

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut mezinárodních studií

**Cultural Diplomacy of Canada
(1993 - 2012)**

2013

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(1993 - 2012)**

Diplomová práce

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Autor práce: **Bc. Barbora Polachová**

Vedoucí práce: **Mgr. Ing. Magdaléna Fiřtová, PhD.**

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Abstrakt

V současné době globalizace, kdy kulturní diplomacie neodmyslitelně patří k nástrojům tzv. měkké síly zahraniční politiky, je relevantní zkoumat postavení kulturní diplomacie v agendě zahraničních politik národních států. Cílem této diplomové práce je zhodnotit přístup kanadské vlády ke kulturní diplomacii od 90. let minulého století do současnosti. Kanadské hodnoty a kultura se v roce 1995 staly jedním z tří základních pilířů kanadské zahraniční politiky, autorka se proto snaží zmapovat, zda-li se kulturní diplomacie stala v této době i koherentním a strategickým nástrojem kanadské zahraniční politiky. Za pomoci analýzy nástrojů kanadské kulturní diplomacie liberálních vlád Jeana Chrétiena, Paula Martina a současné konzervativní vlády Stephena Harpera práce hledá odpověď na otázku, nakolik jsme svědky postupného opouštění konceptu kulturní diplomacie jako nástroje měkké síly za Harperovy administrativy. Pomocí rešerše vládních dokumentů, analýzy zdrojů a programů kulturní diplomacie a za pomoci rozhovorů s důležitými vládními úředníky autorka dochází k závěrům, že z finančních a organizačních důvodů kulturní diplomacie nebyla používána jako strategický nástroj vedení kanadské zahraniční politiky až do třetího volebního období premiéra Jeana Chrétiena v roce 2000 a teprve poté je možné hovořit o naplňování Třetího pilíře jako neoddelitelné součásti vedení zahraniční politiky. Harperova vláda po roce 2006 však nepřisuzuje měkkým nástrojům zahraniční politiky velkou důležitost, tudíž kulturní diplomacie, a tedy i naplňování Třetího pilíře, je v současnosti na ústupu.

Abstract

In the current era of globalization where cultural diplomacy has become one of the inherent tools of “soft power” of foreign policy, it is relevant to research the place of cultural diplomacy in the foreign policy portfolio of nation-states. The focus of this thesis is to evaluate the attitudes of the Canadian government towards cultural diplomacy from the 1990s until today. In 1995, Canadian values and culture became one of the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy. The author therefore attempted to map whether cultural diplomacy became a coherent and strategic tool of Canadian foreign policy during this era. By analyzing the tools of the Canadian cultural diplomacy from the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and the present Conservative government of Stephen Harper, the author seeks to answer whether we are witnessing a gradual eclipse of cultural diplomacy as a means of soft power under the Harper administration. The research of government documents and cultural diplomacy programs, along with the analysis of interviews with important government officials, suggest that cultural diplomacy was not practiced as a strategic tool in foreign policy management until the third election term of Jean Chretien in the year 2000. From there, we can track fulfilling the Third Pillar as an intangible component of Canadian foreign policy. The Harper government, in tenure since 2006, does not attribute the soft power tools as great importance, and therefore fulfilling the Third Pillar of foreign policy is in decline.

Klíčová slova

Kanada, kulturní diplomacie, veřejná diplomacie, měkká síla, Jean Chrétien, Stephen Harper, Třetí pilíř

Keywords

Canada, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, soft power, Jean Chrétien, Stephen Harper,

Rozsah práce: 171, 522 znaků

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V Praze dne 17.5.2013

Bc. Barbora Polachová

Poděkování

Na tomto místě bych ráda poděkovala své vedoucí práci, Mgr. Ing. Magdaleně Fiřtové za cenné rady a čas, který mi po celou dobu studia na katedře amerických studií věnovala.

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Teze diplomové práce

Jméno: Barbora Polachová

E-mail: polachovabara@gmail.com

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V čem se oproti původnímu zadání změnil cíl práce?

Hlavním cílem práce již není zkoumat projekci a hodnocení kanadského image, ale práce se věnuje pouze kulturní diplomacii, která je zasazena do teoretického rámce měkké síly a sociálního kapitálu. Nový cíl práce je kriticky zanalyzovat postavení kulturní diplomacie jako nástroje zahraniční politiky Kanady. Z tohoto důvodu se práce bude soustředit na postavení kultury v rámci kanadského ministerstva zahraničí - Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, případně instituce, které s ministerstvem spolupracují.

Jaké změny nastaly v časovém, teritoriálním a věcném vymezení tématu?

Za nejpodstatnější změnu nové vymezení analyzovaných nástrojů kulturní diplomacie. Práce tak nebude oproti původnímu záměru obsahovat nástroje nation-brandingu.

Jak se proměnila struktura práce (vyjádřete stručným obsahem)?

1. Conceptual Foundations of Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy
2. Historical context of Canadian International Cultural Relations
3. Institutional Character of Cultural Diplomacy in Canada
4. Making Cultural Diplomacy
5. Discussion and conclusions

Které nové prameny a sekundární literature byly zpracovány a jak tato skutečnost ovlivnila celek práce?

Novými prameny v práci jsou Departmental Performance Reports (DPR) Ministerstva zahraničí a mezinárodního obchodu. Pobyt v Kanadě mi umožnil získat tyto dokumenty i

z první poloviny 90. let, které nejsou elektronicky dostupné a zahrnout do práce i porovnání finančních výdajů na aktivity spojené s kulturní diplomacií. Dalšími novými prameny v práci jsou interní materiály ministerstva, které mi byly poskytnuty během vedených rozhovorů. Materiály nejsou klasifikované jako tajné, nicméně nejsou běžně dostupné v archivech. Možnost vedení rozhovorů s lidmi, kteří se na koncepci kanadské kulturní diplomacie přímo podíleli, mi umožnila prohloubit kvalitativní rozměr práce.

Charakterizujte základní proměny práce v době od zadání projektu do odevzdání tezí a pokuste se vyhodnotit, jaký pokrok na práce jste během semestru zaznamenali (v bodech):

Hlavní proměny v práci byly:

- získání nových primárních zdrojů
- upuštění od konceptu nation=brandingu jako nástroje hodnotící výsledky veřejné a kulturní diplomacie- změna výzkumných otázek

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Introduction

Today the soft-power resources of nations are becoming increasingly important for the management of international relations due to globalization and its internationalized media and highly skilled publics demanding a constant flow of new information. Diplomacy management reacts to such changes by opening up to the public and becoming more transparent. The power of the publics was recently demonstrated by the events of the Arab Spring that changed the landscapes of international relations. The public diplomacy and its components are inherently linked to the soft power concept.¹ Joseph Nye argues in his pivotal work, “*a country can achieve its goals through attractiveness of its values, policies and culture.*”² Today, NGOs, non-state actors and individuals play an important part in international relations and in delivering a positive image of countries to foreigners. Acquiring public diplomacy strategy is unavoidable in today’s international order - as Hans Tuch argued in 1990, “*the public diplomacy is an imperative of a nation’s international life*”.³

Cultural diplomacy, as a part of public diplomacy discipline, is one of the tools to spread and foster good relations with foreign publics. Cultural diplomacy programs range from academic programs and artists’ exchanges to travelling exhibitions to international culture events and general promotion of the national culture abroad. The objective of cultural diplomacy is however the national, not artistic, interest of the state. However, cultural diplomacy wages but also benefits from the promotion of the arts, in both political and economic terms.

Since WWII, Canada has developed into a middle-power whose ‘niche diplomacy’ resides in specialization that led Canada to become a model for good international citizenship due to its role of peacekeeper, its diversity management and active membership in international organizations. All of the aforementioned traits

¹ Joseph S. Nye (2003), Jan Melissen (2005), Eytan Gilboa (2009), Evan Potter (2009).

² Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

³ Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World – U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1990).

contribute to Canada's attractiveness based on its legitimacy and credibility. Canada serves the international community as one guarantor of other nations' legitimate actions. Multiculturalism and commitment to equal rights and social justice are the core values of Canadian society. Evan Potter argues that Canada serves as a model nation for its management of diversity and it can teach the world about living in ambiguity and constant evolutionary change⁴ as shown by the Québécois referenda of past three decades. The concept of soft power is therefore a natural foreign policy choice for Canada.

In 1995, promoting culture and values officially became the Third Pillar of Canadian foreign policy as a result of searching for niches in the times of fiscal austerity.⁵ The thesis will look at the implementation of the Third Pillar in Canadian foreign policy management. From the fiscal point of view, the Harper administration seemingly finds itself in a very similar situation as his predecessors in the mid 1990s, although due to the War on Terror the security issues obviously rather predominate the domestic and international political agenda and in political minds leaves much less room for cultural and identity promotion. Naturally, the political philosophy of both parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, has played an important role in formulating priorities where Canada can excel.

The primary focus of the thesis is to analyze attitudes of the Canadian governments towards cultural diplomacy throughout the period of administrations of Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul Martin (2003-2006) until the last election of the Conservative Party of Stephen Harper in 2011.

⁴ Evan Potter, *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy*, (Toronto: McGill' University Press, 2009).

⁵ Evan Potter, "Niche Diplomacy as Canadian foreign policy", *International Journal* 52, 1(96), (1997).

Research Questions

The overall objective of the thesis is to assess why the Canadian government should pay attention to cultural diplomacy within the public diplomacy framework, and what importance does cultural diplomacy have for the Canadian foreign policy portfolio. The thesis has been guided in its structure and methodology by the main research question:

- Are we witnessing the gradual eclipse of cultural diplomacy as a means of soft power under the Harper government?

In order to respond to the main research question, my thesis will have to firstly depict and analyse the main tools of Canadian cultural diplomacy. And secondly, the thesis will try to evaluate and compare the cultural diplomacy management throughout the Chrétien, Martin and Harper administrations. Therefore this approach will guide the structure of my thesis.

Structure

The thesis is organized into four parts. The first chapter provides a theoretical framework for public and cultural diplomacy, the second chapter elaborates on the historical context of Canadian arts promotion. The third chapter titled “The Institutional Character of Canadian Cultural Diplomacy” reflects the position of cultural diplomacy within the federal government structure throughout the administrations. The final chapter, “Making Cultural Diplomacy” is devoted to the evaluation of particular practices of cultural diplomacy in Canada.

Research Design and Method

The paper aims to explore the scope of approaches of Canadian government towards cultural diplomacy from 1993 until 2012. The research design and method of this paper is located within the qualitative research framework and the logic of the comparative analysis method using financial resources and data of government departments or its agencies. The interviews serve as qualitative research methods for the

paper. The qualitative research approach was selected due to 1.) the immaturity of the concept of cultural diplomacy theory and previous research; 2.) the nature of the phenomena of cultural diplomacy does not suit quantitative measures and 3.) a lack of description of cultural diplomacy within academia.⁶ The first part of the paper serves as a theoretical cornerstone for the paper and positions cultural diplomacy within the public diplomacy framework. The second part of the paper is analytical, using qualitative data of 12 one-on-one interviews conducted with present or former government officials and culture and academic stakeholders. One interview was conducted in Ottawa in the fall of 2011, the rest of the interviews were conducted during my 6-week research stay from March to May 2013 in Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal. The thesis does not use findings of all these interviews, however all of them contributed to grasping the topic as a whole. The quantitative data presented, such as federal department's performance reports and evaluations, are used as a compliment of comparative analysis used throughout the thesis.

⁶ These are specific criteria put forward by the author of the thesis based on criteria published IN: John W.Creswell, *Research Design – Qualitative, Quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* –Third Edition, (Thousands Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009), 98-99.

Chapter 1: Conceptual Foundations of Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy

The pedigree of successful attainment of foreign policy objectives is rooted in the national interest of every state in the world. Globalization and growing interdependency among nations instigated states to consider the range of their abilities to convince other actors of the state's uniqueness in various aspects – be it in political, economic, cultural or environmental fields. The technological advancement has had an effect on the way modern diplomacy is managed and how countries exchange information with and about each other. Politicians began to understand that the more their country serves as a role model in areas of democracy, prosperity and economy, the more it is likely to keep its positive image in the eyes of other countries.

The return of the study of diplomacy reflects the changes in international developments of the past thirty years. As the end of Cold War created a vacuum in geopolitics, the academics were searching for a new grand strategy for international relations. The two grand theories for future development of mankind were introduced. Francis Fukuyama argued in his essay *The End of History*⁷ that evolution of the sociocultural model of mankind was peaked by the victory of economic and political liberalism. Fukuyama based his theory on the war of ideas performed by governments. On the other hand, Samuel Huntington introduced the “clash of civilizations” thesis that embraces the importance of non-state actors in shaping the international order landscape. Huntington stresses the role of culture as the main reference point for development of international relations. He argues that *“In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. People and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious*

⁷ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.

communities, nations, and at the broadest level, civilizations.”⁸ As the 9/11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror showed, the clash of civilizations proved to be a valid explanation of the nature of international relations fabric. At the same time, the states began to be more preoccupied with how to win ‘hearts and minds’ of foreign publics and governments. Appreciation and understanding of state policies by others and using power effectively have become the mantras of foreign policy management. The soft power concept and its subfields - such as public diplomacy - received more interest in foreign policy objectives and provided a new venue for how to conceptualize the structure of foreign policy management.

Along with the rise of acknowledgement of soft power as a complimentary concept to hard power, one must not omit the importance of social capital. Social capital theory is the basis for the soft power concept. As brought forward by Robert Putnam,⁹ “Social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. OECD uses another definition of social capital – as “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups.”¹⁰ For the purposes of international relations, the social capital arises in importance when it comes to building networks and developing “bonds”, “bridges” or “links” that we perceive as the primary objectives of diplomacy per se.

This chapter provides the theoretical foundations for the thesis. The soft power concept is the starting point in the study of cultural diplomacy as a dimension of public diplomacy of the state. The chapter aims to provide a review of literature on the concepts of public diplomacy and position cultural diplomacy within its framework. Further, the chapter builds upon the premise that public diplomacy became the primary tool in diplomacy management due to the rapid changes of technology and, more generally, the globalized environment in which it is executed.

⁸ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 21.

⁹ Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone- the Revival and Collapse of American Community*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 19.

¹⁰ Sharon Jeannotte, “Just Showing Up. Social and Cultural Capital in Everyday Life”. IN: *Accounting for Culture*, 125.

Soft power and its conceptual framework

Joseph S. Nye firstly introduced the concept of soft power.¹¹ Nye understands power to be the ability to get the outcomes desired. Hard power, represented by military strength and economic might, operates by inducements (“carrots”) and threats (“sticks”) while “the second face” of power is its soft part. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preference of others. The two concepts of powers are not to be considered as alternatives, but as complements of each other and although the term ‘soft’ may evoke understanding as ‘weak’, soft power should not be understood as a weaker component of a state’s power.

According to Nye, there are three ways to pursue one’s objectives. The soft power concept argues that nations can achieve their goals through the attractiveness of their values, culture and policies. A country may gain the outcomes desired in world politics because other countries admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness will want to follow it.¹² Soft power therefore is the key to shaping the preference of others.¹³ Nye argued, “countries that are likely to be more attractive in postmodern international relations are those that help to frame issues, whose culture and ideas are closer to prevailing international norms, and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and policies.”¹⁴

Fostering nations’ soft power capabilities has grown in importance because the non-state actors come to play in the international relations and their significance has risen over past three decades. The soft power is therefore targeted at two entities – the governments and the public. The governments possess a transparent structure to address it, but targeting the public is hard to catch because of its organic nature and therefore the communication techniques have to be specifically crafted in order to be well-targeted by the decision-makers. Nye introduces two causal models for how soft power functions to

¹¹ The term was first used in his article from 1990 in NYE, J.S. Soft power. *Foreign Policy* 80 (Autumn, 1990), 153-171, and later coined in his book solely devoted to the concept of soft power in Nye, Joseph S. *Soft power: the means to success in world politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

¹² Joseph S.Nye, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

¹³ Joseph S.Nye, “Public diplomacy and Soft Power.”, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (2008) 616: 95.

¹⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 31.

attract its targets¹⁵:

MODEL 1- Direct Effects

Resources -> government elites -> attraction -> elite decision and outcome

MODEL 2 - Indirect Effects

Resources -> publics -> attract/repel-> enabling/ disabling environment -> elite decision

The first model embraces the government-to-government wielding of soft power to produce direct effects of wielding soft power. It requires careful distinction of the internal processes that are sometimes hard to describe due to their closed character. The second model includes the impact of the public that provides enabling or disabling of the environment for the elite decision. We can argue that there is no direct causation for the public opinion to the elite decision, but certainly one can state that the elite is more likely to undertake a decision that is popular among the public rather than undesired by the public, therefore Nye calls it an 'indirect effect'.

The relation of public diplomacy to soft power is compliant. Public diplomacy is one of the tools generating soft power of the nation to become one of the resources for the management of nations' foreign policies. It differs from the traditional forms of diplomacy in its target group - the public - and therefore its tools that have an open and non-secretive character. Nye demonstrated the relationship among the actors in Fig.1, where the traditional model of diplomacy is portrayed on Government 1 (G1) to Government 2 (G2) line. However, today, the G1 must communicate to Society 1 (S1) and Society 2 (S2) and the International Organizations (IO). The actors are mutually interdependent.

¹⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 95.

Fig.1: Two Models of Diplomacy
Source: Nye, J. *The Future of Power*, 102.

According to Nye, Government 1 will try to influence the public in Society 2, but transnational organizations in Society 2 will also wage information campaigns to influence the Government 1. The organizations may employ information campaigns of naming and shaming to influence other governments as well as to put pressure on other nongovernmental actors such as large corporations. Sometimes they would also work through transnational organizations. The result is a new set of mixed coalitions of governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental actors where each is using public diplomacy for its own purpose. Nye gives an example of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which allied smaller governments, such as Canada and Norway, along with networks, created by an activist in Vermont, and the public fame of Princess Diana to defeat the interests of American bureaucracy.¹⁶ Nye's theory justifies the need for soft power, and hence, a public diplomacy component as an unconditional tool in foreign policy management.

¹⁶ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 103.

Review of the soft power concept

Nye has later updated his soft power thesis by replacing it with the ‘smart power concept’. Smart power is neither hard nor soft - it is the skilful combination of both. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand.¹⁷ However, that doesn’t replace the soft power concept for the purpose of this thesis.

The soft power concept has been contested usually by European scholars. Josef Joffe warns that the ubiquity of cultural or political elements in a foreign country, in this case American, can have a negative effect on the government’s foreign policy. Joffe gives an example of protest against the War in Iraq at the International Film Festival in Cannes. The anti-war protesters were wearing Shrek’s green ears – a symbol of the omnipresent American culture but also relating the silliness of the film character to the silliness of American foreign policy in Iraq. In the case of Iraq, the American government was not able to transform its soft power resources into real public support that projected into rejecting the attitude of many European governments. Joffe believes that “In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding non submission but resistance. Likewise, great soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage.”¹⁸ Other scholars such as Javier Noya criticize Nye’s dualistic perception of power. According to Noya, the concept is exclusive to post-modern societies and does not reflect the perception of average citizens who do not do not distinguish a conflict between hard and soft factors.¹⁹ Andrew Liaropoulos discusses the evaluation of soft power. In comparison to hard power where we can measure elements like military expenditures, effects of military sanctions, the soft power elements such as reputation or influence are hard to measure.²⁰

¹⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS Commission on Smart Power – A smarter, more secure America / Coauthors: Richard L.Armitage, J.S.Nye. CSIS (2007), 7.

¹⁸ Josef Joffe, “The Perils of Soft Power”, *New York Times Magazine*, May 14, 2006, 15.

¹⁹ Javier Noya, “The Symbolic Power of Nations”, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, Spain (2005). URL: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Print?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT35-2005 [Last access on March 6, 2013].

²⁰ Andrew Liaropoulos, “Being Hard on Soft Power”, Research Institute for European and American studies, Athens, Greece (2011). URL: <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/1519-being-hard-on-soft-power-.html> [Last access on March 6, 2013].

A review of soft power from the behavioural perspective was undertaken in the research of Kroenig, McAdam and Weber. The scholars argued that the concept of *power* itself contested and hence the practical implications of soft power concept are due to the debate. They attempted to propose three conditions to the success of soft power. First, states must be able to communicate to the intended target in something approximating a functioning marketplace of ideas - where ideas compete. Second, the attitudes of the relevant target must be subject to influence and change - the message and the messenger should be credible. Third, the attitudes of the target must have causal impact on an outcome in international politics that promotes the interests of the state attempting to wield soft power.²¹ They assert that the policymakers should “shape the battlefield” for soft power before its deployment and rather seek intermediaries in communication with the target audience than direct communication.²² Again, a good example is the War in Iraq where the coalition of the willing did not prepare the local public for invasion. The authors, however, do not explain how the battlefield should be shaped before imposing the soft power.

Peter van Ham builds upon the concept of soft power and looks at the soft power from a sociological perspective. The soft power, as the basis of social power, can be defined as the ability to set standards and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment.²³ Social power demonstrates itself in culture, institutions, law, and the media as its agents²⁴ and can be portrayed as a fluid moving between relationships and communication. Therefore we can consider public diplomacy as one of the venues for social power. Ham’s assertion is correct that “with post-modernization of global society, power moves away from territorial conquest to the annexation of imagination,” but Ham connects the social power - therefore soft power- primarily with marketing and branding strategies²⁵ of states that are only a part of public diplomacy programming. I believe that the branding concept of a state is a more complicated process since the states cannot be, and should not be,

²¹ Matthew Kroening; Melissa McAdam and Steven Weber, “Taking Soft Power Seriously”, *Comparative Strategy* 29 (2010): 414.

²² *Ibid.*, 426.

²³ Peter van Ham. *Social Power in International Politics*. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 8-9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 114-116.

considered as products, but rather as an organic and evolving entity that cannot be easily branded or re-branded. The concept of social power is valid for the purpose of this thesis, but I find it too broad to specifically employ it in public and cultural diplomacy.

For the purposes of this thesis, none of these arguments will be deployed because all scholars acknowledge For the purposes of this thesis, I will not employ any of these arguments because all scholars acknowledge the importance of Nye's theory and do not offer a different explanation for state's non-hard power activities as means to success in foreign policy objectives.

Soft power employing Public Diplomacy

The notion of the importance of the public opinion in international relations goes as far back as the realist theorist Hans Morgenthau. In 1954 he argued, "*It is not enough, however, for a government to marshal national public opinion behind its foreign policies. It must also gain the support of the public opinion of other nations for its foreign and domestic policies*".²⁶ This discipline is tailored primarily to gain the support of the foreign and domestic public, which is public diplomacy. Public diplomacy should not be mistaken for propaganda. The difference between the two terms is that propaganda is a one-way information flow, be it true or false, telling people what to think; whereas, public diplomacy is a two-way process of mutual influence. Public diplomacy makers expect feedback from their target group and active engagement - be it in education, NGO activity or cultural exchange. States can serve as a facilitator of engagement between publics and coordinate its own policies to the map of foreign public opinion.²⁷

Edward Murrow, the director of the U.S. Information agency, firstly used the term public diplomacy. In 1963, Murrow stated, "*Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy in that it involves interaction not only with governments but primarily with nongovernmental individuals and organisations. Furthermore public diplomacy activities often present many differing views represented by private American*

²⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among nations*, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 164.

²⁷ Nicholas Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Seven lessons for its future from its past", *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 6 (2010): 12.

individuals and organizations in addition to official government views".²⁸ However, today the nations struggle for public support in a different environment - in the Internet era - where information is spread in the moment it is produced. It is no longer a one-way communication process but a dialogue with the public.²⁹ The governments today must listen to the public opinion; otherwise, their policies will face discrediting campaigns. It does not mean that states would not pursue traditional diplomacy processes with fixed players and rules and clearly delineated responsibilities for only a limited numbers of actors³⁰, but rather employ public diplomacy as another channel to communicate their foreign policy objectives. In 1990, Hans Tuch argued that, although conventional diplomatic activity and public diplomacy were mostly pursued on parallel tracks, it became increasingly hard to see how the former could be effective without giving sufficient attention to the latter. Tuch makes public diplomacy an "imperative of a nation's international life".³¹

As drawn on the premise of Nye and Tuch's conclusions, the soft power intrinsically employs public diplomacy as its tool. The definition of public diplomacy is still a subject of academic debate since there is no consensus on its analytical boundaries.³² Tuch considers public diplomacy as a primarily government approach towards the public.³³ Mark Leonard provides a broader definition such as that "*public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and people; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause*".³⁴ Leonard explains the environment

²⁸ Mark Leonard; Catherine, M; Stead; Conrad, C; Smewing, C. *Public Diplomacy*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre 2002), 1.

²⁹ Some authors argue that the government should move from monologue to dialogue to collaboration. According to Cowan and Arsenault, collaboration is initiative that features cross-national participation in a joint venture or project with a clearly defined goal. The premise is that once people build or achieve something together, they are bound forever by their common experience. Collaboration as an objective of public diplomacy heavily relies on the social capital theory. See Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March (2008): 10-30.

³⁰ Peter van Ham, *Social Power in International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2010): 114.

³¹ Hans Tuch, *Communicating With the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 1-39.

³² Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, March (2008): 271.

³³ Tuch, *Communicating With the World*, 3.

³⁴ Leonard et als. *Public Diplomacy*: 8.

where public diplomacy is engaged. The first dimension is communication on day-to-day issues - basically aligning diplomacy with the news cycle. The second dimension is strategic communication - ensuring the coherency and totality of the message the government wants to make. The third dimension is to develop lasting relationships with key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences and access to media channels.³⁵ The third dimension has a common ground to cultural diplomacy, as we will see in further chapters.

For the purpose of this thesis, I will use a definition set forward by Paul Sharp, who understands public diplomacy as *'the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interest and extend the values of those being represented'*. The main difference to public diplomacy is not solely governments but a bottom-up approach to be pursued.³⁶ Good examples are the adoption of the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Ban of Landmines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court a year later in 1998. In both cases, the governing bodies along with NGOs and the United Nations joined forces for the cause.³⁷ I argue that it is the government that should support the public's engagement in domestic but also international affairs. Jan Melissen states it more clearly when emphasizing the difference between public diplomacy and 'new' public diplomacy³⁸ where the main distinction is that it *engages* its audience and does not only provide information without monitoring the feedback.

Melissen's and Sharp's approach is further supported by Brian Hocking who accents the environment where public diplomacy is performed. Hocking argues that in the current environment of non-state actors the network diplomacy model is more corresponding and flexible than the traditional state-centred hierarchical model.³⁹ The networking environment brought forward by the changing pattern of communications determines demands active role for the public. Therefore, diplomats can no longer be

³⁵ Mark Leonard. "Diplomacy by Other Means", *Foreign Policy* 132 (Sept/Oct 2002): 50.

³⁶ Paul Sharp, "Revolutionary States, Outlaw regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy," in Jan Melissen, ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 106.

³⁷ Jan Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," in: Melissen, J.(ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy- Soft Power in International relations*, 12.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Brian Hocking. "Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy", in: Melissen, J.(ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International relations*, 29.

only the transmitters of the information. but must actively engage in the network and spur the debate.

The framework of Eytan Gilboa explains the surge in the study of public diplomacy. He argues that nation's search for public diplomacy strategies were influenced by three interrelated revolutions in mass communication, politics and international relations. The communication revolution is symbolised by the Internet and global news networks such as CNN International, BBC Worldwide or Al-Jazeera. Secondly, many societies underwent the transition from autocracy to democracy. Such political change generated growing mass participation in political processes. Thirdly, the revolution in international relations transformed the goals and means of foreign policy.⁴⁰ Gilboa argues that public diplomacy is presented as an official policy translating power resources into action.⁴¹ Therefore his understanding encompasses a wide range of areas such as strategic public diplomacy with a PR model; nation branding; domestication of foreign policy and addressing both short and long-term issues.⁴² It is needed to point out that these areas are not considered all at the same level and depth. Marketing and commercial strategies may play an important role but one cannot consider a state solely as a product to be sold.

Public diplomacy and nation – branding

Examining the relationship of public diplomacy and nation-branding is relevant because both disciplines share the same goal - attracting attention. The discussion whether nation-branding should be considered as a subsection of public diplomacy or vice versa is the subject of ongoing academic debate. Simon Anholt was the first to come up with the term nation-branding in 1996. Nation-branding has been widely understood as “the strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating reputational

⁴⁰ Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science* 616 (March 2008): 56.

⁴¹ Gilboa, 61.

⁴² Ibid., 58.

capital through economic, political and social interest promotion at home and abroad.”⁴³ On the other hand, it can be interpreted as employing “branding and marketing communication techniques to promote a nation’s image”.⁴⁴

The problem with linking public diplomacy to nation-branding lies in its different set of activities. According to Szondi, nation-branding is clearly situated in the marketing discipline, while public diplomacy largely remains in the realm and at the intersection of international relations and international communication as host disciplines. Moreover, the nation-branding campaign can be pursued without considering its foreign policy impacts, while public diplomacy must consider the effects of its activities in relation to the priorities of foreign policy.

Simon Anholt as the leading figure in nation-branding (other terms such as country-branding and state-branding are used interchangeably) contradicts himself when, after a decade of advocating the use of marketing and branding strategies onto the nation’s image, he states that public diplomacy is a subset of nation branding. “I have always intended nation branding to consider how the nation *as a whole* presents and represents itself to other nations, whereas public diplomacy appears to concentrate exclusively on the presentation and representation of *government policy* to other publics.”

⁴⁵ I perceive that there is a contradiction because how can we apply marketing and branding strategies into something that embraces all aspects of representation of a nation? How can we make an overall branding strategy that would be followed by all representing bodies without considering the evolution of the national society and its issues?

Simon Anholt, later in 2006, revised his concept and argues the national image cannot be crafted due to its complexity and robustness because primarily there needs to be built-in trust and engagement from the audience. Anholt states that public diplomacy is ‘the master discipline’ of international relations for developed countries just as nation-branding is ‘the master discipline’ of economic development for emerging and less well-

⁴³ Gyorgy Szondi, “Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences”, in: Virginie Duthoit and Ellen Huijgh, “Discussion papers in Diplomacy”, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingdael’* (October 2008): 5.

⁴⁴ Ying Fan, “Branding the nation: what is being branded?,” *Journal of Vacation Marketing* 12 (2006):1.

⁴⁵ Simon Anholt, “Public diplomacy and place branding: Where’s the link?,” *Place Branding* 2 (2006):272.

known countries.⁴⁶ “Governments need to help the world understand the real, complex, rich, diverse nature of their people and landscapes, their history and heritage, their products and their resources: in other words, to prevent them from becoming mere brands.”⁴⁷

In this thesis, I omitted nation-branding in regards to cultural diplomacy because it would contradict the nature of cultural diplomacy that is primarily designed to promote quality cultural content. Nation-branding is a valuable tool to attract short-term attention to economic-related specific issues rather than foreign policies of the state.

Cultural diplomacy as vehicle for public diplomacy

Defining cultural diplomacy is determined by the definition of culture itself. Understanding the meaning of culture and how to foster and nurture it is understood differently in specific domestic cultural policies around the world. For the purpose of this thesis, I understand culture as an encompassing term 1.) for intellect and artistic expression of citizens and 2.) for manifestation of a way of life and values of the nation.

The main predisposition for a state to perform cultural diplomacy is its domestic environment that is supportive of an artistic creation and is easy to access to cultural products by its citizens. Mitchell explains it more explicitly “[...] no external cultural policy is conceivable without recourse of the products of internal cultural policy, without, that is, the artefacts, performers and institutions that make up a country’s cultural profile, and in the modern age, depend on public for their maintenance as well as for their diffusion”.⁴⁸ Simply, nurture at home in order to promote abroad. Cultural diplomacy can therefore be viewed as a reflection of a cultural production at home.

There are many definitions of cultural diplomacy. A compact definition of cultural diplomacy is “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding”.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Simon, Anholt, "Why Nation Branding Does Not Exist." *Kommunikationsmaaling.de* (January 2009). Available at: <http://kommunikationsmaaling.dk/artikel/whynation-branding-does-not-exist/> [Last access January 30th, 2013].

⁴⁸ J.M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: British Council, 1986), 84.

⁴⁹ Milton C. Cummings, Jr. *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, (Washington, D.C: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003): 1.

Prominent scholar Nicholas Cull considers cultural diplomacy as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievement known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad”.⁵⁰ Cull’s and Cummings’ definitions leave space to understand cultural diplomacy as any cultural exchange between peoples - employing cultural relations. However, this thesis is based on the premise of cultural diplomacy as an activity of the government to reach out to the government and public of a foreign state through the means of culture. A positive projection of a national image and increasing physical and intellectual presence in a foreign country are the linchpins of a government’s management of cultural diplomacy. The difference between international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy is that any subject can perform the former while the latter targets its activities according to foreign policy objectives of a government. The cultural relations tend to be a side effect of cultural diplomacy.

There are three main assumptions about why states undertake cultural diplomacy activities. First, culture is the expression of a nation’s ideals and identity. Secondly, the government believes that their culture can be a medium to achieve the desired outcome of appeal to foreign publics and approach them with their policies. Thirdly, in my opinion, that the government can make a difference in setting the cultural agenda both domestically and internationally. I argue that the government should act as a security guard to protect its cultural heritage and production and further to ensure its access to international networks.

The objectives of cultural diplomacy span from expanding state’s areas of interest to academia, searching for new cultural markets or simply promoting national interest, but the common end of all these objectives is making good for its own citizens. In today’s globalized era, excluding cultural diplomacy from state’s foreign policy portfolio would discriminate the state from the international life where the information and communication technologies (ICT) determine everyday processes. As Cynthia P. Schneider rightly argues - the absence of a coherent strategy towards international dimensions of culture, arts and media is a disadvantage to the nation in having an impact

⁵⁰ Nicholas Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories”, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 2008): 31 -54.

on the international scene.⁵¹ Further, the creative process uses freethinking, exploring, altering – simply challenging the status quo. Schneider sees the creative process as a determinant of pluralism and tolerance and therefore it could serve as model for promoting democratic practices and attitudes.⁵²

The main link between public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy lies in their common target – engaging the public. Cultural diplomacy is the core to public diplomacy because it articulates the identity of a nation. Cultural institutions such as museums, libraries, and theatres have often acted as venues for defining national identity. Cultural diplomacy therefore provides a unique input to public diplomacy; hence, foreign policy that no other sector can offer and public diplomacy.

I perceive cultural diplomacy as a *capital* that is to be nurtured in long-term to serve as a *resource* for foreign policy when needed. Cultural diplomacy therefore is not primarily obsessed with the acceptance of policies and concrete policy outcomes as public diplomacy.⁵³ It stems from the nature of culture as a meeting point for exposition and explanation, for dialogue and debate.⁵⁴ Further, Robin Higham points out that the arts generate *low-risk conversations* and it is an important builder of social capital. Cultural experiences, such as dance, concert, theatre or exhibition, provide space for safe communication in the times when the political counterpart may oppose our views.⁵⁵

Also, if one considers public diplomacy activities, such as media communication, conferences with policymakers, adjusting programming of embassies to current issues, as operations on immediate or the mid-term scale, cultural diplomacy aims to build long and durable relationships primarily based on emotional participation of the recipient - be it a theatre performance abroad, support of the translation of books forbidden in an authoritarian regime or educational exchange.

The academic debate on including cultural diplomacy or management of international cultural relations within the public diplomacy framework continues to be

⁵¹ Cynthia P. Schneider and Kristina Nelson, *Mightier Than the Sword: Arts and Culture in the U.S.-Muslim Relationship* (Brookings Saban Center, 2008),16.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Cynthia Schneider, “The Unrealized Potential of Cultural Diplomacy: “Best Practices” and What Could Be, If Only ... “, *The Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* 30 (2009): 261.

⁵⁴ John Holden et al., *Cultural Diplomacy*, (London: Demos, 2007), 27-28.

⁵⁵ Robin Higham, “Arts and Culture as Profit Centre?: A Martial Arts Lesson for Canada’s Cultural Policy Warriors”, *Canadian Journal of Communication* 27 (2), 2002: 363-67.

blurred. The overlap is strong and diplomats or state agents and cultural practitioners do cooperate on all levels when exporting culture abroad. The so-called “cross-pollination”, as called by Martin Rose and Nick Wadham-Smith, generates concerns when it comes to trust. Rose and Wadham assert, “What this cross-pollination means in practical terms is simply that if our cultural relations work is seen as indistinguishable in motivation from our public diplomacy work, it will not – and we will not – be trusted, because we risk being seen as a ‘front’ for political interests. This damages not only our ability to execute cultural relations; but also our ability perform public diplomacy.”⁵⁶ However, such overlap should not be seen as a crucial problem, because the domestic cultural environment would reflect any possible discrediting of cultural actors, if the environment respects free and democratic expression.

Building capital in foreign policy

The graph (Fig.2) below shows how social, political and economic capital is built in foreign policy. The circle illustrates the scope of foreign policy that is formed by four sectors that are mutually interdependent of each other and cannot exist independently. Coherent foreign policy cannot be executed without employing all of the actors at various stages of pursuing foreign policy. The actors (green circle) that follow foreign policy objectives of a state are: traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, direct action and trade. These actors use channels (orange circle) through which the foreign policy interests are executed. The channels employ tools (red circle) to influence the targets of foreign policy objectives (outer white circle). The circle demonstrates that by employing each of the actors, the government is building a capital that needs constant nurturing and care in all of its fields, otherwise fulfilling foreign policy may become unsuccessful. The capital is built by public diplomacy in a long-term span because public diplomacy builds a solid network of various social, academic, media and cultural linkages. The linkages build a *capital* that is yielded up as a *resource* for government’s actors and foreign policy executives in times of crisis. As Schneider asserts, the creative arts and media have an

⁵⁶ Rose, M. Wadham-Smith, N. *Mutuality, Trust and Cultural Relations* (London: The British Council), 34-35.

unlimited potential to penetrate political barriers and build connections, even under adverse circumstances.⁵⁷

In regards to the soft power concept, public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy sectors are considered soft power elements of the foreign policy portfolio, while trade and direct action (military) are hard power elements. The circle graph highlights the importance of the presence of all of these actors in a government's foreign policy handbook, although the size of the sectors does not reflect its proportionate share in the foreign policy portfolio of the government.

As seen from the graph, cultural diplomacy tools include cultural relations, individual exchanges, academic relations, and international broadcasting and leadership programs. Cultural relations, in regards to the government, embrace activities such as the running of cultural centers, supporting of the international activities of national institutions (e.g. performing arts tours, visual arts exhibitions) while also securing membership in prominent international organizations and fairs (UNESCO, Bureau of International Expositions, La Francophonie, Olympic Games etc.). Academic relations, including scholarships and awards, are important tools of cultural diplomacy because it helps to nurture academia and therefore expertise interest in the country. Members of academia often serve as advisors to political and business leaders; therefore, we can consider a long-term support of academic relations programs as vital to the national interest to the country. International broadcasting is still an effective tool of cultural diplomacy, mainly in developing countries. Voice of America, BBC World Service, and Radio France International all provide a good communication platform for cultural diplomacy and the promotion of the language, culture and values of a nation. Leadership programs are programs specifically tailored to a certain group of influence makers from politics, media, NGOs or businesses. Leadership programs include tours, conferences, and seminars organized or supported in home countries or embassies abroad. Cultural diplomacy therefore represents a very useful and important tool for governments seeking to build a stable network of peers and public support.

It is important to also realize the backward effect of the foreign policy. Robin Higham suggests that one of the uniting characteristics for citizens can be the successful

⁵⁷ Schneider, 262.

management of foreign policy abroad.⁵⁸ It can function as one of the cohesive tools for diverse society - such as that found in Canada - and create trust among citizens and towards the government. Therefore, foreign policy should be considered as a contributor to the building of social capital.

Summary


This chapter demonstrated the complexity of the study of public and cultural diplomacy and positioned both in the concept of soft power through the survey of current academic debates on the topics. Moreover, the main obstacle public diplomacy scholars face is its quantitative measurement and its immediate impact. As shown, the public and even more cultural diplomacy should be considered as long-term interests of the country in order to build solid *capital* and establish networks to project other further policy objectives of the government.

⁵⁸ Robin Higham, interview with the author, Ottawa, May 1, 2013.

Fig.2 Building Capital in Foreign Policy (FP)

Key:

- Central blue circle – objective of FP
- Green circle – actors of FP
- Orange circle – channels of FP
- Red circle – tools of FP
- Outer white circle – targets of F



Chapter 2: Historical Context of Canadian International Cultural Relations

This chapter elaborates on the challenges the Canadian cultural relations had to face during the post-war period to gain its place within the structures of the Department of External Affairs - later the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The chapter also looks at the protection of the Canadian culture on the international stage as it is tightly linked to the vitality of the home cultural production.

Defining Canadian values and culture

Formation of a distinct Canadian identity is part of the historic political debate until the present. Canada voluntarily determined its future by referendums on unity in 1980 and in 1995. The country pursued the counter-revolutionary path of its history and chose to follow the British Crown. Lipset argues that the unification of the provinces by the British North America Act in 1867 was not an act in defiance of the British Crown. Rather, it reflected the fact that Britain sought for decades to give up much of its responsibility for the territories and wanted their people to take political responsibility for the British Empire. There was also a second factor; the Tory leadership feared that non-united Canada would be more vulnerable for takeover by the U.S.⁵⁹

It took a century for Canada to introduce its own flag in 1965, to codify its anthem “O Canada” in 1980, and to repatriate the Constitution. Such a long deliberation about self-determination and identity of a nation permeates also into the image projected abroad. Canadians sometimes seem as though they don’t want to be seen but rather work hardly in the background. However, such a cautious approach to nation building has paid off because Canada had time to form coherent policies and strategies to accommodate present developments, and serves as a model for other nations for the 21st Century. Although small in population, Canada is inhabited by two major linguistic societies, aboriginal peoples and diverse immigrant communities. Every fifth Canadian is foreign-born and over 20% of the population has a different native language other than English or

⁵⁹ Martin S.Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 43.

French.⁶⁰ Multicultural policies ensure that newcomers are guaranteed the rights of Canadians. The new Canadian citizens are integrated into the broader society while retaining as much of their ascriptive identities as they choose.⁶¹ Therefore, Canada is proud to be a *cultural mosaic*. Mulcahy further argues that Canada can be ideally positioned to mediate a global cultural perspective that is an alternative to the hegemony of American entertainment.

In 2009, a former primer minister, Joe Clark, wrote in his article: “*Canada has always been an act of will. We didn't come together naturally. We haven't stayed together easily. Confederation was an act of will. So were medicare, equalization, the Charter of Rights, and free trade. One reality of our country is that we have to keep proving our worth to our parts,*” and lists foreign policy as the kind of issue that “*reach[es] across the lines and attitudes that might otherwise set Canadians apart, and to characteristics that distinguish us, legitimately, from comparable societies*”.⁶² The strengths of Canada reside in its diversity management, bridging of differences, democratic reputation, multilateral instinct and ability to work with non-state actors. All these strengths Canada gained throughout its development into a society where many people desire to live and belong.

Canada and culture

Culture has a broad meaning and can be found in multiple aspects of community and private lives. The term itself has been used in many collocations, such as corporate culture, pop culture, street culture, tea culture, online culture, political culture and many more. As there are many collocations for culture, there are as many ways for the government to respond to the developments brought forward by cultural globalization bearing cultural exchange causing cultural diversity. Statistics Canada (Stat Can) developed a definition of culture that is used for statistical purposes; it states, “Culture is

⁶⁰ Statistics Canada. Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census – Immigration: Driver of population growth. URL: <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/p2-eng.cfm> [Last access on Nov 16, 2012].

⁶¹ Kevin Mulcahy, “Identity, Independence and Imperialism.” In. Gattinger, M., Hale, G. *Borders and Bridges – Canada's Policy Relations in North America* (Oxford University Press: 2010), 262.

⁶² Joe Clark, “Play to Canada's Strengths; If we measure our influence by military might or economic influence, it will continue to decline - Canada should focus on its talent for diplomacy”, *The Ottawa Citizen*, June 24, 2009.

creative artistic activity and the goods and services produced by it, and the preservation of heritage”.⁶³ Furthermore, the Stat Can report concludes that the term culture is ‘synthetic’ as no single industry category embodies all cultural activities. From this point of view, we can assume that even for an authority such as Stats Can, that generates primary economic sources for the government’s policies, it is difficult to categorize culture in one particular manner. For the purposes of the cultural diplomacy, culture is a major determinant of how people perceive each other and negotiate their differences.⁶⁴ In an increasingly interconnected world, we should no longer think of culture as *subordinate* to politics. Instead, we should think of culture as *providing the operating context for* politics.⁶⁵

Challenges to Canadian culture

Proximity to a big neighbour

The geographical position of Canada next to the biggest economy in the world is the main determinant for Canadian cultural expression but also for transmission of its values abroad due to the same language. The Canadian population of 33 million is ten times smaller than that of the U.S. Over 90% percent of the Canadian population lives within 100 miles of the American border, making the American cultural influence omnipresent. Moreover, Canada has French and English - the two world languages- as its official languages. Canadian Anglophone culture has to compete and find its unique place in the Anglophone markets, as Francophone culture faces regulations from the European markets while benefiting from the French government nurturing their language worldwide through the network of the Alliance Francaise. Canadian cultural producers such as film makers, book publishers or music producers therefore constantly demand advocacy from the government to defend their interests.

⁶³ Canadian Framework for Cultural Statistics (2011). Defining culture. URL: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/87-542-x/2011001/section/s3-eng.htm>. [Last access on November 16, 2012].

⁶⁴ Holden et al., *Cultural Diplomacy*, 19.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 20.

The asymmetrical relationship between the U.S. and Canada stems from different cultural developments. One of the divisive features is the different historical development of both countries. The American revolutionary tradition is in a direct contradiction with Canadian loyalism towards the British Crown. From this, we can derive different values that each of the nations possesses. The relationship between an individual and institutions is crucial. Canadians tend to lean more towards the state policies and seek protection, while Americans are relatively individualistic and tend to have a fundamental mistrust of the government. Americans are more likely to resolve problems by dispute or coercion; whereas, Canadians are more likely to rely on diplomacy. The results of the differing behaviour can be demonstrated by the fact that the crime rates in Canada are significantly lower than that of the U.S. Such differences can be observed in film productions - American sitcoms, crime movies or dramatic performance.

The conflict between the U.S. and Canada over the nature of the cultural sector and its trade stems from differing perceptions of cultural expression. To put it simply, Canadians have argued that radio and television broadcasting is a means of communications whereby Canadians can communicate with other Canadians and a unique Canadian culture can be articulated to find expression, while the Americans argued that there should be no special treatment for cultural industries. One might describe the U.S. position through a quote by a former Federal Communications Commissioner who stated: "Television is just a toaster with a picture".⁶⁶

Scattered market

The second challenge to Canadian culture is the size of the country. In words of a former DFAIT official: "Canada is not a country, but a continent". Cultural policies differ across the country and its provinces as its administration rests within the provincial authority. To manage international cultural relations and find a united voice is much more difficult due to vast distances between cultural hubs such as Montreal, Banff or Vancouver. The artists rather travel southwards to pursue their carriers in the United

⁶⁶ Andre Lapierre, "The Political Economy of Canada's Culture Policy: the 1990's" In: Andre Lapierre et als., *Language, Culture and Values in Canada at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Carleton University Press and the International Council for Canadian Studies, 1996).

States, often leaving their Canadian origins behind. Film directors such as Jason Reitman or David Cameron, actors such as Mathew Perry, Victor Gaber, Michael J. Fox or Jim Carrey, singer Alanis Morissette or visual artists David Altmejd, are examples of thousands of creative people moving to the United States where there is a bigger market and more opportunities for their self-realization.

Culture on the agenda

Post-war status of international cultural relations

During WWII, Canada distributed its government information through the body of Wartime Information Board that was terminated in September 1945 by the P.C. 6300 Order in Council. However, the Order created a new institutional tool called Canadian Information Service (C.I.S.). The difference was that the W.I.B. mission was to distribute information, while C.I.S. was established to provide information to foreigners. The content was to stipulate: “The Service shall provide means and facilities for distributing abroad information concerning Canada and for coordinating and assisting the public information services of the government.”⁶⁷

The Minister of Finance, the Honourable J. L. Isley, made a statement in the House on October 2, 1945, to explain the purpose of the service: “The need for such a service has been generally recognized. Canada has a vital interest in international peace and prosperity, and an important part to play in the attainment of these objectives. It is essential, therefore, that our people and country be known and understood abroad. Those with whom we trade must know our country and its possibilities; those with whom we are associated for the maintenance of world security must know with whom they are cooperating and what may be expected of our cooperation.”

In short, both trade and diplomacy, to be carried out successfully, need a background of understanding based on factual information objectively presented.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ L.A.D Stephens, *Study of Canadian Government Information Abroad 1942-1972* (Declassified report of DFAIT: Ottawa, 1977), Chapter 2, 3.

⁶⁸ Stephens, Ch 3.

Stephens notes that such a statement was unique because it was comprehensive and in the subsequent two decades no Canadian governments tried to explain why the Canadian taxpayer is expected to provide funds for programs of public information abroad.⁶⁹

The mission of the Canadian Information Service was to bring information to foreigners, concretely peacetime information. However, as Stephens asserts, there was no clear explanation why it was in Canada's interest.⁷⁰ As described, the Canadian Information Service was to maintain relations with press agencies in the given country; to explain and interpret Canadian developments; maintain a reference library; distribute authorized materials; making arrangements for Canadian speakers or foreign visitors to Canada and analyse foreign public opinions in the given country.⁷¹

The Information Division

Concurrently with the CIS, the DEA possessed its own Information Division that was created in 1944. The difference was that the CIS was an interdepartmental institution while the ID served solely the Department of External Affairs. Stephens, as a direct participant in the negotiations at the time, provides an important observation on the dynamics among the new CIS colleagues and the old Information Division: “[...] a good deal of classified material had been handled and distributed by the old Information Division and it was felt that the CIS people did not have the requisite acquaintance with security procedures, nor the right way of looking at reserved information, nor did they have any gift of discretion.”⁷² The purpose of both bodies started to blur and therefore the CIS was incorporated into the Department of External Affairs into Information Division in February 1947.⁷³ The establishment of Information Division basically meant that the Government recognized for the first time that the responsibility of managing public diplomacy rests upon the Department of External Affairs.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁷¹ Ibid., 47-48.

⁷² Ibid., 41.

⁷³ P.C. 472 of February 5, 1947, allowed the authority to the Department of External Affairs to carry out program of Information abroad, *in* Stephens, Ch.2, 40-45.

The Massey-Lévesque Report

After WWII, the world became polarized in the Cold War, requiring nations to pick a side - the West or the East - capitalism versus communism, freedom versus totalitarianism. It was a battle for civilization.⁷⁴ Canada, as part of the Western world, had one more challenge ahead – forming a post-colonial and post-Dominion⁷⁵ unique identity. The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, known as the Massey- Lévesque report, was the first study brought forward to address the issue of nurturing and fostering Canadian culture.

The span of a two-year study (1949-1951) is the basis for the federal arts funding in Canada and has shaped the core of Canadian cultural policies until today. The Massey Report advocated the same arguments as did many other countries after WWII - the need for the democratization of culture. The democratization of culture involves broadening access to the products of one culture. In Canada, as in most modern Western liberal democracies, this has been interpreted and operationalized [through dominant policy frameworks and funding priorities] as the promotion and diffusion of European, mostly high culture forms of expression.⁷⁶ As Druick notes, the report negotiates the shift in the concept of culture from Arnoldian⁷⁷- the best of what had been thought and written - to anthropological; from prescriptive to descriptive; from the elite to the everyday.⁷⁸

During the 1950s, the Information Division lacked enough financial and human resources to undertake persuasive communication.⁷⁹ The Massey-Lévesque Report, in its chapter “The Projection of Canada Abroad” talks about “The division between

⁷⁴ Zoe Druick. “International Cultural Relations as Factors in Postwar Canadian Cultural Policy: The Relevance of UNESCO for the Massey Commission”, *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 31 (2006), 178.

⁷⁵ Kevin Mulcahy, *Globalization and Culture of Canada and the United States*, 160.

⁷⁶ Baeker, G. Back to the Future: The Colloquium in Context: The Democratization of Culture and Cultural Diplomacy. In: Andrew, C. et al. *Accounting for Culture: thinking through cultural citizenship* (University of Ottawa Press: 2005), 279 - 286.

⁷⁷ Mathew Arnold was a Victorian poet and essayist. In his famous work *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) he established a cultural agenda that remained dominant from 1860s to the 1950s. At the center of the Arnoldian perspective is his celebrated definition of culture as ‘the best that has been thought and said in the world’. In: Storey, John. *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A reader*. Pearson Education Limited: (2006), 3

⁷⁸ Druick, 182.

⁷⁹ Stephens, 13.

information and cultural exchanges between states is indeed often blurred”.⁸⁰ Moreover, the Report urged the DEA to expand its Information Service abroad and recommended an increase in press and information officers employed. However, the recommendations of the Report were not heard during the end of 1950s.⁸¹ As departmental historian Mary Halloran asserts, “*the work remained improvisational in nature, the resources allocated comparatively scarce, and an overall strategy non-existent*”.⁸² Canada was lacking a solid central cultural bureaucracy upon which the DEA could rely in order to carry out programs abroad. According to Stephens, such a deficiency frustrated efforts in the fields of educational enquiries, allocation of scholarships, exchange of professors and students, assistance to Canadian artists, exhibitions, etc.⁸³ The Report urged for increased study exchange programs that were described to be “*in elementary and indeed in almost a non-existent stage*”.⁸⁴ Along with all the provisions produced by the Report, such as the Canada Council for the Arts or the National Library and their expanding activities, there was a growing need to institutionalize international cultural affairs separately and to become independent of the Information Division.

The Massey-Lévesque Report was written in the times of Canada’s rising nationalism. The post-war period was symbolized by re-shifting ties from Great Britain towards the American continent. The continentalization of Canada also meant opening towards the U.S. The Report, due to the threat of domination by American culture, consequently, recommended to foster a unique Canadian cultural production through the creation of new federally funded grant institutions - such as the Canada Council for the Arts (1957), the National Library (1953) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (1977). These organizations function at arm’s length principle in cooperation with federal agencies such as Department of Culture (DCH). The Canada Council Act of 1957, Section 8 (1), integrated cultural diplomacy into the mission of the Canada Council of the Arts by assenting its authority to:

⁸⁰ Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey-Lévesque Report) (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1951), 253.

⁸¹ Stephens, 21.

⁸² Mary Halloran, “Cultural Diplomacy in the Trudeau Era, 1968-1984” (DFAIT: Ottawa, 1996), 2.

⁸³ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁴ Massey- Lévesque Report, 261.

e) *exchange with other countries or organizations or persons therein knowledge and information respecting the arts, humanities and social sciences;*

f) *arrange for representation and interpretation of Canadian arts, humanities and social sciences in other countries*⁸⁵

The Massey Report devotes a lot of space to UNESCO and the need for Canadian arts and culture to be widely recognized. The whole report is built upon the idea that “the promotion abroad of a knowledge of Canada is not a luxury but an obligation,” and further, “*We mention UNESCO here in order to include it as one important aspect of the whole problem of securing proper exchanges of information with other countries and adequate sympathy and understanding between Canada and all her neighbours near and far*”.⁸⁶ According to Druick, it is important to realize in what ambience the Massey Commission produced its report - it was the beginning of the Cold War and the time of the formation of UNESCO as a cultural wing of the UN, in which Canada played an important role. Therefore, the report stated, “*We [. . .] recommend, [...] that a body be created [. . .] to stimulate and help voluntary organizations within these fields, to foster Canada’s cultural relations abroad, to perform the functions of a national commission for UNESCO, and to devise and administer a system of scholarships*”.⁸⁷ Thus, it was natural for domestic cultural policy to align itself with the UNESCO objectives.⁸⁸

The Pearson Era - Establishment of Cultural Affairs Division

Under the Lester Pearson’s tenure, 1963-1968, the cultural affairs received more attention than before and bureaucracy started to transform. Until the mid-1960s the cultural affairs activities were under the Information Division, but in 1966 the DEA created the Cultural Affairs Division that was separate from the Department’s

⁸⁵ Canada Council Act: An Act for the Establishment of a Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, 5-6 Elizabeth II. s(1957).

⁸⁶ Massey- Lévesque Report, 255-260.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 377.

⁸⁸ Druick, Z., “International Cultural Relations as Factors in Postwar Canadian Cultural Policy: The Relevance of UNESCO for the Massey Commission”, *Canadian Journal of Communication* 31 (2006): 177-195.

information stream.⁸⁹ Stephens argues that there were several reasons why there was a sudden change in DEA's approach: 1.) Requirements to service the growing needs of UNESCO programs 2.) Pressures from other countries for cultural exchange 3.) The existence of the Canada Council for the Arts became a stimulus for international cultural programs 4.) With the advent of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and its growing interest in its own international relations, the federal government was urged to care not only about foreign relations but also international cultural affairs.⁹⁰ The question for further research is whether the federal allocations, and overall higher attention to cultural affairs, would take place without the challenge of Quebec and its Quiet Revolution. Halloran argues that the federal focus on cultural relations was a reaction to activities of the Quebecois government.⁹¹

The established Cultural Affairs division's activities were divided into four sections: Programs and Planning, Artistic Exchanges, Academic and Youth Exchanges, and UNESCO. The Pearson government accelerated cultural cooperation agreements with France, Switzerland and Belgium in 1963, culminating by signing the Accord Cadre in 1965. As documented by Halloran, the budget for Canadian cultural exchanges with francophone countries was increased from 250,000 dollars to 1 million dollars.⁹² This was the first time that the DEA began treating cultural activities as distinctly separate from information activities.⁹³

The Trudeau Times

During the post-war administrations of prime ministers Louis St. Laurent, John Diefenbaker and Lester Person, Canada fully developed into a middle power promoting internationalism and peacekeeping. Canada has acquired an image of the 'helpful fixer'.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Potter, *Branding Canada*, 86.

⁹⁰ Stephens, 2.

⁹¹ Halloran, 2.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁹⁴ Mary Halloran; John, Hiliker and Greg Donaughey, "The White Paper Impulse: Reviewing Foreign Policy under Trudeau and Clark" (Conference Paper, Canadian Political Science Association Historical Section, DFAIT Canada., 2005), 1-3.

As the 1960s were marked by societal changes worldwide and with the upcoming policy of détente, the foreign policy received a review.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau announced in his statement “Canada and the World,” given during the federal election campaign of 1968, that his government would undertake a foreign policy review. After the landslide victory, the government issued a Foreign Policy for Canadians in 1970. The White Paper clearly justifies the need for the foreign policy review:

“By the mid-sixties, Canada had its own set of difficulties. An over-heated economy, regional differences and disparities, the reverberations of the quiet revolution in Quebec, all added to the stress and strain on Canada's national fibre. They affected the way Canadians saw themselves and the world around them.”⁹⁵

The recognition of changing the world order and Canada’s role in international organizations was shown by listing examples of where Canada needed a “fresh” look at its foreign policies.

“Canada's "traditional" middle-power role in the world seemed doomed to disappear after the United Nations ordeal in the Congo, in the face of peacekeeping frustrations in Vietnam, following the collapse of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1967. Western Europe had not only fully recovered from the war but was taking steps toward integration that put strain on transatlantic ties and, combined with changes in the Communist world, called into question the need for continuing Canadian participation in NATO. The renaissance of French Canada, with its direct consequences for relations with French-speaking countries, raised further questions about the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy.”⁹⁶

The introduction of a new foreign policy approach also meant the reorganization of the Department of External Affairs. The structural innovation came into operation in 1971 and created the Bureau structure. Each Bureau was under the Director General who was directly responsible to the Under-Secretary for all departmental operations within the

⁹⁵ *Foreign Policy Review of 1970 – Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 1970), 7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

framework of the established policy. The Assistant Under-Secretaries were no longer to have operational responsibilities but were assigned to policy considerations and recommendations. The Bureau of Public Affairs came into existence and included the Information Division, Cultural Affairs Division, Academic Relations Division and Historical Division.⁹⁷

The overarching theme of the Foreign Policy for Canadians was the premise that “external activities should be directly related to national policies”.⁹⁸ Trudeau believed that successful performance on the international scene would have a positive impact on the national unity and domestic policies at home. Therefore, the review recognized cultural activities as one of the six themes on which to focus. The “French fact” was welcomed as an advantageous element for foreign policy activities. The White Paper admitted that Canada underwent “*a long period of difficult readjustment [...] a period in which Canada is coming to terms with its essential bilingual character*”.⁹⁹ The purpose of advocating the cultural aspect of foreign policy was evident: “*Cultural, along with technological and scientific exchanges were designed to yield a rewarding life for Canadians and to reflect clearly Canada's bilingual and multicultural character.*”¹⁰⁰ Moreover, it is important to underline that the Trudeau government was aware of the growing American influence on Canadian culture; so, all initiatives during that era were directed towards lessening Canadian reliance on American trade. Halloran asserts that “*involving regulation and financial subsidy of cultural industries within Canada, the options paper also recommended the international projection of Canadian culture, both as a means to ‘reaffirm its distinctive linguistic and cultural complexion’ and to expose Canadians to the advantages of a “wider market” and the “currents of cross-fertilization.*”¹⁰¹

The Cultural Affairs Division therefore expanded the cultural agreements portfolio with Switzerland, Italy, West Germany and the Netherlands. The opening of the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris in May 1970 was the first tool in presenting Canada as

⁹⁷ Stephens, 33.

⁹⁸ Halloran; Hiliker; Donough, *The White Paper Impulse*, 7.

⁹⁹ *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, 14.

¹⁰⁰ Halloran, 4.

¹⁰¹ Halloran, 6.

a multicultural and open country, but also served as a showcase of Canadian arts and culture until today. The Cultural Affairs Division moved in accordance with Trudeau's foreign policy priorities. As a consequence of détente, Trudeau paid a visit to the USSR, followed by a trip to China in 1973. Both trips resulted in signing cultural and academic exchange agreements that were prepared by the Cultural Agreements division.¹⁰²

Cultural diplomacy boomed during the Trudeau Era and cultural affairs received thorough attention in the annual foreign policy reviews during the 1970s. The reports continuously stated "*international cultural exchanges benefit Canadian artists and academics and provide new opportunities to make Canadian cultural achievements better known abroad*".¹⁰³ The Arts Promotion Program (APP) was launched in 1974 and was the flagship of the Department's support to individual artists and companies performing abroad.

The attention to cultural affairs was reflected in announcing a five-year plan at the inauguration of the Chair of the Canadian Studies program at the University of Edinburgh. The plan proposed an increase of the cultural relations budget from 2 million CAD to 12 million CAD for the span of 1975-1980. The only condition was an annual review by the Treasury Board.¹⁰⁴ Extended financial resources were allowed to invest in Canadian Studies programs at foreign universities. The government celebrated the inauguration as the new beginning in cultural relations. The Canadian Studies program in Edinburgh was funded by British authorities, which had secured two-thirds of the necessary endowment - a sum of 180,00 GBP - from Canadian and British corporate sponsors.¹⁰⁵

An important contribution to academic programming at the DEA was put forward by the Canadian Embassy in Washington, which pioneered the Faculty Enrichment Program¹⁰⁶. The program funded American professors for up to six months to develop competency in a field of Canadian studies, including lectureships at Canadian universities. In return, the American university would offer courses with substantial

¹⁰² Ibid., 8.

¹⁰³ Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy Reviews, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 73.

¹⁰⁴ Halloran, 11.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ More on academic programs in Chapter 3.

Canadian content for three subsequent years.¹⁰⁷ The program continued to expand and within two years of its inception, the embassy in Washington had come to view it as the principal tool in the promotion of Canadian studies in the United States and "*the single most important, and productive, means of achieving [Canadian] objectives.*"¹⁰⁸

The program served as an example of launching Canadian studies abroad, for example in Japan. Prime Minister Trudeau, with his Japanese counterpart Tanaka, signed a communiqué reserving 1 million CAD for the development of East-Asian studies in Canada and Canadian studies in Japan.¹⁰⁹ The International Council for Canadian Studies, established in 1981, later managed the Faculty Enrichment Program at arm's length.

International Cultural Relations Bureau

In 1978, the former Bureau of Public Affairs was divided into two Bureaus, the International Cultural Relations and an Information office in order to achieve a more effective development of programs in these two fields.¹¹⁰ The reality of the changing structure of the Department may seem to be chaotic, but the responsibilities did not differ from the Cultural Affairs Division. It was rather a reflection of the international element and desire of the Government. The head of the International Cultural Relations Bureau was Gilles Lefebvre, a respected public arts manager of Jeunesses musicales du Canada (Youth and Music Canada) and associate artistic director of EXPO 67 in Montreal. Later, Lefebvre became the director of the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris. Assigning the Department to an outsider for federal bureaucracy reflected complaints amongst arts groups that the Department in charge of promoting their interests abroad lacked expertise in the area. Also, the ambitious cultural relations program of a planned allocation of 12 million CAD in 1975 was not fully realized due to the fiscal restraint. In 1979-80, the government assigned only 5,35 million CAD to the program. Even with the insufficient resources, the Department still managed to open new cultural counsellor posts in New York, Brussels and London.

¹⁰⁷ Halloran, 14.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy Review*, 1975, 72.

¹¹⁰ Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy Review*, 1978s, 107.

The program of the International Cultural Relations Bureau continued to expand into new areas such as the field of international sports.¹¹¹ Sport exchanges with the Eastern bloc countries such as Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba and China were arranged during 1977-80. The human rights rhetoric had practical effects when Canada assumed a two-year term on UN Security Council seat in January 1977. Canadian diplomacy faced international pressure for stronger action against apartheid in South Africa. Canada wanted to avoid another¹¹² boycott of a mega-sport event in the 1978 Commonwealth Games to be held in Edmonton, as had happened in 1976 at the Montreal Summer Olympics. The decision not to invite South Africa to participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games gave Canada's South African policies a higher international profile.¹¹³ Later, Canada decided to boycott the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics as an expression of disapproval of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

1980s

While the 1970s was an era of Canadian cultural activity and search for a coherent and effective framework, the 1980s were marked by a redirection from Western Europe towards activities in new overseas markets in Asia and Latin America.¹¹⁴

In August 1980, the Liberal Government issued a review of the cultural policies and appointed the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee. The Committee produced the so-called Applebaum-Hébert report, which was the largest cultural policy review since the publication of the Massey-Lévesque Report in 1951. The Applebaum-Hébert report recommendations were not fully realized because of financial constraints, but also due to unpopular recommendations - such as that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation should relinquish all production activities and begin to acquire programming from independent film production companies. In relation to cultural diplomacy and the promotion of Canadian culture abroad, it further criticized the absence of "formal career

¹¹¹ Halloran, 18.

¹¹² African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympics as an expression of refusal of South African apartheid regime.

¹¹³ Macintosh,D.; Greenborn, D.; Black,D, "Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games", *Journal of Sport History* 19 (1), (1992): 31.

¹¹⁴ Halloran, 18.

stream for cultural affairs officers” and lack of “expertise”,¹¹⁵ as already emphasized by the Massey report thirty years earlier. Further, the report clearly posits the federal government in a stewardship for Canadian artists:

*“Cultural relations with other countries must do more than merely support Canada’s foreign policy objectives. Our cultural attainments as well as our trade and economic capacity should be recognized by as much of the world as possible. To achieve this, Canadian creative artists must be given the opportunity to demonstrate that they can attract and sustain the approval of audiences anywhere.”*¹¹⁶

The report thus proposed a creation of a new autonomous agency, the Canadian Institute for International Cultural Relations that would embrace all the cultural activities abroad and would serve as the main mediator between diplomacy and programming. The agency would be administered outside External Affairs but should remain under the ministerial direction of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.¹¹⁷ The report however did not state how it would interact with current Heads of Mission and the whole proposal failed. Due to these reasons and further budget cuts, the DEA refused the creation of such a centralized agency in its official response.¹¹⁸

The Mulroney Era

The Progressive Conservatives, led by Brian Mulroney, won in a landslide victory in the federal election in 1984. The era was marked by the focus on international trade introduced by ratification of the Canada Investment Act in 1985 and later the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement enacted in 1988.

When Mulroney took office, he issued a foreign policy review that was published in 1985 as “Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations.” The paper was guided by six objectives: sovereignty and independence; peace and security; justice and democracy; economic prosperity and integrity of natural

¹¹⁵ Jeffrey Holmes, *A Little Applebert, - a concise version of the report of the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee*, (The Canadian Conference of the Arts: Ottawa), 111.

¹¹⁶ CCA, *A Little Applebert*, 116.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹¹⁸ *Response to the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee by the DEA on Canada’s International Cultural Relations* (DEA: March, 1981).

resources. This was not much of a difference from the previous foreign policy review made by the Trudeau government, “Foreign Policy for Canadians”.¹¹⁹ It stated that annual meetings of the U.S. President and Canadian Prime Minister will become a policy to refurbish the relationship between the U.S. and Canada that was ‘sour’ in Trudeau times. Trudeau’s vision of world politics differed dramatically from Reagan’s, and Trudeau was not hesitant to press those differences. The cold relationship deepened as the protectionist sentiments in Congress grew with the onset of the recession.¹²⁰ Deficit reduction, fiscal restraint, free trade and international competitiveness were characteristic of the Mulroney era¹²¹, which of course resonated with the conservative administrations of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom.

Rachel Maxwell, in her paper “The Place of Arts and culture in Canadian Foreign Policy”¹²², claims that international cultural relations did not fare well during the Mulroney era and almost took a complete cut in 1992; however, she does not provide any detailed reference. The author of this paper found a discussion paper prepared by a private consulting company Christopher Lang and Associates for the Department of External Affairs, the discussion paper attempted to bring forward a specific multi-year strategy to assist the International Cultural Relations Office to work with the private sector. The paper concluded that the government should cooperate with the private sector to stress the Canadian origin of products, and recommended the government enhance the endorsement of companies with government’s support through certifications of various national organizations to provide more credibility to Canadian products.¹²³ More importantly, it encouraged the government to engage more in event-marketing of the international events held in Canada or abroad with participation of Canadian stakeholders. The discussion paper is an example of a market-oriented approach that is typical to Mulroney era.

¹¹⁹ Noble, J. “Do Foreign Policy Reviews Make a Difference?”, *Policy Options* (February 2005).

¹²⁰ Kim Nossal, “The Mulroney Years: Transformation and Tumult”, *Policy Options* (June-July 2003): 81.

¹²¹ Rachel Maxwell, *The Place of Arts and Culture in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Research Paper, Canadian Conference of the Arts: Ottawa, 2007), 28.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Multi-Year Corporate Sponsorship Strategy: A Report Prepared For External Affairs International Cultural Relations Bureau. Christopher Lang and Associates, May, 1991, 59- 67.*

This does not mean that the international cultural activities would be neglected, as Maxwell suggested, but there existed an attempt to find a different mode for funding and the presentation of Canadian cultural activities. This is supported by the work of cultural economist, Harry Hillman Chartrand, at the University of Saskatchewan, who conducted a study called “International Cultural Affairs: A fourteen country Survey”, a comparative analysis of countries’ investments in cultural industries abroad. Chartrand mentions that, in 1991, the most common theme emerging from negotiations between Canadian cultural attaches posted abroad, representatives of the Canadian cultural constituencies, and International Cultural Relations Bureau headquarters staff was the link to culture and trade. “*The attaches were seen as scouts for Canadian exporters of cultural goods and services: They should identify local markets and venues. They should facilitate delivery of products [...]. In short, they should help make Canada a brand name for quality in the global marketplace*”.¹²⁴ Measured as a percentage of total public expenditures, France spent 0.23 percent; the United Kingdom, 0.21 percent; Japan, 0.18 percent; Germany, 0.16 percent; and Canada, 0.03 percent on international cultural affairs.¹²⁵ The flaw of Chartrand’s research is the lack of relevant data from the other nine countries included in his study. However, it is evident that during the Mulroney administrations there was a greater emphasis on the net-benefit approach towards Canadian culture and its promotion abroad.

A good example of the combination of trade objectives and cultural objectives could be demonstrated in the Canada Nouveau festival that was held in the fall of 1988 in London. Two gala receptions and fashion shows were hosted by the federal and Ontario governments, which presented Canadian designers at a famous London department store Liberty. Canadian art, ceramics and furniture designs were on display for the entire month, accompanied by various cultural events. A former official asserts that the Canada Nouveau festival was the most successful cultural event that he helped to bring to life during his more than 15 years of experience within the DFAIT culture promotion portfolio. Further, he contends that the Mulroney government was “very supportive” of the promotion of Canadian arts and culture abroad - namely within the Canada House

¹²⁴ Harry H. Chartrand, “International Cultural Affairs: A fourteen country survey”, *Journal of Arts Management, Law & Society* 22 (Summer 1992): 134.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Cultural Centre, which had been allocated an approximate annual budget of 350,000 CAD that allowed the organization of big events such as Canada Nouveau.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Telephone interview with a former Senior DFAIT Official No. 4, April 24, 2013.

The Protection of Canadian culture on the international stage

The free-trade negotiations between Canada and the United States during the 1980s led to challenging the position of Canadian culture on the North American continent. The question of defending Canadian cultural producers brought reminiscence of the Massey-Lévesque times. The free-trade agreements would even increase the already existing predominance of American cultural products on the Canadian market.

The debate resonated in the cultural sector as the DFAIT negotiated the positions for the Canadian cultural producers in the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. and later joined by Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In his position paper "*Culture and foreign policy*", John Ralston Saul linked foreign policy, culture and trade together. The connection between the international free-trade agreements, foreign policy and the projection of culture at home and abroad was reflected in a famous position paper where "*Culture and foreign policy*" where reknown Canadian author John Ralston Saul argues that "*to attempt to build a new, vigorous foreign cultural policy without addressing the situation inside Canada would be naïve*"¹²⁷, further he emphasizes the existing challenge of dominant French and American cultural products: "*[...] the very heart of the problem is that from the very beginnings of our cultural efforts we have had to deal within our borders with much larger industry structures controlled from the two largest English-speaking countries and the largest French-speaking country.*"¹²⁸ The protection of Canadian culture intensified during the same time as the 1995 *Canada in the World* foreign policy review was published; therefore, it is necessary to look at the protection of culture on the international stage.

The protection of culture within the international trade framework did not come to wider negotiations until the 1990s. The forum for negotiating rules of world trade, known as the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dealt only with goods, not services. This was rectified in the 1994 establishment of GATT 1994 under the new body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its supplementary agreements - the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual

¹²⁷ John Ralston Saul (Position paper on Culture and Foreign Policy, August, 1994), 91.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 88.

Property Rights (TRIPS). The main difference was that while the GATT did not treat cultural industries at all, under the WTO it depended on interpretation as to whether it was considered as a good (GATT 1994 applied) or as a service (GATS applied). There was no general exemption for culture included. The countries were allowed to determine services for which they were prepared to make an offer of liberalization and those for which they were not.¹²⁹

Through the most-favoured nation clause in the WTO agreements, nations are obliged to grant all counter-bodies the same treatment. Canada opted out for film and television co-production agreements and audio-visual services, as these agreements provide more favourable treatment for partner countries, in order to ‘preserve the Canadian and Quebecois cultures’.¹³⁰ But Canada didn’t make any reservation towards its film distribution policy, which leaves space for Hollywood distributors and lobbies in Canada.

In regards to the cultural trade relations with the United States, it is necessary to mention two differing perspectives on the culture of both nations. For Americans, the cultural industry is entertainment defined by the market demand, or in other words, a product, while for Canadian culture it is an expression of national identity.¹³¹ Therefore, the United States is willing to open its markets for other cultural products; whereas, Canada, facing the massive challenge of American cultural imports, should be looking for protectionist measures in the agreements.

In the 1988 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and later in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA 1994), the countries exempted the cultural industries from the agreement in Article 1 (5). Cultural industries as defined in the NAFTA agreement are understood as *involving the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or newspapers; music in print or machine-readable form; the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film and video, audio, or video music recordings; radio*

¹²⁹ Simon Mark, “A Comparative study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India”, (PhD. diss., University of Auckland, 2008), 80-81.

¹³⁰ Keith Acheson and Christopher Jon Maule, *Much Ado About Culture: North American Trade Disputes*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999),81 *qtd* in Mark, 81.

¹³¹ Kevin Mulcahy. “Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Sovereignty: U.S.-Canadian Cultural Relations,” *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* 31 (2002): 265.

*communications, TV cable, and satellite programming.*¹³² Article 2005 (2) of the treaty however contains a disputable clause stating that “a party may take measure of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1”. This leads to different interpretations by the Canadians - as a nullification of the preceding paragraph - while the U.S. argues that it has not directly invoked any of the measures available to it for challenging the exemption. The disagreement of the interpretation of the cultural exemption is the substance of disputes between the U.S. and Canada.

Neither NAFTA nor WTO provided enough security for Canadian cultural industries, namely periodicals as shown in the *Sports Illustrated* case in 1996 that was settled by the WTO in favour of the U.S. publishers. So called ‘*split-run*’ magazines combine editorial content with advertising tailored to particular markets. The term ‘*split*’ refers to the separation of the editorial and advertising content; therefore, the editorial content is cheaper in the export destination. The Canadian government prohibited tax deductions for Canadian advertisers in split-run magazines and also enacted a tariff to block the import of foreign periodicals with advertising aimed at the Canadian market. In the case of *Sports Illustrated*, run by Time Warner Corporation, the magazine would not cross the border physically but electronically, avoiding Canadian protectionist measures (such as minimum requirements for Canadian editorial content) that grant the right to certain tax advantages and lower postal rates.¹³³ The Canadian government reacted with protectionist measures and introduced Bill C-103 that increased the tariff to 80%.¹³⁴ This move led the United States to demand the use of the dispute resolution process of the WTO, which resulted in Canadian defeat. The reaction of the Canadian government was the establishment of Canadian Magazine Fund to reward investment in the production of Canadian editorial content by magazines which were majority-owned and controlled by Canadians and which had at least 80 % Canadian content.¹³⁵ Such examples of poor

¹³² Ibid., 269.

¹³³ Louis Bélanger, “Redefining Cultural diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada,” *Political Psychology* 20, No.4 (December 1999): 682.

¹³⁴ Simon, 77.

¹³⁵ Acheson and Maule *qtd in* Mark, 78.

national cultural policy performance are the outcomes of seeing rather foreign policy objectives than cultural policy protections in the international agreements.

The unsuccessful protection of the Canadian cultural sector against the dominance of American cultural production under NAFTA and WTO, as portrayed above, resulted in the notion that trade agreements would likely be insufficient to retain domestic autonomy in cultural policymaking. Therefore in February 1999, the Cultural Industries Sectorial Advisory Group on International Trade (SAGIT)¹³⁶ introduced a report where it called upon the creation of a new international instrument that would 1.) *Recognize the importance of cultural diversity*; 2.) *Acknowledge that cultural goods and services are significantly different from other products*; 3.) *Acknowledge that domestic measures and policies intended to ensure accesses to a variety of indigenous cultural products are significantly different from other policies*; 4.) *Set out rules on the kind of domestic regulatory and other measures that countries can and cannot use to enhance cultural and linguistic diversity*; and 5.) *Establish how trade disciplines would apply or not apply to cultural measures that meet the agreed upon rules.*¹³⁷ The government accepted the recommendation in October 1999. Concurrently, the Department of Canadian Heritage (DCH) launched the International Network of Cultural Policy (INCP) that played a leading role in negotiating the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005¹³⁸. Canada was the first country to ratify the Convention.

The Place of Cultural Diplomacy in Other Institutions

In the realm of cultural diplomacy, we may find three key players: the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Heritage and the Canada Council for the Arts. However, cultural diplomacy is the objective solely of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), which accommodates its policies according to foreign policy priorities. On the other hand, the Canadian Heritage and the Canada Council seek

¹³⁶ SAGIT was part of the federal government's advisory system on international trade. It was a platform for officials from DFAIT and DCH to consult with representatives of Canada's cultural industries.

¹³⁷ *Canadian Culture in a Global World. New Strategies for Culture and Trade* (SAGIT, 1999).

¹³⁸ More in Chapter 3.

artistic objectives such as the development of Canadian artists' expressions. The institutions have an indirect impact on cultural diplomacy by managing programs in international context that may form an added value to the already existing cultural diplomacy strategy of the DFAIT.

Canada Council for the Arts

The mandate of Canada Council for the Arts to represent Canadian arts abroad was already included in the Canada Council for the Arts Act of 1957. The act was novelized and the authorities were narrowed - the area of humanities and social sciences was left out on behalf of the arts only. The Council's international mandate is now grounded in 'Objects, Powers and Duties of the Council' section of the [Canada Council for the Arts Act - R.S.C., 1985, c. C-2 \(Section 8\)](#)¹³⁹:

(f) exchange with other countries or organizations or persons therein knowledge and information respecting the arts; and

(g) arrange for representation and interpretation of Canadian arts in other countries

and also the Canada Council of the Arts is responsible for Canadian representation to UNESCO:

Duties in relation to UNESCO

(2) The Governor in Council may assign to the Council such functions and duties in relation to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization in Council considers desirable.

The Canada Council for the Arts (CCA) is a crown corporation, acting independently on arm's length principle of the Government - namely the DCH. The DCH

¹³⁹ Canada Council for the Arts Act.

acts as a reporter to the Crown on their status and advocates parliamentary appropriations to the corporations. The crown corporations such as Telefilm Canada, National Arts Centre, and the National Gallery of Canada have an international element in their portfolio description as well; however, the CCA may be considered as the most important one because it covers the broadest area of arts disciplines. Its primary focus is the advancement of lives of Canadian artists and that is the primary ‘criteria’ that the Canada Council follows. The crown corporations cooperate with each other internationally, for example, the CCA recently supported the ‘Oh, Canada’ art show at MASS MoCA in Massachusetts, which was the broadest display of Canadian contemporary art abroad in history. The CCA contributed \$100,000 for realisation of the show.¹⁴⁰

The CCA has a number of programs with international context and also directly funds artists and organizations that perform outside of Canada. Programs such as International Residencies or Visiting Foreign Artists Programs are successful examples of how the CCA fulfills one of its objectives – the enrichment of artistic expression of Canadian artists. The CCA is independent of the government’s foreign policy objectives, and we can consider the Council as an important player in securing and building international cultural relations.

The Director of the CCA, Robert Sirman, and the Senior Official No. 3 both confirm that there has been a relationship between the CCA and DFAIT in regards to the distribution of grants, when the DFAIT sought expertise at the Council. However, former director of the CCA, Joyce Zemans, and the current director Robert Sirman stress that there has never been any political pressure from the DFAIT on the selection of granted organizations or artists.¹⁴¹ Further, Zemans contends: *„The purpose of the discussions I/we had with DFAIT representatives were generally based on how DFAIT might best represent the strength of Canadian artists and arts in promoting Canada internationally. In other words, it was a consultative process about DFAIT’s work in the sector.*¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Robert Sirman, Director and CEO of the Canada Council for the Arts, April 8, 2013.

¹⁴¹ Joyce Zemans, phone interview with the author, April 19, 2013.; Robert Sirman, interview with the author, Ottawa, April 8, 2013.

¹⁴² Joyce Zemans, email correspondence with the author, May 17, 2013.

The Canadian Heritage

The Department of Canadian Heritage (DCH) does not officially have a mandate to represent or pursue Canada's international cultural policy. The Department Heritage Act¹⁴³ empowers the Minister to *“project national policies, projects and programs with respect to Canadian identity and values, cultural development and heritage”*.¹⁴⁴ The Minister also has the jurisdiction *over (j) the formulation of cultural policy, including the formulation of cultural policy as it relates to foreign investment and copyright*.¹⁴⁵ The Department's role rests primarily with the domestic jurisdiction as its *“main program activities are the funding of community and third-party organizations to promote the benefits of culture, identity, and sport for Canadians”*.¹⁴⁶

However, as we closely look at the Departmental Performance report, the first out of three strategic outcomes is: *“Canadian artistic expressions and cultural content are created and accessible at home and abroad – this speaks to the creative and economic importance of the continued existence and public availability Canadian cultural products, artistic work by Canadian creators and performers and Canada's cultural heritage”*.¹⁴⁷ The DCH therefore participates in international cultural relations through its arm's length portfolio organizations such as Telefilm Canada, National Gallery of Canada, National Arts Centre and the Canada Council of the Arts and others. The international activities of these agencies do not have a diplomatic but an artistic objective. Those activities, thus, do have ancillary impacts of trade and diplomatic opportunities.

The international element can be also found in several programs and divisions of the department such as the Branch of International Affairs. The Branch was responsible for preparing the UNESCO International Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions where Canada undertook a leadership role. The department worked with DFAIT and Justice Canada in May 2005 to

¹⁴³ Department of Canadian Heritage Act (S.C. 1995, c. 11)

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Section “Powers, Duties and Functions of the Minister”.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Canadian Heritage, *Departmental Performance report, 2011-2012*, 3.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

prepare a Canadian negotiating position on the Convention, ahead of the 3rd Negotiating Session of UNESCO's Intergovernmental Experts Meeting in June 2005.¹⁴⁸

The Branch is also responsible for communication with the DFAIT and its major posts to be up-to-date on developments abroad and also bring coherence to international cultural relations. The DCH does not decide what it is going to be displayed at the Missions nor takes part in cultural programming of the Posts.¹⁴⁹

The Branch of International Affairs also included the Division of International Expositions that is responsible for Canada's participation in international expositions. Canada has regularly participated in all world expositions (EXPO) since 1937. Canada profited by hosting EXPO in Montreal in 1967 and Vancouver in 1986. The organization and attendance became a model for many other countries. The 1986 Vancouver EXPO was the last such event held in North America.

Summary

Chapter 2 described the evolution of the government's communication with the world and its search for the right position of culture within the organizational set of the government. The Canadian Information Service was primarily focused on the communication with foreigners; one may consider it as the first public diplomacy body of the government. The establishment of the Information Division within the Department of External Affairs structure clarified the responsibility of communicating with the foreign publics. The ID could be considered as the preliminary body of public diplomacy.

As the Massey-Lévesque report initiated the creation of the Canada Council for the Arts and UNESCO almost simultaneously gained more prominence, it became clear that the Department would need to incorporate cultural affairs into its bureaucratic portfolio. Through the creation of the Cultural Affairs Division, under Prime Minister Pearson, that the Department of External Affairs for the first time acknowledged its share in international cultural relations management. The Trudeau era was marked by a higher

¹⁴⁸ Canadian Heritage, *Departmental Performance Report, 2005-2006*. Available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071205174316/http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/0506/pch/pch01_e.asp#Sum_4, Last access April 15, 2013.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Senior Canadian Heritage Officer, November, 2011.

attention to cultural affairs as exemplified by the opening of the Cultural Centre in Paris in 1970. Moreover, in 1974 the Arts Promotion Program was established to help Canadian artists promote themselves and perform. The cultural affairs were fully incorporated into the structure of the Department as it separated from the Public Affairs Division to form the International Cultural Relations Bureau, which existed until the mid-2000s.

The Mulroney era understood culture in more trade and industrial terms, but the place for the cultural element at DFAIT was never contested. The Posts, as demonstrated on the Canada Noveau example, were encouraged to seek private sources for their activities. Also the era revived the national debate on the legal protection of culture in the occurrence of FTA and later NAFTA agreements. The complexity of managing cultural diplomacy was underlined by analysis of the CCA and the DCH mandates to international activities. The following chapter will look at the execution of cultural diplomacy during the Liberal government tenures under Jean Chrétien.

Chapter 3: The Place of Cultural Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy during the Chrétien era (1993-2003)

The Birth of the Third Pillar

The preparation of a new foreign policy review was included in the 1993 Liberal election program, the Red Book. The program articulated a proposal of the establishment of the National Forum on Canada's International Relations where parliamentarians, non-governmental organization and members of the general public were included. The outcome of the consultations was a new roadmap for Canadian foreign policy called "*Canada in the World*" published in February 1995. The review "*Canada in the World*"¹⁵⁰ listed three key objectives of Canadian foreign policy:

- The promotion of prosperity and employment
- The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and
- The projection of Canadian values and culture

The cornerstones of the third objective was the premise that if Canadian values – identified as "*respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the environment*" – are not protected and promoted, "*Canadians will ultimately feel the effects at home*".¹⁵¹ In the section "*Culture and education are vital to our success*", the review emphasized the economic impact of the cultural, scientific and educational activities. In short-term, the Department sought to opening of new educational centres in the Asia-Pacific region. More importantly, the review admitted that "*a country that does not project a clearly defined image of what it is and what it represents, is doomed to anonymity on the international stage*", this could be understood as the official call for public diplomacy strategy. The features that Canada could communicate to the world were expressed as such: "*Only Canadian culture can express the uniqueness of our country, which is bilingual, multicultural, and deeply influenced by its Aboriginal roots, the North, the*

¹⁵⁰ Government of Canada. Government statement, "*Canada in the World*" (1995). 1.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

oceans and its own vastness".¹⁵² Further, the Review stated that "*Cultural affairs, in addition to politics and the economy, are one of the pillar of foreign policy*", therefore the planned cutbacks on resources for cultural activities of embassies by the previous Conservative government were reversed.¹⁵³

Third Pillar – a mind-shift?

It was the first time that culture was incorporated into official government's international policies; thus, culture became known as the Third Pillar of Canadian foreign policy. This was reflected in the International Cultural Relations Bureau (ICRB) within the structure of the DFAIT. Robin Higham, a first appointed Director General of the ICRB, referred to "*a mind-shift, a cultural change*"¹⁵⁴ that the newly created Bureau had to go through. The primary objective was not the promotion of Canadian arts and culture abroad, but rather a real diplomatic project to build Canada's soft power abroad and be persuasive. Suddenly, culture was to be promoted as one of the primary tools of foreign policy and gained legitimacy within the department. The change of mindset at the DFAIT was further described by the former Senior Official No.4, who recalled that: "*The 'third pillar' actually made a positive difference toward the credibility and acceptance of the cultural program internally - i.e. within the Department of Foreign Affairs and the governmental bureaucracy. The magnitude of its impact within the arts community itself would require more discussion, although in terms of self-respect and opportunities for touring, it would have been positive.*"¹⁵⁵

Moreover, there was a dilemma within the government bureaucrats but also the perception of the cultural community about what is the purpose of cultural diplomacy and its implication on the relationship between the DFAIT and the Canadian cultural community. Senior Official No. 2 confessed that his vision at the International Cultural

¹⁵² Ibid., 37.

¹⁵³ For example, it was reflected in the existence of the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris was endangered due to planned cutbacks under the Conservative government. The proclamation of a new foreign policy objective directly helped to save the centre, as it was re-opened after a restoration in 1997. (*The Globe and Mail*, "Liberals drop Tory decision to shut Paris cultural centre", April 26, 1994).

¹⁵⁴ Robin Higham, personal interview, Ottawa, April 2nd, 2013.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with a former Senior DFAIT Official No.4 , Toronto, May 3, 2013.

Relations Bureau succeeded on both fronts - be it DFAIT or the cultural community - was to gain credibility of through “*a network of 200 people - half of them abroad and the other half of them in Canada [...] we needed all these people would be an earmark*”¹⁵⁶ in their positions. In other words, the vision was to create a pool of qualified and trained diplomats - cultural commissioners - that were flexible and would permeate between cultural scene and home cultural scene. The same system works for trade, where trade commissioners are spread across Canada to gain a deeper knowledge of the opportunities for Canadian producers and then the commissioners are sent abroad.

The 1995 “*Canada in the World*” review listed prosperity and employment as the first pillar and projection of security as the second pillar of the foreign policy. We must take into account that in 1993 Canada found itself in a budget deficit and with an unemployment rate of around 11.5%.¹⁵⁷ The primary focus of the Liberal government was seeking new markets and pursuing successful international trade policies as shown on the revival of Team Canada missions led by the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to Asia in the fall of 1994 and to Latin America in January of 1995.¹⁵⁸

Additionally, when the foreign policy was prepared throughout the years of 1993-1994, national unity was a central topic as the 1995 Quebec referendum was approaching. André Oullet, as a Quebecker, was appointed as the foreign affairs minister. Andrew Cohen asserts that the appointment was political because “the government needed a senior francophone Quebecker in a senior portfolio to strengthen its hand in the anticipated referendum.”¹⁵⁹ The inclusion of culture as the third pillar can be explained as a strategic move of the Chrétien government to show to Québec that the federal government was able to represent a united Canada, including Québec, abroad. Robin Higham, the Director General to the ICRB under Minister Oullet, confesses that culture was rather regarded as ‘*the third pencil*’ of foreign policy.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Senior DFAIT Official No.2, Ottawa, May 2, 2013.

¹⁵⁷ Trading Economics statistics, “Canada unemployment rate”, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/canada/unemployment-rate> [Last access April 26, 2013].

¹⁵⁸ Manon Tessier. *Canadian International Relations Chronicle* (Centre Québécois de relations internationales, 1995).

¹⁵⁹ Andrew Cohen, *Behind the lines*, 4.

¹⁶⁰ Robin Higham, interview with author, April 2nd, 2013.

The Sleeping Third Pillar

In the mid-1990s, the government was occupied by the economic situation and large budget-deficits. The reconstruction of the fiscal policy demanded severe budget cuts. As we can see in Fig.3 - DFAIT Operating Budget, 1990-2012 - the department's budget was reduced in 1996 as the federal budget cuts progressed and the finance minister's restrictive policies took effect. As the Canadian economy recovered towards the end of the 1990s, the budget began to increase again.

As a result of government-wide reduction exercises, between the years of 1993-1995, there was a 20% reduction in scholarships and awards under various scholarly exchanges that belonged under the International Cultural Relations Bureau. A more trade-approach towards culture was emerging by the creation of the Cultural and Educational Promotion Division to enhance efforts to promote the Canadian cultural and educational goods and services.¹⁶¹ The division performed market researches to identify emerging markets for Canadian cultural industry. For example, it prepared the guides on sound-recording, film and publishing that were distributed to the Posts abroad to increase international awareness of the capabilities of the Canadian firms.¹⁶²

In 1995, a new structure was implemented again as the cultural and educational parts of the Division were separated. The "cultural" division, the Arts Promotion and Cultural Industries Division (ACA) was created to run 2 programs- the already existing granting program, Arts Promotion Program (AP) and the Cultural Industries Promotion Program (CI). CI essentially conducted "the business of culture" - that is opening up new markets for Canadian cultural industries and ensuring a Canadian presence at international fairs and cultural events".¹⁶³ The challenge arose when in 1998, the Department of Canadian Heritage (DCH) established its own Trade and Investment Branch. The creation of a separate Branch at the DCH was a sign of growing and unclear bureaucracy towards the cultural stakeholders. The evaluation report from 2001 mentioned: "*Previous efforts to collaborate with DCH have been unsuccessful. Despite of*

¹⁶¹ DFAIT and International Trade, 1995-1996 Estimates, Part III – Expenditure Plan (Canadian Government Publishing: Ottawa, 1996), II -69.

¹⁶² DFAIT and International Trade, *Performance report -1996-1997* (Canadian Government Publishing: Ottawa, 1997), 33.


¹⁶³

*senior management direction from both departments to coordinate their responsibilities and share information, progress has not materialized.”*¹⁶⁴ In addition, there is the new Trade and Investment Branch which was basically a roadmap to the Trade Routes Program established in 2001, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

In 1996, the budget was decreased again as were the international cultural relations (Fig. 4); however, the cuts were around 14%, which in comparison with other government bodies did not affect the International Cultural Relations Bureau that much. As soon as a new foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, was appointed, the department went through organizational changes. The budget business line of Communications and Culture was replaced by the Public Diplomacy line where the cultural and academic relations were included.


¹⁶⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Grants and Contribution Audit of the Arts and Cultural Industries Program Division(ACA), (January, 2001), URL: http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2001/ACA_observation.aspx?lang=eng [Last access April 20, 2013].

Fig.3 DFAIT Operating Budget 1990-2012, in thousands CAD \$




Source: Government of Canada, *Public Accounts Canada*, Vol.1990-2012.

Fig.4 - Grants in Cultural Relations, FY 1990- 2008



Source: Data retrieved from the *Public Accounts Canada Volumes 1990-2009*.

Fig.5 - Grants in Academic Relations, FY 1990-2012



Source: Data retrieved from the Public Accounts Canada Volumes 1990-2009

The Axworthy Era

The Axworthy era (1996-2000) was one of the most fruitful times for Canada's public diplomacy. In times of economic constraint, Axworthy was looking for new routes where Canada could excel and 'make a difference'. One of the fields was public diplomacy of which Axworthy was a strong supporter and sought to make an image of Canada as a navigator in the realm of international relations.

According to Axworthy, Canada "[is] a *value-added nation*" that "*can help carve out a global system of security based on protecting individual social, political and economic rights*".¹⁶⁵ Axworthy believed in the power of public diplomacy and advocated opening new posts where Canada was absent and further supporting educational programs - all to maintain Canada's global presence. Public diplomacy gained significance in Axworthy's advocacy in the Ottawa Process. That same year, the Department launched a new Canadian International Information Strategy. The electronic information kiosks were placed in public areas of Canadian embassies to enable foreigners to link to Canadian information sources.¹⁶⁶ The face of the Canadian government abroad presented itself as the pioneer in cyber-diplomacy. The public diplomacy line was slowly increasing as the economy was recovering from the crisis of the first half of the 1990s.

The 1997 Red Book and culture

Due to reconstruction of public finances and large cuts of the previous tenure, Canada started to pay off its debt by 1997. The Liberal government reassured its position in the 1997 federal election, and although it lost 17 seats, it still held a majority of the 155 total seats. A Liberal election platform of 1997 entitled *Securing Our Future Together* or called also the Red Book No. 2 clearly identified culture as an incalculable feature of human society: "*The Liberal government recognizes that the success of Canadian art and*

¹⁶⁵ Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*, (Toronto: Random House, 2003), 14.

¹⁶⁶ Departmental Performance Report, 1997-1998.

*culture cannot be judged in commercial terms alone.*¹⁶⁷ Throughout the interviews with former DFAIT Officials, this was understood as that not necessarily every investment into arts promotion has to be leveraged back in economic terms.

The government planned to establish the Trade Promotion Agency aimed to serve as an information resource centre for Canadian firms and as a marketing agency to help sell Canadian goods and services around the world. The agency would not be a policy promoting body but purely trade-oriented. The proposed Trade Promotion Agency was planned to have a special mandate to market Canadian cultural and educational products as well. The Red Book stated: “*We are making Canada’s artists part of our fundamental rethinking of the way we promote ourselves and our products abroad. International exposure for Canadian artists and artefacts is more than good diplomacy; it also provides substantial artistic and economic benefits.*”¹⁶⁸ The attempt to create a separate idea was in collision with the objective of the International Trade component of the Department as it would duplicate its activities of Trade Officers at the Posts. For cultural industries and the DFAIT itself, it would create another bureaucratic body that would dissolve the advocacy of cultural sector economic interests abroad, therefore the cultural industries promotion rested in the gestion of the DFAIT. The Trade Agency never came to existence.

A successful initiative incorporating trade, public and cultural diplomacy was showcased on the Think Canada Festival in Japan held in 2001. The previous multi-sector Team Canada visit in 1999 instigated a concept to re-brand Canada in the eyes of the Japanese public. The festival consisted of approximately 200 events organized by the Embassy in Tokyo and the Consulates in other regional capitals of Japan where the majority of the events were held. The festival ran from March to May 2001 and consisted of artistic performances, receptions, demonstrations, booths, seminars, symposia etc.¹⁶⁹

The Think Canada Festival proved that a well-prepared and coherent message of Canada can be delivered. The success of transforming “the image of Canada from not only a land of vast beauty, abundant natural resources and ‘nice’ people, to one with also

¹⁶⁷ The Liberal Party of Canada, “Securing Our Future Together” (Ottawa, 1997), 90.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 94.

¹⁶⁹ Office of the Inspector General, *Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival in Japan – Final Report*, Evaluation Division (DFAIT, 2002), 1.

a diverse, sophisticated, technologically advanced society” via different tools of public and cultural diplomacy, which can be evaluated by the vast media coverage (600 newspaper articles and radio spots) and over 20,000 attendees of the Festival. 170

The festival provided an excellent platform for cultural diplomacy given that 73 out of 200 events were cultural - such a reading by Margaret Atwood, a Charles Pachter exhibition, or a concert by Marc-Andre Hamelin. This would virtually translate the Third Pillar in quantitative terms. However, the funding from DFAIT came not from a specific fund created to advance the Third Pillar, but from other special funds such as Program for International Business Development, additional ad-hoc funds and the Post-Initiative Fund. One third of the 3 mil. CAD budget was provided by over 50 Canadian and Japanese corporate sponsors.¹⁷¹ Therefore, it is hard to evaluate the event as an outcome of a long-strategy in cultural diplomacy-

The 2000 Red Book and the Third Pillar

The Liberal Party under the leadership of Jean Chrétien won the third consecutive term in 2000 with 11 more seats than the previous election. The 2000 Liberal Red Book called “Opportunity for All” symbolized a new era of economic recovery from the 1990s. The 2000 Red Book, stated “*A new Liberal government will increase its support for the arts in Canada and help expand international markets for our artists and creators through a new marketing campaign that uses cultural products to brand Canada abroad.*”¹⁷² The Government could finally pursue the Third Pillar in economic terms. The grants in cultural and academic relations were nearly doubled from 4.5 mil. CAD in 1997 to 9 mil. CAD. (Fig. 4 and 5).

Until 2001, there were only a few priority Posts such as Washington, New York, Paris, London, Tokyo and Berlin, that were allocated a separate cultural budget. For example, in Washington the budget was around 80,000 CAD. In 2001, the cultural budgets were expanded to 22 Posts around the world totalling of 1.5 mil. CAD.¹⁷³ The

¹⁷⁰ Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival, Appendix A.

¹⁷¹ Evan Potter, *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power through Public Diplomacy* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 237.

¹⁷² The Liberal Party of Canada, “Opportunity for All- The Liberal Plan For the Future of Canada”, (Ottawa, 2000), 9.

¹⁷³ Ppt Presentation of a former Senior DFAIT Official No.4.

practice of using the Post-Initiative Fund (PIF) for cultural activities was therefore able to be reduced in those Post and invested in more public-outreach activities such as the sponsorship of the Terry Fox Runs.¹⁷⁴

In the same year of 2001, Canadian artists garnered notable praise at the 2001 Venice Biennale where artists Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller were awarded the Special Award for their multimedia work “The Paradise Institute”, while the works of Max Dean, Jeff Wall, and Atom Egoyan were shown as well.¹⁷⁵ The Arts and Cultural Promotion Division contributed 110,000 CAD to the participation of the artists.¹⁷⁶

The Arts Promotion Program - PromArt

In 2000, the Arts and Cultural Industries Division started using a software called Promart2000 as a tool of cultural diplomacy. Primarily it served as the application software for the cultural stakeholders to apply for a grant from the Arts Promotion Program but also it stored information about the applicants that was available to the Posts to seek possible Canadian cultural stakeholders to engage with the local audience. The program allowed the Department to see how is the grant money distributed.

The grants distributed through the system ranged from 300 CAD for an individual to 200,000 CAD for a large company such as the Royal Winnipeg Ballet. The Promart program was always designed to provide “seed-money” for the artists to reduce, no, to cover, their costs of international touring, therefore 50% of the budget was not more than 5,000 CAD.¹⁷⁷ Another 20% was distributed among big performing companies such as Cirque du Soleil, National Canadian Ballet or the Toronto International Film Festival. The target countries for performing arts were: the U.S., the UK, France, Germany Italy, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, China, and India.¹⁷⁸


¹⁷⁴ Interview with a former Senior DFAIT Official No.4.

¹⁷⁵ DFAIT, *Departmental Performance Report, 2000-2001* (Ottawa, 2001).

¹⁷⁶ DFAIT, *The Evaluation of the Arts Promotion Program of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, (Ottawa, 2006).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Simon Mark, “A Comparative study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India”, (PhD. diss., University of Auckland, 2008), 95.



Source: DFAIT, The Evaluation of the Arts Promotion Program, (January 2006).

Trade Routes

In 2001, Prime minister Jean Chrétien and the DCH minister Sheila Copps announced a program “Tomorrow starts today” as an additional three-year investment of \$568 million in the arts and cultural industries. The program was extended for an additional year in late-2003. It was the largest increase in federal funding for the arts in forty years, the new money was targeted toward underwriting creativity, building audiences, maximizing access and developing private-sector partnerships.¹⁷⁹ A new program to expand international markets for the Canadian cultural sector was launched - the Trade Routes program. The program market research and trade experts were across Canada and five foreign posts: New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris and Singapore. Trade Routes had a budget of 23 mil. CAD over a three-year period.¹⁸⁰ The program gave 2 mil. CAD in direct contributions to arts organizations. These contributions enabled organizations to attend fairs and conventions and to be a part of foreign trade missions. A major share of 5 million was spent on service offerings from trade specialists based in

¹⁷⁹ Max Wyman, *The Defiant Imagination – why culture matters* (Douglas and McIntyre, 2004), 183-84.

¹⁸⁰ Formative Evaluation of Trade Routes, ii.

Canada and abroad.¹⁸¹

The Making of Cultural Diplomacy

The issue of composing an attractive cultural program while aligning without straying from foreign policy objectives is a critical issue to every cultural counsellor at the national cultural offices and embassies around the world. In 1993, Curtis Barlow said that “[...] in Washington he would have been more likely to choose ‘mainstream’¹⁸² cultural programming in a relatively conservative place like Washington, because there was less of a market for avant-garde, cutting edge contemporary work in that city. The potential for making a positive impact in Washington was always key in making those programming choices.”¹⁸³

A few years later, in the break of the new millennia, the reality was different. The Cultural Centre in Paris hosted the ‘*Call Girl*’ exhibition. The concept of Nadine Norman was ground-breaking because actresses would pose as prostitutes and engage in erotic conversations with visitors of the exhibition. The exhibition claimed a worldwide recognition and Canada was portrayed as ‘innovative and provocative,’ according to words of Senior Official No.3. The Department of Foreign Affairs allocated \$35,000 and \$15,000 was provided by the Canada Council of the Arts.¹⁸⁴ All of the former DFAIT cultural and bureaucratic executives interviewed agreed that in the late 1990s and the early 2000s the purpose was to portray Canada as a fresh, technologically sophisticated country with an open mind to new trends.

In 2002 the foreign minister, Bill Graham wrote in *The Hill Times* article: “DFAIT dedicates these resources to the arts because cultural diplomacy is a powerful tool for governments and nations to gain positive attention and thus be in a stronger position to

¹⁸¹ Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage (40th Parliament Session), “Report on the Analysis of the Arts programs that were cancelled in summer 2008. (Adopted by the Committee on April 1, 2009; Presented to the House on April 23, 2009). Available at: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3821320&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2> [Last access April 29, 2013].

¹⁸² Curtis Barlow, “International Cultural Relations and Bilateral Cultural Exchange Canada-U.S.: The Current “Climate”, Speech delivered on June 3rd, 2003, in Columbus, Ohio.

¹⁸³ Curtis Barlow, interview with the author, Toronto, May 4, 2013.

¹⁸⁴ Adrian Humphreys, “Call girl ’exhibit costs taxpayers thousands: Cultural centre in Paris: Happy hooker makes ’unhappy taxpayer”, *The National Post*, Feb 14, 2000.

*advance their interests abroad.” And further “Our ambassadors abroad use cultural diplomacy to access and influence senior politicians, government officials and business leaders' groups, who are likely to welcome an invitation to a performance by, for example, Cirque du Soleil.”*¹⁸⁵ The year 2002 could be marked as the Canadian performing arts year abroad. Words like ‘monumental’, ‘fascinating’, ‘shattering’¹⁸⁶ were written about the *Oedipus Rex* opera by the Toronto-based Canadian Opera Company that visited the Edinburgh International Festival. In October, Canada was ‘the country of honour’ at the Cervantino Festival in Guanajuato, a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Mexico. The festival hosted the Mermaid theatre from Nova-Scotia, that won a prestigious Canada Export Award in recognition of its international success. Performing arts companies such as Les Deux Mondes, Les Gens d’R, Ballet British Columbia or the Gryphon Trio of Toronto and two Inuit exhibitions presented by Alhondiga Museum — all served to enhanced image of Canada in a priority country — Mexico.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the famous La la la Human Steps premiered *Amelia* during the Canadian performing arts festival in Prague, Czech Republic. All these grand events have had a positive impact, not only on the artists themselves and the public image of Canada, but also served as an occasion for governmental and private stakeholders to advance Canada’s interests. As a former Senior Official No.4, depicted: “*The job of the diplomat is making people to return your phone-calls. The cultural program represented an effective and positive way for Canadian diplomats abroad to gain access to their foreign interlocutors*”.¹⁸⁸

Academic Relations under the Liberal Government

The academic relations are included in cultural diplomacy because their objective - to increase knowledge and understanding of *Canada in the World* - is the same as that of the DFAIT and its function similar to that of cultural programs. The Academic Relations Division, created in the early 1970s, was divided into two areas: Scholarships programs and Canadian Studies. The Scholarship programs had a stable budget of around 11 million CAD - including scholarships such as the Government of Canada Awards, the

¹⁸⁵ Bill Graham, “Culture is the face of Canada abroad”, *The Hill Times* 657, October 7, 2002).

¹⁸⁶ Reviews: *The Scotsman*, (August 30, 2002);

¹⁸⁷ DFAIT, *Canada World View*, Issue 17 (Ottawa: Autumn 2002), 16.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with former Senior DFAIT Official No.4, Toronto, May 4, 2013.

Canadian Commonwealth Scholarships Program, the Emerging Leaders in the Americas scholarships, and the Canada-US Fulbright Program, among many others.

The Canadian studies program, in particular, helped to target future opinion-makers.¹⁸⁹ The Canada studies program had a clear foreign policy objective: “*to develop a greater knowledge and understanding of Canada, its values and its culture among scholars and other influential groups abroad. Programs offer support to academics outside Canada for teaching, research and publication about Canada in a variety of disciplines*”.¹⁹⁰ The Canada Studies Program was managed by the International Council for Canadian Studies since 1987. The Canada Studies Program included administration of scholarship and fellowship programs listed below:

| For individuals | For institutions |
|--|---|
| Canada-Asia-Pacific Awards in Canadian Studies | Travelling Book Display |
| Canada-Latin-America-Caribbean Awards | Conference Travel Assistance Program |
| Faculty Enrichment Program Grants | Library Support Program |
| Faculty Research Program Grants | Canadian Prime Minister’s Awards for Publishing |
| Graduate Student Research Awards | Conference Grant Program (US only) |
| International Research Linkages (IRL) | |
| Institutional Research Program (IRP) | |

The cooperation between ICCS and DFAIT was long-standing and the programs were based on absolute academic freedom and the grants were awarded based on the quality of the project. The distribution of grants can be illustrated on the graphs below (Fig.7 and 8). The numbers of awards by origin reflect the intensity and activity of Canadian studies in the region and all regions, as a whole, follow the same trend according to annual allocation of resources. The year 2000 is significant for the Africa/Middle East region, more specifically there were 17 awards granted to Israeli faculty within Faculty Research Program.¹⁹¹

The program helped to secure that Canada studies were a part of academic curricula and helped foreign scholars to pursue their studies on Canada. The program

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Senior DFAIT Official No.1, Ottawa, April 8, 2013.

¹⁹⁰ DFAIT, *Evaluation of the International Academic Relations Programs* (Government of Canada: Ottawa, July 2005).

¹⁹¹ Internal statistics provided to the author by International Council on Canadian Studies, April 2013.

budget was approximately around 5 mil. CAD, and in 1994 each dollar invested in the Program contributed at least six dollars to the Canadian economy.¹⁹²

¹⁹² International Council on Canadian Studies (ICCS), *The ICCS Canadian Studies Forum – Report*, May, 2007, 25.




Fig. 8 - Grants awarded 1993-2011, by region

| | United States | Asia-Pacific | Europe | Latin America | Africa | Total |
|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1993 | 77 | 83 | 94 | 54 | 7 | 315 |
| 1994 | 86 | 82 | 95 | 55 | 9 | 327 |
| 1995 | 67 | 76 | 100 | 57 | 8 | 308 |
| 1996 | 70 | 73 | 125 | 57 | 10 | 335 |
| 1997 | 59 | 79 | 119 | 61 | 8 | 326 |
| 1998 | 46 | 78 | 138 | 72 | 9 | 343 |
| 1999 | 55 | 84 | 122 | 66 | 8 | 335 |
| 2000 | 50 | 79 | 126 | 62 | 24 | 338 |
| 2001 | 34 | 76 | 125 | 61 | 14 | 310 |
| 2002 | 36 | 73 | 121 | 55 | 13 | 298 |
| 2003 | 55 | 70 | 110 | 59 | 11 | 305 |
| 2004 | 49 | 69 | 116 | 64 | 12 | 310 |
| 2005 | 67 | 67 | 118 | 57 | 12 | 321 |
| 2006 | 56 | 60 | 118 | 65 | 11 | 310 |
| 2007 | 48 | 44 | 86 | 48 | 7 | 232 |
| 2008 | 34 | 55 | 98 | 56 | 5 | 248 |
| 2009 | 50 | 42 | 88 | 50 | 9 | 239 |
| 2010 | 43 | 58 | 92 | 54 | 1 | 248 |
| 2011 | 37 | 42 | 88 | 45 | 8 | 220 |

In 1997, the academic relations received one of the biggest funds of the decade, amounting to 18,7 million CAD (Fig.5), but the figure also includes programs connected with the internationalization of Canadian higher education. The government understood the economic impact of 100,000 foreign students seeking Canadian higher education and leveraging 2.3 billion CAD to the Canadian economy annually¹⁹³; therefore, the government heavily invested in the marketing and promotion of Canadian colleges and universities. In 1997, the ACA helped to establish ten Canadian Studies Centres¹⁹⁴, and the Canada studies continued contributing to the national Canadian studies associations. The 7,000 Canadianists and 500-1000 scholarly publications on Canada reflected the Canadian realities in literature, history, political science and other disciplines.

In the Departmental Performance Report of FY 2000-2001, the DFAIT acknowledges that countries like Japan and the UK spend four times as much, and France eight times as much, on similar programs. Although the budget for academic relations was around 13.5 mil CAD, Canada still lagged behind the G-7 countries.¹⁹⁵

The Place of Arts in the Martin Era

When Paul Martin took office in December 2003, the cultural diplomacy programs were in full bloom. The Martin administration continued to support cultural and public diplomacy activities of the Missions by increasing the number of Missions from 22 in 2001 to 39 missions by 2004 that were funded by 1.9 mil. CAD separately from the Arts Promotion Program. Projects ranged from the support of nine Canadian authors to participate in the International Book Festival in Edinburgh; Tal Bachman's Tour in South Africa to the Canadian MUTEK Festival in Beijing.¹⁹⁶

Paul Martin's government was severely hit by the Sponsorship scandal that broke out soon after his tenure in February 2004. The sponsorship scandal revolved around the federal government's investment in advertising in Québec and that has indirectly affected

¹⁹³ DFAIT and International Trade, *Performance report -1997-1998* (Canadian Government Publishing: Ottawa, 1998), 31.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ DFAIT, *Departmental Performance Report 2000-2001*, Ottawa, 2002), 74.

¹⁹⁶ DFAIT, *Departmental Performance Report 2004-2005*, Ottawa, 2005), 29.

the Public Diplomacy Program from which cultural and academic relations were funded. The former DFAIT Official No. 5 contends that *“The scandal cut public relations funding of the embassies and we couldn’t do much that year at our Embassy and we had to wait for a new budget [...] It also brought more bureaucracy into our daily operations as we had to precisely report how many people showed at the event and what impact did the event have. But cultural events are difficult to evaluate as they primarily give emotional experience to the attendee.”*¹⁹⁷ The Evaluation of the Public Diplomacy Program (PDP) from July 2005 recommends to terminate keeping the program as a separate business line in the DFAIT budget plan: *“With respect to relevance, we find that the creation of the PDP as a pilot initiative was an appropriate response given the context in 1998. Today, the PDP may no longer be the best mechanism for pursuing the declared objectives. For many stakeholders in FAC, the PDP mechanism served to fill gaps in funding emerging from budget cuts to do programming that is deemed important for different Posts, Bureaus and Divisions in FAC. This "pilot" program has served to confirm the legitimacy of a public diplomacy function within the Department in both the international and domestic arenas. As experience with the PDP suggests, public diplomacy should not be a separate program, but a way of working in the Department.”*¹⁹⁸ The program was therefore terminated as the DFAIT redesigned certain business processes *“to enhance financial reporting, including major reform contracting”*.¹⁹⁹ However, the reconstruction of federal finance management did not help the Liberal Party to be re-elected in 2006.

Summary

The Chapter captured three election terms of Jean Chrétien from 1993 until 2003 and one term of his successor Paul Martin from 2003 until 2006. The Third Pillar was sidelined from the onset of its proclamation in 1995 due to economic constraints. The chapter listed the scope of cultural programming held from 1999 onwards when the cultural programming sprinkled at the Missions as they were assigned separate cultural

¹⁹⁷ Interview with a former DFAIT Official No.5, Montreal, April 4, 2013.

¹⁹⁸ Office of the Inspector General, “Evaluation of the Public Diplomacy Program of Foreign Affairs Canada, Section: Conclusions and Lessons to Carry Forward” (July 2005).

¹⁹⁹ DFAIT, *Departmental Performance Report 2005-2006*, Ottawa, 2006), 4

budgets. The focus on culture was included in whole-of-government approach of the third Chrétien administration exemplified on the additional funding of arts in the form of “Tomorrow Starts Today” program. The domestic policy brought fruit on the international stage by staging more events and increased funding in grants in cultural relations at DFAIT. The third election term of Chrétien followed by Paul Martin can be portrayed as a translation of Third Pillar policy into action.

Chapter 4: The place of arts in the Harper Administration

In the federal election of 2006 the Conservative party won and formed a minority government of 124 seats. The election plan called “Stand up for Canada” did not contain any foreign policy outline for Canada except a few lines of accountability of foreign aid institutions and commitment to ratify international treaties in the Parliament.²⁰⁰ Therefore, we cannot speak of any foreign policy outlook or a strategy presented by the Conservatives as we witnessed in 1993 in the Liberal Red Book.

The budget for FY 2006-2007 was designed by Martin’s administration, therefore the cultural and academic relations contributions were preserved (see Fig.4 and 5). The situation changed in May 2006 when the first set of cuts of 1 bn. CAD in federal spending was announced. The Arts Promotion Program was to be cut by 11.8 mil. CAD over next two years.²⁰¹ The reduction in federal spending was announced the same day as the Government of Canada reported a \$13.2 billion surplus (over \$5 billion greater than estimated), which was entirely dedicated to paying down the debt.²⁰²

In 2008, the grants to cultural relations were decreased by 1.6 mil. CAD from 6.3 to 4.7 mil CAD. The Departmental Performance Report 2007-2008 concludes that cultural relations “did not require an increase in departmental resources”.²⁰³ For academic relations, specifically the Canadian Studies program, the Report stated: “Two of the key findings were: (1) the Canadian Studies and Scholarships programs advance Canadian interests and foreign policy objectives; and (2) the programs are well managed and leverage resources to enhance efficiency and effectiveness.”²⁰⁴

The second round of arts funding cuts of 60.5 mil. CAD was announced in August of 2008. Domestic programs like Canadian Culture Online - New Media Research

²⁰⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, Federal Elections Platform- “Stand up for Canada”, 2006, 45.

²⁰¹ The Canadian Conference of the Arts, “Cultural Spending Cuts Part One: Trade Routes and PromArt Cuts in Context”, *CCA Bulletin* 27, August 25, 2008, URL: <http://ccarts.ca/resources/federal-policies-investments/cultural-spending-cuts-part-one-trade-routes-and-promart-cuts-in-context/> [Last access May 10, 2013].

²⁰² The Canadian Conference of the Arts, “The First Cuts Are Not Always the Deepest: Federal Government Announces \$1 Billion Reallocation of Expenditures”, *CCA Bulletin* 40 (2006), URL: <http://ccarts.ca/resources/federal-policies-investments/the-first-cuts-are-not-always-the-deepest-federal-government-announces-1-billion-reallocation-of-expenditures/> [Last access May 10, 2013].

²⁰³ DFAIT, Departmental Performance Report 2007- 2008, Section: Details of Transfer Payments , (Ottawa: 2008).

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

Networks Fund (\$5.64 mil.), National Training Program for the Film and Video Sector (\$2.5 mil., Canadian Memory Fund (\$11.5 mil.) or Canadian Arts and Heritage Sustainability Program were suspended. The cuts went along with phasing out the DFAIT grants in cultural relations from FY 2009-2010 as the red box in Fig.4 demonstrates. The cuts of summer of 2008 meant the cancellation of the Arts Promotion Program and the Trade Routes Program as the key components of cultural diplomacy. Moreover, the cuts were a surprise since Canada was hosting the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. The programs, especially the Trade Routes program, would be expected to benefit from Canadian exposure in the pre-event and post-Olympics period as a part of public diplomacy strategy.

Cancellation of the Arts Promotion Program (PromArt)

The cancellation of the Arts Promotion Program after nearly 40 years of existence was a factual diminishment of cultural diplomacy within the structure of the DFAIT. The Embassies were not allocated separate cultural and public diplomacy budgets and currently they rely on the Public Initiative Fund (PIF) that is approximately around 1.5 mil. CAD for all missions except priority missions such as Washington, London, Paris or Berlin.

Fig.9 shows spending on the Arts Promotion Program throughout the years of 2000-2009. The exact data was not available for the FY 2002-2003, nor for the earlier years as the DFAIT did not release the data for the author under the Access to Information Act during the course of writing of this thesis. However, we can see the declining trend in funding after the FY 2005/2006. The sharp contrast is in the number of projects funded – in 2004 there were 415 projects funded while in 2008 it was only 185 projects.

The impact of the cuts was reflected in the speech of Alain Paré, the co-founder and CEO of the International Conference for the Performing Arts (CINARS) held biannually in Montreal, in front of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, *“The foreseeable consequences were already disastrous for the 61 professional or artistic companies that took part in our survey. In the next three years, 327 international tours would be compromised, representing some 3,395 shows across the globe and losses of*

*more than \$24 million.*²⁰⁵ A concrete example can be demonstrated on the famous Les 7 doigts de la Main performing arts company that was founded in Montreal in 2002. The company received PromArt Funding from 2005-2008 ranging between 100,000 – 125,000 CAD annually. According to Richard Gagnon, the administrative Director of 7 doigts de la Main, *“De plus, tout l’aspect de la diplomatie culturelle développé par l’intermédiaire des agents culturels ouvrant au sein des ambassades a été abandonné. Le travail de développement de marché entrepris avec différentes ambassades ou consulats a complètement été abandonné. Nous avons perdu tout le travail fait pendant plusieurs années avec certains agents en place qui faisaient un travail formidable. C’est désolant! Cela freine le travail de développement qui pourrait être fait par des compagnies artistiques à l’étranger.”*²⁰⁶ The company therefore turned towards the Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec that increased funding for international tours for the artists.²⁰⁷ Although a Senior DFAIT Official No.2 explains that the cuts were just a part of *“government machinery”*²⁰⁸ and the programs can be renewed with a new government interested in cultural diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. On the other hand, the time is running out, and as the former Senior DFAIT Official No.4, asserts *“There will be no one to replace us”*²⁰⁹ in the sense that the diplomatic bureaucratic apparatus of the Chrétien era is retiring and soon there will be no one to transfer the know-how and lessons learned onto the next generation.


²⁰⁵ Contribution of Alain Paré at the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, March 9, 2009, URL: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3735047&Language=E&Mode=1> [Last access April 25, 2013],

²⁰⁶ Email correspondence with Robert Gagnon, 7 doigts de la Main, May 8, 2013.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Senior DFAIT Official No. 2, interview with the author, Ottawa, May 2, 2013.

²⁰⁹ Former Senior DFAIT Official No. 4, interview with the author, Toronto, May 3, 2013.



Source: Data collected from the DFAIT Departmental Performance Reports (2000, 2001, 2003) and ProMart funded project lists (2004-2009).

Cancellation of the Trade Routes Program

The Trade Routes program was a novelty within the department. For the first time, the DCH would send its officers abroad to seek new markets for Canadian cultural products. The officers were present in trade sections of the Posts. The activities of Trade Officers were definitely suspended in March 2010, but they were also affected by their inability to defend their position within the bureaucratic structure. There were two problems that arose: 1.) Trade Route officers did not have a diplomatic mandate, nor did they go through any diplomatic training, because their primary mission was seeking new trade opportunities; henceforth, their activities were positioned in sort of a vacuum within the structure of the Post 2.) The destination selection for Trade Routes Officers was ineffective because the Posts already produced a vital file on cultural activities and market opportunities within the structures of DFAIT and its subdivision of Arts and Cultural Industries Promotion. The DFAIT had officers within the Post already having

the cultural industry development in their files. Posting of Trade Routes Officers seemed to the DFAIT as “*another bureaucratic measure*”.²¹⁰

The collision of responsibilities was fatal to the Trade Routes as the Final Report on the Trade Routes Program pointed to “a need for program management to reassess the program rationale in order to enable to improve the program.”²¹¹ The DCH ordered an evaluation to be done by Capra International Inc. The Final Report, provided by the DCH to the author via the Access to Information Act Request, indicated that the DCH had many reservations to the execution of the Report as many factual mistakes are pointed out by the DCH officials themselves. The main flaw of the Report is its poor qualitative research framework, such as that the recommendations were made on the basis of two respondent research. This shows that in the strategic moment when the program executives wanted to advocate the effectiveness and existence of the program, the delivery of a credible audit failed.

As the table below shows, the Program helped primarily to the film and audio industry as they were one of the biggest recipients of funding. Another flaw of the program was that only around 20% of the 9 mil. CAD were distributed in the forms of contributions to organizations; the rest of the money was used to cover administrative expenses of the Trade Development Officers abroad and provinces.²¹² The graph below shows that the organizations were more seeking to enter to foreign markets as the amount of applications was increasing by every year.

²¹⁰ Former Senior DFAIT Official No. 4, interview with the author, Toronto, May 3, 2013.

²¹¹ Trade Routes Final Report (Capra International Inc.,2007-2008), 74.

²¹² Department of Canadian Heritage, Advice/ Recommendation to the Minister Moore, November 28, 2008.

| Fiscal Year | Applications Received | Projects Funded | % Funded |
|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------|----------|
| 2001 - 2002 | 10 | 5 | 50 |
| 2002 - 2003 | 99 | 62 | 63 |
| 2003 - 2004 | 102 | 68 | 67 |
| 2004 - 2005 | 116 | 91 | 78 |
| 2005 - 2006 | 168 | 104 | 62 |
| 2006 - 2007 | 157 | 116 | 74 |
| 2007 - 2008 | 261 | 134 | 51 |

The majority government of 2011

The Conservative party election plan of 2011, called “Here for Canada”, mentions a word culture only twice – one in relation to hate-motivated crime and the second in relation to the arts funding that lists what institutions the federal governments supported in the past, but it failed to present any kind of continuous plan for Canada’s arts sector. The Conservatives succeeded in winning a majority of the 166 seats after two terms ruling as a minority government. Further budget culture funding cuts were introduced in 2012 that took away the last piece of cultural diplomacy – the International Expositions division – within the structure of the Department of Canadian Heritage that was left in the structure of the Department of Canadian Heritage.

World Exhibitions

The engagement in the World Exhibitions serves as a good example of Canada’s retreat from the international stage. In 2006, the City of Toronto was denied to bid due to the lack of support of the provincial and federal government.²¹⁴ Later in 2010, Edmonton wanted to mark the 150th anniversary of the Confederation by hosting EXPO in 2017. Although supported by the Government of Alberta, access to the bidding contest was

²¹³ Department of Canadian Heritage, Trade Routes PPT presentation provided to the Capra International Inc, In: Trade Routes Final Report (Capra International Inc.).

²¹⁴ “Toronto’s 2015 World Expo bid is dead”, CBC News, *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*, October 24, 2006, URL: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2006/10/24/expo-bid.html> [Last access May 15, 2013].

denied by the federal government that found its contribution of \$706 million out of \$2.3 billion too expensive.²¹⁵ The destiny of the International Expositions division at DCH was suspended in March 2012 followed by official Canadian withdrawal from paying the membership fees to the Bureau of International Expositions in fall 2012. The contributions accounted for 25,000 CAD per year. Therefore, Canadian cities will not be allowed to bid to host the international events, even if they found supplementary funding apart from federal resources since Canada as country is no longer on the membership list.

Academic Relations under the Harper Government

The academic relations have undergone a major change under the Harper government. The budget was increased by more than one-half from 12.2 mil. CAD to 20 mil. CAD in comparison with mid-2000s when the budget was around 13 mil. CAD. The major change was in the portfolio of the scholarships and grants for international scholars. New scholarship programs such as the Banting Scholarships for postdoctoral students, that are primarily focused on science and technology disciplines, were established.²¹⁶ The Vanier Scholarships are graduate scholarships that vary from health sciences and engineering to humanities and social sciences. The Faculty Leadership Program is aimed at visiting scholars from the CARICOM countries. In 2009, the Emerging Leaders in the Americas Program (ELAP)²¹⁷ was launched to bring up new leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the new scholarship program was launched between Canada and Brazil under the International Science and Technology Partnership Program.²¹⁸

The Canada Studies Program, re-named in 2008 to the Understanding Canada

²¹⁵ “Toronto’s 2015 World Expo bid is dead”, CBC News, *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*, October 24, 2006, URL: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2006/10/24/expo-bid.html> [Last Access, May 15, 2013].

²¹⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The Banting Postdoctoral Fellowships Program, URL: <http://banting.fellowships-bourses.gc.ca/res/2010-2011-eng.html> [Last access April 20, 2013].

²¹⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Emerging Leaders in America, URL: <http://www.scholarships-bourses.gc.ca/scholarships-bourses/can/institutions/elap-pfla.aspx?lang=eng&view=d> [Last access April 20, 2013].

²¹⁸ PM Stephen Harper press release, “PM underscores importance of scientific cooperation and higher education”, Primer Minister Website, URL: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=4228> [Last access April 20, 2013].

Program, was terminated after more than 35 years of existence in 2012. The traditional purpose of the program was to create “*a network of people who know Canada better*”²¹⁹, a network of highly respected ambassadors able to explain and interpret Canada and its policies to their governments and fellow citizens abroad.²²⁰ The scope of the Canada studies network is comprised of 6,000 professors in Canadian studies, 290 centres and programs, 15,000 courses with Canadian content, over 4,500 scholarly articles and 750 books published annually with 34% published in languages other than French or English all touching upon priority themes. Publishing in another language became very important in countries such as Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia, which are all priority countries for the diversification of Canadian exports. Moreover, the members of Canadian Studies communities served in influential positions of advisers and consultants to their governments. Examples include: a member of the Netherlands association advising to the Queen on her trip to Canada and contributing to her speeches and French and Russian Canadianists publishing articles in favour of Canada’s position in the Arctic; the participants of the Program included Belgium minister for environment Paul Magnette or Spanish minister of defense Carme Chacon, and the current Croatian president Ivo Josipovic.²²¹ In relation to cultural diplomacy, the academic program of Canada Studies has had a big impact on the perception of Canada abroad.

The decision to cut the Understanding Canada 5 mil. CAD budget was announced in May 2012 due to fiscal austerity measures. The decision of the DFAIT resonated in the cultural and academic community in the form of an open letter to the federal government urging “*to create a system that will replace ‘Understanding Canada’ and give a new impetus throughout the world in the blossoming field of Canadian studies*”.²²² However, the program was not replaced. The cuts hit the associations of Canada studies with a loss of approximately 1.37 mil. CAD. This, consequently, led to a loss of 5.5 mil CAD in

²¹⁹ Interview with Senior DFAIT Official No.1, April 8, 2013.

²²⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, internal document.

²²¹ Interview with Senior DFAIT Official No.1, April 9, 2013.

²²² Margaret Atwood, Neil Bissoondath, George Bowering, Dionne Brand, Wayson Choy, Elizabeth Hay, Jack Hodgins, Thomas King, Alistair MacLeod, Rohinton Mistry, Timothy Taylor, Jane Urquhart, Aritha van Herk, Rudy Wiebe, D.M.R. Bentley, Neil Besner, Eva-Marie Kroller, W.H. New, David Staines, Brian Trehearne, “*Understanding Canada no More*”, June 19, 2012. Available at : <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/columnists/understanding-canada-no-more/article4332911/> [Last access April 20, 2013].

revenue typically generated back into the Canadian economy by this funding. The International Council for Canadian Studies (ICCS) therefore cancelled scholarship programs such as the Faculty Enrichment Program, Faculty Research Program, Doctoral Student Program, Library Support program, and International Linkages Program.

The program was cut although the expenditures in academic relations were increasing in the last years. Priority themes of the Understanding Program were: Peace and Security; North American partnerships; Democracy, Human Rights; Rule of Law; Economic Prosperity; Managing Diversity; and Environment/Strategy.²²³ As we can see, some of these disciplines, such as Economic prosperity, are covered by other scholarships such as the Vanier scholarships, but topics such as ‘Managing Diversity’ or ‘Human Rights’ fell out of the portfolio of the Academic Relations at DFAIT completely as a part of re-orientation towards more exact science disciplines.

The Understanding Canada program served a useful and long-term tool of Canadian cultural diplomacy. The Program was an example of building a capital that transformed into a resource of a network of people with a positive relationship towards Canada and vast knowledge about Canadian realities. The cancellation of the program will have a negative effect on the study of Canada in the future because there might be no specialists on Canadian issues and policies internationally. Moreover, the original statement of the Government that the Program was cut due to austerity measures proves invalid as the funding for Academic relations and the DFAIT’s budget itself have been increasing in the past six years (see Fig.3 and 5). As indicated by two Senior DFAIT officials, the decision to cancel the Canadian studies program was not an ideological decision, but rather “one-person decision”.

Summary

This chapter outlined the main changes in cultural diplomacy management under the Harper administration since 2006. As portrayed on the election plans, culture and related topics, such as human rights and managing diversity, have not been considered by the Harper government as strategic tools of foreign policy management since the very

²²³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “DFAIT Launches ‘Understanding Canada’ Program”, (DFAIT Press Release), April 1st, 2008.

beginning of the first election term. Given the fact that most budget cuts were advocated as necessary reductions in government spending, looking at the increasing DFAIT budget and a growth in academic relations funding proves that the money saved by abolishing the PromArt or the Canadian Studies were not saving but reallocation measures. The question for further research is to examine on what particular programs the money was spent. Given the reality of the absence of foreign policy review since 2005, and therefore overall foreign policy strategy, the identification process will be difficult.

Conclusions

This thesis set out to examine how the attitudes of the Canadian governments towards cultural diplomacy have varied throughout the period of 1993 until 2012. The Third Pillar, a foreign policy objective to promote Canadian culture and values abroad, proved as the main linchpin to incorporate culture into the set of foreign policy tools of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The policy of the Third Pillar translated into action only after the third election term of Jean Chretien. It was at this time that Canadian economy recovered; therefore, the government could concentrate on accomplishing its commitment to the Third Pillar.

The organizational aspect of the Third Pillar played an important role in changing the perception of cultural diplomacy as only a value-added component to Canadian foreign policy activities. Until 1995, culture was not anchored and considered within the DFAIT bureaucratic apparatus as an equal tool to traditional diplomacy. The reason why cultural diplomacy was challenged as an equal part of the DFAIT portfolio was three-fold. Firstly, cultural diplomacy is attributed as a part of public diplomacy programming that was still a field on the rise in the 1990s. The soft power concept, in which public diplomacy and hence, cultural diplomacy, were included was globally acknowledged only after the attacks of 9/11. This was a wake-up call, which meant that caring about public opinion and the opinion of non-state actors rose in importance. Additionally, the soft power concept began to occupy the minds of the academics and decision-makers as they were challenged to adjust to a new set of rules on the international scene. Secondly, the DFAIT was missing a human capital that would permeate between the bureaucratic apparatus and the cultural community. The challenge for the government was to build credibility within the cultural community and be perceived as ‘a steward’ of the international cultural relations, rather than a policy trendsetter and controller. Lastly, the constant challenge for the Canadian cultural sector posed by their proximity to the United States — the largest English-speaking country in the world, and its giant cultural market — makes it difficult to keep Canadian talents from moving southwards and stand out amongst the

competition. This serves as an argument as to why the Canadian government should have a stable and coherent cultural diplomacy apparatus.

The Third Pillar was an attempt at achieving a substantial cultural international presence in the global market. The establishment of the Arts Promotion and Cultural Industries Division at the time helped to crystallize the position of cultural diplomacy within the Department as the economic potential of cultural industries was emphasized at home and internationally. By the 2000s, the potential of cultural diplomacy could be fully revealed and cultural diplomacy gained a new impetus represented by separate cultural budgets of more than 30 Missions abroad. The grants in cultural and academic relations, namely the Arts Promotion Program (PromArt), were increased and companies such as Les 7 doigts de la main were provided with touring grants that partially covered their costs. The company serves as good example of how seed-money is important in the beginning of the international career of the company. Today, the company, Les 7 doigts de la main, performs on three continents at the same time. The more famous story is that of the Cirque du Soleil, which benefited from federal funding in the 1980s to establish a multi-billion dollar business two decades later. The Arts Promotion Program, therefore, was a specific cultural diplomacy tool that delivered results in long-term.

The examination of the Canadian cultural diplomacy tools, and the analysis of government attitudes towards cultural diplomacy, indicate that the absence of a single politically independent institution is the reason why was cultural diplomacy always perceived as an ad-hoc activity of the government's foreign policies. Although the Canada Council for the Arts has an international component in its mandate and covers the most of arts disciplines, its primary focus is on domestic policies and advancing Canadian artists' lives at home. The focus on projecting the Canadian image abroad is marginal. The Cultural Centre in Paris provides a good example of the weight of importance of Canadian cultural presence abroad to the government. The Centre was destined to have cuts in operations due to austerity measures towards the end of the Mulroney government. The Liberals understood the significance of the institutions, and despite the large economic policy reforms typical of the mid-1990s, the existence of the Centre was secured.

However, the Liberal governments did not manage to solidify the position of cultural diplomacy as a strategic, coherent and tangible part of the foreign policy tool portfolio to be accepted by future governments. The gradual eclipse of cultural diplomacy as a means of soft power under the Harper government could have been expected already in the election campaign of 2006 where foreign policy and culture received little attention, as exemplified by the Conservative election plan “Stand up for Canada”. The cancellation of programs such as Understanding Canada, the Arts Promotion Program, the Trade Routes Program or withdrawing from the International Expositions Bureau are concrete examples of how the Canadian government gradually withdrew from the international spotlight. It also decreased the networking of the Canadian government to find allies and supporters of Canadian policies in the future. Grants in cultural relations were abolished by FY 2009-2010, while attention was drawn to educational promotion activities as the international students represent a significant economic impact on the Canadian economy.

Culture and arts provide a venue where people can find a common ground, as do the diplomats. It provides a low-risk conversation bridge between people of different backgrounds. This is the cornerstone of cultural diplomacy that should not be discouraged, but should instead be a focus point of the government’s foreign policy management. Cultural diplomacy creates soft power capital that is a complement of hard power, not its alternative.

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