

In the submitted thesis a role is examined of the concept of impredicativity in solution suggestions for epistemological and logical paradoxes. We focus on the development of this concept in the way Russell and Poincaré contributed to it in the first stage. An introduction is given to Russell's theory of types based on the exclusion of impredicative principles and definitions, problems are mentioned related with this theory. We continue by offering Ramsey's modification of the theory of types supposed to solve the given problems. Connection is examined between impredicativity and diagonal construction and attention is paid to determination of conditions under which diagonal constructions and impredicative definitions are vicious, i.e. leading to contradictions. For this purpose a distinction is offered between out-picking and potentially constructing principles. In the conclusion the axiomatic set theory is mentioned which neutralizes the distinction between predicative and impredicative principles, and whose acceptance lead to disinterest in impredicativity.