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**Feminist Interpretations of
Traditional Theories of the
State in International Relations**

Magisterská diplomová práce

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Prohlášení

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Anotace

Feministická teorie v mezinárodních vztazích se většinou považuje za homogenní přístup v oboru, patřící mezi kritické teorie. Existuje však několik různých proudů feminismu v mezinárodních vztazích, které se liší jak ve své metodologii, tak ve svém epistemologickém a/nebo ontologickém stanovisku. Tato skutečnost je dobře viditelná na disputacích, které tyto různé přístupy mezi sebou vedou, fakt, na nějž se snažím v průběhu práce upozorňovat. Práce tedy pojednává o různých feministických reinterpretacích zaběhlých teorií mezinárodních vztahů. Po poskytnutí přehledu těchto různých proudů se zabývám tradiční politickou filosofií a její rekonceptualizací ze specificky feministických úhlů pohledu. Stejně tak reinterpretuji základní pojmy mezinárodních vztahů – státu, jeho místa v mezinárodním systému, války, suverenity a mezinárodní politické ekonomie, a to ze tří různých feministických perspektiv, které se liší svým přístupem k pozitivismu a strukturalismu. Za pomoci tezí představených feminismem, jako je rozlišení veřejné a soukromé sféry, přezkoumávám známé koncepty mezinárodních vztahů, abych je pak představila z jiného úhlu pohledu. Zdůrazněny jsou gendrové aspekty běžných teorií, které odkřívám pomocí metody dekonstrukce.

Abstract

Feminist theory in International Relations is usually considered to be a homogenous approach within the field, critical of mainstream IR theory. There are, however, various strands of feminist IR, differing in their methodologies as well as their epistemological and ontological underpinnings. This is well visible in the ongoing discussions amongst these strands, an issue I try to emphasize

throughout. In my thesis, I present various feminist re-interpretations of conventional theories of International Relations. After providing an overview of these different strands, I reflect on traditional political philosophy and re-conceptualize these concepts via a specifically feminist lens. By addressing the current accepted understandings of IR's core concepts – the state, its place in the international system, war, sovereignty, and IPE, I reconsider them from three different viewpoints, based on their stance towards positivist methodology, epistemology and ontology. With the help of notions presented by and typical of feminism, as is the public/private divide, I re-view the familiar concepts to then portray them from a different point of view. Throughout my thesis, I place emphasis on the gendered aspects of the customary schemes, and with the help of the method of deconstruction aim to bring to light less frequent interpretations.

Klíčová slova

Liberální feminismus, standpoint feminismus, postmoderní feminismus, mezinárodní vztahy, politická filosofie, mezinárodní politická ekonomie, rozvojové teorie

Key words

Liberal feminism, standpoint feminism, postmodern feminism, international relations, political philosophy, IPE, development theory

Poděkování

I would hereby like to thank my parents for all their support, in my studies as well as in my life. Many thanks to Ilaria for having introduced me to feminism, opening a new field of vision. I am grateful to Jiří for all the simulative discussions on the subject. I also thank Doc. Plechanovová for her guidance, valuable comments and discussions.

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Introduction

When I first considered the subject of feminist reinterpretations of International Relations (IR) as the topic of my thesis, I had a relatively clear and somewhat simple idea in my mind: I would read the founding texts of IR theory and the founding texts of feminist IR theory and voilà! Feminist IR would surely reveal itself in a well structured and comprehensible way. Now – several months and several hundreds of pages of (not just) feminist texts later - I find myself contemplating time and again one question: how do I formulate what I have learned in a well structured and comprehensible way?

The literature on feminist IR theory is extensive. I cannot begin to map out all that has been written, nor is it the ambition or scope of this work to do so. Rather, I would like to present some of the founding and most important authors and texts, for example works by Elshtain, Pateman, Tickner, or Harding to name a few, which I will try to complement with other authors, who either followed in their footsteps, or disputed their findings.

Feminism is, I believe, deceptive. First of all, and not just in the Czech Republic, it is almost equal to a curse word. God forbid one should publicly identify as a feminist...who knows what sorts of uncalled for confessions may follow. Feminism in IR is, at best, considered irrelevant. It's awfully interesting that women work the so-called second shift¹, but this isn't going to solve the problem of the nuclear armament of North Korea, now is it? But once one starts to read through the texts of feminist IR, new connections begin to appear. After all, why couldn't the same line of analysis that deals with the issue of the monetary conception of "productivity" and its consequences (in this case the problem of the second shift), be of use also when considering the cause of the worlds' inaptitude to resolve the problem of a country's nuclear potential? It was these seemingly hidden linkages and subtle connections that most inspired and motivated me to take on feminism in IR. The outcome is the revelation that the queasy attitude many have towards feminism is rooted, as is often the case, in the acceptance of a false but easily agreeable negative image.

¹ The term refers to housework, traditionally considered a women's job and responsibility, carried out by women who also have regular jobs. It was introduced by Arlie Russell Hochschild in her book of the same title – *The Second Shift*, published in 1989.

The objective of my thesis is to bring to light some of these connections, which remain hidden until interpreted through a feminist lens. I aim to review accepted versions of the current dogma in/of IR theory and of the epistemological and ontological underpinnings that serve as foundations for this field. My goal is not just to present feminist theories and findings, but also use them to re-evaluate traditional concepts of IR. For example the public/private divide, a notion presented by feminist theorists and of great explanatory potential, can indeed be regarded as one of the founding aspects that govern international relations, today as well as in the past. Building on this concept, and on others specific to feminism, I want to take a second (and perhaps even third or fourth) look at issues so common to IR as is war, peace, sovereignty, nonintervention, the concept of security or the basic theories of economics. Then, with the help of new perspectives, I aim to point out some of the gender-specific effects of these traditional models on women.

My main hypothesis is that there exists a male bias in traditional Western theories of international relations and political philosophy. This is manifested in the usurpation of claims to universality and objectivity of these theories. However, I believe that if we reconsider their main premises, for example the state, war and peace, or the basics of international political economy and development theories from a feminist viewpoint, we will reveal that they are not neutral and objective, but rather a testimony of a specific, i.e. male, white, privileged viewpoint.

I aim to test my hypothesis by using the postmodern method of deconstruction. I have chosen this method because I consider it most apt at addressing the given issues from the selected viewpoints. Specifically, this would mean uncovering the dichotomous and hierarchical structure of meanings conveyed to us in traditional IR theory. Building on the premise of the opposition of masculine and feminine and applying the method of deconstruction, feminists have attempted to show that the masculine and feminine are not only dichotomous categories, but the first is also considered superior to the second, and both are dependent on one another. Continuing from there, they have ventured to bring the feminine back in (to IR), each strand in its own way. In other words, feminism generally is largely about the "other side of the story", the version not so often told. However, these versions are to a certain extent already inherent in the original theories presented, most

often by their invisibility. Albeit seemingly an oxymoron, deconstruction breaks down the given theory on the presumption that the theory itself, meaning its field of interest and delimitations, are constructed. With the use of terms such as "objective" and "universal", they (perhaps unintentionally) define the perimeters of what they consider relevant. Therefore, what is not included because it is not considered significant is in fact a manifestation of the exercise of power, in the case of feminism of the masculine point of view.

I have divided my thesis into five chapters. The first is an introductory one, where I will present a general overview of feminist IR. Locating the emergence of this approach in time, I will reveal why it was in this specific period that feminism appeared, or perhaps better put became visible, as a unique approach within IR theory. Afterwards, I aim to provide an outline of the main strands of feminist IR theory. I will divide these into three different groups - positivist, standpoint and poststructuralist - depending on how they perceive questions of epistemology (that deal with manners of the acquisition of knowledge) and ontology (regarding reflections on the nature of existence). While summing up the main characteristics of each strand and pointing out their commonalities, differences, and critiques of one another, I will be moving more or less chronologically, since each newly emerging strand can be said to have come into existence as a result of its critique of the previous one(s). The outcome is an ongoing reformulation of feminist IR theory itself, with new conclusions and new strands emerging. At the same time however, the youngest approach will not necessarily be the most accepted and developed one, since, as I mentioned before, there is a continuing discussion amongst them.

In the second chapter of my paper, I aim to provide feminist reinterpretations of traditional political philosophy. I consider this relevant because I believe it shows that feminism has the potential to meaningfully re-conceptualize even the foundations of political theory, and not just attack its current shortcomings. I will start with the ancient Greek polis and the realities of this society. By showing how this society was structured, what rules governed it and how gender was relevant to the social hierarchies, I aim to present the context within which Plato and Aristotle, two of the most important and influential thinkers of Western political theory, created. I will then move on to the teachings of Machiavelli, who further separated the worlds of the public and private. To each sphere, he allocated not only a sex, but also the "right" kind of

behavior, in the end standing in binary opposition. These were also relevant to the gendered notions of *virtú* and *fortuna*, which I will briefly go over. Moving on to the so-called contractarians, I will briefly introduce Hobbes's and Rousseau's social contract theories to then present Carole Pateman's feminist reinterpretation.

In the following three chapters of my thesis, I will address the issues at hand from three platforms, borrowing the terms "liberal", "standpoint" and "postmodern". I have chosen these platforms because of the epistemological and ontological viewpoints – ranging from strictly positivist (liberal), to postpositivist (standpoint) to poststructural (postmodern). Because of these differences, an ongoing discussion between the different strands of feminism is visible, an issue I will address and emphasize throughout.

In the third chapter, I will mention Morgenthau's main premises regarding IR, which I will use as a bridge between feminist reinterpretations of political philosophy of the previous chapter, and feminist reinterpretations of current IR theory regarding the institution of the state, dominated by realism, which I address in this chapter. I will first deal with where liberal feminism finds the male bias in political theory regarding the state, which I will illustrate on the example of the institution of marriage. Moving on to the standpoint feminist approach to the state, I will once again mention Carole Pateman, this time regarding her re-conceptualization of the birth of the modern state, with emphasis placed on the meaning and consequences of fraternity. I will then introduce the "ethic of care" – one of the most recognizable concepts of standpoint feminism. In the end, I will turn to postmodern feminism, which grasps the issue of women's position in the state in a completely different way. Therefore, it promotes methods that may seem inappropriate to traditional feminism as well as traditional IR, but with the goal of a more profound change.

In the fourth chapter of my thesis I will present some feminist re-conceptualizations of the state in the international system as well as related institutions, specifically war, security and sovereignty. First approaching the issue from the liberal feminist viewpoint, I will point out the parallel of the public and private spheres that exist within the state, to those that exist in the international system. I will continue with Jean Bethke Elshtain's analysis of the semiotics that assist war-making, a landmark concept in feminist IR theory. Continuing with standpoint feminism, I will address the reasons for and

consequences of the women as peace nexus, which has since become one of the greatest clichés of feminism in IR, and address the gender specific effects of war on women. Here I will also mention the issue of rape as a specific method of war and the related mind-set of the international community towards this issue. Once again finishing with postmodern feminism, I will go over the deconstruction of the common conception of “security” to hint at the reformative potential of language (a method of postmodernism generally). By presenting a postmodern reconsideration of the above addressed concept of the Just Warrior and Beautiful Soul, I aim to highlight one of the many ways the different stands of feminism react to one another.

In the final chapter of my thesis, I aim to bring to light the gender bias of IPE and of economics in general. By addressing the issue from the liberal, standpoint and postmodern perspectives, I will simultaneously be mapping out the development theories of the twentieth century and feminist reactions to these theories. The reason is that the development of feminist critiques of economic theory is very well visible on the way development theories evolved, with some changes being inspired preciously by points of critique raised by feminists. Beginning with the liberal perspective, I will map out how the public/private divide effects economics generally, basically by dividing labor into public and therefore valuable and monetarily assessable, versus private and thus invisible. Moving on to standpoint feminism, I will emphasize the effects development projects had on women as women, and introduce the shift in feminist development theory that took the form of Gender and Development – GAD. Again finishing with the postmodern feminist perspective, I will address how the concept of development was itself re-conceptualized and the consequences of this move.

In the conclusion, I will provide a brief summary of the issues addressed in this paper, and hopefully a clear answer to my founding hypothesis – that feminist reinterpretations of traditional theories of the state in international relations is actually capable of undermining the claim of objectivity of these theories, and that they are not, in their practical outcomes, gender neutral.

Having outlined the structure of my paper, presented the main goals, hypothesis and methodology I aim to use and the reasons for choosing them, I

will now move on to the first chapter of my thesis, being the contextualization of feminist IR into the field of International Relations.

1. What is feminism in International Relations?

As mentioned earlier, feminism entered international relations (IR) only towards the end of the 20th century. But why is this so? What were the changes that took place in the world, and in the field of IR itself, that provoked this entrance? And once feminism “established” itself in IR, how did it, as a theoretical approach, evolve?

In this part of my paper, I aim to contextualize feminism, as a specific approach in IR theory, into the general framework of the re-examination of theories of state and international relations. Although these took place most intensely in the 1990s, they already have roots in earlier decades. I will therefore briefly go over the Great Debates of IR theory, in order to be able to address the development and the outcome of dealing with methodological, epistemological and eventually ontological issues within the field. Afterwards, I will introduce the main strands of feminist IR theory, providing a characterization of each and pointing out the ways they are not only interrelated, but also their critiques of one another.

Before I move on, however, I would like to briefly introduce some of the founding concepts of feminism, in order to be able to use them clearly and freely throughout the rest of my thesis. The first of these would be that of “the Other”. Brought into feminism by Simone de Beauvoir in her book *The Second Sex*, it postulates woman as the Other to man. One of the most important aspects of this notion is that man has always been considered not just to be the representative of the masculine, but of the neutral as well. Therefore, the neutral is colonized by the masculine, making women something that is defined as an aberration. Since, however, it plays off the traditional Hegelian Master/slave dialectic, than man needs woman in order to be able to define himself. Thus, fundamental is the dichotomous nature of this system, where one side is superior, but at the same time dependent, to/on the other. This basic concept will later be expanded and built on, depending on the given problematic at hand.

Another essential feminist hypothesis is one already mentioned above - the division of social and political life into the private and public sphere. This

premise has quite a long history, originating in the times of the ancient Greek polis, and keeping its strong hold on society throughout medieval times until today, even if in different forms and intensities. The main assertion is that life is divided into two spheres – a domestic one, inhabited by women, and one outside the home, inhabited by men. Once again, the public sphere is dependent on the private one for its function of sustaining life, but simultaneously, places itself above it and despises it for its earthly worries. At the same time, albeit men may freely move from one to the other, women are defined by (and often kept in) the private sphere.

The last issue I will briefly mention here (and deal with in greater detail later on) is the terms “sex” and “gender”. Although sex seems to be a well understood concept, gender is, contrarily, a rather nebulous one. People either use these terms interchangeably, believing them to be synonyms; identify “gender” to be anything connected with “women’s issues” (and “[i]t is often difficult to persuade men that they have any gender or that gender is of any relevance or interest”² – a testimony in itself); or feel some kind of unexplainable hostility. Yet, everyone intuitively knows there is a difference. The easiest way how to exemplify this is by citing London’s The Guardian blog writer Bidisha’s comment about Sex and the City: “if they wanted to make sure that nobody ever watched it, they could more accurately call it Gender and the City”³. So what is the difference? Sex is the term used to describe the biological condition of a person, usually either male or female. Gender, on the other hand, describes the socially constructed role-playing founded on sex. Analogical to the binary division of sex, male and female genders describe the social roles we take on.

1.1 Feminism enters IR

Although feminist IR is most often considered and thus labeled as *a specific* (i.e. homogenous) approach in IR theory, there are very few proclamations that would apply to all the branches within this line of thought. One of these is

² Carver, Terrell (2003), pp. 290.

³ Bidisha, *Candace Bushnell is more important than Sex and the City* at www.guardian.co.uk, accessed 1.12.2010.

statements is that feminism entered the field of international relations within the overall context of doubts about the epistemological purity of mainstream IR theory. This period dates back to the 1980s and is somewhat chaotically labeled either as the Third or the Fourth Great Debate in IR. I will not go into the details of the history of IR theory here, but will say a few brief words about the Great Debates of International Relations.

Realism had been IR's preferred theory (albeit perhaps not so explicitly) for several centuries. The First World War and its consequences provoked an appetite for a less deterministic and more open-minded approach. Hopes of preventing wars via cooperation steered decision-makers, assisted by some IR theorists now referred to as "idealists", into the League of Nations. However, whether it was the organization that proved to be inadequate for the task it set out to accomplish, or the world was simply not ready for such a change, it soon found itself on the doorstep of the Second World War.

E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crises* is traditionally considered to be the trigger of the First Great Debate. Published in 1939, it reflects the general position of realists considering the naïveté of idealism's attempt to ban war, as opposed to realisms' adherence to rigid but effective rules of the game, based on the anarchic nature of relations among states. The debate, "won" by realists, can hence be characterized as a quarrel between these two main streams of IR theory, centering around questions of whether war is (un)avoidable and cooperation among states (im)possible. Unlike the following debates in IR, it does not address issues of epistemology nor ontology, and not even those of the methodology of research. Completely within positivist boundaries, it can be, with some simplification, characterized as a dispute about who's right and who's wrong.

The Second Great Debate dates to the 1950s and 60s, and is defined by issues of methodology. Most often summed up under the label of behavioralists, these theorists attempted to adopt the methodologies of the natural sciences, seeking objectivity. Positivism was not only the sole lens that could be used to make statements about the world, but, according to these theorists, was indispensable for these statements to be considered legitimate. Science, whether natural or social, was to be objective, and objectivity itself was attainable. The issue at hand was not so much about whose explanation of world events was more plausible and more apt at predicting further

developments, as was the case in the previous Debate, but rather, what conditions must be met in order for the given statement to even be considered legitimate and scientific. As was the case of the First Great Debate, which reacted to the situation of relations among nations and the economic situation of the Post World War I era, here too world events contributed to provoking discussion among academics and directing their conclusions. J. Ann Tickner, a foremost feminist scholar, partly attributes this turn to a desire of "defending the autonomy of rational inquiry against totalitarian ideologies, this time of postwar Communism"⁴. In other words, the consequence of this period, characterized by ideological plurality and hostility, was a craving for scientific objectivity.

Concerns about epistemology in IR theory started appearing in the 1970s as part of the Interparadigm Debate, sometimes referred to as the Third Great Debate. Although realism was still the leading approach in the study of relations among states and the world order, liberalism and Marxism were two other significant viewpoints in the field. Shaping these "worldviews"⁵ were the issues and processes in the world that were *considered* relevant, with each approach emphasizing some other aspect. Each one chose different pieces of the puzzle to create the whole picture, and so the outcome was a series of deliberations about how realities were "constructed"⁶, based on the pre-given assumptions characteristic of each specific paradigm. Therefore, although the Interparadigm debate flirts with epistemological nebulosity, it nonetheless stays true to positivism.

These discussions provided a sort of sneak-preview of what was to come in the 1980s. The Third/Fourth Great Debate (depending on how much relevance and autonomy one concedes to the Interparadigm Debate)⁷ took the contemplations of the 1970s concerning viewpoints even further and began questioning the very validity of positivist epistemology and ontology. The monopoly positivism held concerning legitimate claims about the world (order) came down, and once clear terms such as "objective", "fact" or "truth" became ambiguous. Tainted by belief systems, standpoints and ideologies, they became

⁴ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 23.

⁵ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 21.

⁶ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 22.

⁷ For clarity I will follow the more common division, using the terms Interparadigm Debate for discussions of the 1970s and the Third Great Debate when speaking of the so-called critical turn of the 1980s and 90s.

dubious testimonies of subjective mind-sets. Post-positivism and later poststructuralism demanded their voices be heard.

The core of the questions they were asking was about legitimacy. Why did some testimonies about the world have greater weight than others? Why were some statements considered true and objective, while others biased? Who were these privileged prophets of truth who had the right and capability to make detached statements, and why *them*? Who decided that *this* was the authentic voice of objectivity, and on what grounds did even these decision-makers themselves have the right to decide? How was it possible that these “knowers” were free of the influences of their cultural, social, racial, political backgrounds and able to make claims from what can be termed a God’s point of view? And even – what were these claims they were making? If nobody can make a completely objective statement due to the fact that everybody is rooted in their set of rules about the understanding of the world, does objectivity itself exist? Does truth? Does fact? Simply put: self-proclaimed neutrality and objectivity was no longer enough, and the path of methodological postpositivism eventually led to philosophical postmodernism.

In IR, the unexpected downfall of the Iron Curtain further incited “calls for rethinking the foundations of a discipline that appears to be out of touch with the revolutionary changes in world politics, as well as deficient in how to explain them”⁸. New approaches emerged in IR that took advantage of methodologies often borrowed from other social disciplines (such as genealogy or deconstruction), in order to bring to attention the inadequacies and pitfalls of existing IR theories. Since they seldom offered a substitute version but rather pointed out the fallibility of the existing ones, they became known as “critical theories”. And what they were most vigorously criticizing was, in the words of Linda J. Nicholson, “the failure, common to many forms of academic scholarship, to recognize the embeddedness of its own assumptions within a specific historical context”⁹.

It was in this atmosphere of doubt that feminism began gaining momentum as a specific approach in international relations. Reacting to developments in international relations, in IR and in philosophy, it too evolved, from positivist liberal feminism, through postpositivist standpoint and postcolonial feminism, to

⁸ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 9.

⁹ Nicholson, Linda J (1990), pp.1.

poststructuralist feminism, including postmodern feminism and feminist postmodernism. This is not to say, however, that feminist IR has been welcomed by mainstream IR. As Spike V. Peterson, leading feminist thinker, puts it, feminist critiques “are expanding the margins without, however, significantly affecting the center”¹⁰. She maintains that the reason is lack of effective dialog, with feminism’s critique perceived unclear and perhaps excessively diverse to be able to make a clear contribution by supporters of mainstream IR. J. Ann Tickner, points to the same problem. In her aptly titled essay “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theories”, she maintains that feminism’s shifted epistemological and ontological underpinnings do not “fit comfortably” with traditional state-centered and structural approaches of the mainstream¹¹. I will therefore start by presenting feminist strands of IR, to be able to then go on with the conversation.

In the following section I will chronologically introduce the leading strands of feminist IR theory, pointing out, as mentioned above, the commonalities, differences, and mutual criticisms of each of the strands.

1.2 Strands of feminist IR theory

In this part of my paper I will introduce the main strands of feminist IR thinking, roughly following two division lines that I believe complement each other. The first is based on and inspired by Kimberly Hutchings divide¹², which focuses on the ontological and epistemological differences of the approaches. Specifically, this would be a “liberal” approach, which is positivist in nature and does not differ from traditional IR in its epistemological nor ontological foundations; a “standpoint” approach, which takes issue with traditional IR epistemology, but not with ontology; and a “poststructuralist” approach, which reconsiders both the epistemological and ontological foundations of IR theory. This threefold demarcation will then be roughly supplemented with the lines of

¹⁰ Peterson, Spike V (1992), pp. 184.

¹¹ Tickner, J. Ann (1997).

¹² As is presented in her paper “Feminist Theory and Citizenship” that, although concerning theoretical approaches to citizenship can, I believe, be well adopted for a general division of feminist IR theory. Hutchings, Kimberly (1998)

division presented by Jill Steans in her book "Gender and International Relations". That is, liberal feminism, belonging in the first of the above mentioned categories, standpoint and post-colonial feminism, fitting into the second one, and poststructuralist feminism, located in the third.

1.2.1 Liberal feminism

This strand can be said to have the longest tradition when it comes to the question of women and/in politics. Liberal feminists do not address epistemological nor ontological issues; rather, they focus on the very tangible question of locating women in politics, in political theory, in international relations and in IR theory. They emphasize the public-private binary of social life pointed out by feminists and bring the consequences of this division into IR.

The core of this approach is based on the fact that in western societies, women did not have the same rights as men in relation to the so-called public sphere¹³. Since the times of ancient Greece, this sphere was the domain of men, where productive endeavors such as politics and economic activity took place. Women, on the other hand, were located in the private sphere – that of the household, where activities necessary to sustain life (things such as cooking, cleaning, childbearing) occurred. One of the most prominent feminist thinkers, Jean Bethke Elshtain, maintains that women, being "private beings by definition"¹⁴, were denied any say in the public sphere, "their tongues were silent on the public issues of the day"¹⁵.

This tradition continued throughout the Middle Ages (often) into the 19th and 20th century, when women in the West began fighting for and gaining political rights. Today's liberal feminists have predecessors such as John Stuart Mill or Virginia Woolf, who both pointed out how women's rights and possibilities are being limited, and spoke out against this. In "The Subjection of Women", first published in 1869, Mill tells us

¹³ Nor, obviously, in their „own“ private sphere, but this is not the place to address this issue.

¹⁴ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981), pp. 23.

¹⁵ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981), pp. 14.

"[b]ut this dependence, as it exists at present, is not an original institution, taking a fresh start from considerations of justice and social expediency – it is the primitive state of slavery lasting on, ... [and] the inequality of rights between men and women has no other source than the law of the strongest"¹⁶.

In other words, the title of Mills' book is sufficient to make us understand his stance on the issue of the position of women in society in the 19th century. The key word here is "subjection", which inherently contains a forceful action of one actor against the will of the other actor. And as this paragraph rather aptly reveals, in his opinion, it was not due to any legitimately defensible reason for the benefit of society, but rather the outcome of the tight grip of tradition, and, seemingly, of a simple lust for power.

According to liberal feminism, the lack of possibilities women have historically had and their absence in decision-making has consequences that can be felt "even"¹⁷ today. They maintain that because theories or laws were created by men, they reflect men's points of view. Although these theories may proclaim neutrality, they a priori lack it, since only "one side of the story" is taken into consideration. Issues that concern women are not dealt with, precisely because women have not had any representation or opportunities to have their voice heard and to have issues concerning specifically them as women addressed.

The consequences of this centuries long absence of representation and political power can be, according to liberal feminism, solved just as easily as pointing it out was. This hypothesis is founded on the belief that the unequal position of women is de facto an institutional problem. Therefore, institutional changes ought to be enough to bring about equality. It was Sandra Harding who coined the playful phrase "add women and stir" to describe this approach. In other words, the male bias in current IR can simply be resolved by giving voice and power to women, especially in decision making positions, so they can bring *the* women's point of view into the field. The task is thus one of locating women in international relations, pointing out their marginalization and under-representation and then correcting this by giving them voice, which will allow them to address specifically "women's issues". In many cases, this would be as "banal" a goal as allowing girls to go to school, women to vote or to be elected.

¹⁶ Mill, John Stuart (1988), pp. 7.

¹⁷ Considering the fact that in most European countries, which love to consider themselves especially progressive, women gained the vote only in the (second half of the) 20th century, the word "even" is included solely out of grammatical necessity.

In basic terms, for liberal feminism, the main issue is institutional equality between the sexes, which in many cases may be the method as well as the goal.

One of the defining characteristics of this approach – that it does not question positivist methodologies and outcomes – is also one of the main targets of criticism. Other strands of feminist IR that appeared later on and that can be labeled as postpositivist, reproach liberal feminists for not taking the question of gender into consideration. They denounce the somewhat simplistic belief that just by augmenting the presence of women in IR, the male bias of the field can be remedied. These younger approaches believe that a more profound rethinking of IR is necessary, since even the founding theories of IR are biased.

Although these criticisms of liberal feminism's shortcomings are surely legitimate, it would be counterproductive to depreciate this strand completely. We must not forget that feminism is inherently normative; it has the specific goal of improving the position of women in the world and securing equality between the sexes. Therefore, although on a philosophical level postpositivist and poststructuralist feminists may disagree with the conclusions presented by (and even the basic terminology used by) liberal feminists, in practical terms, women's rights have much to be thankful for to this strand of feminist IR.

1.2.2 Standpoint feminism

Appearing in the 1980s, standpoint feminism is a postpositivist approach to IR. Inequality is not considered to be just an institutional problem, as liberal feminists believe, but to have much deeper roots. Building on Freud's psychoanalytic theory, they point out how the integration of boys and girls into society determines the roles they later take on as men and women. These roles are thus socially constructed, a process that begins in childhood, with the outcome being the subordination of women.

The main thesis, as presented by Nancy Chodorow, who builds on Freud's psychoanalysis, is as follows: due to the necessary separation a boy must go through in relation to his mother, i.e. "escaping" the private realm of the

household and venturing out into the public world of men¹⁸, he as (a) man is different from woman, who as a girl sways inward, reproducing the caretaking activities of her mother. Unlike their predecessors, standpoint feminists do not stress equality with men, but rather emphasize the differences between men and women, i.e. the specific women's point of view. These are produced by gender-specific experiences (such as childbirth and mothering) and the above mentioned social constructing of roles. Therefore, while emphasizing that women are not inferior to men, standpoint feminists maintain that the sexes are essentially different.

How is this relevant to IR? Once again, the self-proclaimed neutrality of IR theories is criticized. These theories and realism in particular lay much emphasis on traits such as independence, sovereignty, rationality or anarchy, which they project into relations between states (but which are founded on a parallel to relations between people). The partiality of this perspective is pointed out by standpoint feminism by emphasizing traditionally specifically female experiences. Sara Ruddick, for example, stresses the importance of mothering and caretaking, where traits as are those mentioned above would basically make human life impossible. Put more clearly: it would hardly be viable for children or the elderly to take care of themselves, be independent and act rationally in an anarchic system – they must, for a given amount of time, be taken care of. Therefore, analogously to the indispensability of cooperation and mutual support in the private sphere, the same is to hold true for the public one. Standpoint feminists bring the necessity of care and cooperation into IR theory, making a point that traditionally valued characteristics in the field are a product of the specifically male point of view, and try to make the female viewpoint visible.

This strand of feminist IR clearly does not attack the ontological essence of women, since it claims its indispensability (below). It does, however, question the epistemological basis of positivist knowledge(seeking). In her fittingly titled article "The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory", Sandra Harding tells us that "[o]ur ability to detect androcentrism in traditional analysis has escalated from finding it in the content of knowledge claims to locating it in the forms and goals of traditional knowledge seeking"¹⁹. In other words,

¹⁸ Chodorow, Nancy (1994).

¹⁹ Harding, Sandra (1986), pp. 647.

feminist reinterpretations have moved from concentrating on the subject of knowledge to questioning the very form it takes on. Her stance toward this is, nonetheless, hesitant. She continues: “[b]oth the standpoint and the postmodern tendencies within feminist theory place feminism in an uneasy and ambivalent relationship to patriarchal discourses and projects”²⁰, since “we sometimes claim that theorizing itself is suspiciously patriarchal, for it assumes separations between the knower and the known”²¹. Although she does defend a feminist and women-centered reevaluation/complementation of IR, she warns against going to (postmodern) extremes, since they may jeopardize the normative goals of feminism. Jumping ahead slightly, Harding defends the standpoint approach, as opposed to the postmodern one, which she accuses of “an inappropriate relativist stance”²², for pragmatic reasons: from a philosophical point of view, questioning the essence of the term “woman” may be valid, but if our goal is to achieve an improvement in the lives of concrete women, we first have to settle on a definition of the term.

As the above may perhaps imply, it is precisely this attempt at pinning out *the* women’s point of view (but also (via opposition to) *the* man’s point of view), in relation to some kind of essence of woman/women, that standpoint feminists are most criticized for. This critique comes not only from poststructuralist feminists, who take issue with the ontological meaning of the terms used, but just as well from postcolonial feminists, who disagree with the all-encompassing endeavors of standpoint feminists.

1.2.3 Postcolonial feminism

This strand, more than anything else, is a critique of western feminism(s) in general, pointing to the repetition of the so-called Enlightenment discourse. As was the case during the times of colonialism, when Europeans ventured to other, “backward” areas of the world to “bring” civilization and present “universal” truths, today, postcolonial feminists accuse Western women of usurping *the* women’s perspective, not leaving any room nor providing any

²⁰ Harding, Sandra (1986), pp. 653.

²¹ Harding, Sandra (1986), pp. 647.

²² Harding, Sandra (1986), pp. 656.

opportunity for other, i.e. non-white and non-western women to voice their opinion.

As Edward Said tells us about the West's attitude towards the Orient, when "...the Oriental is depicted as something one judges..., something one studies and depicts..., something one disciplines..., something one illustrates...in each of these cases the Oriental is *contained* and *represented* by dominating frameworks"²³, the same is to hold true for feminism's modernizing discourse today. A very important aspect of this criticism lays the act of "Othering" those who are not from the West – an act that steals autonomy from the Other by claiming the right to a legitimate statement *about* the Other. The Other is thus *made* a passive *object* of study and judgment, rather than *being* an active and autonomous *subject*.

These lines of thought are very similar to Simone de Beauvoir's account of what "being" a woman means. She asserts that a "woman is the ultimate *object* of desire"²⁴ – once again – a being without any autonomy that passively exists for the sake of others. Similarly, according to Said, the Oriental is "wonderfully synonymous with the exotic, the mysterious, the profound, the seminal..."²⁵, but it is, in the end, "Europe's collective day-dream of the Orient"²⁶, with the most significant word here being day-dream. In other words, women, as well as in this case the Orient, but more broadly the so-called Third World, are creations of the West's imagination. Both are constructed, in one case by men, in the other by the West, as images, but these images serve only their creator, since they are themselves limited by their creators' own limits.

Post-colonial feminism thus locates a parallel between traditional forms of colonialism, that were territorial as well as cultural, and today's on-lasting presumption of the superiority of the West and the "need" of modernization of the Third World, as well as between the "Othering" of women by men and the same "Othering" of Third World women by women of the West. Furthermore, they accuse the West of so-called discourse colonialism, meaning that specifically Western values are presented as universal, without taking into account opinions and viewpoints of other cultural settings. Put differently, "mainstream" feminisms are held to be guilty of the same wrongdoings as

²³ Said, E.W (1978), pp. 40.

²⁴ Beauvoir, Simone de (1953), pp. 343.

²⁵ Beauvoir, Simone de (1953), pp. 51.

²⁶ Beauvoir, Simone de (1953), pp. 52.

traditional IR – of presenting their own viewpoint as *the* universal viewpoint of what “modern”, “developed”, “liberated” or “emancipated” means, without taking into consideration specific cultural contexts. This is also the reason why post-colonial feminists are often disapproving of various “developmental” projects, a topic I will address later in my thesis.

1.2.4 Poststructural feminism

The last branch of feminist IR I will address – somewhat en masse labeled as poststructuralist, is one taken, as mentioned above, from Jill Streean’s categorization. It can be characterized as postmodern in nature, since it questions not only the epistemology, but also the ontology of knowledge claims. Christine Sylvester, in the introductory chapter of her book entitled “Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era”, explains the nuances one can find:

“Within the postmodern movement in feminism, however, there are two streams of thinking...: feminist postmodernism and postmodern feminism. The first, often thought of as an off-shoot of French poststructuralist philosophy, tends to emphasize the deconstruction of authority, including the authority of a coherent Self that is often posed as sovereign man. Poststructuralist feminists ... often look to language as a force in the construction and reconstruction of phallogocentric symbolic orders. ... US-based feminists who take on board aspects of poststructuralist philosophy tend to be somewhat more interested in refusing to reify ... [the] “female experience’, ‘woman’, or the ‘feminine’.”²⁷

The issues at hand obviously differ from the ones of the previous approaches. Not only are traditional methodologies of gaining knowledge considered biased, but even the categories used to *begin* inquiries into the social orders are believed to be tainted by the specifically male perspective (as in feminist postmodernism), or by artificially created categories, presenting themselves as objective (as in postmodern feminism).

Deconstruction and genealogy are used to bring to light the gender hierarchies produced by the linguistic constructions of reality. For example, although poststructuralist feminism appeared only towards the end of the 20th

²⁷ Sylvester, Christiane (1994), pp. 11, 12.

century, the first hints at the questioning (deconstructing) of the gender binary can be found already in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*, first published in 1953. Her arguably most famous remark that "One is not born a woman, but rather, becomes a woman"²⁸, can indeed be interpreted as the same process of social integration and self-(re)interpretation into the role of the social meaning of "woman". The process of Othering, which is, according to de Beauvoir, one that most shapes the meaning of "woman", is first and foremost the process that defines her (i.e. she "is" what the man "isn't", or perhaps more suitably, she isn't what the man is, since, within the conventions of deconstruction, the construction (i.e. man) must come before the de- (i.e. woman)). However, inherent in her remark is process. Therefore, albeit the man may exist already, the woman "creates" herself, although, according to de Beauvoir, within given instructions.

In terms of genealogy, a very interesting case is presented by Judith Butler in her book "Gender Trouble", where she argues that even the very categories of sex – male and female – are social constructions created with political ends in mind. She maintains that it is not gender that was established as the socially constructed mirror of the a priori existing biological categories of sex, but, contrarily, the sexes were created to serve gender. In other words, it is not the sexes that found gender, but gender that invents the sexes, in order to have a seemingly neutral and objective (i.e. biological/natural) given to appeal to, when defending the existing gender hierarchies. A similar point²⁹ is advocated by Helen Kinsella, who claims that the binary mode of thinking about men/women is a specific (dichotomous, gendered) way of interpreting and constructing reality, and thus a (gendered) construct in itself³⁰. Therefore, both of these categories are ipso facto political, and the cause of the current inequality existing between the sexes is not the consequence of institutional problems (as in liberal feminism) nor of some kind of bias in IR (as in standpoint feminisms), but the result of a much more profound, continuous (re)consolidation of gender hierarchies, achieved through ongoing (re)identification of the subjects with their (pre)distributed roles in society.

²⁸ Beauvoir, Simone de (1953)

²⁹ Not, however, one corresponding to Butler's – Kinsella is critical of Butler using gender to construct sex, and not taking one more step back to see that "the determination of sex is a process of construction within a social reality that is already gendered and does not result in the rejection of the materiality of bodies". Kinsella, Helen (2003), pp. 296.

³⁰ Kinsella, Helen (2003)

Nonetheless, although perhaps quite apt at identifying the origins of inequality between men and women, poststructuralist feminism is far from unproblematic when it comes to practical and/or normative ends. As Linda J. Nicholson asks, "does not the adoption of postmodernism really entail the destruction of feminism, since does not feminism itself depend on a relatively unified notion of the social subject 'woman', a notion postmodernism would attack?"³¹ She uses the terms "view from nowhere" and "view from everywhere" to hint at the irony (and perhaps self-negation) of postmodern theory, since, in practical terms, "[t]o invoke the ideal of endless difference is for feminism either to self-destruct, or to finally accept an ontology of abstract individualism"³². A very similar argument is presented by Richard Rorty, who states that "[w]hen philosophy has finished showing that everything is a social construct, it does not help us decide which social constructs to retain and which to replace"³³. This is not only (more or less) the foundation of Sandra Harding's disapproval of poststructuralist feminism, as was mentioned earlier, but of other feminism's critiques of this strand in general. Summing up, unless feminist IR wants to give up its normative character and concrete, short-term goals, it may have to sacrifice (on a practical, not philosophical level), for some time, the more profound explanations of inequality for the sake of the tangibility of its aims.

³¹ Nicholson, Linda J. (1990), pp.7.

³² Nicholson, Linda J. (1990), pp. 8.

³³ Rorty, Richard (1993), pp. 98.

2. Traditional Political Philosophy and its Feminist Reinterpretations

In this part of my thesis, I aim to reconsider the creation of the institution of the state from a feminist viewpoint. I will therefore start at the "beginning" – with the ancient Greek *polis*, since a relevant portion of western political thought has its roots here. I will especially concentrate on the overall character of ancient Greek society and emphasize the position, or better put absence thereof, of women in this society. I will then present some feminist reinterpretations of the theories of Plato and Aristotle concerning the *polis*. Afterwards, I will take a look at Machiavelli's teachings, concentrating on the gendered aspects of the symbolism of *virtú* and *fortuna* and its legacy. Moving on to the social contracts of Hobbes and Rousseau, which I will first briefly present and then re-examine, I will emphasize the presumption of a pre-existing "sexual contract", as is presented by Carole Pateman.

2.1 The ancient Greek polis and its theories

If one is to consider the question of the position of women in the oldest of political institutions – the Greek *polis*, several different aspects of the matter – social, cultural and political, must be taken into consideration. That is, to be able to understand the role of women in this society, we must take a look at the overall characteristics that define it. One of the most relevant questions would be that of citizenship. The rights of being a citizen, meaning a voice in the decision-making process of the *polis*, were reserved for only a small portion of the overall population. Women were categorically excluded, together with slaves and servants. But on what basis were women denied citizenship, if they came from the same families as the most powerful of men?

If we are to understand the reasons why women were a priori considered unfit to be citizens (and thus excluded from any political participation), we must first take a look at the general context of the position of women in Greek society, and Greek society itself. Just as today, the Greek world was one of

gender stereotypes. These were not, however, self-serving. The ancient Greek civilization was martial – constantly conquering new lands. Therefore, the role of the warrior was one of great significance, as was its complementary counterpart - the Beautiful Soul³⁴. This is an issue I will deal with in greater detail in the next chapter of my thesis; for now, I will only mention the gender stereotypes necessary to make this scheme work. Warriors/men, must be strong, brave, independent, rational. Beautiful Souls/women, must be dependent, passive, submissive, in need. This combination and role-identification served as psychological motivation necessary to make wars possible. However, for these roles to be effective, they needed to be permanent and natural. The above mentioned characteristics were, therefore, interpreted to be essential manifestations of the biological sexes.

These gendered attributes were believed to be so inherent to the sexes, that they even gave rise to the Myth of Greek homosexuality. It was not only in war that “the male custom of homosexuality ... served to cement bonds between those who would likely fight and die together”³⁵, although, undoubtedly, an intensified emphasis on the closeness of these relationships had a beneficial effect when it came to the willingness to fight and die for one another/for one’s country. This widespread practice, however, cemented bonds not just in war, but throughout society. Contrarily to common wisdom, it was not a practice based on pleasure, but rather on the social integration and education of the young citizen-to-be. As Martha Nussbaum tells us, “[t]he younger partner, the *eromenos* or ‘beloved’, is likely to be pleased at being the object of admiration and interested in benefits such as friendship, education, and political advancement that a relationship with an *erastes* may bestow”³⁶. Evidently, albeit common practice, it was not one based on sexual pleasure, but rather served as a form of social incorporation of a promising young member of high society into elite, political circles.

At the same time, ancient Greek homosexuality was not free of misogyny. The reason it is often labeled a myth is the presumption that intercourse was socially endorsed or encouraged (and that it even commonly occurred among members of the same social strata, for that matter). Contrarily, it was not to be mentioned in public and could even result in shame for the *eromenos*, since it

³⁴ Elshaint, Jean Bethke (1987)

³⁵ Elshaint, Jean Bethke (1987), pp. 48.

³⁶ Nussbaum, Martha (1998), pp. 306-307.

meant accepting passivity through submission³⁷. Citing Martha Nussbaum once again, "[t]he important point to stress ... is that such shame as was potentially at issue was shame not about the fact of same-sex copulation but about the 'womanish' passivity and its potential connection with being turned into a woman"³⁸. In other words, the greatest danger was taking on "feminine" characteristics, pointing to and at the same time perpetuating the inferior, almost absent, position of women.

Hence, the sexual exclusion of women finalized the absoluteness of their exclusion from civic life, from society, from the public world in general. Considering the misogynic nature of ancient Greek society and all the [negative] connotations being a woman, or even taking on "womanly" attributes carried, it can come as no surprise that women were considered unsuited to take on political roles, and were de facto unconditionally limited to the private sphere of the *oikos*.

It was in this overall context that Plato and later Aristotle created their (and to a certain extent our) most important writings on the workings of society and politics. Once again, the division of life into the public and private played quite an important role in this, since it was within the reality of the existence of this division that both men wrote. As Jean Bethke Elshtain tells us,

"The result of the Greek division and classification of cultural phenomena was the *polis*, the concept and reality of a structured body politic set off in contrast to the *oikos*, or private household. ... First, the relations and activities occurring within and serving as the *raison d'être* of the *polis* were defined as existing outside the realms of nature and necessity. Second, the free space of the *polis*, though apart from necessity, existed in a necessary relation to those activities lodged within the private realm, held by the Greeks to be the sphere of unfreedom. ... The public world of politics and free citizenry was conceptually and structurally parasitic upon the world of necessity, a realm downgraded and demeaned systematically by powerful public voices, including those of Plato and Aristotle."³⁹

Although women were destined to the private realm of the *oikos*, men could freely move from one to the other. This did not mean, however, that men spent more time than necessary in the household, since, as mentioned above, it was the reproductive sphere, "the sphere of unfreedom". Although the term "unfreedom" certainly applies to the factual position of women within the *oikos*,

³⁷ Nussbaum, Martha (1998), pp. 306-307.

³⁸ Nussbaum, Martha (1998), pp. 306-307.

³⁹ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987), pp. 12.

it can also be understood as a metaphor – women were incapable of freeing themselves from nature and necessity. And it was precisely nature and necessity, these contemptible realities, that women were considered to be manifestations and representations of.

Plato is often considered to be one of the first philosophers to favor the participation of women in the public sphere, and was for a long time the only one. Indeed, many of his successors in (political) philosophy were strongly opposed to the idea, providing innumerable reasons⁴⁰. This made Plato feminists' best friend. But just almost. For his incorporation of women into the public sphere is not as innocent and honest as may seem at first sight. According to Plato, it was exactly these natural instincts that man had to conquer. Once again in the words of Elshtain, "To become good on Plato's terms a man must successfully fight and conquer Eros, the most dangerous desire, and sublimate through stern discipline his impulses into a pure and spiritual love of wisdom"⁴¹. The traits Plato believed determined the righteousness of a man were the same ones that he considered indispensable to the ideal state. These were will, reason, and desire, and knowing and understanding their relationship is what provided the foundation for harmony and the righteous man/ideal state. Reason was the most valued one, since it was capable of setting boundaries to itself as well as the other ones, thus creating harmony. And just as the honorable man, the ideal state also had to be harmonious - a single entity.

This had implications for the traditional public/private divide. For Plato's ideal state to be a true entity, having two separate spheres was unacceptable. The private thus had to be integrated into the public, and its inhabitants – women – along with it. But how does one erase the private sphere? Plato's answer was to de facto disintegrate it, by making women and children collective goods. Indeed, Monique Canto rather aptly terms Plato's integration of women into the political the integration of women's *bodies* into the political⁴².

As mentioned above, he believed in conquering the Eros for the benefit of seeking knowledge. This held true in the ideal state as well, therefore copulation was to be strictly regulated, permitted for reasons of reproduction only. However, only the best of women were to be worthy of reproducing with the best of men. This is why it was necessary that they get the same education and

⁴⁰ see Bluestone, Natalie Harris (1994).

⁴¹ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987) pp. 12.

⁴² Canto, Monique (1994)

training as men. Although this may, at first sight, seem like women finally gained a[n equal] place in the public sphere, it was a place granted for pragmatic reasons, not because of the belief that they were worthy of it. On the contrary, it was only because procreation was not just a necessary but also one of the primary functions of the ideal state that women were allowed to legitimately enter the public sphere⁴³. Proof may be the fact that albeit women were assimilated into the public sphere, it was without them once expressing their opinion on what form and final shape this incorporation would take on. What was expected of them may have been the same as what was expected of men, creating an illusion of equality, but this expectance was itself a dictum, and the outcome was to fit into the preexisting picture already once created by men. Women may have been granted a place in the public sphere of Plato's ideal state, but they were not granted a public voice. Their role, in the end, was a complementary and strictly auxiliary one, basically serving as a/the means of reproduction.

Unlike Plato, his student Aristotle a priori ruled out the possibility of women being able to take part in the public world of the *polis*, however inferior that role may be. For one thing, Aristotle maintained that everything around us exists for a reason, has an end that it is destined to fulfill - the so-called teleological imperative. "[T]he 'good' of some *x* is always relative to its function and that function follows a fortiori from its inherent teleological principle"⁴⁴. This applies to the role of woman in society as well. A woman's value is determined by her usefulness - in the eyes of Aristotle basically determined by reproduction. Given the atmosphere of ancient Greek society, as was mentioned above and as Aristotle was obviously not capable of overcoming, women are enslaved and their existence was determined by forces of nature, which made them inferior to man, thus a priori lacking the necessary attributes to be capable of political participation. He therefore "absorbs women completely within the *oikos* or household, denies women any possibility of a public voice or role, and precludes the possibility for female self-transformation over time"⁴⁵. Inherent in this remark is a notion towards the future - the possibility of women ever being able to partake in the public world is ruled out right at the beginning.

⁴³ Canto, Monique (1994)

⁴⁴ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987), pp. 42.

⁴⁵ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987), pp. 41.

Another notion that supported the idea of women's "natural" place in the private realm was the thesis that this realm, one of reproduction, existed prior to any political action or ambition. The endeavor of working together toward a common good was, contrarily, an intentional activity, one that required knowledge and skill, and was therefore placed above the realm of nature. Hence, while men occupied the [higher] public sphere, women inhabited the already [pre]given private sphere, which was "therefore irrelevant to politics"⁴⁶. Women were hence not only apolitical beings by nature, but were also inevitably defined by it and determined to it. This ascribed attribute served as a prerequisite for men to be able to "give birth" to themselves in the form of "immortal political theorists"⁴⁷. As had been addressed in the previous chapter regarding the process of separation a boy must go through, which is from his mother (equaling the private sphere) into the public one, the same process must be undertaken on a metaphorical level. By creating something supposedly permanent in the public sphere, the man/theorist distinguishes himself from the reproductive private one. Hence, this separation is not just a prerequisite for the emancipation of man, but simultaneously the goal. This provides another reason, albeit a clearly tautological one, why women are not suited to participate in the public world of men⁴⁸.

Furthermore, women were not apt to participate in the political sphere because they are swayed by emotion, as opposed to men, who are rational⁴⁹. What further aggravated this "sin" was the fact that for Aristotle, like for Plato, reason was an end in itself, not merely a tool to be used in politics. Taking this into consideration, we can see why it would be such a grave shortcoming. To be slightly cynical, we can say that this is where the "oldest trick in the book" of "explanations" of why women are unfit to participate in politics comes from. Indeed, even today, it is an argument heard more often than any other. There are, however, some feminists who believe that although Aristotle himself was, to use a strong term, misogynist, some aspects of his theory are in accordance with the normative goals of feminism. This is well visible exactly when it comes to emotions. For example, Barbara Koziak argues that the border line between emotion and reason that Aristotle spoke of was not the same one we have now.

⁴⁶ Ackelsberg, Martha A., Shanley, Mary Lyndon (1996), pp. 215.

⁴⁷ Zerilli, Linda M.G. (1991), pp. 253.

⁴⁸ Zerilli, Linda M.G. (1991).

⁴⁹ Koziak, Barbara (1998), pp. 261.

Rather than emotions, he spoke of passions – those that blind reason. She maintains that today, some emotions are considered quite normal in the public sphere – for example anger or greed. It is the supposedly feminine emotions, such as care, that are unwelcomed. Therefore, what is necessary is a reconsideration of the way we perceive specific emotions and the value we attribute to them, returning to Aristotle’s more “judicious” understanding of emotion and reason. A similar point is raised by Ruth Groenhout, who claims that especially the standpoint feminist concept of the ethic of care, an issue I will address later on, can learn much from Aristotle’s virtue ethics. The reason being that like the concept of the ethic of care, Aristotle also considers the judging self situated, defined by his social settings and even praises and ethic of self-sacrifice⁵⁰.

Albeit today we may reinterpret Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories in ways more benign to feminist thought, in the end, considering the place women occupied in Greek society and what being a woman meant, as was illustrated above, it would be almost naïve to think that women in the (ideal) state, whether Plato’s or Aristotle’s, could be equals of men. Their existence was intrinsically defined by necessity and driven by nature. This gave rise to a tradition that eventually inspired Machiavelli to create *fortuna* – the uncontrollable feminine force of nature that was in need of subjugation by *virtú* – the masculine force of will.

2.2 Machiavelli: reinforcing gendered connotations

Influenced by the position the Florentine Republic found itself in at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries – characterized by an omnipresent threat from outside the borders as well as from within, Machiavelli provided for a new dogma in IR theory, one revolving around power. He believed that power and the lust to attain and keep it was the driving force of politics and history. In this sense, he foretold what was to eventually become one of the founding assumptions of realism - that political history doesn’t substantially change, only the actors currently fighting for power alter. Humans are, according to Machiavelli, intrinsically bad – their greatest interest is their own, and they will

⁵⁰ Groenhout, Ruth (1998)

try to benefit themselves, regardless of the harm their actions may cause to others. Society and the state are therefore necessary institutions, whose main function is to protect people from one another. In other words, given the fact that what is crucial in politics is keeping people under control, the most important attribute of the state/ruler is not legitimacy, as was the case in the popular teachings of the time that were influenced by Christian doctrine, but rather force⁵¹.

Machiavelli continues in the tradition of the public/private divide, sometimes even being interpreted as having finalized it, maintaining that they are to be mirror images of each other⁵². He does consider morality, but argues that it has no place in the world of politics, since it may turn out to be counterproductive to the pragmatic goals of the ruler. Therefore, the standards by which we are to judge man in the private sphere, where terms such as "morally good" may have meaning and value, are irrelevant to the standards by which we are to judge a man in the public sphere. These notions were at the same time gendered – the private sphere was feminine – meaning emotional, weak, dependent – the opposite of the rational and independent public one. Elshtain argues that notions of "good" and "bad" were almost categorically separated into the private and public realms by Machiavelli, and perhaps almost paradoxically, what was good in the private one was inevitably bad in the public one. Consequently, she reasons that "[a] 'good' woman makes a 'bad' citizen by definition"⁵³. Women, whose essence was by then associated with emotionality, gentleness, innocence and vulnerability, were (to be) the opposite of strong and brave men, hence making them absolutely unfit for any role in the ruthless public sphere. She continues: "Machiavelli's politics can be seen in large measure as a defense against the softer, 'womanly' Christian virtues"⁵⁴.

A consequence of this defense was the necessity to control and subjugate these weak aspects of the private domain. That is where the gendered terms of [the masculine] "virtú" - virtue, associated with autonomy, ability and strength (values that are, for that matter, considered to define the masculine even today), and [the feminine] "fortuna" – fortune, characterized by disorder and dependency, come in. The reason that *fortuna* must be subjugated by force is

⁵¹ Machiavelli (2007).

⁵² Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987) pp. 93/94.

⁵³ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987), pp. 93/94.

⁵⁴ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987), pp. 93/94.

precisely because she cannot be persuaded into submission, a characteristic inherent to her irrational nature – she is the principal source of violence, “antithetical to reason”⁵⁵. This notion is in accordance with the dichotomous way of thinking in traditional political philosophy. Jill Steans claims that women “were both a sign of men’s original weakness and a threat to his self-control” – representing the seductive forces of nature, they were “a potential source of conflict and division among men”⁵⁶, capable of luring them away from the public realm of citizenship and its loyalties. Therefore, it was necessary that virtue subject fortune, whether that be in terms of order to chaos, public to private, man to woman, rules to coincidence. And analogically, a state founded and run by the forces of virtue will prosper, be long-lasting and stable, as opposed to one founded and governed by forces of fortune, which will be weak and constantly in danger of demise.

A different interpretation, but with very similar outcomes, of the gendered nature of *fortuna* maintains that the reason she had to be inherently violent and irrational, and thus forcefully subjugated, is so there would be a platform which would legitimize the integration of violence into politics⁵⁷, in a time long before Weber’s introduction of the legitimate monopoly of force. In opposition stands *virtú*, which is most importantly *rational*, with rationality being the best way to rule a state and thus to play the prime role in political reign. Therefore, the appearance of *fortuna* in the public sphere is to be ideally minimal, and if she by chance does happen to appear, she will be legitimately conquered. The reason *fortuna* is feminine and not male is, simply, because of the habit of placing “residual” aspects onto the irrational Other, which is already feminine⁵⁸.

Continuing in the tradition of Machiavelli’s ruthless pragmatism is the realist approach in IR, redefined in modern terms by Hans Morgenthau in his 1948 *Politics Among Nations*, which for a while basically became the handbook of IR theory. Before moving on to modern times though, I will first examine two of the so-called social contract theorists, that is, Tomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

⁵⁵ Nederman, Cary J., Morris, Martin (2004), pp. 276.

⁵⁶ Steans, Jill (2006), pp.34/35.

⁵⁷ Nederman, Cary J., Morris, Martin (2004) pp. 277.

⁵⁸ Nederman, Cary J., Morris, Martin (2004) pp. 277.

2.3 The Social Contract vs. the Sexual Contract

As hinted above, the main premise of both of these thinkers is that civil society and its political institutionalization has its origins in the closing of a metaphorical social contract among people. They differ, however, in the original character of these people, and consequentially the reason the social contract was created and the form it took on.

Hobbes was the first to introduce the idea of the social contract. He didn't believe, just like Machiavelli hadn't, in the naturally good character of humans, and contrarily considered them by nature selfish, with the main incentive of their actions being a lust for power and fear of death. Before the creation of the social contract, people lived in a state of nature – defined by self-interest and anarchy, a state of what he calls "a war of all against all". Therefore, they closed the social contract, the main function of which was to provide protection to people from one another. They bestowed their rights in the hands of Leviathan – a metaphorical supervisor of the newly created institution. Leviathan, in Hobbes's terms, had absolute power, but was not self-serving. Therefore, although submission was complete, but the abuse of powers was out of the question, since it would deny the very reason Leviathan came into being.

Carole Pateman brings to our attention several interesting points arising out of Hobbes's presentation of the social contract. First of all, she argues that in his interpretation, there is no difference between obeying on the basis of consent vs. submission. Her explanation of this begins in the state of nature itself. Hobbes maintained that in the natural state, everyone was equal – all men with all women. Each person was equally vulnerable to conquest by someone else – presumably someone stronger. Therefore, if a man, under the threat of death, agreed to become another man's servant in order to save his own life, they enclosed a contract – creating the first origins of institutionalized social structures. Whether one was de facto forced into this contract is of no relevance to Hobbes, nor does it undermine the validity of the contract enclosed.

It was precisely this un-consensual contractarianism that also served as the foundation for what Pateman describes as the impression of the matriarchy of the state of nature. When a child is born, it is decided by the parents by pact to who the child must conform. If there is no contract, it is automatically under the

reign of the mother, since paternity, in the state of nature, cannot be proven due to the absence of matrimonial laws ensuring the mothers' virginity and fidelity. However, it is the mothers' decision whether she will care for it or let it die. Therefore, the newborn – out of necessity - contracts itself into submission to whoever else will care for it, in this case the mother. This, however, along with Hobbes's decision to introduce the family into the state of nature, is where the problem arises. Pateman points out that if people in the state of nature are defined by their self-interest, nobody would ever decide to contract themselves into the care for an infant. It would inevitably mean increased danger for that person, since they would now have to care not just for themselves, but for two. She somewhat cynically concludes that if this were the case, then "all stories of original social contracts and civil society are nonsense because the individuals in the state of nature would be the last generation"⁵⁹. In other words, for the creation of any social contract to be possible, women had to be forced to take on the care of their newborns, making themselves vulnerable, and thus contracting themselves, out of necessity, into submission by men. Therefore,

"[t]he assumption must necessarily be made that, by the time the social contract is made, all the women in the natural condition have been conquered by men and are now their subjects (servants). ... In the natural state all women become servants, and all women are excluded from the original pact. [Thus] husbands are civil masters because men ('fathers') have made the original social contract that brings civil law into being"⁶⁰.

Albeit infants entering into contracts may be slightly farfetched, the argumentation brings to our attention the consequences of Hobbes's social contract theory when thoroughly examined into detail. The conclusion – that women did not de facto take part in the enclosing of the social contract since they were by then already subservient to men, helps explain their inferior position in society once the contract was valid. In other words – if they had had any say, why would they willingly enter into a contract that automatically makes them the subordinates of men? The outcome of this examination is that social contract theory itself depends on a male bias for its existence, since a gender neutral reexamination proves its fallibility.

⁵⁹ Pateman, Carole (1988), pp. 49.

⁶⁰ Pateman, Carole (1988), pp. 48-50.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the other social contract theorist I will mention, continues in the Machiavellian tradition of the binary concept of equating masculinity with reason and order, and femininity with chaos and nature. And just as well, he maintains that it is necessary for the first to conquer and subjugate the second if civil society is to come into existence and survive. In Rousseau's state of nature, relationships of domination and submission do not exist amongst its inhabitants. He argues that since humans have no property, there are no ways how one could materially evaluate these relationships. Therefore, the only outcome of basically random interaction between individuals would be determined by the law of the stronger. However, this law is not (yet) institutionalized, and so relationships of dominance and compliance do not exist even between men and women.

It thus comes as no surprise that for Rousseau the beginning of civil society is determined by the introduction of the patriarchal family – by the metaphorical moment when woman is forced to obey man. Making an attempt at introducing biological and evolutionary foundations to his arguments, Rousseau explains that this is predetermined by women's physical weakness, her role as a mother and her attendance to the household. "This was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and distinguished families, and introduced a kind of property... and [e]ach family became a little society"⁶¹. The roles of men and women changed: women tended the hut, men ventured out. This is basically Rousseau's version of the beginning of the allocation of men into the public and of women into the private sphere. The byproduct was, however, the submission of women to men. As Pateman reads this, "interrelated development of reason, language and social relationships [on] the development of sexual difference, a difference that necessarily entails that women must be dependent on and subordinate to men"⁶². Albeit their roles are a priori defined, something modern feminism would disagree with, fact is that it is nonetheless a relationship based on reciprocity and mutual caring. The only way dominance and submission can come into the relationship is if it is based not on reason, as Rousseau claims (for surely reason should not be blind to such simple facts), but contrarily on physical strength and the primitive form of power derived from it. Just as well, the argument that language and social relationships are dependent on a

⁶¹ Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1973), pp. 88.

⁶² Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1973), pp.97.

necessary subordination of women to men is at best tautological, especially given that this dependence is itself a social relationship, therefore making the argument of its own creation to be dependent on itself nonsense.

Rousseau does provide us with one more reason why women should be ruled by men – their incapability to control their sexual desires and thus function in civil society. This self-control does not seem to be a problem for men, who, also having passions, are nonetheless thanks to reason capable of controlling them. However, “Jean-Jacques matured in the care of a couple that had no sexual relationship and therefore gave him no opportunity to resolve an oedipal conflict and attain genital maturity and sexuality”⁶³. Perhaps against mainstream IR dogma, we must take into consideration *who* is presenting their theories, including their historical, social and personal backgrounds, and be prepared to keep that reality in mind when contemplating the truths they present to us.

Building on the premise of women being raging sexoholics, it is no wonder that Rousseau would consider them a threat to society. This perception of women also provided foundations for the role he prescribed women in society once the social contract was signed: although he insisted that they be educated, their education was to take on a different form than that of men – that is, as to become an obedient wife fostering the needs of her husband. Women were once again considered inapt to take on any political roles and the reason (once again) being “explained” by their natural dispositions, respectively lack thereof. In other words, he does not see beyond the mutually (re)affirming cycle of socialization and socialized behavior.

⁶³ Galle, Ronald and Waegner, Cathy (1986), pp. 558.

3. Feminist Reinterpretations of the State

Beginning with a very quick look at the implications of Morgenthau's principles of politics, I will mainly use them as a starting point for feminist reinterpretations of contemporary concepts of the state. These reconsiderations will be presented from the three perspectives previously mentioned – the liberal, standpoint and postmodern ones. I will examine the concepts of the private/public divide and of independence and freedom from each of these viewpoints, pointing out how they differ from each other and play off one another.

3.1 Morgenthau's realism: a stepping stone for feminist reinterpretations of the state

Hans Morgenthau, in the footsteps of Machiavelli, presents a very rigid and pragmatic vision of politics. Since many of his ideas shape the content of IR theory today, I will only very briefly mention some of his/realism's main premises. I will then move on to a general feminist reconsideration of the traditional concept of the state in IR, returning to the liberal, standpoint and postmodern perspectives.

A view that Morgenthau shared with Machiavelli is that states are not to consider and let their actions be defined by notions of normatively defined good. Once again, the concepts of good and bad were consigned into the private and public spheres: what was valued in one (for example moral beliefs) was disdained or at best irrelevant in the other. Hence, the only measures of good and bad were determined in terms of their usefulness to the state. At the same time, Morgenthau considered the state to be a rational unitary actor that follows his own interest, defined in terms of power. Although he does realize that "power" is not a static term, but its meaning and contents vary depending on the situation, this is as far as he ventures away from black and white thinking. His method is strictly positivist - he maintains that actions of the state are

governed by objective laws that can be described, measured and stand independent of the situation of the observer.

It is not difficult to see why realism is the favorite target of feminist critique. First of all, it still enjoys hegemony in the field of IR theory. Therefore, much of what feminists think needs to be reevaluated in IR is itself a realist presumption, in one form or another. Secondly, its uncompromisingly positivist methodology goes against what feminism (except for liberal feminism) stands and strives for. Let us now revisit some of the main concepts of IR from feminist viewpoints, once again on the liberal, standpoint and postmodern perspectives.

3.2 Liberal feminism: playing the game

Liberal feminism, as mentioned above, is itself a positivist approach. In IR its goals were ones of "bringing the women back in" – of showing where the women were and rendering them visible. Firstly, this meant bringing to light the role of women in politics, whether in the form of lending support to men by their work in the private sphere, or by their activities in the public sphere, as in nationalist movements, guerilla wars or opposition politics. Secondly, liberal feminists tried to map out and illustrate the systematic exclusion of women from IR, backing their claims with documentation of women's absence from political and international organizations and movements as well as decision-making institutions⁶⁴. This was well visible when it came to the visibility of the position of women in the public sphere of the state – or perhaps better put, lack thereof. In political theory, liberal feminism reevaluates the concept of the state on the most superficial level. It points out a parallel between the state in the international system as the private sphere, analogical to the household in the state as the private sphere. It does not, however, wish to undermine either. Its critique of the institution of the state is basically limited to attaining equal rights for women. In the beginning, this mainly referred to women's right to vote and to education, eventually moved on to equal opportunities and pay, and now includes, among other things, women's right to serve in the army and in combat. In other words, the goal is that women become citizens equal to men.

⁶⁴ Nagel, Joane (1998), pp. 243.

Liberal feminism does not, however, redefine or question the term “citizen” nor does it aim to change the rules of the game.

The institution of marriage, in the form it takes on in the so-called Western world, can serve as an example of this. As mentioned above, the household, or rather the family, made up the private sphere, and was considered to be a unit⁶⁵. The wedding traditionally thus meant that the bride was passed on from the care of her father to the care of her husband. Often, she had no say in this, which was one of the first targets of criticism of (liberal) feminists. Care, however, includes a certain amount of authority, and the case of marriage is no exception. The husband was therefore not only in charge of the family, but also represented it in the public world. As a result, legislature that was created responded to this model. The family, once it was established, was out of reach of the power of the state, with the consequences for women usually being negative. As an example one can mention domestic abuse or marital rape. In most states and cultures “there is no such thing” as marital rape, and only recently has legislation began being modified. The same holds true for domestic abuse – the police did not interfere in domestic affairs. In other words, “[i]f law and society label intervention to halt violence and prosecute abusive action as ‘interference’ in family matters, family privacy becomes a cloak for what, in another context, the law would recognize as criminal assault”⁶⁶. Therefore, when the private sphere was described as the sphere of freedom by traditional liberalism, what it also meant, according to feminists as Catherine MacKinnon, was that men were free to oppress women at home. As Anita L. Allen explains, “[t]he gist of MacKinnon’s critique of privacy is that even though women officially have privacy and ‘free choice,’ men actually dominate their private lives, control sexual intercourse, and decide women’s sexual and reproductive fates”⁶⁷. A very similar argument is presented by Nancy J. Hirschmann, i.e. that the freedom of men can exist only at the expense of the freedom of women.⁶⁸ Liberal feminism brings our attention to the male bias of legislature, as the example above demonstrates, and tries to change it in order to improve the rights of women.

⁶⁵ Steans (2006), pp. 89.

⁶⁶ Ackelsberg, Martha A., Shanley, Mary Lyndon (1996), pp. 225.

⁶⁷ Allen, Anita L. (1996), pp. 194.

⁶⁸ Hirschmann, Nancy (1996)

The public/private divide can, however, be quite tricky, for example when it comes to reproductive rights. Although the state is often very reluctant to venture into the private sphere when it comes to "existing conditions of sexual inequality"⁶⁹, it has no problem entering the private sphere when it comes to abortion. Women's reproductive rights are a public issue, no matter how intimate their nature. The ambiguous nature of the delimiting line between the public and the private is most manifest here.

This does not mean, however, that liberal feminism would want to do away with the public/private distinction. As Anita L. Allen mentions in her essay entitled "Privacy at Home: The Twofold Problem", "[a]lthough mindful of the ways in which traditional marriage, family life, and sex roles have resulted in inadequate privacy for women, liberal feminism in principle does not oppose marrying, mothering, and heterosexual relationships"⁷⁰. In other words, the main issue at hand is that of equality. Just as well, although liberal feminism was the first feminist approach to appear in IR, it still has its followers, precisely because of its clear-cut methodologies, beliefs and goals. For example, in her interestingly titled article "Abusing History", Anne Marie D'Aoust argues that historians and political scientists, albeit well aware of the fact that history is not "intrinsically significant" but rather dependent on interpretations, are nonetheless reluctant to abandon positivism, for fear of getting completely absorbed by relativism, a fear she attributes to the rise of postmodernism⁷¹.

3. 3 Standpoint feminism: seeking the mirror image

A very different point of view is that of standpoint feminism. First of all, it abandons positivist methodology and aims at a re-examination via a completely new lens. It maintains that the very concept of the state – how it came about, its characteristics and how it is to behave – is a gendered one. Being postpositivist in nature (not yet, however, poststructuralist) it maintains that the state, the theory of the state, and the theory of International Relations are testimonies determined by the realities of those whose make these statements.

⁶⁹ Allen, Anita L. (1996), pp. 203.

⁷⁰ Allen, Anita L. (1996), pp. 203.

⁷¹ D'Aoust, Anne Marie (2004), pp. 14.

Historically, these are white men from the West, usually of privileged background. Therefore, they believe that thanks to the absence of epistemological neutrality (something impossible), the theory of world politics is a social construction, defined and transformed by the changing realities of the observer. What standpoint feminists thus aim for is the integration of a feminine point of view.

As was described above in the social contract theories, the creation of the state was based on what Pateman then termed the sexual contract, a censored prerequisite to the "founding" social contract. Even Hobbes, the most consistent of the contractarians, couldn't escape (albeit he tried) the necessity of the primary subjection of women via the sexual contract. Rousseau, on the other hand, didn't even pretend something like that was possible – the family as the basic unit of society, with the man as ruler, was a natural (in the sense of normal as well as the sense of 'coming from nature') given that was not even necessary to contemplate. And paradoxically, even this was a step forward from the previous doctrines of the creation of states – the pure patriarchy of God as the absolute ruler, later substituted by the absolute reign of the monarch.

The birth of the modern state is often associated with the French Revolution. The feudal was dethroned in sake of the masses – his sole will was to be replaced by that of the people, who must move and act "as a single body"⁷², in the tradition of Rousseau's general will. From afar, this may seem like the first blow to patriarchy – the kings' absolute power dissolved into liberty and equality for all. However, as Pateman reminds us, women were once again only the handmaiden of the revolution, since the slogan went "liberty, equality, fraternity". With her characteristic yet pertinent cynicism she points out that "[a]lmost no one – except for some feminists – is willing to admit that fraternity means what it says: the brotherhood of *men*"⁷³. The metaphorical father may have been overthrown, but this was of no avail to women, since they were only handed down to another set of rulers – their brothers. Referencing Freud, who was one of the first to make good use of the fact that sex sells,

"[Freud] explicitly states that the father's dominion over women, not merely his dominion over his sons, is the cause of their rebellion and the reason for his murder. In Freud's story, the parricide is actual, not metaphorical, and the sons

⁷² Elshain, Jean Bethke (2008), pp. 138.

⁷³ Pateman, Carole (1988), pp. 78.

commit their dreadful deed to gain the political liberty that will also bring sexual access to women”⁷⁴.

At the same time, along with the nation another concept was born – nationality. What is interesting here is the subtle power of language: the *birth* of nationality was made possible by the existence of a nation. An idea I have briefly mentioned above and will return to in greater detail in the following chapter of my thesis, the nation is often referred to as the motherland, which is of great significance in war. It would, however, be a mistake to consider the state feminine – contrarily, it is modeled after the image of masculinity⁷⁵. Originating in ancient Greece, the tradition of associating women and everything feminine with nature was then fortified by Machiavelli’s *virtú* vs. *fortuna*, segregated into the private and public sphere by the contractarians, and by the 20th century had evolved into such essentialist images of the sexes, it almost seems that adjectives took on a gender, rather than the other way around. The state itself replicates the patriarchal family model: hierarchical structure of authority with men occupying the vast majority of decision-making posts; the gendered division of labor, loyally mirroring the superior and important work of men and the auxiliary nature of the work of women; and men’s say regarding the reproductive and sexual rights of women⁷⁶. Similarly, the power of language, as was pointed out by discourse analysis, was used by feminists to show how certain characteristics are subconsciously associated with women while others with men. At the same time, the “masculine” adjectives, such as rationality, forcefulness, independence, are more valued than the “feminine” ones, as is emotionality or passivity, by men as well as women. And the state, as was preached by realists, was to be just that: sovereign, selfish, pragmatic, forceful. The state was an isolated individual among other states, their relations characterized by mutual animosity. The only possibilities of cooperation were determined by power balancing or bandwagoning, both of which were driven by pragmatic reasons, and even then haunted by paranoia regarding guarantees of the other performing second.

Hence, what standpoint feminists aim at is a re-examination of the state. They do not want women to “play the boy’s game” according to the boy’s rules,

⁷⁴ Pateman, Carole (1988), pp. 103.

⁷⁵ Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981)

⁷⁶ Nagel, Joane (1998), pp. 251.

as is the case of liberal feminism. Contrarily, they want the women's perspective to be taken into consideration as well, and the state be redefined based on an inclusive evaluation. The state and IR theory are to be re-examined and a "women's" version is to be presented, mirroring the one of men. As has already been several times mentioned, characteristic of the standpoint approach is emphasis on women as a specifically marginalized and oppressed group⁷⁷. With their goal being the improvement of the position of women, they must be considered a group per se.

At the heart of the problem lies the concept of freedom. As mentioned above, Nancy J. Hirschmann asserts that men can be free only because women cannot. A liberal feminist response to this problem would be to provide women with the same rights as men (so-called negative liberty as is presented by Isaiah Berlin), and perhaps even with positive liberty, as was reconceptualized by Amartya Sen. In other words, women should not only be guaranteed equal rights by the state, but also the practical possibilities to make use of their potential and have the same right as men to enjoy life. A standpoint feminist response, on the other hand, emphasizes the fact that "[w]omen cannot be equal to men as women"⁷⁸. What this means to say is that women's reality necessarily differs from that of men, primarily due to motherhood. Therefore, to aim for the same position in society as men have is counterproductive to what feminism, in the normative sense, stands and fights for. What is necessary, rather, is a gender-sensitive rethinking of the various concepts that define our society. In the case of freedom, this would mean, as Hirschmann argues, to reject both notions of positive and negative freedom, and replace them with a definition accessible to women, without them having to sacrifice aspects of their natural difference from men. This would include reconsidering the definitions of valued notions in our society. For example, considering success, why should economic success be more valuable than motherhood and caring for the family? Similar would be the case of independence: is the value we grant to existing notions of independence adequate? Or should we redefine the term to include the specifically female experiences of the possibilities of independence? And of course freedom: in the common sense of the term, is it even accessible to women?

⁷⁷ Hartsock, Nancy (1990)

⁷⁸ Hirschmann, Nancy (1996), pp. 63.

The most common response of standpoint feminism to these and similar questions is the concept of the ethic of care. Emphasis is placed on the fact that all humans are, for a certain amount of time in their lives, dependent on the help of others. Joan C. Tronto even calls this a “politically significant fact”⁷⁹. The reason she emphasizes this is perhaps because care was, like many other issues, banished from the public and allotted into the private, where it was, once again, linked to women and the feminine. She mentions two arguments presented by Aristotle: that care is pre-political (since nature provides for sources) and a-political, since care is relevant in the household, which is apolitical in general⁸⁰. Both beliefs (i.e. that the private is irrelevant to politics and that natural resources are apolitical) would be at best fallible in today’s world. Similarly, beginning with Machiavelli and continuing up until the 21th century, realism warns against kindness towards others, promoting self-help instead. Tronto, however, argues that the fact that the concept of self-help is not actually viable from beginning to end of human life (and as a notion is de facto dependent of the support of the “a-political”/“pre-political”) must be incorporated into the political. She maintains that the main argument against this – that care is parochial – applies to most theories claiming universality just the same. In other words, all theories, or as the title of her article says – concepts – are dependent on a concrete time and place. The notion may be universal, but its specific manifestation cannot. Acknowledging care as a political concept would have beneficial effects on politics, as is for example cooperation or more accurate social policies.

A related notion is that of introducing ethics into politics, as a legitimate and *political* concern. As coauthors James Brassett and Dan Bulley point out, mainstream IR has excluded the term from world politics⁸¹. However, feminists and other critical thinkers are making an effort to point out the relevance of this concept and its potential when it comes to the creation of IR policy and dogma. They argue that suffering could be used as a base for ethical theory. Several problems arise, however. Primarily, settling on a definition of the term and its extent would be at best challenging. The authors themselves suggest defining the term as avoiding unnecessary suffering as a result of poverty or war and permitting the attainment of freedom. Although a broad and seemingly innocent

⁷⁹ Tronto, Joan C. (1996), pp. 147.

⁸⁰ Tronto, Joan C. (1996), pp. 139-140.

⁸¹ Brassett, James, Bulley, Dan (2007), pp. 1.

definition, it could give rise to a second set of accusations: of new forms of colonialism and indifference to various cultural backgrounds and traditions. This sort of argumentation would make any definition (and especially practical execution thereof) controversial.

What makes the ethic of care an approach typical of standpoint feminism is the embrace of notions that are considered to be *characteristically* and perhaps even essentially feminine. This strand of feminism not only accepts, but also upholds the fact that women are different from men. It holds true in biological and psychological terms, as well as when it comes to the specific way women experience the world. That is to say – due to the position women have in most societies in relation to men, to motherhood, to their domestic responsibilities, and even to their “inherent” characteristics, as is empathy, concern for others or will/effort to cooperate, their way of experiencing the world necessarily differs from that of men. One of the most important yet controversial essays on the subject is Sara Ruddick’s *Maternal Thinking*. Her question is whether women have their own inquiries, cultures or traditions that they would bring into the public world⁸². Her answer is a transformed maternal thinking, something she already believes to be a social category, and making it a respected social concept. She maintains that “men’s domination is present when their absence from the nursery is combined with their domination of every other room”⁸³. Therefore, what is necessary is not just that men partake in activities of the private sphere, but that so-called maternal thinking, meaning the interest in the preservation, growth and acceptability of the child, also be incorporated into the public world. Preservation (as in the guarding of early life) and growth (as in securing a healthy physical and psychological development of the child) are rather clear terms. Acceptability is the tricky one. She argues that for a child to be successfully integrated into (current patriarchal, and to a certain extent misogynist) society, the mother must raise her child within the boundaries of social acceptability. This would de facto mean consenting to and even supporting precisely this sort of attitude of her child, son or daughter regardless, towards women. She maintains that “[c]hildren confront and rely upon a powerful maternal presence only to watch her become the powerless woman in front of the father, the teacher, the doctor, the judge, the landlord –

⁸² Ruddick, Sandra (1980), pp. 346.

⁸³ Ruddick, Sandra (1980), pp. 360.

the world, [resulting in a] child's rageful disappointment in its powerless mother"⁸⁴. This is precisely why the maternal must be incorporated into the public sphere – since it will mean an incorporation of respect to mothers, to women. It is also the reason why women should not be attempting to partake in the world of men via taking on "masculine" characteristics, but rather the public world should be altered, or better said broadened, so it will not just be the public world of men, but will include women and the "typically" feminine.

3. 4 Postmodern feminism: rocking the boat

It is precisely with these notions that the last approach I will mention – postmodern feminism – strongly disagrees with. Contrarily, it asks: what is the "women's" point of view? If feminism aims to further the rights and possibilities of women, which women, specifically, does it have in mind? What do/can all the women of the world have in common? Whose rights are we to further? But more importantly, if feminism represents women, what is the essence of "woman"? Is there such a thing as a transcendental category "woman"?⁸⁵ Is "woman" defined by the way a certain human (of a certain sex?) performs a certain role in society? And if the concept of "woman" cannot be so easily defined, who is feminism representing? If these contemplations continue to broaden the field of their inquiry, from sex to gender to femininity and masculinity to sexuality to class to race to ethnicity, since all of these realities are relevant, postmodernists may find themselves dealing with "the inevitable 'and so on'"⁸⁶. It is thanks to these and similar questions that postmodern feminism seems to, at first sight, be getting itself into a Catch-22 situation: how can it be of normative nature if it doesn't even know who it's speaking for? However, when one looks more carefully (and in this case ventures a little further from the rigid conception of relevance to IR) at how postmodern feminism grasps reality and manipulates it, relevance (not just to) to IR and politics does reveal itself.

Postmodern feminism rejects the dichotomies that characterize the frameworks of argumentation of the previous two strands. Its approach to IR

⁸⁴ Ruddick, Sandra (1980), pp. 344.

⁸⁵ Jabri, Vivienne (1999)

⁸⁶ Kinsella, Helen (2003), pp. 294.

theory is not based on “dealing with” the situation, but rather re-conceptualizing its very foundations. In terms of political theory and IR theory, they believe that gender is present already, albeit solely the masculine one, since theory is the result of the specifics of the reality the observer found *himself* in. They are therefore skeptical to simply “adding gender and stirring”⁸⁷, a critical alternation⁸⁸ of the old liberal phrase of “adding women and stirring”. In other words, although no doubt helpful in reaching well visible and tangible ends, a more profound re-evaluation of political and IR theory is necessary.

This is well visible when it comes to the public/private divide. The previous two approaches work with the public and the private as givens: pointing out the delegation of women to one and men to the other, reconsidering where one places the borders of these spheres, revealing their gendered nature, and especially emphasizing the political relevance of the private. Nancy Fraser, one of the most prominent feminist thinkers, tells us that feminists use the term in three distinct frameworks: the state, the official economy of paid employment, and as arenas of public discourse⁸⁹. Postmodern feminism, however, argues that these concepts *themselves* are of political nature. Put more clearly, “[p]rivacy is not something natural, prepolitical, or extrapolitical, but a politically constructed and contested good”⁹⁰, the construction of which, in the words of Fraser, is a “political act”⁹¹. These terms – public and private – are not understood as describing a reality to which mankind adjusted and around which man (meaning *man*, not mankind) built *his* world, but contrarily, they are considered to be the part of very world that was created, or to use a more popular term – socially constructed. The “reality” in which we live is nothing more than a Potemkin village that has managed to fool its own constructors. This applies not only to the public/private distinction, but to other concepts of IR theory as well, for example sovereignty, law or even politics itself. As Judith Butler’s tells us:

“...the political construction of the subject proceeds with certain legitimating and exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively concealed and

⁸⁷ Kinsella, Helen (2003), pp. 294.

⁸⁸ I use this phrase because it aptly shows the skepticism of postmodern feminism to gender categories, and in this case to the previous standpoint approach. It is not an indication of the author’s opinions however; who is critical to the insistence of feminism to keep emphasizing women/gender, since it only reaffirms its particularity (and thus distances itself from any concept of generality/neutrality).

⁸⁹ Fraser, Nancy (1990), pp. 57.

⁹⁰ Ackelsberg, Martha A., Shanley, Mary Lyndon (1996), pp. 213.

⁹¹ Fraser, Nancy, *Unruly Practices* cited in Higgins, Nicholas (1999).

naturalized by a political analysis that takes judicial structures as their foundation. Judicial power inevitably 'produces' what it claims merely to represent; hence, politics must be concerned with this dual function of power: the juridical and the productive"⁹².

In a typically postmodern interpretation of politics, she plays off the binary concept of the Other, only to reveal its exclusionary nature. As was the case with the private/public distinction, the judiciary system is also considered a product, whose main power lies in the fact that it *itself* determines who it will represent and what issues it will address. By limiting our perceptions to any binary system, we are at the same time producing that system – and the making of the decision who/what is inside and/or outside is a manifestation of power, since we are setting limits both to inclusion and exclusion in relation to that system. To rephrase simply, identifying as relevant is a form of exercising power.

Postmodern feminist IR also makes an effort to draw attention to the fact that women were not only usually assigned to be the auxiliary Other, helping men define who/what they are via indicating who/what they aren't, but at the same time were absent when it came to presenting the defining trademarks of the concepts that make up society, culture, politics. Catherine MacKinnon sums up: "...their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines family, ... their wars and rulership – defines history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex"⁹³. In other words, all definitions are dependent on men, and where there are no men, there is no public.

As mentioned earlier, the problem of analyzing traditional IR theory on a postmodern level is that one is unconsciously drawn away from the very subject of analysis. The reason, however, is quite representative of what postmodernism stands for, making it almost self-evident. It uses deconstruction to reveal the other side of things, but furthermore, also makes use of genealogy to get to the root of why things are as they are and how the current situation came about. This method has explanatory as well as transformative potential. Once our standard ways of perceiving are broken down, we can begin to comprehend in new ways, noticing different connections and then start creating a new reality. In other words, the only way forward for postmodern feminist IR

⁹² Butler, Judith (1990), pp.3

⁹³ Cited in Ackelsberg, Martha A., Shanley, Mary Lyndon (1996), pp. 219.

theorists is to reconstruct the world itself, but this time with everyone taking part. What is also interesting here is the fact that even the very phrasing of statements is relevant. It would be problematic to say "...with *both sexes* taking part", since this approach often disagrees with the standard dichotomy of male/female sex/gender. The reason is that just as postmodernism in general, this strand of feminism also believes that the way we speak – the words we choose and how we use them – is constructive of reality. And of course – reality itself is something that is continually being (re)constructed, therefore, if we want to change the way of things, must be reconstruct them in our favor.

Concluding, postmodern feminism opposes liberal feminism in its agitation of women to enter the man's world under the existing set of rules as well as its positivist method, and standpoint feminism in its effort to bring to attention the "women's" viewpoint and modify society's perception of the world to include it. Being much more radical, postmodern feminism wants to bring down the very system of gendered characteristics and values. This means that adjectives, as are the ones mentioned above – rationality, forcefulness, independence vs. emotionality or passivity, must be rid of their gendered tinge, and reality must be reconstructed via language in a way that is not harmful to either "sex". The important thing here in relation to feminist IR is noticing who exercised this sort of power in the past (i.e. the power of constructing reality and attributing positive/negative shade), and taking advantage of exercising this power in the present and future. This can then be considered as the transformative method of postmodern feminism.

4. The State in the International System and a Feminist Revisioning of War

Just as we can distinguish a public and private sphere within the state – that is the household vs. the public world of politics and the economy, the same division-line can be used when it comes to the position of the state in the international system. In other words, like the private household, where the entrance of state power and authority is limited, the state in the international system has a similar position – it is internally sovereign and the other states of the system have little say as to what goes on within its borders. They are reluctant to venture beyond these private boundaries, opting for a system of enclosed states (private spheres) in the public international system.

The consequences of this arrangement can best be seen when we consider the core concepts of international relations – war, peace, the intrinsically related concept of sovereignty and the doctrine derived from it – non-intervention. Liberal, standpoint and postmodern feminism use this premise as a starting point for their inquiry into the gender specific aspects of war.

4.1 Liberal feminism: the gendered semiotics of war

Not surprisingly, liberal feminism has a very straightforward approach to the state in the international system and the effects that this position has on women. As was first pointed out by Rebecca Grant (and has since become an accepted claim), the state has the same position in this system as the household has in the state – i.e. the private sphere in a public system. There are several parallels that prompt this comparison. Jan Jindy Pettman presents the most obvious one: the state is not just internally sovereign – that is it sets its own rules as to what and how goes on within its borders, but the other states of the system have to respect this sovereignty – it is sovereign within the larger system as well⁹⁴. Therefore, just as it can be said that the state is made up of

⁹⁴ Pettman, Jan Jindy (1996), pp. 4.

private households, the international system is made up of private states. This also means that the state is considered (at least from a realist point of view) as a unit. Hence, whatever actions a state takes are considered to be manifestations of a rational decision of that state.

The origin of the sovereign state can be traced to medieval times – according to Elshtain in a war-drenched Europe, sovereignty of the king over his territory can almost be considered a necessity. However, she presents a less-common (and typically feminist) version of the story as well: by tracing the incorporation of Roman private law into political theory. The result is threefold: (i) the state is conceived as private property and thus exempt from public power of the overall system – a most explicit reproduction of the private/public divide, (ii) sovereignty follows and expands on the paternalism of the Romans, and (iii) sovereignty is legitimized since it represents a unified nation⁹⁵. Being a typically feminist interpretation, emphasis is placed on the position and symbolism of the father in the family – a hierarchical one that had extended out from the family model and entered into the conception of the state, and then reached out once again through the state into the international system. Since the organization is hierarchical, the outcome is clear: as mentioned above, the state is perceived a private and *single* entity – just like the traditional image of the family (thoroughly criticized by post-positivist feminists) - represented by a symbolic as well as factual leader in the larger system. The strictly positivist nature, concentrating on uncovering the patriarchal patterns in IR, without, however, raising questions about neither the epistemological or ontological foundations, also makes this interpretation of sovereignty in the international system typical of liberal feminism.

Hand in hand with this concept of the state goes that of war. Joshua Goldstein, in his study of what role gender plays in war and vice versa, maintains that there exists a consistency of associating men with war-fighting across cultures⁹⁶. If we take closer look at the way the institution of war works, we can once again notice how important a role gendered semiotics play. Joan Nagel argues that gender plays a threefold role in war: first, the sexualized nature of warfare itself – with emphasis on the strength and virility of man. Second, in the sexualized depiction of enemies: either as “sexual demons ... or

⁹⁵ Elshtain, J. B. (2008), pp. 41.

⁹⁶ Goldstein, Joshua (2001), pp.10.

sexual eunuchs” – in other words, either raging rapists or incapable impotents. And thirdly, when it comes to the sexualized character of metaphors used, with terms such as penetration or rape abundant in high politics speech⁹⁷. I will return to each of these roles in greater detail further on.

Regarding the first mentioned function of gender in warfare, we can even claim that war was made possible by the people’s endorsement of two clearly gendered concepts: the identification with the roles of the Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul and the related concept of the feminine motherland that one must protect. It was once again feminist political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain that presented the landmark concepts of the Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul, as *personas* that people are to identify with in times of war. They serve as personal (vs. detached political) motivation for participation in war and have been used ever since the times of ancient Greece. In a simple yet acute observation she points out: “Narrative of war and politics are inseparable from the activities of war and politics; each – writing about and doing war and politics – are practices existing in a complex, mutually constitutive relationship. ... [W]ar imitates war narrative imitating war”⁹⁸. Indeed, if we take a look at tales of bravery in war, presented not just in traditional folk-tales and literature, but even in modern-day cinema, they loyally reaffirm the images of both of these *personas*. Elshtain, but also another prominent feminist theorist on the issue of women in war – Cynthia Enloe, also bring attention to the esteem granted to mothers of soldiers. That is – a woman will be honored for sacrificing her son, who will fight and perhaps die as a soldier, for the nation.

An interesting question considering the relationship of women and the nation, or perhaps better put, of women *to* the nation, inevitably results from the scheme addressed above. This question did not, of course, escape Elshtain herself. In “Women and War”, she asks: “How does such loyalty come into play in the first place? If women are not fully *citizens*, through what social relations and symbolic representations, through what webs of semiotically charged events and actions, are they entangled the life of the body politic?”⁹⁹ The answer, hinted in the question itself, paradoxically may be that it is war itself that gives women a public meaning – that turns them into “civic beings”¹⁰⁰. Women,

⁹⁷ Nagel, Joane (1998), pp. 257/8.

⁹⁸ Elshtain, J. B. (1987), pp. 48.

⁹⁹ Elshtain, J. B. (1987), pp. 67.

¹⁰⁰ Elshtain, J. B. (1987), pp. 9.

historically being “absent” from war, did not usually fight in them, did not become war heroes, and the suffering that they underwent was considered an unavoidable but irrelevant casualty. Yet at the same time, they are indispensable when it comes to the construction of images and symbols that provide for war. Not just as the Beautiful Souls mentioned above, but also lending femininity to the motherland. Images of home invoke images of mothers and wives – of family, of safety, of peace – until ones’ country gradually takes on a gender – becomes a vulnerable woman that one is to protect and even die for – the *motherland*. Therefore another, certainly more poetic and perhaps a more truthful answer to the question raised above can be found in Virginia Woolf’s *Three Guineas*, “as a woman, I have no country. ... As a woman my country is the whole world”¹⁰¹. Women are the collective other not just to a specific nation, but contrarily a *general* collective other, a symbol in themselves. Hence, Woolf’s statement is quite apt, since it elegantly pinpoints the function of women in war.

War is traditionally considered one of the most characteristic activities a state can take on, and liberal feminism, being a positivist approach, hardly disagrees. Until the 1960’s, it was considered to be a strictly bi- or multilateral phenomenon – only two or more independent and sovereign states could declare war. The reason being, once again, that the state was perceived a unit. The existence of an authority that had the legitimacy to declare war was even one of the prerequisites stated in the *Jus ad bellum* doctrine. From this doctrine eventually evolved, especially thanks to St. Augustine, the encompassing concept of the Just War. The concept was relatively simple: albeit killing is a sin, in some cases – such as the recovery of things wrongfully taken, war is just. A related concept to both sovereignty and (Just) war is that of intervention. Martha Finnemore identifies intervention to be one of the principles governing our international system – with the changing understandings of legitimate intervention being an expression of where this system places the borderline between the public and private. She identifies three different reasons that provided legitimacy for intervention, at the same time marking the different periods in the development of interpretations of this legitimacy: (i) the collection of debts, (ii) humanitarian intervention, and (iii) in the sake of international

¹⁰¹ Woolf, Virginia (1998), pp. 313.

peace and security¹⁰². As was Elshtain's approach to the reinterpretation of the roots of the public/private divide in IR, Finnemore also provides a rather clear-cut analysis of the history of legitimate intervention from a positivist position. Her goal is not to question terms such as "sovereignty", "contractual obligation", or "intervention"; rather, she examines the flexibility of the borderline between the public and private in the international order. In other words – she uses the feminist premise of the division of the system into the public/private to re-examine (within positivist boundaries) the development of the concept of legitimate intervention. As we can see, liberal feminist interpretations of IR theory tend to be rather subtle – focusing more on less visible aspects or presenting a different viewpoint, but not radical in any way.

The notion of the state as the private sphere in the public international system has one more use, quite beneficial to realist perceptions of IR: it makes possible a very clear distinction between war and peace – with, as Jill Steans puts it, "neat beggings and ends"¹⁰³. They are both absolute, standing in binary opposition, with the presence of one ruling out the presence of the other. If, however, we make an epistemological shift, it becomes clear that this very distinction is itself dependent on the male bias in IR theory.

4.2 Standpoint feminism: war and peace through women's eyes

As mentioned earlier, standpoint feminism is an approach characterized by different epistemological reasoning than the previous liberal one, but not yet marked by a shift in the ontological position, as the following postmodern approach. This, however, can most certainly not be considered a shortcoming. As previously pointed out, questioning the categories of "man" and "woman", as postmodern feminism does, threatens the normative goals of feminism, since it debunks the premise of the existence of binary gender categories, thus eliminating the very subject of its inquiry – "women". This is a very clear example of the ongoing discussions in feminist IR theory – with one stream reflecting on and reacting to the theories of another. Albeit the postmodern perspective is newer, thus prompting one to expect it to be more thoroughly

¹⁰² Finnemore, Martha (2004), pp. 3.

¹⁰³ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 58.

worked out, not all feminists agree and associate with its findings and choose instead to adhere to the older and ontologically less volatile standpoint approach.

In so-called high-politics, war and peace are most closely related to the concept of security. Traditionally in IR, this term referred to the state, which is self-interested and with military strategy being the priority. Standpoint feminism brings to our attention the effects of war on women, and how the concept of "security" would have to be reformulated, if IR theory abandons the solely male perspective to include the experiences of women¹⁰⁴. It most characteristically contemplates IR phenomenon from a Women's viewpoint – basically essentializing *the* women's perspective, often based on biological determinants, especially motherhood.

Joshua Goldstein, mentioned earlier, presents four most common explanations of why men are considered "better" at war, based on biologically rooted group dynamics¹⁰⁵: (i) because women cannot partake in male bonding, a prerequisite for the successful functioning of military units, (ii) that men are naturally more prone to hierarchical models of organizations – a model the army depends on, (iii) that they adhere to in-group dynamics more than women, thus making them psychologically better equipped to killing enemies, and (iv) that combat is gender-segregated because the up-bringing of children is also gender segregated, which impedes working in mixed groups¹⁰⁶. One line of thought that falls under the standpoint perspective (although not all standpoint feminists identify with it) is the equation of women with peace. In other words, according to this viewpoint, besides from being the Beautiful Souls of war, women are also the very symbols of peace. Due to the traditional association of women with passivity and thanks to their role as mothers, with caretaking presumed an inherent and perhaps even essential characteristic, women are often considered as the Other to the masculine institution of war. Some standpoint feminists have appropriated this image of the peaceful woman and the femininity of peace and attempt to use it to their advantage – to spread peace. Tickner regards the frequently used notions of threats to families (not

¹⁰⁴ Blanchard, Eric M. (2003)

¹⁰⁵ These explanations, however, can also be interpreted to correspond not only with the biologically predetermined standpoint perspective, but also with the social-constructivist postmodern perspective, due to the role of social integration.

¹⁰⁶ Goldstein, Joshua (2001), pp. 183.

just during wartime), along with the use of maternalist imagery as a strategy per se. One based on personal relations rather than images of enemies “abstract enough to be killable”¹⁰⁷. Indeed, advocates of this nexus emphasize a correlation between motherhood and peace, sometimes also bringing the previously mentioned ethic of care into the context. This association has an almost collusive nature: since women were historically dissuaded from voicing their opinions on politics, peace was one of the few subjects that they could “legitimately” comment¹⁰⁸. To a certain extent, this account is valid even today. With so few women in high politics and important decision-making posts, peace movements remain an accessible opportunity for women to have a say in issues regarding war¹⁰⁹. Although a tradeoff, supporters of the women/peace nexus believe it better to be associated with peace than to not have any voice at all.

However, this notion is also one of the most exploited clichés. Therefore, it has probably just as many opponents as supporters. The most frequent critique of this concept is that it essentializes women – presuming the existence of women as a homogenous, identifiable group. Another very frequent criticism is that equating women with peace is counterproductive – it only helps sustain the false images and dichotomies of men/women to war/peace, resulting in the perpetuation of gender hierarchies¹¹⁰.

Standpoint feminism pays attention not just to the semiotic aspects of IR reinterpretation, but also to the more pragmatic ones. In *Gender in International Relations*, J. Ann Tickner asks the simple yet relevant question of how the inclusion of women’s experiences of war and peace would influence the unproblematic boundaries between them, between legitimacy/illegitimacy and between order/anarchy¹¹¹. It is, de facto, the standpoint feminist question in IR. She, as well as others, for example Jan Jindy Pettman or Cynthia Enloe, criticizes the traditional/realist definition of security in IR, relating to the sovereignty of states and the integrity of their boundaries, and contrarily stresses the known fact that in many cases, the perpetrators of violence may be the states themselves¹¹². Just as well, standpoint feminism emphasizes the individual level of the effects of war – in other words a contemplation of how

¹⁰⁷ Hutchings, Kimberly (1999)

¹⁰⁸ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 59.

¹⁰⁹ Dinnerstein, Dorothy, quoted in Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 60.

¹¹⁰ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 59

¹¹¹ Tickner, J. Ann (1992)

¹¹² Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 41.

war as a phenomenon effects not states, but the people - men and women. The result is the simple observation that has (perhaps not so) surprisingly not been articulated before - that women and men are affected by war in differed ways. A fact that has finally made its way into state and IGO policy¹¹³, as well as the UN's Security Council Resolution¹¹⁴.

These premises are related to a concept known as "the myth of protection". According to this myth, men go off to fight wars in order to protect women, who are left at home in presumed safety. However, numbers of civilian casualties of war are extremely high, with the most moderate estimates at 35%, and in conflicts of religious, ethnic and cultural nature reaching up to 80 – 90%¹¹⁵. As emphasized in a UN study entitled "Women, Peace and Security", since women do not usually go fight in wars, they remain unarmed and unprotected "at a time when traditional forms of moral, community and institutional safeguard have disintegrated, and weapons have proliferated, [which] leads to women being particularly vulnerable during wartime"¹¹⁶. According to the executive summary concentrating on the situation of women in war of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the gender specific impact that war has on women includes: the burden of being responsible for the survival and care of oneself, one's children and the elderly; recruitment as child soldiers; abduction and trafficking for use as combatants, sexual and domestic slaves¹¹⁷. Jill Steans also points out the fact that women and children make up the overwhelming majority of refugees¹¹⁸.

A specific case in itself is the issue of sexual violence towards women during times of war, as is rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, or forced pregnancy. Cynthia Enloe, a leading feminist scholar, provides a list of the most common scenarios of rape during wartime: rapes of women held in military prisons by guards or interrogators, of captured women as part of "morale-boosting rewards" for the male soldiers after battle, of refugee women

¹¹³ For example into the documents and reports mentioned here – as is *Women, Peace, and Security* (2002) – a study of the UN or *Women in an Insecure World: Violence Against Women: Facts, Figures and Analysis* (2005) of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

¹¹⁴ Resolution S/RES/1325, adopted on October 31st, 2000.

¹¹⁵ *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (1999) A study by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

¹¹⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict* (Geneva, 1999) cited in *Women, Peace, and Security* (2002), pp. 14.

¹¹⁷ *Women in an Insecure World: Violence Against Women: Facts, Figures and Analysis* (2005), a UN study.

¹¹⁸ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 58.

in camps by refugee men, of women who are to be later forced into prostitution organized for soldiers, and even rape of a female soldier by her male colleague¹¹⁹. There are several basic explanations as to why rape is, and has historically been, such a prevalent and effective method of war. First of all, the most pragmatic reason is that of spreading terror. Terrorizing the local population is one of the most common strategies of war, especially if driving a population out of a certain territory is the aim. Secondly, there is the aspect of invading the integrity of a nation by literally impregnating its nationals. Rape and consequential pregnancies can thus have an exceptionally important role to play, especially in ethnic conflicts. And thirdly, there is, once again, the symbolic aspect – women not only play the romanticized role of the beloved in manipulated semiotics, but also bear the consequences of the symbols they represent. As mentioned above, the nation is often presented as a female motherland. Although quite the paradox, given the fact that even in Europe women were until recently denied citizenship, the result is that in nationalist speech (and thus by no means accidentally), it was women who often came to *embody* the nation. This is precisely why rape is rightly considered an explicit method of warfare, instead of a casualty. Raping a woman of a certain nationality/ethnicity/religion has the metaphorical significance of raping that nationality/ethnicity/religion in itself, since women's bodies play a central role in reproducing group identity¹²⁰. Other "functions" of rape during warfare include punishment, torture, the humiliation and demoralization of the husband/father who fails to protect his wife/daughter (standing and building on the conceptualization of women as men's property and responsibility¹²¹), ostracism of the victim from the family or community, and from the perpetrators side the encouragement of rape to promote aggressive behavior, as a form of male bonding, as a heroic deed parallel to that of killing a man in war. Furthermore, women are also subject to increased violence (sexual as well as other) from men of their own community in times of war and insecurity¹²².

It was not, however, until 1996 when rape was first labeled a war crime by the International Criminal Tribunal, in relation to the war in Bosnia. It was only in the year 2000 that the UN passed resolution 1325, which pays further

¹¹⁹ Enloe, Cynthia (2000), pp. 109.

¹²⁰ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 58.

¹²¹ Skjelsbaek, Inger (2001), pp. 217.

¹²² Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 58.

attention to the gender specific effects of war on women. This was after several decades of both liberal and standpoint feminists bringing these gender specific impacts of war on women *as women* to the attention of the international community. The fact that it took so long to recognize this can be considered a very clear demonstration of the male bias not just in IR, but also international law.

What would, however, be the effect of admitting the fact that the state is (and de facto never has been) not only incapable of protecting its citizens, but at times proves even counterproductive to that end? The answer is perhaps unpleasant to traditional conceptions of IR, but obvious: questions regarding the necessity of the state as an institution would no doubt arise. If the state fails to provide some of the most fundamental securities that it promises, and from which it often derives its legitimacy, we cannot be surprised at rising tendencies to re-evaluate (or in extreme cases even abolish) it as an institution.

4.3 Postmodern feminism: rethinking delimitations

The postmodern feminist approach in IR, as elsewhere, is defined by the further debunking of positivism, with doubts arising considering the ontological foundations of traditional IR theory. From a historical perspective, it was the Cold War that upheld rigid definitions of terms in IR, as are sovereignty, even war and peace, and especially notions of security¹²³ - in other words, made possible a distinction between so-called high politics and low-politics. Therefore, the epistemological and ontological shifts in perceptions, dating to the 1990s, were influenced by the fall of the Soviet Union, together with globalization, providing space for a broader conceptualization of the above mentioned terms. Just as well, due to the growing numbers of inner-state conflicts, concepts of "inner" and "outer" were dented. The result was greater opportunity, or perhaps better said necessity, for a more thought-through contemplation of the terms "us" and "them". Related to this wave of doubt in IR theory was the legitimacy of the "knower". In vogue was the asking of different questions, since the questions traditionally asked were ones that those already in power wanted

¹²³ Newman, Edward (2001)

answered¹²⁴. A new emphasis was placed on “how” rather than “where” and “what”, since “where” and “what” questions were claimed to produce answers, as opposed to “how” questions, that provoked a more genealogical response¹²⁵. Hence, the way “realities” had once been created was revealed, shedding light on how constructs of “us” and “them” were being produced to serve specific aims. In IR, concepts that were until then considered givens, for example sovereignty, security, war, peace, civilian, etc. were being deconstructed, with the aim of bringing to light and proving that these notions were products, and not pre-existing realities.

A good example of a feminist poststructuralist deconstruction of IR cultivated terms is if we take a look at the concept of security. Elshtain and Steans deconstruct the concept of “us” by pointing to a process well known to feminists – the process of Othering. Regarding the state just as well as the nation, they argue that the creation of the Other – an entity abstract and hostile – was indispensable to the creation of a concept of a communal self – being the nation, religion, or ethnicity, etc. Having an “us” and a “them” then made possible the construction of borders – since “they” are no doubt a “threat” to “us”. Therefore, once again with the help of semiotics, notions of identity and dangers to that identity (for post-positivists itself a product) were used to serve specific ends. These ends can vary – whether it be the need of national defense, the related need of national armament, or to lend legitimacy to aggressive foreign policies. The omnipresent Other being a constant threat to state borders and its inhabitants, new rounds of mutually constructive beliefs and reactions can always be used.

Just as the postpositivists argued that the prefabricated terms of IR were pragmatically used to serve specific ends, they too decided to use this method of constituting meanings to their benefit. Edward Newman, in his essay with the rather self-explanatory title “Human Security and Constructivism” tries to accomplish a change by deliberately manipulating meanings and definitions: he argues the traditional definition of security must be abandoned, and a new, human centered one should be adopted. Since both are constructions, it is time leave behind definitions dictated by the realities of the Cold War, and accept new ones, corresponding to our globalized, interconnected world. This is also a

¹²⁴ Tickner, J. Ann (2006)

¹²⁵ Brassett, James; Bulley, Dan (2007), pp. 10.

manifestation of the normative potential of the postpositivist approach – one that is aware of the transformative power of language and the communication of meanings, and aims to use it.

The postmodern approach (and its deconstructive methodology) may of course also be used to reinterpret other feminist reinterpretations, an indication of the ongoing discussions of the various feminist approaches amongst themselves and their development. For example, if we were to take a second look at Elshtain's Just Warrior and Beautiful Soul model, we can very clearly make out a typically poststructural Hegelian Master-slave dialectic. In other words: the role of the Just Warrior is not just simpler than that of women, but also dependent on them. The archetype of the Just Warrior would be rather redundant if he didn't have someone for whose sake he was fighting for. I use the term "women" rather than the more specific "Beautiful Soul" because the symbolic role of women in war is in fact multidimensional, rather than delimited by this one role. Elshtain identifies women to be "the collective other" to the male warrior, but this has several different meanings. The most obvious one is the Beautiful Soul – serving as the very reason wars are fought. Men must fight wars in order to protect the(ir) women. It is women who make the killing and the violence legitimate – they provide a ("just") cause. They are the vulnerable, virtuous, and private that must be protected, since they are claimed incapable of protecting themselves¹²⁶. And along with women, the warriors are, at the same time, protecting their children, their homes, their traditions, their cultures. Indeed – the concept of the Beautiful Soul can also be understood as a wide and encompassing metaphor for the other symbols women come to represent in war - being the "civic cheerleader", the "designated weepers over the tragedies war trails in its wake"¹²⁷, the symbol of home and its order, and even the very Other to war itself – the symbol of peace. These notions are dependent on the images they aim to (re)enforce – simultaneously being derived from and creating norms of masculinity and femininity in society in general.

Many feminist authors have built upon Elshtain's analysis of the Beautiful Soul/Just Warrior archetypes, crystallized along the lines of gender and their prescribed roles – an analysis ground-breaking in feminist IR theory, to uncover other aspects of the gendered semiotics of war. For example, in "Masculinities in

¹²⁶ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 57.

¹²⁷ Elshtain, J. B. (1987), pp. 58.

International Relations”, Charlotte Hooper examines the other side of the masculinity-war symbiosis – that is, how war is and has historically been used in the formation of masculinity itself. She claims that the exclusion of women from combat, backed by the theory that “men take life while women give it”, has served as the symbolic and institutional bases that has enabled “military service [to function] as a rite of passage for boys to be made men throughout much of the modern era”¹²⁸, with even the “physical shaping of the male body”¹²⁹ playing a role in the social (and psychological) shaping of masculinity.

Once again, by taking the postmodern route when interpreting phenomenon typical of tradition IR theory, we find ourselves “far away” (if judged by traditional measures) from it – in a discourse considering the construction of gender itself, the way gender functions in society and even the way gender is used in society. Albeit at first glance irrelevant, the consequences are contrarily far-reaching. For example, as Jill Steans points out, conceptions of gender lie at the core of the debate regarding women in the army or combat: “The key to understanding the continuing resistance to women in combat roles lies not in understanding the innate characteristics of men and women as such, but in understanding the standards of masculinity and femininity”¹³⁰. Women in combat roles is a theme also taken up by Eleanor O’Gorman, who investigates the difficult position that women warriors have in war narrative, claiming an “implicit ambivalence”¹³¹ in the creation of these images. She examines the portrayal of women in revolutionary art and propaganda, noticing a juxtaposition of women as fighters (therefore taking on typically “masculine” characteristics) and women as victims/causes of war. Analyzing the “contradictory tension” of the typical revolutionary image of a woman holding a rifle and baby, O’Gorman maintains that several antagonist messages are being communicated: a call to arms for women, the shaming of men into military action, reassuring society that women are still feminine though involved in masculine activities, reassuring society that women will return to traditional domestic roles following a temporary aberration of the natural order of things¹³². Indeed, albeit women very often take part in revolutionary struggles, a return to

¹²⁸ Hooper, Charlotte (2001), pp. 82.

¹²⁹ Hooper, Charlotte (2001), pp. 82.

¹³⁰ Steans, Jill (2006), pp. 50.

¹³¹ O’Gorman, Eleanor (1999), pp. 93.

¹³² Hooper, Charlotte (2001), pp. 93.

this “natural” order is basically inevitable. Karima Omar presents four common reasons why women are “disempowered”, to use her term, after revolutionary struggles, and adds a fifth: (i) the nation’s need to keep women in the home and out of the workforce so male veterans can seek jobs, (ii) economic priorities that stress modernization over social welfare, (iii) political systems that view women’s active participation in national affairs as a temporary expedient, (iv) families and communities that turn to the part for a comforting, nostalgic view of life, and (v) the gendered national symbols, manipulated during times of struggle to encourage women to take part, are afterwards reconstructed to once again suit the traditional roles and the gender stratification structures¹³³. However, as O’Gorman concludes, since women take on several different roles in revolutionary wars, oscillating between the private and public spheres, in war “women are what women do”¹³⁴. Therefore, changing the content of the “natural” order of things can also be a question of taking on and constructing these roles.

As we can see, the postmodern approach deconstructs notions that surround us to reveal the ways these notions (can) serve as tools. Carefully examining the language used, the images shown, and the ideas communicated, it is obvious that the postmodern method of IR reinterpretation is diametrically different from the positivist one. Consequently, not just the answers postpositivists arrive at, but also the very content of their studies is also atypical of the traditional bundle of IR theory. The postmodern feminist viewpoint is hence characterized by the embedding of the issues it examines into a wider context, one reaching far beyond the traditional content of IR theory, in order to show how “IR theory” is interconnected and mutually constitutive of social, cultural, political and other phenomenon.

The greatest challenge it faces (and one it is fiercely criticized for by the standpoint approach) is the inevitable deconstructing of the concept of “woman” itself. Albeit normative in nature, it cannot but question the authenticity of “the authentic voice”¹³⁵ – in this case that of women. Due to the diametrically diverse realities women live in and the innumerable ways they experience war, peace, nationality etc., questions regarding the possibilities of their common and shared experiences arise. These are followed by contemplations concerning the

¹³³ Omar, Karima (2004), pp. 50.

¹³⁴ O’Gorman, Eleanor (1999), pp. 94

¹³⁵ Przybylowicz, Donna, Hartsock, Nancy, McCallum, Pamela (1990), pp. 11.

essence of "women", often leading to what may seem to be the death of transformative potential of feminism. However, as had been mentioned earlier, authors such as Judith Butler argue that since we can observe the manipulative potential of the forms of communication of meanings (in this relating to "women", but applicable to all notions), we can also use them ourselves, thus achieving change not just on a superficial level, but a more profound and defining one.

5. A Feminist Take on Economics

In the last part of my thesis, I will deal with what has been labeled by feminists as the male bias in International Political Economy (IPE). After a brief general introduction, I will again approach the subject from the liberal, standpoint and postmodern point of view. Interestingly, the analysis that these three different perspective offer more or less correspond with development theories and approaches, beginning in the first half of the 20th century. This is due to the fact that the evolution of both theories went through epistemological shifts, and although these changes were not dependent on each other nor did they play off each other, some of the defining aspects of these changes were in common. My aim is to show the male bias in the traditional western concept of economics, specifically the dominant neo-classical economic theory, which provoked the same bias in development approaches. I will again build on the public/private distinction and emphasize the effects that the existence of this distinction had not only on the economy, but especially on the lives of women.

5.1. Economics from a liberal feminist viewpoint – the introduction of some basic concepts

As has been previously demonstrated, liberal feminism hardly attempts to rock the boat. The same holds true when it comes to liberal feminist contemplations of IPE. The most potent notion this strand works with is that of the public/private distinction, which is just as useful a tool in the feminist analysis of IPE as in other cases. The conclusions may almost seem banal nowadays, but it is important to remember that the case was very different just three decades ago in the "West", and remains to be so in many parts of the so-called developing world even today.

From a political perspective, it is often argued that "development and sovereign statehood went hand in hand from the very beginning; the sovereign state became the organizational format for development"¹³⁶. Therefore, the

¹³⁶ Sørensen, G. (1999)

issue here is the same as the issue that usually arises when considering the state from a feminist perspective - the patriarchal foundations of the state. Ever since Simone de Beauvoir's concept of the feminine "Otherness" had been imported into political philosophy, it is believed that the western perspective of the world order is itself a masculine one. As mentioned earlier, the current IR order is built on the dichotomies based on the masculine perspectives presented to us by the teachings of traditional political philosophy. Masculine attributes, such as independence, strength, power are those that matter and have value in international relations. They are just as well those that are opposed to the unwanted feminine attributes, such as subordination or weakness. In development this means that for a country to be considered developed, it must be a sovereign state and preferably have these characteristics, and any other form of social organization will not even be taken in account. Accordingly, other channels of development, those outside the realm of sovereign states, were not as widespread or influential.

In economic terms, the public/private distinction has very clear and well visible implications. Most importantly, the dichotomy of these two spheres had the consequence of them being considered completely separated. Albeit this may seem to be an almost redundant claim, the practical outcomes are farther reaching than they seem at first glance. The public/private division resulted in early development theories being oblivious to any form of development in the private sphere, concentrating solely on the public one. Therefore, development was not only aimed at the public sphere, but it was the only one of the two that was taken into consideration in any way¹³⁷. Consequently, liberal, standpoint and postmodern feminism each came to different conclusions regarding these consequences, which all have different impacts on practical, real-life issues.

For liberal feminism, the question of how sex (for they did not yet preoccupy themselves with gender) influences the economy and how the binary public/private system influences the lives and possibilities of women was a question of just that: how are the lives and possibilities of women shaped by this allocation into different spheres? Discrimination, occupational segregation, or the differential rates of labor force participation were just some of the issues dealt with¹³⁸, the findings of which were beneficial to IPE theory. As was the

¹³⁷ Barribeau, V. Eudine (2000), pp. 127.

¹³⁸ Rossetti, Jane (2001), pp. 305.

case when it came to political rights mentioned earlier, many, for example Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill or Virginia Woolf, pointed out that the possibilities of women were extremely limited, since they were often not allowed to work, in the sense of earning money. Therefore, for first- and second-wave feminists of the West, one of the main goals was integrating women in to the workforce.

On a theoretical level, liberal feminism did bring to light some very important issues, with significant practical effects. First of all, the fact that in the West there existed the predetermined roles "housewife" and "breadwinner" provoked the division of labor into two categories: paid, and thus marketable, and unpaid, thus supplementary and dispensable. In other words, the only valid form of labor, that was classified as such, was the type of work that could be ascribed monetary value, as opposed to so-termed supplementary labor, which remained unpaid, and thus for traditional economics invisible¹³⁹. However, as has been emphasized by many feminists, the public sphere was dependent on the private, precisely for "caretaking". The consequences of this division and its heritage take on many different forms. For example the phenomenon of women getting paid less for the same work as men, still prevalent in many countries, can be explained by the presumption that they are not the *primary* breadwinners of the family¹⁴⁰. Liberal feminism therefore continues to appeal for women's right to work, to earn the same pay for the same work as men do, and for women to have the same job security as men.

The relevance of these insights to IR and to IPE becomes evident if we take a look at the development programs and theories of the 20th century. The roots of development can be traced to the 1930s, with the theory of modernization remaining dominant until the 1970s. This theory can be characterized as defining development as a linear process, with the starting point being a (whichever) traditional society and the finish line the western style economy¹⁴¹. This approach was based on a very simplistic assumption that development is defined by coming closer to an industrialized society, modeled after the West. It was therefore measured in quantitative economic terms on the state level (usually in the form GNP), with features like health, education, literacy and infrastructure playing a subservient role in the equation, and generally being

¹³⁹ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 82.

¹⁴⁰ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 84.

¹⁴¹ Reddock, Rhoda (2000), pp 23.

considered more of a means than an end in themselves. Augmented levels of production and consumption were considered a mark of progress¹⁴². Nonmarket processes were basically absent from analyses. The main development agency was the state and according to the so-called trickle-down effect, pouring money into a country through the official government, which was then to redistribute it to the population, was to solve all problems of poverty. This type of evaluation of development is criticized by feminists precisely because of its assumption of the state being a single unit, an issue I addressed earlier. An assumption, however, that on practical grounds, that is when examined from less of a distance, proves to be very misleading, since the government of a country does not always have the well-being of its inhabitants in mind.

Things started to change in the 1970s, when the anticipated improvements did not come. The trickle-down effect proved to be an illusion, contrarily resulting in the establishment of many authoritarian regimes and an enlarged gap between the rich and the poor. The conviction that a strong state was enough to ensure development proved to be false and was replaced by the belief in the necessity of the presence of market forces. Accordingly, the trickle-down model was replaced by the trickle-up model, asserting that an augmented income for the poor would result beneficially for the whole country. It was at this time that liberal feminists pushed to bring to light the position of women in the new development paradigm. They contested the assumptions of the trickle-down theory; emphasizing that modernization, in its prevailing form, could not improve the lives of women nor increase gender equality. An issue they took up was the approach of traditional development strategy towards women: since population growth was considered an obstacle, coercive population control policies were adapted¹⁴³. This was the only way women were involved in development, since they were considered to belong only in the private sphere and the literacy and job-training programs were modeled to suit men.

Therefore, in accordance with this strand of feminism generally, they believed that the situation could be resolved if more women were actually actively present in the development process. What they did not address, however, was the assumption that all reproductive work was women's work. There, part of the strategy was increasing the efficiency of domestic labor, so that women could

¹⁴² Harding, Sandra (1998).

¹⁴³ Harding, Sandra (1998).

more partake in the labor-economy¹⁴⁴. They therefore promoted the inclusion of women and stressed the importance of providing the equality of opportunities for men and women. Particularly, this meant further enhancing access to education, training and employment, as well as providing women with more say in development policies. A prevalent assumption was that is there are more women in the decision-making bodies, there will be a greater tendency to address "women's issues", resulting in the improvement of situations women typically find themselves in.

A method that has its roots here and evolved from this more gender-sensitive viewpoint that lays emphasis on women and was pushed by liberal feminists was the Women in Development (WID) approach. The WID approach is one that preoccupies itself with practical problems and ways of solving them. It believes that the main obstacle lies in the absence of women from the development process. Therefore, this method believes that it is fundamental to integrate women into the process by means of integration into the existing development institutions, which will provide for more efficient and successful results for the possibilities of women¹⁴⁵. It is basically in accordance with the tradition of liberal feminism, which similarly argues that gender equality can be reached by including women in the established institutions. The focus is on projects that concentrate on women, for example the ones mentioned above - better access to education, training, property or better jobs¹⁴⁶. They are to be incorporated into the existing frameworks and the official economy to help achieve development and modernization, as a means of development. The main focus was on providing women with opportunities that will eventually enable them to attain positions of power. In practice, this meant ridding various institutions of their discriminatory practices when it comes to gender, as well as establishing special "women's" departments or branches within the existing institutions¹⁴⁷.

Liberal feminism did not, take into consideration women's however, in its approach to development, search for the more profound and hidden causes of the subordination of women in terms of doubts about the positivist foundations of this phenomenon in general. Just as well, it did not yet question its own bias point of view, not did it consider local diversities. Rather, it concentrated on

¹⁴⁴ Barriteau, V. Eudine (2000), pp. 130.

¹⁴⁵ Reddock, Rhoda (2000), pp 29.

¹⁴⁶ Connelly, M.P., Murray Li, T., MacDonald, M., Parpart (2000), pp. 47.

¹⁴⁷ Pettman, Jan Jindy (1996), pp. 173.

achieving equality through greater incorporation of women into the public sphere, regardless of the concrete public sphere in question. To a certain extent, although the views of liberal feminists have evolved since the 1970s, a tendency still visible and de facto typical of this strand is the belief that the incorporation of women into the public sphere will improve their situation. Just as well, the WID paradigm did not take into consideration the value of domestic work that women produce¹⁴⁸. This is due to the fact that when it came to the public/private distinction of the household within the state, as of the state within the international system, liberal feminism does not doubt the existence of the private and public sphere (with all the economic implications it carries), but rather places the borderline between these two spheres differently than other liberal theorists.

This approach is therefore in line with the modernization approach, and "although the expression *modernization theory* may no longer be in vogue, the spirit of the analysis, drawing on neoclassical free-market economics, is alive and well"¹⁴⁹. Although liberal feminism was successful in many of the above mentioned goals, it did not address and therefore neither begin to resolve many of the core problems causing the subordination of women. Similarly, it did not challenge the modernization paradigm itself, nor did they pay any attention to the private sphere, including the issue of the value of women's domestic labor.

5.2 Standpoint feminism: The effects on women

Until recently, when speaking of development, it would mean speaking in economic terms. Consistent with the modernization approach, development was measured by gross national product, the structure of the industry, the presence of modern technologies, economic institutions or income levels, to name a few. These were all material scales, defined in quantitative terms and measured on the level of the state as a whole. In other words, development was characterized by productive work with a preferably monetary outcome. What would not be measured, however, were "reproductive work" and the qualitative aspects of development. Thus, along with the expansion of the modernization

¹⁴⁸ Connolly, M.P., Murray Li, T., MacDonald, M., Parpart (2000), pp.48.

¹⁴⁹ Connolly, M.P., Murray Li, T., MacDonald, M., Parpart (2000)

concept, a new concept of the division of labor was also introduced- one that differentiated the work in the official economy, and the residual domestic labor, newly designated into a subordinate and inferior position on the social hierarchy. Hand in hand with this approach was also the use of the unified household model, taking into account only statistical data quantitatively measurable, with the family as a single unit¹⁵⁰. Just as well, the Western concept of the household as a sphere of consumption rather than production was integrated into the development models, without however taking into account the fact that in developing countries, the opposite often holds true¹⁵¹. What were also not taken into consideration were the effects of the new policies on women and the individual family members.

It was standpoint feminism that once again shifted the epistemological lens to incorporate the perspective of women, as opposed to just having women incorporated into the traditional views. When it came to integration of women into the public (economic) sphere, a normative good already communicated by liberal feminists, the standpoint approach was quick to point out that since women continue to be considered to belong first to the private sphere and only then to the public one, they are expected to carry on with housework activities even if they take up a paid job¹⁵². The result was what came to be commonly known as the second shift – a term introduced by Arlie Russell Hochschild in her book of the same title. The outcome was a double burden on women – the traditional one in the private sphere and the new, monetarily quantifiable one in the public sphere. This notion was just becoming to be known in the developed world in the 1990s, and was certainly not yet a commonly accepted one, so it took a while before it made its way into official development strategy. Therefore, the attitude toward the role of women in development was more of a gradual process than an abrupt shift.

Nonetheless, for women, the outcomes of development projects of the 1980s and 1990s were determined exactly along the lines of this realization. After the unsuccessful attempt of the trickle-up approach, it was decided to go back to the trickle-down approach, which would go hand in hand with so called Structural Adjustment Programs – SAPs. In the time of falling prices of export commodities, on which developing were dependent and rising prices of oil due to

¹⁵⁰ Jahan, Selim (2005)

¹⁵¹ Steans, J.(2006), pp. 79.

¹⁵² Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 85.

the Energy Crises of 1979, Third World countries found themselves in a situation of immense indebtedness. A new strategy was adopted by the leading institutions- the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Finance Ministry of the USA based on neoliberal theory: the situation was to be resolved by restructuring the economies of developing countries and increasing their integration into the global market economy and international division of labor. Furthermore, granting loans to Third World countries so they could pay off their debts was conditioned by accepting these SAPs. It was believed that the SAPs would result in economic growth, bringing benefit to everyone, including women.

Modernization required a shift of the workforce into the industry, and this shift firstly constituted mostly of men. This resulted in men leaving family-based production, typical of the mostly agrarian societies of the Third World, with the practical outcome being the division of labor, leaving women to take care of subsistence farming¹⁵³. In other words, one of the byproducts of modernization was the introduction of Western division-lines of private and public, foreign to many of the "underdeveloped" societies. Albeit traditionally work may have been split along gendered lines, the communal goal of attaining agricultural produce to make food was a common one. Also, in most parts of Africa and many parts of Asia, it was women who were the merchants – taking the produce to the markets and selling it – something that in the Western world was considered an activity typical of the public sphere, and thus a prerogative of men. Therefore, the consequence was not just an insensitive and forced split of the local private/public lines of division in order to mirror the Western (gendered) one, but the consequential failure of many of these policies. A concrete outcome that can be mentioned was the resulting "near-exclusive access [of men] to economic and other resources"¹⁵⁴, leaving women in a position of dependence in the newly imposed order.

Eventually, women were to be integrated into the economy, meaning the workforce - "on grounds of efficiency- that including women would enable development to get its work done better"¹⁵⁵. This had the consequence of the above mentioned double burden on women – working in the public as well as the private sphere. Once again however, the outcome of this plan was different.

¹⁵³ Tickner, J. Ann (1992)

¹⁵⁴ Reddock, Rhoda (2000)

¹⁵⁵ White, S.C. (1999)

The SAPs did little to “develop” these countries and significantly aggravated the position of most women of these countries. Consistently with the fashion of deregulation, employers, in the name of competitiveness, were cutting back on job security, wages and safety in the workplace. The consequence was the feminization of the labor force, since many men were believed less willing to take these jobs¹⁵⁶. This new neoliberal approach also required a decrease in public spending, which basically translated into a decrease in social services. This meant a shift in providing these services, such as childcare, care for the sick and elderly or even health care and education, from partial state assistance to complete provision by women as unpaid domestic labor. In other words, although modernization approaches considered traditional values as one of the things that must be overcome as part of development, in practice they assumed their existence when relying on the gendered division of labor in providing the services the state had to cut back on. The outcome was therefore not only a double burden on women, but just as well the affirmation of traditional gender roles, both resulting in what has been labeled as the feminization of poverty.

As we can see, although these policies were believed to be gender neutral, they had, contrarily, a negative rather than positive effect on women. It was postcolonial feminists who pointed out the insensitivity of the development approaches of the 1980s and 90s, partly contributing to the redefining of goals and definitions of modernization. Belonging to the standpoint approach, postcolonial feminism emphasizes the differences in women's experiences when it comes to oppression or subordination. Just as relevant in a women's life (and thus her economic situation) is her race and class. Especially postcolonial feminism criticizes the outcomes of development projects of the second half of the 20th century precisely along these lines. It preoccupies itself with the disparity between feminism of the "North" and of the "South", arguing that western feminists forget to take into account the experiences of women from other racial, cultural and social backgrounds, a critique resonating with that of so-called black feminists¹⁵⁷. In the context of development, this means that although the intentions of development and modernization may have been good, in practice western feminists fail to realize the inadequacy of the framework of development they are presenting, since they are doing so from

¹⁵⁶ Connelly, M.P., Murray Li, T., MacDonald, M., Parpart, J.L. (2000)

¹⁵⁷ bell hooks (2000).

their point of view. A point of view that, according to the criticisms of postcolonial feminists, may not necessarily correspond to the realities in other parts of the world. It is therefore not surprising that postcolonial feminism is the most critical of the mentioned streams to modernization efforts and development theories, including the Women in Development approach.

Feminists reacted to the situation by presenting a new gender-centered approach to development – the Gender and Development approach (GAD). As the name itself hints, the main focus is on the issue of gender, or gender inequalities to be more precise. It examines the social constructions that bring about the subordinate position of women, believing that the roots of this inequality must be addressed, not just the superficial manifestations, as was the case on the previous two paradigms. Therefore, an inherent part of the GAD approach is redefining the concept of development itself, with attention being paid to what interests and is relevant for women. It is a concept still being used today, with more attention being paid to local voices. Nonetheless, neither one of these approaches can be considered perfect. The WID model can be argued to be superficial and ignorant of the roots of problems. The GAD model, on the other hand, has to face charges of not being exactly "politically innocent", since it "aims not just to describe the world but to change it"¹⁵⁸. On the other hand, it does deserve credit for addressing the more profound question, and not just looking for quick-fix answers.

Although the notion of modernization was not yet generally overcome in the 1980s and 1990s, since the industrialized society was still considered the goal of these efforts, we can see the beginning of the slow shift in the approach "development". Visible is a change in the epistemological position, with standpoint feminists emphasizing the interests of women. By further listening to and reflecting on the remarks of these more marginal groups, another shift slowly began to take place – an ontological reconsideration of the concepts of modernization and development.

¹⁵⁸ White, S.C. (1999)

5.3. The postmodern feminist perspective: re-evaluating the founding terms, re-evaluating the founding perspectives

Although there is not general agreement on what exactly postmodern feminist economics is¹⁵⁹, we can find some common traits that make an outline of such a description possible. Postmodern feminists subjected economic and development theory to harsh deconstruction. Critique regarded both of these theories, and they were often intertwined. As is typical of postmodernism, the objections to (neo-)classical economic and development theory were not just about presenting new facts and figures that included women, but rather about addressing issues regarding the method of analysis, which played a significant role in both. A re-conceptualization of these terms began to take place. It was pointed out that many of these theories were/are not dominant because they are ideal, but rather because they benefit those who determine the outcomes of the debates regarding these theories. This was especially true when it came to the development and modernization endeavors of the twentieth century.

The term "development", in the context of so-called underdeveloped, less developed, developing, or Third world countries, is a term that's been around for quite a few decades, and has been dependent on Western conceptions of economics. It is a term very often heard, and within the above mentioned context, it is often treated as a term of obvious meaning and neutral character. But as anything, deconstruction reveals that it is a term bias in nature, both on the grounds of ethnocentricity and gender. In general, the main focus of the critique of the concepts of development and modernization from postmodernists was that these terms were intrinsically related to the specific form of existence that characterizes the West. Values such as independence, gain, scientific rationality or technological development were proclaimed universal and considered to be universal indications of a developed/modern society, thus "perpetuating Northern domination and the validity of Western knowledge"¹⁶⁰. The same was to hold true on the individual level – that is, the *homo economicus*, the "self-interested individual is shown to be a very particular form of being"¹⁶¹. This being was assumed to be the human generally, when in fact it was only a characteristic of the male of the West. The value attributed to

¹⁵⁹ Bergeron, Suzanne (2001)

¹⁶⁰ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 93.

¹⁶¹ Rossetti, Jane (2001), pp. 314.

individualism and community in the South was different than the value these notions had in the West. For feminists, this critique ran parallel to their critiques of patriarchy and the proclaimed universal qualities that they believed were a product of the male bias. In other words, at the core of the problem lies the same process of Othering that perpetuated the hierarchical structures in (Western) society: in one case of women in relation to men, in the other of the South to the North. In the tradition of Enlightenment, the civilized Westerner, convinced of his superiority, felt legitimate to at first colonize, afterwards "modernize" the "underdeveloped" and "backward" peoples of the South. He himself credited his knowledge as being rational, objective, transcendent, but failed to realize that the creation of his own image as existing outside time were dependent on another image he created – that of the devalued other¹⁶². Therefore, this process of Othering is a product of not just the simplistic dichotomous character of Western thought, but also a manifestation of Hegel's Master-Slave dialectic referred to earlier.

A specific postmodern perspective of development is presented by the Subaltern Studies Collective, which preoccupies itself with issues of the post-colonial development of South Asia, but whose insights into the constructions of the subject of the knower and the object of inquiry have been a great contribution in postmodern (development) theory in general. One of the most prominent thinkers of this strand Edward Said, mentioned earlier, argues that the Orient, but also the Southern Other in general, is defined by the West. The southern Other thus has no autonomous identity in the West's eyes, and is not permitted/enabled say on the issue¹⁶³. Another respected philosopher of this approach, Gayatri Spivak, further expands the notion of constituting these identities. She maintains that even the "critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates the Subject"¹⁶⁴ [i.e. the West], meaning that intellectuals of the West, regardless of whether they are critical or not of the production of the Other, are still parting in doing so, since they do so from the very position of the Subject. She uses Gramsci's term Subaltern which describes the subordinate position of someone due to their race, gender, class, language or culture, to argue that that the so-termed Subaltern is not only subjected to the process of Othering, but assigned this position of the Other, without having any possibility

¹⁶² Hartsock, Nancy (1990), pp. 18.

¹⁶³ Said, Edward (1978).

¹⁶⁴ Spivak, Gayatri (1988), pp. 272.

to express oneself. This "metaphorical aphonia"¹⁶⁵ has the effect that the Subaltern cannot communicate her/his perception of oneself, because the only means of communication are those dictated by the West. In other words, to even be able to engage in a dialogue regarding one's self with the dominant discourse on the un/underdeveloped, the Subaltern must accept this identity of the Other, and speak from this position of an authentic Other¹⁶⁶. The common language is dictated by the West, since it is the Subject.

In relation to development, this was observable in several ways. First of all, postmodern feminists criticized the import of the Western image of the public/private, as well as the Western definition of "productivity", on which traditional development theories were based and along the lines of which they were carried out. The core of the problem was the attempt to fit a Western framework on the realities of the South, without taking these realities into consideration in any way. They pointed out that the very concepts of "housewife" and "breadwinner" are "Western" inventions¹⁶⁷, irrelevant to the realities of the so-called underdeveloped world, where the boundaries between the public and the private are far less visible, or even located completely elsewhere. This was manifested for example in the incorporation of activities traditionally non-monetary in the South, into the monetarily assessable field, precisely because they are considered monetary in the West¹⁶⁸. Another problem, basically mirroring the one mentioned above, was that the work of women, usually within the private sphere, was not taken into account in the traditional evaluations of development and modernization. Even though first- and second-wave feminism has been a social force in the West for quite a few years, its findings, in this case for example the value of reproductive work in the domestic sphere¹⁶⁹, were not translated into the field of development. The only relevant contributions continued to be the ones that bought financial value.

Connected to this issue is the question of language, a methodology of examination typical of postmodernism. A simple example is the use of terms such as "economic actors"¹⁷⁰, notions originating in traditional Western thought and to a certain extent applicable only to its realities. With the incorporation of

¹⁶⁵ Persram, Nalini (1999), pp. 70.

¹⁶⁶ Spivak (1988).

¹⁶⁷ Hartsock, Nancy (1990), pp. 18.

¹⁶⁸ Wood, Cynthia A (1997)

¹⁶⁹ Wood, Cynthia A (1997)

¹⁷⁰ Tickner, J. Ann (2001)

terms such as this one came along the coming into existence of its meaning in the completely different, non-Western context. Put more simply: with imported or modified public/private distinctions, new (economic) roles had to be taken up, consequently producing "economic actors" to suit the Western definitions. Without having people corresponding to these definitions, traditional forms of development could not be realized. However, a byproduct of this was also the import of western way of life. Issues of methodology also played when it came to the methodology of evaluation, which was just as well considered bias. To continue with the example mentioned above, in making the definition of production dependent on monetary quantification in the so-called waged economy, women's work was rendered invisible¹⁷¹. The subject of traditional medicine, by Western standards considered "unscientific", is another example of how not conforming to Western methods of evaluation thus made it labeled as backward.

A related facet is the absence of the qualitative aspects of development. Since it was the public sphere and not the private sphere that was of interest when dealing with development, it was consistently the quantitative manifestations that were deemed relevant. Only recently has a different concept of development begun to be accepted, one that does take into account the quantitative side. This has to do with the shift in methodology, a shift compelled by feminist and postmodern critique. Strict mathematical evaluations based on statistical data were abandoned in favor of one's providing more insight, such as discussions with individual producers, consumers, workers etc¹⁷². Suitable is a definition offered by the winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences Amartya Sen, who "describes development as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy", including "the freedom to satisfy basic needs for food and shelter, the freedom to live safe from fear and violence, and the freedom to participate in the social, economic and political life of one's community" ¹⁷³. It is a more holistic approach to the issue of development, encompassing not just the public- political and economic viewpoints, but the private one as well, characterized in broader terms with consideration of qualitative as well as the quantitative features of development. In other words,

¹⁷¹ Tickner, J. Ann (2001), pp. 85.

¹⁷² Rossetti, Jane (2001), pp. 317.

¹⁷³ Taking Gender Equality Seriously: Making Progress, Meeting New Challenges, UNDP, www.undo.org

they pointed out many of the problems were inherent to development theories in general.

As is always the problem with postmodern approaches that are to a certain extent inherently self-destructing, here too feminists have to be careful to not just deconstruct the current systems, but offer a way forward. Similarly, there is opposition to both feminism and postmodernism in the field of IR as well as in the field of economics, precisely because of fear of losing precision that scientific method may offer¹⁷⁴. However, that does not mean that the postmodern approach is a dead end, when it comes to normative ends. Although completely abandoning the Western definition of development would rule out the possibility of having any normative goals in terms of the improvement of the position of women, what is deemed necessary by postmodern feminists in relation to development is a more profound sensitivity to how class, gender or race structures shape local societies.

¹⁷⁴ Nelson, Julia A (2001), pp. 286

Conclusion

When it comes to feminism (and not just in IR), there really is no -ism, but rather several -isms. I have tried to emphasize the diversity of this approach throughout my thesis, an approach which is paradoxically often considered to be a homogenous one, characterized by its critique of mainstream IR. The second issue many IR theorists have with feminism is, just as paradoxically, exactly the opposite: that it is overly schizophrenic and thus incapable of clearly answering simple questions. And that is exactly the problem: simple questions do not always have simple answers, and seldom will a diverse group answer in one voice. The same holds true for feminism in IR. Strands that differ in their methodological, ontological and epistemological foundations will each tackle the question at hand in a different way, arriving at diverse conclusions. What they do have in common is the gender-sensitive lens they look through.

In the first chapter of my thesis I provided an overview of feminisms in IR. I first introduced the so-called Great Debates in IR theory, in order to be able to bring into context the entrance of feminism, as a specific set of approaches in the field. The focal points of each of the Great Debates differed, especially in terms of methodology and later epistemology, and it was only the Third Great Debate that brought up questions of ontology. Feminism, a latecomer to IR, took advantage of precisely this quake of epistemological and ontological convictions of IR to make itself heard. I then introduced the main stands of feminist IR theory, grouping them depending on their stance towards positivist methodology, epistemology and ontology. Moving chronologically, I started with liberal feminism, which is positivist in nature and lays most emphasis on institutional structures. I continued with standpoint and postcolonial feminisms, which are both post-positivist in their methodology and especially try to bring to attention the embeddedness of positivist IR theory and liberal feminist IR theory. I finished with poststructural feminism, splitting it into feminist postmodernism and postmodern feminism, whose weapons of choice are deconstruction and genealogy, respectively. In each case, I also mentioned the most common critiques of the given strand, in relation to the development of feminist IR theory.

The second chapter of my thesis dealt with feminist reexaminations of traditional political theory, specifically of the creation of states and its founding

aspects. The aim was to illuminate the male bias in conventional political philosophy, which is observable in theories regarding the establishment of the state as well as the traits valued in the public sphere. I reflected on the reality of the ancient Greek polis, emphasizing the position and role of women in it, the heritage it left us in the form of the private/public division, and the effects it had on the theories of Plato and Aristotle. By understanding the subtle semiotics of the male/female dichotomy, we can better understand why these two theorists placed so much emphasis on certain characteristics that they regarded valuable in the public sphere. However, these traits are not only gendered, but at the same time exist in a hierarchical relation to one another. A closer look at the realities of the ancient Greek world can therefore help us see why women and feminine attributes were absent from their theories, except in the form of negative assets, which, given the fact that they belong amongst the founders of Western thought in general, manifests itself and is relevant even today. I argued that the inclusion of women in their ideal states was based on pragmatic reasons, not on a belief that women actually belong in the public, political sphere. The same holds true on a metaphorical level – the feminine was just as unwelcomed in public sphere as women themselves, which agrees with my primary premise of the male bias in traditional political philosophy. Afterwards, I went over Machiavelli's teachings, how he worked with and finalized the above mentioned distinction of the public and private. I then presented his concept of *virtú* vs. *fortuna*, concentrating on their gendered aspects and semiotics. Continuing with the social contract theorists, I (re)examined Hobbes's and Rousseau's popular theories of the establishment of the state in the form of the so-called Social Contracts to argue in favor of Carole Pateman's hypothesis, who maintains that the creation of both of the Social Contracts was made possible only by what she termed the pre-existing Sexual Contract. Providing for the submission of women to men, in the end it was only men, representing women in the public sphere, who enclosed the Social Contracts. This corresponds with my premise that when it comes to the founding theories of the state, a male bias is quite visible.

In the next three chapters, I reexamined the most popular concepts of mainstream IR theory in relation to the state, the state in the international system and IPE from three perspectives introduced in detail in the first chapter of my thesis – that is the (positivist) liberal, (postpositivist) standpoint and

(poststructural) postmodern approaches. I entwined founding notions of traditional IR theory, such as independence, freedom, sovereignty, or war and peace, with the feminist notion of the public/private divide. The aim was to point out how each of these perspectives differs in their analysis of the above mentioned concepts, as well as how they differ from one another. By using the method of deconstruction, I was able to reveal the gendered nature of these concepts.

In the third chapter, I used Morgenthau's hypothesis regarding the rules of the workings of politics, which were in line with Machiavelli's teachings and provided a foundation for modern-day realist thought in IR, as a bridge between political philosophy and current IR dogma. In the case of liberal feminism, after indicating its normative goals, I applied the private/public division to the position of the household in the state. Using the institution of marriage as an example, I portrayed the flexibility and manipulability of the border-line between these two spheres, hinting at the male-bias of the terms independence, sovereignty and freedom, since they are dependent on the private sphere. Just as well, by pointing out the concrete effects of laws and institutions on women (as was the example of the (non-)existence of the concept of marital rape), we can clearly see that the public world was not constructed in a gender neutral way, but rather as a reflection of viewpoints of those who created these laws – i.e. men. Continuing with standpoint feminism, I again mentioned theories of the establishment and workings of the state to bring to light the importance of *brotherhood* and gendered semiotics in its successful founding and running. This is to say that the general will, which was to be the foundation of the modern state, was not actually *that* general, since women were once again to be represented in the public sphere by men. I then re-conceptualized the notion of freedom from an assumingly women's point of view and presented the standpoint feminist reformulation of the term, in the form of the ethic of care. In other words, in line with the standpoint approach, if we take into consideration the realities of women's lives, we can see that the common notion of freedom is not available to everyone, but contrarily dependent on the provision of necessities on someone else – in this case women. Finishing with postmodern feminism's doubt of the essentialism of the women's viewpoint and of the very subject "woman", I took into consideration one of the greatest problems of postmodern feminism – that it seemingly cuts itself off right at the beginning

when it comes to normative goals, since it doubts its very subject of inquiry. I then addressed the issue of the political nature of the public and private, manifested in its very construction. This is to say that, like most things (or in constructivist extremes everything), the notions of public and private are constructed, but they are constructed by men, who then determine what belongs into the public sphere and what belongs into the private one. The prerogative of determining this is de facto a manifestation of power, and also a manifestation of the male bias in IR.

In the fourth chapter of my thesis, I projected the binary system of the public and private onto the position of the state in the international system, emphasizing the premise that results from this projection – that the state is a single entity in the larger system, entitled to non-intervention. Beginning with liberal feminism, I addressed the necessary and necessarily gendered semiotics of war, as is presented by Jean Bethke Elshtain in the *personas* of the Just Warrior and Beautiful Soul, which make possible (the personalization of) war, and a resulting question: what is the relationship of women to the state defined by? I also mentioned the gendered nature of the crafting of the “motherland” that one is to protect. The core of the argument was that by deconstructing these archetypes, we can see how the feminine was ascribed a role in the gendered semiotics of war – a metaphorical role they physically often end up paying for in times of war. This fact was addressed in more detail in the standpoint feminist perspective. I first contemplated the women as peace nexus, the most clichéd image of feminism in IR and even of women in politics, and then addressed the actual effects of war on women, especially paying attention to the issue of sexual violence towards women in times of war. I provided explanations for why this is such a widespread practice of *political* nature. By pointing out the fact that sexual violence was acknowledged as a specific method of war so late in history, I aimed to illuminate the male bias not just in international law, but also in the defining of the meaning of war. Turning to the postmodern feminist approach, I presented how common concepts of IR were re-thought, and what role the deconstruction of terms such as “us” and “them” played or could play. The construction of these terms also influenced definitions of other terms, such as “enemy” or “civilian”, terms fundamental for warfare. I then re-addressed the relationship of the Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul using the method of deconstruction to provide an example of how

the different strands of feminism can communicate with each other, and why it is beneficial to have several epistemological and ontological basis. Continuing with a reconsideration of women's role in combat, I hinted at the transformational potential of postmodern feminism. In other words, in the same way women's roles in combat are constructed according to need, we can (re)construct other roles women take on in both the public and private sphere by changing society's perception of them, to help further their actual possibilities.

The last chapter of my thesis dealt with feminist re-conceptualizations of IPE and development theories. Throughout this chapter, I reviewed the development theories of the second half of the twentieth century to be able to show how the comments of feminist critiques resulted in the creation of gender-sensitive development strategies, as was WID and GAD. Starting with the liberal feminist perspective, I demonstrated how the public/private divide exists in the economic sphere and the consequences of this division on the economy, on the results of development programs, and on women. Moving on to the standpoint feminist perspective, I addressed the effects of this division on women as women, which led to the so-called feminization of poverty. I also mentioned the critiques of postcolonial feminist's of the development strategies, whose focal point was the inadequacy of the exported frameworks on Southern realities. The goal was to show that if we only consider the (men's) public sphere as the sphere of productivity, and not take into account the (women's) private one, development projects will necessarily backfire. On the other hand, by making visible the women's standpoint, a better conception of development can be created, resulting in the enhancement of the effects of development strategies. Finishing with the postmodern feminist perspective, I discussed their deconstruction of Western terms and definitions of "development", of "productivity", of "economic actors" and "consumers", and of methods of evaluation of development. In the end, I mentioned the need of using methods of development that are more sensitive to local realities and the related necessity of redefining the term "development" to include more qualitative aspects. The point was to show that once again, by deconstructing the traditional definitions, definitions that were created by men to suit the Western public sphere where economic productivity took place (at a time when women were literally absent from it), we are forced to not just reconsider the delimitations of the public and private, but also

definitions of productivity and development itself, a reconsideration that will result beneficial not just to women, but to development in general.

Throughout my thesis I have tried to emphasize, via the method of deconstruction, that the conventional theories of international relations, including political philosophy and international political economy, are not gender neutral, but rather manifestations of the bias of the male point of view. These theories, in the tradition of Enlightenment, albeit being commonly presented as universal, objective, and neutral, are contrarily testimonies of the embeddedness of the so-called knower. As I hope has been sufficiently shown, Western thought, philosophical as well as political, is founded on dichotomous ways of thinking, which are to a certain extent at the same time gendered. These categories not only stand in binary opposition to one another, but also in a hierarchical relation, with the masculine being subconsciously considered superior to the feminine. This is then projected and thus made visible in IR by assigning superior value to behavior (of the individual as well as the state) traditionally considered masculine, as is strength, independence, rationality, as opposed to behavior considered feminine, as is consideration for others or emotionality. The consequences of this reality are far-reaching and can be seen in traditional political theories as well as in current IR dogma.

There is, of course, much more one could say regarding feminism in IR. I aimed to provide an overview of what feminism in IR is and how it can help us see conventional truths from a different viewpoint. My founding hypothesis, that there is a male bias in traditional IR theory, I believe has been proved. What most interested me and I tried to bring to light throughout my thesis were the ongoing discussions between the different strands of feminist IR. This is due to the variations of their stance towards epistemology and ontology, which has an effect not only on how they perceive common notions in IR, but also on their methods of reaching normative goals. Although some approaches (liberal and standpoint feminism), have chosen more tangible methods, postmodern feminism should certainly not be forsaken, since it uses more sophisticated methods and thus aims at more profound change. It is definitely an issue I aim to look further into, especially in terms of the potential of postmodern feminism to reach feminism's normative goals.

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Summary

There are several different feminist approaches within international relations theory, differing in their methodologies as well as their stance towards epistemology and ontology. The outcome is a diverse set of approaches and perspectives, all interpreting conventional IR theory in a specific way. What they do have in common, however, is the gender sensitive lens they look through. The aim of this thesis is to point out how the common concepts of IR alter once we take into consideration the effects of gender (female *and* male). I choose to make use of the method of deconstruction to help reveal these alternative interpretations, since it is apt at uncovering not just the "other side of the story", but also takes into consideration what wasn't included. According to feminists, noticing and evaluating the empty spaces is just as relevant as analyzing the usual content, since the very demarcation of issues as relevant vs. irrelevant is a manifestation, as well as an instrument of power. The main hypothesis is that traditional Western IR theory, including political philosophy and IPE, are not gender neutral, but contrarily a manifestation of the male bias.

The thesis is divided into five chapters: the first is a rather introductory one, where I go over the divergent feminist approaches in IR. This serves to provide a general idea of what feminism in IR is and how the various perspectives differ. The second chapter addresses traditional political philosophy and with the help of the method of deconstruction portrays how models regarding the founding of the state (i.e. the social contract theories) are testimonies of the male point of view. It also takes up the issue of the creation and consolidation of the public and private sphere, with men belonging in the first (and thus provided the possibility of public say) and women in the second (thus publically silent). The outcome is therefore the male-bias in IR theory. In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, issues are approached from three diverse feminist perspectives, depending in their epistemological and ontological underpinnings. The first is the positivist liberal, the second is the postpositivist standpoint, and the third is the poststructural postmodern perspective. I have chosen to use these three different approaches to be able to show the diversity of feminism in IR, manifested in the ongoing disputations between the different approaches. The third chapter hence reconsiders the common notions of the state as an institution, with emphasis on the existence (and consequences) of the public and private spheres. The gendered semiotics of war are also contemplated, as

well as the inaccuracy of the notion of the general will. The fourth chapter re-evaluates the state in the international system, existing in parallel as the private sphere in this (public) system. The actual consequences of war on women are addressed, resulting in the illumination of the bias in the constructing of the concept of war. The last, fifth chapter deals with IPE and development theory, and shows what effects the existence of the public and private sphere has on Western conceptions of economics and on development projects. In each of these chapters, the method of deconstruction is applied to illuminate the male bias in the construction of mainstream theories.

The hypothesis of this thesis, that conventional IR theory is not gender neutral, but contrarily a manifestation of the male bias, provided for the factual and metaphorical exclusion of women from the public field, was I believe confirmed.

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Feminist Interpretations of Traditional Theories of the State in International Relations

Master's Diploma Thesis Proposal

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Introduction

Feminism, like other post-positivist approaches, is a latecomer to international relations theory. It was only in the context of the 1980s debate concerning the ontological and epistemological foundations of international relations theory that feminism entered the discussions, expressing skepticism towards the absolutist claims of mainstream approaches regarding these foundations.

Building on and expanding feminist theory in general, it provided new perspectives on old themes. The very foundations of the field, such as the state and related institutions like sovereignty and non-intervention, were put into question, as well as the international system as a sum of these states itself. Reexamined were not just the theoretical, but also real-life consequences of these rather entrenched institutions and premises.

What was arrived at is a unique viewpoint of past and present phenomenon taking place in the world. The state was re-conceptualized and doubts of the public/private divide appeared - whether the divide be within the state itself, analogously on the international level, or on both levels in terms of economics. Similarly, a new perspective was taken on wars, be it between states or within them; and an alternative explanation of their effects and "side effects", along with new opinions on which is which, was presented. Prevailing notions of peace and security were scrutinized, especially in relation to the concept of the state as the provider of security. In other words, through a theoretical examination of traditional international relations theories explanations of many problems of today's world were presented, explanations I believe could not have been reached through other than feminist analysis.

The relevance of feminism, although still a marginal approach in international relations, I believe is therefore twofold. On a theoretical basis, it is in its power to make us consider a different perspective, take a different standpoint, and in the end perhaps even question the very foundations of international relations theory. On a practical footing, it is in its explanatory potential when it comes to questions about the origin and reason of some of the problems the world faces today, and, consistently with the normative nature of feminism, provide us with answers as how to solve some of these problems.

The aim of this work is to reinterpret traditional theories of the state in international relations from a feminist point of view. I would like to examine the founding premises of the field, especially the implications of the public/private divide presented by the state in the international system, and through the method of deconstruction arrive at an "other" understanding of the underlying concepts of the field. I believe that this particular method is adequate for a feminist work, since it well suits the aim of providing counterpart explanations to prevailing models, without, however, aiming to substitute them. I also aim to examine the concrete consequences of the prevailing theories, using several case studies to do so. My main hypothesis is that a feminist interpretation of traditional theories of the state in international relations is actually capable to undermine the claim of objectivity of these theories, and that they are not, in their practical outcomes, gender neutral.

Scheme

1) Introduction

2) What is Feminism in International Relations (IR)?

- The appearance of feminism in IR theory discussions; contextualization into the general reexamination of theories of state and international relations.
- The main approaches within feminist IR theory and their characteristics.

3) Traditional Political Philosophy and its Feminist Reinterpretations

- A look at some of the basic theories regarding the state and its founding through a feminist lens.

4) Feminism and the State

- A feminist reinterpretation of the state as an institution on three levels of analysis – liberal, standpoint and postmodern.

5) The state in the international system and a feminist revisioning of war

- The consequences of the state as the private sphere in the public international system - a different look at war, peace and security, again approached on the above mentioned three levels of analysis.

6) A feminist take on economy

- The state and the family as unitary actors - considerations of the well-being of a state and "disposable labor", also approached on the previously mentioned three levels of analysis.
- Development theory and practice - the gendered effects.

7) Conclusion

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