gospodarki w stolicach państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej", 19.01.2006.

²²¹ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Informacja po zakończeniu posiedzenia Grupy Koordynacyjnej ds. gazu Komisji Europejskiej", 04.01.2006.

²²² Ministry of Economy, PL, "Komunikat prasowy w związku z ograniczeniami w dostawach gazu", 22.01.2006.

²²³ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Komunikat prasowy w związku z ograniczeniami w dostawach gazu".

²²⁴ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Minister gospodarki: odbiorcy indywidualni nie są zagrożeni", 23.01.2006.

strictly define the place of gas supplies".²²⁵

On January 25 the Ministry published a statement saying that limitations of gas supplies do not concern individual customers, meaning households, as well as hospitals and combined heat and power stations.²²⁶

During the conference on January 27 the Minister said: "We have limited gas supplies for industry but households are not threatened by any limitations".²²⁷ Moreover, the statements says:

"According to the Minister, this year experiences with gas supplies limitations undercovered long-term omissions in modernisation of the carrier network, lack of investments in the country's extraction and infrastructure to use Polish gas".²²⁸

It is the last statement concerning gas and energy security in January. As it might be clearly seen, the topic of gas crisis, energy security and the V4 stance was important and often presented by the Polish Ministry of Economy.

● Slovakia

In Slovakia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not present on its website materials from 2006. The oldest statements available at the website were published in September 2009.²²⁹ In the news section, the oldest news is from May 2005, the next one is from May 2007 and there is no news between them.²³⁰ On the website of the government, the oldest press releases are from June 2010.²³¹ The statement section also has the oldest articles from 2010.²³² The Ministry of Economy has on its website press releases from January 2006 but the gas crisis is not mentioned in any of them.²³³

²²⁵ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Minister gospodarki: odbiorecy indywidualni nie są zagrożeni".

²²⁶ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Komunikat prasowy w związku z ograniczeniami w dostawach gazu", 25.01.2006.

²²⁷ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wizyta ministra Piotra Woźniaka w Poznaniu", 27.01.2006.

²²⁸ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wizyta ministra Piotra Woźniaka w Poznaniu".

²²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Vyhlásenia a stanoviská", 1a.

²³⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Všetky správy", 1c, undated.

²³¹ Government, SR, "Tlačové správy a oznamy", undated.

²³² Government, SR, "Vyhlásenia a stanoviská", undated.

²³³ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Tlačové správy", undated.

● The Visegrad Group

What was the position of the Visegrad Group? Was it discussing the topic of energy security, supplies or gas crisis in its official materials? The official statements of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs were published only once each in 2006.

In their declaration Prime Ministers in October 2006 stated that:

"While discussing the issues on the agenda of the forthcoming European Council the Prime Ministers underlined that promoting innovation at European level is crucial for economic development and enhancing competitiveness of the EU as a whole as well as its Member States and welcomed relevant community and national initiatives in this regard. They stressed that energy security is of major and strategic importance for the sustainability of economic development in Europe and called for a more coordinated approach in this field."²³⁴

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs did not mention any key word connected to the topic in their declaration in November 2006, it was focused on the Schengen area.²³⁵

It might be summarised that in 2006 energy security understood as major and strategic topic appeared in the official statement by the V4. Was it a result of the January gas crisis? The answer might be found by checking whether energy security was mentioned in 2005 official statements. In Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministerial Meeting from July 11, 2005 any of the key words that were used for analysis of the strategies (Russia/Russian Federation, security, crisis, threat, and dependency) or other links to energy security did not appear.²³⁶ Two declarations of Prime Ministers from 2005 also do not mention energy security issues in any way.²³⁷

The number of documents taken into consideration is small as the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs do not have meetings often and do not publish their declarations often. However, it might be stated that in 2005 energy security issues did not appear in any of their statements while in 2006 in the document presented by the Prime Ministers energy security was

²³⁴ The V4, "Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Countries", 10.10.2006.

²³⁵ The V4, "Statement of the Visegrad-4 and Baltic-3 Foreign Ministers", 13.11.2006.

²³⁶ The V4, "Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministerial Meeting", 11.07.2005.

²³⁷ The V4, "Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the V4 Countries on the EU", 10.06.2005; "Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the V4 Countries on Ukraine", 10.06.2005.

stated as a strategic issue.

From this perspective, it might lead to a conclusion that the January gas crisis in 2006 might have influenced them and their perception of energy security especially when other official documents are taken into account, such as press releases by the Polish Ministry of Economy about consultations within the V4 and visits of the Polish delegation to other V4 capitals where energy security was discussed.

3.7.2 2008- oil crisis

The situation concerning oil import is different than in the case of gas supplies. Concerning oil, the issue of dependence on Russian supplies is less pressing for the V4 states as there is a global market with oil and a possibility of relative diversification of suppliers and routes.²³⁸

However, the limitation of oil supplies that the Czech Republic faced in 2008 is also worth to be analysed. How did the Czech Republic react? Did the V4 present some stance on it?

In 2008, when the Czech Republic agreed to host a radar, an element of the American anti-missile shield, the Russian oil supplies were cut down by 40%.^{239 240} Two weeks later it was stated by the Russian side that it was a result of technical problems.²⁴¹ The Czech Republic managed to cover oil supplies from different sources, by the pipeline IKL. Of the V4 states, only the Czech Republic faced limitation of oil supplies.²⁴²

First, it is important to see what the reactions of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czech Prime Minister and his office, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade were.

On the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website among available statements, there is no mention about the oil crisis.²⁴³

²³⁸ David Grodzki, "Energy Security in the V4- Cooperation to Enhance Security and Development", 11.

²³⁹ Grodzki, "Energy Security in the V4", 12.

²⁴⁰ The topic of the radar is not going to be analysed in the thesis as it focuses on crises concerning the V4.

²⁴¹ Grodzki, "Energy Security in the V4", 13.

²⁴² Petra Kuchyňková, *Vývoj vztahů Ruské federace a Evropské Unie v kontextu problematiky energetické bezpečnosti* (PhD diss, Masarykova Univerzita, 2008), 98-99.

²⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Archiv 2008", 10.07.2009.

On the website of the Government there are two statements from July 2008 about energy security. However, they are not linked to the oil crisis- the first article is titled: "The government voted on the novel of energy law or change in the school laws".²⁴⁴ However, the issue of energy is not discussed in the article. The second article is titled: "Energy is a global problem of nowadays". However, it does not refer to the crisis but to an independent commission which prepared recommendations for the government in energy issues.²⁴⁵

On the website of the Ministry of Industry and Trade there is no news from 2008 as it was explained in the previous section- materials are available since 2011. However, also in other sections of the website the oil crisis is not addressed.

The oil crisis was not addressed in the online available official materials by the Czech government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Industry and Trade but it is worth to see whether the other V4 states addressed it somehow.

On the websites of the respective governments and Ministries of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary there are no press releases, statements or news concerning the oil crisis in the Czech Republic. Some institutions do not present materials from previous years as discussed above (in Hungary Ministry of National Development and government, in Slovakia also government), some institutions present materials from 2008 but July is not covered²⁴⁶, all other analysed published materials in July but they are not concerned with the halt of oil supplies to the Czech Republic.²⁴⁷

On the level of individual states there is no mention of the Czech problems with oil supplies. However, it is worth to see whether the V4 addresses it somehow.

● The Visegrad Group

During the meeting of the V4 Prime Ministers in November 2008, they presented a joint statement.

²⁴⁴ Government CR, "Vláda odsouhlasila novelu energetického zákona nebo změnu školského zákona", 02.07.2008.

²⁴⁵ Government CR, "Premiér: Energetika je globální problém současnosti", 04.07.2008.

²⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "The Ministry's Communications", undated.

²⁴⁷ See for example: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Archiwum", undated; Government, PL, "Archiwum", undated; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SK, "Všetky správy", 1d, undated.

It was handed to the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, to the European Commission and to the European Parliament.

There are several paragraphs about energy security. Those statements do not mention directly the oil crisis from August but they are concerned with energy security of the V4. Moreover, the Prime Ministers do not present their statements often so they are more general.²⁴⁸ However, comparing to the previous years there is a big raise in frequency of using key words such as "energy security" and "dependency".

The following quotes are going to present the common stances of the V4 states on energy security:

"The Prime Ministers will consider the proposal of the Slovak Republic to establish Visegrad Development Bank to stimulate the regional cooperation in strategic projects financing (i.e. in energy sector)."²⁴⁹

The second quote addresses not only the issues of energy supplies to the V4, but also the fact that the EU should reflect it:

"The Prime Ministers consider important that the particular energy supply security situation of the Central and Eastern European Member States should be reflected within the second Energy Strategy Review as well as in the second Energy Policy Action Plan."²⁵⁰

The third quotation presents a common approach of the V4 on the important topic for them - dependency on energy imports:

"The Prime Ministers hope that the proposal of the European Commission will be held on the basis of conviction that a resilient internal market policy as well as the climate and energy package will not be enough if the European Union wants to address efficiently its external dependence on oil and gas."²⁵¹

According to the V4 Prime Ministers, diversification should be taken into account by the European Commission:

²⁴⁸ In 2008 the statements of the Prime Ministers on the V4 website were presented three times: The V4 "Press Release: Official Summit of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries," 16.6.2008, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers", 05.11.2008 and "Press Release of the Polish V4 Presidency after the Official Summit of Prime Ministers of the V4 and B3 Countries", 05.11.2008.

²⁴⁹ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers", 05.11.2008.

²⁵⁰ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

²⁵¹ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

"The European Commission should pave the way for diversifying energy sources and routes of its supply to the European Union. Moreover, the proposal of the European Commission should significantly contribute to development of efficient solidarity mechanisms at the Community level."²⁵²

The V4 Prime Ministers also mention in their statement recent shortages:

"Bearing in mind the lack of sufficient capacities and local supply shortages experienced in the previous years, the Prime Ministers expect that the European Commission will analyze present oil and gas pipelines systems and electricity grids within the EU member states with the suggestion of possible connecting through separate systems."²⁵³

Moreover, they also think that:

"(...) focus should be given on the further development of mutual confidence mechanisms between the European Union and the producer and consumer countries, especially within the scope of the Eastern Partnership which will serve as one of the most important instruments for improving the energy relations."²⁵⁴

The last point concerns expectations about security of supply:

"during the Czech Presidency the European Council will give a clear and strong political signal to reinforce the European security of supply policy. According to that, the Prime Ministers declare their support for the Czech Presidency initiatives aiming at intensifying the relations with the countries of the Caspian Sea region and transit countries."²⁵⁵

In 2008, the V4 Prime Ministers met together with the Prime Ministers of the Baltic states. They discussed several issues, among them energy cooperation. In the press release after the meeting it is stated:

"There is general consensus among Visegrad Group countries and Baltic States that the European Union should pave the way for diversifying energy sources and routes of its supply to the European Union. Efficient solidarity mechanisms at the Community level should be developed."²⁵⁶

²⁵² The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

²⁵³ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

²⁵⁴ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

²⁵⁵ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

²⁵⁶ The V4, "Press Release of the Polish V4 Presidency after the Official Summit of Prime Ministers of the V4 and B3 Countries", 05.11.2008.

In this year, the Foreign Ministers of the V4 in their joint statements commented on energy security in common statement with Foreign Ministers of other states.²⁵⁷ They emphasised security of supplies and well-integrated market in the EU level.²⁵⁸

To summarise, there were no speech acts from individual states on the oil issue in the Czech Republic. However, the joint statements of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group bring important remarks about energy security issues in the region, such as external dependency, energy supply security situation, diversification, connections of energy carriers systems, but also some that might be connected to the 2006 and 2008 crises, such as mention about shortages of supplies in the recent years.

3.7.3 2009- gas crisis

The gas crisis in January 2009 was a result of commercial dispute between the Russian company Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz. On January 1 Gazprom stopped supplying gas for Ukraine while gas for export to the EU through was still delivered. On January 2, gas deliveries to a few states, including Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, were affected. On January 6 and 7 deliveries through Ukraine were completely cut. On January 20 the crisis was resolved and gas supplies were renewed.²⁵⁹

What were the reactions in the V4 states after the stop of Russian gas deliveries in January 2009?

● The Czech Republic

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its website in the section "statements" does not have any materials from January 2009. The first one published during the year is from February and it is not

²⁵⁷ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden", 24.11.2008.

²⁵⁸ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden".

²⁵⁹ Commission of the European Communities, "The January 2009 gas supply disruption to the EU: an assessment", 16.07.2009, 3-4.

linked to energy security.²⁶⁰ The section devoted to press conferences has one article from January 2009 but it does not cover the gas crisis or other energy security topics.²⁶¹

However, the Czech government's website contains articles from January 2011. It has to be taken into account that at the time the Czech Republic held the Presidency of the Council of the EU.

On January 6 a common statement by the Czech presidency and the European Commission was presented. The statement says:

"Without prior warning and in clear contradiction with the assurances that the European Union (EU) received from the highest authorities of Russia and Ukraine, gas supplies to some EU Member States have been greatly reduced. This is totally unacceptable."²⁶²

On January 9 the Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek talked to the Prime Minister Putin. According to the statement: "The Czech Prime Minister with his Russian counterpart agreed on the terms of deployment of monitoring committees in all relevant areas of the supply flow."²⁶³

On the next day the statement informed that the agreement is prepared and:

"After the meeting with Vladimir Putin Mirek Topolánek flies again to Kiev, where he will present the agreement to the Ukrainian officials. If they sign it, the delivery of the Russian gas to the EU will be immediately renewed."²⁶⁴

On January 11, the website informed:

"Czech Prime Minister and President of the European Council Mirek Topolánek and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko after the night meeting in Kiev announced that Ukraine accesses to the draft agreement submitted by the Czech Presidency and the European Commission. The agreement sets out the conditions for monitoring the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to the EU."²⁶⁵

On January 12 the statement says:

"Mirek Topolánek thanked in a telephone conversation to Vladimir Putin for his personal approach and

²⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Archiv 2009", 06.05.2009.

²⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Záznamy tiskových konferencí", 1a, 19.03.2009.

²⁶² Government, CR, "Předsednictví a Komise žádají obnovení dodávek plynu do EU", 06.01.2009.

²⁶³ Government, CR, "Předseda Rad y EU Mirek Topolánek konzultoval podmínky obnovení dodávek plynu", 09.01.2009.

²⁶⁴ Government, CR, "Topolánek a Putin se dohodli na podmínkách monitoringu dodávek ruského plynu", 10.01.2009.

²⁶⁵ Government, CR, "Ukrajina se připojila k politické dohodě o monitorovací komisi EK", 11.01.2009.

cooperation in crisis management and spoke to him as well about economic issues associated with recovery of transit."²⁶⁶

On January 14 the Czech Presidency and the European Commission prepared a letter to Russia and Ukraine. The article on the website informs that: "The EU observers are on all agreed sites and gas supplies should be recovered".²⁶⁷ Moreover, they warned that:

"unless immediate resumption of gas supplies to European consumers is provided, the credibility of Russia and Ukraine as reliable partners will be irrevocably damaged."²⁶⁸

A joint statement of the Prime Minister Topolánek and the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was presented on January 16. They stated:

"Due to ongoing major problems with the supply of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in Slovakia, two technical possibilities of alternative supply of about 20 million cubic meters of gas to Slovakia were found. The first option is a swap operation between Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia. The second is the supply through the Yamal pipeline through the Czech Republic. Without the implementation of these measures over the next few days, the Slovak economy falls into a critical condition, including reducing supplies for the population. In this situation, the Slovak Republic expects manifestation of European solidarity."²⁶⁹

As it was mentioned already, the website of the Ministry of Industry and Trade has on its website press statements since 2011 and it does not present other materials concerning the gas crisis.

It might be summarised that especially the last statement has signs of securitization- presenting an issue as a vital threat by emphasising potential "critical condition" for the Slovak economy. Extraordinary measures were proposed concerning gas supplies to Slovakia, such as supplies through the Czech Republic.

²⁶⁶ Government, CR, "Mirek Topolánek hovořil s Vladimírem Putinem o obnovení dodávek plynu", 12.01.2009.

²⁶⁷ Government, CR, "Předsednictví a Komise v dopise naléhavě vyzývají k obnovení dodávek plynu", 14.01.2009.

²⁶⁸ Government, CR, "Předsednictví a Komise v dopise naléhavě vyzývají k obnovení dodávek plynu".

²⁶⁹ Government, CR, "Společné prohlášení předsedy Evropské rady M. Topolánka a předsedy slovenské vlády R. Fica", 16.01.2009.

● Hungary

According to the statement from January 7, 2009 titled "Foreign Ministry consultations after halt of Russian gas deliveries to Hungary – Senior State Secretary Márta Feksz Horváth received heads of missions from Russia, Ukraine, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina" available at the website of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Senior State Secretary Feksz Horváth underlined serious implications for at least nine European Union member states and a few Western Balkan countries and because of that the issue was more serious in terms of the impact of economy, but "also unacceptable from a humanitarian point of view".²⁷⁰

On the meeting with the Russian ambassador, Senior State Secretary

"requested Russia to meet its obligations under the contract for gas deliveries and give regular information on the Russian government's efforts to solve the crisis".²⁷¹

The second statement presented on the website on the same day is also devoted to the gas crisis. It mentions the informal meeting on Foreign Ministers in Prague.

"Hungarian diplomacy is not passive but very proactive in respect of the gas supply crisis, attested to by the fact that European Union foreign ministers have accepted Hungary's position paper as the basis for discussion at their meeting"²⁷²,

said the State Secretary, Jenő Faller, to the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee.

He also said:

"The EU would now like to act in the interest of a swift resolution. Hungary supports these efforts and strongly urges a common position, taking into consideration that the gas supply fallout affects 10 member states and altogether 20 percent of the community's population."²⁷³

The State Secretary also informed that the Foreign Minister:

"intends to clearly stress the importance of solidarity in her address at the Prague meeting. The Czech

²⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "Foreign Ministry consultations after halt of Russian gas deliveries to Hungary – Senior State Secretary Márta Feksz Horváth received heads of missions from Russia, Ukraine, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina", 07.01.2009.

²⁷¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "Foreign Ministry consultations after halt of Russian gas deliveries to Hungary".

²⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "European Union foreign ministers debate Hungarian position paper on gas supply – State Secretary Jenő Faller briefs Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee", 07.01.2009.

²⁷³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "European Union foreign ministers debate Hungarian position paper on gas supply".

Prime Minister – he added - had strongly welcomed Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany's letter in this connection."²⁷⁴

In those two statements the gas crisis is clearly addressed.

As it was mentioned in the previous sections, the Government website and the website of the Ministry of National Development do not present articles from 2009 so the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website is the only website that could be analysed.

● Poland

On the website of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the first relation linked to the gas crisis was published on January 16. It describes a visit of the Minister Radosław Sikorski in Ukraine. Several topics were discussed, including energy security: "transit and supply of gas to Europe".²⁷⁵ However, there are no more details about the topic in the article. It is the only statement from the materials published in January 2009 that mentions gas.

More materials from January 2009 are available on the Government's website.

The gas crisis was commented in several statements. The first statement was published on January 3, 2009. It says:

"Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Waldemar Pawlak, reassured that despite the total suspension of gas supplies from Russia to Ukraine, there is no problem with the supply of gas to Poland, and the situation on the gas market is constantly monitored by the government."²⁷⁶

The advisor to the Prime Minister of Energy, Piotr Woźniak added:

"Over the last three years we have had to deal with similar situations. So we have experience, knowledge and tools to deal with this situation".²⁷⁷

On January 8, a meeting initiated by the Prime Minister Donald Tusk took place. It was a meeting

²⁷⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "European Union foreign ministers debate Hungarian position paper on gas supply".

²⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Wizyta Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Radosława Sikorskiego na Ukrainie", 16.01.2009.

²⁷⁶ Government, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak o dostawach gazu", 03.01.2009.

²⁷⁷ Government, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak o dostawach gazu".

of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group together with the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso. After the meeting, Tusk said:

"States of our group feel a special responsibility for resolving the gas crisis. We want energy security in the European Union to move over the declaration to acts, and this crisis shows that it is a necessity."²⁷⁸

The Prime Minister added: "The gas crisis shows the importance of different sources, not of different threads from one supplier".²⁷⁹

On the same day second meeting of the Group on Energy Security Policy took place. The members of the Group were: Prime Minister, Minister of Economy, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finances, Minister of Treasury, Minister of Infrastructure and Minister of Environment.²⁸⁰ The first meeting took place on January 6.²⁸¹

A short statement from a week later, January 15, brings a note: "Prime Minister Donald Tusk leads intensified consultations to end the gas conflict and to ensure energy security of European countries."²⁸²

It is explained that The Prime Minister discussed it on the phone with the Prime Minister Robert Fico and the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.²⁸³

On the next day the Prime Minister talked with the Chancellor Angela Merkel. The statement says: "They agreed that in the current situation energy solidarity of all EU countries is of exceptional importance for providing energy security to the Union".²⁸⁴

In January on the website of the government two more statements concerning the gas crisis appeared. On January 28 the statement informed that during the World Economic Forum in Davos there was going to be a meeting with the Russian Prime Ministers. Prime Minister Tusk said: "Meeting with the Prime Minister Putin will be a good opportunity to discuss strategic relations,

²⁷⁸ Government, PL, "Spotkanie Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w sprawie dostaw gazu", 08.01.2009
<http://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/spotkanie-grupy-wyszehradzkiej-w-sprawie-dostaw-gazu.html>

²⁷⁹ Government, PL, "Spotkanie Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w sprawie dostaw gazu".

²⁸⁰ Government, PL, "Kolejne spotkanie Zespołu ds. Polityki Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego", 08.01.2009.

²⁸¹ Government, PL, "Spotkanie Zespołu ds. Polityki Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego", 06.01.2009.

²⁸² Government, PL, "Konsultacje premiera Tuska ws. bezpieczeństwa energetycznego", 15.01.2009.

²⁸³ Government, PL, "Konsultacje premiera Tuska ws. bezpieczeństwa energetycznego".

²⁸⁴ Government, PL, "Premier rozmawiał z kanclerz Merkel o konflikcie gazowym", 16.01.2009.

especially after the gas crisis between Russia and the European Union, as well as Poland".²⁸⁵

On the meeting they discussed:

"The gas crisis and possible solutions were the main topic of the talks. I hope that after the declaration of Prime Minister Putin that the problem with the gas supply will be solved - said the Prime Minister."²⁸⁶

On the meeting they talked about a visit of the Russian Prime Minister to Poland, as well as about the issue of planned investments into pipelines.²⁸⁷

The first statement concerning gas issues was presented by the Ministry of Economy on January 3.

The Deputy Prime Minister Pawlak said:

"At this time, the amount of natural gas imported from the East has not changed. There is no problem with supply balance. Losses on the Ukrainian border in Drozdovitse are compensated on the border crossing with Belarus in Wysokoje".²⁸⁸

He added: "Disruption in gas supplies are usually of business nature. I hope that the parties reach an agreement soon."²⁸⁹

On the press conference the Minister said: "The Polish gas system is working smoothly."²⁹⁰

However, the Minister said that in the case there would be a need for it, the industry power plants might receive less gas in case of rapid disruptions and lack of supplies.²⁹¹

In a presentation of the government's stance concerning energy security in regard to halt of gas supplies from Russia through Ukraine to the Parliament, Minister Pawlak said:

"Thanks to our own resources of solid fuels, Poland is one of the least dependent on imports of energy resources of the EU".²⁹²

The Minister added: "Gas accounts for about 12 % of our energy balance, in other EU countries it is about 21 %".²⁹³ According to the Minister, to secure supplies from the East not only contracts

²⁸⁵ Government, PL, "Premier w Davos o kryzysie gazowym", 28.01.2009.

²⁸⁶ Government, PL, "Premier Polski spotkał się z premierem Putinem", 29.01.2009.

²⁸⁷ Government, PL, "Premier Polski spotkał się z premierem Putinem".

²⁸⁸ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak: Ilość dostarczanego gazu nie zmieniła się", 03.01.2009.

²⁸⁹ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak: Ilość dostarczanego gazu nie zmieniła się".

²⁹⁰ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak: Polski system gazowy pracuje bez zakłóceń", 06.01.2009.

²⁹¹ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak: Polski system gazowy pracuje bez zakłóceń".

²⁹² Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak: Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju powinniśmy oprzeć na własnych surowcach", 09.01.2009.

²⁹³ Ministry of Economy, PL, Wicepremier Pawlak: Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju powinniśmy oprzeć na

between states and companies are needed, but also treaties between the Russian Federation and the EU: "Only then we can talk about the real security of supply from the dominant direction from our perspective".²⁹⁴

On the press conference main directions of providing energy security were presented: "Construction of at least two nuclear power plants, LNG terminal in Świnoujście, extension of gas, oil and fuel storage facilities, and increase gas production in Poland".²⁹⁵ The Deputy Prime Minister emphasised that Poland did not face such problems with gas supplies as other countries- : "Losses on the Ukrainian border in Drozdovitse were compensated on the border crossing with Belarus. The system worked in a stable way, also thanks to the use of stocks".²⁹⁶

On a meeting with students of a technical university Minister Pawlak said: "International gas crisis clearly shows how necessary they are new energy technologies".²⁹⁷

It is the last statement presented by the Ministry of Economy in January 2009 concerning the gas crisis. To summarise, Poland recognised the importance of the crisis but according to the Ministry of Economy was not in such serious situation thanks to lower dependency on gas.

● Slovakia

Are there speech acts from Slovakia concerning the 2009 gas crisis?

On the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is one statement from January 2009 but it does not cover the gas crisis.²⁹⁸

The Ministry of Economy commented extensively on the gas crisis. It must be the main source for speech act analysis in case of Slovakia as the government website presents documents only since 2010.

własnych surowcach".

²⁹⁴ Ministry of Economy, PL, Wicepremier Pawlak: Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju powinniśmy oprzeć na własnych surowcach".

²⁹⁵ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Działania rządu na rzecz bezpieczeństwa energetycznego", 13.01.2009.

²⁹⁶ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Działania rządu na rzecz bezpieczeństwa energetycznego".

²⁹⁷ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Wicepremier Pawlak o gazyfikacji węgla na AGH", 15.01.2009.

²⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Všetky správy", 1b, undated.

The first article was published on January 2, 2009. It is titled: "Slovakia so far had no reason to enter into a commercial gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia".²⁹⁹ The Minister of Economy Ľubomír Jahnátek on the meeting with Ukrainian delegation led by Ukrainian Minister of Energy said: "If gas supplies to Slovakia are not endangered, Slovakia will not interfere in any way in negotiations. The dispute between Ukraine and Russia is of a commercial nature".³⁰⁰

The next statement from January 6 concerns the state of emergency: "Slovakia declared a state of emergency".³⁰¹ The members of the crisis committee named the situation as "critical" because the gas supplies to Slovakia were down by 70%. The statement says: "Wholesale gas customers must prepare for possible regulation.(...) Jahnátek stressed that the restrictions will not concern the households."³⁰² Moreover,

"Slovakia is not able to cover temporary loss for very long. Ministry of Economy, therefore, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to make an official protest note to the Russian and Ukrainian side."³⁰³

In the statement from the next day the Minister said: "The situation has not improved but worsened. At night time there was a halt in gas supplies".³⁰⁴ The Minister stressed that individual customers, households, hospitals and schools are not threatened.³⁰⁵

On January, 8 another statement about limitations in gas supplies for industry was presented.³⁰⁶

On the same day, a relation from the press conference was published. On the conference, the Minister of Economy said: "If the gas supply is not restored within 48 hours, the crisis committee will recommend the Slovak Government to restore the operation of the second block of the V1 nuclear power".³⁰⁷ He added: "Reopening of the operation of Unit V1 is necessary for stabilizing the

²⁹⁹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko zatiaľ nemá dôvod vstupovať do komerčného sporu o plyn medzi Ukrajinou a Ruskom", 02.01.2009.

³⁰⁰ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko zatiaľ nemá dôvod vstupovať do komerčného sporu o plyn".

³⁰¹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko vyhlásilo stav núdze", 06.01.2009.

³⁰² Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko vyhlásilo stav núdze".

³⁰³ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko vyhlásilo stav núdze".

³⁰⁴ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko je zásobované zemným plynom zo zásobníkov", 07.01.2009.

³⁰⁵ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko je zásobované zemným plynom zo zásobníkov".

³⁰⁶ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Informácia pre veľkoodberateľov plynu", 08.01.2009.

³⁰⁷ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Ak sa dodávka zemného plynu neobnoví do 48 hodín, krízový štáb odporučí vláde SR obnoviť prevádzku druhého bloku jadrovej elektrárne V1", 08.01.2009.

electricity grid, because halt in gas supplies threaten it to collapse ".³⁰⁸

On the next day in another statement it was explained that the Unit V1 of the nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bohunice was closed in 2008 based on outcomes of negotiations with the European Union. In the same statement, it is emphasised that the halt of gas supplies does not concern households but supplies for industry are limited.³⁰⁹

On January 9, the Minister Jahnátek said: "There is a need to say to openly that Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania are in the worst situation in the terms of this crisis".³¹⁰ The Minister also stated: "Slovak gas industry will explore the possibility of alternative sources of gas that can be taken into account due to halted gas supplies from Russia."³¹¹ This statement mentions also a possibility of supplies from Czech-German border and from Poland.

On the next day, January 10, the Minister said: "Within 24 hours, we managed to secure additional sources of supply."³¹² The Minister talked also about the work of the EU monitoring groups in Ukraine and Russia:

"The problem is that the protocol on the deployment of experts was not signed. The Ukrainian side refused to sign the protocol proposed by the Russian side, which was not in accordance with agreements with the European Commission,"³¹³

Jahnátek said, adding that the new report would be discussed on a working lunch by Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. "It is expected that the lunch should provide a shift in this impasse. There is a need for a political will to finally open taps on the Russian side".³¹⁴ Minister Jahnátek also said that: "The issues of security of supply must have priority before price of supplies".³¹⁵

³⁰⁸ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Ak sa dodávka zemného plynu neobnoví do 48 hodín, krízový štáb odporučí vláde SR obnoviť prevádzku druhého bloku jadrovej elektrárne V1".

³⁰⁹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Naďalej platí pre veľkoodberateľov plynu obmedzujúci odberový stupeň číslo 8", 09.01.2009.

³¹⁰ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko bude skúmať možnosti dodávok plynu z alternatívnych zdrojov", 09.01.2009.

³¹¹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko bude skúmať možnosti dodávok plynu z alternatívnych zdrojov".

³¹² Ministry of Economy, SR, "Krizový štáb zasadne šiesty krát zajtra, 11.1.2009 o 10:00", 10.01.2009.

³¹³ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Krizový štáb zasadne šiesty krát zajtra".

³¹⁴ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Krizový štáb zasadne šiesty krát zajtra".

³¹⁵ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Krizový štáb zasadne šiesty krát zajtra".

On January 11, in the statement published on the website of the Ministry of Economy after the crisis committee meeting, it is stated:

"If the Russian Federation restores gas supplies to Europe and the station Veľké Kapušany receives gas in sufficient volume and pressure, the crisis staff withdraws limiting downstream stage number 8"³¹⁶³¹⁷.

The article is titled: "Gas may come to Slovakia on Tuesday or Wednesday".³¹⁸

On January 12, the State Secretary of the Ministry, Peter Žiga, said that due to limitations of supplies to industry: "Supplies of natural gas to Slovak consumers are stabilized".³¹⁹ On the meeting the Prime Minister Robert Fico said that putting international pressure on Russia: "is the only way. Probably no bilateral pressures or conventions have meaning today".³²⁰ He also commented on a possibility of using the closed nuclear power plant:

"Crisis point for us will be information that the Minister of Economy will bring from the negotiations in Brussels. If no contracts is signed, if we do not see a realistic movement that occurs in the next few hours to restore gas supplies, Minister of Economy can easily instruct to switch on the second block of the V1 nuclear power plant(...) We do not do that to show strength, crucial is energy security of the Slovak Republic".³²¹

The statement from January 13 describes the meeting of the Council of the European Union for Energy in this way: "There were no comments on possible sanctions against Slovakia during the restart of Jaslovské Bohunice nuclear power plant, which would be a violation of the Accession Treaty."³²² Minister Jahnátek said about the power plant: "The situation is really critical and to review the plan to switch on the reactor there would have to be gas in Slovakia immediately."³²³

In the next statement presented on the same day the Minister said: "The worst situation among the European Union states to which gas supplies from the Russian Federation were suspended in the

³¹⁶ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Plyn môže prísť na Slovensko už v utorok alebo v stredu", 11.01.2009.

³¹⁷ Stage 8- stage of limitations for industry.

³¹⁸ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Plyn môže prísť na Slovensko už v utorok alebo v stredu".

³¹⁹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Dodávky zemného plynu pre slovenských spotrebiteľov sú stabilizované", 12.01.2009.

³²⁰ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Dodávky zemného plynu pre slovenských spotrebiteľov sú stabilizované".

³²¹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Dodávky zemného plynu pre slovenských spotrebiteľov sú stabilizované".

³²² Ministry of Economy, SR, "Minister L. Jahnátek vysvetľoval v Bruseli situáciu na Slovensku po zastavení dodávok plynu", 13.01.2009.

³²³ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Minister L. Jahnátek vysvetľoval v Bruseli situáciu na Slovensku".

field of supply for the industry is in Slovakia."³²⁴ Moreover, the statement summarises the results of the meeting in Brussels:

"in future, it is necessary to protest against non-supply of gas, to act quickly to secure reverse flow, to make arrangements for the interconnection with neighboring countries and to prepare the main gas transportation routes from other sources".³²⁵

On January 14, the State Secretary informed that Poland and Hungary offered their help in gas supplies and that thanks to supplies from foreign gas companies Slovakia had gas for another 18 days.³²⁶

On the next day, the Minister of Economy and the Prime Minister took part in the meeting with representatives of gas companies and discussed gas supplies from Jamal. The statement says: "They agreed that it is technically feasible product. Only partners who take gas through the Yamal must show solidarity."³²⁷

On the same day, January 15, the Minister discussed possibilities of gas supplies to Slovakia, especially about swap operation with Ukraine:

"We have confirmed that there is no technical problem to implement this operation. It is our priority. Technically, it is acceptable for us and it would ensure restoration of supply to all customers, including the industrial sector".³²⁸

The statement also mentions a possibility of supplies from Germany and the Czech Republic.³²⁹ The statement is titled: "Slovakia puts enormous efforts to implement swap gas operation with Ukraine".³³⁰

On January 16 the State Secretary also talked about possibilities of gas supplies. He said:

"Slovakia is preparing parallel for swap operation with Ukraine and possible connection to Jamal gas

³²⁴ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Druhý blok jadrovej elektrárne V1 zostáva zatiaľ vypnutý", 13.01.2009.

³²⁵ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Druhý blok jadrovej elektrárne V1 zostáva zatiaľ vypnutý".

³²⁶ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko má za súčasných podmienok plyn do konca mesiaca", 14.01.2009.

³²⁷ Ministry of Economy, SR, "SWAP má prednosť", 15.01.2009.

³²⁸ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko vyvíja enormné diplomatické úsilie, aby sa zrealizovala výmenná operácia dodávok plynu s Ukrajinou", 15.01.2009.

³²⁹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko vyvíja enormné diplomatické úsilie".

³³⁰ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko vyvíja enormné diplomatické úsilie".

pipeline.(...) We realised that the pressure in the Czech Republic is higher than in our distribution system so the implementation could therefore be much shorter than we expected yesterday. "³³¹

On January 17 there was an important progress. The statement from this day is titled: "Slovakia from Monday moves to a normal mode in gas supplies".³³² The statement says: "gas should start coming on Sunday by the reverse flow from the Czech Republic. It is the first time in Slovak history that gas would come from the reverse flow".³³³ Moreover, the State Secretary Žiga outlined the priorities for Slovakia as the solution with the reverse flow was seen as an alternative one: "Therefore, neither on the diplomatic nor on the technical level we can stop working on standard solutions, which transit via Russia's gas pipeline. This is now a key priority".³³⁴ The State Secretary also said that due to current developments the possibility of switching on the nuclear power plant V1 is smaller.³³⁵

The statement from January 18 is titled: "Gas flows to Slovakia from the Czech Republic".³³⁶ Moreover, in the statement it is said that:

"The head of the Slovak Ministry of Economy did not dare to predict when gas supplies from Russia to Slovakia might be restored after the night agreement of Prime Ministers of Russia and Ukraine."³³⁷

On the next day, January 19, the Ministry of Economy informed:

"Reverse flow directed to Slovakia from the Czech Republic from the Jamal pipeline, which delivers Russian gas to Europe outside of the territory of Ukraine, according to information is functional. (...) If case of restoration of gas supplies from Russia via Ukraine, which have been halted for nearly two weeks, the gas flow from the West will be stopped."³³⁸

Moreover, the statement informs on the state of supplies for industry: "Large companies can once again take from today gas without limitation and started the production smoothly".³³⁹

³³¹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko sa v súčasnosti pripravuje na výmenu plynu s Ukrajinou a aj na možné napojenie sa na plynovod Jamal", 16.01.2009.

³³² Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko od pondelka prechádza na normálny režim v odbere plynu", 17.01.2009.

³³³ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko od pondelka prechádza na normálny režim v odbere plynu".

³³⁴ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko od pondelka prechádza na normálny režim v odbere plynu".

³³⁵ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko od pondelka prechádza na normálny režim v odbere plynu".

³³⁶ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Na Slovensko prúdi plyn z ČR", 18.01.2009.

³³⁷ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Na Slovensko prúdi plyn z ČR".

³³⁸ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Podniky spustili výrobu bez problémov", 19.01.2009.

³³⁹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Podniky spustili výrobu bez problémov".

The statement from January 20 is crucial in the case of gas crisis: "Gas supplies from Russia to Slovakia renewed".³⁴⁰ The statement also informs more about the situation:

"According to Minister Jahnátek this week on Friday the state of emergency in Slovakia, declared on January 6 because of substantially reduced gas supplies from Russia, could be cancelled. Subsequently, the supply of natural gas in Slovakia were for almost two weeks completely halted. Their resumption came after the signing of the agreement between the representatives of Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz company."³⁴¹

On the meeting with a representative of the Directorate General for Energy the Minister said: "Priority number 1 must be energy security of all Member States".³⁴²

On January 23: "Slovakia lifted a state of emergency in the gas sector".³⁴³ Moreover, according to the Minister: "Reasons and mandate of the Minister of Economy given on the extraordinary meeting of the government ceased to restart the nuclear power plant "Jaslovské Bohunice V1."³⁴⁴

The last statement from January concerning gas is from January 26 and is titled: "In Slovakia a new gas company might be established".³⁴⁵ It describes a meeting of Prime Minister Fico and Minister of Economy Jahnátek with General Director of Gazprom Alexandr Medvedev. The statement summarises the meeting:

"The delegations discussed the consequences of the gas crisis and measures to mitigate them. The result is the possibility of establishing a new gas company in Slovakia. On the creation of the gas company should participate Slovakia together with Russian giant Gazprom and the state would have dominant position in the company".³⁴⁶

It might be clearly seen that in Slovakia the gas crisis was a crucial topic. What is important from the perspective of the thesis is whether the gas crisis was securitized- whether it was understood in the political discourse of the Ministry of Economy as existential threat needing extraordinary steps

³⁴⁰ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Dodávky plynu z Ruskej federácie na Slovensko sa obnovili", 20.01.2009.

³⁴¹ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Dodávky plynu z Ruskej federácie na Slovensko sa obnovili".

³⁴² Ministry of Economy, SR, "D. Ristori: „Ďakujeme Slovensku za solidárny európsky prístup v plynovej kríze"", 22.01.2009.

³⁴³ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko zrušilo stav núdze v oblasti plynárenstva", 23.01.2009.

³⁴⁴ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Slovensko zrušilo stav núdze v oblasti plynárenstva".

³⁴⁵ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Na Slovensku možno vznikne nová plynárenská spoločnosť", 26.01.2009.

³⁴⁶ Ministry of Economy, SR, "Na Slovensku možno vznikne nová plynárenská spoločnosť".

and non-standard activities. The author believes that speech acts concerning possibility of reopening of the nuclear power plant that was closed on the basis of the Accession Treaty supports this argument. The power plant was closed as one of the conditions of Slovak entrance to the EU so taking into account its opening might be seen as securitization of the topic.

Moreover, Slovakia took some more extraordinary steps, especially calling state of emergency and cooperation with the Czech Republic on the reverse flow of gas that happened for the first time. What is important for the thesis, in the statement also help from Hungary and Poland was mentioned but it was not discussed further. It supports the argument of the thesis that securitization might also lead to international cooperation.

● The Visegrad Group

Did the V4 react in its statement and on the meetings to the gas crisis?

On the official summit of the Prime Ministers in June energy issues were mentioned in a few aspects.

First, in case of Slovak candidacy to the EU Agency:

"The Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico informed about Slovakia's candidacy for the seat of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and asked his V4 partners for support. The Heads of Governments of the V4 countries have assessed the Slovak candidacy as strong and well prepared."³⁴⁷

Second, regional understanding of energy security was the topic of the summit:

"The Heads of Governments of the V4 countries discussed the questions of energy security with special emphasis on the regional context and exchanged views on the progress of preparations to COP-15³⁴⁸ in Copenhagen."³⁴⁹

Third:

³⁴⁷ The V4, "Press Release of the Polish V4 presidency after the Official Summit of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries", 03.06.2009.

³⁴⁸ Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. See: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, „Copenhagen Climate Change Conference", undated.

³⁴⁹ The V4, "Press Release of the Polish V4 presidency after the Official Summit of the Prime Ministers".

"The decision was taken to re-establish in coming days the "V4 energy infrastructure group" consisting of high-level governmental plenipotentiaries whose role will be to examine possible joint V4 energy infrastructure projects that should be undertaken in near future."³⁵⁰

Moreover, on the meeting of the V4 Foreign Ministers in October devoted to integration of the Western Balkans they discussed: "Connecting road, rail and energy networks among the countries of the region and between the region and the EU should be a high priority for all sides."³⁵¹

3.8 Energy security- summary

How the speech acts concerning the crises might be summarised?

First, it must be repeated that lack of the on-line available materials from a particular month might not be interpreted. It is especially the case of the official Hungarian government and Ministry of National Development websites. However, the amount of the gained speech acts in general is satisfying and might form a base for summary.

Second, there is a need to answer the question whether the crises were securitized. Analysing the speech acts, it might be argued that especially the 2009 gas crisis was securitized- it was presented as a security threat and in some countries extraordinary measures were proposed or taken.

A general trend might be traced- in 2006 only in Poland of the V4 states the speech acts about the crisis were found. There were some elements of securitization, such as information from the government website about "urgent actions leading to diversification of gas supplies"³⁵² what might be seen as securitization due to urgency of the action. Moreover, in the same month the Minister of Economy in Poland informed about cuts of supplies for industry³⁵³ what is also extraordinary.

In the case of the Visegrad Group, the crisis of 2006 probably influenced the Prime Ministers when they discussed energy security as of "major and strategic importance"³⁵⁴ in October 2006 while they

³⁵⁰ The V4, "Press Release of the Polish V4 presidency after the Official Summit of the Prime Ministers".

³⁵¹ The V4, "The Visegrad Group stands ready to promote the integration of the countries of the Western Balkans", 06.10.2009.

³⁵² Government, PL, "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju priorytetem dla rządu", 03.01.2006.

³⁵³ Ministry of Economy, PL, "Komunikat prasowy w związku z ograniczeniami w dostawach gazu", 25.01.2006.

³⁵⁴ The V4, "Declaration of the Prime Ministers", 10.10.2006.

did not discuss this topic in the previous year. During the gas crisis 2006, consultations between the V4 representatives took place as it was described in the Polish materials.

The oil crisis of 2008 was not a topic in the official materials of the ministries and the government in the V4. However, the V4 Prime Ministers mentioned the topic of energy security much more often than in 2006 what might be a sign that this topic was gaining importance.

The 2009 gas crisis brought a change in the speech acts and it might be argued that in the all V4 stated it was presented as a security issue.

The author sees especially the case of the speech acts from 2009 in Slovakia as securitized. Extraordinary measures were proposed in the speech acts, mainly the idea of re-opening the nuclear power plant that was closed on the basis of the EU Accession Treaty. Moreover, the industry power plants did not receive gas and it was often discussed what might be also seen as securitization. The state of emergency was called.

However, Slovakia is not the only country that securitized the gas crisis in 2009. It became an important topic for the Czech Prime Minister as well, especially taking into account that the Czech Republic at the time held the Presidency of the European Council. In Hungary, during the 2009 crisis first relevant speech acts are found, what might be also a sign of securitization as the gas crisis was present in most of the speeches presented on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website in January. In Poland the gas crisis was also an important topic but probably due to other reserves and smaller dependency on gas supplies it was not securitized to such extent as to for example in Slovakia.

The crisis of 2009 presented common interests and solidarity within the V4 when Hungary and Poland offered gas supplies to Slovakia and the Czech Republic provided a reverse flow of gas to Slovakia. During the crises there were common consultations within the V4 what might be also a sign of deepening cooperation among the V4 states.

It must be said that openings of the interconnectors between the Czech Republic and Poland and the

Czech Republic and Slovakia and the above mentioned planes for the North-South gas connection are proves of growing cooperation. Moreover, other important steps were taken within the Group, such as V4+ Energy Security Summit that took place in 2010 because "countries of Central-, East- and South-East-Europe are facing similar challenges in the energy sector"³⁵⁵ and "common energy challenges could be better dealt with on the basis of regional cooperation as well as in the EU framework".³⁵⁶

It might be argued that securitization of the energy crises in the four states and on the V4 level led to closer cooperation and concrete solutions in the field of energy security. However, it must be underlined that there is no obvious link between gas crises and e.g. construction of gas interconnectors. On the other hand, the relations between the crises and cooperation might be assumed with probability as before the analysed crises there was no cooperation in this field.

Based on discourse analysis, it might not be clearly stated whether Russia was perceived as a threat. It would be better to state that its actions were securitized as they caused lack of supplies and a need to take extraordinary steps.

Chapter 4. Military security

This chapter is divided into similar sections as the chapter 3. In the first section, conceptualization of military security is presented. In the section 4.2, the Copenhagen School understanding of military security is analysed. In the next section, definitions of military security and threats based on national and military or defence strategies are presented. In the fourth section, basic statistics concerning the V4 states armies are shown. Similarly as in the third chapter, the focus is not on technical details but on general picture of the armies. In the section 4.5, the case of cooperation in military issues is presented. In the following section, content analysis of recent military or defence strategies is brought and in the section 4.7 speeches and statements concerning two recent events

³⁵⁵ The V4, "Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit", 24.02.2010.

³⁵⁶ The V4, "Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit".

are presented- the conflict in Georgia in 2008 and the Russian war games in 2009. Those events were chosen as they took place in neighbourhood of the V4 and as the CS assumes that historical experience with neighbouring countries might influence perception of their actions.³⁵⁷ In the case of the war games, it might not be described as crisis but it was extraordinary event. The last section of the chapter presents summary of the findings.

4.1. Conceptualization of military security

Military security might be understood as prevention and suppression of foreign invasion by use of military force or deterrence.³⁵⁸ Military security means protection of physical security, economic interests and values against the invasion.³⁵⁹ The phrase "external security" is commonly used as a synonymous for military security while "internal security" is connected to threats coming from inside of the state and the term is used for security in police matters. External security is linked to existence, fighting and eliminating threats coming from outside the state. Military security is seen as an element of hard security, opposite to soft security, such as non-military threats to environment.³⁶⁰ Military security is seen as a basic element of national security, moreover there are also other elements- resources, environment, politics and culture.³⁶¹ Military threats are not irrelevant, however, there are many new non-military threats.³⁶²

During the Cold War and in the 1990s security was understood mainly in military, political and power terms. It was linked to a threat of military conflicts between states or blocs of states. However, to understand security in nowadays Europe such categories are not sufficient. It was already presented by the Olof Palme Commission in 1982 and their concept of "common security". In the Commission's opinion, common security would form an alternative to nuclear balance of

³⁵⁷ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 60.

³⁵⁸ Prabhakaran Paleri, *National Security. Imperatives and Challenges* (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008), 125.

³⁵⁹ Paleri, *National Security*, 126.

³⁶⁰ Petr Zeman et al., *Česká bezpečnostní terminologie. Výklad základních pojmů* (Brno: Ústav strategických studií Vojenské akademie v Brně, 2002), 12.

³⁶¹ Zeman et al., *Česká bezpečnostní terminologie*, 14.

³⁶² Zeman et al., *Česká bezpečnostní terminologie*, 18.

power assured by threats and mutually assured destruction.³⁶³ The Commission described that states used to provide security by expanding military capabilities and forming alliances with other military powers. The Commission sees military as supportive for political, development and humanitarian work.³⁶⁴

As Sarah Tarry notices in her article "'Deepening' and 'Widening': An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s", security is seen differently by traditionalists and non-traditionalists. Within the second group there are two approaches- wideners and deepeners.³⁶⁵ Those approaches are not linked only to military security, however, they are interesting point of reference as they present changing understanding of the role of the military in security agenda. The traditionalist agenda is represented by realist Stephen Walt. According to Tarry, he "equates security with peace and the prevention of conflict through military means".³⁶⁶ In Walt's approach military sphere is privileged over others and other realms become part of security agenda if they are linked somehow to military issues.³⁶⁷

Among the group of wideners, Tarry mentions two authors who take into account military security- Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas. They claim that security includes much more than only protection against military attack.³⁶⁸

Among the deepeners who are concerned with military issues there is Spike Peterson who criticises traditional military-based understanding of security from feminist perspective. According to the feminist approach, military is patriarchal and excludes women, but moreover, due to devoting resources to military those resources cannot be use in other spheres to rise well-being.³⁶⁹

As it is seen, military security is understood from different perspectives. Scholars present diverse

³⁶³ Libor Stejskal, "Bezpečnost, její koncept a souvislosti", in *Kapitoly o bezpečnosti*, ed. by Miloš Balabán, Libor Stejskal et al, (Prague: Karolinum, 2010), 11.

³⁶⁴ Report of the Commission on Global Governance, "Promoting Security", undated.

³⁶⁵ Sarah Tarry, "Deepening' and 'Widening': An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s", *Journal of Military & Strategic Studies*, 2:1 (1999): 1.

³⁶⁶ Tarry, "Deepening' and 'Widening'", 2.

³⁶⁷ Tarry, "Deepening' and 'Widening'", 2-3.

³⁶⁸ Tarry, "Deepening' and 'Widening'", 6.

³⁶⁹ Tarry, "Deepening' and 'Widening'", 9.

opinions on the evolving role of military security and its importance.

For the purpose of the thesis, in the context of the V4 the emphasis will be given on a perception of military threats. Such threats might be perceived in a specific way due to the states' history and geographic position as it is going to be discussed more in details in the next section. It must be stated that there is no threat of war or foreign invasion to the V4 states' territories but military security is an important topic for all the states.

To achieve better understanding of the topic from the constructivist point of view, the next section is going to present the Copenhagen School approach to military security.

4.2. The Copenhagen School approach

In their work *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* the authors claim that in the military sector the state is the most important referent object and the elites are most important securitizing actors. Traditional primacy of the military sector connected to the modern state is based on sovereignty, meaning right to govern territory and population. States are concerned with use of force as through it they are able to acquire and control the territory.³⁷⁰

When the elites of the state and its population see the army of another states as a threat there are types two reaction- on the one hand it is rise of technologies and arms race but on the other hand there are other means such as arms control and alliances.³⁷¹ When military affairs between states are securitized, instruments of force are important. However, it is important to take into account that military issues are connected to other topics. Because of that, political relations between the states have to be analysed.³⁷²

The authors claim that securitization is intersubjective and due to that, understanding of threats is socially constructed. However, some conditions might lead to achieving securitization easier, for example a heavily forced neighbouring country that attacked in the past might be easier securitized

³⁷⁰ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 49.

³⁷¹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 51-52.

³⁷² Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 52.

than a pacifist country.³⁷³ The authors write that: "Short of tanks coming across the border, there are very few objective threats".³⁷⁴ According to them, two processes are possible: paranoia being securitization of threats that do not exist and complacency being lack of securitization of clear threats. Different societies react in different ways to the same threats and historical and other conditions affect process of securitization.³⁷⁵

Why according to the Copenhagen School military threats have been traditionally primary in national security? First, military threats are intentional and use of military means is a breakdown of normal relations. Second, wars lead to loses of lives but also many achievements from different fields, such as economic and social. Third, military threats are real existential threats.³⁷⁶

The topic of military security and cooperation in this field on the V4 will be discussed more in details later. However, it must be emphasised that in case of the V4 there is no threat of war or aggression from foreign states and the V4 states are not existentially threaten, but the opinions of the Copenhagen School on mainly military threats but also on war are given as background to the topic. Some of the features of threat perception relevant to the V4 will be presented in the following paragraphs.

The CS notices that geography through distance and terrain influences perception of threats. Distance is important as military threats are easier to defend against when they come from a far distance. In general, states are concerned more with threats posed by their neighbours than by powers that are not in geographical proximity. In case of terrain, it might reduce vulnerability what does not concern for example Poland- it is on flat terrain and there are few obstacles to movement of military forces.³⁷⁷

Not only geography is important for threats and threat perception, but also history. Past experiences influence perception of the present, as for example in this case: "Poland has long historical

³⁷³ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 57.

³⁷⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 57.

³⁷⁵ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 57.

³⁷⁶ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 58.

³⁷⁷ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 59.

suspicious of Germany and Russia" as the authors notice.³⁷⁸ Existence of such history and memories makes the process of securitization easier.³⁷⁹ Moreover, another set of factors that might facilitate securitization are political factors. Those are degree of recognition between the actors and harmonies in their ideologies.³⁸⁰

According to the CS authors, the end of the Cold War caused a shift from a global level of security to regional one.³⁸¹ Military threats do not appear among advanced industrial democracies so it is probably impossible to securitize relations among them. In Western and Central Europe there is commitment to resolve conflicts in peaceful way.³⁸² However, the great powers are able to deliver military forces to different places of the world.³⁸³ At the time of writing of *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* the authors considered formation of new security complexes and whether the EU and Commonwealth of Independent States would be able to form one common security complex or two separate. It seemed unclear for them whether the EU and Russia succeed in desecuritization of their relations.³⁸⁴

4.3. V4 definitions of military security

In this section, definitions of the V4 states of military security will be presented based on their security strategies and military security strategies. Moreover, it will be shown what kind of threats to their security they perceive and whether they see a risk of direct military threats to their territory. The threats presented in this section are of different nature but particularly those listed together with military threats are present in the text. It will be also analysed whether the strategies mention the Visegrad Group. In some cases, link between energy security and military security is mentioned in the strategies.

³⁷⁸ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 59-60

³⁷⁹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 60.

³⁸⁰ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 60.

³⁸¹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 61.

³⁸² Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 62.

³⁸³ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 63.

³⁸⁴ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security*, 65-66.

In its *Security Strategy* published in 2011 the Czech Republic does not present a definition of military security. However, it mentions several elements of military security and threats to it that are going to be presented. The emphasis will be given especially on statements relevant to the topic of the thesis.

According to the strategy, the security environment is changing and it requires new approach combining military and civilian tools including diplomatic and economic means to prevent threats.³⁸⁵ The strategy clearly states that risk of military attack to the Czech territory is low.³⁸⁶

The document sees as a threat activities of some states to build their own sphere of influence through political, economical and military pressure and activities of intelligence.³⁸⁷ According to the strategy, misuse of the role of the main supplier of energy to ensure political or security goals is a strategic asymmetrical threat.³⁸⁸

Protection of security interests is ensured on national level and through international and bilateral relations.³⁸⁹

Military Strategy of the Czech Republic published in 2008 does not present a definition of military security. However, it presents threats to security, such as extremism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises leading to intrastate or international conflicts, rising military and economic power of some states that might lead to more aggressive behaviour in ensuring their political interests, including use of force. Among other threats there are halts of strategic supplies and conflicts about control of them.³⁹⁰ The Czech Republic protects its interests in cooperation with NATO and EU. Activities in other organisations, such as the United Nations, and bilateral relations support security of the Czech Republic.³⁹¹

As it might be summarised, concerning military security, the Czech strategic documents see the risk

³⁸⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, *Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky* (2011), 7.

³⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, *Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky*, 7.

³⁸⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, *Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky*, 7.

³⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, *Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky*, 8.

³⁸⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, *Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky*, 11.

³⁹⁰ *Vojenská strategie České republiky*, (Prague, 2008), 3.

³⁹¹ *Vojenská strategie České republiky*, 3.

of direct military threat to its territory as low but they present several kind of threats to security, including conflicts about strategic supplies.

In the document *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, security is understood as a complex concept including "political, military, economic, financial, environmental and human dimensions."³⁹²

According to the strategy, nowadays

"the military aspect of security appears with new emphases. Security policy challenges whose management requires comprehensive and coordinated political, economic and – if necessary – military action are increasingly prevalent."³⁹³

The strategy clearly states the risk of military attack against Hungary is marginal but traditional risks must be still taken into account as:

"even in the Euro-Atlantic region, the conflicts of the past decades have not yet been resolved everywhere. Consequently, security in certain neighbouring regions also remains fragile, and – as recent international events have demonstrated – military force may play a primary role in a regional conflict even at the beginning of the 21st century, in both Europe and its neighbourhood."³⁹⁴

As it is explained: "the possibility of traditional conflicts continues to exist in Hungary's broader environment".³⁹⁵ For Hungary, "The stability of Hungary's Eastern and Southern neighbourhood and the spreading of democratic values are of paramount importance for the country's security."³⁹⁶

The strategy claims that different kinds of risk coming even from distant places might pose security challenge:

"Terrorism, the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as the intensive build-up of modern military capabilities in certain regions increase insecurity and unpredictability".³⁹⁷

For Hungary, NATO and the EU provide framework of security policy.³⁹⁸ Hungary's neighbours are

³⁹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy* (2012), 2.

³⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 4.

³⁹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 4-5.

³⁹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 10.

³⁹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 8.

³⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 5.

³⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 6.

members of those organisations or they maintain strong relations with them. According to the strategy, "It is in Hungary's interest to support them in their efforts to further enhance these relationships."³⁹⁹

National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary also states that the risk of attack against the territory is low. However,

"the security of the Republic of Hungary may be affected by threats, risks and challenges: they can be global, regional or coming from the neighbourhood and can occur simultaneously and reinforce each other."⁴⁰⁰

In case of threats, the strategy mentions similar ones as the first analysed document.

National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland presents military security as one of subsections of the chapter "National Security: Sector Goals and Tasks". Goals of activities in military security sector are readiness to defend own and allies' territories and independence, elimination of military threats and counteracting possible negative changes in the region's military balance.

In the nearest future large- scale conflicts are unlikely to take place. Similarly as other analysed strategies, the Polish strategy also mentions membership in NATO and the EU.⁴⁰¹

The strategy sees as threatening non-state entities, local conflicts, rogue states⁴⁰², dependence of the Polish economy on energy supplies from one source⁴⁰³, terrorism and connected to it threat of terrorist attack against Polish troops abroad, organized international crime, cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, environmental threats⁴⁰⁴, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction⁴⁰⁵.

However, direct military threats to the Polish territory are not mentioned.

The second document, *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* published in 2009 by the Ministry of Defence does not present a definition of military security. However, it states that security of Poland is influenced by processes in its neighbourhood so stability of Central and

³⁹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, 10.

⁴⁰⁰ *National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary*, 2.

⁴⁰¹ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 14.

⁴⁰² *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 7.

⁴⁰³ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 8.

⁴⁰⁴ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 9.

⁴⁰⁵ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 10.

Eastern Europe, as well as of whole Euro-Atlantic space, forms Polish security. According to the strategy, a risk of large-scale military conflict is low, however, the risk of local conflict in neighbourhood might not be excluded and Poland must be able to react to it.⁴⁰⁶ As an example is given conflict in Georgia that confirmed importance of traditional military threats and importance of armed forces even in the close neighbourhood of Europe.⁴⁰⁷

According to the strategy, military and non-military threats coexist and are interconnected, the most pressing of non-military threats are those to economic security, especially energy security. Energy resources are gaining importance and are used as tools of putting political pressure to achieve political goals instead of military power.⁴⁰⁸

The strategy mentions also other important threats of asymmetrical nature: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised international crime and piracy. The other kind of threats are those connected to local conflicts that pose threat to international security.⁴⁰⁹

For Poland, NATO, the EU and strategic partnership with the United States are pillars of foreign and defence policies. Besides above mentioned stability of the region, also building good relations with Eastern neighbours (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine) is one of the pillars of Polish policy, especially with emphasise on situation in Russia and its security policy that directly influences security of Poland.⁴¹⁰

According to the strategy, Poland builds political and military relations within regional groups, including the Visegrad Group.⁴¹¹

Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic published in 2005 does not offer a definition of military security. However, it presents threats to the Slovak security.

The strategy discusses geopolitics- it names all the V4 member states as members of NATO and the EU and other neighbours- Austria as EU member and Ukraine as a state with Euro-Atlantic

⁴⁰⁶ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw, 2009), 6.

⁴⁰⁷ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 5.

⁴⁰⁸ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 5.

⁴⁰⁹ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 6.

⁴¹⁰ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 7.

⁴¹¹ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 8.

orientation. NATO is mentioned as a pillar of transatlantic security and the EU as a guarantee of political and social stability.⁴¹² The strategy clearly states that Slovakia does not feel directly military threaten by any state.⁴¹³

As the most serious threat is seen a possibility that terrorist groups or rogue states would gain weapons of mass destruction. Among other strategic threats are terrorism, rogue states, regional conflicts, organised crime⁴¹⁴, misuse of information technologies, illegal migration, activities of foreign intelligence services,⁴¹⁵ and dependency on resources including energy resources.⁴¹⁶

Among regional cooperation groups, the Visegrad Group is of extraordinary importance for Slovakia as the V4 states have common interests and goals leading to stability and development in Central Europe.⁴¹⁷

The second document, *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* published in 2005 is based on *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*⁴¹⁸ so it presents similar principles. It is worth adding that according to the *Defence Strategy* the Slovak Republic is not threaten by direct military conflict and other threats of military character are also losing their importance. However, risk of non-military threats is rising, especially in terrorism.⁴¹⁹

4.4 Statistics

As this chapter is devoted to military security, a short table presenting main indicators concerning military of each state is going to be presented. All the data were taken from the CIA World Factbook in order to ensure that the data are comparable.⁴²⁰

⁴¹² *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 5.

⁴¹³ *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 3.

⁴¹⁴ *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 5.

⁴¹⁵ *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 6.

⁴¹⁶ *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 7.

⁴¹⁷ *Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 14.

⁴¹⁸ *Obranná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, (2005), 3.

⁴¹⁹ *Obranná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*, 4.

⁴²⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, "Czech Republic", *The World Factbook*, updated on 11.12.2012; "Hungary", updated on 05.12.2012; "Poland", updated on 14.12.2012; "Slovakia", updated on 05.12.2012.

Table 3- military forces

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
population	10,177,300	9,958,453	38,415,284	5,483,088
land forces	yes	yes	yes	yes
navy	no	no	yes	no
air forces	yes	yes	yes	yes
military expenditures	1.15% of GDP	1.75% of GDP	1.9% of GDP	1.08% of GDP

The CIA World Factbook does not present the number of troops. In order to present comparable data about the troops on foreign mission, the numbers presented by NATO in December 2012 about International Security Assistance Force are going to be used.⁴²¹

Table 4- military forces in International Security Assistance Force

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
number of troops	416	582	1770	234

As it might be seen from the tables, Poland is a leader of the Visegrad Group in terms of number of population, military expenditures and number of troops engaged in NATO mission in Afghanistan. It might explain why Poland is going to lead the V4 battlegroup what is going to be analysed in the next section.

4.5 Cooperation

On May 12, 2011 a formation of the V4 battlegroup was announced. The battlegroup is going to be led by Poland and it is not going to be a part of NATO command. This battlegroup should be operational from 2016 and from 2013 it should exercise under the auspices of NATO Rapid Response Force.⁴²² In 2016 it is going to have for a first time its turn of duty in the EU.⁴²³

⁴²¹ NATO, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures", 03.12.2012.

⁴²² George Friedman, "Visegrad: A New European Military Force", Stratfor, 17.05.2011.

⁴²³ Ministry of National Defence, PL, "Polska państwem ramowym w Wyszehradzkiej Grupie Bojowej UE", 03.05.2012.

As it is clear, active cooperation on the field has not started yet in time of writing. However, it is important to understand whether the battlegroup formation might be linked to process of securitization. In the following section, possible securitization of two events will be analysed- crisis in Georgia in 2008 and military exercise Operation West in Kaliningrad in 2009. Those two events were chosen as they took place recently, the Russian military forces were involved, they took place in geographical proximity to Central Europe and could be perceived as threatening for the members of the V4.

There is a need to answer two questions. How the term "battlegroup" should be understood? What are the agreements about the role and activities of the battlegroup?

Battlegroups in the EU are developed to quickly respond to crises and it is a crucial element of European Security and Defence Policy. A battlegroup has sizes of a battalion, meaning 1500 troops. It is based on combined arms and combat support elements. The battlegroups will take rapid actions in order to form stand-alone operations or to take part in starting phase of larger missions.⁴²⁴

The Ministers of Defence agreed that each country will contribute to the battlegroup according to its abilities and will offer its exercise centres and equipment.⁴²⁵ As it was mentioned above, the battlegroup is going to be a part of the EU forces and participate in its missions.

What led the Visegrad states to this decision about cooperation? The answer will be looked for in military strategies of the states and in speeches and statements after the crisis in Georgia in 2008 and Russian military exercises in 2009.

4.6 Content analysis of the strategies

The key words for analysis are going to be chosen according to the same principles as in the section 3.6. The key word are as follows: Russia/Russian Federation, security, crisis, threat, war, conflict.

From each state, two latest military strategies are going to be analysed. An exception is Hungary

⁴²⁴ European Union, "Factsheet. The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell", 02.2005, 1.

⁴²⁵ Ministry of Defence, SR, "Krajiny Vyšehradskej skupiny vytvoria spoločnú bojovú skupinu pre potreby EÚ", 13.05.2011.

with only one military strategy available.⁴²⁶ The assumption is the same as in the third chapter, meaning that when the key words appear more often importance of those topics is growing. Due to that, it is worth to trace whether importance of the key words was growing in the military strategies of the V4 states. As it is going to be presented, the Czech Republic and Slovakia published their strategies before the events analysed in the fourth chapter. Hungary published only one strategy that might be analysed. However, it is worth to see whether there are some trends in changing understanding of military security in recent years.

In the Czech Republic, the first analysed document, *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*, was published in 2004 and it is 16 pages long. It was published by the Ministry of Defence.⁴²⁷ The second analysed military strategy was titled in the same way. It was published in 2008 and it is 9 pages long.⁴²⁸

In Hungary, only one available document is going to be analysed. It was decided to use the Hungarian military strategy even though it cannot be compared with the previous version. However, other three states present two strategies so general trends within the V4 might be traced.

The *Hungarian National Military Strategy* is 10 pages long. It was published in 2009.⁴²⁹

In Poland, *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* was presented in 2000 by the Ministry of Defence and it is 31 pages long.⁴³⁰ The updated version of the strategy bearing the same name was published in 2009 and it has 32 pages.⁴³¹

In Slovakia, the first analysed *Military Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* was published in 2001 and it is 9 pages long⁴³². The *Defence Strategy* published in 2005 has two pages more.⁴³³

In all the strategies, the key words will be searched and the results will be presented in the tables.

⁴²⁶ At the time of writing, a new strategy was not available yet according to e-mail from Endre Fodor Press Officer, Ministry of Defence, HU, 30.11.2012.

⁴²⁷ Ministry of Defence, CR, *Vojenská strategie České republiky*, (Prague, 2004).

⁴²⁸ *Vojenská strategie České republiky*, (Prague, 2008).

⁴²⁹ *National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary*.

⁴³⁰ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw, 2000).

⁴³¹ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw, 2009).

⁴³² *Vojenská stratégia Slovenskej republiky* (2001).

⁴³³ *Obranná stratégia Slovenskej republiky*.

By the same principle as in the chapter 3, the key words will be searched in noun forms. The strategies were analysed in their original languages with an exception of Hungary.⁴³⁴

Table 5- content analysis of military/defence security strategies

	Czech Republic 2004	Czech Republic 2008	Hungary 2009	Poland 2000	Poland 2009	Slovakia 2001	Slovakia 2005
Russia/ Russian Federation	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
security	15	6	50	42	78	10	15
crisis	1	1	9	28	128	1	0
threat	6	9	8	63	66	65	2
war	0	0	0	11	20	5	0
conflict	8	3	11	15	23	23	12

In case of Hungary and Poland it might be analysed whether the conflict in Georgia influenced their strategies. In the Czech Republic it is not possible as the strategy was accepted by the government in July 2008, before the crisis started.⁴³⁵ The Slovak strategies were presented before those events as well. As it is clearly seen from the table, in all countries besides Poland, Russia is not mentioned in any way.

In the Polish strategy from 2009 it is stated that:

"Building good relations with neighbours, based mutual understanding with the Easter neighbours: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, is one of the foundations of the Polish foreign policy. The situation in these countries and their security policy, in particular the policy of Russia, directly affect security of Poland".⁴³⁶

The strategy mentions also the conflict in Georgia that is going to be analysed in the next section:

"The conflict in Georgia confirmed the validity of the traditional military threats and the importance

⁴³⁴ The key words in national languages: in Czech- Rusko/Ruská federace, bezpečnost, krize, hrozba, válka, konflikt; in Polish- Rosja/Federacja Rosyjska, bezpieczeństwo, kryzys, zagrożenie, wojna, konflikt; in Slovak- Rusko/Ruská federácia, bezpečnosť, kríza, ohrozenie, vojna, konflikt. The key words in Hungarian are not provided as the Hungarian document is analysed in English.

⁴³⁵ The strategy was accepted on 23.07.2008. *Vojenská strategie České republiky*, 9.

⁴³⁶ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 7.

of the armed forces, also in close proximity to Europe."⁴³⁷ Hungary does not mention this topic in its strategy.

The second Czech strategy is much shorter so the fact that the key words "security" and "conflict" appear less often must be seen by taking into account number of pages of the strategies. In Hungary, it is not possible to compare it in this way but two of the key words do not appear in the document- "Russia" and "war".

In Poland, the importance of all key words clearly grew (especially "security" and "crisis"). It has to be taken into account that both strategies have similar length.

In Slovakia, the trend was opposite, with an exception of "security". It might be explained by a different structure of the strategies and different topics as the first one was focused on military while the second on defence.

Due to the dates when the strategies were published, the conclusion of the analysis cannot bring similar results as in energy security strategies. However, at least two states might be compared in terms of one of the events analysed in the chapter. While the Polish strategy mentions the conflict in Georgia, it is not covered in the Hungarian one.

4.7. Speeches and statements- crises

Similarly as in the chapter about energy security, statements from the official governments and ministerial websites are going to be analysed. Those websites are going to be of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, governments and Ministries of Defence as they are key for military conflicts and threats. In each of the two events a short description will be given and will be followed by content analysis of the websites.

⁴³⁷ Ministry of National Defence, PL, *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 5.

4.7.1 Russo-Georgian conflict 2008

First, a short timeline of the events of the Russo-Georgian conflict will be given.

On August 7, 2008 Georgian forces went to secessionist region of Georgia, South Ossetia. It has been functioning as an independent entity. The fights took place but the Georgian forces did not secure the capital city of South Ossetia and the rest of the territory. On August 8, the Russian forces entered South Ossetia after a few hours from the Georgian attack. The counterattack of Russian forces was successful as they defeated main Georgian force. By August 10, the Russian forces consolidated their positions in South Ossetia. On the next day, territory of Georgia was attacked by the Russian forces.⁴³⁸ The military activities were halted on August 12⁴³⁹ and cease fire was negotiated on the same day with the help of the French president.⁴⁴⁰ As the result of the war, Georgia lost control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as other parts of the territory with key elements of infrastructure, such as a power plant. Georgian military forces lost its potential and Russian forces guaranteed security in Georgia. According to Krzysztof Strachota, commentator of the Centre for Eastern Studies, Georgia lost also its credibility as safe transition route for the Caspian oil and gas.⁴⁴¹

On October 9, 2008, Russian forces left buffer zone on Georgian territory but were still present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁴⁴²

● The Czech Republic

First, the materials from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are going to be analysed. All of the sections are going to present materials published until the end of August 2008.

On August 8, the first statement about the conflict in South Ossetia was published. It informed that the Czech Republic calls all parties involved to halt military activities.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁸ George Friedman, "The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power", Stratfor, 12.08.2008.

⁴³⁹ Krzysztof Strachota, "Gruzja na równi pochyłej", Centre for Eastern Studies, 03.09.2008.

⁴⁴⁰ Centre for Eastern Studies, " Gruzja: Rosyjskie wojska wycofały się ze strefy buforowej", 16.10.2008.

⁴⁴¹ Strachota, "Gruzja na równi pochyłej".

⁴⁴² Centre for Eastern Studies, " Gruzja: Rosyjskie wojska wycofały się ze strefy buforowej".

⁴⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Prohlášení České republiky k eskalaci konfliktu v gruzínské Jižní Osetii",

On August 18, the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave an interview to weekly *Respekt* and it was presented among the materials on the Ministry's website. In the interview, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karel Schwarzenberg stated the approach of the Czech Republic to the conflict:

"Our stance is clear. What happened there broke all boundaries. Unfortunately, Russian peace forces and later Russian army occupied occupied a part of a country and city of Gori that is far inside Georgia. We consider it as a break of international law".⁴⁴⁴

The Minister called the operation as "invasion and partial occupation".⁴⁴⁵ According to Minister Schwarzenberg, Russia wants to regain its status of the world superpower. Besides this reason, "It is also about natural resources in Central Asia- through Georgia leads the only oil pipeline outside Russia".⁴⁴⁶

The Minister commented also on approaches inside the EU. Of the V4 states that are on the core of the thesis, he said: "Baltic states and Poland due to understandable reasons have clear stance, but for example Slovakia keeps behind, Hungary does not speak loudly".⁴⁴⁷

In the last paragraph of the interview the Minister summarises the conflict as a breaking moment in global politics:

"Hope that I used to have, that with Russia we can have similar relations as were formed among the European states after the Second World War, is gone. It turned out that Russia still uses categories from the 19th century".⁴⁴⁸

The last statement connected to the conflict was published on August 26. The statement focuses on recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia. The Czech Republic sees it as against the law and rejects it. The Czech Republic sees this decision as "an attack on independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia".⁴⁴⁹

08.08.2008.

⁴⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Ruská invaze je zlom", interview with Karel Schwarzenberg, *Respekt*, 18.08.2008.

⁴⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Ruská invaze je zlom".

⁴⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Ruská invaze je zlom".

⁴⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Ruská invaze je zlom".

⁴⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Ruská invaze je zlom".

⁴⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Prohlášení MZV v reakci na uznání samostatnosti Jižní Oseti a Abcházie ze strany Ruské federace", 26.08.2008.

The government of the Czech Republic also published statements concerning the crisis. The website brings not only statements and opinions of the government and the Prime Minister, but also of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The first statement was published on August 8. According to the statement, the Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek,

"is worried about the escalation of the conflict in South Ossetia and presented his belief that the realistic solution of current situation is halt of military activities and peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Czech Republic in long-term supports efforts of Georgia to strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders."⁴⁵⁰

On August 11, a following statement was published. According to it, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that: "The Czech Republic supports Georgia and it is a sad coincidence that fighting in Georgia is taking place in time when we remind August 21, 1968".⁴⁵¹

On the same day it was decided that the Czech Republic is going to send humanitarian aid to Georgia. In the same statement it is repeated that the Czech Republic calls for withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and supports international troops in the region.⁴⁵²

On August 12, the website informed that a meeting of General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC) is going to take place and Georgia was going to be the main topic. Karel Schwarzenberg was going to go to the meeting. There should be also another meeting for a new network Friends of Georgia and the Czech Republic is a member of it. The statement says that: "The Czech Republic regrets that Russia become a side in the conflict due to military actions against Georgia".⁴⁵³ Moreover, it describes briefly also a meeting of Nicolas Sarkozy, as France hold presidency of the EU, with Medvedev.

What is important to mention due to V4 cooperation, according to the statement a plane taking

⁴⁵⁰ Government, CR, "Stanovisko předsedy vlády M. Topolánka k situaci v Jižní Osetii a prohlášení Ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČR", 08.08.2008.

⁴⁵¹ Government, CR, "Češi v Gruzii jsou v pořádku", 11.08.2008.

⁴⁵² Government, CR, "Česká republika zašle finance na humanitární pomoc do Gruzie", 11.08.2008.

⁴⁵³ Government, CR, "Konfliktem mezi Gruzii a Ruskem se zabývají ministři zahraničí EU", 12.08.2008.

Czech citizens back to the Czech Republic is going to take also Poles as a few dozens of Czechs were taken by a Polish plane before.⁴⁵⁴

On August 14, the results of GAERC meetings were presented. They are not going to be analysed in details as the focus is on speech acts and statements presented by the government and Prime Minister, not on stance of the EU.⁴⁵⁵

On August 20, the Prime Minister Topolánek talked to the journalists about Georgia. The Prime Minister said:

"I consider fraternal internationalist assistance of allied armies in August 68 as commensurate for peacemaking role of the Russian Federation in this area. The problem has been escalating for sixteen years, this is so-called frozen conflict. I believe that a certain signal for the Russian Federation to claim its influence was that Georgia was not invited among NATO member countries at this year's summit in Bucharest".⁴⁵⁶

The statement also adds a point about energy security:

"Conflict in Georgia is according to the Prime Minister warning for the Czech Republic from perspective of energy security as after fall of oil supplies in last months an alternative route is endangered as well. For it Georgia means a "bottle neck" of supplies".⁴⁵⁷

Moreover, Prime Minister Topolánek emphasised:

"The whole conflict in Georgia escalated during summer holidays, Olympic games, leaving American president George Bush administration and election campaign in America. Russia presented its comeback among global powers in applying its politics and in this respect it is impossible not to take this conflict seriously".⁴⁵⁸

On August 20 the Czech government presented its statement. It supported Sarkozy's plan calling Russia to withdraw from Georgia. Moreover, the Czech Republic was willing to take part in

⁴⁵⁴ Government, CR, "Konfliktem mezi Gruzii a Ruskem se zabývají ministři zahraničí EU".

⁴⁵⁵ Government, CR, "Výsledky mimořádného zasedání Rady GAERC, kterého se zúčastnil ministr zahraničí K. Schwarzenberg", 14.08.2008.

⁴⁵⁶ Government, CR, "Premiér: Konflikt v Gruzii musíme brát vážně", 20.08.2008.

⁴⁵⁷ Government, CR, "Premiér: Konflikt v Gruzii musíme brát vážně".

⁴⁵⁸ Government, CR, "Premiér: Konflikt v Gruzii musíme brát vážně".

international mission to reestablish peace in Georgia. The government supports integration of Georgia into European and Euro-atlantic structures.⁴⁵⁹

The website presents also what said the Vice-Prime Minister, Alexandr Vondra, about the crisis in Georgia. On European Forum Alpbach he said: "I am worried that Ukraine could be the next one in the row".⁴⁶⁰

Moreover, the website presents an article written by Mirek Topolánek and a British leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron. The article was published in *Daily Telegraph*. It states:

"For the Czechs, the Russian invasion to Georgia is a strange historical reminiscence. Forty years ago Moscow attacked Czechoslovakia. (...) Europe today is different. (...) The Czech Republic has such friendly and democratic neighbours as Poland, Hungary, and obviously Slovakia."⁴⁶¹

The politicians in their common article also emphasise:

"We have to very clearly state that Russia's behaviour might not be ignored or excused. Whatever are the reasons for some Georgian actions, there are no excuses for strong neighbour to attack small, sovereign state. Russian excuse- that Moscow has a right for military action to protect its citizens, brings frigid memories of recent Czech history but also dangerous implications if it a base for Russian politics. Such doctrine cannot be accepted".⁴⁶²

In the article, they compare past situation of Central and Eastern Europe with nowadays Georgia.

"What was true in Central and Eastern Europe, is as well true today for Georgia and countries such as Ukraine. We should not accept the thesis that while the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic states are members of NATO and the EU, with its full independence and freedom while other countries neighboring Russia, which have not yet become members of these organizations are somehow doomed to exist in political limbo. We must not go back to the time of the Yalta Conference, when whole states were allocated to superpowers according to spheres of influence."⁴⁶³

The politicians also analyse in the article Russian strategies concerning its neighbours:

⁴⁵⁹ Government, CR, "Prohlášení vlády ČR k situaci v Gruzii ze dne 20. srpna 2008", 20.08.2008.

⁴⁶⁰ Government, CR, "Silové řešení gruzínské krize přináší podle A. Vondry obavu", 26.08.2008.

⁴⁶¹ Government, CR, "Premiér M. Topolánek: Rusko nemůže omezovat svobodu svých sousedů", article published in *Daily Telegraph*, 26.08.2008.

⁴⁶² Government, CR, "Premiér M. Topolánek: Rusko nemůže omezovat svobodu svých sousedů".

⁴⁶³ Government, CR, "Premiér M. Topolánek: Rusko nemůže omezovat svobodu svých sousedů".

"It is clear that Russia considers its approach as part of its strategy to maintain its neighbors 'at bay', in other words, that these countries are granted with only limited sovereignty, and if Moscow does not like how they behave or what leaders they choose, they do so at their own risk."⁴⁶⁴

They also emphasised their approach to Russia and importance of energy security issues:

"We must use the leverage available to us - which means more consistent European approach on issues such as energy. We will probably need Russian gas, but on the other hand Russia needs our markets."⁴⁶⁵

On August 29 the statement informed that the Prime Minister is going to take part in the EU summit and one of the discussed topic was going to be Georgia.⁴⁶⁶

It was the last statement concerning Georgia published in August.

The third analysed entity, the Ministry of Defence, does not present any materials from August 2008 in the news section. There are available materials from July and September 2008 but August is not covered.⁴⁶⁷ Press releases are available since 2010 so it is not possible to present and analyse speech acts of the Ministry and Minister of Defence.

● Hungary

On the English version of the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is one statement concerning the conflict in Georgia in 2008. The Ministry: "regrets that the Russian President signed the decree recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia".⁴⁶⁸ According to the statement:

"The unilateral initiative of the Russian parliament - of a Russia which earlier defined itself as an independent external peacekeeper - cannot serve as a legal basis on which to settle the issue. (...) The Republic of Hungary, as a member of the European Union and NATO, firmly stands by the position that this conflict can and must be solved through dialogue and by peaceful means, respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia and its internationally recognised borders."⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁴ Government, CR, "Premiér M. Topolánek: Rusko nemůže omezovat svobodu svých sousedů".

⁴⁶⁵ Government, CR, "Premiér M. Topolánek: Rusko nemůže omezovat svobodu svých sousedů".

⁴⁶⁶ Government, CR, "Premiér navštíví Slovinsko a zúčastní se summitu k rusko-gruzínskému konfliktu", 29.08.2008.

⁴⁶⁷ Ministry of Defence, CR, "Zpravodajství", undated.

⁴⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "The Hungarian Foreign Ministry regrets that the Russian President signed the decree recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia - Statement of the ministry", 26.08.2008.

⁴⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "The Hungarian Foreign Ministry regrets that the Russian President signed the

As it was mentioned already in the chapter about energy security, on the English language website of the government the materials are available only since 2010.

The similar situation is with the website of the Ministry of Defence. The materials in English are available since 2010.⁴⁷⁰

● Poland

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published many statements concerning Georgia. Several of them are concerned with evacuation of Polish citizens from Georgia.

However, other statements present also the Polish approach to the conflict. On August 8 the first statement on this topic was published:

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its serious concern over the developments in the region of South Ossetia in Georgia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers violation of Georgia's territorial integrity by foreign troops as unacceptable."⁴⁷¹

On the same day the Ministry informed that due to exacerbation of the conflict between Georgia and Ossetia it is not recommended to travel in the conflict zone.⁴⁷²

The next day, August 9, there was a first statement published informing about possibility of evacuation by a government plane.⁴⁷³ In the next statement from the same day it is said:

"Due to the escalating conflict between Georgia and Ossetia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs is asking that all Polish citizens residing on the territory of Georgia establish an emergency contact with the Polish Embassy in Tbilisi (...)"⁴⁷⁴

In the third statement the Ministry recommends avoiding travelling to Georgia.⁴⁷⁵

On August 10 more detailed statement concerning evacuation of Polish citizens from Georgia was

decree recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia".

⁴⁷⁰ Ministry of Defence, HU, "News", undated.

⁴⁷¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Oświadczenie MSZ RP w sprawie sytuacji w regionie Osetii Południowej w Gruzji 8 sierpnia 2008 r.", 08.08.2008.

⁴⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Informacja MSZ dla osób planujących podróż do Gruzji", 08.08.2008.

⁴⁷³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji", 09.08.2008.

⁴⁷⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Informacja MSZ dla obywateli polskich przebywających na terenie Gruzji", 09.08.2008.

⁴⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Informacja MSZ dla osób planujących podróż do Gruzji", 09.08.2008.

stated. Besides the Poles, Czechs and Estonians were evacuated as well.⁴⁷⁶ Three following statements inform when the planes are going to arrive.⁴⁷⁷

A statement from August 11 informs that a briefing for journalist about events in Georgia was going to take place. However, there is no statement given by an official of the Ministry, it is only an invitation for journalists.⁴⁷⁸

Four next statements inform about landing of planes from Georgia.⁴⁷⁹ The last statement gives a detailed list of number of citizens of other states evacuated from Georgia by Polish planes- among them were 45 Czechs and 5 Slovaks. The statement informs that 10 Polish citizens are going to be evacuated by Czech plane on August 13.⁴⁸⁰

On August 12 the website informed that the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs accompanies the Polish President on a working visit to Georgia. Presidents of Estonia, Lithuania and Ukraine and Prime Minister of Latvia were also going to take part in the visit.⁴⁸¹

Two following statements from the same day give details about landing of planes with Polish citizens evacuated from Georgia.⁴⁸²

On August 13 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, led a Polish delegation on special meeting of GAERC concerning Georgia.⁴⁸³

On the next day Poland sent humanitarian aid to Georgia.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji", 10.08.2008.

⁴⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji. Przyłot samolotu na wojskowe lotnisko Okęcie", 10.08.2008, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji. Przyłot samolotu na wojskowe lotnisko Okęcie - aktualizacja godz. 20.30", 10.08.2008, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji. Przyłot trzeciego samolotu ewakuacyjnego na wojskowe lotnisko Okęcie - aktualizacja godz. 20.00", 11.08.2008.

⁴⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Briefing Podsekretarza Stanu, Pana Andrzeja Kremera ws. sytuacji w Gruzji", 11.08.2008.

⁴⁷⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji Przyłot samolotu na wojskowe lotnisko Okęcie Aktualizacja godz. 03.00", 11.08.2008, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji. Przyłot samolotu z Turcji na wojskowe lotnisko Okęcie", 11.08.2008, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji. Aktualizacja 12 sierpnia godz. 00.30", 12.08.2008.

⁴⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Osoby ewakuowane z Gruzji", 12.08.2008.

⁴⁸¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Wizyta Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP w Gruzji, 12 sierpnia 2008 r.", 12.08.2008.

⁴⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Ewakuacja obywateli polskich z terytorium Gruzji. Przyłot czwartego samolotu ewakuacyjnego na wojskowe lotnisko Okęcie - aktualizacja godz. 20.45", 12.08.2008, "Ewakuacja polskich obywateli z Gruzji. Wylot samolotu do Erewania. Aktualizacja godz. 15.45.", 12.08.2008.

⁴⁸³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Nadzwyczajne posiedzenie Rady ds. Ogólnych i Stosunków Zewnętrznych Unii Europejskiej (GAERC), Bruksela, 13 sierpnia 2008 r.", 13.08.2008.

⁴⁸⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Pomoc humanitarna dla Gruzji", 14.08.2008.

On August 16 Minister Sikorski led a Polish delegation on an informal meeting of the NATO Council on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The meeting was devoted to the situation in Georgia.⁴⁸⁵

When Russia recognised independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published statement condemning it: "Poland is clearly in favour of respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia."⁴⁸⁶

The last statement concerning the events in Georgia on the website in August briefly describes teleconference among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia preparing for the meeting of the European Council. According to the statement, they agreed that:

"situation requires determined, constructive actions, and the discussion at the European Council should concern the relations of the European Union with Georgia, with Russia, but also with other CIS countries."⁴⁸⁷

On the website of the government, the first statement comes from August 9 and informs about evacuation of Polish citizens from Georgia.⁴⁸⁸ In the second statement published on August 11, it is stated that the Prime Minister Donald Tusk said:

"thanks to the determination of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski on Wednesday there will be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Union states".⁴⁸⁹

According to the Prime Minister: "The most important thing Polish diplomacy can do today is to effectively mobilize the European Union and NATO".⁴⁹⁰

On August 12 the Prime Minister commented on the visit of the presidents, including the Polish President, to Georgia. According to the statement: "the visit to the Caucasus of the presidents can

⁴⁸⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Posiedzenie Rady Północnoatlantyckiej NATO na szczeblu ministrów spraw zagranicznych", 19.08.2008.

⁴⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Oświadczenie MSZ w związku z uznaniem przez Federację Rosyjską niepodległości Osetii Południowej i Abchazji", 26.08.2008.

⁴⁸⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Telekonferencja Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych w związku z posiedzeniem Rady Europejskiej", 29.08.2008.

⁴⁸⁸ Government, PL, "Samolot rządowy zabiera Polaków z Gruzji", 09.08.2008.

⁴⁸⁹ Government, PL, "Premier o kryzysie gruzińskim", 11.08.2008.

⁴⁹⁰ Government, PL, "Premier o kryzysie gruzińskim".

bring good results when it comes to showing solidarity to Georgians and President Mikheil Saakashvili".⁴⁹¹ However, the visit cannot make impression that: "Poland is interested in intensifying the atmosphere of conflict between the European Union and Russia".⁴⁹²

Almost two weeks later, on August 25, the Prime Minister talked by phone with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. They discussed situation and Georgia and the meeting of the European Council planned on September 1.⁴⁹³

The last statement published on the website in August concerning the conflict is also focused on the upcoming summit. The Prime Minister emphasised a need for regular consultations with Georgia: "We need a political dialogue. The idea is that the EU contributes to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Georgia".⁴⁹⁴ Moreover, the Prime Minister mentioned a possibility of participation of Polish forces in peace mission in Georgia, possibility of treaty between the EU and Georgia as well as liberation of visa policy for Georgians: "Together with the president we will analyse in Brussels which demands can effectively prevent Russia from the actions perpetrated against Georgia".⁴⁹⁵

The last analysed entity, the Ministry of Defence, published two statements connected to Georgia. The statements describes humanitarian aid sent to Georgia by military planes.⁴⁹⁶

● Slovakia

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia published two news stories in August 2008. However, they are not linked to the events in Georgia.⁴⁹⁷ Statements of the Ministry are available since 2009 so the speech acts about Georgia cannot be analysed.⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹¹ Government, PL, "Premier: trzeba dążyć do zachowania integralności terytorialnej Gruzji", 12.08.2008,

⁴⁹² Government, PL, "Premier: trzeba dążyć do zachowania integralności terytorialnej Gruzji".

⁴⁹³ Government, PL, "Sytuacja w Gruzji przedmiotem rozmowy telefonicznej premiera Donalda Tuska z kanclerz Angelą Merkel", 25.08.2008.

⁴⁹⁴ Government, PL, "Premier i prezydent razem na szczycie w Brukseli", 29.08.2008.

⁴⁹⁵ Government, PL, "Premier i prezydent razem na szczycie w Brukseli".

⁴⁹⁶ Ministry of National Defence, PL, "Wojskowy samolot z pomocą humanitarną dla Gruzji ", 21.08.2008, "Pomoc medyczna dla Gruzji ", 14.08.2008.

⁴⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Všetky správy", undated.

⁴⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Vyhlásenia a stanoviská", undated.

As it was mentioned in the chapter about energy security, the press releases are available on the website on the government since 2010 so the crisis in Georgia is not covered.

The Ministry of Defence presents the statements only starting in January 2012.⁴⁹⁹ The news section includes also older materials and August 2008 is covered in the news stories. However, Georgia is not mentioned in any of them.⁵⁰⁰

● The Visegrad Group

The issue of Georgia was addressed in 2008 by the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers. In the joint statement presented on November 5, 2008, they state:

"The Prime Ministers express their support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. They welcome EU actions with respect to the Georgian-Russian conflict, which have brought deployment of a European observation mission, the inauguration of talks in Geneva and significant assistance for Georgian economic reconstruction. Furthermore, the Visegrad Group countries underline the need of further EU and international community actions for an effective conflict's resolution."⁵⁰¹

Moreover, Eastern Partnership approved by the European Council for several countries including Georgia is mentioned as "tools of political and economic rapprochement".⁵⁰² Eastern Partnership is presented also as "one of the most important instruments for improving the energy relations."⁵⁰³

Following Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden was published on November 24. Georgia is mentioned several times in the statement. First, it is mentioned in the context of Eastern Partnership, second together with Moldova and Ukraine in relation to

"commitment to European values will be maintained and will, in turn, pave the way for a responsible attitude of all political forces leading these countries to the achievement of European standards in all

⁴⁹⁹ Ministry of Defence, SR, "Vyhlásenia a stanoviská", undated.

⁵⁰⁰ Ministry of Defence, SR, "Infoservis", undated.

⁵⁰¹ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers", 5.11.2008.

⁵⁰² The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

⁵⁰³ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers".

areas".⁵⁰⁴

In the statement there is also clear link to the events in August:

"The Ministers welcome the continuing dialogue between the EU and Russia. They stress, however, that the EU must remain firm on its position regarding Russia having to fulfill all the conditions with respect to Georgia's territorial integrity."⁵⁰⁵

The last mention of Georgia in the statement is related to the visit of the Polish President:

"The Ministers express deepest concern and strongly condemn the incident in Georgia on 23 November 2008 when machine-gun fire was opened in immediate vicinity of a motorcade carrying the presidents of Georgia and Poland, close to South Ossetia, Georgia."⁵⁰⁶

Other statements by Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs are from 2008 not relevant as they were published before the crisis in August.

4.7.2 Military exercise 2009

In September 2009, joint Russian-Belarusian war games were conducted in Kaliningrad and in Belarus, close to the Polish and Lithuanian border. The joint manoeuvres were called Zapad-2009 (West 2009). The exercises included a simulated nuclear attack against Poland, attacking a gas pipeline and suppression of uprising of a minority in Belarus. The experts believe that by a minority was meant the Polish minority living in Belarus. The exercises were described as defensive but they included elements of offensive nature.

Simultaneously, exercises of only Russian forces took place close to the Baltic states borders, they were called Ladoga-2009.⁵⁰⁷

The exercises were formally independent of each other, however, according to analysts, they were part of the same cycle. The exercises had the same elements in several areas, such as the same

⁵⁰⁴ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden", 24.11.2008.

⁵⁰⁵ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden".

⁵⁰⁶ The V4, "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden".

⁵⁰⁷ Anna Dunin, "Intel Brief: Poland On Edge Over Russian Drills", ISN, 18.11.2009.

structures of command, and culmination at the same time. Those war games were the largest military drills on the Western borders of Russia and Belarus since the end of the Cold War.

● The Czech Republic

On the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there are statements from 2009 but there are no statements from September 2009.⁵⁰⁸ The press conferences from September 2009 are available but they do not include topic of the war games.⁵⁰⁹

In its press statements the Czech government also do not mention the joint war games.⁵¹⁰ A similar situation is in the news section⁵¹¹ and in the press conferences section⁵¹².

The website of the Ministry of Defence presents materials from September 2009 but the exercises are not covered.⁵¹³ As it was mentioned in the section about the conflict in Georgia, the Ministry does not have archives of press releases from earlier than 2010.⁵¹⁴

● Hungary

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published statements from September 2009. However, they do not mention Russian military exercises.⁵¹⁵ As it was mentioned already in the chapter about energy security and in the previous section about Georgia, on the English version of the website of the Government the news and press releases from 2009 are not available as the archive is available starting with news published in 2010.

The similar situation is with the website of the Ministry of Defence. The materials in English are available since 2010.⁵¹⁶

⁵⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Archiv 2009", 06.05.2010.

⁵⁰⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CR, "Záznamy tiskových konferencí", 19.03.2009.

⁵¹⁰ Government, CR, "Tiskové zprávy", undated.

⁵¹¹ Government, CR, "Aktuálně", undated.

⁵¹² Government, CR, "Tiskové konference", undated.

⁵¹³ Ministry of Defence, CR, "Zpravodajství", 1a, undated.

⁵¹⁴ Ministry of Defence, CR, "Tiskové zprávy", undated.

⁵¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HU, "The Ministry's Communications ", undated.

⁵¹⁶ Ministry of Defence, HU, "News", undated.

● Poland

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not comment on the war games in its statements.⁵¹⁷ The similar situation is in the case of the website of the Government⁵¹⁸ and the Ministry of Defence.⁵¹⁹

All of those institutions present news stories, statements and press releases from September 2009 but the war games are not mentioned in them.

● Slovakia

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not present the issue of military exercises in its news section from September 2009⁵²⁰ and in the statements section.⁵²¹

As it was mentioned above, the press releases are available on the website on the government since 2010. The Ministry of Defence among its information published in August 2009 does not provide articles about the war games.⁵²²

● The Visegrad Group

After the war games in September, there was one meeting of the V4 Prime Ministers in October concerning the Western Balkans. Military security was not mentioned in the report and other statements are not relevant as they were published before the military exercises in September 2009.⁵²³

⁵¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PL, "Archiwum", undated.

⁵¹⁸ Government, PL, "Wydarzenia", undated.

⁵¹⁹ Ministry of National Defence, PL, "Aktualności", undated.

⁵²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Všetky správy", 1a, undated.

⁵²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SR, "Vyhlásenia a stanoviská", 1a, undated.

⁵²² Ministry of Defence, SR, "Infoservis", 1a, undated.

⁵²³ The V4, "The Visegrad Group stands ready to promote the integration of the countries of the Western Balkans", 06.20.2009.

4.8 Military security-summary

As it is seen, the topic of the 2008 conflict was important especially for the Czech Prime Minister, but was mentioned also by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It might be understood as a securitized topic by the attention it gained in the government, as well as several phrases that were used by the Prime Minister. Especially, by talking about historical reminiscences the Prime Minister presented the perception of the conflict and used a comparison that is strong taking into account the Czech history. Moreover, the Prime Minister mentioned also several times energy security in the context of the military conflict what presents special and broad importance of the conflict, linked to further areas than only military. This aspect was mentioned also by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It might be seen that for the Czech Republic the topic was important and it has some elements of securitization.

In the case of Hungary it is different. As only one statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be analysed, it is not possible to say whether the topic was securitized as the number of the available materials is very limited. However, it should be stressed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the only analysed institution that has on the website materials from 2008, mentioned the crisis.

For Poland, the crisis in Georgia was important, according to the materials available especially evacuation of Polish citizens from the country was widely covered. It might be seen as securitization because it is an extraordinary step and it was presented many times on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government. Also the visit of the Polish president to Georgia during the conflict that was mentioned on the websites of the analysed institution might be seen as extraordinary action and sign of securitization. There is a sign of another extraordinary action- according to the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs assured a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the EU as Poland sees its role in mobilizing its partners. It means that for Poland the conflict in Georgia was of extraordinary importance.

In Slovakia, even if the archives on the websites are available, the crisis is not analysed.

However, it is worth to bear in mind that the V4 presented in two of its documents from 2008 its stance to the situation in Georgia so even if the issue is not covered or nor broadly covered by the individual states, the topic was important for a group as a whole.

This conflict was not securitized to such extent as for example the gas crisis in 2009. However, it was presented as a threat, not directly for the states but for international security. Particularly in the Czech case it might be argued that history influenced securitization process. Russia was not presented directly as a threat but the whole conflict in general was presented as breaking international rules.

As it is clearly seen, the military exercises were not securitized as they were not mentioned by any of analysed institutions on their statements, speeches and press releases on the website. It might be understood in several ways- first, it was not seen as a threat and there was no reason to comment on it. Second, it was not seen as a topic that should be discussed publicly.

The conflict in 2008 became an important topic in the discourse of some states. The authors who write about the perception of the war games stress that they have powerful symbolic importance- such as the name of operation "West" that reminds of operation of the same name conducted by the Soviet forces in 1981 as a demonstration of power. The second symbolic element was term of the military drill, close to anniversary of the Soviet invasion against Poland on September 17, 1939.⁵²⁴

As it was mentioned in the section about the CS approach to military security, historical experience can facilitate process of securitization. It might be argued that in this case it did not happen.

As it is clear from the analysis, such topic did not appear in the discourse of any of the V4 states and the V4 as a whole as the military drill "West" was not mentioned by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Governments and Ministries of Defence at all in the analysed period until the end of September 2009.

⁵²⁴Anna Dunin, "Intel Brief: Poland On Edge Over Russian Drills".

Conclusion

The thesis researched whether deepening cooperation within the V4 is based on the growing common interests in energy and military affairs of the V4 states. Based on the documents of the V4, this might be confirmed especially in the case of energy security as the V4 reflected this topic in its materials after the analysed crises and in consultations during the gas crises as well as cooperation during 2009 gas crisis. In individual states in their speeches and statements, as well as in strategies and in statistics some issues are common, especially high dependence on one supplier and vulnerability and potential threats caused by it. However, due to limited number of materials, especially in case of Hungary, the far-reaching results concerning all of the V4 states might not be made. In general, energy security is broadly covered in Poland but the gas crisis of 2009 was covered in all V4 states and especially in Slovakia it had signs of securitization. Concerning military security, the crisis in Georgia was covered by all the states besides Slovakia and it was covered by the V4. It was securitized especially in the Czech Republic by historical reminiscences of the Soviet invasion what goes in line with the CS assumption that historical experience might influence securitization. The military exercises in 2009 were not covered by any state and the V4 even though they were the largest exercises of this kind since the end of the Cold War.

The gas crisis of 2009 showed cooperation within the V4. It might be argued that it led to establishment of long-term cooperation in the field of energy security, such as construction and plans for construction of gas interconnectors. It was caused by the fact that the V4 states faced similar challenge and they were in similar situation- only the Czech Republic did not face the crisis but it helped Slovakia. The gas crisis showed that issue of dependency on supplies is a common problem in the V4 and the V4 states are prepared to cooperate by sharing critical infrastructure. It might be argued that based on this experience, they established cooperation.

In military security, the link is not as clear. However, it might be argued that cooperation in military affairs is a next step towards cooperation of the V4 on strategic issues and means that importance of

military security within the Group is growing. The link between the battlegroup, the crisis in Georgia and the military exercises in 2009 was not found in the speech acts. Based on analysed speech acts, the question concerning reasons for establishment of the battlegroup might not be answered.

While comparing with the military drill it might be seen that the conflict in Georgia was a serious topic especially for Poland and the Czech Republic and was addressed by the V4 as well. Even though some analysts claim that the military exercises were an important topic for Poland, the analysed statements do not support this argument.

It cannot be said whether the idea of the battlegroup was directly influenced by those events. However, it might be argued that the V4 states might perceive threats similarly but the speech acts from the analysed period do not support it clearly.

Based on the speech acts it might be said that the V4 states are aware of their dependence on Russia on gas and oil supplies that was presented in the thesis. In some of the strategies, there are indications that the states recognize the risk of being dependent. Historical reminiscence mentioned in the case of the conflict in Georgia might not be overlooked as it forms conditions for securitization.

In securitization, the emphasise in the thesis was on moments of speech acts. Implementation of extraordinary measures was also mentioned, such as reverse flow to Slovakia in 2009. It supports the argument that securitization might lead to cooperation.

The thesis presented a link between energy and military security as those topics were analysed in some strategies together and cooperation in those two strategic fields in the V4 started in recent years. In the case of the crisis in Georgia, the link between military and energy security was also mentioned several times in speech acts.

From constructivist point of view it might be argued that the V4 states have similar interests and interact what leads to creating structures for further cooperation. Based on presented examples of

cooperation, it might be said that cooperation will continue as there are several projects that should be implemented, such as interconnectors between Poland and Slovakia and between Slovakia and Hungary being parts of bigger North-South Corridor. In military security, cooperation in the form of the battlegroup is going to start in upcoming years.

Content analysis of the strategies and discourse analysis of speech acts showed official stance on energy and military security and analysed crises within the states. It showed security issues and crises from perspective of individual states as well as of the V4 as a whole. The discourse analysis showed how the crises were presented, whether they were securitized and whether they were seen in similar or different ways by the V4 states. It gives a chance to see the discourse about crises from both perspectives- perspectives of national states and the V4 platform.

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Thesis Proposal

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I).

1. Proposed Topic:

Growing importance of energy security of the Visegrad Group (V4) member states and possible perspectives of cooperation in this field among them analysed from the constructivist approach.

a) Recognizing the problem

The thesis will recognize the problems and issues of cooperative mechanism within the V4 in areas of military cooperation and energy security affairs. It will argue that military cooperation and energy security are connected to each other because all of the V4 states have a common adversary in both areas and it is Russia.

Energy security and military affairs are issues that are crucial for security and stability of states. In case of V4 countries it might be argued that those issues have a similar feature- V4 countries might try to cooperate because they perceive Russia as a threat in military and energy security fields. Russia poses potential threats for V4 countries. For example, when considering military issues it is important to mention Russia's military exercises in 2009 when Poland was chosen as a potential aggressor. During the war games (called Operation West) the Russian army attacked beach in Kaliningrad neighbouring Poland and attacked a gas pipeline. During the same exercises, Russian air force practiced using nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Russia has proved in the last years that it is able to use its energy exports as a tool how to fulfill its political goals. V4 countries might feel threatened that their high dependence on Russia might lead Russia to use energy resources as a political tool against them.

V4 countries might also see that interests of most of EU and NATO members differ from their own interests. Not all member states of the EU see Russian energy exports as dependent on political situation and they do not see limitation of supplies to some countries as a political threat. The V4 countries have reasons to see problems with supplies in those threatening terms.

Concerning NATO, some member states do not perceive Russia as a military threat and it is not named as a threat in NATO's strategic documents. However, due to events such as Russian military exercises and an attack against Georgia in 2008, the V4 countries have a different perspective of this. Russia is closer geographically to them, Poland has border with Kaliningrad, all V4 countries have also long and difficult history of conflicts with Russia. Because of that, their understanding of Russia and its actions differs from Western members of the Alliance and might lead to closer cooperation within a group of like-minded Central European countries.

Military cooperation within the V4 is just occurring in form of a battle group led by Poland. There are also certain examples of cooperation in energy security affairs, such as construction of Poland-Czech Republic gas pipeline and planned project of a gas connection between Slovakia and Hungary. Interconnection between military and energy security affairs among V4 is seen in their geopolitical position, geographical proximity to Russia, historical context, and strategic importance of both military affairs and energy security.

b) Theoretical framework:

Constructivism will be used as theoretical framework for the thesis. Constructivism offers several concepts which can be helpful in understanding relationships between the V4 and Russia, as well as between military cooperation and energy security cooperation.

Those concepts are in particular securitization and speech act. Securitization examines how certain acts and issues are transformed into security issues and it is useful to test how the V4 politicians

perceive Russia and its policies and whether they perceive Russia's acts as security threats. It is also important to see whether their understanding of threats changes through years and depends on Russia's acts, such as military exercises or energy security conflicts.

Ideas are expressed through language so analyzing speeches of the V4 politicians will help to state their attitude towards Russia and its policies concerning the V4 countries.

2. Subject Motivation:

Energy security is a crucial concern for all Central European countries. Those countries have some features in common- they are members of the EU and NATO, they are highly dependent on Russia and they have similar geopolitical positions. However, they are also some differences between them in their interests. As the Visegrad Group decided to cooperate on military affairs and to create a battle group that is not going to be a part of NATO command, it is important to see whether it is willing and ready to cooperate on other crucial issues, such as energy security.

3. Aims:

- To analyse whether countries of the V4 can cooperate with each other in the field of energy security as they are planning to cooperate in military affairs;
- To analyse case studies of energy security cooperation in the past;
- To predict whether further cooperation in this field is possible (based on content analysis of the speeches and analysis of the documents).
- To present linkage between traditional military security and geopolitics in energy security

4. Main Hypotheses and Research Questions

- Variables mentioned in this section are working variables, they might be developed or changed during the research

- a) Deepening cooperation among the V4 states outside other international organizations depends on their common growing interests in military and energy security fields.

Variables: cooperation- growing common interests- shared interests in military and energy security

- Why have the V4 countries decided to form a battle group outside of NATO?
- What may lead them to closer cooperation in energy security?
- What are the successful examples of energy security cooperation within the V4?

- b) Energy crises 2005-2009 presented increasing recognition of vulnerability of the V4 states and became an impetus to develop energy security strategies.

Variables: crisis- revaluation-shared interest

- What are the interests of V4 countries concerning energy security?
 - Which interests do they have in common?
 - How can they protect their interests?
 - Are they prepared in political and technical terms to share critical infrastructure?
 - What are the differences in structures of energy industry and energy consumption among the V4 states?
- c) Constructivism offers analytical tools which can be employed to explain cooperation in military and energy security affairs.
- How might military cooperation and a possibility of energy cooperation be analyzed in terms of constructivism?
 - What does content analysis show us about past cooperation in energy security?

5. Chosen method:

Dependent variable is cooperation in military and energy security affairs. Independent variables are shared interests, crises, revaluation of interests. Those variables are tentative as more variables might be found during the research and some might be omitted.

Factors which are crucial for understanding of military and energy security cooperation are:

- Content analysis of speeches of ministers of foreign affairs of the V4 countries. The analysis will show how often they mention certain words, such as “Russia”, “energy security”, “energy security crisis”, “energy security threat” etc. It will show whether the importance of this issue is growing and how quickly it is growing in each state. This analysis will also present priority of energy security issues for certain leaders.
- Content analysis of mainstream media after the speeches about energy security- to examine to what extent ideas of foreign affairs ministers are accepted by the media and whether they are criticised.
- Qualitative content analysis of speeches based on constructivist variables- testing to what extent the V4 countries share common threat perception.
- Qualitative content analysis of speeches concerning military cooperation- to what extent the V4 states are planning to rely on it according to speeches of their foreign ministers
- Case study analysis: analysis of the military cooperation framework in order to examine its importance

- Case study analysis: cases of cooperation in energy security affairs and chances for such cooperation in the future

II).

1. Planned structure of the thesis

- Introduction (explanation of the concepts);
- description of military cooperation within the V4 and its analysis from the constructivist perspective;
- analysis of energy security situation of all V4 member states (also from constructivist perspective);
- description of past cooperation in energy security affairs;
- content analysis of the speeches and documents concerning energy security cooperation;
- perspectives of future cooperation- content analysis of the speeches and documents;
- summary (summary of the findings of the research).

III).

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