

Abstract

This bachelor thesis is concerned with early works of significant logicians and philosophers Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl at the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Most importantly, it deals with their solution of the objectivity of arithmetic and the objectivity itself. At first they both started in the same direction and they harshly rejected psychologism. They also introduced similar differentiation of sense and reference. According to Frege, the reference of a sentence is a truth value, however, according to Husserl, it is a state of affairs. The sense is the way of referring to an object, also called intentionality. The sense in a sentence is a thought according to Frege and it is a noema according to Husserl. They both put emphasis on objectivity of number but they gradually went in different direction. Frege identified number with extension of concept, however, this subsequently let his system to dispute. Husserl derived number by abstraction, which exposed him to Frege's harsh criticism.

Key words

Frege, Husserl, objectivity, logic