

Abstract

In this paper, I compare the causes, development and effect, that the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine had. I argue that the theses, declared by President Truman contrasted fundamentally with the subsequent advancement of their application to contain communism in Greece and Turkey. I prove this incompatibility on the analysis of (1) the causes, why the Doctrine was promulgated in the United States, with stress on the Turkish Straits crisis of 1946, (2) the American economic and military aid to Greece in 1947–1948 and (3) the strategic support of Turkey by the United States. This triplet of events forms the backdrop to the three related aims, which the authors of the Doctrine pursued. One was to garner domestic support for a swift change in the American foreign policy towards the role of a world superpower. The second aim was to forestall the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence (to contain communism) and the final aim was the support of freedom and democracy as a means of countering the communist ideology.

The three given points contrast with the actual problems that threatened Greece and Turkey. By analyzing the key events surrounding the Truman Doctrine through the years 1946 to 1948 I look for the reason for its success. I see it in the combination of a moralist ideological attitude on the American side with a realist approach to solve the crises in Greece and Turkey.