

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of Political Studies

Department of International Relations

**Dominika Kunertová**

**The Special Relationship, the ESDP and  
the British National Interest at the Turn  
of the New Millenium**

*Master's Thesis*

Prague 2012

Author: **Dominika Kunertová**

Supervisor: **JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.**

Opponent:

Date of presentation: **June 2012**

Grade:

## **Publication data:**

KUNERTO VÁ, Dominika. *The Special Relationship, the ESDP and the British National Interest at the Turn of the New Millenium*. Prague, 2012. 110 pgs. Master's thesis (M.A.). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, Department of International Relations. Supervisor: JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.

## **Annotation**

The Master's Thesis "*The Special Relationship, the ESDP and the British National Interest at the Turn of the New Millenium*" analyses the relationship of the United Kingdom to both the United States and the European Union during the premiership of Tony Blair. By using critical discourse analysis and applying three criteria within the framework of the procedural concept of national interest, the work seeks to determine whether the creation and further development of the European Security and Defence Policy was in the British national interest and whether it was compatible with the close UK-US relationship. After having examined the British public political discourse of three main political parties on security and defence, this thesis arrives at the conclusion that for Britain it was essential to keep NATO at the centre of its security, to maintain the close relationship with the US and to improve Britain's position in Europe. The core attitudes of the British political elite remained unchanged in the respected period. On the discourse level, the ESDP was in the British national interest as it was presented as an effort to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. Predicate and metaphor analysis of Blair's speeches unveiled that the British Prime Minister, considered as the initiator of a more powerful EU in the role of a military actor, used the bridge and mediator metaphor in order to legitimise the Government's defence and security policy and to secure the support of his political counterparts. Furthermore, the research suggests that the term *special relationship* was used only very rarely and did not featured significantly in the British political discourse in respect to the illustration of the continuing importance of the UK-US relationship.

## **Anotácia**

Magisterská práca "Zvláštny vzťah, Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika a britský národný záujem na prelome nového tisícročia" analyzuje vzťah Spojeného kráľovstva k Spojeným štátom americkým a Európskej únii počas vlády britského premiéra Tonyho Blaira. Použitím kritickej diskurzívnej analýzy a aplikovaním troch kritérií v rámci procedurálneho konceptu národného záujmu sa práca snaží stanoviť, či vytvorenie a ďalší vývoj Európskej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky bolo v britskom národnom záujme, a či bola táto politika kompatibilná s blízkym vzťahom medzi Britániou a Spojenými štátmi. Na základe analýzy britského politického diskurzu troch hlavných politických strán na tému bezpečnosti a obrany táto práca prichádza k záveru, že pre Britániu bolo dôležité zachovať NATO v jadre svojej bezpečnostnej politiky, udržiavať blízky vzťah so Spojenými štátmi a zlepšiť svoju pozíciu v Európe. Základné stanoviská britskej politickej elity zostali nezmenené počas celého skúmaného obdobia. Na úrovni diskurzu, EBOP bola v britskom národnom záujme, keďže bola prezentovaná ako snaha posilniť európsky pilier v rámci NATO. Predikátová analýza a analýza metafor prejavov Tonyho Blaira ukázala, že britský premiér, považovaný za iniciátora myšlienky silnejšej EÚ v úlohe vojenského hráča, používal metaforu mostu a mediátora na legitimizovanie bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky svojej vlády, a na zabezpečenie podpory svojich politických protihráčov. Závety výskumu tiež napovedajú, že samotný výraz "special relationship" bol vo verejnom britskom politickom diskurze používaný iba veľmi zriedka, a teda nehral významnejšiu úlohu pri popisovaní dôležitosti vzťahu medzi Britániou a Spojenými štátmi.

## **Keywords**

Tony Blair, British foreign policy, European Security and Defence Policy, Critical discourse analysis, procedural concept of national interest.

## **Kľúčové slová**

Tony Blair, Britská zahraničná politika, Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika, kritická diskurzívna analýza, procedurálny koncept národného záujmu.

## **Declaration**

1. I pledge that I have not received unauthorised assistance during the completion of my thesis and I have referred to the cited sources only.
2. The text of this thesis without Appendices has a total of 212 981 characters in length, which makes 118 standardised pages.
3. I give consent to publicise this thesis for further academic use and scholar reference.

Prague, 18 May 2012

Dominika Kunertová

.....

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D., my primary supervisor at the Charles University in Prague, as well as Mgr. Matúš Halás, Ph.D. from Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Comenius University in Bratislava, and Ing. Vít Beneš, Ph.D. of the Institute of International Relations in Prague, for their consultations, comments, helpful feedback and kindly approach throughout the completion of this thesis. My thank you goes especially to my friend Kristína for punching me whenever it was necessary, and Mária, Martina, and Denisa for their mental support and encouragement.

I dedicate this work to my parents.

## ***Abbreviations***

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CON	Conservative Party
EEC	European Economic Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
IGC	Intergovernmental conference
LAB	Labour Party
LIBDEM	Liberal Democrats
MP	Member of Parliament
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PM	Prime Minister
SDR	Strategic Defence Review
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union

# Table of Contents

## *Abbreviations*

INTRODUCTION: BLAIR'S BRITAIN – BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE.....	1
1. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CONCEPTUAL NOTE .....	4
2. ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR: A PORTRAIT.....	10
3. NATIONAL INTEREST AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: A THEORETICAL NOTE ..	17
3.1. Concept of National Interest .....	17
3.2. National Interest – A New Approach.....	23
3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis.....	27
4. BRITISH POLITICAL DISCOURSE DURING THE PREMIERSHIP OF TONY BLAIR: NATIONAL INTEREST IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE. ....	35
4.1. Criterion: Relevance of the Policy.....	37
4.2. Criterion: Consensus of the British Political Class .....	39
4.2.1. <i>Conservative Party</i> .....	40
4.2.2. <i>Liberal Democrats</i> .....	43
4.2.3. <i>Labour Party</i> .....	47
4.3. Criterion: External Acceptability .....	53
4.3.1. <i>Europe</i> .....	54
4.3.2. <i>The United States</i> .....	57
4.3.3. <i>Intertextual linkages</i> .....	62
5. PREDICATE AND METAPHOR ANALYSIS OF TONY BLAIR'S SPEECHES ON BRITISH SECURITY AND DEFENCE .....	66
CONCLUSION .....	77
SUMMARY.....	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	81
List of Appendices .....	98
Appendices.....	99



## **INTRODUCTION: BLAIR'S BRITAIN – BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE**

Tony Blair dominated British political life for more than a decade and was able to set a strong political direction from Downing Street No.10. His policies were partly defined by the tumultuous international decade of his premiership and it was in foreign policy that he hoped his legacy might be most lasting. It was him who launched a European defence project resulting later into the European security and defence policy (ESDP) which was presented in Europe as something of a U-turn for Britain. At the same time, Blair was able to keep stressing the importance of the Atlantic Alliance.

When talking about the British foreign policy, the concept of three circles is commonly applied. These circles are Europe, Anglo-America, and Commonwealth. The topic of my work touches the former two - I analyse United Kingdom's (UK) relationship with the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Although Britain will always be part of both Europe and of Anglo-America – circles that loom larger than the circle of Empire - there remains a question of priority between the two (Gamble 2003: 220). Thus, the topic of Britain's relationship to both the US and the EU has been present in the British politics, within the society, and central institutions deal with it irrespective of political orientation or content changes. From the longer term perspective, Blair's premiership made a big difference to British foreign policy. His predecessor, the Conservative party, ruled Britain for eighteen years under Margaret Thatcher and John Major and in general, their foreign policy was dominated by strong Atlanticism and a reserved position towards the continental Europe. As a result, the UK's security and defence has been closely tied to Transatlantic defence structures. However, over the past fifteen years there has been a significant advancement in the cooperation between European Union member states within the security and defence field. Great merit for this development is attributed to Tony Blair during the times when he was a Prime Minister of Britain. He is considered to be an initiator of a more powerful EU in the role of a military actor and, what is important, Britain itself has become one of the major contributors and participants in military missions under the EU umbrella. This Blair's step has to be considered in a wider context of heavy European reliance on US military capabilities. He acknowledged that a healthy US-European security relationship in the future would have most likely demanded that both burdens and responsibilities be shared equitably.

Studies of the Europe – America relations in the British foreign policy context are not unique. Regarding previous works done so far on this area, researchers have been interested in British foreign policy predominantly from the historical point of view, mainly when it comes to the concept of the US-UK "special relationship" and traditionally reserved British position towards Europe (Reynolds 1988, Calabrese 2001, Kimball 2005, Marsh-Baylis 2006, Danchev 2007, Edelman 2010). As the intensity of this close relationship varied over time, scholars tried to take its current temperature (Dunn 2008, Dumbrell 2009, Porter 2010, Raymond 2010), reflect on the durability of alliances and to prognosticate its possible future development (Élie 2005, Lloyd 2008). I would like to mention one particular study written by Kassimeris (2006) who analysed the impact of the ESDP creation on the special relationship from the European point of view. As it comes to the European Security and Defence policy, there have been many studies done - either normative or policy oriented - explaining and polemising about motives behind further institutionalisation of foreign and military field on the European level. Forsberg (2007) distinguished between three basic explanations behind the emergence of the ESDP cooperation and the military role of the EU: the attempt to complete European integration, to balance the power of the US or to respond to the new types of crises in Europe's security environment. Besides functionalist, neorealist or constructivist explanations, political sociologists argue that the ESDP is part of Europeanisation of military forces in Europe which has been taking place since the Second World War (Mérand 2008).

However, my work focuses on one particular actor – the United Kingdom – and its point of view on a stronger military role for the EU, as being one of its initiators. This thesis explores political discourse in Britain and tries to untangle the rhetoric of British political class on the complex net of relations within the defence and security field. The selected topic is closely related to my previous academic works I wrote on the deployment of British forces in ESDP missions and a EU naval operation in the Gulf of Aden. This empirical analysis of British foreign policy regarding defence and security is expected to show if (or how) the characteristic of the British national interest changed in the respected period of time.

The main goal of this thesis is to find the answer to these research questions:

**Is the European Security and Defence Policy in the British national interest?**

**Did the British national interest change while the European Security and Defence Policy was developing?**

**Is the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States compatible with the British national interest in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy formation?**

**Is the special relationship still relevant for / in the British national interest?**

Given these above objectives, to explore the construction of British national interest in the defence and security under the Blair's premiership I use in my thesis a so-called procedural analysis. I was inspired by a recently introduced concept of national interest elaborated by Kratochvíl (2010b) who approaches national interest from the procedural point of view and suggests three criteria - relevance, consensus and external acceptability of certain foreign policy - that must be met if talking about the legitimate national interest and defining the way how to actually identify it properly. When it comes to methodology, the role of ideas in foreign policy, and system of signification, I employ critical discourse analysis which is considered to be helpful for establishing a particular discourse as well as for elucidating both how discourses overlap and structure of meaning that they share. Furthermore, this work concentrates as well on Blair's speeches and legitimization strategies he used to defend his foreign policy positions. For this purpose I applied predicate and metaphor analysis elaborated by Milliken (1999). Discourse analysis can serve as an alternative explanation for political events. The aim of my research is not to disqualify positivist approaches, but to present an innovative way how to do a foreign policy analysis. The analysis itself includes approximately 250 speeches, statements, press conferences and interviews that took place in the period given. Moreover, I included key governmental documents, namely annual Departmental Reports and Performance Reports of both the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In addition, election manifestos played an important role in providing relevant data for my research as well. Thus I am persuaded that my work is novatory in the sense that I chose neither integrationist nor historical approach and rather strictly focused on the British political discourse on security and defence during the decade of Blair's premiership from a critical point of view.

# 1. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CONCEPTUAL NOTE

*"The relationship of Britain to Europe and America is not a matter simply of economics or of politics or of international relations: it goes to the heart of the political identity and political economy of this state formed over a very long period of development."*

(Gamble 2003: 1)

In order to understand the landscape of British politics, Gamble (2003) proposes a concept of four overlapping circles<sup>1</sup> which reminds a lot of British foreign policy of three circles once pronounced by Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Reynolds 1988: 235). The fact that after the Second World War Britain lost its status of a leading power was hard to accept by Britons. In order to demonstrate the role of Great Britain and its exceptional position, Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin developed a special system, the so-called *"policy of three circles."* This policy was meant to show Britain in a special position in the system of three overlapping circles representing the United States, the British Commonwealth (and Empire), and Europe. Within these three-circle policy Britain could *"operate as a swing power: not totally integrated into any one circle but wielding power"* (Dumbrell 2001: 7).

In my work I focus on two of them: Anglo-America and Europe, or more precisely, the (changing) relationship between these two circles during Tony Blair's premiership. The question whether Britain has to choose between Europe and America or whether there is any need for this kind of choice, is not a new issue. Europe has been a problem area of policy for British politicians for many years. Very often we hear that there is the *"British approach to Europe"* (Watts – Pilkington 2005: 270). Ever since the Second World War, key strands have been characteristic of the British approach to European policy (ibid: 279): an emphasis upon the importance of British's transatlantic ties as a central tenet of foreign policy and preference for intergovernmentalism over integrationism. It is though surprising that it was Blair – the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom - who did *"cross the European defence rubicon"* (Howorth 2000: 34).

---

<sup>1</sup> a circle understood as political space, imagined community, framing foreign policy conduct

This part of thesis is devoted to the characteristics of British post-Cold War foreign policy which I consider as crucial when conceptualising the Blair's policies towards both the US and the EU. Prime Minister stands as the central figure in the political discourse, thus depicting differences which he and his government made to British politics as such is an important beginning before proceeding to the very research of British political discourse on security and defence, and searching for its national interest in this respected domain.

### ***Pre-Blairite Britain***

In the last twenty-five years British politics has been transformed, and a new political landscape has emerged. Britain is still the leading European member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and one of five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. However, the post-war "policy of three circles" born in 1950s – in which Britain played a major role in Europe, maintained a global empire and influenced US policy via the "special relationship" - was being called into question as the British Empire was dismantled and receded as the main frame of reference for British politics. At the centre of this new context is the concern of Britain's relation to Europe and to America – whether Britain can be somewhere between the two. Thus, other question became more important for the future: the changing roles which Europe and America come to play in British politics, and the ways in which Britain is perceived as between Europe and America strategically, economically, politically, culturally and ideologically (Gamble 2003: 220).

Britain's ties with its American counterpart deserve a more detailed remark. Although both the United Kingdom and United States have close relationships with many other nations, the level of cooperation between them in economic activity, trade and commerce, military planning, execution of military operations, nuclear weapons technology and intelligence sharing has been described as "unparalleled" among major powers. The so-called "special relationship" with the US is used to illustrate a privileged approach of British politicians and diplomats towards Washington. The interconnected British - American interests, sentimentally emphasised shared values are considered to serve as a basis of this relation. According to Wallace-Phillips, the special relationship between Britain and the U.S. has reached dimensions of "*political and ideological superstructure with embedded military and intelligence service substructure*" (2009: 275). As already mentioned, the special relationship has several

dimensions. McCausland-Stuart (2006) present many of its aspects in their works, according to which they identify three pillars: mutually shared legal heritage, mutual economic investment, and diplomatic and security ties. They consider this relationship as "*a source of the productive international community leadership*" (2006: 203). The beginning of formation of the "special relationship" has been identified variously, e.g. Raymond search for traces of this relationship in 1890s in the foreign policy of the Federalists (McCausland-Stuart 2006: 4), but in general scholars date it back back to the WWII following its use in a 1946 speech by British statesman Winston Churchill<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, it is interesting that some scholars claim that this close or special relationship is only illusionary or too vague, and even irrelevant in today's era. One way or another, I do not deal with the formation of this relationship in my thesis but instead I focus on the term's quality and its eventual change within the period of Tony Blair's premiership in the context of formation and rising importance of European security structures, which leads me to the second circle – Europe. The UK had not want any role in a European Defence Community and could not see itself as any part of a European unity movement. The UK's European role in 1950s was according to Sloan (2010: 64) an extension of its special relationship with the US and a distraction from British global political and military involvements. The US in that time valued the special relationship and appreciated the important role that the UK had played in the formative years of the alliance (ibid.). During the postwar times, the UK had been centrally involved in shaping the Western alliance and had promised to maintain forces on the European Continent, at least as long as the troop presence in Europe did not conflict with British global commitments (Sloan 2010: 64). Regarding the European integration, in the British context the partisan politics matters very much. For many years, there were debates over purposes and methods of cooperation: between advocates of supranational Europe and partisans of a Europe of nation-states, between the communitarians and intergovernmentalists, and between the Europeanists and the Atlantists. British politicians have predominantly belonged to the latter. It does not come as a surprise then that the Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) was perceived with prejudices (Sloan 2010: 65) because of its Commonwealth ties and its special relationship with the US. The UK's membership in the European Union has been objected to over questions of sovereignty, and ever since its entry into

---

<sup>2</sup> Speech "Sinews of Peace Address." (Churchill (1946)

EEC in January 1973 there have been divisions in both major parties over the question whether the UK should form greater ties within the EU, or reduce the EU's supranational powers, and this issue has been invoking heated discussions in society. Therefore the British commitment to Europe remained highly qualified till today.

The Conservative Party is seen as the most divided British political party over the "Europe issue". In the post-war years, the party had to adjust to the loss of Empire and as a result, the alliance with the United States became the new linchpin of Conservative policy: *"The Conservatives hoped that a partnership with the United States would allow parts of the global hegemonic role which Britain could no longer sustain to be transferred to the United States, while permitting Britain to remain a great power and able to protect its global interests"* (Gamble 2003: 175). The problem of this Atlantic Alliance was that the relationship was unequal which forced many in the Conservative leadership that Britain's security in the world order was best achieved by joining the EEC. Eventually the Conservatives transformed themselves from being the party of Empire to the party of Europe (Gamble 2003: 175). The reasons were mostly of economic character, but also political and defence interests played an important role, relating to the maintainance of British influence. *"One of the successes of the Conservative party has been their ability to project themselves as a national party while at the same time accepting the United Kingdom's involvement in wider institutions and relationships designed to safeguard British interests."* (Gamble 2003: 176). And it was during the Thatcher era when the Conservatives opened a major debate about what Britain's role in the world should be. Before it was argued that Britain could be both European and Atlanticist. However, Thatcher's Conservative camp was convinced that Britain had to choose between Europe and America, and they chose Atlantic Alliance, calling Europe the danger. As Gamble notes that Thatcher's policy in office was *"deeply ambivalent, and produced a deeply inconsistent policy"* (2003: 176). This ambivalency<sup>3</sup> created a division in the Conservative party, which continued later under the John Major's leadership. There was considerable unease in the party about the constitutional consequences of the Maastricht Treaty which resulted into anti-European sentiments and open conflict over Europe in 1992. So instead of moving expectedly in a more pro-European direction, Major's speeches became much more

---

<sup>3</sup> On one hand, she supported the creation of single market, and signed the Single European Act introducing qualified majority voting for the first time. On the other hand, she opposed the UK joining the ERM and was concerned about the moves towards further integration and the possible creation of a federal union

Euro-sceptic. Gamble argues that this deep split in the party and its difficult management was a direct result of Thatcher's leadership of the party (2003: 178). She legitimated opposition to Europe and gave priority to America over Europe in order to guarantee an open seas, open trade policy, cultivating links with all parts of the world, rather than being focused on Europe. *"The Thatcherites reacted so passionately against Europe because they came to see Europe as a fundamental threat to England and to national identity. They realized that they felt much more in common with America than with Europe, and they polarized the choice in that way"* (Gamble 2003: 178).

One of their main arguments against closer European integration was the claim that national sovereignty must take priority over economic integration. Thus, the concentration on a partnership of nations conception of Europe's future was an understandable reaction to a vigorous intra-party debate on Europe. However, regarding the transatlantic relations, the Conservative government under Major was not able to invigorate its relations with Washington in a way that would have suggested real influence. Major did not manage to make a personal success of his relations with either George H.W. Bush or Bill Clinton. At the other end of the Atlantic ocean, both Bush and Clinton leant towards Germany as the keystone decision-maker in Europe and preferred bilateral relationship with German Chancellor rather than *"some mediated position via London"* (Clarke 2007: 596). Under the Conservative government security and defence policy was altering in a series of ad hoc steps that were justified in the Ministry of Defence but never derived from a governmental overview of the totality of Britain's new external relations. Foreign policy was struggling to cope with the strains in transatlantic relations, a concentration on Europe and the Mediterranean. Moreover, *"realist orthodoxy was proving difficult to apply in the world of the 1990s as being based on an implicit faith in the value of Britain as an independent state, doing what it could to uphold the institutions, alliances and diplomatic norms that stood the test of time and were now in the process of rapid transition"* (Clarke 2007: 597).

Serious problems within of the Conservative parliamentary party in 1990s led to its collapse which gave opportunity to their political rival: the Labour party, at that time presenting itself with a new programme under the title *New Labour*. Almost the whole 20th-century Labour has been insular from events in Europe. *"There is a strong anti-European, chauvinist streak in Labour, a belief in British superiority, a preference for Anglo-America or the Commonwealth, and a dislike for European regimes, a desire to stay clear of them and keep the UK from being entangled with them."* (Gamble 2003:



212). It took the Labour Party a long time to overcome its instinctive suspicion of European integration project as belief in the uniqueness of British socialism remained strong. When it comes to Anglo-America, even if the pattern of America's global hegemony sharply divided opinion in the Labour Party, the Labour leadership remained steadfast in their support of the United States. Close personal ties between Labour leaders and their American counterparts became the norm. The Atlantic Alliance had been a *bedrock* of the Labour mainstream since 1940s (Gamble 2003: 190). When it came to Europe, the Labour tradition was ambivalent. In remaking itself after 1987, the Labour party re-emphasised its strong post-war Atlanticism, while at the same time discovered a "*new enthusiasm for Europe*" (Gamble 2003: 190). In general, the Labour party, being the strongest opposition party, was mostly focused on domestic issues though in the election campaign it relied on the Labour's more "friendly" approach to Europe as well. The Labour at that time was ascendant over the Tories in the opinion polls. The unpopularity of John Major's Conservative government reflected the deep division over the EU within the party itself. And in 1997, the Conservative party being in trouble, Britain's foreign policy was thought to be about to change. In general election that year, the Labour party after the landslide victory took the power and the Prime Minister's chair was handed over to an ambitious and fresh leader of the New Labour: Tony Blair.

## 2. ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR: A PORTRAIT

*"A gifted communicator with an intuitive grasp of the national mood, he [Blair] was the dominant figure in British politics for more than a decade"*

(Stephens 2007: 639)

Anthony Charles Lynton Blair served as the youngest Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 20th century from 2nd May 1997 to 27th June 2007. He was the Member of Parliament (MP) for Sedgefield from 1983 to 2007 and Leader of the Labour Party from 1994 to 2007. He resigned from all of these positions in June 2007.<sup>4</sup> Tony Blair has dominated British political life for more than a decade and was able to set a strong political direction from Downing Street No. 10. Seldon (2007) is comparing him to Margaret Thatcher as he has changed the terms of political debate and provoked as much condemnation as admiration.

Blair was born in Edinburgh, Scotland on 6 May 1953. Shortly after graduating from Oxford in 1975, Blair joined the Labour Party. During the early 1980s, he was involved in Labour politics in Hackney South and Shoreditch. In 1982 although Blair as the Labour candidate lost the Beaconsfield by-election (the only election he lost in his 25-year political career) and he lost 10% of the vote, he acquired a profile within the party. In the 1983 UK general election, Blair was elected as MP for Sedgefield, however the party as a whole was defeated. He became a member of the House of Commons on 6 July 1983. Once elected, Blair's political ascent was rapid. He received his first front-bench appointment in 1984 as assistant Treasury spokesman. By this time of late 1980s, Blair was aligned with the reforming tendencies in the party (headed by leader Neil Kinnock) and was promoted after the 1987 election to the shadow Trade and Industry team as spokesman on the City of London. Later that year, Blair became Shadow Home Secretary under John Smith. Blair was elected Leader of the Labour Party in the leadership election of July 1994 (beating John Prescott and Margaret Beckett), following the sudden death of his predecessor, John Smith, and became the leader of the Opposition from 21 July 1994 till 2 May 1997.

---

<sup>4</sup> At a party conference in Manchester on 24 June 2007, he was succeeded as Leader of the Labour Party on 24 June 2007 and as Prime Minister on 27 June 2007 by Gordon Brown who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer.

He immediately launched his campaign to modernise the Labour Party and reclaim the political centre, which he saw as essential for victory. Party members showed their support for his project when they voted to remove Labour's historic commitment to public ownership, helping Blair to create what he coined "New Labour". Under his leadership, the party used this phrase to define its policy, and created a new version of the ethical socialism. One of his first achievements as a party leader was the replacement of Clause IV of the party's constitution with a new is 'democratic socialist' statement. Blair subsequently led Labour to a landslide victory in the 1997 general election<sup>5</sup>, ending 18 years of Conservative Party government, with the heaviest Conservative defeat since 1832. At 43 years old, he became the youngest Prime Minister (PM) since Lord Liverpool in 1812. Three consecutive election victories in 1997, 2001, and 2005 assure him a place in the history books as Labour's most successful leader and Party's longest-serving prime minister.

Critics and admirers tend to agree that Blair's electoral success was based on his ability to occupy the centre ground and appeal to voters across the political spectrum, to the extent that he has been fundamentally at odds with traditional Labour Party values. Regarding Blair's rhetorical skills, Zbigniew Brzezinski credits Blair with "*giving a finesse and persuasive power to policies that did not deserve it / .../ essentially a kind and courteous man, he had neither the toughness nor the ruthlessness required for a truly great leader*" (in Seldon 2007: 649).

Blair's role as Prime Minister was particularly visible in foreign and security policy. It is interesting, though, that at the beginning of his career he concentrated on the domestic politics<sup>6</sup>. In his first six years in office Blair ordered British troops into battle five times, more than any other prime minister in British history. This included Iraq in both 1998 and 2003; Kosovo (1999); Sierra Leone (2000) and Afghanistan (2001). In fact, Blair's foreign policy when he became PM was an unwritten book, a tabula rasa, only vague Europeanism short on detail. "*None of the Labour front bench had any military experience or even much background in foreign policy. The top two*

---

<sup>5</sup> The 1997 election produced the biggest Labour majority in the history of the party. They won 418 seats, with a majority of 179. The Conservatives under the leadership of John Major suffered their worst defeat in the party's history, losing 178 seats and becoming the official opposition with 165 seats. This election was the start of a Labour government after 18 years in opposition and continued with another landslide victory in 2001 and a victory in 2005. In 2010, they became the official opposition with 258 seats. The new leader of the Labour party, Ed Miliband, dropped the New Labour brand in 2010 when elected as party leader.

<sup>6</sup> At the 1996 Labour Party conference, Blair stated that his three top priorities on coming to office were "education, education, and education".

*players – Tony Blair and Gordon Brown – had made their names on domestic policy.*" (Freedman 2007: 619). In addition, *"defence for Labour prior to Blair had been an electoral disaster zone / .../ Labour's stance on security issues had been much less assured than the Conservatives"* (ibid.).

Eventually, Blair made a big difference to British foreign policy during his decade in Downing Street. As Michael Clarke, a Director of Royal United Service Institute, stated, *"he rose rapidly to the status of a key world leader, taking to foreign affairs more quickly and naturally than the most Prime Ministers"* (2007: 593). It was not that he had a well-worked design for foreign policy when he became PM, or that he was particularly well-informed on international affairs. He both honoured the erstwhile continuity of British foreign policy and traduced it by effectively reinterpreting its goals. The Conservative foreign policy that Tony Blair inherited was characterised by a strong, Thatcherite, conception of nationhood and sovereignty. Foreign policy was fundamentally orientated to the politics and economics of European, Mediterranean, and Transatlantic spheres, with a concentration on trade and commerce. The realist orthodoxy was the default position during the difficult years of Major government. The politics of Europe shifted to the politics of an enlarging Europe. And the US itself was uncertain how it should play its role as the sole remaining superpower. This reactive policy of realist orthodoxy left a room for a Labour challenge. Although continuity from one administration to the next is a characteristic of British foreign policy, by 1997 New Labour could claim *"not only that policy was not being implemented completely enough but also that it was predicated on an out-dated view of the global environment"* (Seldon 2007: 597) which meant a serious challenging contention.

His policies were partly by defined the tumultuous international decade of his premiership, and it was in foreign policy that he hoped his legacy might be most lasting. And indeed, there is some identifiable distinction from his precessors. Blairite foreign policy is irrevocably connected with the principles of liberal – or humanitarian – interventionism<sup>7</sup>. According to Clarke, the decade of Blairite foreign policy was turbulent and distinctive, *"much of it ended in failure, but certainly not all"* (in Seldon 2007: 609). For Blair, promoting the Western values was not an fact of idealism but a *"hard-nosed investment in political survival"* (ibid.). Clarke argues that Blair's

---

<sup>7</sup> Strategic Defence Review published in July 1998 introduced an ethical dimension of foreign policy – a commitment to human rights and shows inclination to an activist stance; activist foreign policy, this activism backed majority of Blair's speeches. The SDR, revisioned in 2001 when a new chapter was added, was the fullest account of UK nuclear capabilities yet published (Freedman 2007: 622).

intentions throughout the decade ought to have been better understood, "*His legacy for foreign policy lies in a deep commitment that globalisation must be embraced, politically, economically and morally*" (Clarke 2007: 613).

The choice of empirical material and subsequent detailed focus on selected speeches for the research was made in order to reflect events and external factors that influenced British foreign policy conduct. As my analysis covers the whole Blair's premiership, the short overview of most important milestones follows.

In his first term, the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was a formative moment as Blair played a large part in resolving the crisis, persuading NATO to take a strong stance against Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milošević. His bold decision to deploy British troops in Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra Leone in 2000 were his chief foreign achievements<sup>8</sup> (Seldon 2007: 645). Consequently, in his Chicago speech he enunciated "*his neo-Gladstonian doctrine of international community*" (Garton Ash 2007: 634). Considering the European agenda, the Blair-Chirac summit of December 1998 that launched the project to create a new European security and defence initiative and pointing towards a war-fighting capability, was presented in Europe as something of a U-turn for Britain, and perhaps a way of engaging in European project that posed fewer domestic political difficulties than joining the euro. This Euro-force remained an elite issue in the run-up to the 2001 election. Blair was able to keep stressing the importance of the Atlantic relationship, avoiding any suggestion that a definitive choice had to be made between NATO and the EU.

During the second term, his first term successes were not matched abroad and generally, the second term stands out as a period of disappointments. The attacks in New York and Washington of 11 September gave Blair the opportunity to get engaged in his broader international agenda and meant that much of his second term focused on foreign policy issues - notably the "war on terror", which began in Afghanistan following the attacks, and the war in Iraq. Blair invested considerable capital and time in establishing a relationship with Bush administration. The UK – US close relationship turned out to be a very controversial issue in Britain during Blair. As we look more into the history, throughout the Cold War, the intensity of this relationship varied. The US

---

<sup>8</sup> Blair was among the first Western leaders to urge that a strong stand must be taken against Yugoslav President Milosevic. For Blair Kosovo was a turning point. Although he had already taken a tough line on Iraq, this time he was at the fore in making the case for NATO action over Kosovo and offered substantial contribution for the ground operations. Blair made the case for Western states to take on those responsible for genocide, ethnic cleansing and repression.

appeared to have more important allies (Germany, Japan) and the UK was increasingly irrelevant, mainly after the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. The relationship improved in the Thatcher – Reagan era during which the UK became valued again as a chief ally. At the beginning of the twenty-first century when Tony Blair was feted in Washington and invited to address Congress following 9/11, *"the special relationship appeared a major force in British politics again"* (Gamble 2003: 87). At this time, Blair demonstrated strong support to the US President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq in 2003. Widely regarded as a more persuasive speaker than Bush, Blair gave many speeches arguing for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in the days leading up to the invasion. Nevertheless, according to a prominent commentator on British political leadership Anthony Seldon, Blair was at his weakest in standing up to President Bush (2007: 649). In fact, Blair did little with Bush on the conduct of the Iraq war. He did not bargain or suggest his support was conditional (ibid). Blair was deeply persuaded that Britain's interests dictated that it worked closely with Washington at all costs, and refrain from criticising in public. Clarke shares similar opinion: *"He [Blair] probably under-estimated the power of international constraints on action and over-estimated his own power to persuade "* ( 2007: 613). Despite the event of the Iraq crisis in 2003 and the rising tide of Anti-Americanism emerged in the Labour Party, the leadership kept pursuing the Atlanticist course. Though knowing that supporters of the Atlantic alliance with the United States were in a minority in the party. Consequently, New Labour's choice of America over Europe threatened to divide the party and isolate the leadership (Gamble 2003: 191). However, Blair's personal commitment to the Bush administration which was expressed by reluctance of the PM to air any disagreements with Bush in public contributed to a growing image of poodleism<sup>9</sup> and considerably diminished domestic support in Britain for foreign operations. The leading author on Tony Blair Anthony Seldon defends the PM: *'The Iraq saw him at his most courageous and principled. To the end he maintained that his decisions were in Britain's interests. Given his character and beliefs...had he not taken those decisions, he would not have been the man that he was.'* (2007: 650). Eventually, by the end of his second term, Blair's relationship with Bush and the lack of apparent gain to Britain damaged him greatly.

---

<sup>9</sup> At one point, Nelson Mandela described Blair as "the U.S. foreign minister" when accusing both the US and UK governments of undermining the United Nations in the case of Iraq (BBC News, 2003a). Blair has also often openly been referred to as "Bush's poodle (BBC News 2003b). And this perception of one-sided compromising personal and political closeness led to serious discussion of the term "Poodle-ism" in the UK media, to describe the "special relationship" of the UK government and Prime Minister with the US White House and President (The Guardian 2002).

Third term was the most successful remarking many gains in domestic politics or modernising Britain's nuclear deterrent. On Europe, Blair made decisive progress. His arch-rivals (Chirac, Schroeder) disappeared, and he was far more in tune personally and politically with their successors Merkel and Sarkozy. Blair's defining moment was his speech to the European Parliament in June 2005 which set out a new agenda for the EU to be more committed to economic and energy reform (Seldon 2007: 645). However, early in the UK's six-month term the 7 July London bombings<sup>10</sup> distracted political attention from the EU despite some ambitious early statements about Blair's agenda.

When looking back to Blair serving as the British Prime Minister, there are three key failings that could be identified: Iraq war, his naive position towards Bush Administration, and the vision of making the EU stronger. Firstly, the invasion and occupation of Iraq has proved to be a disaster, the greatest disservice for liberal interventionism<sup>11</sup>. According (not only) to Garton Ash, Iraq was the most comprehensive British foreign policy disaster since the Suez crisis of 1956. Secondly, as it exposed the weakness of Blairite foreign policy, the attempt to influence American policy by working privately through the corridors of power in Washington, while avoiding all public disagreement. It is hard to point to a single issue on which Britain actually changed or decisively shaped American policy. What surprised even those close to the PM was how, after all the disappointments, Blair remained loyal to Bush (Garton Ash 2007: 635). And thirdly, a strong EU could be achieved only with the full commitment of Germany, France and Britain. In words of Italian Foreign Minister Massimo d'Alema, on Europe, Blair was genuinely a very pro-European leader in his thinking and speaking, but less so in his actions (in Seldon 2007: 636). Blair could claim some progress: Britain no longer sits on the margins of influence of the EU. Regarding Europe, the big failure was at home: the PM never properly confronted voters with the necessary compromises demanded by engagement, and influence, in Europe<sup>12</sup> (Stephens 2007: 644). And although Britain had been a leader in Europe, Blair

---

<sup>10</sup> a series of bomb attacks on London's transport network killed 52 people and injured 700, on 7 July 2005

<sup>11</sup> Iraq 2003: the tragedy for Blair: public believed that Britain is over-extended, not become involved in any foreign conflict unless it is absolutely clear that it is in Britain's own interests to do so (Freedman 2007: 632)

<sup>12</sup> Blair did not succeed in persuading the British public on Europe: "British public opinion remains frozen in its Thatcher-era view of the EU as a monstrous conspiracy" (Lunn – Miller – Smith 2008).

acknowledged that even after 15 years *'British attitudes remain stolidly Eurosceptic.'* (Garton Ash 2007: 636).

Despite the criticism, Blair became a reference point for the nations's politics – he filled almost all the available political space. Other *"formidable politicians spent much of the decade in the shadows"* (Seldon 2007: 644). Significant for his almost whole premiership was the appointment of a media chief: Alastair Campbell. Unexperienced when became PM in 1997, from 1999 he was able to promote his own visions more and became one of Britain's most authoritative figures. Blair's values in world politics represented a genuine innovation compared with previous approaches. His impact on British policy was so significant that we can speak of certain essence of Blairism in foreign policy. When Blair was asked this question, his immediate reply was: liberal interventionism. His foreign policy was about combining soft and hard power, about strengthening Britain's key alliances with the US and with European partners. Britain can only make its weight and influence count through its alliances: *"Relations with other democracies are important, but you build out from the European-American alliance."*<sup>13</sup> Moreover, beside *Blair's World*, there was *the World's Blair*, as Garton Ash (2007) mentions the important look from the other side. From the point of view of this Oxford professor, Blair is one of relatively few world leaders who has had a major resonance in the political imagination of other countries: *"Whether in the US, Germany, France or Italy, there was a strong image of Blair and of something called Blarism, Blairisme or Blairismo"* (Garton Ash 2007: 636). For Americans, Blairism was *"Bushism with a human face"* (ibid.). Although he later notes that those images were *"at a considerable remove from the real personality and policies of Tony Blair / .../ they were projections of local hopes and preoccupations"* (ibid.).

---

<sup>13</sup> interview between Timothy Garton Ash and Tony Blair on 23 April 2007 (Garton Ash 2007: 633).



### **3. NATIONAL INTEREST AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: A THEORETICAL NOTE**

Concerning the concept of national interest, there is a range of definitional and category distinctions which shows how ambiguous and contested the formula has been since its entry into the lexicon of foreign policy analysis and the study of international relations. Recently, there have been attempts to link practical political considerations with the theoretical aspects of national interest and to show that national interest understood as a legitimisation instrument occupies an irreplaceable position both in political theory and in practice to better understand what is at stake when national interest is discussed. However, it is also claimed that the term national interest in the practice of diplomacy is largely devoid of substantive meaning and content. Despite this critique, I choose it as a key concept of my thesis in order to, among other goals, demonstrate its usefulness as an analytical tool for explaining the foreign policy of the United Kingdom in the security and defence field. Before applying this concept and defining its actual conceptualisation in terms of British foreign policy, I had to overcome certain difficulties. These obstacles are clearly outlined in Burchill's volume on the national interest (2005) as well as Kratochvíl's new approach to this concept (2010a). In the first part of this chapter I briefly introduce the concept of national interest. The second part presents main points of Kratochvíl's new approach to national interest. The final part deals with critical discourse analysis which was used in my research.

#### **3.1. Concept of National Interest**

*"The concept of national interest belongs to the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy debate... its rhetorical power can be enormous... policy-makers and commentators talk about national interests when they want to emphasise the significance of a particular foreign policy issue."*

(Drulák 2010: 11, 12)

The concept of national interest has undergone certain evolution as a term of political discourse. Its beginning is connected with the development from Rousseau's conception of the general will and the earlier doctrine of *raison d'état* to its use as a term of modern diplomacy. In the nowadays discourse of international politics,

the concept of national interest is commonly employed in two related ways. Firstly, it is used to shape political behaviour, by serving as a means to describe, justify or oppose foreign policy. And secondly, it is used as an analytical tool for describing, explaining and assessing the adequacy of state's external behaviour. Both usages are implied in assumptions about what is best for a national community (either political or cultural nation) in both domestic and foreign domains (Burchill 2005: 23). National interest should serve for a more stable political order and a more peaceful world (Burchill 2005:26). Basically, national policy is supposed to be founded on the support of the whole population. There are geopolitical, cultural and psychological dimensions which come together to form the national interest as an expression of foreign policy. Despite the fact that there are some concerns about the persistence of the concept, especially in the era of economic globalisation, within each theory of international politics it is a significant point of intellectual orientation. According to Burchill's theoretical investigation (2005), the term national interest is widely present in political circles as a legitimisation tool, having some residual relevance in the domain of security policy, but paradoxically it seems to be a term largely devoid of substantive meaning and content.

The most important division is thus between those who use the national interest to explain and analyse the foreign policy of nation-states and who employ the term to justify or rationalise state behaviour in the international realm. This cleavage is characterised as a split between *objectivists* who believe there are permanent objective criteria against which foreign policies can be evaluated, compared and contrasted, and *subjectivists* who emphasise the changing priorities and preferences of decision-makers as well as the public defences and explanations of their actions (Frankel in Burchill 2005: 3). Accordingly, objective national interests are those which relate to nation-state's ultimate foreign policy goals, independent of but discoverable by policy makers through systematic enquiry. These are permanent interests, comprising factors such as geography, history, neighbours, resources, population size and ethnicity. Subjective national interests are those which depend on the preferences of a specific government or policy elite, and include ideology, religion and class identity. These interests are based on interpretation and are subject to change as governments themselves alter (Burchill 2005: 4). In my thesis I try to compromise between these two camps, thus objective-subjective dichotomy remains an important taxonomy and will be considered in any treatment of the subject of British foreign policy.

Another target of the critics is that the notion of national interest is for some scholars as misleading and unempirical means of explanation as any moral principle or legal precept (Burchill 2005: 29). Moreover, according to Rosenau, national interest is merely a label that denote the entire spectrum of human wants and needs and thus in no way differentiates the circumstances that are likely to lead a nation to define its wants and needs (in Burchill 2005: 28, 29). Thus from this point of view, national interest as such is merely a way of describing the ends to which foreign policy should be directed. The criterion of national interest in itself provides no specific guidance either in interpreting the behaviour of states or in prescribing how they should behave, unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do or should pursue: security, prosperity, ideological objectives etc (Bull in Burchill 2005: 29).

To address this critique claiming that the concept of national interest is in its essence empty, Burchill points on the crucial distinction between means and end, and emphasises the difference between process and outcome. Once the ends and means of state policy are agreed and defined, the concept of national interest becomes more meaningful. It represents the political means most likely to realise the policy ends. National interest in this moment comprises a "rational plan of action" to achieve agreed ends which can be contrasted with policies based on sectional interests, the interests of alliances and international organisations, or the ad hoc and uncritical pursuit of established policy (Burchill 2005: 30). In my work I try to follow this guideline and try to incorporate into the research the confrontation of speech acts made by political leaders with the actual context in the reality.

There is a range of theoretical perspectives which look at the concept of national interest from a different point of view and understood and used it as an explanatory and evaluative tool in international politics. In my thesis I operate with constructivism as I evaluate national interest of the United Kingdom in security and defence field from the critical perspective.

There is no one single constructivist position, only variety of positions stretching across the theoretical spectrum from conventional-realist variants to more critical postmodern perspectives. Generally, constructivists claim there is no objective reality as such when it comes to human relations.<sup>14</sup> Their key idea is that the social world

---

<sup>14</sup> According to a leading constructivist Wendt, constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following statements:

1. States are the principal units of analysis for the international political theory

(including the international one as well) is a human construction. Oposite to behaviouralists and positivists who believe that there is something "out there," constructivists treat world as an inter-subjective awareness among people. According to their logic, the social and political world is not an external, objective reality beyond human consciousness and does not exist in temporal isolation. *"If the thought and ideas that enter into the existence of international relations change, then the system itself will change as well"* (Jackson - Sorensen, 2007: 162). They argue that human structures are determined more by shared ideas than material forces, believing that these shared ideas and normative practices are a key determinant of state behaviour. For most constructivists, especially the national interest is an important social construction which should be seen as a key indicator of state behaviour.

Recently, constructivists have revived debate about the normative foundations of diplomacy and how norms shape current understandings of the national interest. They argue as well that the national interest is inseparable from conceptions of national identity. Constructivists emphasise the role of shared ideas in the constitution of the national interest, looking into discourses, norms and identities. From a constructivist perspective (e.g. Jutta Weldes), the national interest is important to international politics in two ways:

1. it is through the concept of national interest that policy-makers understand the goals to be pursued by a state's foreign policy (national interest = a basis for state action);
2. it functions as a rhetorical device through which the legitimacy of and political support for state action is generated.

Interests and identities are both linked and socially constructed: identities refer to who or what actors are, interests refer to what actors want. Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests (Wendt in Burchill 2005: 191). This argument moves constructivists<sup>15</sup> from the realist contention that the

---

2. The key structures in the state system are inter-subjective, rather than material

3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt in Burchill 2005: 187).

<sup>15</sup> Wendt talks about four basic interests which are, according to him, common to all states: 'I define the national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem' (Wendt in Burchill 2005: 192). These needs must be met so that states (state-society complexes) are to sustain and reproduce themselves. Accordign to Burchill, Wendt arrives at precisely the same position as materialist thinkers (ibid).

national interests of states vary only marginally because they are socialised into the game of power politics by the conditioning effects of anarchy.

Though I need to stress that my work does not deal with identities (and the relational complex of Identities forming interests which, in turn, determine actions, identities being the basis of interests<sup>16</sup>). I would like to underscore the constructivist argument about **changing nature of national interest**: *"Interests and identities (especially group identities) are constantly being moulded and remoulded through socialisation. National identity and therefore national interests, change over time"* (Burchill 2005: 195). Constructivists reject the idea of permanent and fixed interests (which is the basis of much realist thoughts on the subject). If they are right and interests are largely determined through social interaction, they will have to change as the experience of social interaction varies over time. The problem here is that states are not unproblematic agents, not always unified which could speak with one voice on the question of national interests.

The important starting point of critical analysis is the argument that **national interests are constructed by dominant groups** in society in part to secure particular identities. Contrary to neo-realist or neo-liberal, interests and identities are not pre-determined by external conditions – interests and identities arise out of social interaction. Conventional approaches<sup>17</sup> that dominate the field of International Relations usually assume interests and preferences, rather than try to explain them (Chafetz in Burchill 2005: 196). **The crucial point made by constructivists refers to the national interest formation as a theory of how state preferences change.** Furthermore, there are claims about national interest made by constructivists (Burchill 2005: 27):

1. despite major differences, **the members of the society have a number of crucial interests in common**, e.g. protecting their national sovereignty and territorial integrity from external attack; state gives the highest priority to national security (in other words: survival) which is defined as the capacity for deterring a military attack and military defence. This notion divides the world into insiders (nation) and outsiders (the rest, aliens);
2. **certain national interests are permanent and do not change with transient government** (specific national economic or strategic assets). Bipartisanship on

---

<sup>16</sup> Wendt argues that interests give expression to identities (Burchill 2005: 196)

<sup>17</sup> Liberal intergovernmentalism could be seen as an exception confirming the rule, as this theory offers an explanation of how state interests are being formulated

foreign policy (meaning to be *for* or *against* the national interest) in democratic states is a good indication that there are national interests above the cut and thrust of partisan politics;

3. **governments are the agents which interpret and articulate the national interest.** In the same time they assert a sovereign right and a monopoly power, and must exclude alternative claims made on behalf of the citizens of the state. However, it cannot be assumed that whatever policy or decision is said to be 'in the national interest' is axiomatically true or that addressing an issue from a national perspective is always best for a particular group of nationals (e.g. claims by ethnic, religious or cultural minorities).

The national interest has considerable power in that it helps to constitute as important and to legitimise the actions taken by states. Constructivist Weldes is convinced that the analytical usefulness of the national interest is limited until it is understood as a social construction (Burchill, 2005: 201, 202). State officials and representatives are charged with acting on behalf of the state. However, they can only discharge this duty by engaging in a process of interpretation. This process of interpretation should be properly understood as a product of social construction. According to Weldes, *"The national interest that is constructed is created as a meaningful object out of shared meanings through which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood"* (Weldes in Burchill 2005: 202). Thus, he argues that the national interest is a process of interpretation and communication by those with diplomatic responsibilities. Weldes' constructivism allows for subjective variation in how the national interest is defined. For Weldes, the behaviour of state representatives largely determined what the national interest actually is at any point in time. What is important, Weldes rejects the analytical assumption saying that states are unitary actors and that inter-state interaction is the basis of this inter-subjectivity. She prefers to concentrate on the individuals involved in the process. As constructivists are not united on this matter, Weldes redefines the state as the institution or bundle of practices that we know as the state within which **there are individuals who play a special role in constructing the meaning of the national interest** (Weldes 1996 in Burchill 2005: 203) and places the emphasis back on the

individual agents. The key actors are therefore the foreign policy decision-makers<sup>18</sup>. In representing themselves and others the situation in which the state finds itself, state officials have already constructed the national interest (Weldes 1996: 283 in Burchill, 2005: 203).

The strength of constructivism is in the exposure of the inadequacy of neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches. Constructivists argue that states are constrained by social norms (structures) as much as they are by anarchy. National interests according to neo-realists are a small core of fixed concerns (e.g. security). Thus, constructivists try to explain how states redefine the means to secure those interests in a changing world, in other words: new means to the same ends (Burchill 2005: 201).

The above mentioned constructivist statement serves as a theoretical background for my discourse analysis, together with the national interest being an important explanatory tool and understood as a social construction. Having taken into account criticism and objections towards the constructivist camp, I proceed to outline the very conceptualisation of national interest used in this thesis.

### **3.2. National Interest – A New Approach**

Despite the critique, a concept of the national interest has never lost its dominant place in the analysis of IR, either in laudatory or critical manner. As a matter of fact, if a state representative declares that a policy serves the national interests of the nation, political discourse faces one of the most effective rhetorical figures for legitimising the policy. Indeed, Burchill is convinced that the national interest will continue in the political discourse because of its important subjective utility. However, according to him, it is clear that while it may retain in rhetorical and lexical functions in the modern age, the national interest lacks substantive objective content (2005: 211). The

---

<sup>18</sup> One important Burchill's remark I would like to emphasise is that it is a mistake, though, to simply reduce the national interest to the preferences of decision-makers. Decision-making and the construction of the national interest is a product of the interaction of individual preferences and representations from a pre-socialised environment with a range of constrained cultural choices in rapidly changing environment. According to Weldes, the process is more complex: the security imaginary preexists these state officials and is, in part, the condition of possibility for state actors, their practices, and their authority, and in part and conversely, the unintended outcomes of state actors' representational practices. Thus, when state officials construct the national interest, they do so out of extant resources – including linguistic, cultural, and institutional resources – provided by the security imaginary and, in doing so, reproduce their own positions and those responsible for the national interest. In other words, state officials are on the one hand, international actors actively engaged in the construction of meaning, and they are, on the other hand, always already subject to the repertoire of meanings offered by the security imaginary that produces them (Weldes, 1999: 11-12 in Burchill, 2005: 204).

conceptualisation I chose for my analysis of British foreign policy addresses exactly this critical point.

This new approach was elaborated by Kratochvíl who argues that the key weakness of all positivist political theories of the twentieth century is the reduction of socially constructed legitimacy to facticity and justification to explanation: *"The idea that we could qualify the validity of national interest by its acceptability for citizens and/or for the international community is entirely absent from the traditional analysis of national interest in the twentieth century"* (2010a: 24). The main ideas on which this concept is built are first, how to connect the external and internal legitimacy<sup>19</sup> and second, whether to define national interest *substantively* or in terms of *procedures*.

As to the first point, it is possible to couple the domestic democratic legitimacy to the acceptability for the international community comprised of democratic countries. The community of democratic states is large enough to serve this purpose. Understanding legitimacy in the broader sense means to justify a state institution or policy in the eyes of relevant actors which is a necessary feature of any durable institutional set-up or any long-term policy. In dealing with second point, Kratochvíl rejects the substantive definition of national interest (2010a: 27). The fact that there are actually loads of them implies that not even the most general definition of national interest (such as integrity of the nation's territory, of its political institutions and of its culture) is sufficient without being too broad, vague, and nothing-saying. Regarding the issue of legitimacy, Kratochvíl concludes that it is not possible to fix the substance of national interest once and for all. One should insist on the double principle of internal and external legitimisation which means that if one wants to define the criteria of proper national interest, he/she should focus on **the procedure of its legitimisation**.

When dealing with security and defence policy, a security definition of national interest usually depends on how the key threats are defined and how the respective responses to them are understood (in the British context: threats be faced through

---

<sup>19</sup> Generally, there are two conceptions of legitimacy:

a, narrowed interpretation = understands a certain action or a certain state resulting from that action as legitimate if it fulfils the criteria that are generally considered legitimate (i.e. by the actor); questions of good and justice (liberal understanding of legitimacy)

b, broader interpretation = explores the general way in which political action and political institutions gain legitimacy in the eyes of those who are subject to them; in order to understand this kind of legitimacy: the analysis of ways through which political institutions justify their existence and their action, coupled with the consequent exploration of the effectiveness of these legitimisation processes. This interpretation is compatible with liberalist and communitarian conception of historically and socially contextualised legitimacy.



development of multilateral structures within the EU, through a privileged relationship with the US, or through an autonomous foreign policy which is to be decided on the case-by-case basis). However, this does not offer any uncontested definition of the state's national interest. The solid concept should help distinguish between what is important and what is not and be specific enough to make distinctions between various directions possible. When applying this new approach, there was a threefold complex of problems to be solved. First, regarding concepts, there are three criteria to be met in order to unveil national interests (see next paragraph for further details). Second one concerns the variety of research methodologies that can be used when investigating national interests. For my research of British foreign policy I chose a critical discourse analysis (see next part of this chapter). Third problem points on policy-oriented results, e.g. the capability to define and pursue state's national interest. I address this problem in the part of work analysing Annual reports of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in order to discover any policy shifts or changes since the ESDP creation. In general, this procedural analysis is based on the presumption that foreign policy of a state (which is a subject of this work) must be legitimate both internally and externally. Considering all problematic issues mentioned above, Kratochvíl proposes three minimum criteria (2010: 28) which have to be met in order to test the legitimacy and to identify the national interest:

### ***Criterion of relevance***

The basic requirement is that a national interest must be a policy that: i, fundamentally impacts the (external or internal) functioning of the community; ii, substantially transforms its key features; or iii, gives rise to important new rights and obligations for the community; i.e. politics substantially influence a way in which the society functions, significantly changes its basic characteristics or thanks to these politics new rights and duties emerge for the society. In other words, a policy that is marginal for the community cannot be its national interest (e.g. representing the interests of a region or a minority or one social group) and has to be rejected. In terms of empirical evidence, one should ask whether the topic has been present in the community for a long time (at least several months, ideally several years) or whether the issue has been discussed by state institutions irrespective of these institutions' composition or political orientation (Kratochvíl 2010: 29). In my thesis, I verify the relevance of the topic of establishing more coherent European security and defence

policy and of the relationship with the US by consulting programme declarations, annual reports of the central institutions, namely the MOD and FCO, and the speeches of its representatives.

### ***Criterion of consensus***

According to Kratochvíl, this domestic legitimacy-acquiring process represents a more controversial claim: a societally relevant question that becomes present in public deliberation will induce such a change of the stance of those partaking in the deliberation that it will lead to a political consensual statement in the relevant policy field is reached. The goal of the empirical research is to find out to what extent the general consensus does exist and where it is not possible to find any consent (to focus on goals of certain policies, general strategies through which political goals should be reached, individual tactical steps etc.). This approach is very different from the aggregation model (in which individual preferences are simply added up and never creating a consensual position) but also from simple majoritarian views.

A common objection to this approach lies in the fact that the real political debate is fundamentally different from the ideal speech situation and that, as a result, a consensus is impossible to attain. A more pressing question arises when it comes to time limits for the debate. Regarding these objections, Kratochvíl claims that one should distinguish the goal of policy, the strategies through which these goals can be reached, and tactical measures. According to him, this differentiation is important since there is often a broad consensus regarding the basic goal but consensus is harder to find in terms of the policy that would lead to this goal. Therefore the aim of empirical research is to find the borderline between those areas where consensus exists and those where it is no longer present.

### ***Criterion of external acceptability***

This criterion is meant to couple domestic legitimacy (represented by the previous two criteria) with its external counterpart. While the first two are derived from the theory of democracy, the third is inspired by IR theory and tries to find evidence that certain policy is acceptable and compatible for foreign partners of the given polity. When talking about the UK in case of my thesis, it can attain both power and prestige but only if it gains the approval and respect of the other European powers (or actors at which the policy is aimed). Moreover, one should not forget the position of the US.

Taking all three criteria together, this specific concept of national interest using a so-called procedural approach can be used to distinguish areas of national interest from other policy issues. It is argued that to qualify as a national interest, the policy issue needs to be relevant, consensual and accepted by external actors at the same time. In other words, the issue must be taken seriously by state's society, must enjoy broad support at home, and must be accepted by key partners of the state (Drulák 2010: 14). Another remark regarding the existence of several discourses within the same society was pointed out by Donnelly (2008). She claims that there are social practices which constitute different legitimisation process: normative factors contributes to the acceptability of certain policies. But the fact is that neither everyone speaks from the same platforms and nor does have each agent the same capacity to set the terms of debate. *"Instead discursive encounters tend to evolve around constructions of inferiority and superiority and hence a particular distribution of discursive and political power"* (Donnelly 2008: 11). However, if encounters do not take place between two equally powerful parties, it does not mean that hegemonic discourses go unchallenged (Donnelly 2008: 12). This implies that even the most powerful actors inevitably have to justify their actions. This is why first two criteria of the procedural analysis of national interest are tested in this thesis accross the whole British political spectrum of main political parties and one additional chapter on especially Blair's illustration of British national interest is included. The actions must be negotiated by different actors in particular contexts and on particular discursive terrain, and their justifications had to be legitimated by others.

### **3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis**

The general topic of this work is the foreign policy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as an international military actor within both European and Transatlantic structures from the perspective of its national interest. More precisely, the British understanding of its defence role and security position: foreign policy attitudes towards the European Security and Defence Policy and towards the *special relationship* between the UK and the United States of America. My thesis presents a research which has two main goals: whether the creation and further development of the ESDP was in the British national interest and whether it was at

the same time compatible with the close UK-US relationship. To do so, I employ a method offered by discourse analysis which forms the core of research process. It consists of two main stages. First, I operationalize the procedural definition of national interest elaborated by Kratochvíl (2010) which allows me to find out what interests the UK has in the security and defence and at the same time I try to track certain dynamics within the British political discourse regarding security and defence policy. Second, inspired by Milliken's (1999) predicate and metaphor analysis I seek to examine the way how the British PM legitimises his Government's policies. I focus on both the transatlantic link with the US and the developing ESDP in Europe. My analysis of the UK's foreign policy approach under the premiership of Tony Blair should show what the priority is when it comes to providing state's own security.

The main objective of my work is to answer these research question:

**Is European Security and Defence Policy in the British national interest?**

**Did the British national interest change while the European Security and Defence Policy was developing?**

**Is the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States compatible with the British national interest in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy formation?**

**Is the special relationship still relevant for / in the British national interest?**

Discourse analysis in general focuses on '*language-in-use*'. It is an interpretative style of scholar work which ascribes certain significance to texts and speeches that are to be analysed. The core of my analysis is built upon the Milliken's reflection on how to do discourse studies, whose article (1999) made an irreplaceable contribution to the critical agenda. According to her, discourse analysis is "*a post-positivist project that is critically self-aware of closures imposed by research programmes and the modes of analysis which scholars routinely use in their work and treat as unproblematic*" (1999: 227). Discourse theorising crosses over and mixes divisions between post-structuralists, postmodernists and some feminists and social constructivists.

Milliken laid out three theoretical commitments which represents an internally established basis for critically evaluating discourse research and which are taken as presuppositions of discourse analysis. These three analytically distinguishable

theoretical claims have to be met in order to consider discourse analysis as a grounded theory<sup>20</sup> (1999: 228):

### ***Discourses as systems of signification***

Discourse is perceived as a structure of *meaning-in-use* (which construct social realities), a structure which is actualized in its regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships in 'ready-at-hand language practices' (Milliken 1999: 231). This implies that discursive studies must empirically analyse language practices in order to draw out a more general structure of relational distinctions and hierarchies that orders persons' knowledge about things defined by the discourse, when emphasis is given on either relationships or binary oppositions.

There is no single method for analysis and abstraction. The aim of discourse analysis is to explore significative construction. Such an analysis focuses on text itself, the composition, structure of meaning-in-use, language practices in the text in order to draw out a more general structure of relational distinctions and hierarchies that orders person's knowledge about the things defined by the discourse. As a way how to identify key aspects of significative practices and establish a discourse, I chose predicate analysis which is, also according to Milliken, suitable for study of language practices in texts such as diplomatic documents, transcripts of interviews. This analysis focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predication of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities (Milliken 1999: 232). A text never constructs only one thing. Instead, in implicit or explicit parallels and contrasts, other subjects will also be labelled and given meaningful attributes by their predicates. A set of predicate constructs defines a space of objects differentiated from, while being related to, one another (Milliken 1999: 232). Predicate analysis is a process of empirical study and abstraction. In this sense, theoretical categories are drawn from and answer to the empirical data upon which a study is based. Therefore, it is classified as a grounded theory (Milliken 1999: 234). Research based on predicate analysis would certainly entail systematic analysis of text's object space, drawing up lists of predications attaching to the subjects the text constructs and clarifying how these subjects are

---

<sup>20</sup> A theory that emerges from empirical research: rather than selectively choosing data according to a priori theoretical categories, it formulates the theory from the data by developing provisional categorisations via empirical study and abstraction, comparing on the basis of new data whether these categories fit and, if necessary, reformulating the categories so that they can be empirically valid.

distinguished from and related to one another. This kind of analysis should not be based only on one text, or some key documents: *"A single text cannot be claimed to support empirically arguments about discourse as a social background, used regularly by different individuals or groups / .../ instead / .../ a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed to be authorized speakers/ writers of a dominant discourse or to think and act within alternative discourses"* (Milliken 1999: 233). Thus when undertaking an examination of structuring of relational distinctions, the discourse analysis should compare the object spaces of different texts to uncover the relational distinctions that arguably order the ensemble, serving as a frame for defining certain subject identities. This is why my research consists in analysing approx. 250 various documents representing the British political discourse. As to the question, "when to end the analysis?" Milliken suggests that *"An analysis can be said to be complete (validated) when upon adding new texts and comparing their object spaces, the researcher finds consistently that the theoretical categories she has generated work for those texts"* (1999: 234). The reliability of any interpretation ought to be a matter of external checks, i.e. others' (discourse) studies on the same issue. Unfortunately, there are not many discourse studies in general, not to mention the same subject as my work deals with. Nevertheless, the number of texts I incorporated into my research to some extent could present certain reliability and credibility for its final results.

The other method I chose for the study of systems of signification is conceptual metaphor analysis developed by linguists Lakoff and Johnson (1980). This metaphorical analysis focuses upon metaphors - conventional ways of conceptualising one domain in terms of another - as structuring possibilities for human reasoning and action (Milliken 1999: 235). Very briefly, the researcher establishes metaphors used regularly in the language practices of a group or society to make sense of the world. Abstract from these particular metaphors, a theory of metaphorical categorization is then developed to account for particular metaphors as variations of a central model(s). In giving attention to certain linguistic elements and their combination, predicate and metaphorical analyses are more formal approaches for studying language practices than is typical of IR work in this area (Milliken 1999: 235). For example, Chilton (1996) examined the realist sovereignty and security concept which became at once highly metaphorical and representative of the most basic requirements of human survival. His point was to modify and expand the concept of security so that it can be the means for more realistic and more human approaches to international politics. Another approach dealing with

metaphorical expressions is a discourse study focusing on the use of special "rhetorical" structures of text and talk, such as metaphors, comparisons, irony, hyperboles or euphemisms (Toolan 2002). Unlike other structures of text and talk, these rhetorical structures are optional, and used especially to convey or produce specific effects, for instance as part of strategies of persuasion. These figures are supposed to *emphasise* or *de-emphasise* meaning and thus, draw special attention of recipients, which may lead to less/better memory of the meanings. Also, it should be stressed that discourse has many other *persuasive* dimensions apart from these special rhetoric structures, such as argumentation or the use of emotion words. Systematic. In sum, it should provide means for systematic and explicit analysis of the various structures and strategies of different levels of text and talk (ibid.). I have particularly selected to employ this specific approach to Blair's speeches in order to unveil his legitimation strategies used for defending his position on defence and security matters.

### ***Discourse productivity***

Discourses produce the common sense of societies, limiting possible resistance among broader public to a given course of action, legitimating the state as a political unit, and creating reasonable and warranted relations of domination (Milliken 1999: 237). Discourse is understood as being productive (reproductive) in the way how it *acts* towards the world. This theoretical commitments deals with operationalising a particular regime of truth (while excluding other possible modes of identity and action). The discourse specifies subjects authorized to speak and to act and defines knowledgeable practices. Regarding the legitimacy of international practices, discourses produce as subjects publics (audiences) for authorized actors and their common sense of the existence and qualities of different phenomena and of how public officials should act for them and in their name. In this sense, social space comes to be organized and controlled (places and groups are produced as those objects). Particularly, foreign policy studies address discourse productivity by analysing how an elite's regime of truth made possible certain courses of action by a state while excluding other policies as unintelligible or unworkable or improper (Milliken 1999: 236). Foreign policy studies are directly concerned with explaining how a discourse articulated by elites produces policy practices (individual or joint). It means to explain the production of policy practices, namely to take the significative system which they have analysed and to argue for that system as structuring and limiting the policy options that policy makes

reasonable. This process of production of foreign policy arguments is the main focus of analysis of Blair's speeches. Thus, in the research I concentrate on articulation – the construction of discursive objects and relationships out of linguistic resources that already make sense within a particular society.

To explain the relevancy of policy production, Milliken points on the main weakness of most of studies: they leave out what happens after a policy is promulgated among high-level officials, in other words, the implementation of policy as action directed towards those objectified as targets of international practices (1999: 240). Analysing how policies are implemented (not just formulated) means studying the operationalization of discursive categories in the activities of governments and international organizations, and the 'regular effects' on their targets of interventions taken on this basis. "*Discourse studies which include the implementation of policy practices can potentially problematise general vague labels and expose readers to the micro-physics of power in IR*" (Milliken 1999: 241). However, due to the limited scope of the work the detailed study of the implementation phase had to be left to another research specially conducted on the actual outcome of political discourse.

### ***The play of practice***

This commitment directs towards hegemonic discourses, its exterior limits and overlapping quality to different discourses. It addresses open-endedness and instability of the discourse and explores relations to other non dominant subjugated discourses.<sup>21</sup> The fact that discourse is unstable grid requiring work to articulate and rearticulate its knowledges and identities (to fix the regime of truth) makes discourse changeable and historically contingent. That is why one has to differ this approach from the study of norms in International Relations (i.e. treating norms as the collective understandings of proper behaviour of actors). However, the scope of my work does not allow me to do the research more deeply, i.e. to incorporate and examine all inferior discourses but the official public discourses made by British political leaders. As one cannot cover everything, the focus of my thesis is the (potential) development of the discourse represented by British PM in the first place, recognising its influence and impact on the British foreign policy discourse. In my analysis I highlight some the larger discursive fields within which the launch of the ESDP was framed. Therein I address a series of

---

<sup>21</sup> There are four main methods proposed by Milliken (1999: 242): deconstructive method, juxtapositional method, subjugated knowledges and genealogical method.



possible *how* questions. Focusing on how questions (how the discourse has changed, how Blair legitimised his security agenda, how compatible the special relationship and the ESDP are for British political elite), rather than conventional why questions, coincides with the theoretical framework developed above.

This complex picture of relations that discourse analysis is dealing with is quite accurately depicted by Beer and Hariman: *"The behaviour of states is an example of how what we say influences how we see the world, which in turn influences how we act in the world and how, by acting, we remake the world in the image of our discourse"* (1996: 20). The second remark addresses the emphasis on language in terms of demarcation between the practice of inquiry and other social or political practices: the relationship between language and the practice of inquiry parallels the relationship between language and political practice. In other words, what one thinks and does is determined by what one says; and every practice – inquiry included – is somewhat blind at any moment to what else could be said about what it does. It need not compromise inquiry on behalf of other values.

Regarding the theoretical background of this work, a social constructivist approach supports a critical understanding of international relations that is open to alternative possibilities of state action (Milliken 1996). The emphasis is put on studying dialectic interactions, because according to the basis of constructivism, the world is changeable that the past, present, and the future are constructed through our practices and interactions with each other (Fierke 2002). The claim that knowledge and language are held to be inseparable represents a basis for critical approach: *"Things do not mean; rather, people construct the meaning of things, using sign systems"* (Milliken 2001: 138). Nothing exists in a vacuum. Within discourse approaches the centrality is placed on highlighting their utility for conceptualising process of choice and change critically as well as contextually (Donnelly 2008: 2). Concerning the role of ideas in foreign policy and system of signification, predicate and metaphor analysis are helpful for establishing a particular discourse as well as for elucidating both how discourses overlap and structure of meaning that they share. There are some common objections to them such as language is not everything, events are not constructed, they are caused; where there is the space for agency, etc. However, the aim of my research is not to disqualify positivist approaches, but to present an innovative way how to do a foreign policy analysis. Discourse analysis belonging to the constructivist camp could perfectly serve as an alternative explanation for political events. Abstracting from these thoughts,

I treat speeches less as statements about the world and more as tools and weapons of debate and to investigate where the beliefs or ideas came from and how they are changed, rather than just accept them as they are part of a particular time.

In order to address the research questions of this work, I operationalise the procedural concept of national interest in the context of British foreign policy in the security and defence field between 1997-2007. To do so, I employ the critical discourse analysis. In the final part of the research I concentrate on Prime Minister's speeches in more details, employing the predicate and metaphor analysis. Thus, in the next chapters I proceed to the very critical analysis of British political discourse on defence and security focusing on language aspects in order to entangle the complexity of net and structures in this respected domain and period of time.

#### **4. BRITISH POLITICAL DISCOURSE DURING THE PREMIERSHIP OF TONY BLAIR: NATIONAL INTEREST IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE.**

Various political strategies were put forward to deal with dilemmas over relationships with Europe and America which I already mentioned in the previous chapter on British foreign policy and the three-circle concept. New Labour party (LAB), in contrast to Thatcherites, when taking power in 1997, wanted to improve relations with Europe and put more positive emphasis on the *Europe issue* regarding the Britain's well-being: "*We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need*" (1997 LAB Manifesto). But the question - would Blair stick with Europe or walk off with America? – remained without a clear answer. Moreover, after launching the ESDP, certain contra position were to be expected to emerge in the British political discourse, mainly in the Conservative camp.

In this chapter I proceed to the central goal of the thesis. I analyse British public political discourse in order to find out first, whether the ESDP is in the national interest of the UK; second, whether the British national interest changed during the formation of ESDP; and third, whether the historically close relationship between Britain and the US is still relevant for the British national interest and at the same time discursively compatible with the ESDP as far as both have represented two key elements of the British foreign policy within the security and defence field. Based on the assumption that the discourse is a social activity that has certain impact on other elements of social reality, as well as the discursive construction comprising meaning-formation practices (the importance attributed to individual and collective reality and the process of creating the meaning; Milliken 1999), the analysis consists in screening election manifestos and speeches made by political leaders<sup>22</sup> of the three biggest British political parties in the period of years 1997 – 2007. In addition, I included supplementary sources into the empirical material for my research, such as departmental reports, annual performance

---

<sup>22</sup> One of rhetorical rituals of British Politics is the Party Conference speech. Every year, and sometimes twice in a year, party members and activists gather together to debate policy and affirm their party culture. A central moment of such occasions (and the one most widely reported) is the leader's speech. It is an opportunity for authority to be constructed and manifested in front of an audience of followers in the hall as well as the representatives of mass media and their audiences. As to transcript of speeches, I used the database on British political speeches available online on [http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/academic\\_research.htm](http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/academic_research.htm) which is a part of a research project on British rhetoric funded by the Leverhulme Trust.

evaluations and alike related documents, which are considered as strategic governmental documents and valuable source of political outcomes on the discourse level<sup>23</sup> (cca 250 documents in total). By operationalising the procedural approach to national interest, my research should be able to detect possible evolution of these categories, and thus of national interest in defence and security field itself, within the given period of time. In other words, the analysis may show that national interest does not have one valid character over time. As critical discourse analysis being the method, I seek to unveil both the meaning-formation practices of discourse participants and the structure of the British political discourse (internal and external relations between texts).

In order to depict the way how the relationship with Transatlantic alliance and Europe is illustrated in the British political discourse (and its potential development as well), I examine following categories attributed to these two object spaces referring to both British foreign policy circles through grounded theory: the European Union, the ESDP and Europe; and the US, NATO, and America. As my critical discursive analysis is framed into the concept of national interest, the examination of three core criteria already presented in the methodological part of this thesis follows. It is necessary to mentioned that when analysing the British political discourse, I restrict my research horizontally to the official public political discourse due to the limited scope of the work. I excluded the discourse within non-governmental institutions and discourse in British media and British society. Thus, the research covers the dominant discourse of the ruling political party as well as discourse of two main opposition parties in the UK: Conservative Party (CON) and Liberal Democrats (LIBDEM).<sup>24</sup> The citations provided in this chapter were selected on the basis of representativeness of each party's discourse in order to present the conclusion as comprehensive as possible. Many of the leaders' statements were being repeated and articulated in several speeches I examined so I am persuaded that it was not necessary to make more direct references.

---

<sup>23</sup> Note on empirical material: Even though these other documents are in fact 'dead' as they were not presented at real time in front of any audience, they can serve as valuable secondary sources for critical discourse analysis. As to transcript of speeches, I used the database on British political speeches available online on [http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/academic\\_research.htm](http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/academic_research.htm) which is a part of a research project on British rhetoric funded by the Leverhulme Trust.

<sup>24</sup> These three parties (LAB, CON and LIBDEM) presented together around 90 per cent of British electorate in 1997, 2001 and 2005 general elections:  
1997 general elections: 90,7% of votes, 629 out of 659 seats in the House of Commons  
2001 general elections: 90,7% of votes, 631 out of 659 seats in the House of Commons  
2005 general elections: 89,6% of votes, 615 out of 646 seats in the House of Commons  
(BBC News 2005)

#### **4.1. Criterion: Relevance of the Policy**

Defence is one of state's essential services to provide to its citizens. Thus, it is not appropriate to ask if defence itself is in any state's national interest, even when applying a critical approach to such analysis. Defence is, to say, an obligatory state agenda and serves the aims of foreign and security policy. Thus, my research focuses on particular issues how national security and defence should be provided according to the British political elite. I look how defence is thematised in the British political discourse and what threats to the UK's security are topical.

Anglo-America is perhaps most often thought of as a special relationship between two states, the UK and the US each with its own distinctive foreign policy and internal domestic politics. But it is much more than this. Anglo America was imagined as an alternative to Europe. For much of the twentieth century the Conservative party took a broadly Atlanticist stance in relations with the United States, favouring close ties with the United States and similarly aligned nations such as Canada or Australia. The Conservatives have generally favoured a diverse range of international alliances, ranging from NATO to the Commonwealth of Nations. Notably, close US-British relations have been an outstanding element of the Conservative foreign policy since World War II. As already mentioned elsewhere in this work, the Atlantic Alliance has been a long term issue in British foreign policy. Eventually, attitudes in British politics towards the global hegemony which the US has come to exercise since 1945 have always been ambivalent, on both right and left (Gamble 2003: 83). The British political class opinion has been divided between those who want the United Kingdom to become closer than ever to the United States; others want to maintain a special relationship while safeguarding UK independence and forging links with Europe; while a third group are far more critical of the United States and of the hegemony of neo-liberal ideas, and want the UK to disengage from it (Gamble 2003: 11). Successive British governments have tried to avoid the choice between Anglo-America and Europe, but as European integration had gathered pace, so has there been increasing pressure to decide the priority to be given to the Atlantic Alliance and the EU. The opinion in the political class has been sharply divided over whether the UK should progressively transfer more national competencies to the European level. A small group favours an explicit federal future, a much larger number argue for continuing integration but on the basis of a looser intergovernmental federation, and a significant minority argues that the UK

should continue to stand outside blocking further integration and is prepared to withdraw from the EU (Gamble 2003: 12).

Taking into account overall international context, the end of the Cold War (downsizing and modernisation of European armed forces)<sup>25</sup> and the US Congress' threat to disengage from NATO pushed European countries to reshape their armed forces (Mérand 2008: 99). Then the Kosovo case, being '*intorable massacres at the heart of Europe*', showed a sharp contrast and widening gap between American and European military capabilities, and the European *actorness* came into the question. The emergence of the ESDP had a potential to substantively transform key features of the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time introduces new rights and obligations for both the British people and the EU. And indeed, the Blair-Chirac summit of December 1998 that launched the project to create a new European security and defence was presented in Europe as something of a U-turn for Britain, and perhaps a way of engaging in European project that posed fewer domestic political difficulties than joining the euro. The security and defence issues are addressed in most of annual political party leader's speech in Britain and since the introduction of ESDP, large parts have been devoted to this area in departmental reports of both the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I analysed political parties' manifestos from 1997, 2001 and 2005 general elections as well. Although the defence and security issues are generally placed at the bottom of manifestos, they stood an inseparable part of these documents. During the respected period, the emphasis put on defence and security slightly changed from election to election. When comparing three elections, defense and security were the most visible in 2001 (and a bit less in 2005).

In 1997 the new British Government set out a broad vision of Britain's role: strong in defence; resolute in standing up for its own interests; an advocate of human rights and democracy; a reliable and powerful ally; and a leader in Europe and the international community. Furthermore, Strategic Defence Review (SDR) published in 1998 continued in this mode claiming that "*A modern, forward looking country cannot afford to be isolationist.*" When we look at the most substantial threats which were constantly being emphasised in the British discourse - regional conflicts; proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; crime and drug trafficking; environmental

---

<sup>25</sup> After the fall of the Berlin Wall, defence expenditures were falling constantly in Europe. "*These budget cuts led to an important restructuring of European armed forces ... In the UK, regular forces declined by one-third*" (Mérand 2008: 94).

damage; vulnerability to technological dislocation and attack, international terrorism; the growth of ethnic nationalism and extremism; or climate change - it is clear that Britain's security cannot be provided by the state itself in the context of globalisation, growing interdependence and interconnectedness of threats and possible solutions. In order to be able to tackle them "*state needs flexible armed forces*" (MOD 1998). Not isolationism but international alliances is the right approach to dealing with threats. In this respect, NATO and Europe have been accentuated the most. Moreover, notes on the importance of ESDP were incorporated later into the New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review: "*The European Security and Defence Policy encompasses stabilisation tasks, which are key to the overall campaign against international terrorism*" (2002: 23).

By sketching this brief thematisation and interaction of topics, I believe the above presented reasons are qualified enough to speak about relevance of the ESDP for the British political discourse on national interest related to defence and security. The next criterion deals with more concrete language aspects of British security and defence policy. Namely, how British high-ranked politicians see both the relationship between the UK and Europe and the relationship between the UK and the US, and to which of them the priority is given.

## **4.2. Criterion: Consensus of the British Political Class**

In this part, I proceed to the very critical discourse analysis and examine in a more detailed way the nouns, verbs, and adverbs, by giving emphasis on relational distinctions, binary oppositions and metaphorical expressions found in speeches and government documents which have created together a British political discourse concerning security and defence matters during the period of Tony Blair's premiership. More particularly, I seek to find out how three major British political parties illustrate the relationship of Britain to the US and at the same time to the EU. In other words, the British discourse around two object spaces: Europe and the US respectively. Considering the criterion of consensus, first I examine discourse of each of three political parties separately, second, I confront and compare differences and third, I make a conclusion drawing upon the extent of consensus among three major actors on the

compatibility of ESDP and Britain's relationship to the US in security and defence matters.

#### 4.2.1. Conservative Party

*"The British Way is to be in Europe, but not run by Europe"*<sup>26</sup>

Conservative Party, being in the Opposition after ruling Britain for 18 years with strong Atlanticism, did not acknowledge any urgent need to improve military capacities on the European level. Though, when looking at CON positions towards a stronger military EU, in general a reserved CON opinion on the EU and Europe has to be taken into consideration.

##### *Europe*

CON kept emphasising that *"the nation state is a rock of security"* (1997 CON Manifesto). At the same time, they put importance upon international alliances: *"We will continue to work with international partners. Only the United Kingdom is a member of the European Union, the United Nations Security Council, the Commonwealth, NATO and the Group of Seven leading industrial nations"* (1997, 2001, 2005 CON Manifestos). When referring to Europe, there was always some "but" following the statement of "being part of it." There were mostly negative expressions and even warnings against the loss of national sovereignty, *"to succumb to a centralised Europe while calling it not being isolated"* (1997 CON Manifesto); *"We will settle our relationship with the European Union by bringing powers back from Brussels to Britain."* (2005 CON Manifesto). CON preferred the vision of the European Union as *'a partnership of nations'*, contrasting it with the opposite presented a federal Europe: *"A British Conservative Government will not allow Britain to be part of a federal European state"* (1997 CON manifesto). They even used the term *"national interest"* which was according to them threatened in Europe: *"Only the Conservatives can be trusted to stand up for Britain in Europe: our **national interest** must be protected"* (ibid.). It is interesting thought to see that the security and defence (or "World affairs") were placed at the bottom of their 1997 Manifesto, right after the sport and leisure part. In this respect, William Hague, the leader of CON, accentuated the unique position

---

<sup>26</sup> William Hague (Conservative), Leader's speech, Bournemouth 1998



of Britain: *"We are the lucky inheritors of a country with unique advantages in the world: a **unique** relationship with Europe, **unique** relationships too with America and with the Commonwealth."*<sup>27</sup> As to defence, one claim stood as central to the discussion on Atlantic Alliance and Europe: *"NATO will remain the **cornerstone** of our security. We will **resist** attempts to bring the Western European Union **under the control of the European Union**, and ensure that defence policy remains a matter for sovereign nations."* (1997 Manifesto). After the St Malo initiative and creation of the ESDP, CON strengthened their negative rhetoric on Europe and on the possibility of independent European defence structures: *"**No European army outside NATO**"* (2001 CON Manifesto). At this time, defence and the EU became more pushing issue, CON positions were placed in the middle of their 2001 Manifesto. In this mode CON continued in the election run up. In concordance with Manifesto rhetoric, Duncan Smith stated from his position of party's leader: *"NATO remains the **cornerstone** of our security / .../ Invoking collective security is the most powerful statement a friend and ally can make / .../ Nothing must be done to undermine its purpose or diminish its capability. And that is what is **so dangerous about the plan for a European Army**."*<sup>28</sup> They expressed sharply their disagreement: *"Our **primary alliance, NATO**, is being **weakened** by a concerted drive to create an independent military structure in the EU. And for the first time, a British government is leading this attempt / .../ Conservatives have **always supported stronger European defence co-operation, but always inside NATO**. We will not participate in a structure **outside** NATO, but will **insist** instead that any European initiative is under the NATO umbrella"* (2001 CON Manifesto). Later, they admitted that *" Our country / .../ is no longer able to use British soldiers to defend our interests abroad."*<sup>29</sup> CON were not enthusiastic about the EU at all, irrespective of who was the leader: *"The British people don't want to be part of a European super-state."*<sup>30</sup>

Though, it is interesting that right after launching of the European defence initiative in December 1998, one MP from the CON parliamentary party clearly stated that: *"I should like to make **our** position clear. We support the development of a **European defence identity, and even capability, within NATO**, perhaps using the Western European Union as a vehicle **for action without the United States**. We began*

---

<sup>27</sup> William Hague (Conservative), Leader's speech, Blackpool 1999

<sup>28</sup> Iain Duncan Smith, Leader's speech (Conservative), Blackpool 2001

<sup>29</sup> Iain Duncan Smith, Leader's speech (Conservative), Blackpool 2003

<sup>30</sup> Michael Howard (Conservative), Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2004

that process when we were in government, and agreements are in place for any such Western European Union operation to use NATO planning and command structures and to use American intelligence and heavy lift capability."<sup>31</sup> This statement was repeated shortly after few days: "**Conservative Members wholly support the maximum Anglo-French defence co-operation, but within NATO.**"<sup>32</sup> Four years later, CON pledged to make effort in "keeping NATO at the **heart** of our foreign policy" (2005 CON Manifesto). At the time of the general election in 2005, CON pictured Britain as "a leading member of NATO" (2005 CON Manifesto) and called for strengthening Armed Forces within NATO. However, regarding the EU defence, they chose a noticeably milder tone: "A Conservative Government **will support European co-operation on defence but we strongly believe that such co-operation should take place within the framework of NATO**" (2005 CON Manifesto).

CON needed LAB government and European partners to ensure that any EU military capability had to *supplement* and not *supplant* British national defence and NATO, and that it was not in *the British interest* to hand over security to any supranational body. Regarding the defence role of the EU, the Conservatives pledged to re-examine some of Britain's EU Defence commitments to determine their practicality and utility; specifically, to reassess UK participation provisions like Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Agency and EU Battlegroups to determine if there is any value in Britain's participation.

### **Anglo-America**

Regarding the US, CON pronounced: "*We believe **our close ally** deserves our **support** in countering new threats from rogue states and terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction. We will take a lead in building support for ballistic missile defence against threats to Europe and America*" (2001 CON Manifesto). After crisis in British politics due to the war in Iraq, the quality of relationship of Britain to the US came into the question. CON Leader David Cameron expressed his doubts about British policy towards the US: "*Last week the Prime Minister criticised me for wanting a foreign policy which was more independent of the White House / .../ Mr. Blair objects when I say our foreign policy should not simply be unquestioning in our relationship with America / .../ William Hague and I have said we must be steadfast not slavish in*

---

<sup>31</sup> John Maples in House of Commons (1998a)

<sup>32</sup> John Maples in House of Commons (1998b)

how we approach *the special relationship*. Apparently Tony Blair disagrees. Well if he's accusing me of wanting to be a British Prime Minister pursuing a British foreign policy, then I plead guilty / .../ *Questioning the approach of the US administration, trying to learn the lessons of the past five years, does not make you 'anti-American'*."<sup>33</sup> Much later, he reaffirmed the Britons about his position: "*I have always **believed in the Atlantic Alliance***."<sup>34</sup> The Conservative Party upheld the view that NATO should remain the most important security alliance for United Kingdom. They believed that NATO, which has been the *cornerstone* of British security for the past 60 years, should continue to have primacy on all issues relating to Europe's defence. The other guiding principle of CON policy kept reappearing repeatedly as well: "*In Europe, not run by Europe*." The position of CON was built upon the **binary oppositions** regarding preservation of national sovereignty: a partnership of nations vs. a federal European state; and regarding the traditional Transatlantic defence structure: inside/ within the framework of NATO vs. outside NATO. In addition, by using the metaphor **HEART**, they expressed their position towards NATO as something that represents the most important part of living organism (i.e. foreign policy). At the same time referring to NATO as **CORNERSTONE** which can be interpreted as the essential basis which is hard to destroy or replace.

#### 4.2.2. Liberal Democrats

"*A strong Britain in a strong Europe*"<sup>35</sup>

Liberal Democrats did not stress defence and security issues any particularly (not as much as, for example, environmental policy). It was difficult during my research to find any significant references regarding this area besides their election manifestos.

#### *Europe*

In 1997, the section on the UK and the World was placed at the very end of its manifestos, just before the part on taxes. Nevertheless, LIBDEM were constantly calling for a positive leadership in Europe: "*Britain's **interests** can only **best** be pursued through **constructive participation in an enlarged European Union** / .../ Britain has*

---

<sup>33</sup> David Cameron, Leader's speech (Conservative), Bournemouth 2006

<sup>34</sup> David Cameron, Leader's speech (Conservative), Blackpool 2007

<sup>35</sup> 2005 LIBDEM Manifesto

*much to gain from EU membership*" (1997 LIBDEM Manifesto). This position was reflected on defence issue as well: *"Britain must maintain an effective security capability. This will **best** be achieved through **NATO** and **European co-operation**, and this country must continue to **play a full part in both**."* (ibid.). LIBDEM's aim was to *"recast Britain's foreign policy and enable this country to **play a leading role in shaping Europe** and strengthening international institutions / .../ **strengthen the European framework for peace and security** / .../ Britain's security and **national interests are best pursued in partnership with its European neighbours**. We will work to **strengthen European Common Foreign and Security policy** to enable **greater scope for united European action**. Individual member states must be free to decide whether or not their national forces will take part in any particular action"* (LIBDEM 1997 Manifesto).

They speak about *"**constructive engagement with Europe**."*<sup>36</sup> According to them, Britain's interests have been damaged by an attitude to Europe that has been, at best, ambivalent and, at worst, hostile. This attitude has also cost Britain opportunities for influence and advantage. On the importance of British membership in the EU, LIBDEM leader stated: *"By **marginalising Britain in Europe** we are able neither to share in its successes, nor tackle its failures. Britain is losing twice. We are **losing out on the benefits of Europe**, and we are losing out on the **chance to reshape Europe** for the future."*<sup>37</sup> In 2001, the Britain's role in the EU was again located at the bottom of the manifesto which though did not undermine their message: *"The European Union has a **fundamental role in guaranteeing peace and freedom in Europe** / .../ The EU brings **enormous benefits** to Britain. Yet neither Conservative nor Labour governments have made the most of **Britain's potential as a core member of the EU**."* Explicitly in their own words: *"**Liberal Democrats are firm supporters of the European Union** / .../ The EU offers the **best means of promoting Britain's interests in Europe** and in the wider world. Nations acting together can achieve more / .../ **Europe needs a new agenda for reform**. Liberal Democrats are determined that **Britain should lead this reform**"* (2001 LIBDEM Manifesto). In contrast to CON fears, LIBDEM were not afraid of being part of the EU: *" We can **play a full part in the EU without losing our national distinctiveness**."*<sup>38</sup> However, this time it was very short and brief on defence

<sup>36</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech to the Spring Party Conference, Edinburgh 1999

<sup>37</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Speech to the European Election Campaign Rally, Stockport 1999

<sup>38</sup> Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2000

matters: "Support a European Common Foreign and Security Policy that **includes a significant defence capability consistent with our membership of NATO and other international institutions.**" (2001 LIBDEM Manifesto). Regarding international security, LIBDEM focused more on the role of the UN. Next general elections run-up was slightly different. LIBDEM put international affairs in the middle of the 2005 Manifesto: " *Britain at the **heart of Europe** and at the heart and **the heart of its reform** / .../ Membership of the EU has been hugely important / .../ Britain is more prosperous and secure in Europe / .../ the Liberal Democrats' vision for **a strong Britain in a strong Europe, a powerful voice in the world***" (2005 LIBDEM Manifesto). Not surprisingly, LIBDEM leader openly criticised CON: "David Cameron and his *Europhobe allies.*"<sup>39</sup>

LIBDEM acknowledged alarming deficiencies regarding European ability to solve crisis on its own continent, though at the same time choosing rather derisive tone when referring to the US: "Sooner or later, **we Europeans** are going to have to wake up to the fact that we cannot continue to expect **Uncle Sam** to bail us out every time there's trouble in our own back yard. Sooner or later we are going to find that **our interests and those of our friends in the United States do not always coincide.**"<sup>40</sup> And explicitly calling for stronger Europe in military and defence matters, starting with a comparison: " **Europe has become an economic heavyweight, but it remains a military lightweight** / .../ There is a **desperate need for a Europe-wide defence review**, to look at how, by co-ordinating our efforts more closely, we can get better value for money and greater effectiveness for our military /.../ One that will **require a stronger and better organised EU**, and a stronger and better organised - and properly resourced - Common Foreign and Security Policy."<sup>41</sup> Europe was commonly treated by LIBDEM in very friendly fashion: '**our European partners**'.<sup>42</sup> They expressed a slight disapproval regarding European defence only once – in 2005 Manifesto – based on financial rationale: "By switching funding from **unnecessary programmes**, for example by cutting **the third tranche of the Eurofighter programme** / .../ We will seek **new ways of sharing the military burden**, by working with **allies** through **NATO** and the **EU.**"

---

<sup>39</sup> Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Brighton 2007

<sup>40</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Brighton 1998

<sup>41</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Speech to the European Election Campaign Rally, Sheffield 1999

<sup>42</sup> Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Brighton 2002

## **Anglo-America**

Until the war on terror, LIBDEM were positive towards the cooperation with the US and supportive of its action: "As *America's candid friend*, we are able to say: there are **no blank cheques** to be issued to the United States."<sup>43</sup> LIBDEM party's leader pronounced that "Europe and the US working **together** have been the **driving force**."<sup>44</sup> However, both LIBDEM party's leaders criticised the UK Government's approach towards the US after the Iraq war turned out to be a disaster: "I'm sick and tired of hearing Tony Blair make excuse after excuse for George Bush."<sup>45</sup> And continued aggressively: "You [Blair] should apologise for supporting that war."<sup>46</sup> After the tensions in the EU due to the Iraq war, LIBDEM leader Kennedy expressed himself that "Never again must Britain find itself on such a basis so distanced from principal partners within Europe"<sup>47</sup> Expressions in their 2005 Manifestos were formulated in the same mode: "We can fashion a new relationship with the United States: a partnership of influence, not one of uncritical subordination" (2005 LIBDEM Manifesto).

Taking together, LIBDEM had similar rhetoric as LAB (see next section) though obviously being the most pro-European party among the three big ones: "To **fight to put Britain at the heart** of a successful Europe... **Europe is good for Britain**"<sup>48</sup> LIBDEM used the metaphor of **heart** as well as CON (and LAB). Britain should be "at the **heart of the European partnership**"<sup>49</sup>, while at the same time calling for the Britain's leadership: "Don't be led by events on Europe, like the last Government was. Lead them."<sup>50</sup> LIBDEM added to the British discourse the allegory of European states being family to Britain: "And to build a new role for Britain, especially with our **sister nations in Europe**."<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2001

<sup>44</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech to the Spring Party Conference, Edinburgh 1999

<sup>45</sup> Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Blackpool 2005

<sup>46</sup> Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Brighton 2006

<sup>47</sup> Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2004

<sup>48</sup> Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech, Harrogate 1999b

<sup>49</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Friendship Housing Group Lecture, Birmingham 1997

<sup>50</sup> Paddy Ashdown (SDP-Liberal Alliance), Leader's speech to the Welsh Party Conference, 1998

<sup>51</sup> Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat), Leader's speech to the Spring Party Conference, Southport 1998

### 4.2.3. Labour Party

*" Our important national interests and responsibilities are shared with others, particularly our Partners and Allies in the European Union and NATO. " (SDR 1998)*

As being the only political party which represented the British Government, there were much more discursive and empirical materials to explore. I tried to pay attention on possible modifications of LAB attitude towards Europe and the Transatlantic alliance since launching the ESDP idea in 1998.

#### ***Europe***

Blair became PM in May 1997 on a manifesto that was almost entirely domestic. The defence and international security section was placed at its bottom, after art, culture and sport. Only one of the ten promises stated there was about foreign policy, although promising a change: *"We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe needs."* LAB wanted to improve Britain's relations with the EU, after the cold Thatcher-Major years so we can find a new positive emphasis on the Europe issue. Europe was pictured as an opportunity, not a threat: *"Britain will be a leader in Europe"* (1997 LAB Manifesto), *"We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need"* (2001 LAB Manifesto). LAB mostly referred to Europe and Britain as *'leadership from Britain to reform Europe'*. To LAB, their policy on European Defence represented a distinguishing feature from other parties: *"We have led the debate / .../ on the development of a European defence capacity rooted in NATO structures"* (2001 LAB Manifesto).

To some extent, LAB used the same rhetoric as CON: *"Our vision of Europe is of an alliance of independent nations choosing to co-operate to achieve the goals they cannot achieve alone. We oppose a European federal superstate."* Although, LAB continued after the 'dot': *"Withdrawal would be disastrous for Britain"* (1997 LAB Manifesto). It is necessary to mention that Britain held the Presidship twice over the analysed period (1998 and 2005). The UK used its Presidencies to promote effective external policies, in particular, to deliver a more action-oriented, less declaratory Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to continue to work on defence cooperation.

LAB were cautious in assuring that "*Britain's **national security is based on the mutual support that comes from membership of NATO. That will not change***" (2001 LAB Manifesto). However, they were also resolute when it came to the Britain's role in the EU: "*The European defence initiative is an important part of our defence policy / .../ our argument is that **if Britain is stronger in Europe, it will be stronger in the rest of the world. We reject the view of those who say we must choose between Europe and the USA / .../ We shall remain the USA's firm ally and friend; but we are not going to turn our backs on Europe***" (LAB 2001 Manifesto). And they were clear on the EU-NATO ties: "*To enable the European Union to **act where NATO chooses not to**, the EU should **improve its military capabilities** for humanitarian, peace-keeping and crisis management tasks / .../ Europe spends two-thirds as much as the US on defence, but gets only a fraction of its **effectiveness** / .../ European nations need to modernise their armed forces for **rapid and flexible** deployment. Improved EU military capabilities will **not be separate from NATO structures** and would only be **deployed where NATO as a whole chooses not to engage**. The launch of an EU operation will follow a unanimous decision, with **each member state free to decide** whether to take part" (2001 LAB Manifesto). As having opposed to isolationationism, they stressed their international approach: "*We will pursue British interests by working with **our allies** to make the world a safer*" (2005 LAB Manifesto).*

The LAB position on defence matters was consistent throughout the whole period of their government. "*We will continue to lead European defence cooperation. We will build **stronger EU defence capabilities, in harmony with NATO – the cornerstone of our defence policy** – without compromising our national ability to act independently. We will ensure the new EU battle groups are equipped and organised to act quickly to save lives in humanitarian crises*" (2005 LAB Manifesto).

### **Anglo-America**

Among four goals presented by Robin Cook at the beginning of his term as the Foreign Secretary was the security of nations: "*Our security will remain **based on the North Atlantic Alliance***."<sup>52</sup> And in the same speech he proclaimed "*We aim to make the United Kingdom a **leading player in Europe***." Emphasis was thus given on international cooperation in providing security: "*But **the security of Britain is best***"

---

<sup>52</sup> Robin Cook (Labour) Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office", London 1997



*served in a secure world, so we should be willing to contribute to wider international peace and security both through the alliances to which we belong, in particular NATO and the Western European Union"* (1997 LAB Manifesto), repeating that *"Our security will continue to be based on NATO / .../ strong defence through NATO"* (ibid.).

SDR concluded on the pre-ESDP situation very accurately in 1998: *"Our security is indivisible from that of our European partners and allies. We therefore have a fundamental interest in the security and stability of the continent as a whole and in the effectiveness of NATO as a collective political and military instrument to underpin these interests. This in turn depends on the transatlantic relationship and the continued engagement in Europe of the United States."* Before launching ESDP, British *"peace and freedom rest on European security, and hence on NATO"* (SDR 1998). Secretary of State for Defence mentioned in the introduction of this important strategic document summarising British capabilities that *"Underpinning the changes to our forces is our reinforced international commitment, NATO will continue as the cornerstone of our defence planning, and we intend to build on our role as a leading European member of the Alliance."*<sup>53</sup>

Certain importance is placed on the US as well: *"We have kept the transatlantic partnership at the heart of our security through an unparalleled working relationship with the US."*<sup>54</sup> Later continuing with the sentence: *"the United States is our most important ally."*<sup>55</sup> The evaluation of Britain's relationship to the US appeared in every FCO Departmental report - though, sections on Europe security were more detailed and more pages were devoted to this matter - even if nothing had changed in fact: *"The UK/US relationship remains strong and deep. Dealings between the two governments, at all levels from the Prime Minister and President Clinton downward, work well."*<sup>56</sup> Robin Cook repeated statement also in the House of Commons: *"Britain's alliance with the United States has, of course, been the anchor of our security for half a century. Today, that alliance is stronger than ever, particularly because of the close working relationship and mutual respect of President Clinton and our Prime Minister."*<sup>57</sup> In general terms, there is certain interdependence of relations: *"Britain needs its voice strong in Europe and bluntly Europe needs a strong Britain, rock solid in our alliance*

---

<sup>53</sup> Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson, July 1998 in SDR 1998

<sup>54</sup> Robin Cook in FCO Departmental Report 1999

<sup>55</sup> FCO Departmental Report 1999: 10

<sup>56</sup> FCO Departmental Report 2000: 36

<sup>57</sup> Robin Cook in House of Commons (1998a).

*with the USA, yet determined to play its full part in shaping Europe's destiny.*"<sup>58</sup> From the start of the War on Terror in 2001, Blair strongly supported the foreign policy of the US President Bush, participating in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq. Before Iraq, Britain's *"relationship with key international partners, including the United States, Russia and Japan, and our reputation in multilateral organisations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, have rarely been stronger."*<sup>59</sup> The invasion of Iraq was particularly controversial and attracted widespread public and intra-party opposition. Despite the fact that Blair faced criticism over the policy itself and the circumstances in which it was decided upon, his position remained stable: *"Britain should also remain the strongest ally of the United States."*<sup>60</sup>

Although Europe turned to become more important than the others - *"The European Union is the most effective tool we have to magnify and strengthen our influence as a nation on the world stage,"*<sup>61</sup> - the position on defence structure remained unchanged: *"Britain keeps control of key national interests like foreign policy, taxation, social security and defence. Stronger EU defence capabilities in harmony with NATO – the cornerstone of our defence policy. LAB saw EU defence role in the new EU battle groups are equipped and organised to act quickly to save lives in humanitarian crises"* (2005 LAB Manifesto). Britain's memberships in the EU and NATO were not seen as mutually exclusive, definitely not with respect to the US: *" / .../ just as you could stand for Britain while being part of NATO, you can stand for Britain and advance British national interests as part of the European Union / .../ not least improving relationships between Europe and the USA."*<sup>62</sup>

The consistency of Government's perception of Britain's role in Europe and NATO is obvious when looking at annual departmental reports of both Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Since the introduction of autonomous European defence policy, the European circle has been strengthening. It is also worth mentioning that European security and defence – *'Strengthen European security through an enlarged and modernised NATO, an effective EU crisis management capacity and enhanced European defence capabilities'* - has been a joint strategic priority of both ministries. The formulation of the relationship between the EU

---

<sup>58</sup> Tony Blair (Labour), Leader's speech, Brighton 2001

<sup>59</sup> FCO Departmental Report 2002: 2

<sup>60</sup> Tony Blair (Labour), Leader's speech, Brighton 2005

<sup>61</sup> FCO Departmental Report 2002: 4

<sup>62</sup> Gordon Brown (Labour), Speech to the Fabian New Year Conference, London 2006

and NATO within British defence and security remained pretty much stable throughout the whole examined period: *"The FCO has worked closely with the MoD to ensure the ESDP develops in a way which supports British policies and is **compatible** with NATO"*.<sup>63</sup> References to this issue can be characterised mostly by expressions: *compatibility, effectivity, and modernisation* which stood in opposition to *duplication*. The Foreign Secretary's foreword expressed this relation very clearly: *"The EU is developing its military capability in a way that strengthens NATO and reinforces Europe's ability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged."*<sup>64</sup>

LAB perceived that the active engagement in both the EU and NATO was mutually reinforcing and beneficial for Britain's position: *"the last year has underlined the importance of co-operation between the USA and Europe / .../ The transatlantic relationship is rooted in / .../ common security interests."*<sup>65</sup> Regarding this relationship, there is an exceptional role for Britain: *"Europe needs to be a credible partner for the USA in dealing with security challenges. The UK has been working to promote this."*<sup>66</sup> Within their discourse on Europe, a following binary opposition was developed: threat vs. opportunity; isolation/ marginalisation vs. (to be in the) centre (of). Very often verbs as change, reform, strengthen, move forward were attributed to the Britain's role. A metaphor of **heart** was used again: to turn Britain into a leading nation *at the heart of Europe* in order to influence the course of events and the EU's actual functioning. Its desired armed forces were described as strong, effective and responsive. At the same time, LAB regarded NATO as the **cornerstone, bedrock** or **anchor** of British defence and security, thus they did not differ from CON in this respect. Similarly, the US was predominantly seen as a closest (and even the most important) ally to Britain. The special position of Britain itself was being highlighted: *"NATO is a unique partnership, spanning two continents separated by the Atlantic, but joined by common interests. More than any other member, Britain is both a European and an Atlantic state."*<sup>67</sup>

Having conducted the analysis of security and defence discourse in each of three British political parties, it is possible to conclude that each of them consider the United States as the UK's close ally and perceived the EU member states as partners. However,

---

<sup>63</sup> FCO 2006: 72

<sup>64</sup> Jack Straw in FCO 2004: 6

<sup>65</sup> Jack Straw in FCO 2004: 5

<sup>66</sup> Jack Straw in Foreign FCO 2004: 5

<sup>67</sup> Robin Cook in House of Commons (1998a)

there is a difference when it comes to the extent of consensus on how desirable the British closeness to the EU should be when taking into account Britain's Anglo-American circle. More generally, all three parties favoured international cooperation of Britain. The relationship with the US and the UK's membership in NATO were considered as first priority in each party. Thus, the consensus on the NATO's role in British security is clear and doubtless. All three parties perceived NATO as the cornerstone of British foreign policy within security and defence network. CON kept consistently their Atlanticism and rather reserved position towards the EU structures. Their slogan, *'In Europe, but not ruled by Europe'* points on their deprecation of further British involvement and their little willingness to accept more commitments possibly imposed by the EU. However, all the CON concerns and talks of a Euro-force displacing NATO and thus providing the foundation for a superstate missed the point. Right after the launching of the European defence initiative in ST Malo, the PM ensured his domestic counterparts about the compatibility of the initiative with existing NATO structure. Reaching the consensus across the political spectrum is evident during one of many parliamentary debates on European defence on 13 December 1999<sup>68</sup>:

Hague (CON): *"We are in favour of an enhanced European defence capability within NATO. However, we are concerned about the current development of what is euphemistically called readily deployable EU military capabilities outside NATO—in other words, a European army... The decision to establish a defence identity outside NATO is momentous."*

Blair (CON): *"Gentleman also made some points on defence, a subject on which he is perhaps more ridiculous than on any other. If I understand his position, he is in favour of defence co-operation in Europe, but in a way consistent with NATO."*

Duncan Smith (CON): *"Inside NATO."*

Blair (CON): *"Inside NATO. In other words, he supports the European strategic defence initiative agreed by the Tories in 1996 at Berlin... The Deputy Secretary of State for the United States said: The US is for this. It is in our interests for Europe to be able to deal effectively". The United States favours the European strategic defence initiative... I do not think that they [Conservatives] yet understand that this is actually building on the European security and defence initiative, so it is entirely consistent with NATO "*

Charles Kennedy (LIBDEM): *"... there will be a welcome for the modest but significant step towards the establishment of a European rapid reaction force. That is not least because it bolts us further into NATO and bolts a European component into NATO, which is essential for our long-term interest."*

---

<sup>68</sup> Helsinki European Council, HC Deb 13 December 1999 vol 341 cc21-40

The research showed that throughout the years of Blair's premiership, both LIBDEM and CON in fact (former more than the latter) supported the development of EU's military capabilities, though only under the condition that those structures would not duplicate the already existing NATO structures. Although CON stood strongly against it from the beginning and kept their reserved stances and continued to oppose the by-nobody-proclaimed idea of European army, they did not raised any significant objections against the improvement of European capabilities. CON opposition can be associated with their general resentment towards European structures and Britain's engagement, and their preference given to Atlanticism. As it comes to the US, America was considered as candid friend, close ally and strategic partner. From the long-term perspective on one hand, the preference was given to NATO and Anglo-America, but on the other hand, the less friendly statements of CON and LIBDEM towards the US in 2003 refected the unpopularity and their disagreement with Iraq war.

As to some particularities found in the discourse, CON, LIBDEM and LAB operated with the term '*heart*'. The only difference is that LAB and LIBDEM related it with the position of Britain in Europe, meanwhile CON positioned NATO at the heart of British security. LAB consistently continued in their (discursive) effort to place Britain at the heart of Europe - heart being a vivid centre, one of the most important part of living organism and Britain's foreign policy thereof. In sum, the position shared by all parties within British political discourse remained unchanged: the ESDP should be designed to complement rather than rival NATO, the primary British security alliance.

### **4.3. Criterion: External Acceptability**

This criterion is meant to examine positions of the UK's main partners within its foreign defence and security policy. For that reason, besides the British discourse, I included into the research of British national interest also reactions of the US administration and of European partners to Blair's initiative for a stronger military EU. Furthermore, I pay attention to. references to discourses other than the British one which appeared in speeches made by British leading politicians.

The British initiative for stronger military EU and stronger role in the EU of Britain itself was welcomed from both sides. There are three corroborative aspects identified when examining the external acceptability of Britain's foreign policy:

- i, European leaders joined Blair's initiative and supported the development of ESDP
- ii, Americans have been explicitly supporting the stronger military Europe
- iii, Intertextual aspect: references to American politicians found in UK leaders' speeches

#### **4.3.1. Europe**

The defence cooperation among European countries is not a new topic. It dates back to 1950s when first initiative regarding the creation of a purely European multinational military capability - European defence community (EDC) - was on the negotiation table. However, it was rejected in the French Parliament and the Western European Union (WEU) as separate organisation from the European Economic Community (EEC) was created instead. Much later, in December 1969, the leaders of the original six bypassed traditional conflicts and instructed their foreign ministries to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification. As a result, the EEC members initiated a process of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Its original tasks included: through regular exchange of information and consultations to promote a better mutual understanding on important international problems and to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of their views and the coordination of their positions, and where it appears desirable and possible, common actions (Sloan 2010: 69). Eventually, the expansion of topics and problems covered by the political consultations within EPC led the EEC in the direction of security policy. The EEC members though stopped short of what would be considered military policy and that area until the late 1990s remained reserved exclusively for NATO cooperation. Despite of that, EEC consultations by the mid-1980s regularly included issues that were on NATO's consultative agenda as well. In 1987, the European allies took significant steps towards European defence cooperation. France and Germany agreed to form a 'European brigade' which resulted in a major joint military exercise in Germany operating under French command in September that year. In October 1987 the WEU countries issued a "Platform on European Security Interests" that constituted the most explicit and far-reaching European statement to date on common approaches to European security issues (Sloan 2010: 70). The document emphasised the continuing importance for Western security interests of both nuclear weapons and American involvement in European defence. However, the political consultations in the EEC and

the revival of activity in the WEU remained exercises of coordination among the member states rather than a process of political integration. The idea of independent defence structure in Europe re-emerged in 1990s at the time of CFSP creation as the second pillar of the EU at the 1992 Maastricht European Council meeting. Since the EU lacked military capabilities of its own, the Treaty envisioned that the EU would request the WEU — Europe's defence arm at the time — to plan and implement military measures on its behalf. The Maastricht Treaty represented a first step on the road towards constructing a European caucus within the Euro-Atlantic security sphere (Watanabe 2006: 6). Several agreements followed between NATO and European countries in order to allowing greater European autonomy. At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, European Security and Defence Identity was born to provide a means of strengthening a *"European pillar of defence"* within the framework of NATO, i.e. to develop *"separable but not separate"* capabilities through the WEU (Watanabe 2006: 6). At the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, it was agreed that the WEU would oversee the creation of ESDI within NATO structures, and later so-called Berlin-plus arrangement allow the EU to use NATO assets if it so wished. When the efforts to improve European capabilities within a NATO framework failed to provide sufficient incentive and, as far as some in Europe were concerned, did not go far enough towards allowing greater European autonomy (Watanabe 2006: 6), European governments took further steps towards developing greater autonomy in terms of political decision making and military capacity within the framework of the EU. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, the Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the Treaty on the European Union. Even though both the WEU and the EU are empowered to enforce the Petersberg tasks, with the transfer of the most important WEU assets to the EU in 1999, this distinction is mostly artificial (ibid.).

First allusions to revolutionary changes that occurred in European defence had been made by PM Blair at an informal EU meeting of Heads of State and Government in Pörtschach in Austria on 24-25 October 1998 and at the press conference that followed. Blair expressed his impression that *"In respect of common foreign and security policy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role / .../ We all agreed it was important that Europe should be able to play a better, more unified part in foreign and security policy decisions."* And, at the very beginning of the ESDP idea, Blair underscored that:

*"We need to make sure that the institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is complementary to it."*

*"I am certainly not – repeat not – talking about a European army or anything like that."*

*"Let us discuss the best way forward, though I repeat to you, nothing must happen which in any way impinges on the effectiveness of NATO / .../ NATO for us is the absolute correct forum."*

Blair's European colleagues gave him a warm response after he made an introduction to foreign policy and security affairs at this informal summit. In the interview thereafter Blair stated that *"People want to see Britain engaged / .../ it is right that Britain and other European countries play a key and leading role and that we enhance our capability to make a difference in those situations."* (ibid.). At the time of Blair's second year in office as the British PM, another two important meetings on the EU's military role took place. Subsequently, on 1 December 1998 France and Germany at Potsdam issued a joint statement, in which President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder announced that they were in the process of defining CFSP and a common defence policy, and that they continued to be committed to integrating the WEU into the EU. And later in December that year, at British-French summit in St-Malo Britain definitely declared its willingness to participate on the creation of defence policy on the European level. The St-Malo Declaration was the first official document laying down the new British orientation towards EU defence (Rutten 2001: 1). In French President Jacques Chirac Blair found his *partenaire* and together they launched the vision of military EU in Saint Malo whose outcome can be classified as a major new initiative to develop an autonomous European Security and Defense Policy within the framework of the European Union. Chirac and Blair stated at this Franco-British summit that *"the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."*<sup>69</sup> It was the first major step in British co-operation in Europe defence as the national leaders agreed on a defence cooperation initiative. The declaration envisioned the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act autonomously should NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action.

The UK has been able to conduct military missions without EU. Among virtually all NATO members, Britain has the most extensive experience in the type of

---

<sup>69</sup> Franco-British summit: Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998



counter-insurgency, peace-keeping and enforcement operations that became necessary during the 1990s, combined with advanced warfighting skills and a much less complicated attitude towards the use of force than e.g. Germany. As a result of the experience in the Balkans under the UN mandate, Britain was the first European country to develop a doctrine for peace-keeping and peace support operations (Ellner 2005). In fact, the UK and France had the strongest military capabilities in late 1990', so they were the only forces that could lead development of ESDP. Sloan (2010) sees this declaration as an intention to re-establish the Franco-British military cooperation and move it on the European level<sup>70</sup>. But as the previous part suggests, the French delegation had lined up support from German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder prior to the meeting in order to give the declaration even more weight. In addition, shortly after St-Malo, Chirac said of the talks: *"To me this is a positive sign for the future, not only for the future for Britain and France, but more widely for the whole of Europe."*<sup>71</sup>

#### 4.3.2. The United States

At the end of the Cold War, members of the US Congress complained *loudly* about inadequate defense burden sharing and European officials did the same about *excessive* European reliance on US leadership (Sloan 2010: 212). The US has been, on the one hand, reflecting deep European roots in American society, perceptions of shared values, and alliance relationships, on the other hand, schizophrenic about Europe's role in the world. Throughout the Cold War period, the US supported the goal of enhanced European economic, political, and defense cooperation. Even though the US has always welcomed the potential for a stronger European pillar in the transatlantic alliance, it has been wary of approaches that would divide the alliance politically, take resources away from NATO military cooperation, and not yield additional military capabilities to produce more equitable burden sharing. *"The U.S. approach could be called a 'yes, but' policy, supporting the European effort but warning of the potential negative*

---

<sup>70</sup> Back in the past, French President De Gaulle saw Great Britain as an "Atlanticist" Trojan horse. De Gaulle's statement illustrates the perception of Great Britain in Europe with its image of the US close friend, even a dependent friend. That is why de Gaulle feared the UK becoming a member of European Community – with Britain as a member it would become a *"Colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would completely swallow up the European Community"* (Sloan 2010: 65). And eventually, as a result of those prejudices, France vetoed the Britain's first tentative approach to Europe in 1963, and the second in 1967 respectively.

<sup>71</sup> BBC News (1998b)

*consequences*" (Sloan 2010: 213). In the early 1990s, the US kept expressing concerns<sup>72</sup> that it might be marginalised if greater European cohesion in defense led to the creation of an internal caucus within NATO. It is true that as the US perceived the increased momentum towards European agreement on a defense identity early in 1991, it supported a stronger European pillar in the alliance based on the revival of the Western European Union. However, there was a concern that bringing defence issues within the competence of the European Commission would open the way for anti-American sentiment present in the Commission (mainly French) to influence the evolution of transatlantic defence ties (ibid). The US policymakers concentrated on diplomatic efforts to ensure that the definition of that identity emerging from NATO summit in Rome and the EU summit in Maastricht, would be consistent with US interests in NATO as the primary European security institution (Sloan, 2010: 215). However, the differences between the US and French governments about the requirements for the future European security organisation continued. The US was against the idea of Germany and France to create a joint Franco-German military corps. American officials expressed reservation about the degree to which the corps would displace NATO as the focus of European defence efforts and undermine domestic support in the US for a continuing US presence in Europe. And at the same time, the US Administration showed concerns and even dissatisfaction with the development in Europe regarding the process leading to defence cooperation and desirable improvement of military capacities. American administration officials were suspicious of the moves within the European Union to give the Union a defence dimension because the first response of European governments to the end of the Cold War was to begin cutting defence expenditures. The heavy European reliance on US military capabilities added urgency to the initiatives of British PM Blair and other key leaders in the EU to develop military capabilities more in keeping with Europe's economic and financial resources. According to an American international relations expert, *"Balancing the transatlantic relationship*

---

<sup>72</sup> The US approach to European defense integration appeared to have settled on five main points according to the US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney (1991):

- the US supported the development of common European foreign, security and defence policies
- NATO must remain the essential forum for consultations and venue for agreement on all policies bearing on security and defence commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty
- NATO should retain its integrated military structure
- the US supports the European right to take common military action outside Europe to preserve its interests or ensure the respect of international law
- European members of NATO that do not belong to the EU should not be excluded from European defence policy deliberations (in Sloan 2010: 214)

*is critical to keeping the US-European security partnership vibrant in the future. Indeed, it is a founding task of NATO that remains unfulfilled"* (Sean Kay in Sloan, 2010: 213). Questions about the sustainability of a relationship that depended so heavily on the US had been around for a long time. Sloan observed that the only way to maximize the benefits of alliance will be to encourage a process of gradual evolutionary change in US-European relations toward a new transatlantic bargain. *"That bargain must bring greater European responsibility and leadership to the deal; it must ensure continued American involvement in European defense while at the same time constructing a new European pillar inside, not outside, the broad framework of the Western alliance."* (Sloan 1985: 191).

And then the autumn of 1998 arrived. The shape of the discussion on European defense was changed profoundly by the British PM Tony Blair's decision to make a major push for an EU role in defence. As already mentioned, Blair first tired out to hit ideas at an EU summit in Austria in October 1998 and then he reaffirmed his approach on November 3 in a major address to the North Atlantic Assembly's annual session in Edinburgh. Blair bemoaned the fact that Europe's ability for autonomous military action was so limited and called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic alliance. Blair's initiative may also have betrayed some uncertainty concerning NATO's future. Traditionally, Great Britain had been the most reliable (and predictable) partner of the US when it came to dealing with defence issues. The British had shared US skepticism regarding initiatives that might create splits between the US and Europe in the alliance, particularly those *with roots in French Neo-Gaullist philosophy* (Sloan 2010: 220).

The Blair's idea was praised by Americans. In a report released by American Senator it was stated: *"The US should give every possible help and encouragement to the continuing consolidation of European defense efforts. But the US must not be held accountable for the inability of European states to develop a more coherent European role in the Alliance. It is the responsibility of the European Allies to develop the European Security and Defense Capabilities to give real meaning to a European Security nad Defense identity"* (in Sloan, 2010: 221). Later any doubts about the serious nature of the Blair initiative were removed when Blair met with President Jacques Chirac at Saint-Malo early in December 1998.

The US administration's formal reaction to the Saint-Malo statement was positive. Although it might have remained of the traditional form of 'yes, *but*' approach,

mainly the speech by Madeleine Albright represented Americans' supportive approach regarding stronger military Europe. Her article "*The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future*" became widely known as the 'Three Ds' US statement. In the context of the demand for military forces designed, equipped and prepared for 21st-century missions, she wrote:

*"We welcome the call from Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, for Europeans to consider ways they can take more responsibility for their own security and defence. Our interest is clear: we want a Europe that can act. We want a Europe with modern, flexible military forces that are capable of putting out fires in Europe's backyard and working with us through the alliance to defend our common interest. European efforts to do more for Europe's own defence make it easier, not harder, for us to remain engaged.... Like Mr. Blair, we believe the emphasis should be placed on enhancing the practical capabilities Europe brings to our alliance... As Europeans look at the best way to organise their foreign and security policy cooperation, the key is to make sure that any institutional change is consistent with basic principles that have served the Atlantic partnership well for 50 years. This means avoiding what I would call the Three Ds: decoupling, duplication, and discrimination ... The goal outlined by Mr. Blair is consistent with these principles. We look forward to discussing with all of our European allies and partners how to strengthen Europe's capacity to act."*

(Albright, Madeleine, US Secretary of State "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future", Financial Times, 7 December, 1998)

Later in 1999, in his speech on the complementarity of NATO and the EU, the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott<sup>73</sup> first saying that, "*The United Kingdom, under Prime Minister Blair, is now politically at the center of Europe and intellectually at the center of European deliberations over how better to deal with threats to continental peace and transatlantic security,*" expressed a long-term concern:

*"We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.... We will be watching closely to see how the EU defines its security relationship with other Allies who do not happen to be EU members." And followingly, he stressed "the essential complementarity of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance... It's in our interest for Europe to be able to deal effectively with challenges to European security well before they reach to the threshold of triggering U.S. combat involvement."*

(Talbott, Strobe, US Deputy Secretary of State "America's Stake in a Strong Europe". Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs conference on the Future of NATO in London, 7 October 1999)

---

<sup>73</sup> Talbott, Strobe, US Deputy Secretary of State (1999): "America's Stake in a Strong Europe". Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs conference on the Future of NATO in London, 7 October 1999

Lord Robertson, British Labour Party politician who became NATO Secretary General in October 1999 (until then he served as a Secretary of State for Defence under Blair), immediately responded to American fears with the policy of '*Three I's*' during his visit to the United States. The first reference he made to the '*Three I's*' in a formal context<sup>74</sup> was during the speech at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly<sup>75</sup>. At this session, he called for "*more mature transatlantic security relationship.*" As "*It [Kosovo case] made crystal clear that NATO needs to improve its defence capabilities,*" the ESDI "*is no longer just an attractive idea, it has become an urgent necessity. Simply put, the burden of dealing with European security crises should not fall disproportionately on the shoulder on the shoulders of the US. We need to create a more balanced Alliance, with a stronger European input.*" According to him as the NATO Secretary General, "*NATO stands ready to support*" the process of building capabilities to play a stronger role in preserving peace and security. "*I will work to ensure that ESDI is based on three key principles, the three I's: improvement in European defence capabilities; inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies; and the indivisibility of Trans-Atlantic security, based on our shared values... ESDI does not mean 'less US' – it means more Europe, and hence a stronger NATO. Strengthening Europe's role in security is about re-balancing the transatlantic relationship in line with European and American interests.*"

During tensions between the EU and the US in 2003, Blair dismissed the concerns of the US administrative after the chocolate summit on 29 April that year. Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg - '*chocolate summiters*' which were at that time the most open opponents of US plans for war against Iraq - planned to establish a new EU military headquarter at Tervuren near Brussels which would have been separate from NATO.<sup>76</sup> According to Sir David Manning, Britain's ambassador to the US, that mini-summit reflected "*the worst fears of US hardliners about the dangers of ESDP going off in a Nato-incompatible direction*" (The Guardian 2003). Peter Ricketts, Britain's ambassador to Nato, played a key role trying to bridge the gap between the European allies and the US. The British Government agreed with the US in opposing

---

<sup>74</sup> "Three I's First time mentioned at the unofficial meeting in the US on 30 October that year.

<sup>75</sup> Robertson George (1999), NATO Secretary-General, Speech at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, 15 November 1999

<sup>76</sup> The availability of the EU-owned asset, the Civilian- Military Cell, is guaranteed but rather than a fully-fledged HQ it is a small core that has to be built on for each specific operation, which creates an additional training requirement. With an Operations Centre of just five permanent staff, even as a core its capacity remains limited to small-scale (battlegroup-sized) operations (Bishop 2006 :14)

this call. Blair ensured the US counterparts, who feared in return Britain would go along with some form of independent EU military planning (ibid.), about the complementarity of the ESDP and resolved this issue on the next European summit. Blair insisted after the EU summit in Brussels later that year that NATO remained the *cornerstone* of European security: "*We need of course strong European defence, but nothing whatever must put at risk our essential defence guarantees within NATO.*"<sup>77</sup> Regarding Germany and France, he was able to ease the edge situation: "*At the discussion we had last night I would say the vast majority of people spoke up for European defence but only on the basis that it is fully compatible with the NATO agreement. And I think it is an indication of the chance we have to influence the debate in Europe that when Britain speaks up for the NATO Alliance, we get the support of the vast majority of people including, I have to say, France and Germany who recognise that in the end European defence has no future as a competitor to NATO. It can only work if it is fully compatible with NATO*" (ibid). Later in February 2004 in Berlin, Blair ensured that "*We [Britain, France and Germany] came together and worked at European defence in a way that in the end was to the advantage of all of Europe.*"<sup>78</sup>

Concluding on the United States' position, their supportive statements were built around the of burden-sharing argument of responsibility for maintaining security in Europe. The British turn towards Europe represented a fundamental change in the transatlantic bargain. It enhanced the potential for Europe to become a true second pillar for NATO. The British leadership in defence matters appeared as a crucial factor for other EU Member States who began constructing a new transatlantic bargain at the end of the twentieth century.<sup>79</sup>

#### 4.3.3. Intertextual linkages

As to intertextual linkages, British politicians made several references to American thinkers and politicians. In other cases they were mentioning the American press. To make a few examples, Blair often quoted American statesmen when

---

<sup>77</sup> Doorstep interview in Brussels [17/10/2003]

<sup>78</sup> Prime Minister Tony Blair held a joint press conference with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac (18/02/04)

<sup>79</sup> According to Sloan, questions concerning whether or not the European allies would have the political will or material resources to take on the levels of responsibility in the alliance to create a bargain, remained after the decade of Blair's premiership (2010: 213). Regarding the burden-sharing, the question is how much the alliance needs British involvement on the European side of the bargain.

addressing speeches to American audience (e.g. John Kennedy in Chicago in 1999 or Abraham Lincoln in the US Congress in 2003) or recalled common UK-US history (e.g. Chicago speech in 1999 or in the George Bush Senior Presidential Library in Crawford in 2002). Various MPs made references to statements of the US Administration about the appropriateness of stronger military EU which came as important argument in the parliamentary discussion on the ESDP initiative. In important parliamentary debate after Helsinki European Council, CON William Hague asked Blair: *"Has the Prime Minister seen the comments of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe in The New York Times today? General Wesley Clark says: 'the main American concern / .../ is decoupling or duplication or discrimination against non-EU, European members of NATO'".*<sup>80</sup> By which it could be said that the American opinion mattered to him and considered it as a relevant contribution to the discussion. The same accounts for the citation of Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, whose opinion on the ESDP was incorporated into FCO Departmental report 2002: *"The risk to NATO, to the transatlantic link and to the Euro-American relationship does not stem from what Europe is building. This risk could only come from Europe not doing it."*<sup>81</sup>

In this chapter I operationalised the concept of national interest in the British political discourse on security and defence in order to answer research questions. As mentioned elsewhere, the great Tory schism over Europe became Labour's opportunity. At the time of taking over the government in 1997, Labour party presented itself as the party of Europe while at the same time Atlantic Alliance was firmly articulated as the priority when it came to national defence. LAB demonstrated a new positive pro-European approach, proclaiming its goal of putting Britain **at the heart of Europe**. These statements and positions did not mean that Europe was seen as the exclusive framework for common policies. On contrary, the LAB sought to combine its European commitment with a renewed Atlanticist one. However eventually, Labour government chose Anglo-America and the strategic alliance with the US, rather than Europe, when resolving global security issues - *"From the start new Labour / .../ showed greater affinity with America than with Europe"* (Gamble 2003: 190). To put it in a wider context, in the era of American supremacy since the end of the Cold War, the Anglo-American hegemony was more dominant than it had ever been, and as the events of

---

<sup>80</sup> Hague in House of Commons (1999).

<sup>81</sup> Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, North Atlantic Council Meeting, February 2001 in FCO 2002: 44

9/11 have demonstrated, the alliance on military and security matters remained strong. *"Faced with a choice between Europe and America in security and defence issues, British governments still choose America"* (Gamble 2003: 222). The Blair's government (like the Thatcher and Major Governments before) was **a close ally of the US**.

After having examined all three criteria necessary to determine the British national interest in security and defence field, I am able to conclude that European Security and Defence Policy was in the British national interest. There is also the answer to the next research question: the ESDP was compatible with the UK-US special relationship as it was meant to improve British influence on European affairs and at the same time made it stronger in respect to its relationship to the US. European defence, as presented by Blair and his Government, was in the national interest of the United Kingdom, regardless of variety of potential motives behind its launching. Throughout the decade (or more precisely, since the ESDP initiative was launched), the positions of three major political parties to either the US or the EU did not change to any significant extent. Moreover, both American and European key partners welcomed Britain's leadership in building Europeans defence capabilities.

The British national interest in security and defence matters was pretty constant during the Blair's premiership. Though, a stronger EU in military terms was not among a high profile agenda at the beginning of Blair's first term in office, nor was it in other political parties. Only little attention was paid to defence or international security in general. Only limited references to foreign policy and defence were made during the campaign. British national interest in the defense field was associated with NATO structures seeing as traditional military alliance in which UK had a strong position. Despite the fact that CON kept their rather rhetorically hostile position towards EU, the analysis proved that in fact they supported EU security defence policy as it was presented by Blair, i.e. not duplicating NATO. As a matter of fact, CON contributed to this development as well. It was the CON government who signed the Berlin + Agreement in 1996. Thus, it cannot be said that CON opposed the stronger EU military a priori. Their sole condition of their support was to ensure that all developments would be happening inside NATO. Blair kept confirming this kind of engagement from the very beginning ever since he had launched the initiative. Apart from declaratory statement of all parties about the US being the close (and even closest) ally and friend of Britain, at the time of the ESDP formation the opinion of the US Administration did matter to mainly CON party as it was obvious from their argumentation during



parliamentary debates. As to LIBDEM, they kept their positive pro-European approach. The only objection they raised towards European defence was based on economic reasoning. In general, LIBDEM took a position largely similar to the LAB one. For the sake of effectivity, Blair did not support building new autonomous European military headquarters. As a matter of fact, although the EU circle has got stronger, the Anglo-America was still being a priority when it came to defence and security.

One of the most interesting outcomes of this critical discourse analysis is the fact that British high-ranked politicians did use only very rarely the adjective '*special*' when talking about the relationship of the UK to the United States. It seems that in the official British discourse the term '*special relationship*' does not appear almost at all. Neither by opposition nor by Government politicians in their official speeches, press conferences or statements fancied using that expression. This does not mean that the concept of '*special relationship*' is meaningless. On the contrary, "*Special relationship / .../ remains embedded in the public image of international relations*" (Deighton 2002: 118). And this research indicates as well that the sole term is used mainly either by scholars to depict the unique relationship between two powerful states or by British and American journalists. This statement however requires further research on the discourse in media in order to be verified.

## **5. PREDICATE AND METAPHOR ANALYSIS OF TONY BLAIR'S SPEECHES ON BRITISH SECURITY AND DEFENCE**

*'The Germans lost the war and have got over it. The French were humiliated by the war and have got over it. The British won the war and have never got over it... My job is to establish a lasting relationship, and to lead Britain in Europe.'*

(Tony Blair in Seldon, 2005: 320)

The unique impact of Tony Blair on (not only) British politics was presented in another chapter of this work. The analytical part that follows is devoted to the discursive analysis of Blair's pivotal speeches when serving as the Prime Minister of the UK. I decided to include the following chapter into this thesis in order to separately analyse the way how the leading and most internationally recognised and representative figure of 1997-2007 LAB Government – the British Prime Minister Tony Blair – pictured the UK-US and UK-EU relationships. I seek to examine Blair's speeches in more detail in order to demonstrate the difference he made to the British political discourse on defence and security. My aim is to explore the language practices and legitimization strategies which he used in order to defend his foreign policy attitudes. In the following paragraphs I discuss the adjectives, verbs and adverbs attributed to each of the object spaces through predicate and metaphor analysis. I focus on lexical aspects and all kinds of predicates he used to associate with two object spaces: Anglo-America and Europe, and to the speaker's country by himself. I seek to apply Milliken's observations and categorizations of predicates and, inspired by Chilton's security metaphors, I search for certain conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions associated with security and defence in the British context. By using grounded theory in Milliken's predicate analysis, I look for relational distinctions and binary oppositions displayed between these two principal object spaces. In addition, I pay attention to special 'rhetorical' structures of text and talk, such as metaphors, comparisons, irony, hyperboles, or euphemisms. This critical discourse analysis is expected to show Blair's interpretation of Britain's national interest, as well as whether his illustration of Britain's relationship to both the US and the EU changed at some point of his premiership when talking about British foreign policy.

The selection of texts and citations focused on those speeches which depicted the most accurately and representatively the Blair's illustration of Britain's position in both European and Anglo-American circle. When tracking the possible evolution of

these relationships in Blair speeches throughout the decade, I proceeded in the analysis chronologically according to of each term in office (1997-2001, 2001-2005, 2005-2007) in order to get systematic results. The choice of texts and citations reflects the orientation on those speeches which depicted the most accurately the Blair's illustration of Britain's position in both European and Anglo-American circle. As to the citations in this chapter, predicates are put in bold, categories of both object spaces are underlined, and metaphorical expression are capitalised.

### ***Tony Blair 1997-2007***

One cannot look at Blair's attitude towards Anglo-America and Europe separately for the sole reason: his foreign policy was built on the metaphorical expression of Britain being the *bridge* between the US and Europe. The *bridge* metaphor was for the first time officially presented during Blair's in Blackpool in 1998:

*"And do not fall for this **right-wing myth** about choosing the United States over the European Union. **Stronger in Europe means stronger with the US and the stronger we stand with the United States, the stronger the **BRIDGE** we build between our European partners and our American friends. Community values beyond our national boundaries and within our United Kingdom, the same. **Standing stronger together.**"***

(Tony Blair, Leader's speech, Blackpool, 29th September 1998)

Britain being the bridge between the US and Europe is supposed to mean building the connection and construction of closeness which underlines the British uniqueness and fits very well into the image of Britain's exceptionalism. The basic idea behind the bridge concept is simple as it rests on two pillars: the unique relationship with the US and close relations with Britain's European partners. Although the bridge metaphor has its post-war origins in "*Britain's leading role in enlisting US economic and security support in the late 1940s*" (Gowland, Turner, Wright 2010: 228), this concept gained greatly in its importance as it became "*the cornerstone of Tony Blair's grand strategy*" (Kramer 2003: 90). This metaphor became the central claim of his foreign policy related to Europe and the United States, appearing repeatedly throughout his whole premiership.

The Blair's speech on foreign affairs was delivered in the similar atmosphere:

*"[T]hough Britain will never be the **mightiest** nation on earth, we can be **pivotal** / .../ It means realising **once and for all** that Britain **does not have to choose between being strong** with the US, or **strong** with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain **can be both**. Indeed, that Britain **must be both**; that we are **stronger with the US** because of our **strength** in Europe; that we are **stronger in Europe** because of our **strength with the US**. When I launched recently the debate on a **new role for Europe** in defence, there was an instant rush to judgement in some parts that this would lead to a weakening of the transatlantic alliance. On the contrary, this has been welcomed in the US, by the Administration and others / .../ Britain's relationship with the US **has been fundamental to our foreign policy throughout this century**. Twice the US have come to our help to preserve democracy and freedom in Europe. We battled together throughout the Cold War. **We have stood shoulder to shoulder in NATO** / .../ **It is right for us to be close** and for that relationship to work for the fundamental principles we both believe in. But to say that does not for one second negate the importance of Britain being a strong and leading player in Europe / .../ We are in the European Union because it is **the right place to be**."*

(Tony Blair, speech "Britain's Role in the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance" at a luncheon to mark the 150th anniversary of the Associated Press, London, 15th December, 1998)

In the speech he made at NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, Blair explained his motives behind St Malo declaration:

*"[US engagement] will remain **essential** in dealing with future wars and other profound challenges to security and stability on our continent [Europe] / .../ The initiative I launched last autumn on European defence is aimed at giving greater credibility to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. **Far from weakening NATO** this is **an essential complement to the Transatlantic Alliance**. We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard. The European Union **should be able to take on** some security tasks on our own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own / .../ **To strengthen NATO and to make European defence a reality, we Europeans need to restructure our defence capabilities** / .../ But let me assure you of this: European defence is **not about new institutional fixes**. It is about **new capabilities**, both military and diplomatic. The declaration which President Jacques Chirac and I issued at St Malo was the first step to defining the new approach. We decided that we should go beyond the Berlin arrangements agreed by NATO in 1996 to give Europe a genuine capacity to act, and act quickly, in cases where the Alliance as a whole is not militarily engaged /.../ I want our Alliance as a whole to give support to these European developments. I look to our Summit in Washington to endorse some important next steps. It would be **foolish** and wasteful for Europe to **duplicate the tried and tested military structures** in which we **already play a full part in the Alliance**. We should use what we have in the Alliance."*

*But those **structures** and assets need to be **more readily** available for European led operations and we need to be able to rely on them being available."*

(Tony Blair, speech " NATO, Europe, Our Future Security," NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC, 8th March 1999)

One month later that year, during one of the most difficult periods for NATO, Blair made a major speech in Chicago.<sup>82</sup> It was one of the best analyses of the implication of global interdependence and of case for liberal interventionism in defence of civilised standards. He outlined his philosophy justifying military intervention in sovereign countries on humanitarian grounds, which later underpinned the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. And he did not forget to mention that:

*"For far too long British ambivalence to Europe has made us irrelevant in Europe, and consequently of less **importance** to the United States. **We have finally done away with the false proposition that we must choose between two diverging paths - the Transatlantic relationship or Europe**. For the first time in the last three decades we have a government that is both **pro-Europe and pro-American**. I firmly believe that it is in **Britain's interest**, but it is also in the interests of the US and of Europe."*

(Tony Blair, Doctrine of the International Community, Chicago, 24th April 1999)

In the speech at a ceremony to receive the Charlemagne Prize, Aachen, Germany the PM made a note on compatibility of attitudes:

***"To be pro-British you do not have to be anti-European."***

(Tony Blair, New Challenge for Europe, Aachen, 20th May 1999)

Further remarks on European defence cooperation from the Blair's point of view:

*"Britain will **never put at risk** NATO, the foundation of our security.. **CLOSING THE DOOR on Europe is against the British national interest** / .../ It [European defence cooperation] is now the policy of the EU shaped in part by Britain and as a result, shaped in a way NATO applauded."*

(Tony Blair, the PM speech "Making the case for Britain in Europe", London Business School, 27th July 1999)

One year later, after St Malo Declaration, Blair used the bridge metaphor at Party Conference speech:

*"There is **no choice** between Europe and America. **Britain is stronger with the US today because we are strong in Europe. Britain has the potential to be the BRIDGE***

---

<sup>82</sup> According to Seldon, it was the most important speech of his premiership (2007: 645).

*between Europe and America and for the 21st century the narrow-minded isolationism of right-wing Tories should not block **our path** to fulfilling it."*

(Tony Blair, Leader's speech, Bournemouth 28th September 1999)

In the "*Britain in Europe*" speech which launched the Government's pro-European campaign at Blair will concentrated mainly on the merits of European Union membership, though he mentioned the US as well:

*"We are told that Europe is bad for the British economy. That being part of Europe means abandoning **our allies in the USA**... **Britain is stronger with the US by reason of being in Europe**. Go to the US. Deal, as I have, over the past two years, with issues of trade and investment, war and peace, with **our US allies**. **They value us in our own right**. Of course they do. But they value us even more as **people who have influence in Europe** who can talk to **key European allies** and who **are respected both in the US and in Europe**. Likewise, **we are stronger in Europe if strong with the US**. **Stronger together. Influential with both**. And a **BRIDGE** between the two... **We** can also help lead debates about European defence / .../ And we make this case, not because **we are pro-Europe** - though I believe in the ideal of **European partnership**. We make it because we are pro-Britain. **To be part of Europe is in the British national interest**. So far from submerging our identity as a nation in some Eurosceptic parody of a Federal super-state, we believe that by **being part of Europe**, we **advance** our own self-interest as the British nation / .../ working with **others is a sign of strength not weakness** / .../ I believed Britain's destiny was with Europe then. I believe it now. "*

(Tony Blair, "Britain in Europe" speech, London, 14th October 1999)

Blair speaks of his shock at the terrorist attacks on the US and pledges Britain will stand shoulder to shoulder with the US<sup>83</sup>:

*"[T]his mass terrorism is the new evil in our world. The people who perpetrate it have no regard whatever for the sanctity or value of human life, and **we the democracies of the world**, must come together to defeat it and eradicate it. This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. **We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends** in this hour of tragedy, and **we**, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world."*

(Tony Blair, "September 11 attacks: PM's statement", 11th September 2001)

---

<sup>83</sup> On Blair's reaction to terrorist attacks, British historian and biographer said that: "No fewer than 67 Britons died on that day, and Blair showed a side of his personality that had been impossible to discern before: Churchillian leadership. With his announcement that Britain would stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the United States, and backing that up with sending large numbers of British troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq, he carved a place for himself in the first rank of British premiers since 1900. Blair proved himself an exemplary war leader" (BBC News (2007b)).

One of Party Conference speeches Blair traditionally mentioned the Britain's links to the US and Europe:

*"Our friendship with America is a strength. So is our membership of Europe. We should make the most of **both**."*

(Tony Blair, Leader's speech, Blackpool, 1st October 2002)

Two months before sending British troops to Iraq, Blair was clear about the role for Britain when referring to the US and Europe :

*"/ .../ Here's where Britain's place lies. We can only play a part in helping this - to suggest more would be grandiose and absurd - but it is an important part. **Our very strengths, our history** equip us to play a role as a **unifier** around a consensus for achieving both our goals and those of the wider world. / .../ [W]e should remain **the closest ally of the US**, and as allies **influence them** to continue broadening their agenda. **We are the ally of the US** not because they are **powerful**, but because **we share their values**. I am not surprised by **Anti-Americanism**; but it is a **foolish indulgence**. For all their faults and all nations have them, **the US are a force for good**; **they have liberal and democratic traditions** of which any nation can be proud. / .../ The price of **British influence** is not, as some would have it, that we have, obediently, to do what **the US** asks. I would never commit British troops to a war I thought was wrong or unnecessary. Where we disagree, as over Kyoto, we disagree. But the price of influence is that **we do not leave the US to face the tricky issues alone**. By tricky, I mean the ones which people wish weren't there, don't want to deal with, and, if I can put it a little pejoratively, know the US should confront, but want the luxury of criticising them for it. So if **the US act alone, they are unilateralist**; but if they want allies, people shuffle to the back. International terrorism is one such issue. / .../ **Britain must be at the centre of Europe**. /.../ There is **no greater error** in international politics than to believe that **strong in Europe means weaker with the US**. The roles **reinforce** one another... **We can help to be a BRIDGE between the US and Europe**. / .../ **Europe should partner the US not be its rival** / .../ **We are the ally of the US** not because they are **powerful**, but because **we share their values**."*

(Tony Blair, speech to Foreign Office Conference in London, 7th January 2003)

When delivering a speech to the US Congress, Blair made a sharp contrast between the nineteenth-century balance of power to today's US-UK partnership:

*"There is no more dangerous theory in international politics than that we need to **balance the power** of America with other competitive powers; different poles around which nations gather. Such a theory may have made sense in 19th-Century Europe. It was perforce the position in the Cold War. Today, it is **an anachronism to be discarded** like traditional theories of security. And it is **dangerous** because it is not rivalry, but **partnership we need**; a common will and a **shared purpose** in the face of a **common threat**. And I believe **any alliance must start with America and Europe**. **If Europe and America are together, the others will work with us**. / .../ You know, people ask me after*

*the past months when, let's say, things were a trifle strained in Europe: "Why do you persist in wanting Britain at the centre of Europe?" And I say: "Well, maybe if the UK were a group of islands 20 miles off Manhattan, I might feel differently. But actually, we're 20 miles off Calais and joined by a tunnel."*

(Tony Blair, Speech to the US Congress, Washington, DC 17th July 2003<sup>84</sup>)

The controversial 'chocolate summit' proposal by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg (29th April 2003) to set up an EU operational HQ provoked such sharp reactions from the Atlanticist side of the spectrum who feared about duplication and undermining of NATO. A day before this mini-summit, Blair on the press conference reassured that:

*"We will wait and see what comes out of it, but we won't accept, and neither will the rest of Europe, accept anything that either undermines NATO, or conflicts with the basic principles of European defence that we have set out. And on the contrary, European defence was already an issue. What we have done is ensure that Britain does not have an empty chair in that debate, that it is there making sure that European defence develops in a way that is compatible with NATO / .../ Now I think it is perfectly possible for Europe to become more powerful, but as an ally and partner of the United States of America /.../ And let me make it clear to you, France remains an important ally for the United Kingdom... France and Britain should work together, but I think it is important that we come to a proper understanding within Europe of what our relationship with America is / .../ And my fear is that if we don't deal with the world on the basis of a partnership between Europe and America, then we will in a sense put back into the world the divisions that we wanted to get rid of when the Cold War finished / .../ in terms of our values, the values of Europe and America are the same."*

(Tony Blair, PM's monthly Downing Street Press Conference, 28th April 2003)

Later that year, Blair's reaction after the EU Summit of Prime Ministers in Brussels was resolute:

*"We need of course strong European defence, but nothing whatever must put at risk our essential defence guarantees within NATO."*

[Question: Is there an axis, and have they managing to woo you away from President Bush on the issue of defence?]

---

<sup>84</sup> This was the first speech given to Congress by a British prime minister since Margaret Thatcher in 1985. Blair became the first Briton since Winston Churchill to be awarded a Congressional Gold Medal by the United States Congress for being "a staunch and steadfast ally of the United States of America." He was also awarded an Ellis Island Medal of Honor for his support of the United States after 9/11—the first non-American to receive the honour. (Speech Archive, <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=285>)



[Tony Blair] " *Let me make one thing very clear to you. I will never put at risk NATO, and I think in the last year it would be impossible to accuse me of being anything other than a staunch ally and friend of the United States. But I believe that Britain has to be strong in Europe and strong with America, and there are people who want to pull me away from Europe, and people who want to pull me away from America. The position under my Prime Ministership will be that we remain strong with both. That's where Britain should be in the 21st century, strong European power, strong as allies with the United States of America. And I don't think there's any inconsistency between the two at all, and I also believe that most sensible people realise the problems of the world are easier to sort out if Europe and America work together and Britain can play a part in making sure, particularly after the divisions in the international community, that we work together.*"

(Tony Blair, Doorstep interview in Brussels, 17th October 2003)

The speech to the European Parliament on 23rd June 2005 marked the start of the UK's six-month European Union presidency. Blair said the EU faces a leadership crisis and proposed a bold new vision for the EU:

"*We should be agreeing practical measures to **enhance** European defence capability, be prepared to take on more missions of peacekeeping and enforcement, develop the capability, **with** NATO or where NATO does **not want to be engaged** outside it, to be able to intervene **quickly** and **effectively** in support of conflict resolution. Look at the numbers in European armies today and our expenditure. Do they really answer the strategic needs of today /.../ my point is very simple. A strong Europe would be an active player in foreign policy, a good partner of course to the US but also capable of demonstrating its own capacity to shape and move the world forward.*"

(Tony Blair's speech to the European Parliament, 23rd June 2005)

During Blair's difficult period when facing criticism at home because supporting the conduct of US foreign policy:

"*We remain strong partners in Europe. Britain should also remain **the strongest ally of the United States**. I know there's a bit of us that would like me to do a Hugh Grant in Love Actually and tell America where to get off. But the difference between a good film and real life is that in real life there's the next day, the next year, the next lifetime to contemplate the ruinous consequences of easy applause.*"

(Tony Blair, Leader's speech, Brighton, 27th September 2005)

In one of his last speeches as the PM, Blair recapitulated most of his principal statements:

*".../ to principal consideration of Britain's foreign policy over the past 10 years. Global challenges can only be met by **global alliances**. A nation like Britain has **no prospect** - none - in the world as it is developing today, of **pursuing its national interest except in close concert with others**. That is why, no matter how tough the test, and these past years since 9/11 have shown how tough it can be - **the alliances Britain has with America and within Europe, must remain the cornerstones of our policy**. Do not misunderstand me. **I support the US willingly. I believe in the EU for reasons of principle** / .../ **We may agree or disagree with the US position on some or all of these issues. But none of these vital British concerns can be addressed, let alone solved, without America /... / We need America. That is a fact /.../ might and any president who didn't do it, wasn't going to be president for lon / .../ **When I said, after 9/11 that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with America, I said it because I believed it. But I also thought it was profoundly in Britain's interests /.../ And the truth is, for Britain, it is always right for us to keep our partnership with America strong./.../ **Europe gives us weight and strength.** / .../ based on alliances with nations that share our values.. our partnership with America and **our membership of the EU are precisely suited to Britain**. For that reason, it would be insane - yes I would put it as strongly as that - **for us to give up either relationship**. For that reason **anti-Americanism or Euroscepticism** are not merely foolish they **are the surest route to the destruction of our true national interest** /.../ When people say: yes, but we want a "British" foreign policy, I say: of course we do, but **in today's world a foreign policy based on strong alliances is the only "British" policy which works.** "*****

(Tony Blair, speech on foreign policy at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, 13th November 2006)

In his last speech delivered as the LAB party leader, he confessed:

*"Yes it's **hard** sometimes to be America's strongest ally. Yes, Europe can be a **political headache** for a **proud sovereign nation** like Britain. But believe me there are **no half-hearted allies of America today and no semi-detached partners in Europe**."*

(Tony Blair, Valedictory Address to the Labour Party Conference, Manchester, 26th September 2006)

How important the US was to Blair is obvious as he mentioned this close Britain's ally even in his PM resignation speech:

*"I decided **we should stand shoulder to shoulder with our oldest ally**. I did so out of belief. So Afghanistan and then Iraq."*

(Tony Blair, Resignation speech, Sedgefield, 10th May 2007)

Despite the turbulent sequence of international events, Blair remained coherent in his statements. Blair's strategy was meant to bring more cooperation between the US and Europe. His rhetoric on Europe and the US was based on stressing the importance of both Alliances and their non-excluding character for British foreign policy, and the unique position of Britain between two of them. This leads me to the fact that in respect to its relationships to both America and Europe, there were many predicates attributed to Britain itself as well: Britain being a *true friend*, *wholehearted friend*, *not a semi-detached friend*, *strongest ally*, and most importantly: Britain being the *bridge* between America and Europe. The bridge metaphor was attractive and serving its purpose because it provided vital linkage to the traditionally stronger Anglo-American circle. In addition, it would be damaging for Britain to stand outside of the European circle any longer. This is why he used another metaphorical expression: "*Britain must be at the heart of Europe*," where heart is meant to represent the most important part/ the centre of a living organism (discussed already in the previous chapter). When saying "*Britain is stronger with the US by reason of being in Europe*," Blair also employed the *mediator* approach<sup>85</sup> as he considered the cooperation of both of these two circles of British foreign policy as essential for pursuing British national interest. According to Blair, there is no choice for him - he called this possibility as "*false proposition that we must choose between two diverging paths*" – and to underscore his conviction he pronounced that: "*Closing the door on Europe is against the British national interest*." A door usually represents a path to opportunities thus this metaphor relates to the statement that it is beneficial for Britain to be a part of Europe.

National interest was always present in the background of the Blair's speeches. His vision of Britain's national interest was far from narrow. Being a strong rhetorical weapon, Blair used the term "national interest" several times explicitly to stress and eloquently articulate the importance of Britain's engagement in the EU and European defence while being firmly embedded into NATO, the *cornerstone* of British security. As to the development of stronger European defence capabilities, Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College in London, depicted Blair's effort quite precisely: "*Blair however was not trying to create a European defence entity as an alternative to the US or NATO but more to insure against the US failing to meet its obligations to European security*" (2007: 625). Blair was able to keep stressing the

---

<sup>85</sup> Winston Churchill's doctrine of the Three Circles was already guided by this "mediator" approach (Deighton 1995)

importance of the Atlantic relationship, avoiding any suggestion that a definitive choice had to be made between NATO and the EU. When talking about the possibility of giving up either of relations, Blair used hyperbole "would be *insane*", and to put even more emphasis on his statement, he added "*not in the British interest.*" In almost every important speech he delivered in front of different audiences - NATO, the EU, the US, and last but not least at home in Britain - he did not forget to repeat his belief that Britain was stronger in the EU and defended the compatibility of European defence with the Transatlantic Alliance. When talking about security and defence, Blair never forgot to stress the importance of close cooperation between the US and Europe. In his statements he was driven by seeking effectivity and influential outcome. But eventually, Blair's Britain being the *bridge* and *mediator* between two circles, stood *shoulder to shoulder* with its *closest, oldest and most important ally and friend*, the US, despite the resulting unpopularity at home and in Europe. This in no way undermined the intent of being engaged in Europe. When looking closely at Blair's statements during his whole premiership in respect to the ESDP, his arguments remained unchanged: "*stronger EU defence capabilities in harmony with NATO.*"

In sum, there were several conceptual metaphors and metaphorical schemes found in Blair's speech but the most important were the mediator, the bridge, heart and cornerstone. In addition, most of his speeches on the US and Europe respectively contained following, regularly reappearing and very similar:

- predicates: heart, belief, values, weight, strength; believe, support; alliance, partnership, friendship;
- binary oppositions: a partnership between Europe and America vs. divisions in the world; unilateralism/ isolationism vs international alliances;
- relational distinctions: Britain **in** Europe vs. Britain **with** America.

If applying Chilton's security conceptual metaphors associated with British security and defence relating to the US and Europe, one can find following examples:

- LINK: relationship, bridge, strong alliance, partnership, cornerstone
- PERSON: friends, allies, partners
- PATH: reformed, more efficient Europe, secure world
- FORCE: powerful nation, strength, weight

## CONCLUSION

The objective of my thesis was to examine on the discursive level the United Kingdom's relationship to both Europe and America during the ten years of Tony Blair's premiership. I have attempted to analyse British public political discourse on security and defence by applying critical discourse analysis within the framework of the procedural concept of national interest in order to determine whether the creation and further development of the ESDP was in the British national interest and whether it was at the same time compatible with the close UK-US relationship.

The first chapter was devoted to the conceptualisation of British foreign policy, namely the three-circle policy pronounced by Winston Churchill after the Second World War and foreign policy of the Conservative Government, concluding on the strong Atlanticism and rather reserved positions regarding Europe. The next chapter was meant as a brief portrait of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his ten years in office, focusing on his foreign policy towards the US and Europe and assessing his influence on the world affairs. The third chapter, divided into three sections, presented the methodological background of this work. The first part was dedicated to the usage of the term "national interest" in the international relations, the second part went on to introduce a new concept of national interest which was elaborated by Kratochvíl (2010a), and the last section paid attention to methods of critical discourse analysis.

The fourth chapter operationalised the concept of national interest in the British public political discourse on security and defence which was formed by three main political parties: Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats. The procedural character of this particular national interest concept required three criteria to be examined – relevance, consensus and external acceptability - in order to determine whether the policy was taken seriously, enjoyed broad support at home, and was accepted by key partners of the state. The purpose of this analytical chapter was to look for answers to the research questions. After having analysed all three criteria applied on the British political discourse, this thesis arrives at the conclusion that for Britain it was essential to keep NATO at the centre of its security, to maintain the close relationship with the US and to improve Britain's position in Europe. The core attitudes of the British political class remained unchanged in the respected period. In addition, the research suggests that the term *special relationship* was used only very rarely and did not significantly featured in the British political discourse regarding

the description of the continuing importance of the UK-US relationship. As to the relevance, ever since the introduction of the ESDP idea, it has become an integral part of UK's security policy which was demonstrated in annual departmental reports of FCO and MOD. Moreover, there was an urgent need to adjust existing defence structures and capabilities to the changing security environment and new emerging security threats. At first sight, the consensus on the ESDP was difficult to see. While it is true that LIBDEM had very similar rhetoric to LAB one, this cannot be said about CON, mainly due to their traditional refusal of any further EU integration. Despite the fact that CON kept their rather rhetorically hostile position towards the EU, the analysis proved that in fact they supported the EU security defence policy as it was presented by Blair, i.e. not duplicating NATO. As to the last criterion, both American and European key partners welcomed Britain's leadership in building European defence capabilities. Taken together, the initiative of a stronger military role for Europe was in the British national interest because it was compatible with Transatlantic structures, the cornerstone of British security, which appeared to be a central condition of the Government's opposition.

The fifth and final chapter looked closer at Blair's legitimization strategy in respect to security and defence. Predicate and metaphor analysis of Blair's speeches unveiled that the British Prime Minister, considered as the initiator of a more powerful EU in the role of a military actor, used the bridge and mediator metaphor in order to legitimise the Government's defence and security policy and to secure the support of his political counterparts. Blair's rhetoric on Europe and Anglo-America can be characterised as full of enthusiasm and vision of close cooperation between them in security and defence area which he saw as crucial for Britain's security itself. Overwhelmingly positive approach of Blair's government appeared as a substantial change after the years of Conservative rule: *"Stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe... we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US."* Blair chose security and defence domain which apparently lacked leadership in Europe and was perceived as desperately underdeveloped concerning the widening gap between American and European capabilities and the need to rebalance links between the two parts of the transatlantic alliance. Taking a leading role in the European defence initiative was in the British national interest as it was meant to strengthen the British position in Europe and at the same time to enhance British relationship with the US. If using the vocabulary of three-circle policy, the European circle was being strengthened

during Blair's premiership. Blair was consistent in his statements to keep the transatlantic partnership at the centre of British security through a working relationship with the United States, and at the same time avoiding any suggestion that a definitive choice had to be made between NATO and the EU. The cooperation between Europe and the US was illustrated as vital for the British national interest. That is why Blair placed Britain into the position of *bridge* to connect the two shores of the Atlantic ocean, which supported the sense of British exceptionalism as well. Defence and security policy is an exemplary case of how these two circles of British foreign policy can overlap in a complementary way and Britain in the position of the mediator can be actively engaged in both Europe and America.

I believe that my research from "the national interest point of view" was useful in both contentual and methodological aspect, and that the innovative approach towards the national interest conceptualisation has provided a valuable complementary theoretical outcome for this particular topic.

The very last point concerns possible further research. As this thesis was deliberately limited to the analysis of public political discourse, it would be interesting to include into the analysis of the British national interest discourses on other levels as well. Further research could focus also on the actual outcome of Blair's defence and security policy, namely the deployment of British Armed Forces and the structure of defence expenditures in order to compare the extent of Britain's engagement in both NATO and the ESDP. It would be also interesting to analyse and then compare the British national interest under the unusual coalition government in today's Britain.

## SUMMARY

This master's thesis analyses the national interest of the United Kingdom in security and defence during the premiership of Tony Blair from 1997 to 2007. In the first chapter, I briefly introduced foreign policy of British governments since the end of the Cold War, focusing first on the Conservative Government under Thatcher and Major and then moving to Tony Blair's Labour Government in order to contrast their different approaches to British foreign policy. The next chapter devoted to the personage of Tony Blair was included into this thesis because of the impact he has made on the British politics and the international scene as well. The third chapter explained the methodological background of the thesis – critical discourse analysis – and the overall framework of the research: procedural concept of national interest. In the fourth chapter I proceeded to the operationalisation of this particular national interest concept. The research consisted in applying three criteria on the British public political discourse on security and defence of three main political parties: Conservative party, Liberal Democrats and Labour party. The fifth chapter was dedicated to critical discourse analysis of speeches made by the PM Tony Blair in order to unveil consistency of his arguments and his illustration of Britain's position between Europe and the US. This thesis arrives at the conclusion that for Britain it was essential to keep NATO at the centre of its security, to maintain the close relationship with the US and to improve the Britain's position in Europe. The core attitudes of the British political class remained unchanged in the respected period. Thus, the Blair's initiative of a stronger military role for Europe was in the British national interest because it was presented as compatible with Transatlantic structures - the cornerstone of British security - which appeared to be a central condition of the British opposition. As to the legitimisation strategy, in his speeches Blair placed Britain into the position of the bridge and mediator between two shores of the Atlantic ocean and therefore emphasised the unique position of Britain. The term *special relationship* was used only very rarely and did not featured significantly in the British political discourse with regard to the illustration of the continuing importance of the close UK-US relationship.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Publications

### Non-periodical literature

- Burchill, Scott (2005). *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*. London: Palgrave.
- Beer, Francis; Hariman Robert (1996): "Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations," in *Post-realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by F. Beer and R. Hariman. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Clarke, Michael (2007). "Foreign Policy," in *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*, edited by A. Seldon. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chilton, Paul (1996). *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common European Home*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Deighton, Anne (1995). "Britain and the Three Interlocking Circles," in *Europe 1945-1990: The End of an Era?*, edited by A. Varsori. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Drulák, Petr (2010). "Introduction: How to Explore National Interest and Why," in *The Quest for the National Interest. A Methodological Reflection on Czech Foreign Policy*, edited by P. Drulák and M. Braun. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.
- Drulák, Petr *et al.* (2008). *Jak zkoumat politiku. Kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích*. Praha: Portál.
- Dumbrell, John (2001). *A Special Relationship. Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Freedman, Lawrence (2007). "Defence," in *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*, edited by A. Seldon. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamble, Andrew (2003). *Between Europe and America. The Future of British Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Garton Ash, Timothy (2007). "Commentary," in *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*, edited by A. Seldon. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gowland, David; Turner, Arthur; Wright, Alex (2010). *Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Jackson, Robert; Sørensen, Georg (2007). *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kratochvíl, Petr (2010a). "National Interest and its Legitimacy: An Attempt at a New Approach," in *The Quest for the National Interest. A Methodological Reflection on Czech Foreign Policy*, edited by P. Drulák and M. Braun. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.

- Lakoff, George; Johnson, Mark (1980). *Metaphors We Live by*. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.
- Mérand, Frédéric (2008). *European Defence Policy. Beyond The Nation State*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Stuart, Douglas T., eds. (2006). *U.S. – UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*. Strategic Studies Institute. U. S. Army War College.  
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=633>  
 [Last Accessed 29 October 2011].
- Milliken, Jennifer (1996). "Metaphors of prestige and reputation in American foreign policy and American realism," in *Post-realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by F. Beer and R. Hariman. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Milliken, Jennifer (2001). "Discourse Study: Bringing Rigor to Critical Theory," in *Constructing international relations: the next generation*, edited by K. M. Fierke, K. E. Jørgensen. New York: Sharpe.
- Seldon, Anthony (2005). *Blair*. London: Free Press.
- Seldon, Anthony (2007). "The Net Blair effect, 1994-2007," in *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*, edited by A. Seldon. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sloan, Stanley R. (2010). *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama*. 1st ed. New York: Continuum.
- Sloan, Stanley R. (1985). *NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
- Stephens, Philip (2007). "Commentary" in: *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*, edited by A. Seldon. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Toolan, Michael J., ed. (2002). *Critical Discourse Analysis. Critical Concepts in Linguistics*. New York: Routledge.
- Watts, Duncan; Pilkington, Colin (2005). *Britain in the European Union today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

## **Periodical literature**

- Calabrese, John (2001). "The United States, Great Britain, and the Middle East: How Special the Relationship?" *Mediterranean Quarterly*. Summer: 58 – 84.
- Danchev, Alex (2007). "Tony Blair's Vietnam: The Iraq War and the 'special relationship' in historical perspective," *Review of International Studies*. 33: 189–203.

- Deighton, Anne (2002). "Review of 'The Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community. Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defense, 1950-55,' and 'A Special Relationship. Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After,'" *Journal of Cold War Studies*. 4(4): 118-120.
- Donnelly, Faye (2008). "Shifts in International Relations and US Foreign Policy," *Paper Presented at ISA Annual Conference in San Francisco*: 26h – 29th, March 2008.
- Dumbrell, John (2009). "The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 11: 64–78.
- Dunn, David H. (2008). "The double interregnum: UK–US relations beyond Blair and Bush," *International Affairs*. 84(6): 1131–1143.
- Edelman, Eric (2010). "A Special Relationship in Jeopardy," *The American Interest*. 5(6): 25-34.
- Élie, Jerome B. (2005). "Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt To Understand The Continuity Of The Special Relationship," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. 3: 63-83.
- Ellner, Andrea (2005). "The European Security Strategy: Multilateral Security with Teeth," *Defence & Security Analysis*. 21(3): 223-242.
- Fierke, Karin M. (2002). "Links Accross the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly*. 46: 331–354.
- Forsberg, Tuomas (2007). "Explaining the Emergence of the ESDP: Setting the Research Agenda." *Paper Prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Standing Group for International Relations (SGIR) Conference, Turin, September 12-15, 2007*.
- Howorth, Jolyon (2000). "Britain, France, and the European Defence Initiative," *Survival*. 42(2): 33-55.
- Kassimeris, Christos (2006). "The Impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy on the 'Special Relationship' Between Britain and the U.S.A.," *Journal of Business & Society*. 19(1/2): 91-103.
- Kimball, Warren (2005). "The 'Special' Anglo-American Special Relationship: A Fatter, Larger Underwater Cable," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. 3: 1-5.
- Kramer, Steven P. (2003): "Blair's Britain after Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*. 82(4): 90-104.
- Kratochvíl, Petr (2010b). "Co je to národní zájem?" *Mezinárodní politika*. 5: 4-7.
- Lunn, John; Miller, Vaughne; Smith, Ben (2008). "British foreign policy since 1997," *International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library Research paper*

08/56, 23 June 2008. [www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP08-56.pdf](http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP08-56.pdf) [Last Accessed 29 October 2011].

- Lloyd, John (2008). "The Special Relationship," *Public Policy Research*. 15: 142-147.
- Marsh, Steve; Baylis, John (2006). "The Anglo-American 'Special Relationship': The Lazarus of International Relations," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*. 17(1): 173–211.
- Milliken, Jennifer (1999). "The Study of Discourse in Internaitonal Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," in: *European Journal of International Relations*. 5: 225-254.
- Porter, Patrick (2010). "Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special relationship," *International Affairs*. 86(2): 355–375.
- Raymond, Ray (2010). "The U.S.- UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lessons of the Past," *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*. 21(2/3): 259-270.
- Reynolds, David (1988). "Britain and the New Europe: The Search for Identity Since 1940," *The Historical Journal*. 31(1): 223 – 239.
- Rutten, Maartje, ed. (2001). "From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents," *Chaillot Paper #47*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union.
- Wallace, William – Phillips, Christopher (2009). "Reassessing the special relationship," *International Affairs*. 85(2): 263–284.
- Watanabe, Lisa, (2005). "The ESDP: Between Estrangement and a New Partnership in Transatlantic Security Relations," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 13 (1): 5-20

## Official Documents & Reports

- Conservative Party (1997). *You can only be sure with the Conservatives*. General Election Manifesto. <http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1997/1997-conservative-manifesto.shtml> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Conservative Party (2001). *Time for Common Sense*. General Election Manifesto. <http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1997/1997-conservative-manifesto.shtml> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Conservative Party (2005). *It's Time For Action/The British Dream*. General Election Manifesto. <http://www.conservatives.com/pdf/manifesto-uk-2005.pdf> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1999). Departmental report and Resource Accounts 1998/1999.

- <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029395465>  
[Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2000). Departmental report 1999/2000.  
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front%3Fpagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029395456> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2001). Departmental report 2000/2001.  
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029395447>  
[Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2002). Departmental report 2001/2002.  
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1023722709591>  
[Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2003). Departmental report 2002/2003.  
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1051783486185>  
[Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2004). Departmental report 2003/2004.  
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/publications1/annual-reports/departmental-report/archive/> [Last Accessed 29 February 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2005). Departmental report 2004/2005.  
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/publications1/annual-reports/departmental-report/archive/> [Last Accessed 29 February 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2006). Departmental report 2005/2006.  
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/publications1/annual-reports/departmental-report/archive/> [Last Accessed 09 February 2012].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2007). Departmental report 2006/2007.  
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/publications1/annual-reports/departmental-report/archive/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].
- House of Commons (1998a). Hansard, Foreign Affairs and Defence, HC Deb 27 November 1998 vol 321 cc439-512.  
[http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/nov/27/foreign-affairs-and-defence#S6CV0321P0\\_19981127\\_HOC\\_61](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/nov/27/foreign-affairs-and-defence#S6CV0321P0_19981127_HOC_61) [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- House of Commons (1998b). Hansard, European Defence Review, HC Deb 07 December 1998 vol 322 cc8-11.

- [http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/dec/07/european-defence-review#S6CV0322P0\\_19981207\\_HOC\\_62](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/dec/07/european-defence-review#S6CV0322P0_19981207_HOC_62) [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- House of Commons (1999). Hansard, Helsinki European Council, HC Deb 13 December 1999 vol 341 cc21-40.  
[http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written\\_answers/1999/dec/06/st-malo-declaration#S6CV0340P0\\_19991206\\_CWA\\_41](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1999/dec/06/st-malo-declaration#S6CV0340P0_19991206_CWA_41) [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- Labour Party (1997). *New Labour because Britain deserves better*. Election Manifesto <http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Labour Party (2001). *Ambitions for Britain*. General Election Manifesto <http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/2001/2001-labour-manifesto.shtml> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Labour Party (2005). *Britain forward not back*. General Election Manifesto. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13\\_04\\_05\\_labour\\_manifesto.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13_04_05_labour_manifesto.pdf) [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Liberal Democrats.(1997). *Make the difference*. General Election Manifesto. <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/e97/man/ld97man.htm> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Liberal Democrats.(2001). *Freedom, Justice, Honesty*. General Election Manifesto. <http://www.libdemmanifesto.com/2001/2001-liberal-manifesto.shtml> [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Liberal Democrats.(2005). *The REAL Alternative*. General Election Manifesto. [http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/LD\\_uk\\_manifesto.pdf](http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/LD_uk_manifesto.pdf) [Last Accessed 29 March 2012].
- Ministry of Defence (1998). Strategic Defence Review. [http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998\\_complete.pdf](http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf) [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].
- Ministry of Defence (2001). Performance Report 2000/2001. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0001/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].
- Ministry of Defence (2002a). Strategic Defence Review – A New Chapter. [http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/79542E9C-1104-4AFA-9A4D-8520F35C5C93/0/sdr\\_a\\_new\\_chapter\\_cm5566\\_vol1.pdf](http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/79542E9C-1104-4AFA-9A4D-8520F35C5C93/0/sdr_a_new_chapter_cm5566_vol1.pdf) [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].
- Ministry of Defence (2002b). Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts and Performance Report 2001/02.

<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0102/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

Ministry of Defence (2003). Annual Report and Accounts 2002/2003. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0203/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

Ministry of Defence (2004). Annual Report and Accounts 2003/2004. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0304/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

Ministry of Defence (2005). Annual Report and Accounts 2004/2005. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0405/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

Ministry of Defence (2006). Annual Report and Accounts 2005/2006. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0506/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

Ministry of Defence (2007). Annual Report and Accounts 2006/2007. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/MODAnnualReports0607/> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

Joint Declaration on European Defence. Saint-Malo: Franco-British summit, 4 December 1998. <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> [Last Accessed 06 February 2012].

## **Internet and other sources**

BBC News (1998a). *Europe Analysis: Britain tests the Franco-German axis*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/225447.stm>. [Last Accessed 27 August 2011].

BBC News (1998b). *UK Politics Anglo-French military pact*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/227598.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/227598.stm). [Last Accessed 31 August 2011].

BBC News (2003a). *Mandela condemns US stance on Iraq*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2710181.stm>. [Last Accessed 06 January 2012].

BBC News (2003b). *Blair battles "poodle" jibes*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/2721513.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2721513.stm). [Last Accessed 06 January 2012].

- BBC News (2005). *Results & Constituencies*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/vote2001/results\\_constituencies/default.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/vote2001/results_constituencies/default.stm). [Last Accessed 30 April 2012].
- BBC News (2007a). *Assessing Blair's foreign policy*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/6601097.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6601097.stm). [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- BBC News (2007b). *How will history judge Blair?*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/6636091.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6636091.stm). [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- BBC News (2007c). *The Tony Blair story*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/6506365.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6506365.stm). [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- BBC News (2007d). *The message in Blair's speech*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/6642819.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6642819.stm). [Last Accessed 31 August 2011].
- BBC News (2008). *The Blair years 1997-2007*. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in\\_depth/uk\\_politics/2007/blair\\_years/default.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2007/blair_years/default.stm). [Last Accessed 06 March 2012].
- BBC News (2009). *US-UK 'special relationship' not so special any more*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8382384.stm>. [Last Accessed 31 August 2011].
- The Guardian (2002). *Blair has not been a poodle, but poodleism still beckons*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/14/iraq.foreignpolicy>. [Last Accessed 06].
- The Guardian (2003). *Nato bid to defuse EU defence row*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/21/nato.politics>. [Last Accessed 06 January 2012].
- The Washington Times (May 30, 2006). *Blair and Bush*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/30/20060530-095100-9978r/?page=all>. [Last Accessed 06 January, 2012].

## Speeches

- Albright, Madeleine (1998). "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future," *Financial Times*, 7 December, 1998, in *From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents*, edited by M. Rutten. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union.



- Churchill, Winston (1946). "Sinews of Peace Address," Fulton, Missouri, March 5. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.wyzant.com/Help/History/HPOL/churchill/> [Last Accessed 16 May, 2012].
- Robertson George (1999). Speech at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, 15 November 1999, in *From St-Malo to Nice. European defence:core documents*, edited by M. Rutten. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union.
- Talbott, Strobe, US Deputy Secretary of State (1999): "America's Stake in a Strong Europe". Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs conference on the Future of NATO in London, 7 October 1999, in *From St-Malo to Nice. European defence:core documents*, edited by M. Rutten. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union.
- Blair, Tony (1998). Press conference Pörschach 25 October 1998 in *From St-Malo to Nice. European defence:core documents*, edited by M. Rutten. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union.
- Blair, Tony (1998). "Britain's Role in the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance". London, December 15, 1998. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.european-security.com/index.php?id=958> [Last Accessed 06 January, 2012].
- Blair, Tony (1999). "Making the case for Britain in Europe." London Business School 27 July 1999. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/1999/jul/27/emu.theeuro2> [Last Accessed 06 January, 2012].
- Blair, Tony (1999). "Britain in Europe," speech Launching the Britain in Europe campaign, London, 14/10/1999. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/1999/oct/14/emu.theeuro2> [Last Accessed 06 January, 2012].
- Blair, Tony (1999). "NATO, Europe, Our Future Security," Speech at the NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, Royal United Services Institute, London, 08/03/1999
- Blair, Tony (2006). Valedictory Address to the Labour Party Conference, 26 September 2006, Manchester, United Kingdom. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/tblairfarewell.htm> [Last Accessed 06 January, 2012].
- Blair, Tony (2005). Lord Mayor's Banquet speech 14 November 2005. [ONLINE] Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/6145454.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6145454.stm) [Last Accessed 06 January, 2012].

**British Political Speech (Speech Archive)**

<http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?q=&speaker=&party=&searchRangeFrom=1997&searchRangeTo=2007>

Date	Party	Author	Title
<b>Conservative party 1997-2007:</b>			
03/10/2007	Conservative	David Cameron	Leader's speech, Blackpool 2007
04/10/2006	Conservative	David Cameron	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2006b
01/10/2006	Conservative	David Cameron	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2006a
26/06/2006	Conservative	David Cameron	"Balancing freedom and security – A modern British Bill of Rights", London 2006
06/12/2005	Conservative	David Cameron	Leadership acceptance speech, 2005
06/10/2005	Conservative	Michael Howard	Leader's speech, Blackpool 2005
05/10/2004	Conservative	Michael Howard	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2004
09/10/2003	Conservative	Iain Duncan Smith	Leader's speech, Blackpool 2003
10/10/2002	Conservative	Iain Duncan Smith	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2002
10/10/2001	Conservative	Iain Duncan Smith	Leader's speech, Blackpool 2001
05/10/2000	Conservative	William Hague	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2000
07/10/1999	Conservative	William Hague	Leader's speech, Blackpool 1999
08/10/1998	Conservative	William Hague	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 1998
07/10/1997	Conservative	John Major	Leader's speech, Blackpool 1997

**Labour party 1997-2007:**

10/05/2007	Labour	Tony Blair	Resignation speech, 2007
27/02/2007	Labour	Gordon Brown	Speech at a seminar on Britishness, London 2007
21/02/2007	Labour	Jim Murphy	"The welfare state – time for a contract?" London 2007
12/02/2007	Labour	Jim Murphy	"Welfare Reform – Challenges for the next 10 years", London 2007
26/09/2006	Labour	Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Manchester 2006
25/09/2006	Labour	Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Manchester 2006
05/09/2006	Labour	Tony Blair	"Our Nation's Future - Social Exclusion", York 2006

10/05/2006	Labour Lord Goldsmith	"UK Terrorism Legislation in an International Context", London 2006
14/01/2006	Labour Gordon Brown	Speech to the Fabian New Year Conference, London 2006
10/01/2006	Labour Tony Blair	"Respect Agenda" speech, London 2006
27/09/2005	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Brighton 2005
26/09/2005	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Brighton 2005
02/09/2005	Labour Tony Blair	"Speech on improving parenting", Watford 2005
06/05/2005	Labour Tony Blair	General election victory speech, 2005
28/09/2004	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Brighton 2004
27/09/2004	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Brighton 2004
05/03/2004	Labour Tony Blair	"Prime Minister warns of continuing global terror threat", Sedgefield 2004
04/02/2004	Labour David Lammy	"Speech on Equality and Human Rights", London 2004
06/11/2003	Labour David Lammy	"Third anniversary of the Human Rights Act", London 2003
30/09/2003	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2003
29/09/2003	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Bournemouth 2003
17/07/2003	Labour Tony Blair	Speech to the US Congress, Washington, DC 2003
01/10/2002	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Blackpool 2002
30/09/2002	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Blackpool 2002
10/09/2002	Labour Tony Blair	Speech to TUC conference, Blackpool 2002
07/04/2002	Labour Tony Blair	Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library, Crawford, 2002
02/10/2001	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Brighton 2001
01/10/2001	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Brighton 2001
08/06/2001	Labour Tony Blair	General election victory speech, 2001
29/03/2001	Labour Tony Blair	"Faith in Politics", London 2001
30/11/2000	Labour Gordon Brown	Speech at the New Deal Conference, London 2000
26/09/2000	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Brighton 2000
25/09/2000	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Brighton 2000

28/09/1999	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 1999
27/09/1999	Labour Gordon Brown	Chancellor's speech, Bournemouth 1999
24/04/1999	Labour Tony Blair	"Doctrine of the International Community"
29/09/1998	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Blackpool 1998
30/09/1997	Labour Tony Blair	Leader's speech, Brighton 1997
12/05/1997	Labour Robin Cook	"Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office", London 1997
02/05/1997	Labour Tony Blair	General election victory speech, 1997

---

**Liberal Democrats 1997-2007:**

20/09/2007	Liberal Democrat	Menzies Campbell	Leader's speech, Brighton 2007
21/09/2006	Liberal Democrat	Menzies Campbell	Leader's speech, Brighton 2006
22/09/2005	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Blackpool 2005
23/09/2004	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2004
25/09/2003	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Brighton 2003
26/09/2002	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Brighton 2002
24/09/2001	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2001
21/09/2000	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Bournemouth 2000
23/09/1999	Liberal Democrat	Charles Kennedy	Leader's speech, Harrogate 1999b
21/09/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Leader's speech, Harrogate 1999a
08/06/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the European Election Campaign Rally, London 1999
07/06/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the European Election Campaign Rally, Stockport 1999
21/05/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the European Election Campaign Rally, Nottingham 1999
18/05/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the European Election Campaign Rally, Sheffield 1999

07/03/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Leader's speech to the Spring Party Conference, Edinburgh 1999
03/02/1999	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	RSA Lecture, London 1999
31/10/1998	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Leader's speech to Northern Region Party Conference, Hartlepool 1998
24/09/1998	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Leader's speech, Brighton 1998
27/04/1998	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to local election campaign public meeting, Colne 1998
27/01/1998	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	3rd Annual "Liberal Democrat News" Lecture, London 1998
17/11/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to by-election rally, Beckenham 1997
11/11/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the CBI, Birmingham 1997
11/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the 48th Congress of Liberal International, Oxford 1997
11/09/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech at public meeting in support of "Yes for Wales" Campaign, Llanelli 1997
23/06/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to Liberal Democrat Parliamentary Candidates Association, London 1997
16/06/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Friendship Housing Group Lecture, Birmingham 1997
24/04/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	General election campaign speech, Edinburgh 1997
17/04/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	General election campaign speech on health, Cardiff 1997
04/04/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to launch general election manifesto, 1997
09/03/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Leader's speech to the Spring Party Conference, Cardiff 1997
01/03/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Leader's speech to the Scottish Party Conference, Paisley 1997
21/02/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the Liberal Democrat Business Dinner, London 1997

05/02/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the London Region Party Conference, London 1997
03/02/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to the National Children's Homes "House our Youth 2000" campaign launch, London 1997
22/01/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	Speech to Candidates Meeting, London 1997
15/01/1997	Liberal Democrat	Paddy Ashdown	2nd Annual "Liberal Democrat News" Lecture

**The National Archives Number10.gov.uk. Speech Archive 1999-2005.**  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135117/number10.gov.uk/>

**Tony Blair's speeches, statements and press conferences 1998-2005:**

Press Conference given by Blair, President Clinton and President Santer [18/5/1998]  
Statement: Tampere European Council [19/10/1999]  
Statement on the Berlin Council [29/2/1999]  
Euro Statement [23/2/1999]  
Blair, Tony: Doctrine of the International Community [24/4/1999]  
Statement on the NATO summit in Washington [26/4/1999]  
Speech to the Romanian Parliament [4/5/1999]  
New Challenge for Europe [20/5/1999]  
Britain in Europe [14/10/1999]  
Committed to Europe, Reforming Europe [23/2/2000]  
Speech by the Prime Minister to the Scottish Parliament [9/3/2000]  
Global Borrowers and Investors Forum Conference [22/6/2000]  
Global Ethics Foundation, Tubigen University, Germany [30/6/2000]  
Speech to Polish Stock Exchange [6/10/2000]  
Mansion House Speech [13/11/2000]  
The war on terrorism: Prime Minister's interview with CNN [16/9/2001]  
Prime Minister Tony Blair's interview with Al-Jazeera [9/10/2001]  
PM: coalition is 'remarkably strong' [7/11/2001]  
International Security Assistance Force [21/12/2001]  
Statement to Parliament in response to terrorist attacks in the US [14/9/2001]  
Statement to Parliament (US terror attacks) [4/10/2001]  
Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons [8/10/2001]  
Speech to the Welsh Assembly [30/10/2001]  
Prime Minister's statement to Parliament on the war on terror [14/11/2001]

Prime Minister Tony Blair after the 2001 General Election [8/6/2001]  
 September 11 attacks: Prime Minister's statement [11/9/2001]  
 September 11 attacks: Prime Minister's statement including Question and Answer session [12/9/2001]  
 Press conference: Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Schroeder [20/9/2001]  
 Door step interview: Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Chirac [20/9/2001]  
 PM's briefing to the press en route to New York [21/9/2001]  
 PM's door step interview in Brussels [24/9/2001]  
 Prime Minister: 'The cause is just' [8/11/2001]  
 Doorstep interview with the PM and Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel of Austria [16/11/2001]  
 Doorstep interview: PM and Prime Minister Guterres of Portugal [14/11/2001]  
 Press conference: PM and US Secretary of State Colin Powell [11/12/2001]  
 Statement at 10 Downing Street [25/9/2001]  
 Statement on military action in Afghanistan [7/10/2001]  
 Laeken - Prime Minister's statement to Parliament [17/12/2001]  
 The government's agenda for the future [8/2/2001]  
 Speech by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Parliament [23/2/2001]  
 Lord Mayor's Banquet [12/11/2001]  
 'Britain's role in Europe' - speech to the European Research Institute [23/11/2001]  
 PM's New Year's message [30/12/2001]  
 Interview given by the Prime Minister Tony Blair for NBC [4/4/2002]  
 PM's interview with BBC World Service [5/4/2002]  
 PM interview with BBC World Service [9/10/2002]  
 Statement on European Council in Barcelona [16/3/2002]  
 Statement on EU Seville summit [24/6/2002]  
 PM statement on EU Summit in Brussels [28/10/2002]  
 Press Conference - PM and Vice President Dick Cheney [11/3/2002]  
 Press Conference: PM and President George Bush [6/4/2002]  
 Press Conference by the Prime Minister Tony Blair (20/06/2002)  
 Press conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush [21/11/2002]  
 Press conference following the EU Council in Copenhagen [16/12/2002]  
 Doorstep interview on EU Council meeting in Copenhagen [13/12/2002]  
 PM's Statement to Parliament on NATO Summit [25/11/2002]  
 PM statement on European Council meeting [16/12/2002]  
 Prime Minister's speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library [7 April 2002]  
 PM speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet [11/11/2002]  
 PM: 'A clear course for Europe' [28/11/2002]  
 Prime Minister's New Year message [31/12/2002]

PM interviewed on Iraq, WMD, Europe and the Euro [31/5/2003]

Interview by the PM on European Council meeting [13/12/2003]

PM interview at the European Council meeting in Brussels [12/12/2003]

Joint press conference: PM Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac [5/2/2003]

Joint press conference: PM and President George Bush [31/1/2003]

Press Conference following EU Summit in Brussels [21/3/2003]

Press conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush [8/4/2003]

Joint press conference with President Bush at Camp David [27/3/2003]

PM doorstep interview at European Council meeting in Greece [20 /6/2003]

Press conference with President Bush at the White House [17/7/2003]

Joint press conference with the French President, Jacques Chirac [24/11/2003]

Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush [20/11/2003]

Doorstep interview by the Prime Minister in Brussels [11/12/2003]

PM's statement to Parliament following summit with President Bush [3/2/2003]

PM statement on European Council meeting [20-21/3/2003]

Joint statement by PM Tony Blair and President Bush on Iraq [8/4/2003]

PM statement to MPs on the Euro Summit in Brussels [15 /12/2003]

PM statement at Downing Street on Saddam Hussein [14 /12/2003]

PM statement on capture of Saddam Hussein [14 /12/2003]

Joint press conference in Poland: PM Tony Blair and Polish PM Leszek Miller [30/5/2003]

Prime Minister's speech on Europe in Warsaw [30/5/82003]

PM speech to Foreign Office Conference in London [7/1/2003]

PM's speech to Congress [18 July 2003]

PM's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet [10/11/2003]

Prime Minister's Address to the Nation [20/03/2003]

Statement on the EU White Paper and the EU Constitution [20/04/2004]

PM's statement on the European Council [21/06/2004]

PM's NATO and European Council Statement [30/06/2004]

PM's Parliamentary Statement on European Council [8/11/2004]

PM's statement on the European Council [20/12/2004]

Prime Minister's press conference [15/01/2004]

PM press conference in Berlin [18/2/2004]

Doorstep interview at the European Council in Brussels [26/03/2004]

Press conference with President Bush in Washington [17/04/2004]

PM's Q and A with French President in Paris [9/05/2004]

PM and President Bush Press Conference in Georgia [9/06/2004]

PM's Press Conference in Georgia [10/06/2004]

PM's Doorstep Interview in Brussels [26/06/2004]



Press Conference with President Chirac [18/11/2004]  
Press conference with President Bush at the White House [12/11/2004]  
Speech on the threat of global terrorism [5/3/2004]  
Speech on EU enlargement and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [19/14/2004]  
PM's speech on US Elections [3/11/2004]  
PM's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet [15 November 2004]  
Doorstep press conference with Condoleezza Rice [4 February 2005]  
Doorstep interview in Tuscany [30/5/2005]  
Tony Blair and George W Bush joint press conference [7/6/2005]  
PM's Press Conference in Paris [14/6/2005]  
PM's press conference following Brussels EU Summit [18/6/2005]  
PM's EU Presidency press conference [1/7/2005]  
PM's statement after London attacks [21/7/2005]  
Statement to Parliament on the London bombings [11/7/2005]  
Press Conference with The French Prime Minister [25/7/2005]  
Press Conference with the Spanish Prime Minister [25/7/2005]  
PM and President Chirac speak to journalists after informal talks [10/10/2005]  
Statement on Informal EU Heads of State or Government Meeting [31/10/2005]  
Speech to the EU Parliament [23/6/2005]

## **List of Appendices**

**Appendix No. 1: "Britain's Role in the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance." Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, a luncheon to mark the 150th anniversary of the Associated Press , London, 15th December 1998 (full text)**

**Appendix No. 2: "NATO, Europe, Our Future Security." Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC, 8th March 1999 (full text)**

**Appendix No. 3: "Britain in Europe." Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, London, 14th October 1999 (full text)**

**Appendix No. 4: Speech to the European Parliament by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, 23rd June 2005 (full text)**

## Appendices

### **Appendix No. 1: "Britain's Role in the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance." Speech by British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at a luncheon to mark the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Associated Press. London, Tuesday, December 15, 1998 (full text)**

I have said before that though Britain will never be the mightiest nation on earth, we can be pivotal.

It means building on the strengths of our history; it means building new alliances; developing new influence; charting a new course for British foreign policy.

It means realising once and for all that Britain does not have to choose between being strong with the US, or strong with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain can be both. Indeed, that Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US.

When I launched recently the debate on a new role for Europe in defence, there was an instant rush to judgement in some parts that this would lead to a weakening of the transatlantic alliance. On the contrary, this has been welcomed in the US, by the Administration and others.

As that debate unfolds, and I welcome the support expressed in Vienna at the weekend for our initiative with the French, then it is one in which I will ensure the Americans are fully engaged.

Britain's relationship with the US has been fundamental to our foreign policy throughout this century. Twice the US have come to our help to preserve democracy and freedom in Europe. We battled together throughout the Cold War. We have stood shoulder to shoulder in NATO. We were at the core of the successful coalition in the Gulf War. We remain absolutely together in our analysis of the continuing dangers posed by Saddam Hussein and our determination not to allow him Weapons of Mass Destruction, on which Richard Butler is due to report to the Security Council in the next day or so.

In the economic field, Americans and British have defended free and open markets around the world, and the establishment of a rule-based international trade system. We do not always see eye to eye - most recently on bananas - but our underlying principles are the same. The links between our two economies extend into all areas - two-way trade is expected to be 50 billion pounds this year. Including services, the US is easily Britain's largest export market. Britain is the main direct investor in the US with almost 150 billion dollars, providing employment for almost one million Americans. 40 per cent of US investment in the EU comes to Britain.

All this is underpinned by deep-rooted commitment to political pluralism and freedom, by the myriad personal and cultural ties between the British and American peoples, and by two societies comfortable with each other. We remain very distinct and different countries in so many ways, as anyone who knows both can readily testify. But people travelling in both directions find a warmth and a welcome, and an ease of communication, that make them feel instantly at home.

I value this closeness, and the richness of its bindings. It is language, history, shared values, friendship. It is much more than sentimentality. A hard-headed assessment of the value of good relations with the one remaining superpower would lead us to good relations anyway. But I also believe America at its best is a powerful force for good in the world; one of a few countries willing and able to stand up for what it believes. It is right for us to be close and for that relationship to work for the fundamental principles we both believe in. But to say that does not for one second negate the importance of Britain being a strong and leading player in Europe.

I made very clear, before the election, that a new Government would mean a new approach in Europe. We are in the European Union because it is the right place to be. And as we are in, it is time we started winning arguments, rather than running away from them.

The logical conclusion of the Euro-sceptic approach that says everything that comes out of Europe is bad; that says Europe is something that is done to us, rather than something that we can shape; is to get out of Europe altogether. That would at least be an honest intellectual

position. But it would be a disaster for British jobs, British trade, British influence in the world. Far better is to be in there, engage in the arguments, and win the arguments.

There are two forms of Euro-scepticism. The first, for which I have no time, looks at anything that happens in Europe as an excuse to be anti-European. The second, more intelligent scepticism, realises Europe is of vital importance to Britain, but is anxious about the direction Europe is taking. It fears, if I am again being frank, that because centre and centre left governments are now in the ascendancy in Europe, there will be a return of old Labour.

But again, people should have confidence in their own arguments. I have always believed that over time, the right arguments win in politics.

Enterprise and fairness. That is what we stand for. That is the argument we promote. A broad coalition of those who believe in progress and justice, not a narrow class-based politics, but a Party founded on clear values, whose means of implementation change with the generations.

Enterprise and fairness together. The third way; and those of you who report beyond these shores know that it is striking a chord right around Europe. It is a reflection of the lack of confidence I referred to that the extent of the debate on the third way generated around Europe is barely covered here at home.

We won with the landslide we secured because we combined policies of economic rigour, fiscal and monetary stability, with the insight that the market alone cannot deliver social justice; that the answer lay not in tax and spend policies, but in an agenda that tackles youth and long-term unemployment, as we are doing through the New Deal, that promotes education, lifelong learning, a skills revolution; that invests in small businesses, technology and infrastructure.

Again, the unintelligent scepticism warned that because the new Government planned to sign the Social Chapter, we would put at risk hundreds of thousands of jobs. But with Britain as part of the Social Chapter, there has been no new legislation put through at all. Another scare story bites the dust.

The Employment Chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty was another example. Dire warnings about the business-threatening regulatory approach were issued. What happened? We and others argued our case for the economic reform agenda, and we won that argument.

The unintelligent scepticism saw the beef ban as an excuse to declare war on the rest of Europe. Where did it get us? Nowhere. No nearer getting the ban lifted. No nearer getting help for farmers.

We called off the war, stepped up the diplomacy, spelled out the facts, patiently, robustly, built up the alliances, and got the ban lifted.

In advance of Vienna, alliances had to be built - on employment and economic reform issues with the Spanish, on tax with the Germans, on social policy with the Swedes, on defence with the French, on duty free goods with the French, the Germans and others. We built those alliances, we engaged in those arguments, and we protected and promoted our national interests.

And today I read, in the front page headlines of one of our broadsheets, that being positive and constructive in Europe, amounts to me issuing orders to the Government to 'bat for Brussels.' So that when I say to the Government - get close to our allies in Europe, I am somehow batting for Brussels. I see it as batting for Britain.

I will pursue this new approach in Europe not because it is in Europe's interests but because it is in Britain's interests.

We have deluded ourselves for too long with the false choice between the US and Europe. We live in a global economy, and an interdependent world. Nations must maximise their influence wherever they can. To be a country of our size and population, and to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear power, a leading player in NATO, a leading player in the Commonwealth, gives us huge advantages which we must exploit to the full.

Our membership of the EU gives us huge advantages too, and we must exploit those to the full as well. It requires a new maturity in our relations with Europe. This new Government will deliver that new maturity, and Britain will be the winner from it.

**Appendix No.2: "NATO, Europe, Our Future Security." Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC, 8th March 1999 (full text)**

A 50th anniversary is a time to celebrate the achievements of the past and to plan ahead for the future. This conference, which I am delighted to have a chance to address, is an opportunity for open debate among friends and partners on the way ahead for the NATO Alliance, a debate which I warmly welcome. The 50th Anniversary Summit next month in Washington will be the time for decisions as well as celebration. It will shape the way we provide for our defence and security for the early part of the 21st century.

The Alliance is fortunate to have at its helm a Secretary General of the quality and fine touch of Javier Solana. I am delighted that he will be speaking here tomorrow, and would like to thank him for all the work he has done. I am glad that Jose Cutileiro, who has steered the work of the Western European Union so ably, is also attending.

The range of representation here today, including from countries beyond NATO's borders - Russia, Ukraine, Central Europe, including the Baltic States, and elsewhere - shows how NATO's horizons have widened. East and West, divided for too long, are now intertwined. NATO guaranteed the stability and defence of Western Europe since its foundation 50 years ago. It is now adapting and developing. But there are unique qualities which we must hold on to.

NATO binds the United States and Canada with Europe. NATO members guarantee each others defence. We have an integrated military structure in which our forces plan for operations under a single command structure. NATO has prevented the nationalisation of defence for the first time in modern Europe. It is these qualities which have made the Alliance so strong and which we must preserve and cherish into the next century.

**Partnership**

In the Cold War NATO's main role was the defence of its own members in the face of a persistent and very real threat. Now, NATO exports security to others. We are now creating a framework of stability and security across the whole Euro-Atlantic area, with NATO at the core. The main tool is NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. Partnership with 43 countries, including many who were once our adversaries.

Our partnerships with Russia and Ukraine are the most important. Negotiated so skilfully by Secretary-General Solana, backed by the vision and good sense of US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who is speaking here later today, the NATO-Russia Founding Act ushered in a new era for Russian co-operation with the West. We now consult with Russia more intensively than ever before on issues ranging from proliferation and arms control to the Balkans and the Millennium Bug. The NATO-Ukraine Commission, too, is building up a track record, increasing understanding and laying the framework for working together.

**Enlargement**

Three of our Partners - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - have gone beyond partnership and later this week, at a ceremony at Independence, Missouri, will become members of the Alliance itself. These three countries which were fought over for too long, and this century rarely enjoyed real independence, will take the ultimate step to guarantee their defence by becoming members of the Alliance. They will also share responsibility for the defence of their fellow Allies.

I hope they and other European countries will also become members of the European Union in a few years time. NATO and the European Union, perhaps the World's two most successful organisations, extending their reach and the benefits they bring.

NATO enlargement not only underpins the defence of its new members. It will also strengthen European security as a whole. Although Russia and others have their concerns, I believe these

are now receding as the defensive nature of the Alliance and our wish for genuine partnership becomes clearer.

I want the process of NATO enlargement to continue, at the right pace. At the Washington Summit, we will commit ourselves to helping other applicants to prepare themselves to come through NATO's open door. I look forward to more countries joining once they and NATO itself are ready, and as their inclusion in the Alliance strengthens European security as a whole.

### **Bosnia and Kosovo**

Sadly, the countries of the former Yugoslavia have not all shared in the progress made by NATO's partners. NATO was slow to become engaged in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. We tried to bring peace to Bosnia through the UN and with political good offices but without the willingness to use force which we now know was necessary. Our troops, under the auspices of the UN, did a good job at great risk, to deliver humanitarian relief. But they could only deal with the symptoms of the problem. It was NATO that brought serious force to bear and gave the desperately needed muscle to end the war. Since Dayton, NATO has underpinned the peace and created the conditions in which Bosnia can rebuild.

In Kosovo, we will not repeat those early mistakes in Bosnia. We will not allow war to devastate a part of our continent, bringing untold death, suffering and homelessness. Robin Cook and Hubert Vedrine, with their partners in the Contact Group, made good progress at Rambouillet towards an interim political settlement based on substantial autonomy.

But political agreement is not enough: the Balkans are littered with agreements that are signed but not implemented. To make an agreement work, to bring stability to Kosovo, an international force is an indispensable element. Only NATO is equipped to lead it. Either side in the negotiations can wreck the chances of full agreement. But both must understand their interest in success.

The Kosovars should see that the time has come for the Kosovo Liberation Army to cease its operations and accept demilitarisation.

The Serbs must reduce their forces to agreed levels and allow a NATO-led force to underpin the new autonomy arrangements.

We will not accept prevarication in the negotiations. No side can be allowed to obstruct the process. In this crucial period President Milosevic and his commanders must also understand that NATO will not stand by in the face of renewed repression in Kosovo or atrocities like the one we witnessed recently at Racak. Nor can the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

True peace and security will not come to the Former Yugoslavia until authoritarian, nationalist governments give way to democracy based on ideas rather than ethnicity. Free press, a market economy, responsible and accountable government and an end to repression are all essential for the long term. NATO can help by providing a stable base. But it is for the people of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to build their own civil societies and free institutions.

The countries of the Former Yugoslavia will integrate into the European mainstream eventually. Their leaders and societies have to become more like their counterparts in West and Central Europe before that can happen. I expect to see further political change in the Balkans. But political change should be achieved by political means. More war will only set back those dreams of security and prosperity to which the ordinary people of the Balkans aspire.

### **European Defence**

In dealing with the Balkan wars of the 1990s the full strength of the Alliance, Europeans and Americans working together, has been needed. Alliance cohesion with a strong US role, have given clout to our political efforts, and forced the warring factions to stop fighting and start negotiating. US engagement in European security was essential to our success. It will remain essential in dealing with future wars and other profound challenges to security and stability on our continent.

The initiative I launched last autumn on European defence is aimed at giving greater credibility to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Far from weakening NATO this is an essential complement to the Transatlantic Alliance. We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard. The European Union should be able to take on some security tasks on our own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.

Europe's military capabilities at this stage are modest. Too modest. Too few allies are transforming their armed forces to cope with the security problems of the 1990s and the 21st century. To strengthen NATO and to make European defence a reality, we Europeans need to restructure our defence capabilities so that we can project force, can deploy our troops, ships and planes beyond their home bases and sustain them there, equipped to deal with whatever level of conflict they may face. George Robertson will address this issue in more detail when he speaks to you on Wednesday. But let me assure you of this: European defence is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new capabilities, both military and diplomatic.

The declaration which President Jacques Chirac and I issued at St Malo was the first step to defining the new approach. We decided that we should go beyond the Berlin arrangements agreed by NATO in 1996 to give Europe a genuine capacity to act, and act quickly, in cases where the Alliance as a whole is not militarily engaged. In any particular crisis, the European Union will develop a comprehensive policy. But within that, deployment of forces is a decision for Governments. I see no role for the European Parliament or the Court of Justice. Nor will the European Commission have a decision-making role on military matters.

Anglo-French collaboration has continued and fleshed out the practical requirements for Europeans to decide and act soundly on military matters.

I want our Alliance as a whole to give support to these European developments. I look to our Summit in Washington to endorse some important next steps. It would be foolish and wasteful for Europe to duplicate the tried and tested military structures in which we already play a full part in the Alliance.

We should use what we have in the Alliance. But those structures and assets need to be more readily available for European led operations and we need to be able to rely on them being available. At the same time, we European Allies need to commit ourselves at the Washington Summit to develop the full range of capabilities needed for the sort of crisis management tasks and humanitarian operations where Europe might take the lead. Only then can we make European Defence a reality.

To retain US engagement in Europe, it is important that Europe does more for itself. A Europe with a greater capacity to act will strengthen both the European Union and the Alliance as a whole. And I want our Allies in NATO who are not members of the European Union to be able to play a full role in European operations, without reserve.

With the Alliance's endorsement and agreement on these points, the next step will be the WEU Ministerial in May where we shall take stock of the first part of the audit of European capabilities, which I suspect will start to reveal how much more we Europeans need. The June European Council in Cologne will be an opportunity to draw these threads together. I hope we will reach agreement there on the principles for new arrangements for security and defence in Europe, giving the European Union a direct role and a close working relationship with NATO.

These tasks are substantial. Our responsibility is huge. 50 years ago a British Labour government helped found the NATO Alliance which locked Europe and North America safely together through all the dangerous years of the Cold War.

We are now creating new arrangements for the 21st century. We do not know exactly what dangers lie before us, what threats we will face. We must be prepared for some difficult challenges, for decades to come. Let us lay the foundations for dealing with them now in a spirit of partnership, cooperation, interdependence and commitment.

**Appendix No. 3: "Britain in Europe." Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, London, 14th October 1999 (full text)**

Once in each generation, the case for Britain in Europe needs to be remade, from first principles. The time for this generation is now.

The debate should be conducted with good judgement, clarity and above all, based on fact. For months, if not years, there has been a clamour from those opposed to Europe, that has been always shrill and often effective. We are told that Europe is bad for the British economy. That being part of Europe means abandoning our allies in the USA. That Europe is obstinately against reform, dedicated to bloated bureaucracy rather than the needs of European citizens. That being in Europe means losing our identity as the British nation. That as a consequence, Britain should rule out joining the Euro and should prepare to leave Europe altogether.

It is time we took each one of these arguments in turn and demolished them.

Three and a half million British jobs depend on our membership of the EU. Over 50 per cent of our trade is with Europe. British firms daily sell £320 million of goods and services into the European single market. Inward investment flows into Britain as a result of our being part of Europe. The English language, a flexible labour market, a thriving culture are all good reasons for companies choosing Britain as their place of entry to Europe. Last year alone, inward investment created 50,000 new jobs. But it is investment dependent on Britain in Europe.

Europe is not marginal to the British economy. It is fundamental to it and each day becomes more so. To quit Europe would be an act of economic mutilation.

Second, Britain is stronger with the US by reason of being in Europe. Go to the US. Deal, as I have, over the past two years, with issues of trade and investment, war and peace, with our US allies. They value us in our own right. Of course they do. But they value us even more as people who have influence in Europe who can talk to key European allies and who are respected both in the US and in Europe. Likewise, we are stronger in Europe if strong with the US. Stronger together. Influential with both. And a bridge between the two.

Third, we know Europe needs reform and we are fighting for it. Since taking office, we have shifted employment policy away from regulation to job creation. Next year in Portugal there is the first EU Summit dedicated to economic reform. The two British Commissioners in Europe have secured vital portfolios in shaping Europe in the future. Yes, there is a long way to go. But I say to you simply: we will only get reform in Europe by being part of Europe. We can also help lead debates about European defence, about effective action against crime and pollution, about the balance between integration and subsidiarity, how Europe does more in the areas it needs to do more; and gets out of the areas it doesn't need to be in at all. Europe can reform and Britain can and should play a leading part in achieving it.

And we make this case, not because we are pro-Europe - though I believe in the ideal of European partnership. We make it because we are pro-Britain. To be part of Europe is in the British national interest. So far from submerging our identity as a nation in some Eurosceptic parody of a Federal super-state, we believe that by being part of Europe, we advance our own self-interest as the British nation. This is a patriotic cause. The people here represent a patriotic alliance that puts country before Party. The Britain of the 21st Century should surely be the Britain I grew up believing in: not narrow-minded, chauvinistic or isolationist; but a country open in its attitudes, engaged in the outside world, adventurous in taking on the future's challenges, and having the confidence to know that working with others is a sign of strength not weakness.

And for all these reasons, to rule out participation in the next stage of European development - the single currency to accompany the single market - would be to repeat the mistakes of the past not learn from them. In principle, if the single currency succeeds and it is in Britain's economic interest, we should join. In practice, the economic conditions must be met. Meanwhile we prepare so we can decide. That puts the test exactly where it should be: what is good for jobs, trade, investment and industry in Britain. These conditions were set out in October 1997, repeated in February 1999; they remain in place. As does every other aspect of the policy, including of course the commitment to a referendum.



That is a sensible position. All the issues of principle: resolved. The test: the practical one of the national economic interest. What would be madness would be to shut the door on the option of joining a single currency in the future, deprive Britain of the choice of joining even if it was in our clear interests to do so.

All round the world, countries are moving closer. New alliances are being formed. From the Americas, to South East Asia and beyond, the pace of global economic and technological change is pushing nations together. In previous centuries, when different alliances dominating the world were being formed, Britain was sometimes their adversary, often in the thick of them, but never irrelevant.

The real denial of our history would be to retreat into isolation from the continent of Europe of which we are part and whose history we have so intimately shaped.

I will not and could not lead the country to such a position. In 1975, still a student, I voted yes in the referendum. I believed Britain's destiny was with Europe then. I believe it now. And I am proud to be part of a gathering that stretches across all political parties and none, to make our case to our country.

**Appendix No. 4: Speech to the European Parliament by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, 23rd June 2005 (full text)**

It is an honour to be here in the European Parliament today.

With your permission, I will come back after each European Council during the UK Presidency and report to you. In addition, I would be happy to consult the Parliament before each Council, so as to have the benefit of the views of the European Parliament before Council deliberations.

This is a timely address. Whatever else people disagree upon in Europe today, they at least agree on one point: Europe is in the midst of a profound debate about its future.

I want to talk to you plainly today about this debate, the reasons for it and how to resolve it. In every crisis there is an opportunity. There is one here for Europe now, if we have the courage to take it.

The debate over Europe should not be conducted by trading insults or in terms of personality. It should be an open and frank exchange of ideas. And right at the outset I want to describe clearly how I define the debate and the disagreement underlying it.

The issue is not between a "free market" Europe and a social Europe, between those who want to retreat to a common market and those who believe in Europe as a political project.

This is not just a misrepresentation. It is to intimidate those who want change in Europe by representing the desire for change as betrayal of the European ideal, to try to shut off serious debate about Europe's future by claiming that the very insistence on debate is to embrace the anti-Europe.

It is a mindset I have fought against all my political life. Ideals survive through change. They die through inertia in the face of challenge.

I am a passionate pro-European. I always have been. My first vote was in 1975 in the British referendum on membership and I voted yes. In 1983, when I was the last candidate in the UK to be selected shortly before that election and when my party had a policy of withdrawing from Europe, I told the selection conference that I disagreed with the policy. Some thought I had lost the selection. Some perhaps wish I had. I then helped change our policy in the 1980's and was proud of that change.

Since being Prime Minister I signed the Social Chapter, helped, along with France, to create the modern European Defence Policy, have played my part in the Amsterdam, the Nice, then the Rome Treaties.

This is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens.

It always will be.

I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market.

To say that is the issue is to escape the real debate and hide in the comfort zone of the things we have always said to each other in times of difficulty.

There is not some division between the Europe necessary to succeed economically and social Europe. Political Europe and economic Europe do not live in separate rooms.

The purpose of social Europe and economic Europe should be to sustain each other.

The purpose of political Europe should be to promote the democratic and effective institutions to develop policy in these two spheres and across the board where we want and need to cooperate in our mutual interest.

But the purpose of political leadership is to get the policies right for today's world.

For 50 years Europe's leaders have done that. We talk of crisis. Let us first talk of achievement. When the war ended, Europe was in ruins. Today the EU stands as a monument to political

achievement. Almost 50 years of peace, 50 years of prosperity, 50 years of progress. Think of it and be grateful.

The broad sweep of history is on the side of the EU. Countries round the world are coming together because in collective cooperation they increase individual strength. Until the second half of the 20th Century, for centuries European nations individually had dominated the world, colonised large parts of it, fought wars against each other for world supremacy.

Out of the carnage of the Second World War, political leaders had the vision to realise those days were gone. Today's world does not diminish that vision. It demonstrates its prescience. The USA is the world's only super power. But China and India in a few decades will be the world's largest economies, each of them with populations three times that of the whole of the EU. The idea of Europe, united and working together, is essential for our nations to be strong enough to keep our place in this world.

Now, almost 50 years on, we have to renew. There is no shame in that. All institutions must do it. And we can. But only if we remarry the European ideals we believe in with the modern world we live in.

If Europe defaulted to Euro scepticism, or if European nations faced with this immense challenge, decide to huddle together, hoping we can avoid globalisation, shrink away from confronting the changes around us, take refuge in the present policies of Europe as if by constantly repeating them, we would by the very act of repetition make them more relevant, then we risk failure. Failure on a grand, strategic, scale. This is not a time to accuse those who want Europe to change or betraying Europe. It is a time to recognise that only by change will Europe recover its strength, its relevance, its idealism and therefore its support amongst the people.

And as ever the people are ahead of the politicians. We always think as a political class that people, unconcerned with the daily obsession of politics, may not understand it, may not see its subtleties and its complexities. But, ultimately, people always see politics more clearly than us. Precisely because they are not daily obsessed with it.

The issue is not about the idea of the European Union. It is about modernisation. It is about policy. It is not a debate about how to abandon Europe but how to make it do what it was set up to do: improve the lives of people. And right now, they aren't convinced. Consider this.

For four years Europe conducted a debate over our new Constitution, two years of it in the Convention. It was a detailed and careful piece of work setting out the new rules to govern a Europe of 25 and in time 27, 28 and more member states. It was endorsed by all Governments. It was supported by all leaders. It was then comprehensively rejected in referendums in two founding Member States, in the case of the Netherlands by over 60 per cent. The reality is that in most Member States it would be hard today to secure a 'yes' for it in a referendum.

There are two possible explanations. One is that people studied the Constitution and disagreed with its precise articles. I doubt that was the basis of the majority 'no'. This was not an issue of bad drafting or specific textual disagreement.

The other explanation is that the Constitution became merely the vehicle for the people to register a wider and deeper discontent with the state of affairs in Europe. I believe this to be the correct analysis.

If so, it is not a crisis of political institutions, it is a crisis of political leadership. People in Europe are posing hard questions to us. They worry about globalisation, job security, about pensions and living standards. They see not just their economy but their society changing around them. Traditional communities are broken up, ethnic patterns change, family life is under strain as families struggle to balance work and home.

We are living through an era of profound upheaval and change. Look at our children and the technology they use and the jobs market they face. The world is unrecognisable from that we experienced as students 20, 30 years ago. When such change occurs, moderate people must give

leadership. If they don't, the extremes gain traction on the political process. It happens within a nation. It is happening in Europe now.

Just reflect. The Laeken Declaration which launched the Constitution was designed "to bring Europe closer to the people". Did it? The Lisbon agenda was launched in the year 2000 with the ambition of making Europe "the most competitive place to do business in the world by 2010". We are half way through that period. Has it succeeded?

I have sat through Council Conclusions after Council Conclusions describing how we are "reconnecting Europe to the people". Are we?

It is time to give ourselves a reality check. To receive the wake-up call. The people are blowing the trumpets round the city walls. Are we listening? Have we the political will to go out and meet them so that they regard our leadership as part of the solution not the problem?

That is the context in which the Budget debate should be set. People say: we need the Budget to restore Europe's credibility. Of course we do. But it should be the right Budget. It shouldn't be abstracted from the debate about Europe's crisis. It should be part of the answer to it.

I want to say a word about last Friday's Summit. There have been suggestions that I was not willing to compromise on the UK rebate; that I only raised CAP reform at the last minute; that I expected to renegotiate the CAP on Friday night. In fact I am the only British leader that has ever said I would put the rebate on the table. I never said we should end the CAP now or renegotiate it overnight. Such a position would be absurd. Any change must take account of the legitimate needs of farming communities and happen over time. I have said simply two things: that we cannot agree a new financial perspective that does not at least set out a process that leads to a more rational Budget; and that this must allow such a Budget to shape the second half of that perspective up to 2013. Otherwise it will be 2014 before any fundamental change is agreed, let alone implemented. Again, in the meantime, of course Britain will pay its fair share of enlargement. I might point out that on any basis we would remain the second highest net contributor to the EU, having in this perspective paid billions more than similar sized countries.

So, that is the context. What would a different policy agenda for Europe look like?

First, it would modernise our social model. Again some have suggested I want to abandon Europe's social model. But tell me: what type of social model is it that has 20m unemployed in Europe, productivity rates falling behind those of the USA; that is allowing more science graduates to be produced by India than by Europe; and that, on any relative index of a modern economy - skills, R&D, patents, IT, is going down not up. India will expand its biotechnology sector fivefold in the next five years. China has trebled its spending on R&D in the last five.

Of the top 20 universities in the world today, only two are now in Europe.

The purpose of our social model should be to enhance our ability to compete, to help our people cope with globalisation, to let them embrace its opportunities and avoid its dangers. Of course we need a social Europe. But it must be a social Europe that works.

And we've been told how to do it. The Kok report in 2004 shows the way. Investment in knowledge, in skills, in active labour market policies, in science parks and innovation, in higher education, in urban regeneration, in help for small businesses. This is modern social policy, not regulation and job protection that may save some jobs for a time at the expense of many jobs in the future.

And since this is a day for demolishing caricatures, let me demolish one other: the idea that Britain is in the grip of some extreme Anglo-Saxon market philosophy that tramples on the poor and disadvantaged. The present British Government has introduced the new deal for the unemployed, the largest jobs programme in Europe that has seen long-term youth unemployment virtually abolished. It has increased investment in our public services more than any other European country in the past five years. We needed to, it is true, but we did it. We have introduced Britain's first minimum wage. We have regenerated our cities. We have lifted almost one million children out of poverty and two million pensioners out of acute hardship and are embarked on the most radical expansion of childcare, maternity and paternity rights in our

country's history. It is just that we have done it on the basis of and not at the expense of a strong economy.

Secondly, let the Budget reflect these realities. Again the Sapir report shows the way. Published by the European Commission in 2003, it sets out in clear detail what a modern European Budget would look like. Put it into practice. But a modern Budget for Europe is not one that 10 years from now is still spending 40 per cent of its money on the CAP.

Thirdly, implement the Lisbon Agenda. On jobs, labour market participation, school leavers, lifelong learning, we are making progress that nowhere near matches the precise targets we set out at Lisbon. That Agenda told us what to do. Let us do it.

Fourth, and here I tread carefully, get a macroeconomic framework for Europe that is disciplined but also flexible. It is not for me to comment on the Eurozone. I just say this: if we agreed real progress on economic reform, if we demonstrated real seriousness on structural change, then people would perceive reform of macro policy as sensible and rational, not a product of fiscal laxity but of commonsense. And we need such reform urgently if Europe is to grow.

After the economic and social challenges, then let us confront another set of linked issues - crime, security and immigration.

Crime is now crossing borders more easily than ever before. Organised crime costs the UK at least £20bn annually.

Migration has doubled in the past 20 years. Much of the migration is healthy and welcome. But it must be managed. Illegal immigration is an issue for all our nations, and a human tragedy for many thousands of people. It is estimated that 70 per cent of illegal immigrants have their passage facilitated by organised crime groups. Then there is the repugnant practice of human trafficking whereby organised gangs move people from one region to another with the intention of exploiting them when they arrive. Between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked globally each year. Every year over 100,000 women are victims of trafficking in the European Union.

Again, a relevant JHA agenda would focus on these issues: implementing the EU action plan on counter-terrorism which has huge potential to improve law enforcement as well as addressing the radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists; cross-border intelligence and policing on organised crime; developing proposals to hit the people and drug traffickers hard, in opening up their bank accounts, harassing their activities, arresting their leading members and bring them to justice; getting returns agreements for failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries and others; developing biometric technology to make Europe's borders secure.

Then there is the whole area of CFSP. We should be agreeing practical measures to enhance European defence capability, be prepared to take on more missions of peacekeeping and enforcement, develop the capability, with NATO or where NATO does not want to be engaged outside it, to be able to intervene quickly and effectively in support of conflict resolution. Look at the numbers in European armies today and our expenditure. Do they really answer the strategic needs of today?

Such a defence policy is a necessary part of an effective foreign policy. But even without it, we should be seeing how we can make Europe's influence count. When the European Union agreed recently a doubling of aid to Africa, it was an immediate boost not just for that troubled continent, but for European cooperation. We are world leaders in development and proud of it. We should be leading the way on promoting a new multi-lateral trade agreement which will increase trade for all, especially the poorest nations. We are leading the debate on climate change and developing pan-European policies to tackle it. Thanks to Xavier Solana, Europe has started to make its presence felt in the MEPP. But my point is very simple. A strong Europe would be an active player in foreign policy, a good partner of course to the US but also capable of demonstrating its own capacity to shape and move the world forward.

Such a Europe - its economy in the process of being modernised, its security enhanced by clear action within our borders and beyond - would be a confident Europe. It would be a Europe confident enough to see enlargement not as a threat, as if membership were a zero sum game in which old members lose as new members gain, but an extraordinary, historic opportunity to build a greater and more powerful union. Because be under no illusion: if we stop enlargement or shut out its natural consequences, it wouldn't, in the end, save one job, keep one firm in business, prevent one delocalisation. For a time it might but not for long. And in the meantime Europe will become more narrow, more introspective and those who garner support will be those no in the traditions of European idealism but in those of outdated nationalism and xenophobia. But I tell you in all frankness: it is a contradiction to be in favour of liberalising Europe's membership but against opening up its economy.

If we set out that clear direction; if we then combined it with the Commission - as this one under Jose Manuel Barroso's leadership is fully capable of doing - that is prepared to send back some of the unnecessary regulation, peel back some of the bureaucracy and become a champion of a global, outward-looking, competitive Europe, then it will not be hard to capture the imagination and support of the people of Europe.

In our Presidency, we will try to take forward the Budget deal; to resolve some of the hard dossiers, like the Services Directive and Working Time Directive; to carry out the Union's obligations to those like Turkey and Croatia that wait in hope of a future as part of Europe; and to conduct this debate about the future of Europe in an open, inclusive way, giving our own views strongly but fully respectful of the views of others.

Only one thing I ask: don't let us kid ourselves that this debate is unnecessary; that if only we assume 'business as usual', people will sooner or later relent and acquiesce in Europe s it is, not as they want it to be. In my time as Prime Minister, I have found that the hard part is not taking the decision, it is spotting when it has to be taken. It is understanding the difference between the challenges that have to be managed and those that have to be confronted and overcome. This is such a moment of decision for Europe.

The people of Europe are speaking to us. They are posing the questions. They are wanting our leadership. It is time we gave it to them.