

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Science

Department of International Relations

Klára Schneiderová

**Predicate Analysis and Analysis of
Metaphors Used in Messages Attributed to
Osama bin Laden Regarding the United
States of America and Their European Allies
Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq**

Master's Thesis

Prague 2011

Author: **Klára Schneiderová**

Consultant: **PhDr. Radana Makariusová, Ph.D**

Opponent:

Date of presentation: **June 2011**

Grade:

Publication data

SCHNEIDEROVÁ, Klára. *Predicate Analysis and Analysis of Metaphors Used in Messages Attributed to Osama bin Laden Regarding the United States of America and Their European Allies Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq*. Prague: Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science, Department of International Relations, 2011. 122 pgs. Consultant: PhDr. Radana Makariusová, Ph.D.

Annotation

The Master's Thesis *“Predicate Analysis and Analysis of Metaphors Used in Messages Attributed to Osama bin Laden Regarding the United States of America and Their European Allies Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq”* deals with predicate analysis and analysis of metaphors found in the discourse of Osama bin Laden, the leader of the global Jihadist network, al-Qaeda, particularly his messages regarding the United States of America and its European allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as they were gathered in various relevant sources of record up to the near present. I chose this topic due to my long-term interest in the Middle East, particularly the relationship and links between religious ideology and politics in the region. Both predicate analysis and metaphorical analysis could therefore serve as efficient methods in seeking the two central questions of this thesis: **1. How are the United States of America and its European allies referred to and portrayed in various relevant messages attributed to Osama bin Laden following the invasion of Iraq? 2. What do these characteristics, assumptions and descriptions and discourse construction of the latter actors through multiple predicates (adjectives, verbs, adverbs) and metaphors testify or reveal about their author(s) and disseminator(s)?** The findings can provide a means to help further clarify the manifestations and consequences of fundamentalist logic chains, resulting in the imperative perception of war on terror as *de facto* war on Islam; as well as to better understand which definitions, attributes or descriptions of “Western” actors imply the need for *jihad* in fundamentalist minds, entering the vicious circle of anticipated and escalating violence.

Keywords

discourse analysis, predicate analysis, metaphorical analysis, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, terrorism, Jihadism, Iraq war, Cold War, United States of America, Europe

Note on transcription

Specific Arabic terms and rarely mentioned names in this thesis are generally romanized following the ALA-LC table, a system of transliteration adopted by the US Library of Congress (al-Saddākī, al-Khātīb al-Baghdādī, 'ilm al-khaṭāba, dār al-islām). Frequently used expressions and names (Muslim, umma, jihad, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, Riyadh) are left in their popular form for better clarity. Expressions in Urdu are transcribed using respective additional characters (Jamā't-e Islāmī).The use of Arabic and other terms in citations and bibliography is left unchanged.

Declaration

1. I pledge that I have not received unauthorized assistance during the completion of this thesis and I have referred to the cited sources only.
2. The text of this thesis without Annotation or Appendices has a total of 220 517 characters in length, which makes 122 standardized pages.
3. I give consent to publicize this thesis for further academic use and scholarly reference.

Prague, May 2011

Klára Schneiderová

.....

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank PhDr. Radana Makariusová, Ph.D, my primary consultant at Charles University in Prague, doc. Ing. Petr Drulák, Ph.D of the same institution, as well as Dr. John Lee Gordon, Dr. Walid Hamarneh and especially Dr. Joseph Essid, my principal mentor at the University of Richmond, VA, for their comments, encouraging feedback and kindly helpful approach throughout the completion of this work.

I dedicate this work to my parents with love and thanks for their inspiration and support.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION: WAR ON TERRORISM, WAR ON ISLAM?.....	4
1.ARABIC RHETORIC AND JIHADIST DISCOURSE: A CONCEPTUAL NOTE.....	8
1.1 ARABIC RHETORIC.....	10
1.2 JIHADIST DISCOURSE	15
2.OSAMA BIN LADEN: A PORTRAIT.....	26
3.PREDICATE ANALYSIS AND METAPHOR ANALYSIS: A THEORETICAL NOTE.....	35
3.1. PREDICATE ANALYSIS, GROUNDED THEORY (MILLIKEN).....	38
3.2. METAPHORICAL ANALYSIS, SECURITY METAPHORS (CHILTON).....	41
3.3. AL-QAEDA AND “THE WEST”: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS APPLIED.....	44
4. PREDICATE ANALYSIS AND METAPHOR ANALYSIS OF MESSAGES ATTRIBUTED TO OSAMA BIN LADEN REGARDING UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES FOLLOWING THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ.....	47
4.1. PREDICATE ANALYSIS.....	50
4.1.1. USA.....	51
4.1.1.1. America.....	53
4.1.1.2. Americans.....	54
4.1.1.3. Bush and the White House.....	56
4.1.1.4. People.....	57
4.1.1.5. Soldiers and armed forces.....	58
4.1.1.6. Alliances.....	59
4.1.2. European allies.....	61
4.1.2.1. Leaders, states and alliances.....	61
4.1.2.2. People.....	63
4.1.3. Shared.....	65
4.1.3.1. Crusaders and Romans.....	65
4.1.3.2. Unbelievers and infidels.....	67
4.1.3.3. Forces and powers.....	68
4.1.3.4. The West.....	69
4.1.3.5. Oppressors, occupiers, enemies and thieves.....	70
4.2. METAPHORICAL ANALYSIS.....	71
4.2.1. USA.....	71
4.2.1.1. Person.....	72
4.2.1.2. Container.....	75
4.2.1.3. Link.....	77
4.2.1.4. Path.....	79
4.2.1.5. Force.....	81
4.2.2. European allies.....	82
4.2.2.1. Person.....	82
4.2.2.2. Container.....	84
4.2.2.3. Link.....	85
4.2.2.4. Path.....	86
4.2.2.5. Force.....	87
CONCLUSION	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	91
LIST OF APPENDICES.....	94
APPENDICES.....	95

Introduction: War on Terrorism, War on Islam?

*“If the specter of Islamic 'fundamentalism' replaces communism as the principal perceived threat to Western civilization and norms, as seems to be the case, then it is incumbent on scholars and citizens to examine not only the **insecurities and aspirations that drive such movements** but also the historical processes that constructed the historical opposition between 'our' supposed civilization and international norms and 'their' imagined backwardness and fanaticism.”*

Steve Niva, 2006, 167

The objective of this work is to analyze the terrorist discourse of Osama bin Laden, the iconic leader of the global Jihadist network al-Qaeda, particularly his messages regarding the United States of America and its European allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as they were gathered in various relevant sources of record up to the near present.¹ I chose this topic due to my long-term interest in the Middle East, particularly the relationship and links between religious ideology and politics in the region. The methodology selected is closely related to media image analysis, which I focused on and applied in my previous academic work. In accordance with the introductory quote by Steve Niva, I believe that in the world today, Islamic fundamentalism has somewhat filled the place of communism as the representing the indispensable “Other”, enemy and foreign to “the West”. It has therefore become increasingly important to reflect, observe and closely examine the roots and foundations of fundamentalist argumentation and logic, which – in this case – serve as the key motors of the global Jihadist movement.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, various works dedicated to the matter have been published, aiming to gather, summarize and document the existing messages of al-Qaeda, analyzing the key concepts and terms that the network operates with in its discourse, as well as focusing on particular key figures and ideologists of the organization, such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For the purposes of this work, I have chosen to refer to two of such compilations in particular (Lawrence 2005; Ibrahim 2007), which will serve as primary sources for my research. The relevant texts comprised in these publications present precise and eloquent translations of the original Arabic messages, often accompanied by scholarly comments and remarks on terrorism or Islamic thought. I expect that through a close up and detailed analysis of such messages, addressed to – as labeled by both bin Laden and Zawahiri – “*the land of*

¹ I limited my research to the messages imminently preceding and later following the 2003 invasion of Iraq until the establishment of the first Iraqi government since I assumed that these two dates provided feasible landmarks for the purposes of this work and its estimated length. Opting for an analysis of discourse regarding the aftermath of 9-11 would in my opinion represent an excessive amount of data.

infidels” and “*the Great Satan*” (Ibrahim 2007, 2), one is able to better and more fully grasp and understand the concepts, images and motives the Jihadist ideologists use in their interpretation of the current affairs and history and which then can – and often do – result in positive feedback from – however small – extremist segment of Muslim populations in the world. The findings can then provide a means to help further clarify the manifestations and consequences of fundamentalist logic chains, resulting in the imperative perception of war on terror as a *de facto* war on Islam; as well as to better understand which definitions, attributes or descriptions of “Western” actors imply the need for *jihad* in fundamentalist minds, entering the vicious circle of anticipated and escalating violence.

Since the main aim of this research is to closely examine and define concepts, attributes and images associated with various “Western” actors in the messages of Osama bin Laden following the invasion of Iraq, it seemed best to choose a discourse analysis method, defined in critical and postmodernist theory as seeking to “*illustrate how /.../ textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world*” (George 1994, 191, in Milliken 1999, 225). **Predicate analysis** then seemed most appropriate in this case. The term, as defined by **Jennifer Milliken**, provides a detailed method of revealing the way actors in discourse are constructed through their description, through “*language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities*”. (Milliken 1999, 232).

The concept of predicate analysis is closely related to another method, **metaphorical analysis**, a concept based in linguistics and developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), which “*focuses upon metaphors (conventional ways of conceptualizing one domain in terms of another) as structuring possibilities for human reasoning and action*” (235). Hence, if we accept the premise of metaphorical structures as determining the boundaries and trajectories of actors, applying a metaphorical analysis method seems an appropriate **complementary** theoretical outcome for this particular topic. Rooting from this argumentation and given the disciplinary focus of this work, in my analysis, I have therefore chosen to refer to the methodological concepts of **security metaphors** as explored in the work of **Paul Chilton**, who examined metaphorical expressions in the Cold War context; as well as Jutta Weldes's

concepts of **articulation** and **interpellation**, which constitute **societal common sense** and promulgate **paradigmatic truth**.

I believe that both predicate analysis and analysis of security metaphors could serve as efficient methods in pursuit to answering two central questions of this thesis:

1. How are the United States of America and its European allies referred to and portrayed in various relevant messages attributed to Osama bin Laden following the invasion of Iraq?

2. What do these characteristics, assumptions and discourse construction of these actors through multiple predicates (adjectives, verbs, adverbs) and metaphors testify or reveal about their author(s) and disseminator(s)?

The basic data which I aim to analyze for this project are **nine relevant messages** attributed to Osama bin Laden regarding the United States of America and its European allies throughout the years 2003-2006. Specifically, I will be dealing with the following texts: *“To the Iraqi people“* (February 2003); *“Among A Band of Knights“* (February 2003); *“Quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates“* (October 2003); *Israel, Oil and Iraq“* (October 2003); *“Resist The New Rome“* (January 2004); *“Osama bin Laden's Peace Treaty to the Europeans“* (April 2004); *“The Towers of Lebanon“* (October 2004); *“Depose The Tyrants“* (December 2004) and *“Bin Laden's Truce Offer to the Americans“* (January 2006).

Given the above aims and objectives, I am of course aware of various potential threats and drawbacks that I am facing in this work and I must bear in mind, seeking to avoid or diminish their impacts as a researcher. Firstly, my findings and conclusions may result in being **narrow and rigid portraits**, due partly to the fairly small amount of data I aim to examine and partly to the fact that I will naturally be reflecting my subjective views in the matter. Since both predicate analysis and metaphorical analysis operate with **subjective interpretation**, I encourage the readers to perceive the results of my work more as a contribution to an ongoing debate rather than a precise presentation of exact evidence or proof. Furthermore, as the thesis will **focus primarily on “Western” actors**, United States of America and its European allies, it may be prone to reinforcing rigid interpretations of bin Laden's discourse, such as the perception the United States as “the evil brain“ juxtaposed by a portrait of its European allies as “mere tools“ employed in order to exercise American power policies.

In sum, I conclude that although all the concerns discussed above present potential and substantial limits to my research, its and validity, I believe it can still serve

as a credible attempt to document how an iconic leader of a radical organization used and formulated predicates and metaphorical structures addressing his foes in pursue of achieving his vision and strategy. It would surely be both desirable and interesting to perform a similar analysis on subjects outside the realm of what is labeled as “Western civilization” and to analyze bin Laden's discourse with regard to the key regional powers in the Middle East with predominantly Muslim populations. It would then be possible to examine predicates and metaphors attributed to Iraq, Saudi Arabia or the then newly established, emerging Afghan government. Despite their potential shortcomings and foreign policy preferences, often contradictory to al-Qaeda's ideology, these countries are perceived as a part of the *dār al-islām* and hence the *umma*. Therefore, I assume that an analysis designed in this direction could result in rather more diverse and ambiguous findings, possibly leading to further interesting research on this topic in the future.

1. Arabic rhetoric and Jihadist discourse: A conceptual note

*“Rhetoric, arguably the first political science, offers an analytical program that works well with the common sense and enduring concerns of foreign affairs. The **rhetorical tradition** includes appreciation of the dynamics of power, valorization of both argument and style, a focus on negotiation, involvement in the dialectic of elites and their publics, a strategic sensibility, and an ambivalent mixture of technical skill and ethical schemes. Within the rhetorical perspective, one **takes words seriously** but not for their own sake alone. The **emphasis is on discourse** /.../ yet the **interest is in the effect discourse has on the conduct.**”*

Francis A. Beer; Robert Hariman, 1996, 10-11

This piece of work is dedicated to examining and analyzing Arabic rhetoric and Jihadist discourse as a specific and extreme manifestation rooted in this complex discipline via the methods and means of international relations theory. Along with Beer and Hariman, I argue that language and rhetoric is closely intertwined with politics and international relations. As such, it *“probes the relationship between the content, forms, and functions of discourse and it demonstrates the capacity of speech to affect judgment and action, particularly in respect to political decision-making”* (Beer and Hariman 1996, 11). This task can be seen as overambitious, as any worthwhile research in these two fields ideally implies a fluency in Arabic language, as well as profound knowledge of Islam and Middle Eastern history. Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that like any researcher in this subject, I will constantly be confronted with the challenge of eliminating my perspective on the matter; seeking to avoid Orientalist assumptions which are linked to the use and nature of Arabic language. Among others, these include claims that it exclusively **determines** the psychology and characteristics of Arab peoples, or a belief that it is characterized by over-assertion and exaggeration. Such claims create a static image of *“the mute Arab”* and misleadingly enable the researcher *“to make the language equivalent to mind, history, history and nature”*, which constitutes a major and unfortunate generalization (Said 1978, 320-321). Having established this perception, however, I do not aim to dismiss or challenge the linguistic relativity hypothesis as stipulated by Sapir and Whorf. By rejecting *“**important interconnections** /.../ between language, culture and psychology”* (Whorf 1939, in Carrol 1998, 134) and the impacts they have on one another, or by denying that *“we see and hear and otherwise experience **very largely** as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation”* (Sapir 1929, in Whorf, in Carroll 1998, 134), language and rhetoric would be reduced to mere means of communication, which also results in shortsighted simplifications. I hope that by being

aware of these potential drawbacks, along with variability in referencing various scholars of record, I hope to limit the possible shortcomings which pose a threat to the relevance of my findings, while still providing a feasible contribution to the subject within the realm of my capabilities.

Initially, I want to start by conceptualizing and contextualizing the characteristics of Arabic rhetoric and its components, as well as some of the key and frequent elements and terms which Jihadist discourse operates with and which I will be encountering further on in my analysis. Labeling a rhetoric as Arabic and a discourse as Jihadist implies that I provide reasons for a these particular attributes and carefully define both of these phenomena, since a clear and established understanding of each of these terms in is crucially linked to other theoretical observations expressed by various scholars whose in opinions I base my claims.

1.1 Arabic rhetoric

*“Language is an organism of sheer power. If language is the body, rhetoric is the soul. **Rhetoric is the womb, the text is the foetus, and the writer/ speaker is the midwife.** /.../ Language without rhetoric is like food without salt.”*

Hussein Abdul-Raof, 2006, 276

Arabic rhetoric constitutes a complex and important linguistic discipline which forms an integral part of Arabic language and literature; being *“a necessary linguistic tool for effective speeches and the mastery of eloquence in Arabic discourse”* (Abdul-Raof 2006, 16), which was very much needed in the time of early Muslim conquests following the death of Prophet Muhammad. In Arabic, rhetoric is referred to either a science (*'ilm*) or ars (*fann*), distinguishing between ***al-khaṭāba* (science of discourse)** and ***al-balāgha* (science of eloquence)** (Halldén 2005, 20). While the former definition was associated with Greek philosophy and tradition and thus often presented as foreign, the latter was defined and cultivated as an Arab rhetoric, forming part of Muslim theological sciences. By the 14th century, al-Sakkākī and other scholars had established *al-balāgha* as an academic discipline, distinguishing between three separate branches of rhetorical studies: the science of meanings (*'ilm al-ma'ānī*), which deals with sentence level syntax, semantic cohesion and harmony; science of discourse and linguistic clarity (*'ilm al-bayān*), which focuses on eloquence and the figures of speech; and science of ornamentation (*'ilm al-badi'*), which studies embellishments (Halldén 2005, 21; Abdul Raof 2006, 15).

Interestingly, the concept of *al-khaṭāba* as the art of public speech and preaching is in fact more noticeable in everyday-life, linked to Islamic tradition, law, religion and language (many commonly used words in Arabic connected to speech come from the same root of KH-T-B, including the term for sermon, *khuṭba*). Here, the canon is not defined by scholars, but rather the tradition (*sunna*) and particularly jurisprudence (*fiqh*), with the model examples of the Prophet and his early followers, formulating *“the proper procedure of public speech as a formal act /.../ regulated in accordance with Islamic law and ethics”* (Halldén 2005, 34). Unfortunately, *al-khaṭāba* had also been less studied, as it was understood as a skill of oratory art that *“had to be imitated and transmitted /.../ without the need to theorize about it”* (23). Yet, various works have been dedicated to analyzing modern-day Muslim sermons, suggesting that these represent *“a rhetorical form /.../ whose elements are linked images and symbols composed in such a way as to express an underlying message through the organizing*

metaphor of kinship” (Antoun 1989, 106), and share multiple common features. Within this flow of formal speech in an established order, words, phrases and religious formulas, current events and issues can be ensconced, addressed and tackled, often in the form of comparison of particular present-day situations to possibly similar ones in history, in order to **“transform the dangerous and uncertain present into the fixed eternal and orderly past”** (Bloch 1975, in Antoun 1989, 231).

For militant Islamists and Jihadists in particular, the traditionally respected form of sermon can thus be highly appealing, insofar serving as an instrument of ideological and political agenda. As Richard Antoun has observed, for example,

“a juxtaposition of the indigenous Jews driven out of Medina by Muhammad in the seventh century after they refused to accept his message, the Crusaders driven out of the near East by Saladin in the twelfth century, and the Jews inspired by Zionism in the modern State of Israel makes it appear that all are alike and, therefore, subject to a similar fate. /.../ In terms of persuasion, the paradoxical result on this assault on the historicity of events is to make them alike, in some sense scripturally anticipated, and to enhance the feelings of unity and solidarity not only with their heroic past but also with one another in the living present.”
(Antoun 1989, 231).

In fact, these very tendencies, chains of thought and objectives can be traced in bin Laden's messages, one of them even being delivered as a sermon. Thus, we see that both rhetorical categorizations are applicable to bin Laden's messages, comprising the practical and oratory functions of *al-khaṭāba* as well as the figures of speech as a part of the literary tradition of *al-balāgha*, particularly the metaphor, labeled as a specific subtype of allegory. Metaphor analysis will constitute the core of this paper due to its linkage to international relations theory, where this concept has been at the center of attention of various post-realist, post-structuralist and post-modernist scholars in the field who study discourse and whom I will further reference.

Arabic rhetorical theory stresses the importance of message dissemination and the impacts on its audience. *Vis-à-vis* any message, each addressee can either be aware (*ghayr jāhil*) or unaware (*jāhil*) of the information being provided (Abdul Raof 2006, 106), as well as variably receptive to its content (theory speaks of the open-minded, the skeptic and the denier) (104). Thus, depending on the particular context, a combination of these factors results in different decoding and ultimately the effectiveness of a statement. Figures of speech represent an *“eloquent discourse that uncovers the emotional feelings of the communicator and exposes them to the addressee”*. Therefore, *'ilm al-bayān* are regarded as powerful instruments, which help to further enhance the impact of disseminated information, as they *“have psychological force /.../ and the skill*

to convince your audience of the truth of your thesis“ (196). Sayyid Qutb (whose work will be discussed further in this chapter) claims that “*discourse (bayan) opposes [erroneous] doctrines and concepts*” (Qutb 1964, 61; in Kepel 2003, 55). Rooting from this argumentation, it is evident that Arabic communicators and recipients pay key attention to simile, metonymy and allegory components of speech. I will now broadly define these three categories, while focusing most closely on the metaphor, its definition, characteristic and form it takes on within the system of Arabic rhetoric.

In its broadest sense, a **simile** is referred to in Arabic as “*the art of likening*”. Through this figure, two or more elements are confronted and compared, either implicitly or explicitly, in variable order and detail (200). A fully represented simile expression consists of the likened-to, the likened, the simile feature and the simile element; such as in the affirmation “*Zaid is like a lion*” (ibid.). However, not all the four components need to be literally present in order to consider a phrase a simile. For example, in the statement “*the full moon feels jealous of your beauty*”, it is implied that a person's beauty be favorably compared to the moon, without the simile element being articulated explicitly (202). Similarly, the phrase “*Zaid is the sun*” suggests a charming character, even though the actual simile feature is omitted (205). In terms of stylistic function, a simile figure serves four main objectives: to clarify a matter by comparison, to distinguish a key characteristic and to either exalt or inversely disgrace someone (209). Bin Laden uses simile expressions for all those purposes; in statements such as “*Islamic umma is the greatest human power*” (Lawrence 2005, 19), establishing a direct link of likeness between the community of believers and power; or the affirmation that “*the occupation of Iraq is a link in the Zionist-Crusader chain of evil*” (214), a double simile enforcing the perception of occupation as evil, which, when spread, will be literally linked to other similar attempts like a chain.

Metonymy is a highly contextual figure of speech with direct relation to hyperbole as an “*allusion to someone or something without specifically referring to his or her or its identity*“ (Abdul-Raof: 2006, 233), often employed in political discourse. In order for it to be efficient, a metonymy reference should avoid allegory, be poignant, direct and straightforward, thus making further explanation unnecessary. The art of metonymy lies in bringing out the symbolically opportune and contextually accepted feature of an item “*with a given linguistic expression instead of explicitly mentioning it*“ (234), such as in the phrases “*Suad's door is always open*”, which aims to highlight one's generosity; or “*Aisha is holding the olive branch*”, this time pointing out to the

fact that we are referring to a peaceful person who is seeking reconciliation (ibid.) In bin Laden's messages, metonymy is applied frequently, for instance in statements proposing a tooth-for-tooth, eye-for-eye revenge “*the oppressor would /.../ get a taste of its own medicine*” (Lawrence 2005, 239); loss “*we are counting our dead*” (Ibrahim 2007, 212); or threat “*may our mothers become barren if we leave any of you alive on our soil*” (ibid.).

The main subject of this analysis, **metaphor**, is classified as a subtype of **allegory**, which is a figure aiming to transform an element in its original literary sense to another abstract meaning; both directly associated to one another through a semantic link. The strength of such a link depends on the existence of a clue that the recipient of a message is provided with, either in lexical (explicit) or cognitive (implicit) terms. This connection can alternatively stress either a likeness or a difference between its elements (211). Metaphor is viewed as a “*master figure of speech and /.../ a compressed analogy*” (218). This analogy established between two or more elements is voiced through an abstracted clue provided to the addressee, which distinguishes metaphor from simile. Like the latter, a full metaphor constitutes of three elements: the **borrowed-from** (equivalent to the likened), the **borrowed to** (equivalent to the likened-to) and the **borrowed** (the element that transforms the first component into the other) (218-219). A metaphor can take on six major forms of statement: **explicit** or **implicit**, **proverbial**, **enhanced** or **naked** (in terms of multiple features of borrowed or borrowed-to), and **absolute** (no cognitive link is provided) (224). Examples of metaphorical allegory include statements such as “*time oppresses*” or the precaution “*beware of the sword between your two jaws*” Here, the addressee distinguishes the allegory as valid based on experience that oppression is a result of human action that takes place during time (212), and the notion of the sword and tongue both possibly serving as sharp weapons (219). Bin Laden's use of metaphorical expressions include phrases such as “*they [the 9-11 hijackers] rubbed America's nose in the dirt, wiped its arrogance in the mud*” (Lawrence 2005, 194). Despite the fact that America as a country has no nose which could be rubbed in dirt, nor does it possess any concrete arrogance which could be wiped in mud, the intended notion of humiliating “a proud face” is conveyed and realized through an abstract metaphorical structure. An example of a more complex metaphorical affirmation in bin Laden's discourse would be the phrase that “*Bush and his gang /.../ have stabbed into the truth until they have killed it altogether in the eyes of the world*” (Ibrahim 2007, 210). Again, an abstract term such

as the truth cannot be *verbatim* stabbed to death, just as the world itself objectively has no eyes that could have witnessed such an event. In substituting “all human eyes” for the term “world”, a generalizing effect is produced and the latter expression becomes a metonymy built up on the initial metaphor, depicting the American government as “murderers” of truth.

Having characterized simile, metonymy and allegorical metaphor components of Arabic rhetoric and provided examples of their use, it should be nevertheless understood that I will base my analysis and its findings primarily on a methodology rooted in **international relations theory** and focus thus on the concept of metaphor as defined by scholars of this discipline. Yet, at the same time, I will also be dealing with **language as a part of discourse**. Metaphor analysis is a method discussed and applied in various interrelated domains, including linguistics and political science, and thus needs to be approached **complexly**. By defining figures of speech via lexical categories, I sought to emphasize this aspect, as well as the existence of mutual bonds between various figures of speech and their relation to the particular discourse of Jihadism, all of these being important features to be considered in this analysis.

1.2 Jihadist discourse

*“We are certain that we shall – with the grace of Allah – prevail over the Americans and over the Jews, as the Messenger of Allah promised us in an authentic prophetic tradition when He said the Hour of Resurrection shall not come before Muslims fight Jews and before Jews hide behind trees and behind rocks. /.../ This battle is not between al-Qaeda and the U.S. **This is a battle of Muslims against the global Crusaders.**”*

Osama bin Laden, 1998, 2001; in Roshandel and Chadha 2006, 4; 67

In this section, I wish to clarify the notion and concept of **discourse** employed in this work. This frequently used term has been multiply defined and applied in various disciplines. In accordance with my academic intentions, I will derive my definition of discourse from the field of international relations and the debate over the study of this term and method term between streams of **critical theory, post-positivism, post-modernism, post-structuralism** and **social constructivism**. As there is no consensus within the field on how to study discourse, nor whether it be a method, a theoretical approach or a framework, scholars have provided multiple explanations and concepts of understanding the matter. I have chosen to employ the formulation articulated by Jim George quoted in the work of Jennifer Milliken, which stipulates that discourse studies in the field of international relations in its broadest sense constitutes a *“post-positivist project”* which seeks to *“illustrate how /.../ textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world”* (George 1994, 191, in Milliken 1999, 225-227). In this work, discourse analysis will be carried out through a process of predicate and metaphor analysis, which is described thoroughly in Chapter 3 dedicated to the matter.

Having established a general notion of discourse, I will now elaborate on some of the crucial and repetitive elements that lead me to label this particular ideological manifestation as **Jihadist**, providing an overview explanation of its key concepts – religious and geopolitical terms, important ideologists and other figures of Islam and Islamism as well as events in the history of Europe, United States and the Middle East which are relevant to my analysis.

This work will be examining discourse as expressed in messages attributed to Osama bin Laden on behalf of al-Qaeda. Labeling it as Jihadist implies I explain both the meaning and evolution of this term, distinguishing it from and comparing it to other definitions used to describe re-Islamization movements emerging in the Muslim societies of predominantly the Middle East with increasing force from the second half

of the 20th century, notably after the Iranian revolution. In this landmark event, its leader ayatollah Khomeini articulated the international objective of holy war against all secular power, namely American imperialism, labeling it “*the work of Satan*”, implicating that United States of America thus represent “*the Great Satan*”. Such proclamations were soon to inspire various Islamist groups, whether Shi’ite or Sunni, both in rhetoric and agenda. These movements, having previously been called mostly as either militant or extremist, were henceforth labeled as **fundamentalist**, referring to a term first cited in this context by the Scottish scholar H. A. R. Gibb in the 1940s (Roshandel and Chadha 2006, 10; Lawrence 1989, 231). As characterized in one of its contemporary definitions, **Islamic fundamentalism** “*represents a sharp break with established religious tradition and at the same time it calls for a return to the past. But it is to be a **past reaffirmed in a different light**, a past dispensing with significant traditions of law, theology and mystical practice*” (Antoun 1989, 236). Apart from “*Islamic fundamentalism*”, the manifestations of this ideology have been given multiple and variable denominations, emphasizing and highlighting its different aspects and characteristics: “*revival*” and “*reformist*” movements (Esposito 1984), “*moderate/reformist*” and “*radical*” “*Islamism*” (Roy 1994; Ashour 2009), “*traditionalist*” and “*reformist*” fundamentalism, “*political Islam*” (Roy 1994; Kepel 2002, Esposito: 2006), “*re-Islamization movements*”, “*Islamism*”, “*Jihadism*”, “*Salafism*”, or “*Salafism-Jihadism*” (Kepel 1994, 2004).

The plenitude of terms reveals the extent of academic interest as well as the ambiguity and diversity of ideological streams in question with regard to these movements. For the purposes of this work, I have chosen to follow the latter categorization, Gilles Kepel's classification of re-Islamization movements. The French scholar distinguishes between **re-Islamization from below** and **re-Islamization from above; militant Islamism** (or **Jihadism**) and **Pietism** (or **Sheikhism**, as dubbed by the militant Islamists/Jihadists due to their loyalty to the Saudi regime, which the “zealots” view as corrupt) (Kepel 2004, 251). All streams share the same objective, “*to re-Islamize society in Muslim countries and to propagate Islam everywhere until humanity was converted into 'ummanity'*” (Kepel 1994, 46), yet they undertake different strategies to achieve this goal. Whereas militant Islamists advocated violent *jihad* and generally sought to perform the task “from above”, targeting the state, the Pietists/Sheikists restrain from violence and mostly aim to carry out the change “from below”, focusing on the individual and societal reform. Nevertheless, Kepel notes that it

would be misleading to homogenize these categories by considering re-Islamization from below as necessarily less radical. Both re-Islamization from above and re-Islamization from below can take on a form of *jihad*, justifying violence as a legitimate tool in pursuit of establishing the *umma*. This is particularly true of **Salafism-Jihadism**, the term coined by Kepel that is crucial for my analysis, defined as yet a further radicalized hybrid of extreme standpoints derived from Salafism rooting from Saudi Wahhabist tradition and influenced by Egyptian Jihadism, merged to create the ideology of al-Qaeda (Kepel 2004, 72). The term *salaf* refers to a Muslim from the first three generations of believers following the example of Prophet Muhammad in the early days of Islam. In Salafist thought, rooting from the teachings of the Saudi cleric **Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab**, this era is regarded as the purest form of religion and society, uncorrupted by neither the pre-Islamic nor contemporary practices of *jāhiliya* (the age of ignorance). Hence, innovations are viewed as unacceptable while the ideal of the primary *umma* is cherished and sought to restore, employing both Pietist/Sheikhist and militant Islamist/Jihadist approaches and strategies (Ashour 2009, 7). Although I fully agree with Kepel's conceptualization and categorization, as well as the coined term of “Salafism-Jihadism”; in this work, I have chosen label bin Laden's discourse as “Jihadist” merely for the sake of generalization, considering the term both sufficiently exact and broad to serve the purposes of this analysis.

Yet firstly, it should be emphasized that the term *jihad* is by no means universally perceived as negative or destructive.² Originally translated as “effort” or “striving”, it is derived from the Arabic root J-H-D, forming part of a large group of words, among them other terms I will elaborate on, frequently mentioned in bin Laden's messages, *mujāhid* (literally “fighter”, combatant of *jihad*) or *ijtihād* (independent thinking, the intellectual effort to both interpret and re-interpret sacred texts) (Kepel: 2005, 13). The basic typology of *jihad* attributed to al-Khātib al-Baghdādī juxtaposes its “greater” and “lesser” form; placing the personal and internally oriented struggle of a believer over his own soul and passions above the effort to exercise this defense of Islam externally as a whole society; the most extreme manifestation of this being armed struggle against the infidels. However, militant Islamists and Jihadists question this hierarchy, favoring the concept of “holy war” over internal striving. Some Sunni extremist groups even consider *jihad* to be a religious duty of every Muslim, labeling it

² This notion of *jihad* is illustrated in the fact that is used – not infrequently – as a given name. (Kepel 2005, 6).

as the sixth pillar of Islam (Lawrence 1989, 217). However, as rooted in both the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth* (literally “narrative”; stories concerning the life and deeds of Prophet Muhammad), the Islamic religious tradition (*sunna*, literally “habit” or “practice”) offers other distinctions and understandings of the term, resulting in multiple categories and notions of *jihad*, emphasizing both its violent and peaceful aspects. Hence, it can be defined in terms of the **enemy being fought** (*jihad* against one's own soul; *jihad* against Satan; *jihad* against the hypocrites and unbelievers; *jihad* against the leaders of oppression and innovation; *jihad* against political dissent or *jihad* against criminals); with regard to the **force employed** in the struggle (*jihad* by the heart, *jihad* by the tongue, *jihad* by the pen, *jihad* by the hand or *jihad* by the sword; equaling the notion of *jihad* as a holy war); as well as with regard to the **entity engaged** in the strife (*jihad* of the individual or the *jihad* of the society as a whole) (Martin 1987, 10).

In Islamic religious theory, this complex and positive notion of *jihad* is juxtaposed by its negative counterpart. The '*ulamā'* (literally “scholars”, educated in religion and Islamic law) have referred to this dangerously perceived state of internal conflict, anarchy, discord destruction in Muslim society, as *fitna*. The contrast of ideological terms reveals that *jihad* is regarded as a desirable instrument to restore order and establish the rule of justice, whereas *fitna* represents the danger that threatens the Muslim community internally, the dreaded and feared “war at the heart of Islam”. Hence, in order to prevent *fitna*, the '*ulamā'* and scholars of Islamic law are required to vigil over the *umma* (literally “nation”, community of believers) and monitor the observance of Islamic law, being the only ones sufficiently qualified in order to pronounce a *fatwā* (a decree reflecting a legal opinion in a matter), or declare *jihad* in the extreme form of armed struggle. This immensely difficult and complex decision requires extensive religious erudition and wisdom, for “*if jihad is declared inappropriately, there is a danger that anarchy and chaos may follow*” (Kepel 2004, 288-289). Furthermore the discourse towards *jihad* in the **Qur'an**, perceived as the authentic word of God revealed to Prophet Muhammad,³ is highly ambiguous. The holy book of Islam offers multiple and often and contradictory verses regarding *jihad*, ranging from the recommendation to remain passive, option to resort to self-defense,

³ This understanding of the Qur'an is emphasized repetitively in various passages in the book, such as in the verses “*God has sent down the best of all texts, a Book which is self-consistent and uses re-iteration*” (Sura 39:23); “*In this Qur'an We have drawn every sort of parable for mankind /.../ It is an Arabic Qur'an, free from all distortion*” (Sura 39:27) or “*Any revelation of Ours which We abrogate or cause to be forgotten We bring a better in its place or one similar*” (Sura 2:106). The latter verse may be very well applicable to the perception of *jihad*.

commandment to protect the *umma* and ultimately the declaration of the religious duty to wage war against polytheism and unbelief, articulated in the famous and disputed “*jihad* verses” of Sura 9:5,⁴ frequently employed by bin Laden and other Jihadist groups (Roshandel and Chadha 2006, 46).

Thus, in the light of the persistent threat of *fitna* endangering Islam from the inside since the very beginnings of its existence, a system of a religiously-geopolitical boundaries had been developed to determine under what circumstances and in what lands *jihad* may be waged. Originally introduced by the scholar Abū Ḥanīfa during the early Islamic conquests, it divides the world into domains (literally “houses”), following categories rooted in the Qur'an as well as concepts introduced by Muslim scholars later in history, with regard to their relation to Islam and the *umma*, distinguishing between *dār al-Islām* (the house of Islam, where *jihad* is forbidden, comprising lands and countries where the religion is practiced where all Muslims can reside peacefully without fearing persecution, thus regarded as the ideal place to live), *dār al-kufr* (the house of unbelief, inhabited by infidels, where Islam is not practiced), which is further subdivided into two subcategories of *dār al-ḥarb* (the house of war, where *jihad* is permitted against unbelievers and infidels) and *dār al-sulḥ* (the house of truce, where Muslims are obliged to restrain from violence against the unbelievers and infidels) (Kepel 2004, 7, 251-252; 255; 292). Given these multiple distinctions, various Islamist groups have chosen to establish different explanations as to where *jihad* can be waged legitimately. In this respect, the year 1989 marks an important and relevant change regarding the subject of my analysis. It was then when the Muslim Brotherhood declared their intention to henceforth consider of Europe as the house of Islam, which implied that no *jihad* in the form of armed struggle would be waged toward this continent on behalf of the organization from now on and it would not object to Muslims settling in those countries. The decision caused dismay among the Salafists, as both branches continue to regard the Old Continent as the house of unbelief. The Pietists/Sheikhists view it as the house of truce and restrain from advocating *jihad*, whereas Salafi-Jihadists retain their militant discourse (255). In order to provide religious grounds for their convictions, such groups often refer to the works of various Islamic and Islamist scholars, both historical and contemporary, along with respective

⁴ The verses read as follows: “*Then when the Sacred Months have passed, then kill the Mushrikūn wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and prepare for them each and every ambush. But if they repent and perform As-Salāt and give Zakāt, then leave their way free. Verily, Allāh is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful*”. Reference is made to two pillars of Islam: prayers (*salāt*) and charity (*zakāt*).

interpretation of key landmarks in world history. Therefore, I will now further elaborate on these points in an overview summarizing the legacy of several figures which have served as an inspiration for Salafi-Jihadists, discussing their rationale and contributions to the matter in the light of key events in Middle Eastern, European and American history which have influenced and shaped the ideology and discourse of of al-Qaeda, before turning to the messages of bin Laden as its leading figure and the principal object of my analysis.

In order to explain the necessity of fighting *jihad* of the sword on all fronts, including against other Muslims, radical Islamists adhere to various supportive argumentative tools. Among these is the concept of *takfir* (literally “atonement”), introduced by the 13th century Islamic scholar **ibn Tamiyya** during the time of the Mongol conquests and later popularized by the previously mentioned **ibn abd al-Wahhab** in 18th century Saudi Arabia. Through the practice of *takfir*, one can declare a particular person or a segment of a society as “impure”, thus excommunicating them from the community of believers (Kepel 2002, 31). This step, although not necessarily violent and originally intended as a means of last resort, employed very scarcely by the '*ulamā*' is thus exploited by the present-day militant Islamists, providing an extreme justification of armed *jihad* against fellow believers. Ibn Tamiyya believed it to be the “*neglected duty*” of every Muslim, and, along with ibn abd al-Wahhab, stressed the importance of returning “*back to the roots*” of Islam, embodied in the righteous examples of the Salafis⁵, the first generations of Muslims exposed directly to the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, uncorrupted by later innovations or heresy (Roshandel and Chadha 2006, 52). For ibn Tamiyya, this included Shi'ism and Sufism, and this rigid perception was later acknowledged and used by bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi and other ideologists of al-Qaeda. Following a chain of mutual inspiration, their viewpoints were affected by the works of various 20th century Islamic ideologists, such as the Pakistani **Saiyyd Abū al-A'lā Mawdūdī** (founder of the Jamā't-e Islāmī), whose legacy was adopted up by the radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, among them Afghan anti-Soviet Jihadists. Bin Laden himself was most influenced by two leading figures of these movements – **Muhammad Qutb** (brother of **Saiyyd Qutb**) and **Abdullah Azzam**.

⁵ However, not all Salafis ought to be labeled as Jihadists. As demonstrated in Kepel's classification, Salafi thought differs with regard to the use of violence – Pietist Salafis restrain from it completely, (Kepel 2004, 255), whereas “reformists“ advocate the idea that Muslims should not engage in *jihad* against the West until they „gather enough strength“ and “get their own house in order“ (Roshandel and Chadha 2006, 51).

Saiyyd Qutb was an Egyptian writer and teacher who eventually shifted his attention from literature to social and political issues. Initially, active in the nationalist movement. A stay in the United States of America during the late 1940s left him disillusioned and disappointed with the state of the world, insofar that he drew closer to Islam and joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1951, quickly rising to become one of its key ideologists as the head of the department of propagation of Islam (Kepel 2003, 41). After the disrupt of the movement with president Gemal Abdel Nasser and the secular regime of the Arab socialist republic, he was imprisoned several times, ultimately sentenced to death and hanged with two other collaborators. It was in prison where Qutb wrote his most important and influential work, *Signposts*. In it, he drafted his perception of a schism between the corrupt societies of the Western world and the values of Islam, coining the Qur'anic term *jāhiliyya* in this contemporary context:

“Nowadays, the entire world lives in the state of jahiliyya as far as the source from which it drives the rules of the mode of its existence is concerned, a jahiliyya that is not changed one whit by material comfort or scientific inventions, no matter how remarkable. /.../ The degradation of man in general in collectivist regimes, the injustice suffered by the individuals and peoples dominated by capital and colonialism are only the effects of this opposition to the rule of God, the negation of dignity that God bestowed upon man! /.../ Now, at the most critical of times, when when turmoil and confusion reign, it is the turn of Islam, the umma, to play its role /.../ Islam's time has come, Islam which does not denounce the material inventions of this world, for it considers them the first function of man, since God has accorded man his lieutenancy over the world, and as a means – under certain conditions – of worshiping God and of realizing the aims of human existence.”
(Qutb 1964, 7-10; in Kepel 2003, 46-47).

Upon Saiyyd Qutb's death, the work became increasingly popular, propagated and disseminated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of its members were later released from jail and found exile in other countries. Thus, Saiyyd Qutb's brother Muhammad left for Saudi Arabia where he sought the publication of his brother's works as well as his own and began teaching at the Umm al-Qura University and later the King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud University in Jidda. Under his influence, some students would come to combine the ideas of Qutbism with radical Saudi Wahhabism (Kepel 2004, 176). Among them was also Osama bin Laden, who began studying at the university in the 1980s.

It has been disputed among scholars and never confirmed whether this was the first time and place the Saudi millionaire's son met his other major acclaimed influence, who would later become his mentor and collaborator in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam (Guanaratna 2002, 17; Saghi 2008, 16; Hegghammer 2008, 90). Dubbed “*the imam of jihad*”, Azzam was born into modest and pious family in Transjordan with ties to the

Muslim Brotherhood. Azzam joined the movement in the early 1950s as a young student, eventually pursuing higher education in religious studies at various institutions and earning a doctorate at the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo. Lecturing and preaching in Jordan, he established his name as a scholar and cleric, and formed a large network of contacts. His radicalized notion of *jihad* and critical anti-secularist remarks subsequently led to a break with the secular Arab governments, the Palestinian liberation movement, his father, (who objected Azzam's participation in the “Palestinian *jihad*” after the **Six Day War**,⁶) and ultimately with the Muslim Brotherhood itself. This was when its leaders refused to fund the *jihad* in **Afghanistan, occupied by the Soviet forces**, which Azzam had decided to pursue upon his return from the pilgrimage in Mecca (Hegghammer 2008, 91). In Afghanistan, Azzam wrote his most influential works, “*The Defense of Muslim Territories*” and “*Join the Caravan*”, advocating for the individual duty of every Muslim to wage *jihad* as a *reconquista* of a territory occupied by foreign forces. The **externally defined enemy** and the emphasis on the **land** rather than the nation state as an object of *jihad* were contributions that differentiated him from the Egyptian Jihadists: instead of a revolutionary *coup d'état*, Azzam proposed a **pan-Islamist** project, a **military “solid base”** (*qā'ida ṣulba*), a place where young Muslims would receive **Jihadist education** (*tarbiya jihādiya*) before going off to fight and recapture Muslim lands in Afghanistan through armed struggle, led by the motto coined by Azzam: “*Jihad, and a rifle, and that's all. No negotiations, no conferences, no dialogue*” (99). When bin Laden joined Azzam in Afghanistan, they established the “Services Bureau” in Peshawar for this cause, where they continued working together until the mid 1980s, when another influential figure appeared on the scene, which would eventually succeed in driving bin Laden from the influence of Azzam over to his side – **Ayman al-Zawahiri**.⁷

The Egyptian physician arrived in Afghanistan in 1985, seeking asylum and funds for a Jihadist base project. He had been released from prison only the year before as a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood suspected of plotting the successful assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. Being a convicted

⁶ During this period, Azzam lived in the refugee camp of al-Zarqa near Amman, which would later become the local center of radical Jihadism fueled by its Wahhabi immigrants from Afghanistan and the Gulf; serving as a pseudonym for its infamous native citizen, **Abu Musab al-Zarqawi** (Milleli 2008, 240).

⁷ After the assassination of Azzam in 1989, several theories suggest Zawahiri himself or together with bin Laden plotted the act because of the power struggle. Yet, none of this has been confirmed through direct evidence (Lacroix 2008 151).

follower of Sayyid Qutb's ideas prior to his imprisonment, the humiliation and torture experienced during that time only reinforced Zawahiri's beliefs and aspirations as a Jihadist wishing on to carry Qutb's legacy. During his trial, he addressed the present foreign journalists in English with a message which already embraces the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and anti-Semitism to later be found in the texts of al-Qaeda:

*“Who are we? /.../ We are Muslims. We are Muslims who believe in their religion, both in ideology and practice, and hence we tried our best to establish an Islamic state and an Islamic society. /.../ We are not sorry for what we have done for our religion, and we have sacrificed, and we are ready to make more sacrifices. /.../ We are here – **the real Islamic opposition against Zionism, communism and imperialism.**”*

(Lacroix 2008, 151).

The speech was delivered in a group of other prisoners, who, showing their tortured bodies, shouted that they “**will not sacrifice the blood of Muslims for Americans and Jews**”, while Zawahiri concluded with a series of rhetorical questions and a warning: “*So where is democracy? Where is freedom? Where is human rights? Where is justice? /.../ We will never forget!*” (ibid.). In bin Laden, Zawahiri found both a receptive ear for these claims and the funds necessary to exercise them. The founder of al-Qaeda and his new mentor shared a common experience of the anti-Soviet *jihad*, resulting in their firm belief that it was solely the *mujahidin* who caused the Russians to withdraw, defeating a then global superpower. Thus, the American reluctance to acknowledge and share this perception, along with the invasion of Kuwait, a conflict leading to American military presence in the Gulf, particularly “*the land of two Holy sanctuaries*“, Saudi Arabia, a move approved by the Saudi dynasty; all led to sharp disappointments and fostered bin Laden's and Zawahiri's radicalism, shaping their “**eschatological interpretation of global politics**”, seeking to revive and reinterpret “*the golden days*” and “*glory*” of the early Islamic era, exploiting historical events for the sake of *jihad* of the “*global Islamic front against the Crusaders and the Jews*” in the present-day context. In the years following the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, local *jihad* (in Egypt, Algeria and Chechnya; among others) against “*corrupt Muslim leaders*“ was initially and gradually recognized as a “*failed strategy*” and abandoned for the sake of a more extreme concept, shaped and drafted during al-Qaeda's exile in Sudan and Afghanistan. Ultimately, the legacies of Qutb and Azzam were “**internationalized**”; adopted, redefined and contextualized in a merger comprising Egyptian and Saudi Jihadist influences (Ashour 2006, 10). As far as the mid-1990s, bin

Laden and Zawahiri as leader and deputy of the organization advocated that *jihād* was insofar to be waged while employing means of mass communication, with the **objective of “striking the far-away enemy”**: United States of America, Israel and their allies (Kepel 2004, 72-73). Opting for this strategy was rooted in their shared conviction and perception of the Afghan *jihād* and *mujahidin* as the key power which led the Soviet superpower to leave the country. In probably his most known work, “**The Knights Under the Prophet's Banner**”, Zawahiri advocated for the continuation of this strategy towards the United States, stipulating that dissemination of successful attacks and subsequent panic would galvanize the Jihadist movement worldwide more quickly and efficiently. The radicalized approach was manifested on both the American soil and the Old Continent; with **suicide terrorist attacks of 9-11, bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005** being its most lethal demonstrations. Stipulating that a universal war against the West was necessary, Zawahiri called upon “**victims of iniquity and tyranny of Western civilization, led by America**” to

“join the Muslims to resist this oppression, the likes of which humanity has never seen before. Unite with us, because we are united with you in this injustice and oppression /.../ Resist with us, until those who have been stripped off their rights have recovered them, until the symbol of tyranny in human history has collapsed.”
(Lacroix 2008, 168).

However, this position would come to be challenged by other concepts of Jihad and figures, such as **Abu Musab al-Zarqawi** and **Abu Musab al-Suri**, who shared a strong **anti-Shi'ite sentiment**. Due to Zarqawi's success as a militant, Zawahiri was eventually forced to acknowledge this strategy, despite his objections and fears of *fitna* and intra-Muslim sectarian war. Furthermore, Zarqawi's anti-Shi'ite discourse was backed by other hard-line fighters, influenced by radical Saudi Wahhabism. Al-Suri (by real name Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) who had been a part of al-Qaeda since the era of Afghan *Jihad* and had spent several years abroad in Europe, establishing local Jihadist networks in Spain and London, represented this extreme standpoint, extending the justification of *jihād* against “**Crusaders, Christians, Jews and lapsed Muslims**“, rejecting partnership between the two major branches of Islam, praising the attacks of 9/11 and advocating for the use of weapons of mass destruction towards the United States, as well as calling for a replacement of the former hierarchical concept of the organization with the strategy of “**individual terrorism**”, (Cruinchank and Ali 2007, 7-8), drafting his concept of al-Qaeda as a **structure of detached units and terrorist cells shielded under an ideological umbrella** in which Suri “*threw physics, Arab*

nationalism, Third World ideologies, Qutb's Islamism and French and Spanish essays and novels into the Jihadist blender of his mind” (Kepel 2008, 169). Yet, I would argue that even in the light of such eventual fragmentation of power and inspirational sources, the perpetuation of charisma and leadership continued to be crucially important; Osama bin Laden and his messages providing a sample illustration in this respect.

2. Osama bin Laden: A Portrait

“So let me be a martyr / dwelling in a high mountain pass / among a band of knights who / united in devotion to God / descend to face armies.”

(Osama bin Laden, 2003; in Lawrence 2005, 205)

“Bin Laden is seen by millions of his co-religionists – because of his defense of Islam, personal piety, integrity and generosity – as an Islamic hero, as that faith's ideal type, and almost as a modern-day Saladin. /.../ [He] has demonstrated patience, brilliant planning, managerial expertise, sound strategic and tactical sense, admirable character traits, eloquence, and focused, limited war aims. He has never, to my knowledge, behaved or spoken in a way which could be described as 'irrational' or 'extreme'.

(Michael Scheuer, CIA, 2004; in Lawrence 2005, xvii-xviii)

“Look at Osama. Look at his face. He's a kind man. He's a man of God. He cares for poor Muslims.”

(Jakarta taxi driver, 2001; in Gunaratna 2002, 52)

The first quote, retrieved from a poem written by Bin Laden in one of his messages to the Iraqi people, could, as Bruce Lawrence (2005) notes, serve well as the man's epitaph. It is beyond doubt that Osama bin Laden was⁸ probably the best known terrorist of the last decades. Hence, in this section, I will turn my attention to his life story, character and evolution of thought; with the biographical narrative serving as a framework for my principal objective and focus: to demonstrate and analyze his positions and attitudes towards the United States of America, as well as several European countries as their allies, which represent the two subjects of analysis in this work. Rooting from the initial textual emphasis on the words pronounced and recorded, as well as acknowledging bin Laden's literary skills and affection for poetry, I will consider other elements noted by various scholars; which form part of bin Laden's rhetorical and discursive arsenal and strategy and should be hence reflected in the predicate and metaphor analyses. These include aspects such as bin Laden's physical appearance as well as use of certain symbols and props, both religious and political, chosen to convey and emphasize particular messages in a manner resonating with his audience. The observations aim to be reflect both verbal and non-verbal means of

⁸ This work was largely being completed when the question whether Osama bin Laden is dead or alive remained a subject of dispute. However, this uncertainty was halted on May 2, 2011 at 4:35 GMT when the American president Barack Obama announced and confirmed in a nationwide address that the leader of al-Qaeda had been shot in the head by a team of CIA-led Navy SEALs following a 40 minute firefight in a compound in the city of Abbottabad north of the Pakistani capital Islamabad in an operation which was planned and precised for several months. In his remarks on Osama bin Laden, the US head of state affirmed that the man had been “*al-Qaeda's leader and symbol*” for over twenty years and his killing is thus by far the greatest counter-terrorist achievement against al-Qaeda, yet warned that it does not mark the end of its attempts nor need for vigilance in the future. The president pointed out that “*bin Laden was not a Muslim leader; he was a mass murderer of Muslims,*” as well as stressed once again that “*the United States is not – and never will be – at war with Islam*”. (The White House; The Economist; BBC News – May 2, 2011).

communication and provide complex and theoretical grounds for the detailed analysis of the respective exposed in Chapter 4 of this work.

Initially, I want to cast a light on Osama's family background and status, as I believe that his social capital and financial circumstances played an important role in how the man presented himself and influenced his manners. As Omar Saghi has noted, bin Laden had “*a nonchalant way of intervening at the highest political levels without bothering to support his position with an apparatus or an ideology. He is still a millionaire's son. He knows how to talk to the wealthy, to attract the poor, to make up for the lack of any compelling discourse, use his financial clout to convince the reticent. He has thus situated himself at the intersection of several social categories*” (Saghi 2008, 16). Indeed, Osama bin Laden was born into a wealthy family. His father, Muhammad bin Laden, was a sample self-made man; an illiterate immigrant from the Hadhramaut region in central Yemen, who had a great talent for entrepreneurship. In Saudi Arabia, which became his home in the 1930s, he eventually succeeded in building a large enterprise in the construction business, the Bin Laden Group. A pious man, he refrained from politics and religious debate but at the same time established close ties and good relations with the Saudi dynasty, who commissioned him to build and renovate roads, buildings and mosques throughout the kingdom and abroad; including in the three holiest places of Islam: Mecca, Medina, and al-Quds (Jerusalem), where the bin Laden family had a house until the **Israeli capture of East Jerusalem** in 1967. This year also marked Muhammad bin Laden's death in an airplane crash. Osama was born in Riyadh in 1957 as his seventeenth son; his mother Hamida being most probably a Syrian⁹. In his early childhood, he often visited his mother's homeland, and later studied in Beirut, thus spending time in two countries at front-line war with Israel, growing up close to the political turmoil in Palestine and experiencing the dispirited atmosphere which dominated throughout the Arab Middle East following the **Six Day War**. Thus, it was not only the religious devotion rooted in the beliefs of Saudi Wahhabi Islam, an example of **piousness** set by his late father, but also the political developments in the region – especially the **Yom Kippur War**, the event which bin Laden himself would later point to as his political awakening – or the **Hama revolt in Syria against the regime of Hafiz al-Assad** in 1982 that would come to shape the beliefs and convictions of the young businessman, who became increasingly engaged in politics despite his late

⁹ Some authors have presented speculations that she was either Alewi or Palestinian, although none of this has been confirmed (Riedel 2008, 40).

father's advice. This personal development and course, as previously noted, further deepened during his college years at the Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud University in Jidda, where he studied business management and met his two major influences, Muhammad Qutb and Abdullah Azzam, who taught him courses in Islam and introduced him to the radicalized ideas of Qutbism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Their stream of thought had clear appeal for bin Laden and blended well with his Wahhabist beliefs. Indeed, as demonstrated later in his life during the final years of anti-Soviet guerrilla in Afghanistan, he would come to favor the Egyptian notion of *jihad* as advocated by Zawahiri over the Afghan strategy proposed by Azzam during the power struggle between the two ideologues, each seeking to convince bin Laden to take their side. Meanwhile, the future leader of al-Qaeda gained experience in his father's business empire, having inherited between 25-30 million USD, most of which, along with annually generated revenues and returns, he would later send overseas to finance *jihad* in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The total sum of this funding adds up to as much as 250-500 million USD in total, according to estimates made by intelligence services based on Swiss bank data, which are perceived as most accurate (Gunaratna 2002, 19).

Within a month following the **Soviet invasion of Afghanistan** in 1979, bin Laden promptly left for the country to broaden the lines the anti-Soviet *mujahidin*, joining Azzam to recruit Arab fighters. He quickly gained fame and clout both there and in his home country, due to his **philanthropy, piousness and commitment to the cause of jihad**, for which he abandoned his wealthy life. As one *mujahid* expressed it, “*he [bin Laden] not only gave his money, he also gave himself. He came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants and the Arab fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug trenches with them. This is bin Laden's way*” (20). Despite the evident idealism of this statement, interestingly enough, it represents a major point on which former Afghan *mujahidin* agree with various scholars of record and even CIA officials charged with capturing the leader of al-Qaeda.¹⁰ All have noted that bin Laden actually enjoyed the harsh conditions when in combat; participating most notably in battles around Jalalabad in 1986, as well as the attack confronting a big Soviet offensive a year later, which – due to its high risk – would come to be known as “Operation Lion's Den”; or the final battles at Jaji three years later. Furthermore, there seems to be a general consensus among these sources that bin Laden's reasons for fighting “*spirited jihad*” as well as his conduct were driven by deep personal conviction of the righteousness of

¹⁰ This notion is demonstrated in Michael Scheuer's quote presented at the beginning of this section.

these acts, targeted both against communism and later against imperialism¹¹ in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. This conviction then crucially deepened even further after the **Iraqi invasion of Kuwait** in 1990, when the Saudi royal family rejected his proposal to defend the territory with the Arab veterans of Afghan *jihad*, instead opting for American protection and military presence (Riedel 2008, 44, 49; Lawrence 2005, xiii-xi).

As a whole, bin Laden's discourse comprises both religious and political rhetorical elements. Yet, al-Qaeda's leader himself clearly emphasized the sacrificial aspect of following the pious *salaḥī* principle of disrupt with *jāhiliyya* and waging *jihad* over the political aspirations of a leader who has “***employed violence in pursuit of his political aims and objectives***” (Gunaratna 2002, 53). This double-sided argumentation reveals a complex problem of “*tension between rhetoric and reality vis-à-vis nationalism*” (Lawrence 1989, xv), leading different segments of bin Laden's global audiences to adopt a variety of stances based on different grounds; ranging from complete rejection of his religiously oriented rationale as mutually exclusive, incomprehensible or false; to doubts or indifference; support, admiration or complete trust. The leader of al-Qaeda sought to convey the religious aspects of his messages through both verbal and non-verbal means of communication, employing symbols and garments rooted in the Islamic tradition. Such devices include his frequently disseminated image as a saint warrior on a white horse, thus implying the connection with Prophet Muhammad, who is believed to have fought this way; a ring with a black stone set in silver symbolizing the holy Ka'aba sanctuary in Mecca, or his use of the Palestinian *keffiyeh*, the white turban or the Arabian knife as testimonies of both religious and political authority and legitimacy.

Furthermore, these symbols are accompanied by the strength of bin Laden's narrative and his literary skills, which have been acknowledged by various scholars. Bernard Lewis, for instance, labeled his messages as “*a magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic Arabic prose*” (Lewis, 1998, in Lawrence, 2005, xvii) Indeed, bin Laden had a great affection for verse, a genre highly valued in Middle Eastern cultural traditions, and he resorted to it both in public speeches and private proclamations, such

¹¹ Although Bruce Lawrence (2005) acknowledges that the word “imperialism” does not occur once in the collected statements of bin Laden, who presents the struggle as a religious war against “*global unbelief*”, which comprises political means, although these are not the main focus. For Lawrence, this represents a “fundamental dichotomy” in bin Laden's messages, where boundaries of the political and religion are blurred (Lawrence 2005, xx).

as his eldest son's wedding, where he recited a poem praising the attacks against USS Cole (Gunaratna 2002, 49).

Thus, symbols embedded in poetry and religion ultimately served as powerful tools which helped bin Laden to resonate with his Muslim audiences, by whom they could be easily identified and decoded. The pious approach, religious zeal and public denouncement of life's luxuries articulated in an eloquent speech gained bin Laden public approval, recognition and support among ardent Muslims who adhere to the Salafi ideal, comprising both violent and Pietist streams. As demonstrated in the quote pronounced by a taxi driver from Indonesia at the beginning of the chapter, these people often negate the responsibility of al-Qaeda for their major operations, such as the attacks of 9/11, claiming that bin Laden as a “*man of God*” who “*cares for poor Muslims*” would never be capable of ordering such an act, and instead blaming it on either the Israeli Mossad or the American CIA (Gunaratna 2002, 52).

Despite these multiple strengths, however, bin Laden's standpoint faces a notable drawback. As Bruce Lawrence points out, the extremely purist nature of bin Laden's revolutionary appeal to *jihād* is unprecedented due to the fact that it largely lacks a social dimension, focusing rather on “*the glories of martyrdom than the spoils of victory*” and advocating that “*rewards belong essentially to the thereafter*” (Lawrence 2005, xxi). Not surprisingly, through favoring the sacrificial over not only the political, but ultimately the societal aspects, bin Laden considerably narrowed and reduced the clout of al-Qaeda and its potential of indoctrination among mainstream Muslim populations, who often failed to find a remedy for the pressing problems facing their societies in al-Qaeda's ideology. It is for these reasons that bin Laden had been labeled by some scholars as an “*apocalyptic terrorist*” (Roy, 2006), placing mind over matter. The next sections will explore the evolution of his thoughts, focusing on bin Laden's perceptions and attitudes regarding the United States of America as well as its allies among various European countries. In accordance with my principal objectives and academic focus, I will pay close attention to the predicates and metaphors attributed to these subjects, aiming to trace the general patterns and tendencies before proceeding on to the actual analysis

Firstly, it should be established that bin Laden had not viewed or targeted “the West”, United States nor its allies in Europe and elsewhere as a foe from the very beginning. Rather, it is important to understand that bin Laden's beliefs and views were shaped in a bipolar world of the Cold War era; an ambiance stabilized by fear and

inhibited by high tension, as two competing superpowers held each other in a security deadlock and states in areas of major strategic importance such as the Middle East had little option but to bandwagon with either the “East“ or the “West“. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and *mujahidin* guerrillas backed by the Pakistani and American funds provide a sample illustration in this respect. Throughout the conflict, bin Laden as a representative of the Services Bureau worked closely with the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI), which was financially supported by the American CIA, without feeling a “*moral dilemma*” (Lawrence 2005, xii). It was not until the Saudi government favored the aid of American forces over the veterans of Afghan *jihad* in the operations “**Desert Shield**” and “**Desert Storm**”, that drove bin Laden towards a confrontational anti-American stance. Not only had bin Laden's proposal to defend the Saudi territory been refused, thus leaving him and the Afghan *mujahidin* humiliated, but the open preference of the “*infidels*” as the protectors of the “*Kingdom of the Two Holy Sanctuaries*”, their military action alongside Muslim troops and their prolonged presence on the Arabian Peninsula; all being moves sanctioned by the Saudi ‘ulamā’, further fostered the sense of betrayal and anger among the Salafi and Wahhabi purists, henceforth causing a major divide in religious circles. Not surprisingly, bin Laden sided with the dissent theologians (*sahwā’*) who condemned the decision of the Saudi ‘ulamā’ and left the country in 1991 for exile in Sudan. In 1994, he was stripped off Saudi citizenship, the same year marking large government repressions against the *sahwā’*. Bin Laden responded by establishing the “Advice and Reform committee”, a London-based organization, through which he issued a letter addressed to the Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, ibn Baz. In it, he labeled the American military presence in his native country as futile and unacceptable and asserted that such a pro-Western foreign policy of the kingdom is a corruption and betrayal of Islam. Interestingly, in this first major public statement intended for an “outside” audience, bin Laden already employed and voiced several concepts and convictions that would dominate his discourse in the years to come and be found in his later messages. Apart from the appeal to “*banish the polytheists from the Arabian peninsula*”,¹² or the condemnation of “*Arab apostate regimes*” these include the emphasis on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a testimony of injustice towards Muslims and – more importantly with regard to the focus of this thesis, – the

¹² Here, bin Laden quotes the *ḥadīth* of al-Bukhari, pointing out to it as one of the three wishes Prophet Muhammad articulated on his deathbed (al-Bukhari, vol. 4, book 52, no. 5,409; in Lawrence 2005, 187).

articulation of the “**Crusader-Jewish alliance**”¹³; preceded here by the future symptomatic predicate “*aggressive*”, which “*occupies the country in the name of liberating Kuwait*” (Lawrence 2005, 7). Significantly, the later configuration of al-Qaeda mirrored this strategy, deliberately fusing and blurring the boundaries between the religious and the political; while employing Zawahiri's concept of “*striking the far-away enemy*”, formally articulated in the declaration of the “*World Islamic Front against the Jews and the Crusaders*”. The fierce rhetoric of this document was soon to be materialized through the attacks at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attacks of 9-11 as well as the bombings in Madrid and London as a result of British and Spanish direct military support of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In addition to the **American military presence on the Arabian Peninsula**, the declaration names two more reasons for *jihad* against the alliance: the impact of the **UN sanctions imposed on Iraq**, and the **existence of the Jewish state** with occupied Jerusalem as its capital; and asserts that “*to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all countries /.../ so that their armies leave all the territory of Islam, defeated, broken and unable to threaten any Muslim*” (Lawrence 2005, 61). The document contains major predicates and concepts henceforth to be openly attributed to the United States and its European allies, including the label “**Crusader**”, borrowed from the anti-colonialist discourse of early Arab nationalism; as well as the term “**Great Satan**”, popularized by ayatollah Khomeini at the time of the Iranian revolution. Yet, whereas the first term refers to any enemy “Western” power alike, comprising both European and American foes; the latter is used exclusively to label the United States, which is hereby perceived as the leader and principal agent of the alliance. Bin Laden's approach to American allies in Europe then mirrors the same logic of “you reap what you sow”, yet the leader of al-Qaeda notes that he does not view them as primarily culpable. As he presents them with an offer of peace truce, he advises the Europeans to “*stop spilling our blood in order to save your own*” and refrain from participating in “*the American conspiracy against the great Islamic world*” (235). Significantly, in his offer of peace truce to the Americans he demonstrates a utilitarian turn as he draws a rhetorical distinction between the “*American people*” and “*those in the White House*” (240). This is a very common strategy, which has been greatly applied

¹³ The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and issues related to it are frequently found in Bin Laden's rhetorical reasoning. “Jews” and “Zionists” are often addressed and described jointly with “the West”. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this work, I have limited my analysis to the United States and its European allies. A broader focus would in my opinion represent an excessive amount of data.

throughout the Cold War contra-propaganda. In this case, bin Laden's decision to **divide the previously greatly homogenized enemy** (whether American, European or other) into two or more **mutually exclusive entities** (typically those who need to be persuaded versus those who need to be fought) mirrors al-Qaeda's objective to benefit from unfavorable opinion polls and to further fragment Western populations with regard to fighting global terrorism and their military presence in Iraq. Similarly, the notion of the enemy's strength is dichotomous, largely summarized in the quote "*America is a superpower, with enormous military strength and vast economic power, but all this is built on the foundations of straw*" (195). Indeed, the discourse of power and weakness varies notably, resulting in alternate claims such as "*the current Zionist-Crusader campaign against the umma is the most dangerous and rabid ever, since it threatens the entire umma, its religion and presence*" (215); or "*Spain is an infidel country, but its economy is stronger than ours because the ruler there is accountable*" (227) on one side; and assertions such as "*the myth of great America and the myth of democracy collapsed*" (194), "*all the coward Americans could do was run away*" (192), or, rooting from the Qur'an, "*Satan's strategies are truly weak*" (180). All this can serve as a demonstration of the versatility, conformism and flexibility present within bin Laden's messages.

In the light of these observations, displaying rhetorical fluidity of bin Laden's discourse as shaped *vis-à-vis* current events, I agree with Bruce Lawrence in concluding that rather than an appeal driven by purely religious incentives, bin Laden's declarations of "*war against global unbelief*" towards "*the West*", United States and its allies are ultimately a **political act**, despite the religious props and religious vocabulary employed in the messages or bin Laden's emphasis on the sacrificial nature of his mission. Furthermore, as emphasized above, it is important to view bin Laden's attitudes and towards the United States and its allies in the context of Cold War legacy; representing a setting of international politics into which the leader of al-Qaeda (along with some of his major influences) was born in, came of age and established himself as a public figure. The collapse of the bi-polar balance/threat configuration left a unprecedented power and ideological vacuum that needed be filled, whether in Soviet, American, Middle Eastern or other societal contexts; resulting in a multilateral quest for a post-Cold War definition of "the enemy"; "the Other". Therefore, I argue that the dichotomy between "Islam", "Muslims", "umma", or "terrorism" and so forth on one hand and "the West", "global unbelief" "Crusaders" or "democracy" *et cetera* on the other represent an

unfortunate and dangerous attempt of an extension of the Cold War ambiance in the multipolar world and global politics. When displayed in extreme articulations of key leaders disseminating or supporting such a discourse, whether bin Laden or George W. Bush, these terms evoke their indispensable perception of “*the [Middle East] region in largely Cold War terms*” (Ehteshami 2006, 114), as binary oppositional “blocks”; two entities with mutually exclusive discourses, where all remaining actors inevitably side with one or the other. Of course, unlike Soviet Russia, al-Qaeda is neither a communist state nor a nuclear superpower and lacks territoriality; yet I would argue that this global terrorist network has both defined itself and been labeled as the principal US enemy and employs anti-imperialist argumentation, albeit embedded in a religious discourse. Thus, I hereby view it as opportune to examine bin Laden's discourse through a linguistically-turned methodological framework within the field of International Relations which approaches metaphor analysis in the Cold War context. In the next chapter, I introduce several such approaches, namely predicate analysis and grounded theory, as well as metaphorical analysis of security metaphors, along with concepts of articulation and interpellation, societal common sense and paradigmatic truth. Combined with the figures of speech in Arabic rhetoric which have been characterized previously, these observations and findings provide the theoretical framework of my thesis.

3. Predicate analysis and metaphor analysis: A theoretical note

„Analysis of statements does not claim to be a total, exhaustive description of language (langage), or of 'what was said'. /.../ It is another way of attacking verbal performances, dissociating their complexity, of isolating the terms that are entangled in its web, and of locating the various regularities that they obey.”
Michel Foucault, 1969 (trans. 2007, 121)

If untangling the meanings and components of discourse is not a descriptive, static task, but rather a flexible and thorough “*attack of verbal performances*”, how can this process be carried out and achieved in the field of International Relations? Initially, it should be noted that the very definition of discourse analysis as a full-fledged methodological framework within the discipline remains a subject of dispute, regarding both its procedure and principles. This marks the epistemological schism between rationalists and constructivists of the Third Great Debate and the “language turn” in International Relations and results in multiple, albeit related approaches to research. Rationalist researchers from both liberalist and realist backgrounds have henceforth expressed their critique, numerous labeling such discourse scholarship and analysis as a “*foreign*”, “*dissident*” (Ashley and Walker 1990b, 399; George 1994, 191) and “*marginal*” (Adler 1997) stream within International Relations, referring to it as a “*dangerous*”, “*prolix and self indulgent*” science which lacks empirical backing (Kehoane 1988; Mearsheimer 1994, in Milliken 1999, 227). On the other hand, scholars and theoreticians of discourse analysis within the discipline defend their stance, stressing the constructivist argument that mere “scientism” cannot grasp the complex and continuously variable nature of actors in the international system. On these grounds, they defend discourse analysis as a “*critically aware post-positivist project*” and a “*vibrant research programme*” that does not denounce necessary theoretical commitments and procedures, yet refuses to superordinate them to “*critical theorizing*” and “*critical praxis*” that are “*supposed to be at the centre of discourse analysis*” (Ashley and Walker 1990b, 404, in Milliken 1999, 225, 228).

Jennifer Milliken (1999) describes three main functions discourses may have, depending on how they are produced and defined: either as subjects authorized to speak and to act; as practices of these subjects towards the objects of a discourse; or as audiences of these subjects who use their common sense to adopt a specific attitude towards the respective discourse. In sum, discourses are regarded as constructive, changeable and variable ways of **describing social realities and relationships** between

actors through predominantly **linguistic** means. Rooting from Jacques Derrida's work, Milliken claims that this process is largely achieved through a system of “**binary oppositions**”, where one component of the discourse is privileged to the prejudice of the inevitable “Other”, establishing the leitmotif of “us” and “them” (Derrida 1981; in Milliken 1999, 229). Naturally, apart from hegemonic discourses, there exist subjugated and alternative voices, which are often complementary, in opposition or resistance to the one predominantly present. Due to the variable nature of discourses as socially driven phenomena, the configuration and distributional balance of power between their different manifestations are naturally subject to **change** and **transformation**, as all the actors within a social system (subjects, objects and audiences) reformulate their attitudes and perceptions towards the existing “**regime of truth**” (David Lincoln 1989, 23; in Milliken 1999, 236, 245). Jutta Weldes (1999), who has examined post-Cold War discourses from a social and anthropological perspective with regard to cultural, ethnic and nationalistic tendencies and their reflection in security studies, refers to this product of discourse as “**paradigmatic truth**” and claims that discourses constitute, reproduce and reformulate the “**societal common sense**” which exists in a community. Through the process of **articulation** and **interpellation**, objects and relationships between them are defined using the “**'cultural raw materials' and 'linguistic resources' that already make sense within a particular society**”. These perceptions are subsequently tested in public discourse to prove if and which ones are regarded by the public as a “*natural and accurate description of reality*” (Weldes 1999, 154). The efficient images prevail, while the dysfunctional are replaced by more resonating ones.

Thus, especially in the political realm, discourse has the power to either reinforce or strengthen collective notions of what is perceived as reality; as well as disrupt, re-articulate or create new ones. This aspect makes discourse analysis a highly flexible and critical method of approaching International Relations and serves as a major asset in describing changes and transformations that rationalist theories within the discipline possibly fail to grasp. On the other hand, due to the fact that discourse analysis is a linguistically-based method, any such descriptions or interpretations of change and transformation are essentially subjective findings and their assessment becomes a highly sensitive task, which can lead to unreliable conclusions if performed incautiously. Milliken stresses that a researcher using any type of discourse analysis should thus check his or her results regularly, both in *medias res* and subsequently, comparing it with scholarly work of record in the respective field. Therefore, I consult

my findings with observations published by experts in Arabic and Islamic studies who have translated bin Laden's messages into English and provided them with a commentary apparatus, as well as works devoted to a similarly structured discourse analysis of American foreign policy during the Cold War.

From the plenitude of possible methods and means designed to address discourse analysis within the field of International Relations, I have particularly selected to employ Jennifer Milliken's concept of **predicate analysis** carried out through the method of **grounded theory**, along with **metaphorical analysis**, namely Paul Chilton's concept of **security metaphors** examined in the Cold War context. In addition to these two major approaches, I refer to the above mentioned concepts of **articulation** and **interpellation** which construct **societal common sense** and promulgate **paradigmatic truth** in a particular society. By incorporating these findings into my methodological framework and reasoning, I seek to provide a richer and more complex assessment of the analyzed material. In the following paragraphs and sections, I characterize the two chosen types of discourse analysis, outlining how the respective method is to be conducted and what are the issues a researcher has to bear in mind when working with any related concepts therein. Next, I review how these approaches have been applied in previous analyses of American foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East region during the Cold War and beyond. Lastly, I explain how I view this research as applicable to the specific case and topic of this work and how it proves useful in my analysis of Bin Laden's messages towards the United States and its European allies.

3.1. Predicate analysis, Grounded theory (Milliken)

“Suitable for the study of language practices in texts /.../ predicate analysis is a process of empirical study and abstraction which goes hand in hand, in the sense that theoretical categories are drawn from and answer to the empirical data upon which a study is based.”

Jennifer Milliken, 1999, 231, 234

As emphasized previously, discourse analysis is a variable method and can therefore be carried out in a number of ways which highlight different aspects of the relationship between subjects, objects and audiences of a particular narrative. One such approach, **predicate analysis**, was introduced and proposed by the above mentioned Jennifer Milliken and applied in her work dedicated to American foreign policy discourse towards Korea during the Cold War. She stipulates that discourse practices be examined by *“focusing on the language practices of predication – the **verbs**, **adverbs** and **adjectives** that attach to nouns”*. In this process, the researcher initially distinguishes certain characteristics and qualities verbally attributed to objects. Such perceptions, which construct the attitudes collectively adopted towards these nouns, are captured by lexical means, through verbs, adverbs and adjectives. Their analysis can reveal the realms and *“modes of acting and interacting”* between them in a hereby created *“text's **object space**”* (Milliken 1999, 232-233). In order for such predicate analysis to be representative and complex, it should focus on relations between the studied subjects and their dynamics. It is therefore crucial to gather a sufficiently large and variable set of texts which are pronounced over a longer period of time and by various figures viewed as authorized speakers. Ideally, the set of texts is chosen so that it displays a range of positions expressed towards a particular issue. Through comparing various object spaces defined in different texts, the researcher uncovers *“relational distinctions”* or *“binary oppositions”* displayed between the subjects of a discourse and reveals way these are structured in a rhetorical framework. For most part, it has a hierarchical nature, where subjects are subjugated and superordinated to one another. Often, the attributions are consistent or reveal a systematic pattern with regard to specific object spaces. In order to uncover a relational framework of a discourse, Milliken advocates the use of the sociology-based approach of *“**grounded theory**”* (234), where the researcher progressively abstracts the empirical material into provisionally defined theoretical categories generated *sur place* and gradually precised until the point when no new predicaments emerge upon adding new texts.

To demonstrate this process, let us now suppose that Japan has been identified as the subject of discourse in a predicate analysis. The chosen empirical material consists

of American foreign policy documents published over a certain period of time. First, we seek to find a passage concerning Japan's "object space", such as "*if the US does not take any action in Korea /.../ Japan, the **linchpin of our policy in Asia, would lose morale and experience a strengthening of the widespread desire for neutrality, with the result that not even a commitment of significant US military strength would keep Japan in the West***" and "*Soviet aggressive intentions in the Far East would be underlined*" (232). From that phrase, we derive the predications which attach to Japan (in bold) and subsequently categorize these into significance clusters: on one hand, Japan is prone to losing morale and political course (**weakness**), on the other, the country remains a key partner and pillar for the US foreign policy in Asia (**strength**). A similar distinction is projected between the US and Japan itself: Japan is vulnerable (**dependance**) and experiences feelings (**emotionality**) whereas the US acts as its protector (firmness). Japan's object space is further contextualized by exploring its relations to other entities or actors present in the empirical material, because "*a text never constructs only one thing*" (232). In our case the Soviet Union is labeled as the "aggressor" and major "threat" for Japan while constituting the binary opposition to the American role as a guardian (233), even though both nations share a parallel of acknowledged military strength with regard to third countries.

Similarly, applied to one of the subjects of this work, bin Laden's discourse concerning the United States, we first find a statement concerning the American "object space", such as :

*"Muslims, if you do not punish the Crusaders for their **sins** in Jerusalem and Iraq, they shall **defeat** you because of your failure. They will also **rob** you of the land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. Today [they **robbed** you] of Baghdad, and tomorrow they will **rob** you of Riyadh and **so forth** unless God deems otherwise"*
(Lawrence 2005, 218).

In this passage, rooted in religious lexis, the United States (and ultimately its allies) are referred to as Crusaders, which implies a negative perception, further reinforced by the repetitive act of robbery committed towards the Muslims and their lands, which thereby testifies American strength. The villain image in the text suggests that United States and its allies– the robber-knight – dispose with **negative, sinful, unjust** potential **offensive** capacities (**activity, force, victory**) which are enabled by and juxtaposed to Muslim lack of **positive, defensive, virtuous** and **just** punitive action in

the matter (**passivity, weakness, failure**). Thus, in sum, at least seven sets of binary oppositions emerge from the text, constituting their respective significance clusters.

The analyst then continues uncovering multiple distinctions and similarities between Japan or the United States and other objects of discourse beyond the cited passages in this manner until the empirical material is exhausted and no new significance clusters emerge. However, since these categories construct Japan or the United States in general and broadly defined terms which even seem to contradict one another at first glance (strength, weakness, dependance, emotionality/negativity, injustice, offense, sin, activity, force, victory), Milliken advises the results of predicate analysis should ideally be further analyzed in detail in order to achieve greater accuracy in research. A way to address threats of validity is to strengthen the theoretical framework of research and seek a complementary methodological stance which may be used along with predicate analysis. One such possible approach is **metaphorical analysis**, which I have chosen to employ in this work due to bin Laden's alleged affection towards poetry and the figurative expressions present in his discourse.

3.2. Metaphorical analysis, Security metaphors (Chilton)

“Metaphor is taken as a bridge that brings together the study of language and the study of politics. It is taken to be a central rather than a peripheral feature of language and textual organization. /.../ Change occurs through change in discourse; in part this involves change in metaphors. Linguistic analysis and discourse analysis can thus play a role in such a change.”

Paul Chilton, 1996, 3, 202

In Chapter 1 of this work, metaphors were characterized and analyzed as a frequent element found in Arabic rhetoric and literary tradition and it was demonstrated how these ornamental expressions are employed in both religious and secular discourses. However, metaphors discussed in the field of political science are understood more widely, comprising not only figures of speech in their literary sense, but *“figures of speaking and thinking”* in general, which are somewhat **embedded in “all discourse in natural human language”** (Drulák 2006, 502; Chilton 1996, 39). and this chapter voices this notion. Employed to activate a sense of togetherness among a particular society, metaphors in International Relations theory are defined as based on familiar perceptions and attitudes which a community is expected to be prone to embrace, derived from its bodily and cultural experience, and produced systematically in such a way that certain ones eventually come to be taken as natural and emphasized over others. All these characteristics and factors can be considered and used in their classification and analysis.

Originally introduced and described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), **metaphorical analysis** examines metaphors as *“conventional ways of conceptualizing one domain to another”*, used by specific groups or societies to *“make sense of the world”* (Milliken 1999, 235). Like predicate analysis, it represents a linguistically-based, rhetorical approach to International Relations, through which metaphors found in micro-level empirical data are abstracted into macro-level categories designed *“as variations of a central model or models”* (ibid.), following the basic distinction between a generally defined **conceptual metaphor** and a specifically voiced **metaphorical expression** (Lakoff and Johnson, in Drulák 2006, 500). Metaphors also differ with regard to their preference in discourse: while some are **dominantly** present, others are **frequent** and certain expressions are **also used**. Others are **absent, rejected** (employed in the negative sense) or used **ambiguously**, alternately in positive and negative connotations (518). This layered and dynamic process, which takes place over a period of time, is referred to as *“sedimentation”*. It determines the *“life cycle”* of a metaphor and subsequently influences the course of societal common

sense and the regime of truth (506). Initially, every new metaphor introduced in a discourse is perceived as **unconventional** and revolutionary, creatively linking two areas that have not been joint previously. Due to their innovative nature, such concepts have the highest potential of changing societal common sense. However, once a metaphor has been present or emphasized in a discourse for a certain period of time, it gradually loses its figurative features and becomes **conventional** and rather “*automatic*” until the point when it is no longer perceived as a metaphor, but rather a **sedimental** statement, indistinguishable from factual reality. Such concepts, instead of modifying societal common sense, actually reproduce and strengthen the *status quo* (507-509).

Thus, it is evident that metaphorical analysis depends not only on the personality and literary skills of the respective speaker or disseminator, but also on the societal context and the frequency and preference in discourse over time. Paul Chilton (1996), whose observations and classification I primarily reference in this work, considered all these factors when he examined the **security metaphors** present in American and European discourses during the Cold War and noted how “*the desire for sovereignty becomes transmuted into concerns about security*” (Beer and Hariman 1996, 16). Quoting Murray Edelman, Chilton claims that any metaphor articulated in political discourse “*defines the **pattern of perception** to which people respond*” and is “*taken for granted in a political culture*” herewith (Chilton 1996, 194). Chilton considers the security discourse to be “*highly **metaphorized***”; its components and expressions must therefore be “**demetaphorized**”, examined and categorized in order to grasp the conceptual, “**basic-level meaning**” of what was said (212). Although Chilton argues that “*it is possible to communicate and conceptualize alternative models*” (ibid.), he warns at the same time that this process is by no means unique or isomorphic, since “*different linguistic cultures encode different models, and different discourses make different selections and uses from their languages*” (201). In the broadest sense, Chilton introduces and describes five general conceptual schemes by which different metaphorical expressions found in political discourse can be examined and categorized into various conceptual metaphors. The **person scheme** joins together values, beliefs or feelings attributed to objects found in discourse, presuming that these entities can acquire such experiences innate to living organisms. Thus, for example, the phrase “**truth is not a constant but is actually created by the Soviet leaders themselves**” (430) promulgates the understanding of the men in the Kremlin as in fact architects of of

accepted facts. Similarly, the **container scheme** operates with the perception of states and groups as bodies or living beings and determines what is situated “inside”, “outside”, or on the “boundaries” of these entities. In the sentence “*governments seal their territories off against Communist penetration*” (ibid.), we come to view state rulers and authorities as situated on the **margins** between Communism, aiming to keep themselves **outside** their realm while building blocks which would keep their domains **inside** and intact from this expansive influence. The third conceptual cluster, the **link scheme**, projects “bonds”, “ties”, “ruptures” or “obligations” between objects and actors in the international system, such as in the phrase “*the U.S. must successfully stop the extension of Communist power into South Vietnam if its promises are to be given credence*”. Here, we find evidence for partnership and cooperation between the USA and South Vietnam and conversely a major fissure between the American and Soviet relations. The **path scheme** captures “directions”, trajectories and quests of objects and actors in the international system, from “starting point” to “endpoint”, as well as obstacles described on the way to achieve a particular “goal” or “source”. This is embodied in the phrase “*once a given party line has been laid down, the whole Soviet government machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path*” (431). Here, we find also the **force scheme** (in bold without italics), which binds together expressions concerning dynamics between entities and describing pressure, resistance, balance, equilibrium, vacuum, polarity attraction, alignment and others (200).

Applied to bin Laden's discourse towards the United States in the previously cited passage, it is evident that the text operates with the **person scheme**, promulgating the villain image of the **American Crusader** as a **robber-knight** who **steals** Muslim domains and is capable of defeating the community of believers. This role configuration of mutual enemies testifies the major **schism** discursively promulgated between the Muslims and the Americans, hereby denying any **link scheme** comprising the two identities. In this perception, all Americans are irreversibly situated **outside** the **container scheme** of the Muslim umma. The passage condemns the expansive American **path scheme**, supposedly leading through Baghdad to Riyadh towards the **dominance** of Muslim lands and suggests this course can be stopped only by righteous Muslim punitive action in accordance with God's will, which would shift the **dynamics** and reverse the **force scheme** currently favorable to the Americans.

3.3. Al-Qaeda and “the West”: discourse analysis applied

“The iconic symbol of the 'Arab terrorist' /.../ is a representational response to the short-lived rise in oil prices, the event of the Iranian revolution, the general cultural awakening in the Muslim world, and the activities of various surrogate allies that turn into demon opponents. These events straddle the period of evaporation of the 'Communist bloc'. The vacuum created /.../ a new round of demonization of Islam and Muslim fundamentalism, effected by refreshing centuries old stereotypes, and the substitution of Kalashnikov and Stinger missile for scimitar.”

Ziauddin Sardar, 1999, 111

In the previous chapter, I have established the hypothesis that Osama bin Laden as well as George W. Bush employed rhetorical devices which perpetuated the mutually conditioned Cold War discourse and its configuration of binary oppositional blocks. Elaborating on this supposition, I argue in this section that the post-9-11 doctrine of George W. Bush applied and revived a similar reasoning towards supporters of al-Qaeda like his father and realist predecessors have articulated towards the allies and supporters of the Soviet Union from the 1950s onwards. Among the Muslim populations in Middle East and elsewhere, this foreign policy line is mirrored in variable attitudes, ranging from cautiously expressed resentment to open and confrontation; such as the discursive stance of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Since both leaders claimed to speak on behalf of an entity, in their political discourses, United States hence represent the core opposition to al-Qaeda and *vice versa*. This approach and strategy is mutually conditioned and double-sided, revealing the political use of language and rhetoric and the role it plays in a conflict. Any researcher, myself included, must hence inevitably take into consideration both confrontational narratives.

American foreign policy discourse towards the Third World and the Middle East in particular has previously been the subject of multiple analyses in the field of International Relations which revealed major consistencies with regard to its diction. In his research of American state documents from the 17th century onwards, David Campbell (1992) proposes that American identity represents a **continuous discourse** and suggests that *“it may be critically useful and important to point out **continuities between the Cold War and today’s International Relations**”* because *„if the United States has always drawn upon similar identity oppositions in its foreign policy practices, it seems unlikely that this discourse can develop any time soon ,an orientation to the inherently plural world that is not predicated upon the desire to contain, master and normalize threatening contingencies through violence“* (Campbell 1992, 252; In Milliken, 1999, 247-248). Milliken herself applied metaphorical analysis to examine American foreign policy documents during the Vietnam war (1996) and

beyond. She notes that in the years leading to the Gulf War and thereafter, the American foreign policy towards the Middle East region continued to be led by the idea of “*deterrence through prestige and reputation*”, tracing back to the “*domino theory*” of the 1950s, which stipulates that losing a one country to communism would produce a highly undesired bandwagoning effect among its neighbors. In order to prevent this threat, the American administration of George Bush Sr. employed **metaphors of prestige and reputation** which would thereby testify the country as a global superpower. Thus, upon the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, in Henry Kissinger's words, the United States either “*had to respond to Iraqi aggression or risk losing prestige*” (Milliken 1996, 217). Using instruments of hard power, the American administration again advocated the urgency of Washington's leading role in overthrowing Saddam's regime, hereby linking counter-proliferation with the war on terror, as well as boosting prestige and reputation of the country, while “*imposing democratization and far-reaching reform*” in the region (Milliken 1996, 117). This logic stipulated that if the United States failed to act, the Middle East would otherwise be lost to the radical Islamists and the American prestige and reputation of the watchdog of democracy would be seriously damaged. Similarly, Paul Chilton (1996) claims that especially in the post World War II era, the American foreign policy discourse increasingly operated with realms “*within*” and “*out there*”, embodied in the symptomatically named strategy of “*containment*”. He suggests that such a discourse could in fact have nourished and legitimized the continuation of the Cold War itself, proving “*disastrously dysfunctional*” once “*the West lost its Soviet enemy*” (Chilton 1996, 211). Reflected in the Middle East policy, this persistent discourse implied that “*the Gulf War of 1991 was ‘successful’ only if viewed from the outside as an ‘external’ clash of container-like states resulting from the penetration of one by another*” (ibid.). In the light of these observations, I regard the American discursive practices in foreign policy as highly consistent.

Having established this notion, however, I need to emphasize again that American foreign policy discourse towards al-Qaeda is not the direct object of my analysis. In order to maintain the desired length criteria of this thesis, I have limited the scope of this work to a **unilateral** analysis of bin Laden's discourse towards the United States of America and its European allies in nine relevant texts disseminated between 2003 and 2006. I believe that the three year period serves the purpose and desirable length of this academic paper and provides me with a sufficient amount of empirical

material needed to define a possibly credible and valid categorical framework. As stated previously, I view bin Laden's discourse as an alternate attempt to exploit the binary oppositional Cold War narrative in global politics. In the next analytical chapter, I seek to apply Chilton's, Milliken's and Weldes's observations and categorizations of predicates and metaphors as part of political discourse, building up on Abdul-Raof's classification of metaphors as literary figures of speech in Arabic rhetoric. Using grounded theory in Milliken's **predicate** analysis, I look for relational distinctions and binary oppositions displayed between two principal object spaces (the United States of America and its European allies); as well as verbs, adverbs and adjectives attributed to them by a third major subject: the disseminator himself, the variable entities he identifies himself with, substitutes and hereby speaks for. Concurrently, I categorize the **metaphorical** expressions found in the predicates of bin Laden's discourse towards the United States and their European allies into Chilton's conceptual schemes. Choosing to perform discourse analysis unilaterally of course embodies possible shortcomings. Although the authenticity and authorship of some of bin Laden's messages may be disputed, by considering texts supposedly attributed to solely the head of al-Qaeda, I still narrow my analytical gaze to a unique perception of **one person**, albeit the probably best known terrorist of the last decades. Nevertheless, I have chosen to do so precisely because of the **undoubted ideological and psychological impact** of bin Laden's alleged signature and name, which has – in Western and namely American perceptions – become a trademark of terrorism. The leader of al-Qaeda presented his audience with metaphorical figures embedded in poetic and religious structures with a dangerous potential of resonating within the addressees in order to promulgate his political objectives. In bin Laden's messages, religion and poetry served politics. Analyzing how this was achieved and which predicates and metaphors were entrenched and preferred in his discourse towards “the West” is an attempt to cast a light on of the problematic of global Jihadism and counter-terrorism as well as possibly provide grounds for a mutual transformation of societal common sense concerning these issues.

4. Predicate analysis and metaphor analysis of messages attributed to Osama bin Laden regarding United States of America and its European allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq

“To elucidate this ideology, without simply calling it terrorism, is to enable ourselves to understand its modus operandi and define it by comprehension, rather than extension.”

Gilles Kepel, in Kepel and Milleli, 2008, 4

In this chapter, I proceed to the very predicate and metaphorical analysis and closely examine the relational distinctions, binary oppositions, nouns, verbs, adverbs and metaphorical schemes, concepts and expressions found in nine messages attributed to Osama bin Laden in his discourse concerning the United States of America and its European allies between the onset of the invasion of Iraq and the results of the first Iraqi parliamentary elections three years later. Not all of them are addressed explicitly towards these two principal object spaces. In the respective period, bin Laden addresses five *communiqués* either to the *umma* or the Iraqi people in particular, while the Americans are the direct addressees of three of his messages and the Europeans are the recipients of one. Of course, this does not mean that the USA and their European allies were mentioned or referred to only in the letters addressed to them. On the contrary, with three multiple and different recipients, we come to trace interesting dichotomies or changes of tone in the respective messages as the addressees vary. In addition, their dynamics, style and form clearly mirror current events and depend on the method of dissemination as well as the occasion on which they were pronounced. Therefore, I initially want to cast a light on these circumstances which can provide a necessary and important contextual background and explain certain features attributed to the subjects in discourse.

In the first message analyzed in this work, Bin Laden addresses a speech *“To the People of Iraq”* on a 16 minute audiotape that was immediately broadcast on the Qatari television channel al-Jazeera. It was pronounced five weeks before the anticipated invasion of Iraq on **February 11th, 2003**. Due to this, its tone is warning and preparatory, aiming to condemn the coalition attack and encourage the Iraqi people to unite and confront these events courageously. The second message, *“Among a Band of Knights”*, shares the same addressee and objective and is enhanced by religious zeal. Choosing to frame it as a Friday sermon, Bin Laden disseminated this 52 minute

audiotape only three days later, on **February 14th**, so that it coincided with the holiest day of the Islamic calendar, the Eid al-Adha (Feast of Sacrifice), which commemorates the willingness of Ibrahim to sacrifice his son Ismail to God. In my opinion, the symbolism and deliberateness of bin Laden's decision is beyond question and undoubtedly shapes the nature of the predicates and metaphors in the letter. Bin Laden's third message analyzed in this work is likewise destined towards the Iraqis, which demonstrates the importance he hereby places on conveying the people of this country to oppose and fight the now ongoing invasion. In a videotaped speech from **October 19th, 2003**, entitled "*Quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates*", bin Laden hails the resistance of the Sunni forces in Iraq and praises them for posing a crucial obstacle to the Anglo-American coalition forces, evoked in the title. The day before, on **October 18th, 2003**, he also issues his first message to the Americans since the outbreak of the invasion, also broadcast on al-Jazeera. In a *communiqué* called "*Israel, Oil and Iraq*", much briefer than his address to the Iraqis, bin Laden proposes several historical parallels with the present situation, suggesting a dichotomy between the interests of "deceived" American people and the "aggressive" Bush administration linked to the "Zionist" lobby, while suggesting a parallel between the nature of the current American government policies and those historically adopted against the Native Americans. The subsequent message is again addressed to the Iraqis, yet it targets the whole *umma* and the current situation in the region, namely Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Due to its unprecedentedly outspoken critical tone with regard to these regimes, the original 47 minute videotape was abbreviated to more than a fourth when broadcast on al-Jazeera. In his appeal from **January 4th, 2004**, "*Resist the New Rome*", bin Laden urges to fight not only the "*Crusader*" invasion forces, but also the "*treacherous rulers in the Muslim world*" who assisted the "*New Rome*", hereby jointly referring to the Byzantines and Romans, thus evoking an updated perception of historical enemies. In alternative to their rule, bin Laden proposes a form of organization based on local councils abiding to *sharia* (Islamic law) and advocates an easy access to arms for the cause of fighting *jihad*. Four months later, in **mid-April 2004**, he addresses his "*Peace truce offer to the Europeans*", urging them to refrain from collaborating with the USA, Israel and the United Nations in exchange for a cease-fire, to which no European state responded. Yet, the leader of al-Qaeda timed his message poignantly, stressing the importance of security to the inhabitants of the Old Continent who have been shaken by the suicide bombings in Madrid only a month earlier. Indeed, this incident clearly influenced

electoral behavior in Spain, as the socialist opponents of the country's participation in the war toppled the pro-American Aznar government and subsequently withdrew their forces from Iraq. The next *communiqué* bin Laden issued in the name of al-Qaeda was a videotape delivered to al-Jazeera on October **29th, 2004**, addressed to the American audience and aired in a five-minute excerpt. The full message, entitled "***The Towers of Lebanon***", also deliberately coincided with an electoral event, the upcoming the US presidential polls whose outcome al-Qaeda sought to influence. Following this principal aim, bin Laden draws a dichotomy between the characteristics and objectives of the Bush administration on one hand and "the American people" on the other, reminding the latter to ensure their own security and refuse involvement in more attacks, claiming that "*every action has a reaction*", while linking the American-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its "*destroyed towers*" with his inspiration to "*destroy towers in America*". The next text, published in **mid-December 2004** on the website of the Global Islamic Media Front, was by far bin Laden's most radical and outspoken attack on Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East which collaborate with the USA and implement their policies. Targeting the Muslim populations in the region, bin Laden encourages the *umma* to rise up against these leaders with arms and, as the title suggests, "***Depose the Tyrants***", establishing the rule of *sharia*. The last message analyzed in this work is "***Bin Laden's Peace Offer to the Americans***", issued in **late January 2006** and again broadcast as an audiotape on al-Jazeera. In it, the leader of al-Qaeda confronts the Americans with a description of the losses the war in Iraq has inflicted on American economy and its people, especially its soldiers, who die in combat while the majority of the population opposes the military operations. Bin Laden claims that if the US-led invasion is not brought to an immediate end, nor will the attacks of the *mujahidin* on Western targets cease in the near future.

This initial overview provides essential contextual details of the respective messages useful in order to analyze their discursive components, predicates and metaphors; but also reveals the variability of the addressees. As established previously, I explore two principal object spaces: the United States and their European allies. Yet, as I presently seek to demonstrate, bin Laden differentiates not only between these two object spaces and their core binary opposition, the *umma*, but also draws dichotomies within the object spaces themselves, nominating each of its segments based on certain criteria and attributing them with diverse characteristics; adjectives, verbs and adverbs, which can be explored through the method of grounded theory.

4.1. Predicate analysis

In the case of **the USA**, the variability of nouns attributed to this object space through grounded theory can be divided into six main clusters; two universal and four specific ones: 1. **USA or America in general**; 2. **Americans in general**; 3. **Bush** and the **White House** administration; 4. American **people**; 5. American **forces** and 6. American **alliances** (alliances where the American presence is explicitly emphasized). As for the second object space, nominative predicates attributed solely to the European allies of America can be divided into two main categories: 1. European **leaders, states** and **alliances** and 2. European **people**. In addition to these two main object spaces, the USA its European allies share five common categories, where neither of the addressees can be singled out exclusively: 1. **Crusaders and Romans**; 2. **unbelievers and infidels**; 3. alliance **forces and powers**; 4. **the West**; 5. **oppressors, enemies and thieves**.

In the following paragraphs, sections and subsections, I characterize and discuss the adjectives, verbs and adverbs attributed to each of these categories and object spaces through predicate analysis, rooting from the supposition that these characteristics are largely constructed through binary oppositions to al-Qaeda and the Muslim *umma*, seeking to trace these arbitrary contrasts in bin Laden's discourse. Each section is introduced by an initial demonstrative quote, aiming to display the core predicates attributed to each category which are analyzed and summarized in detail and supported by additional characteristics and information found in the empirical material. In the italicized quotes, synonymic nominative predicates are CAPITALIZED, auxiliary nominative predicates are left regular (without the initial italicization); adjective predicates are indicated in **bold**, verbs are underlined and adverbial predicates are **underlined in bold**. If negative, any predicates are ~~crossed-out~~. In the text, significance clusters attributed to each category are indicated either in **bold** or in **(bold in brackets)**. As for citations and references from primary sources, for the sake of abbreviation, I have chosen to label them by the initial letter of its editor, followed by the indication of the respective page, omitting the year of publication. Thus, for example, a quotation from Bruce Lawrence's edited collection of bin Laden's messages from page 243 is referenced as (L 243) and an excerpt from Raymond Ibrahim's volume on page 181 is cited as (I 181). Citations from the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth* collections, as well as any additional clarifications, are footnoted.

4.1.1. USA

4.1.1.1. America

*Who helped AMERICA to kill more than a million children in just a few years in the greatest slaughter of children that mankind has known, your **wicked** embargo on Iraq? The Prophet said: 'A WOMAN went to hell because she had a cat whom she tied up so that it could not eat, not even the crumbs on the floor, so it died.'*¹⁴ (L 267). *It was like a CROCODILE devouring a child, who could do nothing but scream. Does a CROCODILE understand anything but weapons? (L 239) /.../ while UNCLE SAM was committing these reckless transgressions and **terrible oppression**, going through the world without paying attention to anyone else and thinking that nothing could attack it, disaster **struck** it /.../ at the very heart of the Ministry of Defense, and they [the 9-11 hijackers] **hit** the American economy right at its heart, too. They **rubbed AMERICA'S NOSE in the dirt**, **wiped its arrogance in the mud**. /.../ It became clear to all that America's values are **the lowest**, and the myth of 'THE LAND OF THE FREE' was **destroyed**. /.../ The attacks **revealed** the AMERICAN WOLF in its **true ugliness**. /.../ It also became clear to people, that AMERICA, this **UNJUST POWER**, can be **struck down** and **humiliated**. /.../ We can conclude that AMERICA is a SUPERPOWER, **with enormous military strength and vast economic power**, but that all this is **built on foundations of straw**. /.../ The whole EDIFICE will totter away, and relinquish its unjust leadership of the world (L 194-95). Here is AMERICA today, screaming at the top of its voice as it falls apart in front of the whole world (L 208). When the UNITED STATES makes a **sincere** decision to stop wars in the world, it knows before anyone else that that day will mark the beginning of its collapse and the disintegration of its states (L 231).*

The cluster of citations above was chosen to demonstrate the general narrative attributed to the category of America as such in bin Laden's messages during the studied period, mentioned more than fifty times. In **simile** structured figures, the USA are compared to a wicked woman who went to hell; ironically referred to as the land of the free; likened to a crocodile, an ugly wolf, a reckless Uncle Sam, a falling building and a humiliated power, which, although being an arrogant superpower, is doomed to failure due to its injustice. America and her nominative predicates are depicted as **wicked, reckless, terrible, unjust, arrogant, insincere**, the lowest and truly **ugly**. Although it is economically and militarily very powerful, this strength is only an illusion based on fragile foundations (**false strength**). Therefore, the country has been justly hit, rubbed in the dirt and mud, revealed, **humiliated** and **struck down**. Before, America was **killing** and slaughtering children and imposing embargoes, understood nothing but weapons and went through the world carelessly, but now it is **screaming, falling apart, relinquishing** and tottering away, still **unable** to decide to stop wars, facing **inevitable collapse** and disintegration. All bin Laden's references to the United States in the broadest sense follow this story line. The **infidel** and **protector** America, an important decision-maker in the matters of Middle Eastern states, oppressive and tyrannical, behaves **under the pretext** of democracy, liberty and equality, but in fact fosters hatred and enmity towards the people in the region and propagates lies about its power, which is only illusory. It has notoriously ignited dozens of wars, caused waves of **terror** and

¹⁴ From the *hadīth* collection of al-Bukhari, vol. 3, book 40, no. 535. In Lawrence 2005, 267.

oppression on the Arabian Peninsula and continues **blackmailing** the competing Saudi princes into meeting its wishes, demands subservience from the Saudi family, frightens the rulers of Riyadh and establishes military bases all over Saudi Arabia, seeking to divide the country up. Meanwhile, it imposes changes in Middle Eastern countries, **corrupts** their honor and **occupies** their land. And now it used force once again when it sent its armies to invade Iraq in a **corrupt** and **unjust** war, **murdering** Muslims in the country and **killing** them deliberately for the sake of money and the oilfields which it wants to take over. According to bin Laden, these acts are great **crimes** and must be **punished**. Because America has angered God himself, Allah now rejects it and will throw it into the fire. The country, he claims, has been **warned** before not to behave this way, stop supporting the Jews and leave Saudi Arabia, which it had always wanted to occupy and nearly did accomplish this “*old strategic aim of theirs*” three decades ago with the help of the Gulf countries (L 188). Since it **rejected** the warnings issued on numerous occasions or failed to respond, it has firstly been struck to get “*the taste of its own medicine*” (L 239) and now it is embroiled in the Iraq war, **shamed** and begging for help. Yet, its calls for laying down arms are insincere and must not be listened to, because, as bin Laden himself confesses, “*once I believed them and I'm still living in a tent*” (L 231). America's **defeat**, he summarizes, is **inevitably** coming, because it has not been able to achieve its goals in the war (**supposed strength**) its victories and captures of cities in Afghanistan are only illusory and part of the **lies** and **propaganda**. In fact, bin Laden affirms, America hides many **weak** points which can be **easily targeted**. Right now, he concludes, the USA are making record losses, the federal deficit is rising and people are loosing jobs, so the country will soon **bleed** to the point of bankruptcy thanks to the attacks of the *mujahidin*.

4.1.1.2. Americans

*AMERICANS' intentions have also become clear in their statements about the need to change the beliefs, curricula and morals of Muslims in order to become more tolerant, as they put it. In clearer terms, it is religious-economic war. They want the believers to desist from worshiping God so that they can enslave them, occupy their countries and loot their wealth. It is **strange** that they want to dictate democracy and Americanize our culture through their jet bombers." (L 214). 'Only steel breaks STEEL', and our situation, by Allah's grace, is only getting better and better, while your situation is the **opposite of that** (L 221). Your lives will be **troubled**, your lives **embittered**, and the course of events will lead to that which is hateful to you. /.../ You have occupied our lands, transgressed against our manhood and dignity, spilled our blood, plundered our wealth, destroyed our homes, dislocated us, and played with our security – and we will **give you the same treatment**" (L 224). So **THE AMERICANS are in a sorry plight today, unable either to protect their forces or form a government that can protect its own leader, let alone others** (L 204).*

The message outlined here is largely similar to the one summarized in the previous section. The same fate which awaits the country as a whole is destined towards the Americans themselves. In bin Laden's discourse in general, the Americans have bad, **evil** and strange intentions and goals: to change the beliefs, morals and curricula of Muslims and desist them from their faith, Americanizing their culture **under the pretext of tolerance and democracy**. In fact, bin Laden claims, they want to dictate all this through their jet bombers, **occupy** the Muslim countries, **enslave** them and **loot** their wealth in a religious-economic war. In bin Laden's understanding, all culture, inhabitants and land in the region is inevitably Muslim; and now the Americans occupy it, transgressing against the manhood and dignity of the people, spilling their blood, plundering their wealth, **destroying** their homes, dislocating them and playing with their security and **unjustly** "*taking their oil for a paltry price in the knowledge that the prices of oil commodities have multiplied many times*" (L 272). The leader of al-Qaeda asserts that this conduct, as well as their presence on the Arabian Peninsula is "*forbidden under God's law*" (L 270), the Americans must therefore be **punished** for these actions and given the same treatment of steel breaking steel. This process, he claims, is already underway, as the situation of the Americans is getting worse and worse (**collapse**) and they are **bleeding** in Iraq "*in economic, human and psychological terms*" (L 272). According to bin Laden, it is a **shame** that the Americans are not properly informed about the real state of things by "*unbiased*" people, such as the British journalist Robert Fisk (L 240). As things are, though, he stresses that it is the duty of the *umma* to fight *jihad* and bleed the Americans and their alliances, targeting them everywhere, because "*they know full well that they will not enjoy our wealth and land as long as we remain mujahid Muslims*" (L 215). As for their desires for peace and security, he warns, they are by nature most **insincere** and should not be heeded.

4.1.1.3. Bush and the White House

*The GANG OF CRIMINALS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, misrepresenting the truth, whose IDIOTIC LEADER claims that we despise their way of life – although the truth that the PHARAOH OF THE AGE is hiding is that we **strike** them because of their **injustice** towards us in the Islamic world... (L 193). [US president G. W.] BUSH AND HIS GANG with their **heavy sticks** and **cruel hearts**, are AN EVIL TO ALL MANKIND. They have stabbed into the truth until they have killed it altogether in the eyes of the world. /.../ This GANG and THEIR LEADER enjoy lying, warring and looting – [all] in order to serve their own ambitions. The **blood** of the children of Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq still **drips from their TEETH** (I 210). BUSH'S HANDS are **covered with blood** from all these casualties, all in the name of oil and more business for his private companies (L 243). BUSH became **embroiled in the quagmires of Iraq**, which now threaten his life. He is like THE GRUMPY GOAT who dug out of the ground the very knife with which he would be killed (L 243). Now you are like THE KNIGHT who was trying to protect the people from the Sword of Malik, but ended up begging someone to protect him (I 211). It would not be accurate to say that ~~al-Qaeda has defeated THE WHITE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION~~, or that ~~THE WHITE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION has lost this war~~, for on closer inspection it cannot be said that ~~al-Qaeda is the sole reason for these amazing gains~~. THE WHITE HOUSE LEADERSHIP, which is so keen to open up war fronts for its various corporations, whether in field of arms, oil, or construction, has also contributed to these remarkable results for al-Qaeda. To some analysts and diplomats, it seems as if we and THE WHITE HOUSE are on the same team shooting at the United States' own goal, despite our different intentions (L 241-42).*

For the leader of al-Qaeda, George W. Bush, the White House administration and its representatives represent concentrated **evil** in its purest sense, the embodiment of all **wrong**. Indeed, he claims, Bush and his administration are an evil to all mankind and a mortal **danger** to the entire world. In a plenitude of hostile nominative predicates, they are and likened to a **criminal** gang, an **unlucky** quartet,¹⁵ capitalists, those with influence, “*merchants of war*” who “*direct the policy from behind the scenes*”, “*bloodsuckers*” with **bloody** teeth (L 235) led by a grumpy goat, an **idiotic** leader, a Pharaoh of the age, a knight who is unable to protect anyone from danger (**supposed strength**), the greatest **liar** revealed, the liar in the White house, an agent of deception and **exploitation** and a butcher (of freedom) whose hands are covered with blood (I 222). The leader of al-Qaeda warns that George W. Bush follows the actions of his father, such as “*imposing lethal sanctions on millions of people*” in Iraq (L 148, 240), as well as “*the policy of his ancestors who slew the American Indians in order to seize their land and wealth*” (I 211). Bin Laden claims that both Bush presidents, father and son, secretly admired the “*oppressive*” and “*tyrannical*” regimes in the Middle East and envied the fact that they could remain in power for decades, so they implemented a few local policies upon visiting them, such as grooming their sons for state service in the case of Bush Sr. and falsifying elections in “*tricky moments*” (L 241). The White house administration is depicted as a “*gang*” (**criminals**), equipped with heavy sticks and cruel hearts which enable them to misinterpret the truth, hide their **injustices** and **lies**, shamelessly bribe, stab and **kill**, while enjoying to **loot** and wage wars, opening up

¹⁵ George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. In Ibrahim 2007, 223.

fronts in order to serve their own ambitions and private, dubious interests (**carelessness**) and the desires of the Zionist lobby and thus all “*benefit from stirring up this war and bloodshed*” (**opportunism**) (L 235). Bin Laden asserts that Bush Jr. “*removed a former collaborator and installed a new one who would help steal Iraqi oil and commit other atrocities*” (L 240). Yet, in doing so, and in as bin Laden observes, the American president dug out the very knife with which they would be killed and revealed how trivial and insincere he is: since Bush implemented legislation under the **pretext of fighting terrorism**, affirms bin Laden, he launched into a groundless war while only assuming the weapons of mass destruction existed. Thus, he is now on the same team with al-Qaeda due to these shortcomings, shooting at the United States' own goal and forced into an emergency budget by the *mujahidin* (**foolishness**). George Bush, as the leader of al-Qaeda claims, became embroiled in the quagmires of Iraq and his term as president is a continual **disaster** and mistakes. He is **stuck** in dire straits and his life is in danger (**collapse**), because the “*black gold blinded him and he put his own private interests ahead of the American public interest*” (L 243). In bin Laden's understanding, the American president and the leading figures of the administration are destined to **failure** and “*easily lured into perdition*” (L 241) because he perceives them to be enslaved to money, greedy and careless to the needs of the American people, who are exploited for these objectives to stay at war. The next section explores how the head of al-Qaeda and perceives “the American people” and analyzes the predicates he attributes to them in detail.

4.1.1.4. People

*I say to the AMERICAN PEOPLE: we will continue to **fight you** /.../ until you depart from your **oppressive** course, abandon your **follies** and reign in your **MADMEN** (I 212). Some have the **impression** that you are **REASONABLE PEOPLE** – yet the majority of you are **base, lacking sound ethics or good manners**. You **elect THE WICKED from among you, the GREATEST LIARS and MOST DEPRAVED, and you are enslaved to THE WEALTHIEST and MOST INFLUNENTIAL [among you]** – especially THE JEWS, who **direct you through the lie of 'democracy' to support the Israelis and their machinations and in complete antagonism toward our religion [Islam]** (I 210). You would do well to consider **THE THOUSANDS WHO LEFT YOU ON SEPTEMBER 11th, waving desperately for help.** /.../ One of the most significant things I have learned about their torments before falling was what they said: 'We were **wrong** when we **let the White House inflict unchecked** this **aggressive** foreign policy on THE POOR PEOPLE.' They were saying to you: **PEOPLE OF AMERICA, call those who caused our murder to account.** /.../ It should also be clear to you that **AMERICAN THINKERS AND INTELLECTUALS warned** Bush **before the war...** (L 243).*

Whenever bin Laden wants to differentiate between the atrocities committed by the government or the state and address Americans in attempt to advise them, he refers to them as the people of America or the American people. Overall, in his understanding, they must be awakened from their ignorance, brought to their senses and cultivated. Now, they are base, lacking sound ethics or good manners, **unreasonable** in their choice of leaders and **deceived** to believe in the lie of democracy, which bin Laden refers to as “*the religion of ignorance*” (208-09). He assumes that apart from these still somewhat sensible, yet most depraved, tormented and **desperate** people, such as the victims of 9-11 or American intellectuals, who warned Bush before the war, there are others among the American population: those, who have been elected and described in the previous section and who are hereby labeled as the **wicked**, the greatest **liars**, yet the wealthiest and the most **influential**, especially the Jews. According to bin Laden, they are the ones who lure the rest of the population into their ideological machinations and direct them in complete antagonism to Islam (**dependence, exploitation**), who have not changed since their ancestors slew the American Indians or fought in Vietnam and who manipulate the others into this unjust war once again. As suggested previously, establishing a dichotomy between the government and the people is in my opinion a tool which helps bin Laden target the Americans double-sidedly, seeking to influence domestic affairs while staying loyal to his fierce rhetoric towards America in general. In line with this purpose and objective, he concludes that the war in Iraq must and can serve as a wake-up call for the majority of Americans, who are now for the first time “*aware of the Palestinian issue and that what happened to them in Manhattan was a result of the unjust policies of their government*” (L 195). A similar **transformation from subservient ignorance to painful awareness** occurs among the American army and its soldiers, whose predicates are discussed in the next section.

4.1.1.5. Soldiers and armed forces

It [THE AMERICAN ARMY] depends mainly on psychological warfare, in light of the huge propaganda machine that it possesses, as well as on intense aerial bombardment, which hides its most conspicuous. ACHILLES HEEL, namely the fear, cowardice and lack of fighting spirit of the AMERICAN SOLDIERS (L 191). These TROOPS are utterly convinced of their governments tyranny and lies, and they know the cause they are fighting is not just. (Lawrence 181). Try to picture the state of psychological breakdown that afflicts the SOLDIER while he gathers the remains of his FELLOWS after they step on a land mine and are blown apart. Thereafter, the SOLDIER is caught up between a rock and a hard place: /.../ he has but two choices – both of which place extreme psychological pressure on him [and lead to] fear, humiliation and defeat. All the while his people are unmindful of him. Thus he finds no other solution than to commit suicide /.../ a strong message he writes to you with his soul, blood and anguish, to save what can be saved from this inferno. /.../ All the suppressive measures adopted by the AMERICAN ARMY AND ITS AGENTS – there is no mentionable difference between these crimes and [former Iraqi leader] Saddam [Hussein's] crimes. The[ir] crimes have reached the degree to where women are raped and seized as hostages in place of their husbands /.../ As for the torturing of men, this has reached a point to where burning chemical acids and electric drills to dismember them are utilized. And whenever they [THE AMERICAN ARMY] give up on [interrogating] them, they sometimes kill them by drilling them in the head. Read, if you will, the humanitarian reports that enumerate the horrors [committed] in the Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo and Bahgram prisons (I 221-22).

We trace a similar dichotomy in bin Laden's discourse concerning the American army and its soldiers as we have seen previously with regard to the people of America. Whenever the leader of al-Qaeda wishes stress **humanity** or **empathy**, he speaks of American soldiers on the individual level, practically following the footsteps of a man who marches on and gathers the remains of his fellow fighters. This soldier is depicted as **humiliated, defeated, betrayed**; wishes to be saved from this inferno and dies while his people are unmindful of him (**helplessness**), either in combat or having committed suicide due to high psychological **pressure** inflicted on him and the **guilt** that overcomes him when he realizes that he is fighting for **unjust** people and an **unjust** cause. Bin Laden even claims that the soldier wishes to inform the American people of his feelings, if only they would listen. Apart from this alleged discourse of condolence, however, the leader of al-Qaeda often speaks of the American army and its troops without the slightest touch of empathy or sense for the individual fate of a soldier: those are the passages where he speaks of the army as a **machine**, depicting its members as **inhuman** monsters who are equal to Saddam Hussein in the extent and depth of their **crimes** and **horrors** they have committed. They employ **barbarous** methods, rape women, **seize** them as hostages, **torture** men, burn them with chemical acids and **kill** them in the head when they give up on interrogating them. Yet, as stated previously, this dichotomy is in my opinion again but a purely functional tool, designed to target different audiences. When bin Laden speaks to the *umma*, he never omits to point out that the American army “*depends mainly on psychological warfare and intense aerial bombardment*” by which it hides its “*most conspicuous Achilles heel, namely the fear,*

cowardice and lack of fighting spirit among its troops” (L 181). Even though the machinery is regarded as ruthless and despite the sophisticated ammunition and smart laser-guided bombs which rain down mercilessly on the ground, the American army is made up of “*the most cowardly people in battle*” dependent on propaganda. Therefore, the *mujahidin* can **target them easily (supposed power)** with “*mighty blows*” (L 193), while the American troops waste their bomb supplies in a terrain they does not know, fearing close combat and human losses. “*As for us*”, bin Laden concludes bluntly, “*we have nothing to lose. One who swims in the sea does not fear rain* (I 224).

4.1.1.6. Alliances

*This struggle is partly an internal regional struggle, but in all other respects it is a struggle between **global unbelief** with the APOSTATES UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF AMERICA **on one side**, and the Islamic umma and its brigades of mujahidin, on the other (L 250). In the light of a NEW SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT, THE BUSH-BLAIR AXIS /.../ claims that it wants to annihilate terrorism, but it is ~~no longer a secret~~ – even to the masses – that it really wants to annihilate Islam (L 187-88), occupy one of Islam's former capitals, loot Muslims' riches, and install a stooge government to follow its MASTERS IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV... (L 180). Current events are merely an extension of the struggle against the CRUSADER-AMERICAN alliance who **fight us everywhere**, just like **we fight them everywhere...** (L 274). What is happening to our people in Palestine is just a small example of what they want to repeat in the rest of the region courtesy of the ZIONIST-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: murder of men, women and children, incarceration, terrorism, destruction of houses, bulldozing of fields and razing of factories (L 189). Oh Lord, abandon the ZIONIST-AMERICAN ALLIANCE and their SUPPORTERS and COLLABORATORS, oh Lord, ~~destroy~~ them and ~~break~~ their backs, take away their **power** and shatter their **unity**, make their ~~wives widows~~, turn them ~~against each other...~~” (L 24). In the midst of this **corrupt, unjust war** that the INFIDELS OF AMERICA are waging with their AGENTS AND ALLIES, I would like to emphasize: /.../ **Fight** the ALLIES OF SATAN. SATAN'S strategies are **truly weak** (L 180).*

For bin Laden, all the states, people and forces who stand against the *umma* thereby constitute the global alliance of evil in accordance with his omnipresent perception of the world in binary oppositions. Of the denominations where the American presence in the alliance is explicitly mentioned, such a covenant is referred to in a plenitude of terms, such as masters in Washington and Tel Aviv; the Crusader-American alliance; the Zionist-American alliance with their supporters and collaborators; the infidels of America with their agents and allies; and the allies of Satan. Indeed, all these alliances are viewed as a conspiracy of evil, **unified, merciless, unjust, omnipresent and apparently strong**. As such, they can commit even greater injustices to the *umma* as its members would have achieved on their own. The most dangerous of them, according to bin Laden, is the Zionist-Crusader alliance, constituting one of the most frequent bogeymen in his discourse, mentioned more than forty times in the empirical material. He claims that this coalition fights the *umma* everywhere, just like it fights the alliance everywhere. One of the *umma's* greatest duties is essentially to “*to bleed the Jews, the allies of America, and to bleed the Americans, the allies of the Jews*” (L 204), because they want to, as bin Laden warns, annihilate Islam under the **pretext of fighting terrorism** and install a loyal government to extend their injustices into the region. Hence, they loot, cause terror and spill blood everywhere in the Muslim world. In Palestine, bin Laden asserts they have **murdered** its inhabitants, **plundered** their property and deprived them of their livelihood. In Saudi Arabia, he notes that America and her allies “*mowed down people in the blessed land of al-Aqsa*” and in Lebanon, the Americans helped the Israeli army **invade** the country and started “*bombing, killing, wounding many*”, leaving “*women and children massacred, houses*

destroyed” while American and Israeli bombs “*rained down mercilessly on homes*” (L 239). In order to make America and her allies “*flee in the dark of the night*” (L 192) as has previously happened, the *mujahidin* have to increase the amounts of daily suicide and combat operations to a level which would be unbearable for the joint forces and target them everywhere. Bin Laden remains certain that the allies of Satan will be expelled, because deep down, they are “***truly weak***” (L 181), while the Muslim forces are unified, strong and just in their faith.

4.1.2. European allies

4.1.2.1. Alliances, states and leaders

Our wounds have yet to heal from the /.../ SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT of 1916 between FRANCE and BRITAIN which brought about the dissection of the Islamic world into fragments (Lawrence 2005, 187). The economy of all Arab countries is weaker than the economy of one COUNTRY that had once been part of our [Islamic] world when we used to truly adhere to Islam. That country is the LOST AL-ANDALUS. SPAIN is an INFIDEL COUNTRY, but its economy is stronger than ours because the ruler there is accountable. In our countries, there is no accountability or punishment, but only obedience to the rulers and prayers of long life for them.” (Lawrence 2005, 227). Prince Talal bin Abd al-Aziz¹⁶ also stated publicly that his father had received money from THE ENGLISH, thereby affirming the facts and documents that prove that his father was a collaborator with THE ENGLISH. (L 255). As for your LEADERS and their FOLLOWERS, who persistently ignore the real problem, which is the occupation of Palestine, and indulge in lies and deceit about our rights to self-defense, they have no self respect. They show contempt for peoples' blood and minds through such deceit, but it only means that your blood will continue to be shed (Lawrence 2005, 234). We have a right to retaliate at any [given] time and place against [any and] all COUNTRIES involved – particularly ENGLAND, SPAIN, POLAND, AUSTRALIA, POLAND, JAPAN and ITALY, /.../ MERCENARIES from every corner of the world, even from the SMALL STATES (I 211).

The predicates attributed to European allies of America in the Iraqi campaign and its leaders, states and alliances represent one of the most variable and dichotomous categories in this paper. On one hand, the leader of al-Qaeda considers their plots and plans – such as the **Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916** and the **Bush-Blair axis of present** (between which he draws a parallel; L 187); or the collaboration between the British government and the Saudi family – to be **disastrous** for the Islamic world, causing unhealed wounds until the present day, which thereby testifies their immensely **evil** nature and objective. On the other hand, he acknowledges quite unprecedentedly and in accordance with current historiography, that some of these “*collaborationist countries*” which take part in this “*hostile coalition*” (I 223) share a common past with the Middle East region and are bound by cultural, social and political ties. Symptomatically, in this case, these ties are not depicted in the habitual discourse of impoverishing colonialism; because bin Laden stresses in fact that the roles are opposite and it was the Muslims then who acted as competent conquerors. This is the case of Spain, which is labeled by the **nostalgic** and somewhat tender epithet of the “*lost al-Andalus*”. Given the antagonistic tone of previous references to America and Europe, it is rather interesting that at this point, the leader of al-Qaeda apparently mourns the fate of a caliphate, known for its unprecedentedly tolerant ambiance towards people of different religions. What is even more striking is that in the next sentence, upon acknowledging the **infidel**

¹⁶ The younger brother of the current King Fahd (born 1923). His father is the first Saudi King ibn Saud (1890-1953), who maintained good relations with the British in the interwar period. King Fahd signed the al-Yamamah (Dove) contracts with the Great Britain in 1986 and 1988. (In Lawrence 2005, 255, 265).

nature of present-day Spain, bin Laden presently claims quite composedly that despite of this characteristic, Spain as a state is viewed as economically strong because of the **accountability** of its ruler, whereupon he makes an unfavorable comparison to Middle Eastern countries. Despite bin Laden's critical stance regarding these regimes, such an approach is quite unusual of an ideologist who frequently opposes the idea of democracy, calling it "*the religion of ignorance*" (L 209). Yet in my opinion, this confirms the fact that for bin Laden, accountability is **not associated with democracy**, but rather with **justice** in accordance with God's law. Furthermore, this rare outlook on Spanish accountability on the level of state is an opportune tool undoubtedly driven by the outcome of the Spanish elections as a backlash to the Madrid bombings, and especially the subsequent decision of the new government to withdraw its forces from Iraq. Such a favorable depiction is certainly not captured in the case of European leaders and administrations who remained in combat, as well as supporters of the invasion. Generally speaking, the leader of al-Qaeda labels them as highly **deceitful**, lacking self respect, ability and willingness to distinguish the "*real problem*", incorrigibly abiding to their contempt for the value of human life and the minds of their people, which they **waste** for the sake of their interests (**carelessness, crudity, ignorance**). Thus, they seal not only their own fate, but also the fate of their countries (explicitly numbered in a list) and people, thereby condemning them to be targeted on legal grounds by al-Qaeda and its *mujahidin*. In labeling supporters of the invasion as **mercenaries** and **scum** bin Laden implies the shady and criminal nature of these subjects, as well as the perception that their loyalty across the world has been bought. Thus, according to bin Laden, small states and forces have been lured into the supportive stance by economical means, because the **European nations** among US allies lack their own proper sources at home, a condition which yet again testifies their **unjust maliciousness**, aiming to **hide** their **supposed power** and **true weakness**.

4.1.2.2. People

*This is a letter to our NEIGHBOURS **NORTH OF THE MEDITERRANEAN** incorporating a peace proposal in response to **positive** recent exchanges. /.../ What happened on September 11 and March 11 are your goods returned to you. /.../ Your description of us as terrorists and of our actions as terrorism necessarily means that your actions must be defined likewise. /.../ We are both suffering injustice at the hands of your leaders who send your SONS to our countries, to kill and do be killed. So it is in the **interests** of both sides to stop those who shed their own PEOPLE'S blood. /.../ In response to the positive initiatives that have been reflected in recent events and opinion polls showing that **most PEOPLE IN EUROPE want peace**, I call upon **JUST MEN**, especially **SCHOLARS, MEDIA and BUSINESSMEN**, to form a permanent commission to raise ~~awareness~~ among **EUROPEANS** of the justice of our causes... (Lawrence 2005, 234-35).*

Similarly as in the case of the American people, the European populations of nations allied to America are regarded as **insensible** and **incorrigibly foolish**, short-sighted people, who, in spite of the fact that they yearn for peace and security, enable their leaders to repeatedly encroach on it, “*send their sons to kill and to be killed*” while abiding to their inhuman agenda of their governments. For bin Laden, both the leaders and the peoples of Europe in the allied countries are ignorant, yet he draws a contrast **distinction** between the **evil ignorance** of the administrations and leaders and the **foolishly unaware ignorance** of the **people**. Their stance, although it must equally be **punished**, can apparently still be averted by persuasion: awareness among the **suffering** and **deceived** peoples of Europe in countries allied to America can and must be raised by “*just men*”, namely “*scholars, media and businessmen*” from among those populations in order for them to wake from their **unconsciousness**, to stop merely **objecting** to the policies of their unjust governments in word and rather **stand up** against “*those who shed their own people's blood*”, in deed, because, as the leader of al-Qaeda advises European people, “*returning to truth is better than continuing to lie*” (L 236). The European leaders and governments, not al-Qaeda, are the true enemy of Europeans seeking peace, claims bin Laden. The politicians of The Old Continent who are loyal to the United States, he points out, are double-sided and should not be trusted, because they self-righteously call their victims innocent and the *mujahidin* casualties worthless, seeking to “*please the liar in the White House*” (ibid.). In my opinion, such a rigidly drawn discursive distinction between the people and “their leaders on the level of government designed as two completely antagonist specimen again serves as an essential erosive tool for bin Laden in order to draw a clear line between those who “*choose war over peace*” and those who “*choose peace*”, aiming to foster enmity and friction among the two thereby created mutually exclusive entities. In accordance with this objective, the leader of al-Qaeda follows the same strategy as he employs in his discourse towards the American people; establishing a supposedly

comprehensive and pitying stance towards the **neighbors** north of the Mediterranean who have not yet all awoken up from their naive and **foolish** ideals about their leaders, stressing historical connections and praising recent positive events (again with reference to the outcome of the Spanish elections) and simultaneously remaining irreconcilably critical to the political representations in European countries allied with the United States, thereby abiding to his and al-Qaeda's ideological imperatives as well as the perceptions of the triumphant *umma*.

4.1.3. Shared

4.1.3.1. Crusaders and Romans

When our adherence to our religion weakened and our rulers became corrupt, we became weak and THE ROMANS returned, waging their infamous CRUSADER wars. They occupied the al-Aqsa mosque... (Lawrence 2005, 217). The occupation of Iraq is a link in the ZIONIST-CRUSADER chain of evil. Then comes the full occupation of the rest of the Gulf states to set the stage for controlling and dominating the whole world. /.../ The current ZIONIST-CRUSADER campaign against the umma is the most dangerous and rabid ever, since it threatens the entire umma, its religion, and presence. Did Bush not say that it is a CRUSADER war? (Lawrence 2005, 214-15). THE ROMANS have gathered under the BANNER OF THE CROSS to fight the nation of beloved Muhammad... (L 210). It is also no secret that this CRUSADER war is directed primarily against the people of Islam, regardless of whether the socialist party, or Saddam, remains [in power] or not. (Lawrence 2005, 183). Muslims, if you do not punish THE CRUSADERS for their sins in Jerusalem and Iraq, they shall defeat you because of your failure. They will also rob you of the land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. Today [they robbed you] of Baghdad, and tomorrow they will rob you of Riyadh and so forth unless God deems otherwise (Lawrence 2005, 218). Prepare for repulsing the raid of THE ROMANS which started in Iraq; no one knows where it will end.” (Lawrence 2005, 230).

Bin Laden refers to Americans and Europeans who took part in the invasion of Iraq as Crusaders and Romans very frequently. These two nominative predications are the mentioned more than forty times (Crusaders) and five times (Romans); in parallels drawn both between the Crusaders of the Middle Ages and the current campaign, as well as the Romans and the inhabitants of a present day hostile power, pointing to the historical antagonism with regard to the nature of the Roman and Byzantine empires. This is facilitated due to the fact that the word for “Roman” and “Byzantine” is quite similar in Arabic.¹⁷ The word Crusader certainly is not a new label for foreign intruders in the Middle East, although it was not used in this sense until modern times, when it was revitalized in the Arab nationalist discourse. In the cluster of quotes cited above, rooted in religious lexis, the negative perception is further reinforced by the repetitive act of robbery committed towards the Muslims and their lands, which hereby testifies the Crusader's strength. The villain image in the text suggests that the Crusader (American or European) – the robber-knight – disposes with **negative, sinful, unjust** potential **offensive** capacities (**activity, force, victory**) which are enabled by and juxtaposed to Muslim lack of **positive, defensive, virtuous** and **just** punitive action in the matter, which testifies their unfortunate passivity, weakness, and failure, due to the fact that “*the Islamic umma is the greatest human power, if only its religion were properly established*”(L 191). As it is, though, the banner of the cross is destined to **triumph** over the Islamic nation in an **unprecedented** raid. In this discourse, bin Laden calls to action both the inhabitants of Middle Eastern countries and regimes which he views as corrupt. Only their re-Islamization in accordance with *sharia* can, in his

¹⁷ The word al-Rum means Byzantine, while al-Ruma means Roman. In Lawrence 2005, 212.

understanding, reverse this lethal and dangerous trajectory and trend, because the Zionist-Crusader onslaught and war in Iraq is inevitably a link in their “*chain of evil*” with the objective of “*controlling and dominating the whole world*” (L 214). The Romans and Crusaders are **allied** with the Jews and are allies only to each other, **firm** and **unified, threatening** the entire *umma*, because they have **promoted and defended their causes better** than Muslims have done in the past. Now, Muslims should not fall for their tenants and conspiracies and learn from their past how to confront them, because otherwise they will only “*throw dust in their eyes*” (L 220), just like they have done previously in Palestine, bin Laden concludes warningly.

4.1.3.2. Unbelievers and infidels

*So continue on the path, don't be afraid of any difficulty and be sure to **cleanse** the Arabian peninsula of POLYTHEISTS, ATHEISTS and HERETICS (Lawrence 2005, 271). Those INFIDELS will not scare you with their weapons, for God has **weakened** their schemes and **stopped** their ~~progress~~. Don't let their numbers **frighten** you, for their **hearts are empty** and they are falling into military and economic disarray..." (L 210). 'God may **curb the power** of the DISBELIEVERS, for he is stronger in might and more terrible in **punishment**'¹⁸ (L 190).*

Interestingly, it is as if calling Americans and their European allies as unbelievers and infidels inflicted some sort of automatic **weakness** on them: instead of the historically frightening and dangerously villain image of a foreign Crusader and Roman, unbelievers and infidels are doomed to **failure**, they are not the impersonation of a lethal threat with excellent lobbying for their cause as the Romans and Crusaders are. This different narrative is highly supported by voiced references in the Qur'an and the *hadīth* where infidels and unbelievers are frequently mentioned in fierce and hostile verses. Significantly enough, bin Laden omits or suppresses the ones in which the holy book of Islam is benignant towards other religions. The infidels, heretics, polytheists and atheists with empty hearts cannot scare the *umma* (**supposed power**) because they have not scared it in the past. In the past, the *umma* triumphed, **banished** them from the Arabian Peninsula. And now, bin Laden claims, Muslims will cleanse it again, as well as the whole region, because God is on their side and he will curb the power of the disbelievers and **punish** them terribly. Already, bin Laden affirms, he has **weakened** and them and **stopped** their progress, and just like he has done in the past, when the Islamic civilization flourished and triumphed; so they are disintegrating economically and militarily (**collapse**) Thus, bin Laden concludes, their occupation of Muslim lands and their collaboration with the apostate and infidel Arab regimes in the region will not last long.

¹⁸ Qur'an, 4:84. In L 190.

4.1.3.3. Forces and powers

*The BIG POWERS believe that the Gulf states are the key to controlling the whole world, due to the presence of largest oil reserves there (Lawrence 2005, 214). In fact, the Islamic umma is the greatest human power, if only the religion were properly established. History has shown in recent centuries that it is able to **fight** and **resist** the SO-CALLED SUPERPOWERS. (L 191). If all the FORCES of GLOBAL EVIL could not even achieve their objective over one square mile against a small group of mujahidin with such modest capabilities, how could they expect to **triumph** over the whole Islamic world?” (L 182).*

Although the America and its European allies are referred to as big powers, superpowers and forces of global evil and all nominative predicates attributed to them demonstrate largeness and might, the sentiment that once again underlines bin Laden's description of these forces is that their **power** is only **illusory** and **supposed**. As such, they can be easily fought and resisted. Like in the case of unbelievers and infidels, he derives this argumentation from history, claiming that these forces have never achieved their objective over but a small area and group (**weakness**), so it is absolutely out of the question to think that they will control the whole Islamic world like they intend to (**foolishness**). To prove the truth of this perception, he does not reference religious texts from the Qur'an or *ḥadīṭ* this time, but rather points out to the most recent encounter the *mujahidin* have had with a “so called superpower”, the former Soviet Union: “*With patience and crude weapons we battled the Soviet foe for ten years. We bled their economy and by the grace of Allah they are now nothing*” (I 225). For bin Laden, this personally acquired conviction and historical experience serves as a base for his solemn belief that that “*evil forces of materialism*” sooner or later inevitably surrender to “*forces of faith*” which will savor their triumph (L 181).

4.1.3.4. The West

*THE WEST'S occupation of our country is old yet new and /.../ the confrontation between right and FALSEHOOD will continue until Judgment Day. /.../ If we look at the nature of the conflict between us and THE WEST, we find that when they invaded our countries more than 2,500 years ago they did not have **a sound religion** or **ethics**. Their motive was to steal and plunder. /.../ Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, THE WEST today is doing its utmost to tarnish Jihadism and to kill anyone seeking Jihadism. THE WEST is **supported** in this endeavor by hypocrites. This is because they all know that Jihadism is the effective tool to foil all their conspiracies” (Lawrence 2005, 217-18).*

The degree to which bin Laden utilizes historical parallels culminate here, when he refers to America and its European allies as the West. When talking of Western occupation, he goes as far as 2,500 years back in time to demonstrate the length and extent of this **oppression**, which his ancestors allegedly experienced from the **barbaric** and **infidel** invaders in the Fertile Crescent who **stole** and **plundered** their property. In accordance with his Salafist beliefs, bin Laden affirms that it was only under Prophet Muhammad and his quests when the Muslims, unified in the *umma*, were able to reverse this unfortunate course and “*nobody could stand in the way of the battalions of faith*” (L 217). Despite the dynamics of the conflict and its reverses throughout time, fundamentally, bin Laden qualifies this struggle as **constant**. He claims that its essence is in fact **eternal** and even good for both the parties involved, their countries and peoples; going on from the very cradle of civilization up to the present and until the very Judgment Day. For the leader of al-Qaeda, this is not only a battle between faith and **unbelief**, but a conflict between right and **falsehood**, a struggle between the just, ethical and straightforward *umma* which defends itself from the **savage robbers from abroad** who foster false pretenses for their unjust actions, and who are, as bin Laden admits, **supported** by other **hypocrites** in their **conspiracies**. Thus, according to the leader of al-Qaeda, the only effective way to confront this trend can again be found in Muslim history: resort to *jihad* in the form of armed struggle and do not cease practicing it even though it is targeted and hindered; because as a matter of fact, it is efficient and difficult to tarnish; and the West – he concludes – is well aware of that, despite its supposedly victorious declarations.

4.1.3.5. Oppressors, occupiers, enemies and thieves

*Self defense and **punishing THE OPPRESSORS in kind**: is this shameful terrorism? Even if it is, we have no other option (L 240). There can be no dialogue with THE OCCUPIERS except **with weapons**. (Lawrence 2005, 217). We also underline the importance of **dragging the ENEMY FORCES into a protracted, exhausting, close combat**... /.../ What THE ENEMY **fears** most is **urban and street warfare**, in which **heavy and costly human losses** can be **expected** (Lawrence 183). The Sheikh of Islam [ibn Taymiyya] said: As for fighting the ENEMY AGRESSOR who **corrupts religion and the world**, there is no greater duty after faith than **uncompromising struggle** against him /.../ continuing to **hate the ENEMIES OF GOD** and calling for Jihadism against them. (Lawrence 2005, 202). **Moving the government of Iraq from a local THIEF [Saddam Hussein] to A FOREIGN ONE /.../ to take the land of Muslims and control them** is one of the ten acts **contradictory to Islam** (L 255).*

This cluster of quotes reveals the basic and fundamental substance of bin Laden's argumentation: the struggle against the occupiers, enemies and thieves is in fact a defensive struggle of the *umma* led against the aggressors and **offensive** figures. The leader of al-Qaeda stresses that he and the community of believers punishes these oppressors in kind, although they classify this reaction as shameful terrorism. Upon posing the voiced rhetorical question, bin Laden gives an ostensibly blunt response, which I believe to be intentional and self-consciously deliberate in its crude reading: “*even if it is, we have no other option*”. This way, bin Laden instantly reverses the roles attributed previously: instead of shameful terrorists, as the precedent sentence suggests, we are instead given the image of valiant and just people who have been cornered by **oppressive foreign forces** and are merely defending their rights with weapons in their hand out of pure necessity; an act they would not have otherwise resorted to if it had not been for the occupiers and their deaf ears to dialogue (**recklessness**). These aggressors, as the leader of al-Qaeda stresses, notoriously **lie, encourage their children to fight** (*'you fight, so you exist'*) while telling the Muslim *umma* the contrary: that seek peace (L 231). In fact, bin Laden warns, they want to **kill**, tyrannize and murder; take the land of Muslims and **occupy** it. In phrases such as these, the aspect that the oppressors are **foreign** is enhanced on numerous accounts. Their strangeness is not perceived as merely coming from another country, but as another testimony of their fundamental and profound antagonisms to the *umma* and Muslims: due to their **transgressions**, they must and will be **punished**, for they are considered **hated enemies of God** and thereby enemies of the Islamic nation, which defends its cause bravely in ferocious attacks against them. Luckily, as bin Laden observes, the aggressors are by nature **cowardly** and **fearful**, especially with regard to close combat and street warfare, where they suffer many casualties. Thus, the narrative concludes with the picture of the brave *mujahidin* dragging the enemies to **exhaustion**, causing them to **disintegrate** and grow more and more scared of the *umma*, who will inevitably **defeat** and conquer it.

4.2. Metaphorical analysis

After having analyzed the predicates attributed to the United States of America and its European allies through grounded theory, I will now proceed to similarly categorize the metaphorical clusters chosen with regard to the United States of America and its European allies. As apparent from previous analysis, the two principal object spaces differ in the intensity of representation concerning the respective metaphorical categories: the person scheme, the container scheme, the link scheme, the path scheme and the force scheme. Therefore, their metaphorical expressions will be examined separately for the sake of better clarity and subsequently confronted with one another in order to compare and trace possible dichotomies, contrasts or similarities and parallels. In the citations and text, metaphorical schemes and conceptual metaphors are CAPITALIZED while metaphorical expressions are indicated in **bold**.

4.2.1. USA

4.2.1.1. Person

*The Prophet said: 'A woman went to hell because she had a cat whom she **tied up so that it could not eat, not even the crumbs on the floor, so it died.**'¹⁹ (L 267). It [America] was like a crocodile **devouring a child, who could do nothing but scream. Does a crocodile understand anything but weapons?** (L 339). While Uncle Sam was committing these **reckless transgressions and terrible oppression**, going through the world **without paying attention to anyone else and thinking that nothing could attack it**, /.../ [the 9-11 hijackers] hit the American **economy** right at its heart /.../ wiped its **arrogance** in the mud. /.../ It became clear to all that **America's values are the lowest, and the myth of 'the land of the free' was destroyed.** /.../ The attacks revealed the American wolf in its true **ugliness.** /.../ It also became clear to people, that America, this **unjust power**, can be struck down and humiliated (L 195). Here is America today, **screaming at the top of its voice as it falls apart** in front of the whole world (L 208). When the United States ~~makes a sincere decision to stop wars in the world~~, it **knows before anyone else that that day will mark the beginning of its collapse and the disintegration of its states** (L 231).*

To demonstrate the metaphorical scheme of PERSON attributed to America, I now once more refer to the quote previously used to for predicate analysis. Again, we discover that America is likened to various human-like figures: an evil woman who went to hell, a crocodile devouring a child, a reckless Uncle Sam, an ugly wolf and a humiliated, proud face. Indeed, it has a nose, which is wiped in the dirt by the *mujahidin*, a heart, which the former have struck and wounded; a voice, with which it screams as it falls apart and a mind in which it knows that it will collapse and disintegrate, now that it has been revealed that it has been living in a myth and it was hit, because its foundations and convictions are the lowest and unstable like straw. Under these circumstances, America in bin Laden's discourse can be categorized and depicted in four conceptual metaphors derived from the empirical material *sur place*: as a BEAST, a CRIMINAL, a FOOL and a COWARD, all with their respective feelings, values and beliefs. In the next sections and paragraphs, I demonstrate each of these categories in detail.

As the cluster of quotes above suggests, the same narrative applies to American leaders and the US government who are frequently referred to as “*the gang of criminals in the White House, misrepresenting the truth*” led by an “*idiotic leader claims that we despise their way of life – although the truth that the Pharaoh of the Age is hiding is that we strike them because of their injustice towards us in the Islamic world*” (L 193). Having established this general perception, bin Laden specifies:

[US president G. W.] *Bush and his gang with their heavy sticks and cruel hearts, are an evil to all mankind. They have stabbed into the truth until they have killed it altogether in the eyes of the world. /.../ This gang and their leader enjoy lying, warring and looting – [all] in order to serve their own ambitions. The blood of the children of Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq still drips from their*

¹⁹ From the *ḥadīth* collection of al-Bukhari, vol. 3, book 40, no. 535. In Lawrence 2005, 267.

teeth (I 210). *Bush became embroiled in the **quagmires of Iraq**, which now **threaten his life**. He is like the **grumpy goat** who **dug out of the ground** the very **knife** with which he would be killed* (L 243).

Here, similarly as America had previously been likened to historical figure, the reckless Uncle Sam, George Bush is described as an idiotic leader, the Pharaoh of the age. And similarly as the nation has been compared to an ugly wolf, its leader is compared to yet another animal: a goat. This time, through, the creature is not frightening, but rather morose and stubbornly evil to the point of being silly and harming one's future, ambitions and interests. As stated previously, apart from the BEAST with a cruel heart and bloody teeth who stabs the truth; another important conceptual metaphor emerges in discourse: the CRIMINAL, with all his illegal activities: he is part of a gang, loots, fights wars and lies to make a living, which is rather short-sighted. According to bin Laden, the actions of these criminals are made possible because they themselves are appointed by FOOLS:

*I say to the American people: we will continue to fight you /.../ until you depart from your **oppressive** course, abandon your **follies** and reign in your **madmen** (I 212). Some have the impression that you are ~~reasonable people~~ – yet the majority of you are **base**, **lacking sound ethics** or **good manners**. You **elect the wicked from among you**, the greatest **liars** and most **depraved**, and you are **enslaved** to the **wealthiest** and most **influential [among you]** – especially the **Jews**, who direct you through the **lie of 'democracy'** to **support the Israelis** and their **machinations** and in complete **antagonism toward our religion** [Islam] (I 210). You would do well to consider the thousands who left you on September 11th, waving **desperately** for help. /.../ One of the most significant things I have learned about their **torments** before falling was what they said: 'We were **wrong** when we let the White House inflict **unchecked this aggressive foreign policy** on the poor people.' They were saying to you: **People of America, call those who caused our murder to account**. /.../ It should also be clear to you that **American thinkers and intellectuals warned Bush** before the war... (L 243).*

As evident, bin Laden considers them to be base, unreasonable, unethical and ill-mannered FOOLS because they believe in the lie of democracy, which enslaves them to be prone to elect the most foolish, wicked and depraved liars. Corrupted by power, wealth, influence and Jewish evil, these people emerge as CRIMINALS and BEASTS, leaving the rest desperate and in torments. Explicitly, bin Laden points out two such inflicted groups: the victims of 9-11 and American thinkers and intellectuals. However, in bin Laden's perception, that the gloomiest fate and exploitation awaits the American soldiers:

*It [the American army] depends mainly on **psychological warfare**, in light of the **huge propaganda machine** that it possesses, as well as on intense aerial bombardment, which **hides** its most conspicuous **Achilles heel** namely the **fear**, **cowardice** and **lack of fighting spirit** of the American soldiers (L 191), **utterly convinced of their governments tyranny and lies...** (L 181). Try to picture the **state of psychological breakdown** that **afflicts the soldier** /.../ [and leads to] **fear**, **humiliation** and **defeat**. All the while his people are **unmindful** of him. Thus he **finds no other solution than to commit suicide** /.../ **a strong message he writes to you with his soul, blood and anguish**, to save what can be saved from this **inferno** (I 222).*

In this depiction, the leader of al-Qaeda stresses the psychological breakdown, anguish and immense schizophrenia that the US troops experience in the bloody combat with the *mujahidin*. Bin Laden claims that despite the propaganda and bombardment, the American army cannot hide the fear, humiliation and defeat of these men, who are hereby labeled as COWARDS. Although the leader of al-Qaeda suggests that they become aware of the tyranny and lies the CRIMINALS have inflicted on them, they lack the courage and means to do something about it and inevitably find no other solution than to commit suicide. Yet apparently, as demonstrated in the quote, not all soldiers and troops come to this conclusion and in fact undertake a different transformation to become the BEAST, implementing the policies of the government on the spot:

*All the **suppressive measures** adopted by the American army and its agents /.../ there is no mentionable difference between these **crimes** and [former Iraqi leader] Saddam [Hussein's] **crimes**. /.../ Read, if you will, the humanitarian reports that enumerate the **horrors** [committed] in the Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo and Bahgram prisons. (I 222).*

In sum, bin Laden's metaphorical scheme of person attributed to America and the different segments of its population can be categorized in a somewhat perpetual hierarchy of the four basic conceptual metaphors listed above. Furthermore, the leader of al-Qaeda suggests a transformation is taking place on each level within this sequence, as fools become cowards or turn into criminals and criminals or cowards metamorphose in beasts. The oldest and most sedimented of the “beastly” metaphors is the expression “Great Satan”, coined by ayatollah Khomeini in the years preceding the Iranian revolution. In the text analyzed in this work, it appears twice, in the phrases “*allies of Satan*” and “*Satan's strategies*” (L 180). Another well-sedimented and frequent metaphorical expression in this group is the usual epithet for the American president, who is referred to on numerous occasions as “*the butcher of freedom in the world*” and “*the butcher in the White House*”, or the epithet for Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, labeled as “*the butcher of Vietnam*” (L 174).

4.2.1.2. Container

*This struggle is partly an internal regional struggle, but in all other respects it is a struggle between **global unbelief with the apostates under the leadership of America on one side**, and the Islamic *umma* and its brigades of mujahidin, on the other (L 250). “[The believer], continuing to be friends with believers and mujahidin /.../ must help them to feel that faith lies in one single tent, and that **the infidels are in another tent...** (L 202). For when it comes to American **intervention in internal affairs**, where do we start? (L 251). Saudi Arabia was the regime which provoked the youths by **opening up** the country for the Crusaders in violation of religion... (L 225). The White House leadership, which is so keen to **open up war fronts** for its various corporations, whether in field of arms, oil, or construction, has also contributed to these remarkable results for al-Qaeda (L 241). We only killed Americans in New York after they supported the Jews in Palestine and **invaded** the Arabian peninsula, and we only killed them in Somalia after they **invaded** it in Operation Restore Hope (L 236). Just as you **violate** our security, so we **violate** yours. Whoever **encroaches** upon the security of others /.../ like a crocodile **devouring** a child /.../ would be **prevented** from killing our women and children (L 238-39).*

Due to the binary oppositional nature of bin Laden's allegations and in accordance with the security nature of his statements, the CONTAINER conceptual scheme, dealing with inside, outside and boundary perceptions of entities and states, is very **sedimented** and **frequently** utilized in his discourse towards the United States, which is labeled as its primary foe. As apparent from the illustrative set of quotes, the respective metaphorical expressions range between various **oppositional distinctions (D)** between “*us*” and “*them*” (global unbelief versus the Islamic *umma* on opposite sides; faith versus the infidels in two separate tents); phrases with an expansive or intrusive nature, aiming **outwards** or positioning oneself on the **boundaries (B)** between the two entities, dealing with encroaching, penetrating or threatening the realm of “the Other” (intervention, to open up, to invade, to violate, to encroach, to devour); as well as locutions which imply an exclusive, **inward (I)** motion, sealing or defending one's own territory against the enemy (internal affairs, to prevent). Each category represents approximately one third of the empirical material; no sub-cluster clearly dominates, although we could say that due to the fact that “Otherness” of the enemy is essentially perpetuated in bin Laden's speeches, the binary oppositional sub-category is perhaps the most apparent. Among the specific metaphorical expressions organized in all three sub-categories are phrases such as the warning in which the leader of al-Qaeda tells the Americans that the current war and its outcome “*will be either ours or yours*” (I 224, D), unfavorably comparing “*our mujahidin brothers*” with the “*Pentagon propaganda*” (I 222, D) and assures Washington that “*American interference has ended once and for all*” (ibid., B). Similarly, according to bin Laden, George W. Bush hypocritically claims that “*Americans don't fight Muslims on their land and that they [the Muslims] don't fight us [the Americans] on their land*” (ibid., D), a phrase which

marks a well sedimented, dominant metaphor. The leader of al-Qaeda subsequently assures the American public that this statement of George Bush is false and warns that despite the recent failures of al-Qaeda to **break through** (B) security measures, the Americans will shortly feel the devastating effect of future suicide operations “*in their own homes*” (ibid., I).

Since discourse production has been described as a layered process, it implies that the metaphorical expressions extracted from the empirical material differ in frequency and certain words and phrases tend to be repetitive. In the case of phrases based on oppositional distinctions, it is the byword contradiction of “*us*” versus “*them*” and their derivations, such as “we” versus “you”; “our” versus “their” and so forth. As for the expansively, outward-oriented or boundary-based metaphorical expressions, the most habitual one contains the word “*occupation*” or its derivations in some form, either alone or complemented by other predications, such as “*occupier forces*”; “*Crusader occupation*” and other synonymic wordings, such as “*oppression*” or “*invasion*”. Finally, the third sub-category, joining together inward-oriented and exclusive phrases, is dominated by the expression “*conspiracy*”, its nominative specifications or derivations, most notably “*American conspiracies*” or “*chain of conspiracies*”.

4.2.1.3. Link

*All the suppressive measures adopted by the **American army and its agents** – there is no mentionable difference between **these crimes** and [former Iraqi leader] **Saddam [Hussein's] crimes** (L 222). In the light of a new **Sykes-Picot agreement, the Bush-Blair axis** /.../ claims that it wants to **annihilate terrorism**, but it is no longer a secret – even to the masses – that it really wants to **annihilate Islam** (L 187-88). **Current events** are merely an extension of the **struggle** against the **Crusader-American alliance** who **fight us everywhere, just like we fight them everywhere...** (L 274). *Oh Lord, abandon the **Zionist-American alliance** and their **supporters and collaborators**, oh Lord, destroy them...* (L 24). *In the midst of this corrupt, unjust war that the **infidels of America** are waging **with their agents and allies**, /.../ fight the **allies of Satan*** (L 180).*

Through the LINK scheme, bin Laden establishes metaphors based on subjectively based resemblance or parallel concerning the Americans. As captured in the initial group of quotes, he views one such likeness between the **character, actions** and ultimately the **fate** of the **American army and its allies** and **Saddam Hussein and his clan**: in his perception, both entities are suppressive, committed equally atrocious crimes and will thus inevitably be confronted with God's wrath and the anger of the *umma* for their convictions and actions. A similarly constructed parallel, although not quoted above, is drawn between Paul Bremer, the former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, who is labeled as the “*American ruler of Baghdad*”, and its Iraqi successor, the interim prime minister Iyad Alawi, who is depicted as a mere puppet following and blindly “*implementing American policies in Iraq*” (L 260). Aiming to demonstrate the ruthlessness of these people, institutions and the evil nature of their alliances, bin Laden presents yet another parallelism, pointing out to the likeness of the **present Bush-Blair axis** and the **historical Sykes-Picot agreement**. According to the leader of al-Qaeda, the hostile sentiment of this alliance towards Islam is manifested in their sinful and prejudiced **association of this religion with terrorism** and ultimately results in their conviction that its very existence must be eradicated. Yet another historical parallel is embodied in bin Laden's claim that the recent Muslim counteractions against the suppressive occupiers are a manifestation of the centuries old and persistent **conflict between the *umma* and the Crusaders**, and their **present campaign**, currently led by America. Through these implication of historical connections, bin Laden thereby points to the approved manner of dealing with such situations: just like the **Muslims of the Middle Ages** courageously fought their foreign Crusader enemies by force and expelled them from the Holy Land, thus must the *umma* of today demonstrate equal valiance and proceed in banishing the imperialist **American-led present-day Crusaders** from the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, Saudi Arabia; and elsewhere in the region, affirms bin Laden. This may be difficult, he

claims, because the identified and highly sedimented metaphorical expression of a **Crusader-American alliance** is **supported** by other subjects, such as **Zionists**, who are equally aligned to other **supporters** and **collaborators**, all of them labeled and singled out as a corrupt and unjust **coalition of infidels, agents and allies of Satan**. This particular last metaphorical expression constitutes one of the most sedimented ones in bin Laden's discourse, although it is by far not the most dominant and in fact used only on several occasions in the analyzed materials. In fact, a considerably large portion of metaphorical expressions joint under the LINK scheme are **neutral** in their sense (such as the phrases "*America's proxy*", "*agreement with America*", "*joint forces*" and so forth); although the majority is still marked by somewhat **negative** connotations and lexis, among them phrases such as "*alliances with the infidels*", "*Zionist-American alliance*", "*Crusader-American alliance*" and so on. The last two listed metaphorical expressions are by far the most dominant and sedimented ones among bin Laden's metaphorical phrases categorized under the LINK scheme. Apart from the dominantly present American-European ties and obligations, there are also numerous examples of American-Arab or other regional alliances expressed in descriptions and phrases such as "*educated slaves who will be loyal to America*" (L 253), used to describe states and public officers in the Middle East who maintain a strategic partnership with the United States in their foreign policy while implying their subservience; or commonly repeated sentences testifying the US-Saudi cooperation, viewed as blasphemous, such as the affirmation that "*prince Abdallah pledged support for America and encouraged it to invade Iraq*" (L 256), or a similar claim stipulating that "*this government in Riyadh has entered into a global alliance with Crusader unbelief, under the leadership of Bush / .../ helped the Americans and facilitated their occupation*" (L 254).

4.2.1.4. Path

*The occupation of Baghdad is only one practical **stage** in what the United States has already **thought through** and **planned**. The entire region **was targeted** in the **past**, is **being targeted now** and will **remain targeted** in the **future** /.../ the war will **continue** for many years and **target** 60 states /.../ to **change** the regions ideology, (L 214-215), **occupy** one of Islam's former capitals, **loot** Muslims' riches, and **install** a stooge government **to follow** its masters in Washington and Tel Aviv... (L 180). I say to the American people: we will **continue** to fight you /.../ until you **depart from your oppressive course, abandon your follies** and reign in your madmen (I 212). To some analysts and diplomats, it seems as if we and the White House are on the same team **shooting at the United States' own goal**, despite our different intentions (L 241-42). If you could avoid perpetrating these injustices, you Americans would be on the right path towards security you enjoyed before September 11 (L 240). [G. W. Bush is] like the **knight who was trying to protect** the people from the Sword of Malik, but **ended up begging someone to protect him** /.../ [the Iraqis] turned his **profits into losses, his happiness into misery** and now he is merely looking for a way [to go] **back home** (I 211).*

Upon viewing bin Laden's metaphorical expressions categorized in under the PATH scheme, it is evident that the leader of al-Qaeda considers the American ambitions and goals regarding the Middle East region as **perpetual** in its **aggressive** aims and perceptions of catching an "easy prey" (L 208), but vainly doomed to **deterioration** and **perdition, loss** and **shame**. Their quest for dominance is bound to fail to the prejudice of a rising and successful *umma*. This basic narrative is abandoned rarely. Even when acknowledging American strength or threat potential, bin Laden never forgets to stress that its nature is only momentary, illusory, fable or feeble, because the community of believers will inevitably triumph over them in the end. Here, America's primary transgression according to bin Laden, the occupation of Muslim lands, presently realized in Iraq, is depicted as a **lengthily-planned plot** with practical stages, which lead to utter and unquestionable worldwide American dominance with the help of its loyalist collaborators, who will be installed everywhere as components of the "Zionist-Crusader **chain of evil** /.../ to **set the stage for controlling and dominating the whole world**" (L 214) seeking "to enslave them [Muslims], occupy their lands and loot their wealth", as well as "to change the region's ideology" into hatred (L 214-15). Of course, the prospect of such an outcome is, according to bin Laden, highly threatening and potentially lethal to the existence of the *umma* and the whole world and in sharp contrast to the objectives which al-Qaeda has identified: establishing an independent Islamic state free of any interference or non-Muslim influence. Therefore, these supposed American goals, which, as the leader of al-Qaeda claims, are now largely **underway** and even partly completed, must be and are being foiled, efficiently and without delay. Hence his warning affirmation to the Americans that they will be confronted in their attempts and trajectories towards this aim until they **abandon** it and **embark on a path of atonement and reformation** of their goals. Due to the

counteractions and resistance adopted by the *mujahidin*, continues bin Laden, the situation is now beginning to **reverse**, taking on an ironic twist: upon choosing to proceed in the way of occupation and revived imperialism, the Americans have not only begun to “reap what they sowed”, but quite bluntly undermined their position to the point where the policies of their government and their convictions turned against them. At present, concludes bin Laden, the country is in a ridiculously bizarre position of a foolish, shortsighted gunner **shooting at the same goal with his enemy**, although their intentions and justifications are “*different*”, claims the leader of al-Qaeda and juxtaposes the righteous motivations of the *umma* to American exploitation and the “*course of these conspiracies*” which “*restored nothing*” (L 220). In accordance with this overall message, their president and commander-in-chief is depicted as a knight who, in attempt to protect everyone, **resulted totally helpless** and begging for help himself; a disoriented person **lured into misery and failure** because of his own pride and selfishness, desperately seeking to return to his homeland and restore its former state, which is now “*falling into military and economic disarray*”, having “*recorded a budget loss for the third year running*”, affirms bin Laden (L 210). Despite the fact that the head of al-Qaeda urges the Americans to repent, he subsequently warns the *umma* not to heed to these calls and **changes of course**, affirming that they are essentially **false** and pronounced “*under the pretext of achieving peace*” (L 231). In the light of these discursive maneuvers, the Americans are for most part prevented from actually proving and maintaining a righteous course, as any attempt to do so is preemptively classified as a fearfully hypocritical or dangerously shrewd tactical move, which testifies the binary oppositional nature of the good ways of *mujahid* Muslims and the evil ways of the American infidels, which bin Laden seeks to convey.

4.2.1.5. Force

*We can conclude that America is a **superpower**, with **enormous** military **strength** and **vast economic power**, but that all this is **built on foundations of straw**. /.../ The whole edifice will **totter** away... (L 194). Just read the history if you want – including the history of America, which has **ignited** dozens of wars throughout only six decades. This is because this was one of its most **pressing needs**. When the United States makes a sincere decision to **stop** wars in the world, it knows before anyone else that that day will mark the beginning of its **collapse** and the **disintegration** of its states (L 231).*

A similarly double-sided image of American power and dynamics is perpetuated also in the case of the last metaphorical scheme of FORCE, joining together phrases concerning dynamics between America and other entities; describing pressure, resistance, balance, polarity attraction and others. Indeed, admits bin Laden, America is an immensely strong country, referred to as a “**superpower**”, but again, as before, he claims yet once more that this might is only **illusory**, “*built on foundations of straw*” and thus will easily **succumb to pressure** and **totter away**. In bin Laden’s view, due to the irresistibly strong **impulse and affinity** of this nation to **wage wars habitually**, this tendency in of American policy **cannot be stalled**, as it is embedded in its very nature to battle out of essential necessity. Abandoning this crucial dynamic inevitably means making an artificial and self-destructive move which causes breakdown, disintegration and collapse; a state which America eventually cannot escape, anyway. Hence, as in the case of its PATH cluster, America’s FORCE scheme expressions are regarded as **authentic** and genuine only if they express **aggressive, negative** tendencies; whereas any other, alternative manifestations and **softer, positive** scenarios are not to be heeded or trusted, because they are initially **pretense**, warns the head of al-Qaeda. The majority of the metaphorical expressions classified under the FORCE scheme are therefore negative and, bin Laden ultimately makes the habitual juxtaposition based on binary oppositions, this time between the “*evil forces of materialism*” on one side and the triumphant “*forces of faith*”, which have won previous battles and “*neutralized*” the enemy (L 181), on the other. Although the American forces ruthlessly attempted to blow up, destroy, pour bombs down and attack their modestly occupied positions, the *mujahidin* were able to “*drag the enemy forces into a protracted, exhausting, close combat*”; “*resist*”, “*push them back*” and **defeat** America “*with all its supposed power*” (L 182-3), an act which is sure to be repeated in the future, concludes bin Laden warningly.

4.2.2. European allies

4.2.2.1. Person

*Our wounds have yet to heal from the /.../ Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between France and Britain which brought about the **dissection of the Islamic world into fragments** (L 187). The economy of all Arab countries is weaker than the economy of /.../ the lost al-Andalus. Spain is an **infidel** country, but its **economy** is stronger than ours because the ruler there is **accountable**. In our countries, there is no accountability or punishment, but only obedience to the rulers and prayers of long life for them. (L 227). As for your leaders and their followers, who persistently **ignore the real problem**, which is the occupation of Palestine, and indulge in **lies** and **deceit** about our rights to self-defense, they **have no self respect**. They show **contempt** for peoples' **blood and minds** through such **deceit**, but it only means that your blood will continue to be shed (L 234).*

In bin Laden's discourse, the metaphorical scheme of PERSON regarding the European countries allied with America are much **less numerous** than the ones concerning the United States. Due to this, the phrases found in the empirical material also display **lesser diversity** and we do not encounter explicit simile figures among them. Nevertheless, we still see a variable plenitude of expressions which describe different beliefs, values and feelings attributed to European countries, leaders and people in general, and can categorize those manifestations into the same sub-clusters that have been previously defined in the case of America. Indeed, European allies in bin Laden's discursive perceptions **similarly can and do act as BEASTS, CRIMINALS, FOOLS and COWARDS**. Yet, the proportional distribution of these traced sub-categories is different: the attributions to a BEAST are much less dominant to the prejudice of the three other categories, which are equally even in representation. Furthermore, in the case of The Old Continent, we can say that the extent of their BEASTLY or CRIMINAL nature is **directly proportionate to the extent of their alignment with its American partners** or eventually to their **participation in any other coalitions**. Naturally, the categorization also depends on the **degree** to which this alliance is **explicitly manifested** in the respective metaphorical expressions. Upon looking at the initial set of quotes above, we can see that that the European countries acted and act as BEASTS when following their private political aims. An example is given when two of them signed an agreement of partition of the Middle East region, which has *“brought about the dissection of the Islamic world into fragments”* ever since; and, as bin Laden affirms, the unfortunate aftermath of this decision continues to this day. The subsequent quotes bring about an interesting **dichotomy** concerning the perception of European states with regard to the conduct and notion of their heads of state. On one hand, the leader of al-Qaeda claims that the leader of Spain, *“the lost al-Andalus”*, is an **accountable** man and stipulates that this accountability positively

influences the **strength** and **potential** of Spanish **economy**, which is thereby favorably compared to the economies of current regimes in the Middle East, who are criticized for subservience and weakness. This remark could suggest that bin Laden does not necessarily view the European countries as FOOLS, because they undertake sensible and necessary steps to ensure that their economy flourishes. Nevertheless, I would say that the core of this message is intended not as a praise for European responsibility, but rather as a criticism of “*the apostate regimes*” in the region who have strayed from the path of Islam (L 183, 222). Therefore, based on other expressions characterizing the leaders of European nations allied with America, I am convinced to conclude that this phrase is a double-sided exception aiming to intrigue the European public while still condemning the idea of accountability before anyone else but God and his law. As discussed in previous sections in this chapter, I believe **bin Laden does not associate accountability with democracy** (to which he habitually refers to as “*the religion of ignorance*”; L 209). **but rather with subservience** to God's law and abiding to the Salafist ideal of the primary *umma*, governed by *sharia*, uncorrupted by other worldly influences. And as apparent from the set of quotes above, such a favorable depiction is certainly not attributed to European leaders and administrations, who are generally characterized as essentially **deceitful**, lacking-self respect and the desire to heed to settle the “*real problem*”, preferring to continue **wasting the lives and minds of their people for the sake of their posts and interests**. This critical perception of **notorious** and **liars** and **transgressors** fits rather the sub-cluster of CRIMINAL than a FOOL. Similarly as in the case of America and its metaphorical schemes of person, for bin Laden, it is primarily the people, the majority population, who are depicted as pertinent to this category, because they **insensibly abide** to the rules of their leaders and let them govern, meanwhile their “*blood continues to be shed*” due to their own **short-sightedness** and **ignorance**.

4.2.2.2. Container

*This is a letter to our **neighbors north of the Mediterranean**, incorporating a peace proposal in response to positive recent exchanges /.../ In response to the positive initiatives that have been reflected in recent events and opinion polls showing that **most people in Europe** want peace, I call upon just men, especially scholars, media and businessmen, to form a permanent commission to raise awareness **among Europeans** of the justice of our causes... /.../ **Whoever chooses war over peace** will find us ready for the fight. **Whoever chooses peace** can see that we have responded positively. We only killed Europeans after they **invaded** Afghanistan and Iraq... (L 234-36), the mujahidin have been able to **penetrate** time and time again all **security measures** adopted by the **oppressive alliance** (I 223).*

As in the case of expressions classified under the CONTAINER scheme attributed to the United States, the emphasis on binary oppositions and security in bin Laden's allegations and statements is equally evident in this category regarding the European allies. Similarly, from the illustrative set of allegations quoted above, we are able to divide the manifested metaphorical expressions into the same four sub-clusters as in the case of American CONTAINER schemes: various **oppositional distinctions (D)**, juxtaposing “us” and them” (**whoever chooses war over peace** versus **whoever chooses peace**); phrases with an expansive or intrusive nature, aiming **outwards** or positioning oneself on the **boundaries (B)** between the two entities, dealing with encroaching or threatening the realm of “the Other” (**to invade, to penetrate, oppressive, neighbors north of the Mediterranean**); as well as locutions which imply an exclusive, **inward (I)** motion, sealing or defending one's own territory against the enemy (**security measures**). Again, the categories are balanced, although boundary-based expressions and the tendencies to divide the category of European allies in general into segments and fractions (**most people in Europe; awareness among Europeans**) tend to be in slightly more apparent. After the metaphorical scheme of PERSON, the CONTAINER cluster is the most employed one in bin Laden's discourse towards the Europeans.

4.2.2.3. Link

*What happened on September 11 and March 11 are your goods returned to you /.../ Your description of us as terrorists and of our actions as terrorism necessarily means that your actions must be defined likewise. Our actions are but a reaction to yours – your destruction and murder of the people, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Palestine (L 234). The proof of this is the explosions you have seen in the most important capitals of the **European nations** that are **in this hostile coalition** (I 223).*

The LINK scheme and reasoning drawn here is simple and clear-cut and could quite well be summarized by two sayings: “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” and “what goes around, comes around”: If **you describe us as terrorists**, then **you too must be terrorists** because of your actions towards our countries, because of your atrocities, killings and transgressions, addresses bin Laden the Europeans warningly. He adds that all European nations must be prepared for punitive operations of the *mujahidin* targeted against them, and that these events have been and will be a mere a counteraction LINKED to the exploitative and unjustly shrewd behavior of these allied countries towards the regimes in the region, with whom they **collaborate**:

*Prince Talal bin Abd al-Aziz also stated publicly that his father had received money from the English, thereby affirming the facts and documents that prove that his father was a **collaborator** with the English (L 255).*

Of course, for the leader of al-Qaeda, such LINKS between Muslim countries and the *umma* and their European counterparts are sinful and blasphemous in their very essence because the economical support and incentives **go hand in hand** with political and social dominance and corrupt the rulers of the Middle Eastern countries, ultimately causing them to abandon the religion of God and *sharia* for democracy, “*the religion of ignorance*” (L 209). Therefore, such corrupt alliances must be condemned, avoided, halted and stopped at all costs, as all attempted LINKS between the Muslim *umma* and European infidels are integrally threatening, pretense and false. The message bin Laden seeks to convey is really a clash of civilizations in its purely negative sense, with **no** real space for **dialogue** or **bridge-building**.

4.2.2.4. Path

Returning to truth is better than continuing the lie (L 236). *I say that the West's occupation of our country is old yet new and that the confrontation and conflict between us and them started centuries ago. This confrontation and conflict will go on because the confrontation between right and falsehood will continue until Judgment Day* (L 217). *Prepare for repulsing the raid of the Romans, which started in Iraq and no one knows where it will end* (L 230).

Upon looking at bin Laden's metaphorical expressions regarding European allies of America categorized in under the PATH scheme, it is evident that despite his welcoming remarks of "positive developments" or "neighborhood" of the Middle East region and Europe; as well as calls to "return to the truth" instead of "continuing the lie", the leader of al-Qaeda considers the conflict between the *umma* and the West to be essentially good "for both peoples" despite its aggressive and threatening aims. Thus, any attempts for reconciliation are obsolete and sinful moves to halt a perpetual, lengthy struggle, which has begun centuries ago and has no certain end. This juxtaposed and confrontational war between right and wrong is doomed to carry on until Judgment day, when the *umma* will inevitably triumph, claims bin Laden. In his messages, the leader of al-Qaeda continually presents the prospect of an **infinite and unchangeable PATH towards hell for unbelievers on one side and heavenly glory for the mujahid Muslims on the other**, and he makes no exception in his expressions concerning the European countries, allies and leaders.

4.2.2.5. Force

*The **big powers** believe that the Gulf states are the key to controlling the whole world, due to the presence of largest oil reserves there (Lawrence 2005, 214). As to how to **resist** these enemy forces from outside, we must look back at the previous Crusader wars against our countries to learn lessons that will help us **confront** this **onslaught**, understand the most important causes of these **attacks** and learn how they were **repulsed** and **resisted** (L 217).*

Even in the last metaphorical scheme analyzed in this paper, the FORCE scheme, we are yet again confronted with the evergreen narrative of supposed and illusive power and potential that the “*big powers*” and “*so-called powers*” allegedly have (L 195, 231). Upon having established that these countries and their armies can be **fought**, **confronted**, **resisted** and ultimately **repulsed** in their **attacks** and **onslaught**, bin Laden encourages the *mujahidin* and the *umma* to learn their **lessons** from previous experiences of the Crusader wars that have been recorded and narrated as triumphant victories of the Muslim forces led by Saladin; as well as the early Islamic conquests under Prophet Muhammad and other *salafis* in the first generations of the *umma*, which, for bin Laden and al-Qaeda, represent the ideal specimen both on the state and personal levels. **Confrontation by force** and **with arms** is the only type of “*dialogue*” that the occupiers will listen to, affirms the leader of al-Qaeda and claims that the current “*robbers*” of Muslim lands will “*collapse*” in front of the “*battalions of faith*” and “*their shouts 'God is great'*” (L 217), just like their Persian, Tatar, Turk, Roman and Berber predecessors have done centuries earlier.

Conclusion

“The revelations from these texts serve as a wake-up call to an often naive and therapeutic West that believes enemies are to be understood rather than defeated and their threats explained away as empty rhetoric rather than braced for as the bitter truth.”

Victor Davis Hanson, in Ibrahim 2007, xxxii

“Self defense and punishing the oppressors in kind: is this shameful terrorism? Even if it is, we have no other option.”

Osama bin Laden, 2004, in Lawrence 2005, 240

After having thoroughly examined predicates and metaphors found in messages attributed to Osama bin Laden concerning the United States of America and its European allies after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, I conclude that their manifestations are largely driven by notions of incomprehensive and irreconcilably perpetual antagonism. These gloomy and hostile oppositions are in my understanding somewhat similar to the ones observed by the Czech author Karel Čapek in his celebrated essay “**Why I'm Not A Communist**” (1924), where he writes:

*“I believe to this day that there are certain moral and rational properties by which one human being recognizes another. Communism's method is a **broadly based attempt to achieve international misunderstanding; an attempt to shatter the human world to pieces that do not fit together and have nothing to say to each other.** Whatever is good for one side cannot and must not be good for the other side; as if people on both sides were not physiologically and morally identical. /.../ It is no firmness of conviction, but rather some **ritual prescription or, after all, a craft.**”*
(Čapek 1924, in Klíma 2002, 131).

In this thesis, I have attempted to analyze a discourse of an ideological figure who in my opinion sought to achieve the same goal through a similar method in the case of global Salafism-Jihadism. As the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, rooting from a Cold War experience and backlashes of colonialism reflected in modern Islamic and Islamist political thought as well as the Salafī tradition existing in his homeland, bin Laden cultivated and formulated a fundamentalist, radical and extremely hostile interpretation of this religion in which Muslims and their faith were exclusively juxtaposed to the rest of the whole world and Islam and its lexis was exploited for acts of terror motivated by anti-imperialist convictions. In bin Laden's black and white world, there was no place for dialogue (“*all there is between you and me is the piercing of kidneys and smiting of necks*”; Lawrence 2005, 185), and the whole nature of the conflict and the quest for an Islamic state based on Salafist principles “*that includes all Muslims under its authority, with His [Allah's] permission*” (202) was essentially a never-ending and highly grim task, promising eternal struggle *in terra* followed by glories of martyrdom and ultimately pleasures of the thereafter. Peace is not to be

achieved on this Earth, less with “the Other side”. In bin Laden's discourse, this term came to be largely associated with a nation which had just lost its former principal foe, the Soviet Union, a superpower which the leader of al-Qaeda was convinced to have defeated with the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan. Both the United States along with its allies and the Jihadists had previously been accustomed to the threatening, yet stable nature of the bipolar world and lost their primary and core enemy with its collapse. This ideological, political and strategical void was essentially prone to be filled on both sides. Hence bin Laden's unshaken and context-free belief that the subjectively perceived victory over the Soviets could be repeated a decade later with the other “intrusive” superpower (and its allies) which had previously aided them against the USSR and the concurrently drafted American doctrines regarding the Middle East which implied support of Israel, isolation of Iraq and a strengthened American military presence in the Gulf: these are the two parallel and mutually fostered processes of alienation manifested both in action and discursive strategies. After having thoroughly carried out the attempt of this thesis and performed a unilateral predicate and metaphorical analysis of such a discourse based on relational distinctions regarding two object spaces, the USA and its European allies, I conclude that the respective predicates and metaphors found in the empirical material are indeed primarily driven by alienation and juxtaposition of “the Other”, a tendency which is most manifested in two dominant metaphorical schemes of PERSON and CONTAINER, through which the United States of America and their European allies are conceptually depicted as beastly, criminal, foolish and cowardly entities situated on the strictly drawn boundaries which separate “us” from “them”. Both objects of discourse are projected as being in complete antagonism to Islam. As for the remaining conceptual schemes, in the case of the United States, this enmity is expressed predominantly through expressions joint under the FORCE scheme, whereas perceptions of its European allies are symptomatically dominated by the LINK scheme testifying their cooperation with the United States and further enhanced by a slight resentment over “a lost land” in the case of some of its territories on the side of the *umma*. Time has proven how powerful and disastrously threatening all these perceptions can be. The purpose of discourse analysis is to trace and characterize components and features of discourse which resonate within particular societies and audiences over time, determine which ideas are prone to prevail and which to transform. The highly sedimented and rigid nature of bin Laden's discourse serves as a sample illustration in this respect. Indeed, I am finishing this thesis at a time marked

by turbulent changes in the Middle East and the aftermath of the capture and death of bin Laden himself. Under such unprecedented circumstances, it may be a tempting prospect for many to label his thoughts and the appeal of al-Qaeda as obsolete; and I too would have liked to make that conclusion. Certainly, I believe that radical Islamism cannot be compared with Communism neither in terms of strength nor dangerousness, despite the subjectively viewed similarities initially pointed to in Čapek's quote. Unfortunately, I must admit that as a totalitarian ideology, it is far from being eradicated and bin Laden's discourse of anti-imperialist Salafism-Jihadism continues and will continue to inspire followers, in spite of its apocalyptic nature and the absence of social dimension. For some, he continues to be a hero who defended the faith of the *umma* and is thus perceived as incapable of committing the atrocities and murders which he had praised in his messages. Furthermore, the legacy of an ideologist who frequently criticized the long established and some of the recently toppled regimes in the Middle East as “apostate” and “corrupt”; opposed the idea of democracy, calling it the religion of ignorance and associated accountability rather with justice in accordance with God's law can be of appeal to some religious and zealot segments of Middle Eastern populations in their current revolutionary demands. Yet on the whole, I am inclined to believe that the current winds of change accompanied by a possible ideological void within the structure of al-Qaeda represent a possibility for a mutual and favorable change in discourse. Thus, I hope that many are aware of this opportunity and undertake constructive steps to do so, learning from the past discursive tenants and their tragical and lethal consequences, aiming to **“de-terrorize” Islam and Muslims and “de-imperialize” America and its allies in both word and deed.**

Bibliography

Theoretical Approaches

ABDUL-RAOF, Hussein (2006): *Arabic Rhetoric: A Pragmatic Analysis*. New York: Routledge

BEER, Francis; HARIMAN Robert (1996): "Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations." In *Post-realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by Francis Beer and Robert Hariman, 1-28. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

CHILTON, Paul (1996): *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common European Home*. New York: Peter Lang

DRULÁK, Petr (2006): "Motion, Container and Equilibrium: Metaphors in the Discourse about European Integration." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.12(4): 499-531.

FOUCAULT, Michel (1969): *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Routledge, 2007

HALLDÉN, Philip (2005): "What is Arab Islamic Rhetoric? Rethinking the history of Muslim oratory art and homiletics." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 37 (2005): 19-38.

MILLIKEN, Jennifer (1996): "Metaphors of prestige and reputation in American foreign policy and American realism." In *Post-realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by Francis Beer and Robert Hariman, 217-237. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

MILLIKEN, Jennifer (1999): "Intervention and identity: reconstructing the West in Korea." In *Cultures of insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger*, edited by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duval, 91-116. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

MILLIKEN, Jennifer (1999): "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5(2): 225-254.

WHORF, Benjamin Lee (1939): "The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language." In *Language, thought, and reality: selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*, edited by John B. Carroll, 1998, 134-159. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press

Primary Sources

IBRAHIM, Raymond, ed. (2007): *The Al-Qaeda Reader*. New York: Broadway Books

ARBERRY, Arthur J., trans. (1955, 1998): *The Koran interpreted*. New York, Oxford University Press

LAWRENCE, Bruce, ed. (2005): *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*. New York: Verso

Publications

ANTOUN, Richard T. (1989): *Muslim Preacher in the Modern World. A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

ASHOUR, Omar (2009): *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists*. New York: Routledge

- EHTESHAMI, Anoushiravan (2006): "The Middle East: Between ideology and geopolitics." In *The Bush doctrine and the war on terrorism: global responses, global consequences*, edited by Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, 105-119. London; New York: Routledge
- CRUICKSHANK, Paul; ALI, Mohannad Hage (2007): "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. Vol. 30(1): 1-14.
- ESPOSITO, John L. (1984): *Islam and Politics*. New York: Syracuse University Press
- ESPOSITO, John L. (2006): "Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam." In *The Roots of Terrorism*, edited by Louise Richardson, 145-157. New York: Routledge
- GUNARATNA, Rohan (2002): *Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror*. New York: Columbia University Press
- HEGGHAMMER, Thomas (2008): "Abdallah Azzam, the Imam of Jihad." In *Al-Qaeda in its own words*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh, 81-101. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- JUERGENSMEYER, Mark (2006): "Religion as a Cause of Terrorism." In *The Roots of Terrorism*, edited by Louise Richardson, 133-143. New York: Routledge.
- KEPEL, Gilles (1994): *The revenge of God: the resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the modern world*, translated by Alan Braley. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
- KEPEL, Gilles (2002): *Jihad: the trail of political Islam*, translated by Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- KEPEL, Gilles (2003): *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: the Prophet and the Pharaoh*, translated by Jon Rothschild. Berkeley: University of California Press
- KEPEL, Gilles (2004): *The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West*, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- KEPEL, Gilles (2005): *Du jihad à la fitna*. Paris: Bayard
- KEPEL, Gilles (2008): *Beyond terror and martyrdom: the future of the Middle East*, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- KEPEL, Gilles; MILELLI, Jean-Pierre (eds.) (2008): *Al Qaeda in its own words*, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- KLIMA, Ivan (2002): *Karel Čapek – Life and Work*. Translated by Norma Comrada. North Haven: Catbird Press
- LACROIX, Stéphane (2008): "Ayman al-Zawahiri, Veteran of Jihad" in *Al-Qaeda in its own words*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh, 147-170. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- LAWRENCE, Bruce (1989): *Defenders of God. The fundamentalist revolt against the modern age*. San Francisco: Harper & Row
- MARTIN, Richard C. (1987): "Striving in the Path of Allah: A Fundamentalist Interpretation of Jihad in Egypt." *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. 7(1): 5-19.

- MILELLI, Jean-Pierre (2008): "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Jihad in 'Mesopotamia'." In *Al-Qaeda in its own words*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh, 237-250. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- NIVA, Steve (1999): "Contested sovereignties and postcolonial insecurities in the Middle East." In *Cultures of insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger*, edited by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duval, 147-172. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
- NOONAN, Jeff (2010): "Fundamentalist foundations of terrorist practice: The political logic of life sacrifice." In *Discourses and practices of terrorism: interrogating terror*, edited by Bob Brecher, Mark Devenney and Aaron Winter, 97-117. New York: Routledge
- RIEDEL, Bruce O. (2008): *The search for al Qaeda: its leadership, ideology, and future*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press
- ROSHANDEL, Jalil; CHADHA, Sharon (2006): *Jihad and International Security*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- ROY, Olivier (1994): *The failure of political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- ROY, Olivier (2006): "Terrorism and Deculturation." In *The Roots of Terrorism*, edited by Louise Richardson, 159-169. New York: Routledge.
- SAGHI, Omar (2008): "Osama bin Laden, the Iconic Orator." In *Al-Qaeda in its own words*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh, 11-41. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- SAID, Edward (1978, 2003): *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books
- SARDAR, Ziauddin (1999): *Orientalism*. Philadelphia: Open University Press
- SINGH, Robert (2006): "The Bush Doctrine." In *The Bush doctrine and the war on terrorism: global responses, global consequences*, edited by Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, 12-31. London; New York: Routledge
- TORRES, Manuel R.; JORDÁN, Javier; HORSBURGH, Nicola (2006): "Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18(3): 399-421.
- VENKATRAMAN, Amritha (2007): "Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(3): 229-248.
- ZWIKAEEL, Ofer (2007): "Al Qaeda's Operations: Project Management Analysis." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30(3): 267-280.

List of Appendices

Appendix No. 1: Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan (1985), Sipa Press/Rex Features (Photograph)

Appendix No. 2: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Khost, Afghanistan (1998, published March 2004), Mazar Ali Khan/AP (Photograph)

Appendix No. 3: Poster of Osama bin Laden as a knight on a white horse, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (1999), P.K. Bangash/AP (Photograph)

Appendix No. 5: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, location unknown (released October 7, 2001), AP (Video still)

Appendix No. 6: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on al-Jazeera, Afghanistan (released September 10, 2003), AFP/Getty Images (Video still)

Appendix No. 7: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, Afghanistan (released September 10, 2003), AFP/Getty Images (Video still)

Appendix No. 8: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, location unknown (released October 29, 2004), AFP/Getty Images (Video still)

Appendix No. 9: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, date and location unidentified AFP/Getty Images (Video still)

Appendix No. 10: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Atlanta-Journal-Constitution (August 8, 2007), Mike-Luckovich (Cartoon)

Appendix No. 11: Osama bin Laden watching himself on television, Abbottabad, Pakistan (released May 8, 2010), AP (Video still)

Appendix No. 12: Pro-Taliban party rally in reaction to bin Laden's death, Quetta, Pakistan (May 3, 2011), AFP/Banaras Khan (Photograph)

Appendix No. 13: Afghan shopkeepers watch the announcement of bin Laden's death on television (May 3, 2011), AFP/Getty Images (Photograph)

Appendix No. 14: "Bin Laden's Death: Satan Comes To Take His Body", Al-Hayat (May 4, 2011), author unidentified (Cartoon)

Appendix No. 15: Predicate analysis: Total (Graph)

Appendix No. 16: Predicate analysis: USA (Graph)

Appendix No. 17: Predicate analysis: European allies (Graph)

Appendix No. 18: Predicate analysis: Shared (Graph)

Appendix No. 19: Metaphorical analysis: USA(Graph)


Appendix No. 20: Metaphorical analysis: European allies (Graph)

Appendices


Appendix No. 1: Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan (1985), Sipa Press/Rex Features (Photograph)



Appendix No. 2: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Khost, Afghanistan (1998, published March 2004), Mazar Ali Khan/AP (Photograph)



Appendix No. 3: Poster of Osama bin Laden as a knight on a white horse, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (1999), P.K. Bangash/AP (Photograph)




Appendix No. 5: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, location unknown (released October 7, 2001), AP (Video still)



Appendix No. 6: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on al-Jazeera, Afghanistan (released September 10, 2003), AFP/Getty Images (Video still)



Appendix No. 7: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, Afghanistan (released September 10, 2003), AFP/Getty Images (Video still)



Appendix No. 8: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, location unknown (released October 29, 2004), AFP/Getty Images (Video still)



Appendix No. 9: Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera, date and location unidentified AFP/Getty Images (Video still)



Appendix No. 10: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Atlanta-Journal-Constitution (August 8, 2007), Mike-Luckovich (Cartoon)



Appendix No. 11: Osama bin Laden watching himself on television, Abbottabad, Pakistan (released May 8, 2010), AP (Video still)



Appendix No. 12: Pro-Taliban party rally in reaction to bin Laden's death, Quetta, Pakistan (May 3, 2011), AFP/Banaras Khan (Photograph)




Appendix No. 13: Afghan shopkeepers watch the announcement of bin Laden's death on television (May 3, 2011), AFP/Getty Images (Photograph)




Appendix No. 14: “Bin Laden's Death: Satan Comes To Take His Body”, Al-Hayat (May 4, 2011), author unidentified (Cartoon)




Appendix No. 15: Predicate analysis: Total (Graph)




Appendix No. 16: Predicate analysis: USA (Graph)




Appendix No. 17: Predicate analysis: European allies (Graph)



Appendix No. 18: Predicate analysis: Shared (Graph)



Appendix No. 19: Metaphorical analysis: USA (Graph)



Appendix No. 20: Metaphorical analysis: European allies (Graph)

