

Abstract

The Russo-Georgian war, which took place in August 2008, with separatist ambitions of Georgian region of South Ossetia being the *casus belli*, was not merely understood as a clash between these two countries, but it was also seen in broader terms as a Russia-West dispute or a "new Cold War". This symbolic dimension of the conflict was based mainly on the Russian rhetoric prior to the war, which reacted sharply to the promise of future NATO membership for Georgia. Another reason was the nature of the Russian intervention with its inadequacy raising question whether the aim was solely to consolidate the situation in South Ossetia or if the real intention was to overthrow the Georgian government and reverse the Western foreign policy orientation of Georgia. During the August 2008 and in the following months in the West the relations with Russia became a major political issue. On the one hand the West strongly criticised Russia and condemned its actions on the other hand Western response lacked significant pressure that would persuade Russia to change its practices. The aim of this thesis is to explain the discrepancy between rhetoric and actions of the West, or by other words to answer the question why the West did not intervene against Russia, while at the same calling its steps "unacceptable". Author's hypothesis is that despite its potential, in the eyes of the West the conflict did not become a priority security issue, so Russia did not have to face any emergency measures that would force it to change its opinion. To verify this hypothesis the securitization theory and analytical framework of the Copenhagen school, defined in the book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* will be used.