

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut politologických studií

Bakalářská práce

2011

Lenka Hlaváčová

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut politologických studií, Katedra mezinárodních vztahů

Lenka Hlaváčová

**Reasons of U.S. veto in the United Nations Security
Council on behalf of Israel, 1972-1997**

Bakalářská práce

Praha 2011

Autor práce: **Lenka Hlaváčová**

Vedoucí práce: **Mgr. Pavel Příkryl**

Rok obhajoby: **2011**

Bibliografický záznam

HLAVÁČOVÁ, Lenka. The Reasons for the U.S. Veto in the United Nations Security Council on Behalf of Israel, 1972-1997. Praha, 2010. 97 s. Bakalárska práca (Bc.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálných vied, Institut politologických studií. Katedra mezinárodních vztahů. Vedúci bakalárskej práce Mgr. Pavel Přikryl

Abstrakt

Hlavným cieľom tejto práce je na základe predložených rezolúcií určiť a definovať príčiny, ktoré vedú Spojené štáty americké k používaniu veta v Bezpečnostnej Rade OSN v prospech Izraela. Autor predstavuje rezolúcie vetované USA v otázke Izraela v období rokov 1972 – 1997. Analýza sa sústreďuje na štyri oblasti: kto predkladá rezolúcie, o čom rezolúcie pojednávajú, aký jazyk v nich je použitý a aké je vyjadrenie amerického vyslanca pri OSN. Autor stanovuje, že predkladatelia rezolúcie nie sú relevantným faktorom, ktorý by ovplyvňoval americké rozhodovanie. Prikláňa sa k názoru, že jazyk rezolúcie a riešenie Arabsko-Izraelského konfliktu Bezpečnostnou radou sú s najväčšou pravdepodobnosťou príčinami pre americké veto, rovnako ako nevyrovnanosť rezolúcií (podľa amerického chápania). USA odmieta odsúdenie Izraela v rezolúciách BR OSN a snaží sa, aby Arabsko-Izraelský konflikt bol vyriešený stranami, ktoré sú jeho aktívnou súčasťou a nie tretím subjektom, ktorý stanoví jeho podmienky.

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to define the reasons of the U.S. veto on behalf of Israel in the United Nations Security Council through analysis of the drafted resolutions. Author presents the resolutions vetoed by the U.S. on Israel in 1972-1997. The analysis focuses on four fields: who proposes the resolutions, what is the subject of the resolutions, what language is used in the resolutions, and what is the stance of the U.S. Representative to UN. Author states that the sponsors of the resolutions aren't relevant for the U.S. decision-making. Author rather supports the opinion that the language used and the intention to solve the Arab-Israeli Conflict by the UN SC are most probably the reasons for the U.S. veto. The unbalancedness of the resolutions (in the U.S. Understanding) is also one of the causes of the veto. U.S. is refusing to condemn Israel in UN SC resolutions and it is trying to have the Arab-Israeli conflict solved by the parties involved and not by the third party who would impose the conditions of the settlement..

Kľúčové slová

Spojené štáty americké, Izrael, OSN, Bezpečnostná Rada. veto, arabsko-izraelský konflikt

Keywords

United States, Israel, United Nations, Security Council, veto power, Arab-Israeli conflict

Rozsah práce: 83 091 znakov s medzerami

Prehlásenie

1. Prehlasujem, že som predkladanú prácu spracovala samostatne a použila som len uvedené pramene a literatúru.
2. Prehlasujem, že práca nebola využitá k získaniu iného titulu.
3. Súhlasím s tým, aby práca bola sprístupnená pre štúdijné a výskumné účely.

V Prahe dňa 10.7.2011

Lenka Hlaváčová

Pod'akovanie

Na tomto mieste by som rada pod'akovala vedúcemu svojej bakalárskej práce, Mgr. Pavlovi Přikrylovi za jeho konštruktívnu kritiku a rady pri písaní. Rovnako by som rada pod'akovala Oddeleniu zahraničných stykov FSV UK za možnosť štúdia na Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya v Izraeli, bez ktorého by získanie množstva materiálov a poznatkov nebolo možné.

Table of content

Table of content.....	1
Introduction.....	2-3
1. Background.....	4
1.1 United States-Israeli relations.....	4-7
1.2 United Nations Security Council.....	7-9
1.2.1 United States in the United Nations.....	9-10
2. Vetoes SC UN resolutions.....	11
2.1 Prior to the first veto.....	11
2.2 The U.S. vetoed UN SC resolutions.....	12-23
2.3 Voting behavior of other UN SC permanent members.....	23-24
2.4 Issues of resolutions.....	24-26
2.5 Resolution proposals.....	26-27
2.6 Common features of the U.S. vetoed resolutions.....	28-33
3. Reasons behind U.S. veto on behalf of Israel.....	34
3.1 Selection of vocabulary and the U.S. veto.....	35-37
3.2 Conflict settlement and the U.S. veto.....	37-38
3.3 Official reasons and the U.S. veto.....	38-39
4. Application to the resolution S/2011/24.....	40-41
5. Conclusion.....	42-44
Summary.....	45-46
Bibliography.....	47-51
Annex	52-54
Project of the BA thesis (in Slovak).....	55-61

Introduction

Two years after the conclusion of the the Second World War, in 1947, the creation of the independent state of Israel in Palestine, which was administrated by British mandate at that time, was proposed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. State of Israel was created on May 14, 1948 by Proclamation of Independence. However, its creation led to crisis in the Middle East, where the newly emerged Jewish state has been refused by its neighbors and Arab world which called for it annihilation. Since this moment, the antagonism between Jewish state and Muslim world deepened and Israeli-Palestinian conflict was developed what created an issue which is troubling entire international community.

Despite the problems it has to face, Israel is supported by the strong ally – United States of America. Even though US was the first country to recognize the independence of the newly established state, it was not automatic ally from the beginning. Quite contrary, in the era of Cold War, Israel has been fighting for its independence in 1948 by the arms from Eastern bloc, namely Czechoslovakia and at its beginnings have been supported by the USSR.¹ However, the close ties between these two countries developed over the years and the beginning of the “special relation” can be traced to Kennedy's administrative. However, the real US interest and close ties developed after the Six-Day War in 1967 and especially after the Israel's promise to support Jordan during Jordanian crisis in 1970. Nowadays, this close relationship can be linked directly to the US foreign policy towards Israel or in the United Nations Security Council where US repeatedly since 1972 casts the veto to protect Israel's actions.

The main goal of this thesis is to present the reasons for the use of the US veto in the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the state of Israel in 1972 and 1997. This period of time is

¹ **PODHORETZ, N.** *Israel and the United States: A complex history*. Commentary 105, no. 5 (May 1998): 28. Academic Search Complete, p.28

chosen as author believed its a representative sample. The year 1972 is the year when the first veto was casted. The year 1997 was chosen as the last veto prior to Second intifada in 2000 was casted at this year. Author chose not to include the period of Second Intifada as the civil war in Israel could misinterpret the findings. This year is also the last time the veto was exercised during Clinton administration and before the 9/11 attacks.

The goal of this thesis should be successfully accomplished by analysis of the vetoed resolutions and drawing the similarities among them. To achieve this objective, there will be a brief presentation of the relations between US and Israel. Furthermore, the goals and functions of the United Nations Security Council will be presented and the U.S. representation within its framework would be described. To achieve the satisfactory conclusions, the vetoed resolutions would be analyzed and it should be possible to define the reasons for the US veto. At the end, we should be able to understand what drives US foreign policy in this matter despite the continuous changes in US leadership. To prove our findings, the results would be applied to the latest UN SC drafted resolution.

To achieve satisfactory results, the qualitative case study would be applied on numerous vetoed resolutions to obtain reasons for the use of the veto casted by the US in UN SC. The comparison of the resolutions and finding the similarities and differences should raise the key factors influencing the US decision-making. The US veto on behalf of Israel would be the dependent variable and the factors which affect the US decision would be the independent variable in the following research.

The basic work which sets the ground for this thesis is James Ross-Nazzal's *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* published in 2008. Furthermore, the collection of the UN resolutions on Israel vetoed by US and the stands of the U.S. representatives would be the core for the research.

1. Background

In this chapter, the background of the United States – Israeli relationship would be described to reader as well as the United Nations Security Council would be introduced. Also, the the brief introduction of the U.S. in UN would be made. This is necessary prior the analysis of the resolutions so the reader might understand the bigger picture of the problem.

1.1 United States - Israeli Relations

Relation between United States and Israel is being referred to as a “special relationship” and was developed gradually. It is based on “common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests. Relations have evolved through legislation; memoranda of understanding; economic, scientific, military agreements; and trade.”² Despite this fact it was not always so.

Prior the Second World War, United States did not have any specific policy which would refer to the Middle East and even after the war US didn't develop anything particular in this matter. It was keeping the distance from the area due to the British rule. However, British sought the termination of their responsibility and handed the issue over to the United Nations.³ The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created and the plan proposition on Palestine's division was presented. It passed also with support of the US. In the words of president Truman (1945-1953), US did so “to help bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism.”⁴ This position could be also explained by close Jewish friendships of the

2 **MIGDALOVITZ, C.** *Israel: Background and Relations with the United States*, CRS Report for Congress, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB82008.pdf (March 27, 2011), p.26

3 **REICH, B.** “The Beginning of Relationship”, *United States and Israel* (Praeger Publishers, 1984), p.3

4 Ibid.

president and also his dependence on Jewish support.⁵ However, the Department of State and Department of War perceived decision as harmful because of the access to Arab oil. Therefore, the decision taken by president Truman was solely his own without support of his cabinet.

During the Eisenhower's presidency (1953-1961), the relations were neutral due to US policy's focus on the strategic importance of Arab oil countries and their role in containment of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Eisenhower was the only US president since establishment of Israel in 1948 who confronted Jerusalem and called for the changes in its policy⁶ and this era is usually seen as the coldest part of the relationship between the two countries.

Kennedy's short lasting presidency (1961-1963) set itself a goal to improve relations with Egypt, therefore it needed to settle Arab-Israeli conflict. However, despite the attempt to portray the balanced position, president Kennedy on December 27, 1962 told Golda Meir that "the United States has a special relationship with Israel really comparable to what it has with Britain over a wide range of issues"⁷ During the period of 1961-1963, the really close ties were created and US for the first time supplied Israel with sophisticated weapons in order to reinforce Israel's superiority in the area.⁸ The relationship was also deepened during Johnson administration (1963-1969), when the sale of the phantom fighters has been approved to Israel. However, up until Six-Day War in 1967, "the U.S. position could be characterized as seeking to prevent an Arab-Israeli war while promoting regional security, stability, and socioeconomic improvement."⁹

After the war, when Israel unexpectedly won against presumably more powerful adversaries, the US interest grew as it has seen an opportunity to form a strategic alliance with a strong state in the Middle East. During Nixon administration (1969-1974) the ties grew closer and the official policy has

5 **SPIEGEL, S. L.** "Eisenhower", *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (The University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.52

6 *Ibid.* p.91

7 **MANSOUR, C.** *Beyond Alliance: Israel and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 82.

8 **PODHORETZ, N.** *Israel and the United States: A complex history*. Commentary 105, no. 5 (May 1998): 28. Academic Search Complete, p.32

9 **REICH, B.** "The Beginning of Relationship", *United States and Israel* (Praeger Publishers, 1984), p.9

been created. The real impact on the policy was the Israeli decision to back Jordan against the Palestinian organizations in Jordan in September 1970 (what is also known as Black September). And even though the weapons were already shipped to Israel during the Six-Day War to create balance¹⁰, it wasn't until Yom Kippur War in 1973 when US support was crucial for the Israel's survival. At this point, US airlift to Israel changed the course of the war and many authors such as historian Stephen Ambrose or Michael Thomas argue that without US help Israel would be destroyed by Arab countries. Furthermore, it was US, namely Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who successfully mediated the peace talks between Egypt and Israel after the war and “created the conditions for and initiated a new Arab-Israeli peace process, beginning with a limited settlement.”¹¹ In the following years and Ford administration (1974-1977), Kissinger still was a dominant figure in US diplomacy towards Arab-Israeli conflict.

During the Carter administration (1977-1981), the shift in the policy could be perceived. While Nixon/Ford and Kissinger have seen main problem in conflict the relation between Arab countries and Israel, Carter and Brzezinski believed in solving of the Palestinian problem as a solution.¹² This policy created tensions between the US and Israel. The biggest success of this administration has been the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt signed as Camp David Accords in 1978 which was mediated by president Carter.

Reagan administration (1981-1989) continued in support for Israel despite the disagreements which arose during the First Lebanon War in 1982 and Israel's rejection of the peace plan proposed by Reagan. However, these events didn't seriously challenge the relationship between the two countries and during the Reagan's second term, the ties grew even stronger with US-Israeli agreements in

10 U.S was supporting Israel while U.S.S.R. was supporting Egypt in the Yom Kippur war, which was proxy war in the Cold War era.

11 **SPIEGEL, S. L.** “Nixon and Ford”, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (The University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.314

12 **PODHORETZ, N.** *Israel and the United States: A complex history*. Commentary 105, no. 5 (May 1998): 28. Academic Search Complete, p.35

strategic and defense cooperation, what made it “most pro-Israel ever”.¹³

The relations cooled down during Bush administration (1989-1993) and it was widely reported that no amicable relationship was shared between Bush administration and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Improvement occurred after the election in 1992, when he was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin.¹⁴ The agreements on freezing the settlements in West Bank and US loan guarantees have been agreed on.

During the two terms of president Clinton (1993-2001), mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) occurred and in 1995 the Oslo Accords (officially Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements) have been signed under auspices of the US. Furthermore, it was Clinton's achievement to host negotiations between two parties at the River Conference Center in 1998.

Additionally, it is important to mention that Israel is the number one receiver of the U.S economic and military aid. It received about 100 billion USD since its independence (Annex I) - an average of 3-3.5 billion per year what is about one fifth of US foreign aid. It is also interesting to notice that the amount of aid ten-folded in the years following the Jordanian crisis in 1970 (1968 - \$25m; 1969 - \$85m; 1970 - \$30m; 1971 - \$545m; 1972 – \$300m; 1973 - \$307.5)¹⁵, in the same time U.S. started to exercise its veto power to back Israel in UN Security Council.

1.2 United Nations Security Council

United Nations Security Council (UN SC) is one of the six organs which were established after

13 **CLYDE, R. M.** *Israeli-United States Relations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB82008 [online]. 2003.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/14820.pdf> (April 3, 2011), p.2

14 Ibid p.3

15 **QUANDT, William.** “The Nixon and Ford Presidencies”, *Peace Process*. (University of California Press, 2001), p.104

the Second World War within United Nations in order to prevent any future human disaster. Its first meeting was convened in 1946 and since then it held sessions continuously up to this day. The UN Charter assigned functions, goals and powers to the UN SC and they are enumerated in its Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII. The primary responsibility of this organ is “the maintenance of international peace and security”¹⁶ while acting on behalf of the members of the UN. To be able to achieve these objectives and prevent conflicts, it is authorized to create peacekeeping operations, impose international sanctions and authorize military actions (the only UN body authorized to use this mean to resolve the conflict situation).

United Nations Security Council consists of 15 members¹⁷ - 5 permanent members (China¹⁸, Russia¹⁹, France, United Kingdom and United States of America) and 10 non-permanent members elected for two year terms. Five permanent members are reflecting the power-structure in the world after the Second World War and are entitled to veto power on resolutions which are targeting any other but procedural matters. The use of veto, in the words of Bailey and Daws, is “the failure of the Council to adopt a resolution due to the negative vote of one or more permanent members, during a vote in which nine or more members of the Council have voted in favor.”²⁰ It means that voting against a resolution by any of these members would lead to failing of the draft resolution. This gives them great power in decision-making in the UN, thus in international system as a whole. However, resolution may be passed if the permanent member decides to abstain from the vote.

Since establishment of the SC UN in 1946 until 2001, veto power has been exercised 248 times. It was most often used by the USSR during the Cold War (115 vetoes till 1991) and up to this date it is the member with the highest number of vetoes (121 till 2001). In the period of years 1946 – 2001, US casted veto 76 times, United Kingdom 32 times, France 18 times and China 4 times.²¹ In the

16 UN Charter, Chapter V, Article 24

17 In 1966, number of non-permanent members arose from 6 to 10.

18 Represented by the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1945-1971 and replaced by the People's Republic of China in 1971.

19 Russia is a successor of the USSR after it dissolved in 1991.

20 **BAILEY and DAWS**, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Clarendon, 1998), 3rd Edition, p.228

21 Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, <http://globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and->

case of US, which is relevant for our research, the veto has been used 32 times until 1997 in the case of the Middle East issues and peace process solution. In the majority of the cases, US was the sole member who opposed the draft resolution and in many cases the resolutions were withdrawn because the use of US veto was certain.²² However, it is relevant to say that since the end of the Cold War, the number of vetoes casted dramatically dropped.

1.2.1 United States in the United Nations

United States created the U.S. mission to the United Nations in 1947, in order to assist the President and the Department of State to conduct the policies of U.S. at the United Nations. It is headed by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations (in shorter version U.S. Permanent Representative) who is appointed by the U.S. president and approved by the vote in Senate.

It is the U.S. representative who is in charge of representing U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly as well as Security Council. His or her decisions are in accordance with the U.S. policies and he or she disposes of a large supportive bureau (The U.S. Mission to the UN). This function is especially entitled to the political section which is divided into geopolitical areas and helps “formulate and articulate the United States position on all political and security matters under discussion at the United Nations.”²³ Another important body which provides support is the legal section which “provides counsel and service on all matters of an international legal character arising in

charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/use-of-the-veto.html (June 3, 2011)

22 THOMAS, M. *American Policy Toward Israel: The power and limits of beliefs*, (Routledge, 2007), p.5

23 United States Mission to the United Nations, Political Section, online: http://usun.state.gov/about/pol_sec/index.htm (July 1, 2011)

the course of the United States' participation in the United Nations.’’²⁴

Over the years, many influential figures headed the office, such as later president George H.W. Bush or Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. (The complete list of the U.S. Permanent Representatives in 1972-1997 can be found in the Annex II.)

²⁴ United States Mission to the United Nations, International Law, online:
http://www.archive.usun.state.gov/Issues/int_law.html (July 1, 2011)

2. Vetoed SC UN resolutions

2.1 Prior to the first veto

The history of the U.S. veto in United Nations Security Council goes back to the Cold War Era, when the world was divided by Iron Curtain into two competing camps. Both U.S. and Soviet Union wanted to establish their position in the Middle East. While the U.S.S.R opted at the end for the alliance with Arab world represented by Egypt and Syria, U.S. changed its more even-handed approach after the Six-Day War (and especially after the Yom Kippur War) and its policies biased towards Israel. After the Six-Day War the Resolution 242 from 1967 became a resolution for the future reference as all the parties concerned agreed upon its principles and basically led to recognition of Israel by Arab countries. It also called upon the “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories²⁵ occupied.”²⁶ However, “according to Abba Eban, the Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1967, the U.S. voted in favor of the resolution, while stipulating that future Security Council resolutions which the United States deemed hostile to Israel would be vetoed by the United States unless Israel and at least two Arab countries acquiesced to the proposed resolution.”²⁷

In the years 1967-1970, the Security Council passed 10 resolutions condemning Israel for its military practices, however, they were not vetoed by the U.S. because they were not directing or imposing a settlement upon the Palestinians or Israel.²⁸

25 French version calls for “the territories” instead of “territories”.

26 Resolution 242, online: <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8254613.87634277.html> (May 9, 2011)

27 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.16

28 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.18

2.2 U.S. Vetoed UN SC Resolutions

The first resolution vetoed by the U.S. on behalf of Israel was a draft resolution S/10784 from September 10, 1972. The resolution called on “the parties concerned to cease immediately all military operations and to exercise greatest restraint in the interest of international peace and security.”²⁹ (This resolution was proposed after the Israel's air attacks on the civilian targets in Syria and Lebanon) The resolution didn't pass due to U.S. voting against explaining its vote on unbalanced character of the resolution (it didn't take into account the terrorist acts leading to the Israeli actions). It was at this time that the U.S. proclaimed that in order to obtain its concurrence, “any draft resolution before the Council would have to be balanced and show concern about terrorist acts as well as Israeli attacks.”³⁰

Draft resolution S/10974 voted on July 24, 1973 “strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict”³¹, “expresses serious concern at Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”³², declared no change to occupied territories which might complicate a peaceful and final settlement and the rights of inhabitants in these territories should be recognized. U.S. called the draft resolution highly partisan and unbalanced, changing the principles of the Resolution 242 which was agreed by all the parties.³³

The next resolution was vetoed by U.S. in 1975. The draft resolution S/11898 condemned the

29 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/10784, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/99bac90768dbb503052565310071d0ec?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

30 United Nations Yearbook, 1972 (New York: United Nations, 1973), online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/de9be8e9630430da8525631c0067f2e4?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

31 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/10974, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/d359ecec4eb0e3ea50525652900785400?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

32 Ibid.

33 United Nations Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations, 1974), online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/7a23051153b0889d85256349005d41ad?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

Israeli government for the air attacks on Lebanon and called upon its cessation. The U.S. vetoed the resolution on the grounds that it was unbalanced and didn't condemn both sides – Lebanon's actions needed to be condemned as well.

There were 3 more draft resolutions concerning Middle East in 1976 which were vetoed by the U.S. The draft resolution S/11940 from January 1976 affirmed “that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine”³⁴ and “that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967.”³⁵ The U.S. representative to UN explained that the U.S. vote “was not based on antipathy to the aspirations of the Palestinians but rather on the conviction that passage of the draft resolution would not ameliorate the condition of the Palestinians or be the most effective way of addressing the long-neglected problem of their future in the context of an over-all settlement.”³⁶ Draft resolution S/12022 from March 1976 vetoed by U.S. deplored “Israel's failure to put a stop to action and policies tending to change the status of the Jerusalem”³⁷ and called “on Israel, pending the speedy termination of its occupation, to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories.”³⁸ The U.S. Ambassador William Scranton called resolution unbalanced and “stated that not only was the U.S. involved with the parties in reaching a diplomatic end to the 'Question of the Middle East,' but that the U.S. had made more progress in that endeavor than had the Security Council since 1967.”³⁹ The last vetoed resolution in 1976 was the resolution S/12119 affirming “inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national

34 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/11940, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/696d540fd7821bce0525651c00736250?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

35 Ibid.

36 United Nations Yearbook, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1977), online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/295767025a94cb1f85256396004f101b?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

37 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/12022, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/4db1f4f41b666425052565310058461c?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

38 Ibid.

39 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.71

independence and sovereignty in Palestine.”⁴⁰ U.S. representative explained the negative vote of the U.S. as the text being “totally devoid of balance, stressing the rights and interests of one party and ignoring those of other parties. The political interests of the Palestinians and their role in a final settlement, he said, was a matter that had to be negotiated between the parties before it could be defined in Council resolutions.”⁴¹

For the next 4 years, no resolution on Middle East had been vetoed by the U.S. Also, there was a change in the U.S. leadership in this period. Jimmy Carter became the new American president in January 1977 and the dominance of Henry Kissinger as the Secretary of State ended when he was replaced by Cyrus Vance. In the following years, two resolutions were passed on Middle East what seemed to be a change in the U.S. position. Ross-Nazzal wrote that :

“Resolution 446 of March 22nd 1979 was the first instance in which a Security Council resolution referred to the area in question as 'the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.' The resolution affirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12th 1949 to the 'Arab territories, including Jerusalem.' The resolution also determined that Israel's settlement policy 'in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.' In addition, the resolution called upon Israel to desist from changing the character of 'the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.' Finally, the resolution called for the creation of a Commission to examine the Israeli settlement policy and its effect in the occupied territories. Although it is an important resolution not only because it was the first time in which the Security Council referred to the area as the 'Palestinian' territories, but its concern with Israeli settlements was also shared by Carter. 'The long- standing position of the United States,' Carter later wrote, 'was that we were opposed to the establishment to be illegal and an obstacle to peace.' A similarly worded resolution was passed by the Council on July 20th 1979 which called on Israel to cease settlement activities.”⁴²

However, it is important to realize that in the time when the U.S. didn't exercise its veto to

40 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/12119, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/f9678de127e481f90525651c0073b022?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

41 United Nations Yearbook, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1977)

42 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.71-72

protect Israel, Israel was in the process of invading southern Lebanon – Litani operation (withdrawal started after SC Resolution 425 was passed)⁴³.

Despite this brief period and the resolutions passed thanks to U.S. abstention from voting, U.S. interest in the area didn't stop and U.S. continued to veto resolutions which were opposing Israeli interest in the future.⁴⁴ In the early 1980, the resolution 465 which called for dismantling of the previously determined illegal settlements in the Arab occupied territories, passed, however, in the words of the president Carter, it happened by mistake.⁴⁵ In 1980, the draft resolution S/13911 which was in many points similar to draft resolution S/11940 (calling for inalienable rights of Palestinians and deploring Israel's occupation of Arab territories) was vetoed by the U.S. The veto was casted on the ground of the ongoing settlement solution conducted by U.S. according to Camp David Accords which were agreed upon by the disputed parties.

In the year 1982, the First Lebanon War outbreak after the attempt to assassinate Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom. In this year, six resolutions on the Middle East were presented and all six draft resolutions were vetoed by the U.S. First one, draft resolution S/14832, condemned Israel for failing to comply with SC resolution 497 (1981)⁴⁶ and GA resolution 36/266B (1981) as well as called upon the member states to consider application of the “concrete and effective measures in order to nullify the Israeli annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights and to refrain from providing any assistance or aid to and co-operation with Israel in all fields.”⁴⁷ The U.S. based its decision on the fact that it didn't believe that the Golan Heights had been annexed by Israel.⁴⁸

43 However, it remains questionable if it was the UN and the resolution 425 or the intense U.S. pressure what led to withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

44 The U.S. engagement in the peace process is obvious from the Carter's initiative of Camp David Accords which were the framework to settle the conflict.

45 More issues were risen by this resolution, however, president Carter was concerned by dismantling more than by the sanctions or the status of Jerusalem.

46 Resolution 497 solely calls the imposition of laws and jurisdiction of occupied Golan Heights void and null but doesn't condemn Israel in any way.

47 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/14832, online:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/a34ace3ac50615f50525652900788fa9?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

48 It's an interesting excuse for the decision because Golan Heights Law was ratified by Knesset in 1981. The UN SC Resolution 497 condemns this annexation and U.S. voted in favor of this resolution.

Next vetoed resolution was draft resolution S/14943 and basically condemned Israel for the violation of human rights in the occupied territories and denounced its dismissal of elected mayors elected by Palestinians. U.S. called the resolution unbalanced as well as not promoting the peace as it didn't refer to UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Another resolution followed soon afterwards. Draft resolution S/14985 condemned “”shooting of worshipers by armed Israeli within precincts of al-Haram al-Shareef” and deplored “any act of encouragement of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem as tending to disturb world peace.”⁴⁹ U.S. called the resolution unbalanced and Jeanne Kirkpatrick claimed the resolution “would have made acts of violence more, not less, likely to happen in the future.”⁵⁰

The draft resolution S/15185 condemned Israel's non-compliance with previous resolutions (508⁵¹ and 509⁵²), called upon Israel to withdraw to internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon and cease fire. U.S. representative casted her veto because resolution was unbalanced and the lasting peace wouldn't be achieved through its application. Further resolution S/15255 also focused on ending the First Lebanon War and demanded withdrawal of “the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometers from the periphery of that city.”⁵³ The veto was casted as the resolution failed “to call for the essential requisite for the restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon, that is the elimination from Beirut and elsewhere of the presence of armed Palestinian elements who neither submit to nor respect the sovereign authority of the Lebanese Government.”⁵⁴ In

49 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/14985, online:
[http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/6a94b92d83b86d830525652900790cd2?](http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/6a94b92d83b86d830525652900790cd2?OpenDocument)
[OpenDocument](#) (May 9, 2011)

50 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.101

51 Resolution 508 calls for *all* parties to the conflict to cease immediately and doesn't impose any sanctions and doesn't condemn Israel in any way.

52 Resolution 509 calls on Israel to withdraw to international recognized boundaries but doesn't impose any sanctions for not complying with the resolution.

53 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/15255, online:
[http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/d441628eb0b68ad205256531005fa3eb?](http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/d441628eb0b68ad205256531005fa3eb?OpenDocument)
[OpenDocument](#) (May 9, 2011)

54 Security Council Official Records, 2381st meeting, online:
[http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/889a252698f47b988525739100660d73?](http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/889a252698f47b988525739100660d73?OpenDocument)
[OpenDocument](#) (May 9, 2011)

August the S/15347 resolution drafted by U.S.S.R. condemned Israel for its failure to implement previous resolutions (516 and 517)⁵⁵ and called upon member states to stop military supply to Israel until the full withdrawal from Lebanon. U.S. vetoed the resolutions because it was in its words unbalanced and it called for sanctions on Israel which U.S. wasn't willing to impose. U.S. representative also believe that the Middle East mission of Philip Habib (the U.S. special envoy to settle the conflict) could solve the situation better than the resolution proposed.

Following year, the resolution S/15895 condemned the existing settlements, called their dismantling, called upon all states to stop any assistance to Israel which is used for settlements as well as it condemned the attacks against Arab civilians in the occupied Arab territories. U.S. representative called the resolution unbalanced and the handling issue by dismantling the settlements was seen by him as inappropriate and could raise tensions in the future negotiations.⁵⁶

At this point, it is interesting to mention that due to the U.S. overwhelming exercise of veto power which led to Security Council's inability to act in this matter, UN held an international conference on the "Question of Palestine" in Geneva from August 29th to September 7th 1983 which was boycotted by both U.S. and Israel.

Next year, on September 6th, 1984, U.S. vetoed resolution S/16732 which was reaffirming previous resolutions and called upon Israel to respect human and civil rights and demanded lifting of "all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation."⁵⁷ U.S. viewed resolution as unbalanced and "the US representative stated the resolution did not address the problem which led to the invasion of Israeli forces, thereby alluding that Israeli's massive invasion was defensive in nature and that Israel was 'forced' to invade Lebanon."⁵⁸

55 Resolutions 516 and 517 called for a cease fire and withdrawal from Lebanon, however, no sanctions were implied if Israel wouldn't comply with the resolutions.

56 Security Council Official Records, 2461st meeting, p.25, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/f66d83a60905fa2e852570a40067518d?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

57 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/16732, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/b2c789bf99a9262105256531005a22e0?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)

58 ROSS-NAZZAL, James. *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security*

In March 1985, Lebanon drafted another resolution S/17000 which condemned Israeli practices against the population of southern Lebanon and demanded unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon. The veto was casted by U.S. representative because the resolution was unbalanced and it didn't address the realities of the situation.⁵⁹ In September 1985, another resolution was drafted. Draft resolution S/17459 deplored “the repressive measures taken by Israel since 4 August 1985 against civilian Palestinian population in the Israeli occupied territories” and called upon Israel “to immediately stop all repressive measures”.⁶⁰ The U.S. veto was used to prevent the unbalanced resolution, which didn't condemn the acts of terror against Israel, from coming into force.

Following year, 1986, three more resolutions didn't pass due to sole negative U.S. vote. Draft resolution S/17730 deplored Israel's acts of violence and abusive practices and measures against Lebanese civilians, demanded Israel's withdrawal to international recognized boundaries and demanded that Israel desist immediately practices and measures against southern Lebanese civilians. U.S. casted the veto because the resolution wasn't dealing fairly with all parties (unbalanced) and it was preventing the progress towards the peace.⁶¹ Later in January 1986, the draft resolution S/17769 was also vetoed as unfair. It dealt with the occupied territories and the applicability of the Fourth Geneva convention, as well as basic law⁶² on Jerusalem which was considered null and void. The last draft resolution which have been vetoed by the U.S. in February 1986 was S/17796 condemned Israel's aerial hijack of the Libyan civilian aircraft (due to suspicion of the terrorists on the board). Even though the U.S. deplored Israel's action, it casted the veto due to the fact that Security Council is failing to recognize the rising problem of the terrorism which led to Israeli action.

Council, 1972-2007 (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.110

59 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.111

60 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/17459, online:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/deb97f7b60d3b3940525651a00521cfa?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

61 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.113

62 Israel doesn't have a written constitution, instead of that, it has basic laws which have power of the constitutional laws.

In January 1988, draft resolution S/19434 which deplored “the repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory” and requested “that Israel cease all acts of encroachment of land, construction of roads and setting up of fences that violate the border, and any attempts to occupy or change the status of Lebanese territory”⁶³ was vetoed by sole, decisive vote of the U.S. U.S. representative explained that the resolution was unbalanced and it was blaming the victims (this rhetoric was used by U.S. quite often in the case of Israel). Later that month, the resolution S/19466 wasn't passed due to sole negative vote casted by the U.S. Resolution called upon Israel “to accept de jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligation under that Convention”, stop violating “the human rights of the Palestinian people” and affirmed “the urgent need to achieve, *under the auspices of the United Nations* (highlighted by author) , a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict.”⁶⁴ The U.S. vote was based on the fact that it was already handling the issue by the diplomatic measures. The draft resolution S/19780 once again affirmed the need for comprehensive, just and lasting settlement under the auspices of the UN, condemned violation of the human rights of Palestinians and urged Israel to stop deporting Palestinians from the occupied territories. It didn't pass due to sole negative vote of the U.S. which called resolution unbalanced and not easing the tensions. U.S. was also vetoing resolution on the grounds of ongoing U.S. diplomatic efforts to solve the issue. In May 1988, the draft resolution S/19868 repeated the need of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and reaffirmed the four previous resolutions passed by UN SC (425⁶⁵, 426⁶⁶, 508, 509) which demanded the Israeli withdrawal to internationally recognized boundaries. U.S. representative once again called the resolution unbalanced where the victims are being blamed. In December, draft of resolution

63 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/19434, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/c0a36a03aa8e5edb05256531005ac465?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

64 Ibid.

65 Resolution 425 (1978) called for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and integrity of Lebanese territory as well as establishment of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon. However, it didn't impose any sanctions on Israel in case of its non-compliance with the resolution.

66 Resolution 426 (1978) recalls the establishment of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon.

S/20322 was vetoed by the U.S. It deplored “attacks against Lebanese territory by Israeli naval, air and land forces on 9 December 1988”, strongly requested “that Israel cease immediately all attacks against Lebanese territory”⁶⁷ and reminded previously applied resolutions 425, 426, 508 and 509. U.S. representative opposed the resolution “because it criticizes the actions of one party while ignoring the attacks and reprisals that have originated on the other side of the border,”⁶⁸ thus it's unbalanced. She also pointed out that the U.S. can't accept the resolution because it requested Israel to “cease all attacks against Lebanese territory regardless of provocation this draft resolution would deny to Israel its inherent right to defend itself.”⁶⁹

Ross-Nazzari in his analysis remarks that since vetoing resolution S/19466, the pattern in voting was exactly the same – 14 countries in favor, 1 country (U.S.) opposing the resolution. This pattern continued up until 1997. This raised question, what can be the justification of the U.S. veto if the whole world is having a different opinion?

In February 1989, resolution S/20463 have been drafted and vetoed by U.S. It was once again concerned about the violation of the Palestinian human rights by Israel, increased injuries and deaths of Palestinian civilians and called for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. U.S. explanation of its vote was the same as in previous cases. Unbalanced resolution which is not bringing the progress in the peace process, which is U.S. actively involved in, needed to be vetoed. The draft resolution from June 1989, S/20677, called on Israel “to accept the de jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem” and requested “the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories.”⁷⁰ The U.S. representative vetoed the resolution because it was

67 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20322, online:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/e92b9729faeb66fc05256531005b21be?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

68 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2832nd Meeting, p.20, online:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/216b0f1610a00414852570980067d667?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

69 Ibid.

70 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20677, online:

unbalanced, Israel's actions were defensive in its nature and also U.S. was already handling the situation.⁷¹ Following draft resolution S/20945 presented in November urged Israel (among other things) to “return the illegally and arbitrarily confiscated property to its owners.”⁷² U.S. once again used the same argument as before that the U.S. was already involved in settling the problem and the draft resolution wouldn't help the situation.

Next year, 1990, the draft resolution S/21326 requested the Commission report containing “recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israel occupation” and also wanted the “constant and close scrutiny and reconvene to review the situation in the light of the findings of the commission.”⁷³ The U.S. representative said that the resolution was unbalanced and blaming the victims as well as U.S. was working on resolving the issue. This was the last resolution vetoed during the Cold War era.

It is interesting to point out that in the next year (during the Iraq invasion to Kuwait), U.S. didn't veto resolutions which were dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict and condemning Israel for its actions. Resolution 672 was passed on October 12th, 1990, even though the resolution similar to it (draft resolution S/14985) was vetoed 8 years earlier which was called unbalanced.⁷⁴ Resolution 673 deploring Israeli government refusal to cooperate with investigative committee and resolution 681 condemning the Israeli deportation of Palestinian civilians were also passed by the U.S. voting in favor of them. Resolutions 672, 673, 681 were passed with the U.S. approving vote. Ross-Nazzal explained this by the ongoing Gulf war and shaky alliance when U.S. couldn't afford to lose its allies

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/5876575068a967ea0525651b003c6e6b?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

71 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.129

72 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20945, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/8433c093d60679440525651b003ce74a?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

73 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/21326, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/ff40d88c3f6848a80525651b00551598?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

74 **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.131

by casting the veto on the resolutions mentioned above.

It is interesting the Ross-Nazzari doesn't mention 3 other resolutions which have been passed by the U.S. affirmative vote. These resolutions – 694, 726 and 799 – have been condemning Israel after the the Gulf War ended (on February 28, 1991). However, I believe that U.S. have done so to be consistent in its voting pattern and because the resolutions didn't bring anything new then the resolutions U.S. agreed on in 1990-1991, in the period of the war. They all basically reaffirm the previous resolutions. Resolution 694 from May 24, 1991 reaffirmed resolution 681; resolution 726 reaffirmed resolutions 694 as well as resolutions 608, 636, 641 (U.S. abstained from voting on these resolutions in the past) and resolution 799 reaffirmed as well all the previous resolutions. Therefore, I believe that with acceptance of these resolutions nothing really changed.

For the five years, there were no resolutions on behalf of Israel vetoed by the U.S. The next draft resolution vetoed by the U.S. was the draft resolution S/1995/394. It confirmed the invalidity of expropriation of land by Israel in East Jerusalem but stated that negotiations would be reserved to parties involved. It also supported the peace process and Declaration of Principles (better known as Oslo Accords). Even though Ross-Nazzari believes this was the most balanced resolution since 1972, U.S. representative (Madeline Albright) believed that “Council should be encouraging the parties and not acting in a way that is detrimental to the process,”⁷⁵ thus not set the outcome it wants to see but rather the path to the lasting peace.

Two resolutions had been vetoed in 1997. Both draft resolutions were dealing with the settlement issue. The draft resolution S/1997/199 which was calling upon Israel to “refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations, and have negative implications for the Middle East Peace Process”⁷⁶ and

75 United Nations Security Council 3538th Meeting, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/5391b33a35b11729852561cd006e3cc8?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

76 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1997/199, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/f97c162f6a30647205256531005b4e15?>

also supported the continuation of the Middle East Peace Process and its implementation. The U.S. representative's reason to veto the resolution was the prevention of a third party to interfere in the mutually-accepted path towards peace which was set in Madrid Conference and confirmed in Oslo Accords. The draft resolution S/1997/241 demanded (among other things) “that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories.”⁷⁷ The reason for the U.S. veto in this case was the same as in the previous case – U.S. didn't believe that GA or SC should get involved in the peace process as it would only add tensions into the talks. However, U.S. representative (Richardson) made it clear that U.S. does not support the settlements.⁷⁸

2.3 Voting behavior of other UN SC permanent members

The very interesting point which needs to be taken into account is the fact that U.S. is in the all of the resolutions presented the sole member of the UN SC voting against the resolution. This makes the issue more interesting because if the U.S. allies are not following the same pattern of voting as U.S. is then it might mean there's a different (special) relationship between U.S. and Israel and there are different reasons which drive the U.S. decision-making. This is a very important point realizing that for instance U.K., other permanent member of Security Council, and U.S. main ally don't vote in accordance. There are multiple resolutions where other country abstain from voting, however, we can not consider abstention as a support neither to Israel nor U.S.

The cases of countries abstaining from voting are: S/10784 (Panama abstained); S/11898 (Costa Rica abstained); S/11940 (Italy, Sweden, UK abstained); S/12119 (UK, France, Sweden

[OpenDocument](#) (May 10, 2011)

77 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1997/241, online:

[http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/88f7fb474668764705256531005b7239?](http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/88f7fb474668764705256531005b7239?OpenDocument)

[OpenDocument](#) (May 10, 2011)

78 United Nations Security Council 3756th Meeting, online:

[http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/2564fa5c2ec99b208025646c0029d699?](http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/2564fa5c2ec99b208025646c0029d699?OpenDocument)

[OpenDocument](#) (May 10, 2011)

abstained); S/13911 (France, Norway, Portugal, UK abstained); S/14832/Rev.1 (France, Ireland, Panama, UK abstained); S/14943 (Zaire abstained); S/15347/Rev.1 (Togo, UK, Zaire abstained); S/15895 (Zaire abstained); S/17000 (Australia, Denmark, UK abstained); S/17459 (Australia, Denmark, UK abstained); S/17730/Rev.2 (Australia, Denmark, UK abstained); S/17769 (Thailand abstained); S/17796/Rev.1 (Australia, Denmark, France, UK abstained); S/19434 (UK abstained); S/1997/241 (Costa Rica abstained).

Thirty-two resolutions which concern Israel were vetoed and the U.S. was the sole country voting against the resolution. In 15 of them, variety of countries abstained from voting on resolutions, the most abstention (10) from United Kingdom. Thus, even if we would consider abstention as a certain type of support to the U.S. decisions, only 10 out of 32 resolutions (app. 31%) could be considered supported by UK. Other permanent member, France, abstained only 4 times, what results only in 12.5% of relative support.

Two other UN SC permanent members, Soviet Union (later Russia) and China, never opposed or abstained from voting on the draft resolutions which have been vetoed by the United States. In the case of U.S.S.R it might be explained by the fact that Middle East (and more specifically Arab-Israeli conflict) has been a part of the larger conflict – Cold War. It was one of the theaters where the U.S. and U.S.S.R have been fighting through proxies – U.S. supporting Israel while U.S.S.R backed the Arab countries (most notably Egypt until 1972 when Soviet officers were temporally ousted from Egypt and Camp David Accords in 1978, when Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel and gain U.S. support). China wasn't involved in the process of settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.4 Issues of resolutions

After the presentation of the resolutions which have been vetoed by the U.S., we might see that

there are various issues that have been presented and that repeat themselves. Among the most common problems which are being dealt with in the UN SC belong: status of Jerusalem and occupied territories, violence of the human rights (Israel's noncompliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention⁷⁹), settlements, refugees and the matters concerning attacks on and withdrawal from Lebanon.

All these issues have an importance for Israel. Jerusalem is perceived by Israel as its capital (even though international community refuses it) and it is not willing to discuss its status until the final agreement is signed.⁸⁰ Occupied territories (territories occupied since Six day War in 1967) consist of East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights (annexed by law passed in Knesset in 1981, condemned by UN) and Sinai (until 1982 when it was returned to Egypt). Israel was not willing to give up the territories as they form the defensible borders as well as they are part of the biblical lands. Settlements are argued over because they are built in the occupied territories. They are considered to be illegal and Israel because of them condemned by international community. Issue of Palestinian refugees is also causing problems as Israel is not willing to take back over 2,000,000 refugees which left Israel as a result of Six day War in 1967. Intake of such a large number of Palestinians would lead to demographic changes in the Jewish state. The Lebanon War⁸¹ which started in 1982 was from a big part war against the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), which was located in the Southern part of Lebanon, and the regime which supported it. As PLO was at this point viewed as a terrorist organization, it might be understandable why U.S. didn't condemn majority of the Israel led actions. All these issues are of high importance to Israel. Undivided Jerusalem as a capital of a holy land, occupied territories as a part of the biblical lands as well as defensible borders, refusal of return of Palestinian refugees due to demographic change to Israel, settlements as a way to keep the occupied territories under Israeli control.

79 Fourth Geneva Convention have been issued in August 1949 and deals with the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Israel

80 According to Oslo Accords from 1993, the final status of Jerusalem should be agreed in the final talks and not before.

81 The First Lebanon War wasn't in Israel perceived as war but rather it was called Operation Peace for Galilee.

Therefor, if we consider the close ties between Israel and the United States, we might conclude that these issues are important for U.S. as well. Thus, the reasons for which the U.S. vetoes the resolutions on Israel might be joined with the importance of these issues for the Israel itself.

2.5 Resolution proposals

Who did propose the resolutions U.S. vetoed? Can we find any similarities and reasons for U.S. veto in this matter? Here is the list of the countries proposing the above mentioned vetoed draft resolutions:

S/10784	Guinea, Somalia, Yugoslavia
S/10974	Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Yugoslavia
S/11898	Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania
S/11940	Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Romania, United Republic of Tanzania
S/12022	Benin, Guyana, Panama, Tanzania
S/12119	Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Tanzania
S/13911	Tunisia
S/14832	Jordan
S/14943	Jordan
S/14985	Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Uganda
S/15185	Spain
S/15255	<i>France</i>
S/15347	<i>Soviet Union</i>
S/15895	Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen
S/16732	Lebanon
S/17000	Lebanon
S/17459	Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago
S/17730	Lebanon
S/17769	Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, UAE
S/17796	Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, UAE
S/19434	Algeria, Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia
S/19466	Algeria, Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia
S/19780	Algeria, Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia
S/19868	Algeria, Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia
S/20322	Algeria, Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia
S/20463	Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Yugoslavia
S/20677	Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia
S/20945	Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia

S/21326	Colombia, Code d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Yemen, Zaire
S/1995/394	Botswana, Honduras, Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman, Rwanda
S/1997/199	<i>France, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom</i>
S/1997/241	Egypt, Qatar

We might see in the list above that resolutions have been proposed by various countries over the course of the years. Only three resolutions (they are highlighted in italic letters) have been proposed by permanent members of the UN SC – France, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. Majority of other countries proposing the draft resolutions are countries from Non-Aligned movement, beside Romania (S/11940), Spain (S/15185), Portugal and Sweden (S/1997/199). Therefore, we might see that the U.S. didn't vote on the resolutions which would be presented by the Eastern bloc as a way to undermine the power of the Soviet Union. Only 2 resolutions were drafted by the Eastern bloc (S/15347 by U.S.S.R and S/11940 by Romania) and 3 others by the countries aligned with Western bloc. Thus, even in the context of the Cold War we have to search for other reasons of the veto than the antagonism towards the Soviet bloc by the U.S.

However, it might be said that because of the fact that the resolutions weren't presented in most of the cases by the states from the Eastern bloc, U.S. could veto the resolutions as it didn't conflict directly with the U.S.S.R interests.

Another interesting finding might be that only 8⁸² out of 32 resolutions proposed, thus 25%, have been drafted by countries who are directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. We could argue that U.S. didn't want countries which are not the part of the conflict impose the settlement on the countries which are being part of it. However, there's not a sufficient research to draw these conclusions therefore author of this thesis cannot include them as relevant.

⁸² Even though in 1982 Lebanon and in 1997 Egypt already had a peace treaty with Israel, they still were involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.6 Common features of the U.S. vetoed resolutions

Now that 32 different U.S vetoed resolutions were presented, the common features might be underlined what would help us to understand the U.S reasons for the decisions. As it might be seen, there is numerous crucial issues which are reappearing in these resolutions : status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlement, Palestinian issue (refugees and inalienable rights). However, these issues are also present in the resolutions which have passed. Where are then differences from the resolutions which were supported (excluding abstained from) by the U.S.? The difference which might be perceived is the language used in the resolutions as well as the “bigger picture” (settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict).

Resolutions vetoed by U.S. on behalf of Israel, 1972-1997:

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Wording</u>	<u>US stance</u>
S/10784	Israeli attack on Syria and Lebanon	“calls on the parties concerned (Israel) cease immediately all military operations...”- in words of U.S. representative resolution <i>condemned</i> Israel	unbalanced, problem of terrorism
S/10974	Occupied territories	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> Israel's continuing occupation...”	unbalanced
S/11898	Attack on Lebanon	“ <i>strongly condemns</i> the Government of Israel...”	unbalanced
S/11940	Independent Palestine	“... <i>deeply deploring</i> Israel's persistence in its occupation...”	not settling the problem
S/12022	Jerusalem, occupation	“ <i>deplores</i> Israel's failure to put a stop to action and policies...”	unbalanced
S/12119	Independent Palestine, inalienable rights	“...inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine...”	unbalanced, ongoing diplomatic efforts
S/13911	Independent Palestine, inalienable rights, occupation	“... <i>deeply deploring</i> Israel's persistence in its occupation...”	clash with Resolution 242, ongoing diplomatic settlement

S/14832	Golan Heights	“ <i>strongly condemns</i> Israel for its failure to comply...” “...refrain from providing any assistance or aid to and co-operation with Israel in all fields...”	against UN Charter, Golan Heights weren't annexed by Israel
S/14943	Human rights	“ <i>denounces</i> measures imposed on the Palestinian population...by Israeli authorities...”	unbalanced
S/14985	Violent acts in Jerusalem	“ <i>condemns</i> in the strongest terms these appalling acts...” (shooting of worshipers by armed Israeli) “ <i>deplores</i> any act or encouragement of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places...” (acts against al-Haram al Shareef and shooting of worshipers in the Dome of Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque)	unbalanced
S/15185	Withdrawal from Lebanon	“ <i>condemns</i> the non-compliance with resolutions...by Israel”	unbalanced
S/15255	Withdrawal from Lebanon	“demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces...”	missing points (basically unbalanced)
S/15347	Withdrawal from Lebanon	“ <i>strongly condemns</i> Israel for not implementing resolutions...”	unbalanced
S/15895	Settlements	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices...” “ <i>rejects</i> Israeli arbitrary and illegal actions...” “ <i>condemns</i> the recent attacks perpetrated against Arab civilian population...” “...not provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements...”	unbalanced
S/16732	Human and civil rights	“calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to respect strictly the rights of the civilian population in the areas under its occupation...” “demands that Israel immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions...”	unbalanced, defensive nature of invasion
S/17000	Human and civil rights, Lebanon	“ <i>condemns</i> Israeli practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon...”	unbalanced
S/17459	Human and civil rights	“ <i>deplores</i> the repressive measures taken by Israel...” “calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately stop all repressive measures...”	unbalanced

S/17730	Human and civil rights	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> the Israeli acts of violence as well as abusive practices and measures...” “demands that Israel desist forthwith from its practices and measures...”	unbalanced
S/17769	Occupied territories, Jerusalem	“ <i>strongly deploring</i> the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions...” “ <i>strongly deplores</i> the provocative acts...”	unfair (basically unbalanced)
S/17796	Hijacking of Libyan civil aircraft	“ <i>condemns</i> Israel for its forcible interception and diversion...”	condemnation, problem of terrorism
S/19434	Attack against Lebanon	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> the repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory...”	unbalanced
S/19466	Human rights, Palestine	“...grave concern over the <i>increasing sufferings</i> of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories...” “calls again upon Israel to desist forthwith from its policies and practices which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people” “... <i>under auspices</i> of the United Nations...”	ongoing diplomatic efforts
S/19780	Human rights	“ <i>condemns</i> those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people...” “... <i>under auspices</i> of the United Nations...”	unbalanced, ongoing diplomatic efforts
S/19868	Withdrawal from Lebanon	“ <i>condemns</i> the recent invasion by Israeli forces...”	unbalanced
S/20322	Attacks against Lebanon	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> the recent Israeli attack against Lebanese territory...”	unbalanced
S/20463	Human rights, Palestine	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> Israel's persistent policies and practices...” “... <i>under auspices</i> of the United Nations...”	unbalanced
S/20677	Human rights, Palestine	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> those policies and practices of Israel...”	unbalanced, actions defensive in nature, ongoing diplomatic efforts
S/20945	Human rights	“ <i>strongly deplores</i> those policies and practices of Israel...”	ongoing diplomatic efforts
S/21326	Commission	“...deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel...” “establishes a Commission . . . to examine situation relating to the policies and practices of Israel...”	unbalanced

S/1995/394	Occupation, Jerusalem	“confirms that the expropriation of land by Israel, the occupying Power, in East Jerusalem is invalid and in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions...”	Dealing with final status, against Oslo Accords
S/1997/199	Settlements	“...refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations...”	Preventing third party from interfering
S/1997/241	Settlements	“demands that Israel immediately cease construction of ... settlement activities in the occupied territories”	Preventing third party from interfering

Table 1 (assembled by author)

When we look at the Table 1 above, we might observe that resolutions which either “deplore” or “condemn” Israel almost never pass⁸³ and if so, they pass due to U.S abstention from voting. Out of 32 resolutions vetoed in a period of 1972-1997 and presented in the table, 23 either condemn, strongly condemn, deplore, strongly deplore or denounce Israel. That means that almost 72% of resolutions which openly condemn Israel are rejected by the U.S.(23 out of 29, or more than 79% during the Cold War era). Thus it seems that the use of veto doesn't depend on any specific period of time or administration in power when the draft resolutions was presented.

We can also group six other resolutions (S/12119, S/19466, S/21326, S/1995/394, S/1997/199, S/1997/241) based on the involvement of the UN in the peace process settlement. If we look into the essence of the draft resolutions, they all try to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict (not just partial issues but the conflict as a whole). S/12119 is basically calling for the Palestinian state thus changing realities on the ground without consulting Israeli side. S/19466 affirmed “the urgent need to achieve, *under the auspices of the United Nations* (highlighted by author), a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict”⁸⁴, thus trying to settle the conflict. S/21326 called for establishment of the

⁸³ Exceptions such as Resolution 465 (passed by mistake, see page 12) or 520 are rare.

⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/19434, online:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/73d45a14d3a792e20525651b002da40e?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

Commission which would “keep the situation in the occupied territories under constant and close scrutiny”⁸⁵, therefor it would once again interfere with the settlement of the conflict. S/1995/394 “urges the parties to adhere to the provisions of the agreements reached and to follow up with the full implementation of those agreements”⁸⁶, therefor interfering into the peace process which should be discussed between parties involved. S/1997/199 “calls upon the Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations, and have negative implications for the Middle East Peace Process”⁸⁷ thus once again interfering in the peace process. Lastly, S/1997/241 Security Council “demands that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories.”⁸⁸ Settlements are the question of the final agreement and should be agreed on by the parties involve, therefor Security Council once again tried to settle an issue crucial for the conflict and interfered into the peace process.

Lastly, three resolutions (S/10784, S/15255, S/16732) remain unqualified due to their uniqueness. Even though draft resolution S/10784 condemns Israeli action in its essence, it doesn't use the vocabulary which could make it part of the first group based on the wording of the resolution. S/15255 calling for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Beirut neither fits into any of the two categories created above. S/16732, dealing with the Lebanon War, cannot be grouped with any of the previous draft resolution.

Even though 3 resolutions remained unclassified, it is only 9,3% of the all the draft resolutions

85 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/21326, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/ff40d88c3f6848a80525651b00551598?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

86 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1995/394, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F58C6AD432A5A3980525651B00529AE9> (May 30, 2011)

87 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1997/199, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/f97c162f6a30647205256531005b4e15?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

88 United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1997/241, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adb322aff38525617b006d88d7/88f7fb474668764705256531005b7239?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

vetoed by the U.S. on behalf of Israel. Therefore, in the next part of this thesis two questions will be asked based on this analysis. Firstly, why does U.S. veto the draft resolutions which condemn or deplore Israel actions? Secondly, why does U.S. veto the draft resolutions which are trying to settle Arab-Israeli conflict?

3 Reasons behind U.S veto on behalf of Israel

Four different partial conclusions might be drawn from the previous chapter. Firstly, U.S. is the sole member of the Security Council who have vetoed the resolutions which concern Israel. No other countries backed its actions and the U.S. protect Israel alone against the whole international community. Secondly, various countries proposed the resolutions on vetoed by U.S, most of them coming neither from Western nor from Eastern bloc, without direct involvement in the conflict. Thirdly, language used, thus wording of the resolutions, might be one of the reasons for the U.S. veto. Lastly, the resolutions which are coping with the settlement of the conflict are being vetoed as U.S. proclaimed the need for the settlement agreed upon by the parties involved and not being imposed by the third party.

In this part, the focus is going to be on two categories mentioned above which could be applied to the U.S. and its use of the veto power in SC UN and which are possible to conclude from the resolutions themselves. First category is the based on the wording (or selection of the vocabulary) of the resolutions and the condemnation of the Israeli actions and behavior. Second category is based on the UN effort to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict by imposing the peace on the parties involved.⁸⁹ At the end, we also elaborate on the reasons based on the statements of the U.S representatives to UN Security Council and apply our findings on the latest resolution which wasn't passed due to U.S. veto (Draft Resolution S/2011/24 of February 18, 2011).

⁸⁹ Author is aware of the possibility of the overlap of the 2 categories, however, it is not perceived as a relevant issue because it doesn't affect neither change the outcome of this thesis.

3.1 Selection of vocabulary and the U.S veto

From the draft resolutions reviewed, it is possible to conclude that the wording plays a significant role in the U.S. decision-making. Author reviewed other resolutions which were passed with the affirmative vote of the U.S. on behalf of Israel to see the similarities and differences in wording. In the resolutions reviewed, only 2 (Resolutions 465, 487⁹⁰) of them were passed, where the vocabulary clashes with our findings. The reasons for this type of voting protecting Israel and refusing to condemn it for its actions might be various.

There is no doubt about the non-formal alliance or “*special relationship*” between United States and Israel and it's typical for the international politics that the allies are being backed by each other. As we can see in the previous analysis, US does not want its ally to be condemned for the various reasons which might weakened its position.

Bernard Reich presented following as main reasons for the U.S.-Israeli support – prevention of the Soviet dominance in the region; assuring the flow of oil at reasonable prices (especially to U.S. friends and allies); access to regional markets; security and prosperity of Israel.⁹¹ Furthermore, in his opinion, Israel presents a political-strategic asset, when Israel has been supportive of the U.S. policies in UN and other world forums. And after the fall of the U.S. supported Iran in 1979, it remained a sole reliable ally. It is also supported on the bases that it is seen as “the type of the state (“like-image”), with a similarity of outlook and generally progressive in nature, that the United States would like to see exist worldwide”⁹² and “the perception is also influenced by a religious factor that perceives Israel as fulfilling the biblical prophecy that the Jews would return to the promised land.”⁹³ The moral responsibility is also seen as one of the reasons for the U.S. support.

⁹⁰ The reasons for passing the resolutions 672, 673, 681, 694, 726 and 799 have been explained earlier.

⁹¹ REICH, B. *The United States and Israel. Influence in Special Relationship* (Praeger Publisher, 1984), p.178

⁹² REICH, B. *The United States and Israel. Influence in Special Relationship* (Praeger Publisher, 1984), p.185

⁹³ REICH, B. *The United States and Israel. Influence in Special Relationship* (Praeger Publisher, 1984), p.186

Another reason presented by Reich is the fact that the Jewish community in U.S., with its 6.1 millions⁹⁴ largest one in the world, is unified and wants to work on Israel's behalf. This community is involved more in the political actions than the general American population. Reich also recognizes the influential role of Israel lobby American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPEC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations as a tool to form U.S attitudes and formulate its policies concerning Israel. Therefor, he writes that "United States has extensive ties with Israel, some of which partly reflect the efforts of these groups and the individuals that compose them."⁹⁵,⁹⁶ However, this influence exercised is limited and personal rather than institutional lacking the major channels of influence.⁹⁷

Saliba Sarsar similarly argues that the shared national interests, common religious tradition as well as similar visions of a reformed Middle East are the causes for the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. He also argues that Americans always favored Israel over Arabs between 1967 and 2001 (basing this on multiple polls conducted).⁹⁸

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt write that Israel's supporters argue the Israel's strategic value; its weakness and encirclement by enemies; its democratic character which is morally preferable; Jewish people deserve special treatment due to past sufferings and crimes; its conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries.⁹⁹ However, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the explanation of the American support for Israel lies in the power of the Israel lobby, which is effective in U.S. Congress as well as executive.

All these arguments might possibly be the reasons for the U.S. veto which protects Israel from

94 U.S Memebership Report, http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/US_2000.asp (June 10, 2011)

95 **REICH, B.** *The United States and Israel. Influence in Special Relationship* (Praeger Publisher, 1984), p.201

96 However, Reich argues as well, that this influence isn't only influencing U.S. policy towards Israel but also Israeli policies towards the U.S. and other issues in the Middle East.

97 **REICH, B.** *The United States and Israel. Influence in Special Relationship* (Praeger Publisher, 1984), p.203

98 **SARSAR, S.** *The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations* . International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3, Spring 2004, p. 461

99 **MEARSHEIMER, J. J.; WALT, S. M.** *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Online: mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf (June 10, 2011)

being condemned by the UN Security Council, thus by international community. Selecting one particular reason for which it happens so would be complicated, incorrect and merely subjective as we would omit complexity of the decision-making. Therefore, it might be concluded in this part that U.S. vetoes the SC UN draft resolutions on behalf of Israel because it doesn't want its sole democratic ally with strategic position in the Middle East which is backed by 2% of its citizens with strong lobby being neither condemned nor deplored by the international community.

3.2 Conflict settlement and the U.S. veto

Six draft resolutions which tried to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict have been vetoed by the U.S. After the previous chapter, it might be seen as partially illogical that the Israel's biggest “ally” might not want her to live in peace with its neighbors. However, this is not the case of U.S. not willing to settle the conflict. It is just refusing the settlement of the conflict by imposing it on both sides without the proper negotiations and peace talks.

It is also important to realize that U.S. is not very supportive of many UN operations and found itself many times opposing its actions. And especially in the issue of Israel which is very sensitive for U.S., it would hardly find support for this body. Refusing UN involvement in the settlement of this crucial conflict is therefore just a logical result of its foreign policy.

Another reason which was presented by the U.S. representatives to UN was that the U.S. was working on achievement of the peace and the UN involvement therefore is unnecessary and counterproductive. At the time of the vetoes casted based on this rationale, U.S. was involved in Camp David talks, Madrid Conference or Oslo Accords respectively. These were creating the framework for the peace talks and not settling the conflict as a whole. They weren't specifying the conditions of the

peace but rather presenting the map to the peace. And more importantly, U.S. was playing an important role which it could lose if the settlement of the conflict would be under auspices of the UN.

To conclude, it might be said that U.S. vetoes UN SC resolutions in this matter because it doesn't want the UN, organization that U.S. opposes and which condemns its ally, to impose settlement on Israel what would diminish U.S. involvement in process. Also, in the politics of the U.S. prevails the opinion that the peace shouldn't be imposed but agreed upon by the parties involved. Therefor U.S. vetoes the resolutions to prevent the conflict to be settled by the third party, thus UN SC.

3.3 Official reasons and the U.S. veto

The U.S. representatives presented various reasons why they vetoed the resolutions which were presented to vote in Security Council. Ross-Nazzari came in his analysis to conclusion that U.S. uses 5 types of rationale to justify its veto.

- (1) 14 times the US blamed the victim (Israel) while it didn't separate the aggressor from the oppressed;
- (2) 17 times it was inappropriate or untimely due to U.S. engagement in diplomatic efforts with the parties in question and the adoption of the resolution would endanger the process;
- (3) 3 times it would be, in U.S. understanding, against the Resolution 242, which is the sole framework for the conclusion of the conflict;
- (4) twice it was considered unfair to blame Israel for actions just a few of its citizens took;

(5) 5 times due to the agreements at Madrid Conference (thus Oslo Accords).¹⁰⁰

Also based on the official statements of the U.S. representatives, vetoed draft resolutions were in 18 cases considered unbalanced and in 12 other cases lack of balance was inferred.¹⁰¹

Therefor, it is possible to conclude in this part, that the decisions taken by the U.S. are based on the unequal approach towards Israel by this body of the United Nations (resolutions which U.S. opposes pass in the General Assembly but they don't have any real implications) as well as the U.S. involvement in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus refusing any other party taking the part in the process.

¹⁰⁰**ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.172

¹⁰¹**ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* (The Edwin Mellen Press: 2008), p.173

4. Application to the resolution S/2011/24

To prove the points made in the previous chapter, they would be applied on the resolution which have been drafted on the issue of Israel on February 18, 2011 (the latest resolution applicable). The draft resolution S/2011/24, calls states that settlements “are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace”¹⁰² and it calls upon both parties to follow the road map to peace. Based on these two points, we would believe that U.S. would support the resolution because it doesn't settle the conflict, neither it calls for UN to solve it on its own terms.

However, there is numerous issues which we might see which could result in the U.S. veto. Firstly, the resolution may be perceived as unbalanced. The first operative clause writes “reaffirms that the Israeli settlements established in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.”¹⁰³ This point then blames Israel as a subject which is causing the problems in settling the conflict. That it is Israeli settlements which are illegal and Israel is the party who should be blamed for ongoing problem. It doesn't put any blame on Palestinian authority for the attacks on Israel and so on. Therefor, I believe that U.S. might see this as unbalanced resolution which is not looking at the problem in complexity.

Furthermore, two problematic issues are raised in this resolution. Firstly, East Jerusalem which is perceived by international law as a part of occupied territories but by the Israel as an integral part of the Jewish state. Secondly, the issue of illegality of settlements is raised. However, if we look at the preambulatory clauses, the fourth line, where UN SC is “*Condemning* the continuation of settlement

102United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/2011/24, online:
[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?](http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?OpenDocument)
[OpenDocument \(June 14, 2011\)](#)

103United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/2011/24, online:
[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?](http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?OpenDocument)
[OpenDocument \(June 14, 2011\)](#)

activities by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of all other measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Territory, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant resolutions,”¹⁰⁴ might be one of the reasons for which the resolution should be (and it was) vetoed by the United States. The resolution condemns Israel what, as we showed in the previous chapters, is one of the reasons when the U.S. is casting its veto.

Therefor, we might conclude that results which we have achieved in our analysis are applicable to the resolutions which are being drafted even nowadays and it is possible to assume what will be U.S. vote on the particular resolution even before the vote would take place.

¹⁰⁴United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/2011/24, online:
[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?](http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?OpenDocument)
[OpenDocument](http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?OpenDocument) (June 14, 2011)

5 Conclusion

The goal of this BA thesis was to find the similarities among the resolutions drafted on Israel in the United Nations Security Council which weren't passed due to application of the U.S. veto power and present the reasons for the U.S. voting. During the analysis of the resolutions and the official statements of the U.S. representatives, author of this thesis realized it is impossible to name one sole reason for the U.S. behavior but rather the issue should be looked at from different angles. Also, it was impossible to say if the U.S. policy is regarding Israel as a strategic asset, if it wants to protect its democratic character and provide it with security against the neighboring Arab countries or if the decisions are made based on the strong and well-organized Israel lobby in U.S. This cannot be found out through analysis of the resolutions themselves and doing so would be misinterpretation of the resolutions analyzed.

However, the author believes that even though it wasn't possible to successfully determine what lies beneath the U.S. protection of Israel in United Nations Security Council, it is possible to conclude, that U.S. doesn't want Israel to be condemned by this body and international community and wants to keep a dominant position in the issue. Whatever the rationale behind this decision (strategic, cultural, psychological, political,...), once Security Council decides to condemn, strongly condemn, deplore, strongly deplore or denounce Israel for its actions, U.S. would with very high probability cast the veto on its behalf. Thus we might conclude, that U.S. bases its decision on Israel on certain rationale which refuses any condemnation of Israel. Thus the language used in resolutions plays an important role in the U.S. decision making.

Furthermore, U.S. bases its decision also on the fact that it does not want U.N to be highly involved in the process of settlement of the conflict and it wants to get the issue from its auspices. This

might be understood also as a measure to protect Israel from the involvement of the organization which deplores or condemns it. Also, it is possible that U.S. wants to keep a dominant position in the issue which it would lose if the multinational organization would take over.

The conclusions which have been reached in the analysis were applied to the latest resolution presented in the United Nations Security Council, S/2011/24 from February, which proved that even today, they are applicable and true.

However, it is also important to mention the fact that U.S. supports Israel in the United Nations Security Council only when the international situation makes it possible. This means that U.S. did pass 2 resolutions on Israel in 1979, a year of Iran revolution, Saddam Hussein coming to power as well as year when the U.S.S.R entered War in Afghanistan. When the resolutions critical on Israel were passed in 1990-1991, U.S. was involved in the Gulf War and couldn't afford to lose its allies. Therefore, it is impossible to say that the U.S. decision-making is blindly driven by the protectionism towards Israel as some would like to claim. Therefore, in the conflict times even the U.S. support towards Israel diminishes and Israel can not count its support and the findings presented would fail.

Even though author still believes there are multiple reasons for the U.S. veto on behalf of Israel, which are, however, vague and unclear and would be a matter of the subjectivity, the fact is that U.S. is refusing to deplore or condemn Israel actions while the other subjects involved remain unpunished. It was proven through the analysis of the resolutions drafted and the statements of the U.S. representatives that U.S. finds the resolutions unbalanced and doesn't want the State of Israel to be condemned in this manner (belief that Israel is the oppressed and not oppressor). It also doesn't want the third party to be imposing the settlement on the countries involved and to prevent these actions it used its veto power in multiple cases. For these reasons U.S. wants to remove the issue from the U.N., the organization which is very critical of Israel and which condemns it.

However, author encourages further research to be done on this issue, especially the

comparative research of the passed and vetoed resolutions as well as analysis of the GA resolutions on Middle East, to prove these findings.

Summary

The main intention of this BA thesis is to analyze the resolutions which have been drafted in the United Nations Security Council on Israel in 1972-1997 and which have been vetoed by the United States of America. This research sets itself a goal to successfully determine from these resolutions the reasons for the U.S. veto which is present since 1972 and lasts despite the changes in the administration. To be able to do so, it firstly presents the background of the relation between United States and Israel, functioning of the United Nations Security Council and the United States in this organization.

Author presents the reader with analysis of the resolutions drafted and vetoed by the U.S., it presents the findings that the U.S. is the member casting the sole negative vote while, in the most of the cases, other members are in favor (with rare abstentions). Resolutions examined are mostly proposed by the countries of Non-Aligned Movement, without association to either bloc of the Cold War era. Drafted and U.S vetoed resolutions are focusing on the issues of status of Jerusalem and occupied territories, violence of the human rights, settlements, Palestinian refugees and the matters concerning attacks on and withdrawal from Lebanon. Through the comparison of the resolutions, author finds the issue of wording (condemning and deploring of Israel) and the imposition of the settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict as repeating points. Based on the statements on the U.S. representatives, author also could conclude (basing this on the research of the Ross-Nazzal) that U.S. is also vetoing resolutions based on the unbalancedness (in their interpretation).

Author, therefor, concluded that the reasons, which might be found out through the analysis of the vetoed resolutions, for the U.S. veto are the problem of the vocabulary and the conflict settlement. There might be other reasons causing this behavior, however, their evidence is not presented in the

resolutions. To prove the findings, author applied them on the latest resolution concerning Israel and the findings stayed standing as relevant.

The importance of the international situation is also mentioned as the U.S is willing to pass the resolutions critical to Israel in the conflict times (such as Gulf War).

However, at the end the author had to admit that the thesis failed to show the reasons of the U.S. veto as it was set in the project. This mostly wasn't possible to be concluded from the text of the resolutions and the results would be subjective. Thus, author concludes that the further research needs to be done in the area in order to support the findings.

Bibliography

Monographs:

- [1] **BAILEY, Sidney Dawson; DAWS, Sidney.** *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*. 3rd edition. Clarendon Press, 1998. pp.689
- [2] **ČEJKA, Marek.** *Encyklopedie blízkovýchodního terorismu*. Praha : Barrister & Principal, 2007
- [3] **ČEJKA, Marek.** *Izrael a Palestina - Minulost, současnost a směřování blízkovýchodního konfliktu*. 2. vyd. Praha : Barrister & Principal, 2007.
- [4] **ČEJKA, Marek.** *Judaismus, politika a Stát Izrael*. 1. vyd. Brno : Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity, 2002.
- [4] **CHAN, Steve.** *Power, Satisfaction and Popularity . A Position Analysis of UN Security Council Vetoes*. [online]. 2003, Available:
<http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/4/339> (July 1, 2011)
- [5] **CLYDE R. Mark.** *Israeli-United States Relations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB82008 [online]. 2003, Available:<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/14820.pdf>
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/14820.pdf> (July1, 2011)
- [6] **KIRGIS, Frederic L., Jr.** *Security Council's First Fifty Years*. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-53.
- [7] **KÖCHLER, Hans.** *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council*. Studies in International Relations, XVII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, [online] 1991 ,
Online: http://i-p-o.org/koechler-Voting_Procedure-UN_Security_Council.pdf (July 1, 2011)
- [8] **LAQUEUR, Walter.** *The Israel-Arab Reader – Middle East Conflict & Peace*. 6th revised

edition, Penguin, 2001. pp.580

- [9] **MANSOUR, Camille.** *Beyond Alliance: Israel and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 324.
- [10] **MEARSHEIMER, John J.; WALT, Stephen M.** The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, Online: mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf (July 1, 2011)
- [11] **PODHORETZ, Norman.** Israel and the United States: A complex history. *Commentary* 105, no. 5 (May 1998): 28. Academic Search Complete, pp. 28-43
- [12] **QUANDT, William B.** *Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incrementalism.* *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 26-40
- [13] **QUANDT, William B.** *Peace Process. American Diplomatic and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967.* University of California Press, 2005. pp. 535
- [14] **REICH, Bernard.** *The United States and Israel. Influence in Special Relationship.* Prager Publisher, 1984. pp.237.
- [15] **REICH, Bernard.** *Securing the Covenant. United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War.* Greenwood Press, 1995. pp.171
- [16] **ROSS-NAZZAL, James.** *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007.* Edwin Mellen Pr. 2008, pp.192
- [17] **ROULEAU, Eric.** *US-Israel Relations.* *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer, 1977), pp. 169-177
- [18] **SARSAR. Saliba.** *The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations .* *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Spring 2004

- [19] **SPIEGEL, Steven L.** "Eisenhower", *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (The University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.538
- [20] **TINDALL, George Brown.** *Dějiny Spojených států amerických*. 5.dopl. vyd. Praha: NLN, 2008
- [21] **THOMAS, Michael Tracy.** *American Policy Toward Israel: The power and limits of beliefs*, (Routledge, 2007), p.253

Electronic Sources:

- [1] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/10784
- [2] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/10974
- [3] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/11898
- [4] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/11940
- [5] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/12022
- [6] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/12119
- [7] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/13911
- [8] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/14832
- [9] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/14943
- [10] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/14985
- [11] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/15185
- [12] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/15255
- [13] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/15347
- [14] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/15895
- [15] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/16732
- [16] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/17000
- [17] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/17459
- [18] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/17730
- [19] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/17769
- [20] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/17796
- [21] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/19434
- [22] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/19466

- [23] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/19780
- [24] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/19868
- [25] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20322
- [26] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20463
- [27] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20677
- [28] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/20945
- [29] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/21326
- [30] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1995/394
- [31] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1997/199
- [32] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/1997/241
- [33] United States Mission to the United Nations
- [34] United Nations Yearbook, 1972 (New York: United Nations, 1973), online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/de9be8e9630430da8525631c0067f2e4?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)
- [35] United Nations Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations, 1974), online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/7a23051153b0889d85256349005d41ad?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)
- [36] United Nations Yearbook, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1977), online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/295767025a94cb1f85256396004f101b?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)
- [37] Security Council Official Records, 2381st meeting, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/889a252698f47b988525739100660d73?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)
- [38] Security Council Official Records, 2461st meeting, p.25, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/f66d83a60905fa2e852570a40067518d?OpenDocument> (May 9, 2011)
- [39] Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2832nd Meeting, p.20, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/216b0f1610a00414852570980067d667?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)
- [40] United Nations Security Council 3538th Meeting, online:
<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/5391b33a35b11729852561cd006e3cc8?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)
- [41] United Nations Security Council 3756th Meeting, online:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/2564fa5c2ec99b208025646c0029d699?OpenDocument> (May 10, 2011)

[42] [U.S Membership Report,http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/US_2000.asp](http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/US_2000.asp)
(June 10, 2011)

[43] United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/2011/24, online:
<http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/9397a59ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?OpenDocument> (June 14, 2011)

Other Internet sources:

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf>

(official website of United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine)

<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>

(official website of United Nations Security Council)

<http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/>

(official website of U.S. Mission to UN)

List of Annexes:

Annex I : U.S. aid to Israel (table)

Annex II: List of U.S. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in 1972 – 1997 (list)

Annex I: U.S. aid to Israel (table)

Table A-1 shows cumulative U.S. aid to Israel for FY1949 through FY1996, and U.S. aid to Israel for each fiscal year since. Detail for the years 1949-1996 is shown in **Table A-2**.

Table A-1. Recent U.S. Aid to Israel
(millions of dollars)

Year	Total	Military Grant	Economic Grant	Immig. Grant	ASHA	All other
1949-1996	68,030.9	29,014.9	23,122.4	868.9	121.4	14,903.3
1997	3,132.1	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.1	50.0
1998	3,080.0	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	—	—
1999	3,010.0	1,860.0	1,080.0	70.0	—	—
2000	4,131.85	3,120.0	949.1	60.0	2.75	—
2001	2,876.05	1,975.6	838.2	60.0	2.25	—
2002	2,850.65	2,040.0	720.0	60.0	2.65	28.0
2003	3,745.15	3,086.4	596.1	59.6	3.05	—
2004	2,687.25	2,147.3	477.2	49.7	3.15	9.9
2005	2,612.15	2,202.2	357.0	50.0	2.95	—
2006	2,534.5	2,257.0	237.0	40.0	—	0.5
2007	2,503.15	2,340.0	120.0	40.0	2.95	0.2
2008	2,423.9	2,380.0	0	40.0	3.90	0
2009	2,583.9	2,550.0	0	30.0	3.90	0
2010	2,800.0	2,775.0	0	25.0	—	0
Total	109,001.55	61,348.4	30,897.0	1,613.2	151.05	14,991.9

Notes: ESF was earmarked for \$960 million for FY2000 but was reduced to meet a 0.38% recision. FY2000 military grants include \$1.2 billion for the Wye agreement and \$1.92 billion in annual military aid. Final amounts for FY2003 are reduced by 0.65% mandated recision, and final amounts for FY2004 are reduced by 0.59%.

The \$600 million in housing loan guarantees, \$5.5 billion in military debt reduction loan guarantees, \$9.2 billion in Soviet Jew resettlement loan guarantees, and \$9 billion in economic recovery loan guarantees are not included in the tables because the United States government did not transfer funds to Israel. The United States underwrote loans to Israel from commercial institutions.

Source: U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf

Annex II: List of U.S. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in 1972 – 1997 (list)

03/1971 – 02/1973	George H.W. Bush
02/1973 – 06/1975	John Scali
07/1975 – 02/1976	Daniel P. Moynihan
03/1976 – 01/1977	William W. Scranton
01/1977 – 09/1979	Andrew J. Young
09/1979 – 01/1981	Donald F. McHenry
01/1981 – 04/1985	Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
05/1985 – 03/1989	Vernon A. Walters
03/1989 – 05/1992	Thomas R. Pickering
05/1992 – 01/1993	Edward J. Perkins
02/1993 – 01/1997	Madeleine K. Albright
02/1997 – 09/1998	Bill Richardson

Source: Past Ambassadors, http://usun.state.gov/about/hist_ambassadors/index.htm

Projekt Bakalárskej práce

Voľba témy

Po konci 2. svetovej vojny bol v roku 1947 navrhnutý vznik nezávislého štátu Izrael v oblasti Palestíny (vtedy britského mandátneho územia), a to Organizáciou spojených národov na základe Rezolúcie 181 Valného zhromaždenia. Izrael vznikol o rok neskôr, 14.mája 1948, Deklaráciou nezávislosti. Avšak jeho vznikom sa skomplikovala situácia na Blízkom východe, kde sa novovzniknutý štát Izrael ocitol vklinený do arabskej oblasti, ktorá vznik svojho nového suseda od počiatku odmietala. Od tohto obdobia môžeme sledovať silný antagonizmus medzi židovským štátom a moslimským svetom.

Izrael však má na svojej strane mocného spojenca v podobe USA, ktoré od prvých dní stáli na strane Izraela. USA sa podieľali ako na vzniku štátu, tak jeho podporou počas jeho existencie (či už to bola podpora politická, logistická alebo vojenská). Táto podpora sa prejavuje ako v zahraničnej politike USA mierenej konkrétne voči Izraelu, tak počas rokovaní Bezpečnostnej Rady OSN, kde USA ako stály člen pravidelne využíva právo veta na obranu izraelských akcií. Počas Studenej vojny to bol Sovietsky zväz, ktorý využíval pravidelne právo veto. Avšak situácia sa od pádu ZSSR zmenila a z najviac vetujúceho člena (115krát využili toto právo od počiatku OSN do rozpadu ZSSR) na člena s najmenším počtom odmietnutých rezolúcií (od roku 1991 vetovalo len v 2 prípadoch). Od roku 1970, kedy USA využilo prvýkrát svoje zvýhodnené postavenie v BR OSN, až do roku 2002 bolo predominantne kvôli USA vetovaných 75 navrhovaných rezolúcií. V porovnaní s ostatnými permanentnými členmi rady je toto číslo niekoľkonásobné (Francúzsko, Veľká Británia a Čína, počas celej existencie OSN veto použili spolu v 53 prípadoch). Z toho viac ako 35 prípadov amerického veta sa týkalo oblasti Palestíny. A vo väčšine prípadov boli USA jediným členom rady, ktorý nesúhlasil s danou rezolúciou. Keďže BR OSN má aj 10 nestálych členov, ktorí pochádzajú z rôznych geopolitických oblastí, je americké jednanie skutočne zaujímavým predmetom pre posúdenie a analýzu.

Vo svojej bakalárskej práci sa chcem venovať prejavu americko-izraelského vzťahu na pôde Bezpečnostnej rady OSN, a to najmä v podobe amerického rozhodovania. Obdobie si vymedzujem na obdobie rokov 1972 – 2001, pretože v roku 1972 bolo veto USA voči Izraelu použité po prvýkrát. Danú tému považujem za dostatočne zaujímavú a prínosnú pre účely bakalárskej práce. Ako základnú prácu, od ktorej by som chcela odvíjať svoj výskum, som si stanovila *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007* od Jamesa Ross-

Nazzala. Rovnako dôležité pre prácu považujem využitie rezolúcií týkajúcich sa Izraela, konkrétne tých, ktoré nevstúpili do platnosti z dôvodu veta USA. Tieto rezolúcie budú taktiež slúžiť ako základný výskumný materiál, ktorý určí dôvody amerického konania. United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine budem využívať ako základný zdroj týchto materiálov a informácií.

Cieľ práce

Hlavným cieľom mojej práce bude na základe rezolúcií určiť a definovať príčiny, ktoré vedú USA k používaniu veta v BR OSN v prospech Izraela. Chcela by som podrobnejšie rozobrať aké dôvody podmieňujú politiku USA a jej rozhodovanie v najvýznamnejšom orgáne OSN, ktorým Bezpečnostná rada bez pochyb je. Konkrétne mám záujem zistiť, ako už samotná téma mojej práce napovedá, príčiny, pre ktoré USA vykazujú dané stanovisko spôsobom použitia veta v prospech štátu Izrael. Pre získanie uspokojivého záveru združím jednotlivé rezolúcie týkajúce sa Izraela prejednávané v BR OSN a odmietnuté USA a uskutočním ich analýzu. K tomu mi budú nápomocné najmä stránky United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, ktoré združujú materiály týkajúce sa otázky Palestíny od počiatku vzniku štátu Izrael. Predpokladám, že bude možné nájsť spoločné črty väčšiny rezolúcií, na ktorých základe bude možné dôjsť k objektívnemu záveru a vyvodu objektívnych príčin. Touto cestou by následne bolo možné lepšie porozumieť dôvodom prečo sa tak deje.

Zo získaných informácií by malo byť na záver možné predpokladať rozhodnutie delegáta USA v ďalších hlasovaniach o rezolúciách týkajúcich sa oblasti Izraela a Palestíny.

Výskumná otázka

Základná výskumná otázka znie, aké sú dôvody nadmerného využívania veta zo strany USA. Je to podmienené obranou záujmov USA v Izraeli? Alebo sa jedná o podporu Izraela na Blízkom Východe a jeho obranu voči arabskej väčšine v regióne? Prípadne, je príčinou izraelské lobby, ktoré podľa Mearsheimera a Walta podmieňuje americkú zahraničnú politiku? Otázkou teda je, aké sú príčiny využívania veta v BR OSN zo strany USA.

Štruktúra práce

Na úvod svojej bakalárskej práce sa chcem venovať dôležitosti Bezpečnostnej Rady OSN. Aké vykonáva funkcie, čo je jej náplňou a akými právomocami disponuje. Taktiež by som rada poukázala na postavenie USA v tomto orgáne. Rovnako považujem za dôležité načrtnúť čitateľovi vzťahy medzi USA a Izraelom mimo pôdu OSN. Zmieniť kľúčové akcie USA voči Izraelu, formu podpory, ktorú mu poskytujú a zbežný historický vývoj.

V druhej kapitole sa zameriam na rezolúcie týkajúce sa Izraela v rozmedzí rokov 1972-2001, ktoré kvôli americkému vetu nevošli do platnosti a neboli implementované. Mojou snahou bude nájsť spoločné znaky, ktoré sa nachádzajú vo vetovaných rezolúciách. Touto cestou vymedzím kľúčové body, ktoré sa v nich opakujú a na ich základe budem v ďalšej časti mojej práce vyvodzovať príčiny, ktoré vedú USA k využívaniu veta.

V nasledujúcej kapitole vyvodím z informácií získaných z analýzy rezolúcií príčiny vedúce k americkému vetu v BR OSN. Určím opakujúce sa dôvody, ktoré vedú USA k jeho rozhodnutiu a týmto spôsobom vytvorím predpoklady pre budúce prípady.

Na záver sa budem zaoberať návrhom niektorej z aktuálnych rezolúcií na pôde BR OSN a na základe získaných informácií bude mojim cieľom predpokladať rozhodnutie zo strany USA voči danej rezolúcii.

Metodológia práce

Vo svojej bakalárskej práci sa budem snažiť aplikovať prípadovú kvalitatívnu metódu, na základe ktorej z množstva vetovaných rezolúcií vyvodím príčiny podmieňujúce využitie amerického veta. Následnou komparáciou rezolúcií v spojitosti s americkou politikou vyvodím príčiny, ktoré boli kľúčové pre zamietnutie návrhu rezolúcie. Ako závislá premenná sa v mojej práci bude prejavovať veto využité na obranu Izraela zo strany USA. Za nezávislú premennú bude možné považovať faktory pôsobiace na rozhodnutie ohľadom daných rezolúcií.

Moje zistenia na záver aplikujem na aktuálny draft rezolúcie, o ktorom ešte nebolo rozhodnuté a týmto spôsobom sa pokúsím preukázať presnosť vykonanej štúdie, ktorá v ideálnom prípade preukáže pravosť mojej štúdie.

Predbežná osnova práce

1. Úvod
 - 1.1 Úloha Bezpečnostnej rady OSN
 - 1.2 Vzťahy USA a Izraela
2. Rezolúcie BR OSN vzťahujúce sa k Izraelu
 - 2.1 Rezolúcie vetované USA
 - 2.2 Spoločné znaky v rezolúciách
3. Príčiny veta USA
 - 3.1 Príčiny veta na základe spoločných znakov rezolúcií
- 4 Aplikácia na aktuálnu rezolúciu BR OSN
- 5 Záver

Predpokladaný zoznam literatúry

Neperiodická literatúra

ADLER, Gerald. *Israel and Iraq: United Nations Double Standards – UN Charter Article 25 and Chapters VI and VII*. [online]. 2003, Dostupný z WWW: <http://www.middle-east-info.org/gateway/unitednations/Israel%20and%20Iraq%20-%20UN%20Double%20Standards.pdf>

BAILEY, Sidney Dawson; DAWS, Sidney. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

ČEJKA, Marek. *Encyklopedie blízkovýchodního terorismu*. Praha : Barrister & Principal, 2007

ČEJKA, Marek. *Izrael a Palestina - Minulost, současnost a směřování blízkovýchodního konfliktu*. 2. vyd. Praha : Barrister & Principal, 2007.

ČEJKA, Marek. *Judaismus, politika a Stát Izrael*. 1. vyd. Brno : Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity, 2002.

CHAN, Steve. *Power, Satisfaction and Popularity . A Position Analysis of UN Security Council Vetoes*. [online]. 2003, Dostupný z WWW: <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/4/339>

CLYDE R. Mark. *Israeli-United States Relations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB82008 [online]. 2003, Dostupný z WWW: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/14820.pdf>

GOODRICH, Leland M. *The UN Security Council*. International Organization, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1958), pp. 273-287.

HARRINGTON GAGNON, Mona. *Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent*. International Organization, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 812-836

KIRGIS, Frederic L., Jr. *Security Council's First Fifty Years*. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-53.

KÖCHLER, Hans. *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council*. Studies in International Relations, XVII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, [online] 1991, Dostupný z WWW: http://i-p-o.org/koechler-Voting_Procedure-UN_Security_Council.pdf

LAQUEUR, Walter. *The Israel-Arab Reader – Middle East Conflict & Peace*. 6th revised edition, Penguin, 2001.

MAKDISI, Ussama. *"Anti-Americanism" in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History*. The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 2, History and September 11: A Special Issue (Sep., 2002), pp. 538-557

MEARSHEIMER, John J.; WALT, Stephen M. *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf

NES, David; FULBRIGHT, William. *US Policy*. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1/2 (Autumn, 1975 - Winter, 1976), pp. 243-252

PETRAS, James. *Moc Izraele ve Spojených státech*. 1.vyd., Nakladatelství Radomír Fiksa

QUANDT, William B. *Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incrementalism*. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 26-40

ROSS-NAZZAL, James. *The U.S. Veto and the Polemics of the Question of Palestine in the United Nations Security Council, 1972-2007*. Edwin Mellen Pr. 2008.

ROULEAU, Eric. *US-Israel Relations*. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer, 1977), pp. 169-177

SARSAR, Saliba. *The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations*. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3, Spring 2004

TINDALL, George Brown. *Dějiny Spojených států amerických*. 5.dopl. vyd. Praha: NLN, 2008

WATKINS, Eric. *The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East*. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 1-14

Základné internetové zdroje

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf>

(oficiálne internetové stránky United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine)

<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>

(oficiálne internetové stránky Bezpečnostnej rady OSN)

<http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/>

(oficiálne internetové stránky Misie USA pri OSN)

<http://israel-un.mfa.gov.il/>

(oficiálne internetové stránky Misie Izraela pri OSN)

<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vie/viepoltoc.html>

(oficiálne stránky Židovskej virtuálnej knižnice)

Ostatné

Charta OSN

NEFF, Donald. *An Updated List of Vetoes Cast by the United States to Shield Israel from Criticism by the U.N. Security Council.* Washington Report on Middle East Affairs; May/Jun2005, Vol. 24 Issue 4, p14-14, 1p

WILLIAMS, Ian. *Latest U.S. Veto on Behalf of Israel Gives The Lie to Claim of Even-Handedness.* Washington Report on Middle East Affairs; Jan/Feb2002, Vol. 21 Issue 1, p36, 2p, 1 color