

Professor Sergey Slobodyan
Deputy Director of Graduate Studies at CERGE-EI
Professor Peter Katuscak
Vozar's Advisor, CERGE-EI

Dear Sergey and Peter,

I have reviewed Mario Vozar's dissertation, "Essays on Matching Markets" . With some minor changes, I recommend that the draft warrants a dissertation defense and eventual award of a doctoral degree. I focused my comments on the two empirical chapters.

Sincerely,

Gregory Veramendi
Arizona State University

REPORT

I enjoyed reading Mario Vozar's dissertation. I have a few comments that will help clarify the work.

Comments on "Let's Dance. With Someone Else? Empirical Evidence on Determinants of Match Separation"

I really liked the idea of using ballroom dancing couples as proxies for marriages and it is a nice setting to study matching. I was expecting the authors to use some of the tools applied to labor markets, such as studying the effect of tenure and experience. Perhaps they are saving that type of analysis for a future paper.

I have a few comments about this chapter:

1. Page 35: Is it possible for couples/men to be demoted? Or once they achieve a class they retain it forever?
2. Page 37: You define a couples dancing in higher classes having higher match quality. Is it possible that if the couple is a new match, then the classes reflects the quality of the man and his previous partner?
3. Page 38: Are points accumulated over a fixed period of time (e.g. a year) or over the career of the male? (I say male, since he retains points if a match is dissolved.)
4. Page 40: The assumption that the highest class is a measure of a dancer's quality should be discussed a bit more. Couldn't a great dancer quit early in their career due to exogenous reasons and so their potential is not reflected in their highest class? Also, couldn't a woman "upgrade" by matching with a man who is in a higher class? Sometimes men have ulterior motives other than winning dancing competitions.
5. Page 41, Fig 2.2: How much of these figures is driven by "terminal" couples? If you make these figures for couples that are not the last for either dancer and they are not in their final/highest class, do you still see such strong assortative matching?
6. Page 43, 1st paragraph: I could think of a few reasons why dancers might break up that aren't related to dancing.
7. Page 44, Figure 2.3: Do men or women typically do better after breakup? I like 3-D figures, but in this case it is hard to see what is going on.
8. Page 45, Table 2.3: Does adding a dummy if a female is changing class affect the results? You might also consider adding a variable that is delta-class for the females.
9. Page 52, top of page: Could you clarify why the finding explains the non-significance of the coefficient on woman's personal quality?

10. Page 52, Figure 2.7: Could you discuss why this might not be a selection generated by how you form the groups? Imagine that all matches breakup once they learn they are a bad match. Then each dancer is most likely to find someone of similar quality to themselves. If you require that neither partner does better, then it is likely that they have the same quality beforehand. On the other hand, if you require that one partner does better, you might select the matches with unequal qualities. You might be able to check this by seeing how often the worse partner does better?
11. Page 56, first paragraph: The relative ranking coefficients between the two groups are not statistically different, so I'm not sure if you can make this claim.
12. Page 43 and 56: you misspell assess as "asses". Thought you might want to fix that.

Comments on "Marriage Dot EU: The Effect of Internet Usage on Marriage Hazard"

I also enjoyed reading this chapter. My only general comment is have you considered looking at the usage of match websites in each country? That might give a more direct measure of online markets.

1. Page 63: Shouldn't you have age and gender superscripts on α ?
2. Page 64: I think you should include a little more information about the source of data. Are these representative samples from each country? How many observations do you have in each country-age-year for your marriage hazard calculation?
3. Page 66: I'm not sure what you mean that the character of differences between countries seems to be the same before and after the shift. Can you show this quantitatively or by taking out country and time fixed effects from figures 3.1 and 3.2 to show that this is the case?
4. Page 67: How do you handle missing values in the variables, for example, the Gini coefficient?
5. Page 68: Have you considered the interaction of education and internet usage?
6. Page 68: Have you considered region-specific time trends? This would be a little less general than the country-specific linear time trends.
7. Page 68: Model 3 does have larger standard errors, but the point estimates are much smaller as well.
8. Page 69, 3rd paragraph: Not sure what you mean by "diluted as in Model 3".
9. Page 70, figures: I really like these figures. I think you could label 3.4 a little better so it is clear what you are doing without reading the text.
10. Page 71: You should define cumulative internet usage more explicitly.

11. Tables: You have a note about clustered standard errors, but I couldn't find any description of how the standard errors were clustered.
12. Tables 3.15 and 3.16: I can't figure out how you got such statistically significant marginal effects, when the coefficients in table 3.15 are not statistically significant.