

ABSTRACT

Behavioral study based on observations of 30 street newspaper sellers from Prague (about 50% of all Prague sellers) observed at the time of offering the “Nový Prostor” street newspaper (below just “NP”) and their interactions with a total of 140 customers. Street newspaper sale project is primarily intended as a social program. The sellers participating take in many self-restraints resulting from accepting the “Nový Prostor” rules. In the alternative ways of asking for financial support from the passerby people there is an obvious absence of a rules similar. Theoretical basis of research assume that there is a signal produced by a street newspaper sale, through which the sellers communicate their ability of money donated meaningful use to the passing by people and potential customers. In this context a meaningful use includes also the overnight expenses (housing for 1 night). The above mentioned self-restraints represent the costs expended for this signal. One of the confirmation aspects to assess the suitability of the sale of NP through the lens of Signaling Game Theory is the existence of a counterfeiters (in a NP slang so called “poachers”). Empirical experiment has proved that the sellers giving clear signals actively, are waiting for a customer less then those who are not active (survival analysis: median 13min x 28 min, $p = 0.006$). On the contrary signal of inability (real or feigned handicap) is not significantly efficient ($p = 0.461$).

Key words : street newspaper, competition, altruism, Signaling Games Theory, satisfizers, maximizers, income targeting, behavioral analysis.