

Charles University

Faculty of Arts

Centre for Ibero-American Studies

History/Ibero-American Studies

Dissertation

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Czechoslovak-Spanish relations (1918-1977)

Československo-španielske vzťahy (1918-1977)

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2022

Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor prof. Josef Opatrný for his help and patience. My home institution during the last eight years has been the Centre for Ibero-American Studies at Charles University and I am hugely indebted to the academic staff there. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues – historians, for their invaluable advice, namely to Jan Koura, Jakub Mazanec and Eric Burton. Last but not least, I would also like to thank my family for their support and never-ending patience.

I hereby declare that I have written this dissertation independently, using only the mentioned and duly cited sources and literature, and that the work has not been used in another university study programme or to obtain the same or another academic title.

In Innsbruck on 30.7.2022

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Abstract

The dissertation focuses on Czechoslovak-Spanish relations between 1918-1977. The main focus of the thesis is the research of the Spanish communist exile in post-war Czechoslovakia and the Slovak and Czech anti-communist exile in Francoist Spain, using new methodological approaches and concepts (everyday resistance, (im)mobility). Through the case studies focusing on the everyday life of “heterodox” Spanish exiles, the thesis also addresses the question of the dichotomy between the Spanish collectives in Ústí nad Labem and Prague. The research is also oriented towards the question of the development of economic relations between the people’s democratic Czechoslovakia and Franco’s Spain, as well as the subsequent process of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, with an aim to contextualise the post-war Czechoslovak-Spanish relations within the reality of the Cold War. Last but not least, the thesis analyses the relations between both the individual emigrants (the leaders of the exile and its “rank and file” members) and between the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) and the Communist Party of Spain (PCE).

Keywords: Czechoslovakia; Spain; Exile; Communist Party; Cold War; everyday resistance; (im)mobility

Abstrakt

Dizertačná práca sa zameriava na problematiku československo-španielskych vzťahov v období medzi rokmi 1918-1977. Hlavným ťažiskom práce je výskum španielskeho komunistického exilu v povojnovej ČSR a slovenského a českého antikomunistického exilu vo frankistickom Španielsku, s využitím nových metodologických prístupov a konceptov (každodenná rezistencia, (i)mobilita). Prostredníctvom prípadových štúdií zameraných na každodennosť „heterodoxných“ španielskych exulantov, sa práca venuje tiež otázke dichotómie medzi španielskymi kolektívami v Ústí nad Labem a Prahe. Bádanie je taktiež orientované na otázku rozvoja hospodárskych stykov medzi ľudovo-demokratickým Československom a Francovým Španielskom, ako aj následný proces znovunadviazania diplomatických stykov medzi oboma krajinami, pričom si dizertačná práca kladie za cieľ kontextualizáciu povojnových československo-španielskych vzťahov do reality studenej vojny. V neposlednom rade práca analyzuje vzťahy či už medzi jednotlivými emigrantami (vedúcimi predstaviteľmi exilu a jeho „radovými“ členmi), ako aj medzi Komunistickou stranou Československa (KSČ) a Komunistickou stranou Španielska (PCE).

Kľúčové slová: Československo; Španielsko; Exil; komunistická strana; studená vojna; každodenná rezistencia; (i)mobilita

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List of abbreviations

- ABS – Archiv bezpečnostních složek (Security Services Archive)
- AČNB – Archiv ČNB (Archive of the Czech National Bank)
- AGA – Archivo General de la Administración (The General Administration Archives)
- AMZV – Archiv MZV (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic)
- APCE – Archivo del PCE (Archive of the PCE)
- CMSA – Colegio Mayor Santiago Apóstol (Santiago Apostol College)
- CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- ČKD – Českomoravská-Kolben-Daněk
- ČOK – Československá obchodní komora (Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce)
- ČSČK – Československý červený kříž (Czechoslovak Red Cross)
- IEME – Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera (Spanish Institute of Foreign Currency)
- IUS – International Union of Students
- KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)
- MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- MFT – Ministry of Foreign Trade
- MOI – Ministry of Interior
- MOÚV KSČ – Mezinárodní oddělení ÚV KSČ (International Department of the CC CPCz)
- NA – Národní archiv Praha (National Archive Prague)
- PCE – Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain)
- PZO – Podnik zahraničního obchodu (Foreign trade enterprise)
- RNE – Radio Nacional de España (National Radio of Spain)
- SBČS – Státní banka československá (State Bank of Czechoslovakia)
- SCC – Socialist camp countries
- SNA – Slovenský národný archív (Slovak National Archive)
- SNB – Sbor národní bezpečnosti (National Security Corps)
- SPDŠ – Společnost přátel demokratického Španělska (Society of Friends of Democratic Spain)
- StB – Státní bezpečnost (State Security)
- STZ – Severočeské tukové závody (North Bohemian Fat Works)
- ÚRO – Ústřední rada odborů (Central Council of Trade Unions)
- WPC – World Peace Council

1. Introduction

Although June 2019 marked the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Czechoslovakia (9 June 1919), there are still many aspects of the mutual contacts in the 20th century that can be considered under-researched. On one hand, Czechoslovak-Spanish relations between 1918-1977 are undeniably an attractive topic, not only for historians but also for the general public as the number of the below mentioned publications dedicated to the relationship between the two countries proves. Nevertheless, instead of widely known topics such as the Spanish Civil War, Czechoslovak International Volunteers and Czech translations of Spanish authors, the present dissertation focuses exactly on two of these understudied issues (Slovak and Czech anti-communist and Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia; economic relations between Prague and Madrid after WWII), whose entanglement it presents within the context of the Cold War.

1.1 The objectives and contributions of the thesis

This dissertation is, in a sense, a continuation and also a broadening of the MA thesis entitled “The Spanish Civil War and Slovakia (1936–1939),” and naturally a result of the PhD research over the last five years. During the preliminary archival research, carried out back in 2017, it was the relations between the two countries during the Cold War where the highest number of unexploited perspectives for the future research were found, as well as a surprising absence of new theoretical-methodological approaches that were still not being applied. Thus, we decided that research focused mainly on the post-war Czechoslovak-Spanish relations with the application of the transdisciplinary methodology, overreaching the traditional unilateral view through the lenses of international relations, could offer a unique and innovative perspective and thus reinterpret Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the 20th century. Therefore, the objective of this work is, through a new methodological approach and a special focus on the interrelationship between (im)mobility, resistance, power and space, to present the Spanish communist exile, as well as relations between Prague and Madrid, in a new light. Another aim of the present work is to contextualise Czechoslovak-Spanish contacts within the Cold War reality, in order to serve as a new referential point for the investigation of relations between the East and the West.

Moreover, the use of concepts/paradigms of (im)mobilities and (everyday) resistance is a prerequisite for the interdisciplinarity of the present work – mobilities are mostly studied by sociologists and geographers, while everyday resistance is the subject of research not only in

subaltern studies but lately also in resistance studies. Furthermore, these concepts/paradigms are intertwined with the analysis of power relations and the study of the functioning of power. Thus, this dissertation overlaps not only various disciplines but also several themes: exile, (im)mobilities, resistance, economic relations, power structures – relevant not only within historiography but also in other social sciences. In a sense, the situation in which Czechoslovak-Spanish relations ended after the Second World War (with foundations in the interwar period and during WWII) was rather unique and up until now unexplored in detail. It is the research of relations between two smaller states – an Eastern European country (Czechoslovakia) and a Southwestern European dictatorship (Francoist Spain) – through the lenses of new tendencies and approaches in the Cold War historiography, where another one of the objectives, as well as the contributions of the present thesis lie.

1.2 Overview of the current state of research

Considering the above stated, it seems clear that relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain in the 20th century offer many possible subjects of study. At the same time, the issue of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations between the years 1918-1977 is hardly possible to be analysed in its entirety, despite its undoubted attractiveness for researchers across various disciplines. The main reasons for this are the complexity of the issue, the quantity and availability of archival documents, as well as the time range of the topic. Although it is true that several Czech, Slovak, and Spanish authors have already investigated this subject, their research has been mainly focused on the interwar period and specifically on the Spanish Civil War and the Czechoslovak volunteers,¹ or the diplomatic relations and cultural contacts between these

¹ Hana BORTLOVÁ, “Los españolotes checoslovacos – intento de reconstrucción de algunos denominadores comunes de sus vidas”, in: Josef Opatrný (ed.), *Las relaciones checo-españolas* (=Ibero-Americana Pragensia, Supplementum 20), Praga 2007, pp. 253-270; Idem, “La participación interbrigadista checoslovaca en la guerra de España vista por los protagonistas y los historiadores checos a través del tiempo”, in: Josef Opatrný (ed.), *Las relaciones checo-españolas: viajeros y testimonios* (=Ibero-Americana Pragensia, Supplementum 22), Praga 2009, pp. 165-173; Jaroslav BOUČEK, “Čs. interbrigadisté jako zdroj politických elit po roce 1945”, in: Ivana Koutská (ed.), *Politické elity v Československu 1918-1948. Sborník* (=Sešity Ústavu pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, sv. 20), Praha 1994, pp. 147-180; Idem, “La ayuda inestimable: médicos y sanitarios checoslovacos en las Brigadas”, in: Manuel Requena Gallego – Matilde Eiroa (eds.), *Al lado del gobierno republicano: los brigadistas de Europa del Este en la guerra de España*, Cuenca 2009, pp. 140-158; Vladimír NÁLEVKA, “Los voluntarios checoslovacos: su contribución y su perfil político”, in: REQUENA GALLEGO – EIROA (eds.), *Al lado*, pp. 135-139; Idem, “Las relaciones checoslovaco-españolas durante los años de la guerra civil”, in: OPATRNÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 245-248; Jiří NEDVĚD, *Českoslovenští dobrovolníci, mezinárodní brigády a občanská válka ve Španělsku v letech 1936 – 1939* (MA thesis), Praha 2008; Josef OPATRNÝ, “Španělsko, občanská válka a atlantický svět”, in: Zdenko Maršálek – Emil Voráček et al., *Interbrigadisté, Československo a španělská občanská válka. Neznámé kapitoly z historie československé účasti v občanské válce ve Španělsku 1936-1939*, Praha 2017, pp. 10-33; Maroš TIMKO, “Los voluntarios checoslovacos en el bando sublevado durante la Guerra Civil en España” in: Josef Opatrný (ed.), *Checoslovaquia, Europa Central y América Latina: el periodo de entreguerras* (=Ibero-Americana Pragensia, Supplementum 51), Praga 2019, pp. 93-108.

countries during the period of the First and the Second Czechoslovak Republics.² In this respect, as the most consistent and encompassing work dedicated to Czechoslovak-Spanish relations during the interwar period could be considered the dissertation of Luis Montilla Amador “Las relaciones entre España y Checoslovaquia en la etapa de entreguerras (1919-1936)” from 2020, in which this Spanish historian worked with the major part of the archival materials accessible in Czech and Spanish archives.³

On the other hand, there is less interest among researchers in the question of (Czecho)Slovak-Spanish relations during WWII.⁴ Additionally, post-war relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain are still a subject of investigation standing on the periphery of scientific interest – the Spanish historian Matilde Eiroa is most probably the only researcher, who has dealt with this topic in a systematic and long-term manner.⁵ In her writings, this author has mainly focused on the question of exile, gradually abandoning the descriptive approach while attempting to analyse specific aspects of mutual relations (communication media, exiles’ publishing activities); however, in her works, Eiroa understands the issue of Czechoslovak-Spanish contacts as an integral part of relations between the Eastern Bloc and Francoist Spain – this holistic approach to Eastern Europe, even though undoubtedly thought-provoking and in its essence historically correct, does not pay enough attention to the uniqueness of relations

² Marina CASANOVA, *La diplomacia española durante la guerra civil*, Madrid 1996; Matilde EIROA, “La embajada en Praga y el servicio de información de Luis Jiménez de Asúa”, in: Ángel Viñas (ed.), *Al servicio de la República: diplomáticos y guerra civil*, Madrid 2010, pp. 207-240; Vladimír NÁLEVKA, “Československo-španělské vztahy v letech občanské války 1936-1945“, *Dvacáté století*, 2004, pp. 85-112; Jiří NOVOTNÝ – Jiří SOUŠA, “Acerca de los contactos económicos y financieros de los bancos checoslovacos con la España de entreguerras”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 231-243; Josef OPATRŇÝ, “La imagen de España entre los viajeros checoslovacos de entreguerras. No solamente Karel Čapek”, in: Idem (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 219-230; Idem, “España en “las postales” de los viajeros checoslovacos de entreguerras”, in: Idem (ed.), *Las relaciones checo-españolas: viajeros*, pp. 133-147; Peter SZÁRAZ, “Činnosť španielskeho vyslanectva v Prahe pod vedením Luisa Jiméneza de Asúa (1936-1938)”, in: Idem (ed.), *Španielsko a stredná Európa: minulosť a prítomnosť vzájomných vzťahov*, Bratislava 2004, pp. 64-72; Idem, “La crisis checoslovaca en los informes de los diplomáticos españoles y del Servicio de Información republicano”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones checo-españolas: viajeros*, pp. 175-182; Pavel ŠTĚPÁNEK, “Artistas checos viajeros a España, 1920-1935”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones checo-españolas: viajeros*, pp. 149-163.

³ Luis MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones entre España y Checoslovaquia en la etapa de entreguerras (1919-1936)* (PhD Dissertation), Madrid 2020.

⁴ Matilde EIROA, *Las relaciones de Franco con Europa Centro-Oriental (1939-1955)*, Barcelona 2001; Idem, “España, refugio para los aliados del Eje y destino de anticomunistas (1939-1956)”, *Ayer* 67, 2007, pp. 21-48; Idem, “Refugiados extranjeros en España: el campo de concentración de Miranda de Ebro“, *Ayer* 57, 2005, pp. 125-152; Peter SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta k slovensko-španielskej obchodnej dohode 1943“, in: Idem (ed.), *Španielsko*, pp. 79-90; Idem, “Relaciones eslovaco-españolas en los años 1939-1945”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 271-285; Filip VURM, “Las relaciones hispano-checoslovacas 1939-1946“, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 287-292.

⁵ Matilde EIROA, “Las relaciones de Checoslovaquia y España tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial en el contexto de las relaciones de España con la Europa oriental”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 307-319; Idem, “Studená vojna a vnútroeurópske presuny medzi Pyrenejským poloostrovom a Železnou oponou”, in: SZÁRAZ (ed.), *Španielsko*, pp. 91-99.

between Czechoslovakia and Spain, and often overlooks intriguing singularities which might enable us to see the bigger picture of the Cold War differently.

Regarding the issue of exiles from Eastern European countries in Spain, studies from both Spanish authors,⁶ as well as scholars from the former Eastern Bloc countries,⁷ dealing with the question of the anti-communist, fascist or nationalist exiles in Francoist Spain, is still limited. However, it is once again Matilde Eiroa who has probably most contributed to the development of investigation also on the question of Slovak and Czech post-war exile in Francoist Spain.⁸ The Slovak and Czech emigration in Franco's Spain have also been researched by mostly Slovak, nationalistically oriented or exile historians – however, in this case, a critical and objective view of the activities of Slovak and Czech exiles is (especially in the Slovak case), often absent.⁹ Still, on the topic of Slovak and Czech anti-communist emigration in Spain, there are several primary sources that have been rarely used by historians,

⁶ Pablo DEL HIERRO, “The Neofascist Network and Madrid, 1945-1953: From City of Refuge to Transnational Hub and Centre of Operations”, *Contemporary European History*, 2021, pp. 1-24; José M. FARALDO, “Dreams of a Better Past: Central European Exiles in Franco's Spain and the Projects of the Interwar Period”, in: Carolina Rodríguez-López – José M. Faraldo (eds.), *Reconsidering a Lost Intellectual Project. Exiles' Reflections on Cultural Differences*, London 2012, pp. 89-113; Idem, “Patronizing anti-communism. Polish émigrés in Franco's Spain (1939-1969)”, in: Andrew Chandler – Katarzyna Stokłosa – Jutta Vinzent (eds.), *Exile and Patronage: Cross-cultural Negotiations Beyond the Third Reich*, Berlin 2006, pp. 189-197.

⁷ Mihaela ALBU, “Romanian Intellectual Elites in Exile. Painful Experiences and Multifaceted Actions”, in: RODRÍGUEZ-LÓPEZ – FARALDO (eds.), *Reconsidering*, pp. 115-135; Gregorz BAK, “Civilización y cultura. Aproximación a una bibliografía de Józef Lobodowski”, *Eslavística Complutense* 6, 2006, pp. 229-242; Dragomir DRAGANOV, “Las relaciones búlgaro-españolas en los fondos de la Dirección General de los archivos búlgaros (1939-1989)”, *Ayer* 67, 2007, pp. 119-135; Wolodymyr JARYMOWYCZ – Alexander BILYK – Mykola WOLYNSKYJ, *Breve historia de la organización estudiantil y de la colonia ucraniana en España, 1946-1996*, Madrid, Philadelphia 1997; Cristina PETRESCU, “Eastern Europe, Central Europe or Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Central European Dissent and Romanian 'Resistance through Culture'”, in: José M. Faraldo – Paulina Gulińska-Jurgiel – Christian Domnitz (eds.), *Europe in the Eastern Bloc. Imaginations and Discourses (1945-1991)*, Köln 2008, pp. 231-249; Zoltán A. RÓNAI, “Königlich-Ungarische Gesandtschaft, Madrid, 1949-1969. Ferenc von Marosys Aufzeichnungen”, *Ungarn-Jahrbuch* 20, 1992, pp. 147-161.

⁸ Matilde EIROA, “Pax Romana y los estudiantes católicos del Este de Europa. Solidaridad y perspectivas de futuro”, in: Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica. “Pax Romana” en la política europea de posguerra*, Alicante 2005, pp. 257-301; Idem, “From The Iron Curtain to Franco's Spain: Right-Wing Central Europeans in Exile”, *Central Europe* 1, 2018, pp. 1-16; Idem, “Una mirada desde España: mensajes y medios de comunicación de los refugiados de Europa del Este”, *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 2, 2011, pp. 479-497.

⁹ Zdeněk BENEŠ – Andrej STANKOVIČ – Vladimír BORECKÝ, et al., *Na ztracené vartě Západu: antologie české nesocialistické publicistiky z let 1945-1948*, Praha 2000; Beáta KATREBOVÁ-BLEHOVÁ, “Ako a čím žilo slovenské katolícke študentstvo v minulosti? Časť III.: Účinkovanie Združenia slovenských katolíckych študentov v zahraničí v Španielsku v 50. rokoch“ [on-line], 2021, www.christianitas.sk, <<https://www.christianitas.sk/ako-a-cim-zilo-slovenske-katolicke-studentstvo-v-minulosti-cast-iii-ucinkovanie-zdruzenia-slovenskych-katolicckych-studentov-v-zahranici-v-spanielsku-v-50-rokoch/>>; Juraj CHOVAN-REHÁK – Genovéva GRÁCOVÁ – Peter MARUNIAK (eds.), *Slovenský povojnový exil: zborník materiálov zo seminára Dejiny slovenského exilu po roku 1945 v Matici slovenskej v Martine 27.-28. júna 1996*, Martin 1998; Juraj CHOVAN-REHÁK (ed.), *Dr. Jozef Cieker. Seminár pri príležitosti nedožitých 90. narodenín Jozefa Ciekra v Tvrdošine 20. júna 1997*, Martin 2000; Emil VONTORČÍK, *Za krajinami do Madridu alebo Vojna o Španielsko: Výbor cestopisných a historických esejí*, Nitra 2013.

such as the memoirs and reflections of Slovak exiles living in Francoist Spain,¹⁰ as well as a number of studies and newspaper articles by leading representatives of Slovak and Czech exile published during their lives in Spain.¹¹ Probably the only comparative research on the Slovak and Czech exile in Francoist Spain, based on the above-mentioned primary sources, is a study by the author of the present dissertation.¹²

Therefore, it could be argued that several aspects within the relations between Prague and Madrid, especially during the period after the end of WWII and the subsequent Cold War, have not been comprehensively investigated. Despite the abundance of available archival materials, Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations during the years 1945-1977 fall into this category of under-researched topics – the only published study, based mainly on archival documents from the Archive of the Czech National Bank, was published by Helena Konrádová.¹³ To this day, the process of the re-establishment of Czechoslovak diplomatic relations with (post)Francoist Spain also remains an almost unexplored question, except for the MA thesis by Filip Vurm.¹⁴ The number of publications dedicated to Czechoslovak or Spanish (economic) foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century is, of course, very extensive; however, studies devoted especially to contacts between Francoist Spain and Eastern European countries during the post-war era (e.g., the issue of the reestablishment of mutual relations) are

¹⁰ Karol BELÁK, *Madrid: Zastávka a križovatka slovenského študenta (1951-1960)*, Nitra 1999; Boris GAŠPAR, *Z ostravských baní do austrálskeho veľkomesta*, Martin 2017; František CHAJMA, “Slovenský post v Madride“, in: CHOVAN-REHÁK – GRÁCOVÁ – MARUNIAK (eds.), *Slovenský*, pp. 143-147; Jozef M. KOLMAJER, “Vznik a poslanie Združenia slovenských katolíckych študentov v zahraničí“, in: CHOVAN-REHÁK – GRÁCOVÁ – MARUNIAK (eds.), *Slovenský*, pp. 279-294; Idem, “Slovenské vysielanie štátneho rozhlasu Radio Nacional de España“. in: CHOVAN-REHÁK – GRÁCOVÁ – MARUNIAK (eds.), *Slovenský*, pp. 352-356; Viliam P. MIHALOVIČ, *Oživené spomienky*, Bratislava 2003; Jozef A. MIKUŠ, *Pamäti slovenského diplomata*, Martin 1998.

¹¹ Such as for example the works of Jozef Cieker, Štefan Glejdura or Bohdan Chudoba, cited in the section 3.2.2 “Slovak and Czech(oslovak) exiles in Franco’s Spain. Organisations, contacts, activities and conflicts”.

¹² Maroš TIMKO, “De Gottwald a Franco: El exilio checo y eslovaco en la España franquista”, *Acta Hispanica* 25, 2020, pp. 153-167.

¹³ Helena KONRÁDOVÁ, “Relaciones entre España y Checoslovaquia. El comercio en los años cincuenta”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones*, pp. 293-305.

¹⁴ Filip VURM, *Československo-španělské vztahy v letech 1945 – 1975* (MA thesis), Praha 2007.

relatively scarce.¹⁵ More investigated is, in this sense, the question of relations between the Eastern Bloc and the Spanish Republican Government in exile.¹⁶

On one hand, it should be noted that research on the question of the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia (as well as in other Eastern European countries) has been enhanced during the last two decades – in the Czechoslovak case, mainly thanks to Czech and Slovak historians and journalists.¹⁷ Overall, the biggest contribution to this topic was the monograph of Matilde Eiroa “Españoles tras el Telón de Acero. El exilio republicano y comunista en la Europa socialista”¹⁸ and the dissertation by the Hungarian scholar Szilvia Pethő “El exilio de comunistas españoles en los países socialistas de Europa centro-oriental (1946-1955)”.¹⁹ In their works, both authors focus on the Spanish communist exile also in other Eastern European countries – the literature on this topic is becoming broader over the last two decades.²⁰ In addition to available (and ample) archival materials, both Eiroa and Pethő used the memories of second- and third-generation Spanish exiles regarding their (and their ancestors’) lives in socialist countries in their works. However, the studies by these two authors contain some

¹⁵ José M. FARALDO, “The Story of Laura. Eastern Bloc Surveillance of Spain in the Late Cold War (1967-1990)”, *Cold War History* 1, 2021, pp. 1-18; Iván HARSÁNYI, “1973, año clave en las relaciones diplomáticas hispano-húngaras”, *Ayer* 67, 2007, pp. 137-157; Lourdes MIRÓ LIAÑO – María Dolores FERRERO BLANCO, “Motivaciones y dificultades en la evolución de las relaciones económico-comerciales hispano-polacas (1950-1970)”, *Ayer* 67, 2007, pp. 81-118; Ricardo MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA – Guillermo PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, “Bajo la influencia de Mercurio: España y la Europa del Este en los últimos años del franquismo”, *Historia del presente* 6, 2005, pp. 43-59; Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, “Spain’s Foreign Policy in the Years 1945-1975”, in: Małgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska – José Luis Orella Martínez (eds.), *Poland and Spain in Contemporary World*, Madrid 2014, pp. 45-67; Maroš TIMKO, “Moc peněz najednou pro ty španělské 'stručňáky'. Hospodárske styky medzi Československom a Španielskom v priebehu studenej vojny”, in: *Vita trans historiam. Zborník z vedeckej doktorandskej konferencie v Nitre 13. a 14. septembra 2021*, 2022 (in print).

¹⁶ Matilde EIROA, “Republicanos en el Centro-Este de Europa: los intentos de normalización institucional”, in: Ángeles Egido León – Matilde Eiroa (eds.), *Los grandes olvidados: los republicanos de izquierda en el exilio*, Madrid 2004, pp. 301-322; Jan Stanisław CIECHANOWSKI, “Las relaciones entre la Polonia comunista y la República española en el exilio. Razones políticas de la misión de Manuel Sánchez Arcas en Varsovia (1946-1950)”, *Ayer* 67, 2007, pp. 49-79; Filip VURM, “La misión diplomática de la República española en Praga (1946-1949)”, in: OPATRŇÝ (ed.), *Las relaciones checo-españolas: viajeros*, pp. 183-194.

¹⁷ Vladimír NÁLEVKA, “Partyzánská válka ve Španělsku”, in: *Pocta profesoru Janu Kuklíkovi*, Praha 2000, pp. 135-141; Idem, “Španělé v poválečném Československu”, *Dvacáté století*, 2005, pp. 77-95; Maroš TIMKO, “‘Con la maleta hecha’. La realidad socialista checoslovaca vista por los exiliados españoles”, in: Mario Martín Gijón – Chiara Francesca Pepe – José Ramón López García (eds.), *Destierros y destiempos: Una revisión del exilio republicano español*, Berlin 2021, pp. 139-152; Karel VRÁNA, “Česká španělská vesnice” [on-line], *Týden* 3, 2006, [www.tyden.cz, <https://www.tyden.cz/tema/ceska-spanelska-vesnice_61.html>](https://www.tyden.cz/tema/ceska-spanelska-vesnice_61.html).

¹⁸ Matilde EIROA, *Españoles tras el Telón de Acero. El exilio republicano y comunista en la Europa socialista*, Madrid 2018. See also Idem, “Sobrevivir en el socialismo. Organización y medios de comunicación de los exiliados comunistas en las democracias populares”, *Historia Social* 69, 2011, pp. 71-90.

¹⁹ Szilvia PETHŐ, *El exilio de comunistas españoles en los países socialistas de Europa centro-oriental (1946-1955)* (PhD Dissertation), Szeged 2008.

²⁰ José M. FARALDO, “Entangled Eurocommunism: Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party and the Eastern Bloc during the Spanish Transition to Democracy, 1968-1982”, *Contemporary European History* 4, 2017, pp. 647-668; Enrique LÍSTER LÓPEZ, “Vorgeschichte und Voraussetzungen der Ansiedlung der spanischen kommunistischen Emigranten in Osteuropa”, *Totalitarismus und Demokratie* 2, 2005, pp. 289-316; Alicia ALTED VIGIL, “El exilio español en la Unión Soviética”, *Ayer* 47, 2002, pp. 129-154.

methodical and analytical defects: apart from not working with all of the available archival materials (e.g., documents from the Security Services Archive in Prague), their interpretations of Eastern European countries as a part of a monolithic Soviet Bloc (in contrast with Francoist Spain) could be also contested, despite the fact that both researchers acknowledge the uniqueness of Prague's position within the Spanish communist exile. Furthermore, in the case of Eiroa, a lack of interest in the question of the dichotomy between the Spanish collectives in Prague and Ústí nad Labem is unfortunately also present. Lastly, another, until now not fully researched category of primary sources and information about the lives of Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia are the memories of former Spanish exiles, whether the leaders of the party,²¹ or those who could be designated as “rank-and-file” émigrés.²² An additional, interesting and helpful source of information is the documentary by Diego Fandos “Dos tonalidades diferentes de rojo” (2002).²³

Within the study of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations and Spanish communist and Czech and Slovak anti-communist exile in the respective countries, the methodological approach with a concrete focus on (im)mobilities of these exiles, either over the Iron Curtain or within and outside of Czechoslovakia/Spain has been up until now missing – though scholars have already analysed topics such as travel during (Czechoslovak) socialism and cross-border contacts through the East-West division,²⁴ or focused on Prague as “the communist Geneva”²⁵ – the

²¹ Nevertheless, many of them mention their stay in Prague only marginally, see: Santiago ÁLVAREZ, *Memorias V. La larga marcha de una lucha sin cuartel (1954-1972)*, A Coruña 1994; Antonio CORDÓN, *Trayectoria: Recuerdos de un artillero*, Sevilla 2008; Enrique LÍSTER FORJÁN, *Así destruyó Carrillo el P.C.E.*, Barcelona 1983; Jorge SEMPRÚN, *Autobiografía de Federico Sánchez*, Barcelona 1997.

²² Pedro GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias de un niño de la guerra: Desde Praga, memorias, apuntes y reflexiones de un niño de la guerra civil española de 87 años*, Almería 2019; Enrique LÍSTER LÓPEZ, *Praga, Agosto 1968. Páginas de un diario personal*, Guadalajara 2008; Teresa PÀMIÉS, *Testament in Prague*, New Orleans 2005; Carmen PARGA, *Antes Que Sea Tarde*, México City 2007; Manuel TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio De Dos Guerras*, Barcelona 1978.

²³ Diego FANDOS, *Dos tonalidades diferentes de rojo*, 2002, [www.youtube.com, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhN3Iw3pHz0&t=84s&ab_channel=DiegoFandos>](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhN3Iw3pHz0&t=84s&ab_channel=DiegoFandos).

²⁴ Alena K. ALAMGIR, “Recalcitrant Women: Internationalism and the Redefinition of Welfare Limits in the Czechoslovak-Vietnamese Labor Exchange Program”, *Slavic Review* 1, 2014, pp. 133-155; Patryk BABIRACKI – Kenyon ZIMMER (eds.), *Cold War Crossings. International travel and exchange across the Soviet bloc, 1940s-1960s*, College Station 2014; Paulina BREN, “Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall... Is the West the Fairest of Them All? Czechoslovak Normalization and Its (Dis)Contents”, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4, 2008, pp. 831-854; Susan L. CARRUTHERS, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc “Escapees” and Cold War Borderlands”, *American Quarterly* 3, 2005, pp. 911-942; Simo MIKKONEN – Jari PARKKINEN – Giles SCOTT-SMITH (eds.), *Entangled East and West: Cultural Diplomacy and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War*, Berlin, Boston 2018; Pavel MÜCKE – Lenka KRÁTKÁ (eds.), *Turistická odysea: krajinou soudobých dějin cestování a cestovního ruchu v Československu v letech 1945 až 1989*, Praha 2018.

²⁵ Karel BARTOŠEK, *Zpráva o putování v komunistických archivech. Praha – Paříž (1948–1968)*, Praha, Litomyšl 2000; Jan KOURA, “‘Geneva of the East’: Prague as a centre of international socialism”, in: James Koranyi – Jan Koura – Bernhard Struck, *Modern Europe: A Transnational History*, London 2022 (in print), pp. 1-16.

centre of not only Spanish but also other foreign communist exiles and left-wingers.²⁶ Still, the research of exiles within the “new mobilities paradigm” maintains fairly unknown in the Czech and Slovak historiography, even though almost two decades have passed since its popularisation by John Urry and Mimi Sheller.²⁷ The new mobilities paradigm intends to overcome the dichotomy between social sciences and travel research, while claiming that mobilities are organised in complex mobility systems, which include not only mobility (movement) but also (relative) immobilities (moorings). This popular paradigm led many authors to “turn” within their (mobility) research and to focus on communist exile in/from/to Eastern European countries, as well as on the transfer of people, products or information through the Iron Curtain (and between continents), while utilising more analytical, encompassing and multidisciplinary approaches in the study of these (im)mobilities.²⁸

Furthermore, another missing concept in the study of (Spanish) communist exiles is (everyday) resistance, as well as the relationship between the power holders and the resisters. Apart from works by the author of the concept of everyday resistance, James C. Scott,²⁹ new studies, originating predominantly from the research group “Power, Resistance and Social

²⁶ Milan BÁRTA, “Právo azylu. Vznik politické emigrace v Československu po roce 1948“, *Paměť a dějiny* 1, 2011, pp. 15-22; Kathleen B. GEANEY, “Špatná strana hranice? Anglicky mluvící levicová komunita v Československu na počátku studené války“, *Střed: časopis pro mezioborová studia střední Evropy* 19. a 20. století 1, 2013, pp. 40-62; Idem, *English-Speaking Communists, Communist Sympathizers and Fellow-Travellers and Czechoslovakia in the Early Cold War* (PhD Dissertation), Praha 2017; Marta E. HOLEČKOVÁ, “Konfliktní lekce z internacionalismu: studenti z “třetího světa” a jejich konfrontace s českým prostředím (1961-1974)“, *Soudobé dějiny* 1-2, 2013, pp. 158-175; Idem, *Příběh zapomenuté univerzity. Univerzita 17. listopadu (1961–1974) a její místo v československém vzdělávacím systému a společnosti*, Praha 2019; Doubravka OLŠÁKOVÁ, “V krajině za zrcadlem. Političtí emigranti v poúnorovém Československu a případ Aymonin“, *Soudobé dějiny* 4, 2007, pp. 719-743; Pavel SZOBI, “Portugalci v „komunistické Ženevě“: Praha jako středisko antisalazaristické opozice (1948–1974)“, *Soudobé dějiny* 4, 2014, pp. 609-634; Konstantinos TSIVOS, *Řecká emigrace v Československu (1948–1968). Od jednoho rozštěpení k druhému* (PhD Dissertation), Praha 2011; Ondřej VOJTĚCHOVSKÝ, “Soudruzi nebo vetřelci? O životě cizinců v ČSR na příkladu jugoslávské emigrace“, *Paměť a dějiny* 3, 2017, pp. 24-32; Idem, *Z Prahy proti Titovi!: jugoslávská prosovětská emigrace v Československu*, Praha 2012; Františka ZEZULÁKOVÁ SCHORMOVÁ, *African American Poets Abroad: Black and Red Allegiances in Early Cold War Czechoslovakia* (PhD Dissertation), Praha 2020.

²⁷ Kevin HANNAM – Mimi SELLER – John URRY, “Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings“, *Mobilities* 1, 2006, pp. 1-22; Mimi SELLER – John URRY, “The new mobilities paradigm“, *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 2, 2006, pp. 207-226.

²⁸ Sune BECHMANN PEDERSEN – Christian NOACK (eds.), *Tourism and Travel during the Cold War: Negotiating Tourist Experiences across the Iron Curtain*, London, New York 2019; Kathy BURRELL – Kathrin HÖRSCHELMANN, (eds.), *Mobilities in Socialist and Post-Socialist States: Societies on the Move*, Houndmills, New York 2014; Eric BURTON – Anne DIETRICH – Immanuel R. HARISCH et al., *Navigating Socialist Encounters. Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements between Africa and East Germany during the Cold War*, Berlin, Boston 2021; Christina SCHWENKEL, “Socialist Mobilities: Crossing New Terrains in Vietnamese Migration Histories“, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 1, 2015, pp. 13-25.

²⁹ James C. SCOTT, *Decoding Subaltern Politics: Ideology, Disguise, and Resistance in Agrarian Politics*, New York, Abingdon 2013; Idem, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven, London 1990; Idem, “Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance“, *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 2, 1986, pp. 5-35; Idem, “Everyday Forms of Resistance“, *Copenhagen Papers in East and Southeast Asian Studies* 4, 1989, pp. 33-62; Idem, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven, London 1985.

Change” at the University of Gothenburg, that further develop (rearticulate) this concept in its diverse forms, have appeared in recent years.³⁰ Nevertheless, none of them has instrumentally addressed the question of everyday resistance of communist exiles in Eastern European countries. Thus, everyday resistance of (not only) Spanish émigrés in Czechoslovakia remains a completely unexplored topic. On the other hand, it should be noted that works dealing generally with the question of resistance in state-socialist Czechoslovakia, carried out mainly against the regime and the State Party are also limited.³¹ In contrast to the enormous amount of publications about this party (KSČ) and its history, the number of works dedicated to the history of the Communist Party of Spain started to grow only in the last few years.³²

Last but not least, relations between Madrid and Prague, contextualised within the history of the Cold War, could be considered as another almost un-researched topic. New approaches and frameworks in the study of this conflict (New Cold War History, Pericentrism)

³⁰ Mikael BAAZ – Mona LILJA – Michael SCHULZ et al., “Defining and Analyzing “Resistance”: Possible Entrances to the Study of Subversive Practices”, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 3, 2016; pp. 137-153; Marta IÑIGUEZ DE HEREDÍA, *Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making: Insights from ‘Africa’s World War’*, Manchester 2017; Anna JOHANSSON – Stellan VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing ‘Everyday Resistance’: A Transdisciplinary Approach*, New York, Abingdon 2020; Idem, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: An Analytical Framework”, *Critical Sociology* 3, 2016, pp. 417-435; Idem, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: the Palestinian Sumūd”, *Journal of Political Power* 1, 2015, pp. 109-139; Mona LILJA – Mikael BAAZ – Stellan VINTHAGEN, “Exploring ‘irrational resistance’”, *Journal of Political Power* 2, 2013, pp. 201-217; Mona LILJA – Mikael BAAZ – Michael SCHULZ et al., “How resistance encourages resistance: theorizing the nexus between power, ‘Organised Resistance’ and ‘Everyday Resistance’”, *Journal of Political Power* 1, 2017, pp. 40-54; Mona LILJA, *Constructive Resistance: Repetitions, Emotions, and Time*, Lanham, London 2021; Mona LILJA – Stellan VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed resistance: unpacking the spectrum and properties of glaring and everyday resistance”, *Journal of Political Power* 2, 2018, pp. 211-229; Idem, “Sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower: resisting what power with what resistance?” *Journal of Political Power* 1, 2014, pp. 107-126; Jeremy B. STRAUGHN, “Taking the State at Its Word”: The Arts of Consensual Contention in the German Democratic Republic”, *American Journal of Sociology* 6, 2005, pp. 1598-1650; Stellan VINTHAGEN – Anna JOHANSSON, “‘Everyday Resistance’: Exploration of a Concept and its Theories”, *Resistance Studies Magazine* 1, 2013, pp. 1-46.

³¹ Václav HAVEL – John KEANE, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central Eastern Europe*, Armonk, N.Y. 1985; Přemysl HOUDA, *Normalizační Festival: Socialistické paradoxy a postsocialistické korekce*, Praha 2019; David SCHRIFFL – Michael GEHLER (eds.), *Violent Resistance: From the Baltics to Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe 1944-1956*, Paderborn 2020; Tomáš VILÍMEK – Oldřich TŮMA – Jaroslav CUHRA et al., *Projevy a podoby protirežimní rezistence v komunistickém Československu 1948-1989*, Praha 2018; Adam ZÍTEK, “‘Hodina odplaty se blíží ...’ Příklady osudů mladistvých odpůrců proti komunismu na Žatecku”, *Sborník Archivu bezpečnostních složek* 13, 2015, pp. 65-107.

³² Eduardo ABAD GARCÍA, “El otoño de Praga. Checoslovaquia y la disidencia ortodoxa en el comunismo español (1968-1989)”, *Historia Contemporánea* 61, 2019, pp. 971-1003; Manuel BUENO – José HINOJOSA – Carmen GARCÍA (eds.), *Historia del PCE. I Congreso 1920-1977, Vol. II*, Oviedo 2007; Michele D’ANGELO, “El Partido Comunista Español en Francia, ¿Partido de la protesta u organización para emigrados? 1950-1975”, *Aportes* 92, 2016, pp. 177-211; Joan ESTRUCH TOBELLA, *Historia oculta del PCE*, Madrid 2000; Fernando HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, “Comerciendo con el diablo: las relaciones comerciales con el Telón de Acero y la financiación del PCE a comienzos de los años 60” [on-line], 2014, www.historiadelpresente.es, <<http://historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/43/fernandohernandezsanchez.pdf>>; José Luis MARTÍN RAMOS, *Historia del PCE*, Madrid 2021; Gregorio MORÁN, *Miseria, grandeza y agonía del PCE: 1939-1985*, Madrid 2017; Emanuele TREGLIA, “El PCE y la huelga general (1958-1967)”, *Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea* 20, 2008, pp. 249-263; Idem, “El PCE y el movimiento comunista internacional (1969-1977)”, *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 37, 2015, pp. 225-255.

that have emerged in recent decades, initially in foreign historiography,³³ focus not only on the bipolar relationship between the USA and the USSR but also take into account the role of other countries – “small(er) states” or “junior actors”. Both Czechoslovakia and Spain could be undeniably interpreted as one of these states. The pluralist approach to the Cold War proposed by some of the leading foreign scholars³⁴ reflects not only in the questioning of the bipolarity of the conflict but also in its focus on various Cold War histories and topics – Cold War (im)mobility or the (im)permeability of the Iron Curtain,³⁵ are just two examples. Within the Czech historiography, the Cold War Research Group, established as part of the Institute for the Study of Strategic Regions (a research platform of Charles University), which seeks to reinterpret the role and position of Czechoslovakia within the contemporary Cold War research, as well as to rearticulate the paradigm of a monolithic Soviet Bloc, can be identified as a leading institution in the research and application of these new approaches within the Cold War historiography.³⁶ In recent years, the author of the present dissertation had the honour of being one of the members of the above-mentioned research collective.

1.3 Structure of the dissertation

Due to the above-stated deficiencies (or “gaps”) within the historiography of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations, we decided to focus in this dissertation mainly on two,

³³ Laurien CRUMP – Susanna ERLANDSSON (eds.), *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe. The Influence of Smaller Powers*, London 2019; Theodora DRAGOSTINOVA, *The Cold War from the Margins: A Small Socialist State on the Global Cultural Scene*, New York 2021; Theodora DRAGOSTINOVA – Malgorzata FIDELIS, “Introduction”, *Slavic Review* 3, 2018, pp. 577-587; John Lewis GADDIS, *We now know: rethinking Cold War history*, Oxford 1997; Federico ROMERO, “Cold War historiography at the crossroads”, *Cold War History* 4, 2014, pp. 685-703; Oscar SANCHEZ-SIBONY, *Red globalization. The political economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge 2014; Tony SMITH, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War”, *Diplomatic History* 4, 2000, pp. 567-591; Odd Arne WESTAD, *The Global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of our times*, Cambridge 2005.

³⁴ Melvyn P. LEFFLER – Odd Arne WESTAD (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume I: Origins*, Cambridge, New York 2010, p. XVI; Odd Arne WESTAD, “Exploring the Histories of the Cold War. A Pluralist Approach”, in: Joel Isaac – Duncan Bell (eds.), *Uncertain empire: American history and the idea of the Cold War*, Oxford, New York 2012, pp. 51-59.

³⁵ Gertrude ENDERLE-BURCEL – Piotr FRANASZEK – Dieter STIEFEL et al. (eds.), *Gaps in the Iron Curtain: Economic Relations between Neutral and Socialist Countries in Cold War Europe*, Cracow 2009; Michael DAVID-FOX, “The Iron Curtain as Semipermeable Membrane. Origins and Demise of the Stalinist Superiority Complex” in: BABIRACKI – ZIMMER, *Cold War*, pp. 14-39; György PÉTERI, “Nylon Curtain – Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe”, *Slavonica* 2, 2004, pp. 113-123; Angela ROMANO, “Concluding remarks. Tourism across a porous curtain”, in: BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK (eds.), *Tourism*, pp. 190-206.

³⁶ Recent publications by members of this group include e.g., Constantin KATSAKIORIS, “The Socialist Countries, North Africa and the Middle East in the Cold War: The Educational Connection”, *Contemporary European History* 4, 2021, pp. 597-612; Jan KOURA, “A prominent spy: Mehdi Ben Barka, Czechoslovak intelligence, and Eastern Bloc espionage in the Third World during the Cold War”, *Intelligence and National Security* 3, 2021, pp. 318-339; Daniela RICHTEROVA – Mikuláš PEŠTA – Natalia TELEPNEVA, “Banking on Military Assistance: Czechoslovakia’s Struggle for Influence and Profit in the Third World 1955–1968”, *The International History Review* 1, 2021, pp. 90-108.

relatively less known but mutually interconnected issues: 1. The question of the Spanish communist exile in state socialist Czechoslovakia (and also of the Slovak and Czech anti-communist exile in Francoist Spain) and 2. The relations between Prague and Madrid (1945-1977). However, in contrast to the above-cited studies, we decided to offer in our analysis a new methodological approach – by working in the two main chapters with two theoretical-analytical concepts and thus present the Spanish communist exile, as well as Czechoslovak-Spanish relations, in a new light. This way we try to offer a different perspective on relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain while underlining mutual (dis)entanglements between the applied concepts of (im)mobilities and (everyday) resistance, which also influenced the economic aspect of international relations.

The first chapter (Czechoslovak-Spanish entanglements from WWI until “Victorious February”) focuses on mutual diplomatic and cultural relations during the period 1918-1948. Its three subchapters deal with relations between Prague and Madrid from the establishment of Czechoslovakia until the country’s bitter end in 1939, then with contacts between the Slovak state, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, and post-war Czechoslovak Republic with Francoist Spain. The last subchapter analyses the relations between Czechoslovakia and the Spanish Republican government in exile, especially the role the respective communist parties played within mutual Czechoslovak-Spanish contacts since WWII.

The second chapter, entitled “Cold War (im)mobilities and (anti)communist moorings”, is dedicated to the question of the Czech(oslovak) and Slovak exile in Francoist Spain and the Spanish communist exile in state-socialist Czechoslovakia, with a special focus on the (im)mobilities of these émigrés. This chapter consists of three subchapters: the first one could be considered a theoretical-methodological introduction to the issue of mobility and the new mobilities paradigm. Stemming from these theoretical-analytical bases, the second subchapter is dedicated to the anti-communist emigration in Franco’s Spain. In its first part, it focuses on the moorings of Central and Eastern European exiles as a whole. Then, in the second part, it targets the Czech and Slovak anti-communist exile, its main protagonists and their activities, mutual interconnections and conflicts. The last subchapter deals generally in its first section with the Spanish communist exile in post-war Czechoslovakia, its functioning and the experiences of Spaniards with state socialism, its second part focuses on the Prague collective of this emigration. Special attention is paid not only to nodes and character of (im)mobilities of this exile but also to the special position of Prague, “the communist Geneva” – a hub of left-wing emigrants, students and organisations in the first years of the Cold War.

Everyday resistance of heterodox Spanish exiles is the main object of investigation in the third chapter of this dissertation, entitled “”As a punishment, to Ústí nad Labem!” Everyday resistance of Spanish communist exiles in Czechoslovakia”.³⁷ This chapter is divided into four subchapters – in the first one, the focus is dedicated to the collective of Spanish communist exiles living in Ústí nad Labem, its functioning and its (dis)similarities with the Prague collective. The second subchapter could be interpreted as an introduction to the topic of resistance, with a focus on its main analytical attributes and its relation to power. Next, in the third subchapter, the concept of everyday resistance, its genesis and its various forms are presented. However, the backbone of the chapter is provided by the fourth subchapter which involves two case studies of everyday resistance of heterodox Spanish exiles in state socialist Czechoslovakia. This chapter seeks to shed light on the issues facing the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia by analysing the resistance practices of two Spaniards from Ústí, while putting in contrast the fates of those Spanish exiles, who were expelled from the PCE and subsequently ostracised, with the life of the leading figures of the Spanish political emigration in Prague. The concept of everyday resistance, in its two forms (“dispersed constructive resistance” and “consentful contention”) is applied and its influence on power relations existing between the heterodox members of the PCE, its leadership and the Czechoslovak authorities (as well as the KSČ), is explored.

Spanish communist exiles and their Czechoslovak (im)mobilities play also an important role in the fourth chapter, entitled “Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations from “Victorious February” to *détente*”; even though the focus of the research in this chapter lays mostly on the post-war economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Franco’s Spain. The first subchapter is oriented toward the interwar era and WWII, when the foundations for the economic relations between the two countries during the Cold War can be found. The second subchapter then analyses the economic aspects of the relations between the PCE and the KSČ – the often conflicting point of the “fraternal” relationship between the two parties. The third subchapter is dedicated to the development of commercial contacts between Prague and Madrid between 1948-1968, while the fourth and the last one analyses the situation in Czechoslovak-Spanish relations after August 1968 – leading from a split between the KSČ and PCE to the final reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Madrid in 1977. In this chapter, Czechoslovak-

³⁷ Unfortunately, due to the lack of archival materials, the issue of (everyday) resistance could not be properly analysed in the cases of Slovak and Czech anti-communist exiles in Francoist Spain.

Spanish relations are placed in the international context of the post-WWII reality, with an intention of trying to bring the smaller states into the centre of the Cold War research interest.

1.4 Methodology

This dissertation is based on a combination of several research methods and scientific approaches. The key methodological tool used in the thesis is analysis, the main object of this analysis being archival documents from Czech, Slovak and Spanish archives and published memoirs, complemented by selected secondary literature. Overall, with inductive reasoning, this dissertation intends to shed light on Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the 20th century, through an investigation of crucial aspects within the chosen topic.

The first chapter deals with Czechoslovak-Spanish relations between 1918-1948. With its focus on diplomatic and cultural relations, it combines the analysis and critique of archival materials with the secondary literature, and through a combination of diachronic and synchronic approaches, it follows the development of relations between the regimes that existed during the investigated period in Czechoslovakia and Spain, as well as in the exile. Just as in the first chapter, in the second one we apply the progressive method of historical research while in this case, we focus on the (im)mobilities of Czech(oslovak), Slovak and Spanish communist exiles into/outside of/within Czechoslovakia/Spain, through the analytical treatment of archival materials, mostly of an official character (documents from the MFA and the KSČ), supplemented by a discursive analysis of the memoirs, publications and correspondence of these exiles. This chapter, while methodologically stemming from theories elaborated under the new mobilities paradigm, attempts to trace the complex phenomenon of exile in two different countries with undemocratic regimes through both diachronic (the functioning of the respective Czech/Slovak and Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia/Spain) and synchronic approach (putting into contrast the exile collectives in these countries). Regarding the everydayness and functioning of exiles in the 1950s and 1960s, the method of structural analysis of archival materials, as well as secondary literature, seems like the most convenient research tool.

The third chapter is dedicated to everyday resistance in state socialist Czechoslovakia, carried out in two of its forms (consentful contention, constructive/productive resistance). Apart from the two theoretical-methodological subchapters, it is based upon a combination of diachronic (the functioning of the exile collective in Ústí), as well as synchronic (two case studies) approach, through the application of the progressive method and the above-mentioned models of resistance. Documents studied in the two case studies proceed mainly from Czech

and Spanish archives, while their discursive analysis also brings to light the changing power structures existing within Spanish communist exile, its relation to its heterodox members, as well as their relationship with the KSČ. Besides, the studied insubordination of Spanish communist exiles, interconnected with their expulsion from the party, incites a comparative approach – the fate of resisters is put into contrast with the lives of the leaders of the Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia. The fourth and last chapter of this dissertation is, apart from the secondary literature, based almost exclusively on archival materials (The Czech and Spanish MFA, MOÚV KSČ), the analysis and critique of which attempt to shed light on the question of the development of relations between two small(er) countries with antagonistic regimes from the other side of the Iron Curtain. The emphasis in this part is mainly laid on the economic relations between the two states, while the post-war relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain are in their complexity placed in the context of the Cold War. In this part of the dissertation, a progressive method is applied, complemented also by a structural analysis. In its four subchapters, four chosen issues within the Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations are studied through a combination of synchronic and diachronic approach, while the chosen methods of historical research aim to help contextualise the contacts between state socialist Czechoslovakia and Franco's Spain, as well as their interconnection with the PCE-KSČ relations, within the Cold War reality.

1.5 Hypotheses

As mentioned above, the main subject of research in the dissertation is the development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the period between 1918-1977, with a special emphasis on the Spanish communist exile and contacts between Prague and Madrid, while offering a comprehensive view of the issue by using new methodological approaches. The investigation is thus directed mainly toward four areas (chapters): 1. Relations between the countries in 1918-1948 and the KSČ's access to dominance over Czechoslovak foreign policy; 2. (Im)mobilities of Slovak and Czech anti-communists in Spain and Spanish communist emigrants in post-war Czechoslovakia; 3. Everyday resistance of heterodox Spanish communists in Ústí; 4. The development of relations between state socialist Czechoslovakia and Franco's Spain in the context of the Cold War and the influence of the economic relations PCE-KSČ on these contacts (and vice versa). Taking into account the division of the dissertation into four thematically interconnected, but in terms of research analytically separated units, each chapter works with its own sub-hypotheses, which are all interconnected and as such lead to the main hypothesis of the dissertation, elaborated in the conclusion of this work.

In the first chapter, we question the thesis of the Czech historian Jindřich Dejmek who claims that the diplomacy (and thus also the foreign policy) of the Third Czechoslovak Republic (1945-1948) was until “Victorious February” under the dominating influence of Czechoslovak democrats, while the communist positions at the MFA were generally weak.³⁸ On the other hand, we claim that, at least in relation to Spain, the communist influence started to dominate Czechoslovak foreign policy already in 1946, especially after the parliamentary elections of May 1946. This was due to the communist control of organisations in support of Republican Spaniards, their positions at the Prague MFA (whose most emblematic representative was the communist Vice-Minister, Vlado Clementis) and their relations with the PCE.

The main hypothesis of the second chapter of this dissertation, devoted to the issue of (im)mobilities of Spanish communist exiles in Czechoslovakia and Czech and Slovak anti-communist emigration to Spain, is based upon the theory of the (re)productive/constructive character of (im)mobilities.³⁹ Therefore, in this chapter, we posit that the mobility of Spanish communist and Slovak and Czech anti-communist exiles through the Iron Curtain into Czechoslovakia and Spain enabled and/or led (through fixities and (infra)structures) to another (im)mobility (and vice versa). During their stay in host countries, these exiles were confronted with the everydayness of state socialism as well as of the Francoist regime – experiences with their “moorings” often led to another (im)mobility, either within or outside of the country.

One kind of mobility within the Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia – a “voluntary” transfer from Prague to Ústí nad Labem, was generally conceived by Spaniards as a form of punishment. Also, considering that the Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia (as is the case in any other collective), never formed a homogeneous and immutable entity, this transfer to Ústí eventually led to the everyday resistance of Spanish exiles, which we consider as a “by-product” of (im)mobility. In this third chapter, we also argue that this resistance, oriented against the dominant power structures, fundamentally affected not only the functioning of the Spanish exile collectives in Czechoslovakia but also the relations between the PCE and the KSČ, while the (im)mobilities of Spanish exiles played a crucial role in the (re)production of this resistance.

³⁸ Jindřich DEJMEK, “Postoj Československa k nabídce Marshallova plánu”, in: Jindřich Dejmek – Marek Loužek (eds.), *Marshallův plán: šedesát let poté*, Praha 2007, p. 13; Idem, “Únor 1948 v mezinárodním kontextu”, in: Jindřich Dejmek – Marek Loužek (eds.), *Únor 1948: šedesát let poté*, Praha 2008, p. 59.

³⁹ Sue FROHLICK – Kristin LOZANSKI – Amy SPEIER et al., “Mobilities Meet Reproductive Vibes ...”, *Transfers* 1, 2019, p. 95; Mimi SELLER, “The reproduction of reproduction: theorizing reproductive (im)mobilities”, *Mobilities* 2, 2020, pp. 188-195.

In the last chapter, dedicated to the economic relations between Prague and Madrid and the influence of the relationship PCE-KSČ on them, we work with the hypothesis of Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, who claims that during the Cold War, the USSR was not autarkic and the Soviet economy has always been a part of global economic structures. We apply this argument to Czechoslovakia while claiming that also in the case of Prague, the situation was similar and the political-ideological principles often had to make way for economic pragmatism – the country’s foreign trade with Western countries was (as was the Soviet case) a necessity, due to the lack of convertible currencies. In addition, we claim that there were more variables (actors) within the formation of Prague’s foreign policy towards Spain – it was influenced not only by the USSR but also by the PCE (at least until 1968), while the Czechoslovak approach toward Madrid was coordinated with and following other Eastern European countries.

Overall, these chapters seek to reinterpret the comprehension of relations between an Eastern Bloc state (Czechoslovak Republic) and a country in Southwestern Europe attempting to integrate into European structures despite its dictatorial regime, while emphasising its anticommunism (Francoist Spain). Thus, in the conclusion, within our attempt to bring small(er) state(s) back into the history of the Cold War,⁴⁰ this dissertation contests the myth of the impermeable Iron Curtain. Based on the examples of the (im)mobilities of the Spanish, Slovak and Czech emigrants in Czechoslovakia/Spain, we work with the thesis of Michael David-Fox, who questions the permeability of this barrier, which according to him, had the character of semipermeable or selectively permeable membrane. David-Fox claims that this curtain “was very real, in the sense that the divisions and barriers between the Soviet-dominated socialist camp and the rest of the world cannot be downplayed [...] [but] the partition it marked was not airtight but semipermeable.”⁴¹ Thus, at the end of this dissertation, the four chapters and their sub-hypotheses lead us to David-Fox’s thesis (our main hypothesis), which we examine, based on our analysis of the selected issues within the Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. With our focus on contacts and cooperation between the two ideologically antagonistic regimes, we intend to contribute to the pluralist, multipolar and multilateral approach(es) to the Cold War histories, with our story of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations.

⁴⁰ Bradley REYNOLDS, “Bringing the (Smaller) State Back In: State of the Field in ‘Small State’ Research”, *H-Diplo* (Essay 338), 2021, pp. 1-13; Laurien CRUMP – Susanna ERLANDSSON, “Introduction. Smaller powers in Cold War Europe”, in: Idem (eds.), *Margins*, pp. 1-10.

⁴¹ DAVID-FOX, “The Iron”, pp. 34-35.

2. Czechoslovak-Spanish entanglements from WWI until “Victorious February”

Spain “has Roman foundations, Moorish pomp and a Catholic mind.”⁴² With these words the famous Czech writer Karel Čapek described Spain at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, it was not only its ancient history, Arabic heritage and Christian traditions that shaped this Southwestern European country throughout the 20th century. Just like Czechoslovakia, Spain also had to face various political, social and economic challenges, many of which influenced not only its international position but also the mutual relations between Prague and Madrid. It goes without saying that since the declaration of the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic in October 1918, relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain have undergone several phases.

In this chapter, we analyse the contacts between the two countries from the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic until the Prague communist coup d’état in February 1948. With a focus on the diplomatic and cultural relations during these three decades, we follow the gradual takeover of the Czechoslovak foreign policy by the communist party. In contrast with Dejmek’s thesis about the control of the Czechoslovak diplomacy by the democratic forces until February 1948,⁴³ we argue that, at least in relation to Spain, Prague’s foreign policy was dominated by the communists as early as 1946 – at first by controlling the organisations in support of the Spanish Republic, later through the influence of the KSČ at the Czechoslovak MFA. Still, the foundations for this situation were established during the interwar era, especially during the Spanish Civil War, based on the role that KSČ played in the support of Republican Spain (also gradually subjugated to the interests of the Spanish Communist Party). Furthermore, after the departure of the PCE from the Spanish Republican government in exile in 1947, the KSČ was even able to reorient the Czechoslovak foreign policy from the support of this exile government to an exclusive collaboration with Spanish communists.

2.1 Relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain during the interwar period (1918-1939)⁴⁴

2.1.1 Czechoslovak-Spanish relations from 1918 until the Spanish Civil War

Notwithstanding the relatively quick establishment of mutual relations (9 June of 1919), there was a certain mistrust between the two countries until the end of the 1920s, as

⁴² Karel ČAPEK, *Letters from Spain*, New York 1932, p. 72.

⁴³ DEJMEK, “Postoj”, p. 13; Idem, “Únor”, p. 59.

⁴⁴ This subchapter is partially stemming from the first chapter of the MA thesis: Maroš TIMKO, *Španielska občianska vojna a Slovensko (1936-1939)* (MA thesis), Praha: Charles University, 2017.

Czechoslovakia was considered by Spain to be an unstable state with a left-wing regime.⁴⁵ Also, Spanish nostalgia for the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy played its role, especially in the circles of the Spanish royal family.⁴⁶ While Josef Šindler acted as the Czechoslovak consul from February 1919, at first in Barcelona and then in Madrid, and Spain was being represented in Prague from 1919 by José María de Santos Cía, due to the above-mentioned impediments, the Czechoslovak embassy in Madrid did not begin its activity until May 1921.⁴⁷ Miloš Kobr became the first Czechoslovak ambassador to Spain in 1921 and, from December 1925, Adolf Berka headed the embassy from the position of *chargé d'affaires*.⁴⁸ On the other hand, in 1920, José María Doussinague y Teixidor was designated as the Spanish consul in Prague. The first Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary in the Czechoslovak capital was Pedro Sebastián de Erice (1920-1925) and, after short one-year stays of his two predecessors, another long-term Spanish ambassador, Joaquín de Ezpeleta y Montenegro, was appointed in 1927.⁴⁹ The aforementioned suspicion within mutual relations was eventually overcome only with the fall of the Spanish monarchy and the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic in April 1931. However, neither Czechoslovakia nor Spain considered the maintenance and strengthening of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations as a key aspect of their foreign policy during the interwar period, although both countries oriented themselves mainly towards France and Great Britain (at least until 1936 in the Spanish case).⁵⁰

Despite the above-mentioned mutual discrepancies and suspicions; diplomatic, economic and cultural relations had been developing correctly between the two countries since the early 1920s – the signing of the first Czechoslovak-Spanish trade treaty with the most-favoured-nation clause took place on November 18, 1921.⁵¹ The limited level of commercial exchange in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s (in the interwar period, the share of trade with Spain reached its peak in 1935; nevertheless, it never exceeded 1% of the total Czechoslovak foreign trade)⁵² were in contrast with actively developing cultural contacts. These were represented for example by the establishment of the Spanish circle of Prague (*Círculo*

⁴⁵ Jiří CHALUPA, *Dějiny Španělska*, Praha 2017, p. 629; VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 3.

⁴⁶ NÁLEVKA, “Las relaciones”, p. 245.

⁴⁷ MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 76-78; Antonio UBIETO ARTETA et al., *Dějiny Španělska*, Praha 2007, p. 798.

⁴⁸ EIROA, *Las relaciones*, p. 15.

⁴⁹ MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 84-87, 161-163.

⁵⁰ Jindřich DEJMEK, *Československo, jeho sousedé a velmoci ve XX. století (1918 až 1992): vybrané kapitoly z dějin československé zahraniční politiky*, Praha 2002, p. 16; Juan Carlos PEREIRA CASTAÑARES – José Luis NEILA HERNÁNDEZ, “La España de Alfonso XIII en el sistema internacional de posguerra (1919-1931)”, *Historia Contemporánea* 34, 2007, pp. 125-129.

⁵¹ NÁLEVKA, “Las relaciones”, p. 245.

⁵² Idem, “Československo-španělské”, p. 86; Jiří CHALUPA, *Španělsko*, Praha 2010, p. 193.

español de Praga), whose members were several prominent Czechoslovak personalities, involved in the promotion of contacts with Spain and Latin America, such as its founder, doctor Jaroslav Lenz; traveller and ethnologist Alberto Vojtěch Frič; the first lecturer of Spanish at the Charles University Antonia Dickertová and the historian and diplomat Vlastimil Kybal, who was also the Czechoslovak ambassador to Spain between 1927 and 1933.⁵³ This group has contributed to the considerable development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations since its foundation in 1918, and thanks to its activities (exhibitions, concerts, lectures and language courses) many Spanish artists, writers, students and industrialists visited Czechoslovakia. *Círculo español de Praga* was eventually transformed in 1929 into the Spanish and Ibero-American Institute, with a library of approximately 2,000 works in Spanish or related to the Hispanic world.⁵⁴ Further cultural contacts were represented by publication of translations of well-known Spanish authors such as Benito Pérez Galdós, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez and Antonio Machado into Czech and Slovak,⁵⁵ by Czechoslovak artists travelling in the 1920s and 1930s to Spain,⁵⁶ as well as by the editions of travelogues of famous Czechoslovak authors who visited Spain (Karel Čapek, Jaroslav Durych, Jan Václav Rosůlek and Zuzka Zguriška).⁵⁷ Similarly, the Association of Friends of Czechoslovakia (*La Agrupación de Amigos de Checoslovaquia*) was established in Spain in 1929, based on the initiative of ambassador Kybal. This Association was an informal group of intellectuals, meeting regularly with the aim of promoting Czechoslovakia in Spain, for example through art exhibitions.⁵⁸ Furthermore, in 1931 the Hispanic-Slavic Committee (*Comité Hispano-Eslavo*) was created, whose objective was to support the intellectual, cultural and economic contacts between Spain and various Slavic countries through conferences, language courses, cultural exchanges and participation in exhibitions and trade fairs.⁵⁹

Czechoslovak-Spanish relations continued to develop relatively actively during the dictatorship of Spanish General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), despite the ideological differences between the two regimes. Taking into account the general economic boom of the 1920s, it is not surprising that the period of the second half of the 1920s could be regarded as a time of increasing mutual trade (in July 1925, a temporary trade agreement was signed), while

⁵³ UBIETO ARTETA et al., *Dějiny*, p. 798.

⁵⁴ CHALUPA, *Španělsko*, p. 193.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ ŠTĚPÁNEK, "Artistas", pp. 149-163.

⁵⁷ OPATRŇÝ, "La imagen", pp. 219-230; *Idem*, "España", pp. 133-147.

⁵⁸ MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 224-227.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 228-230.

the beginning of the 1930s and the worldwide economic crisis was, on the contrary, a period of the declining intensity of trade.⁶⁰ This notwithstanding, it could be argued that during the time of the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936), Czechoslovak-Spanish relations and contacts were generally strengthened. This intensification was based on the ideological and political proximity of both Republics and was evidenced not only by the mutual abolition of visa requirements in 1932,⁶¹ but also by the appointment of renowned personalities as the new diplomatic agents. Francisco Agramonte y Cortijo was designated as the Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary in Prague in 1932, and Robert Flieder was appointed as the new ambassador to Madrid in the summer of 1935.⁶² Additionally, the former Spanish ruler Alphonse XIII decided to spend some time of his exile in Czechoslovakia in the Kynžvart Castle.⁶³

2.1.2 Spain, Czechoslovakia and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)

The Civil War in Spain was an important turning point in mutual relations. Undoubtedly, it strengthened contacts between the two countries in many spheres: even though the Spanish *chargé d'affaires* in Prague Luis García Guijarro, as well as his first secretary Gaspar Sanz y Tovar, joined the Rebel cause within a few weeks of the coup d'état,⁶⁴ Spain did not remain without a diplomatic agent in Prague for a long time, as the Republican government swiftly sent a new representative to Czechoslovakia. This was a renowned jurist and a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* – PSOE), Luis Jiménez de Asúa, who took up office in October 1936 as the new Republican *chargé d'affaires*.⁶⁵ Jiménez de Asúa could be described as an active and very capable representative of the Spanish Republican government – in addition to his diplomatic duties in Prague, he was also engaged in other activities for the benefit of the Republican cause. During his stay in the Czechoslovak Republic, four ideologically interrelated activities can be distinguished: efforts to purchase arms for the Spanish Republic, assistance in recruiting volunteers for the International Brigades, organisation of an intelligence service in Central Europe and propaganda in favour of the Republicans based on various cultural events.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta”, p. 82.

⁶¹ Vyhláška ministra vnitra ze dne 18. dubna 1932 o zrušení visové povinnosti ve styku se Španělskem (Decree of Minister of the Interior from April 18, 1932, on the abolition of visa requirements in relation with Spain) 49/1932. Sbírnka zákonů a nařízení státu československého (Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Czechoslovak state) [on-line], 25.4.1932, p. 215, <<http://ftp.aspi.cz/opispdf/1932/021-1932.pdf>>, [accessed 11 March 2022].

⁶² MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 245, 252.

⁶³ CHALUPA, *Dějiny*, p. 632.

⁶⁴ SZÁRAZ, “Činnost”, pp. 64-65.

⁶⁵ NÁLEVKA, “Československo-španělské”, pp. 89-90.

⁶⁶ EIROA, “La embajada”, pp. 207-240.

Probably the most famous aspect not only among Jiménez de Asúa's activities, but also within Czechoslovak-Spanish relations during the Spanish Civil War was the recruitment of volunteers from Czechoslovakia to the International Brigades. In total, between 2,171-3,000 foreign volunteers (*interbrigadistas*) from Czechoslovakia participated in this conflict on the side of the Republic.⁶⁷ Of the Czechoslovak volunteers whose nationality was recorded, 45% were Czechs, 21% Slovaks, 20% Germans and 11% were Hungarians.⁶⁸ Jiménez de Asúa collaborated in organising the departure of these fighters with the Communist and Socialist Czechoslovak parties, mainly to avoid exposing the Spanish embassy; however, it was the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) which played a key role in the recruitment of the *interbrigadistas*. The KSČ also economically supported their journey to Spain, while the number of communists among the volunteers rose from 20% to more than 50% over the course of the war.⁶⁹ With the gradually increasing numbers of volunteers from Czechoslovakia, at the end of 1936, the first Czechoslovak unit was formed within the International Brigades – Platoon Klement Gottwald and then, in 1937, other Czechoslovak units were created (Machine Gun Company Jan Žižka, Anti-Aircraft Battery K. Gottwald, Battalion T. G. Masaryk).⁷⁰ Moreover, in April 1937 the field hospital J. A. Komenský was deployed to Spain, the medical staff of which consisted of 27 doctors and medics.⁷¹ During the three years of the Spanish conflict, almost 400 International Volunteers from Czechoslovakia died, were captured or pronounced missing; another 1,000 were injured.⁷² There were also Czechoslovak citizens who decided to join the Nationalist side – based on our research, it can be concluded that from at least 8 Czechoslovaks, who decided to help the Francoist cause, the majority had German ethnicity and/or originated from the Sudetes.⁷³ Lastly, the Spanish war also attracted Czechoslovak journalists, including famous writers such as Egon Erwin Kisch and Laco Nomoveský, whose reportages from Spain were published in various Czechoslovak and foreign newspapers.⁷⁴

One of the main foreign policy objectives of Spanish Republicans during the Civil War was the purchase of arms. This, however, conflicted with the policy of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict, espoused by the members of the Non-Intervention Committee set up in September 1936. Prague's adherence to this policy led not only to the general decline in

⁶⁷ BORTLOVÁ, "Los españolotes", p. 256.

⁶⁸ NEDVĚD, *Českoslovenští*, p. 116.

⁶⁹ CASANOVA, *La diplomacia*, pp. 186-187; NÁLEVKA, "Los voluntarios", pp. 136-137.

⁷⁰ NÁLEVKA, "Los voluntarios", p. 138.

⁷¹ BOUČEK, "La ayuda" pp. 147, 153-158.

⁷² NEDVĚD, *Českoslovenští*, p. 157.

⁷³ TIMKO, "Los voluntarios", pp. 93-108.

⁷⁴ CHALUPA, *Dějiny*, p. 631.

Czechoslovak-Spanish trade, but also to further complications in the purchase of arms for the Republican cause in Czechoslovakia. The acquisition of military material for the Republic was unofficially tolerated by the Czechoslovak government, but had to be done illegally, through re-export via so-called “third countries”.⁷⁵ Most of these purchases (through El Salvador, Bolivia or Mexico) eventually failed, Czechoslovakia nevertheless managed (with the help of Jiménez de Asúa) to export aircraft and infantry weapons through Estonia and the USSR.⁷⁶ Another interesting but unsuccessful attempt was carried out in the autumn of 1936 through Spanish colonel Ángel Pastor Velasco, who received a false Mexican passport under the name Alfredo Palacios. Under this false identity, Velasco sought to negotiate in Prague the secret purchase of Czechoslovak arms for the Republic (officially for Turkey); nevertheless, the cover of this mission was revealed and the whole operation ended in an international scandal.⁷⁷ Czechoslovak arms arrived to Spain from ports such as Hamburg, Constanza and Gdynia. The Czechoslovak factories taking part in these arms sales involved *Avia*, *Škoda*, *ČKD*, *Zbrojovka Brno* and *Považská Bystrica*.⁷⁸ Other activities of Jiménez de Asúa included the organisation of an intelligence service in Central Europe (its network covered 9 countries) and propaganda in favour of the Republicans (collections and cultural activities in aid of the Republic).⁷⁹

After the outbreak of the Civil War, changes also occurred at the Czechoslovak embassy in Madrid. Due to the fact that at the time of the coup, ambassador Flieder was on holiday in Southern France, *chargé d'affaires* Zdeněk Formánek took over the administration of the embassy.⁸⁰ Formánek offered refuge at the Czechoslovak embassy in Madrid to several Spanish anti-republicans (47 of these rescued rightists were evacuated in May 1937 to Czechoslovakia, from where they eventually got back to the Francoist zone) – this decision, which had been previously not consulted with the government in Prague, caused a scandal and partly complicated Czechoslovak diplomatic relations with Republican Spain.⁸¹ As a result of the victorious advance of the Rebel troops in the Civil War and the changing international situation, foreshadowing another global conflict, the Czechoslovak government tried beginning in 1938 to establish contacts also with the Francoist government. Nevertheless, representatives and supporters of Nationalist Spain had been active in Czechoslovakia from the outbreak of the

⁷⁵ EIROA, “La embajada”, pp. 219-220; BORTLOVÁ, “Los españolotes”, p. 254.

⁷⁶ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 7-8.

⁷⁷ OPATRŇY, “Španělsko”, pp. 10-33.

⁷⁸ SZÁRAZ, “Činnost”, p. 68.

⁷⁹ Idem, “La crisis”, pp. 175-176; CASANOVA, *La diplomacia*, pp. 194-196.

⁸⁰ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 10-11.

⁸¹ NÁLEVKA, “Las relaciones”, p. 246.

Civil War, centred around the journal Dawn (*Svítání*).⁸² In January 1938, talks about the establishment of normal relations between Prague and Burgos began in London. At the same time, negotiations took place in Czechoslovakia with the still unofficial Francoist representative in Prague, Sanz y Tovar.⁸³ These resulted in an agreement under which the Czechoslovak Republic designated its General Agent (Michal Hanák) to the Nationalists in June 1938 (the same position was to be held by Sanz y Tovar in Czechoslovakia).⁸⁴ Prague, however, still maintained official relations with the Republican government and at the end of 1937 Jiménez de Asúa succeeded in getting both Czechoslovak diplomats in Spain, Flieder and Formánek, recalled from their positions. Nonetheless, after his unsuccessful protests against the appointment of Sanz y Tovar as General Agent, and due to the gradual intensification of relations between Prague and Burgos, Luis Jiménez de Asúa decided to definitively depart from Czechoslovakia in late August 1938.⁸⁵

Another significant turning point in relations between the two countries was the interruption of diplomatic relations with the Spanish Republic and the subsequent establishment of official relations with Francoist Spain in January 1939, after the Rebel conquest of Barcelona.⁸⁶ General Agents Michal Hanák and Gaspar Sanz y Tovar were promoted to the position of *chargé d'affaires* and Zdeněk Němeček, *chargé d'affaires* to the Republican government, was recalled from Barcelona (headquarters of the Czechoslovak embassy since 1938 until the end of the war).⁸⁷ The Second Czecho-Slovak Republic oriented its Spanish foreign policy exclusively towards Nationalist Spain – Zdeněk Formánek was to be designated as the new Czechoslovak representative to the Francoist government in March 1939, but the independence of the Slovak state and the subsequent creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia ended this period of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations.⁸⁸ The Spanish embassy in Prague was transformed into a consulate (headed by Ramón Martín Herrero), dependent on the Spanish embassy in Berlin, as the newly established Protectorate did not make its own foreign policy and the Czechoslovak embassy in Madrid was closed in March 1939.⁸⁹

⁸² BORTLOVÁ, “Los españolotes”, p. 255.

⁸³ EIROA, *Las relaciones*, p. 16.

⁸⁴ NÁLEVKA, “Československo-španělské”, pp. 110-111.

⁸⁵ SZÁRAZ, “Činnost”, pp. 70-71.

⁸⁶ NÁLEVKA, “Československo-španělské”, p. 112.

⁸⁷ BORTLOVÁ, “Los españolotes”, pp. 254, 256.

⁸⁸ EIROA, *Las relaciones*, pp. 18-19.

⁸⁹ VURM, “Las relaciones”, pp. 287-288.

2.2 The Slovak state, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, post-war Czechoslovak Republic and Francoist Spain (1939-1948)

2.2.1 Relations between the Slovak state and Franco's Spain (1939-1945)

During the Second World War, Zdeněk Formánek, the former *chargé d'affaires*, acted as the unofficial Czechoslovak representative in Madrid. Despite this, diplomatic and commercial relations were developing between Franco's Spain and the clerical-fascist Slovak state (1939-1945). Francoist Spain recognised the wartime Slovak Republic on April 25, 1939, and the new Spanish *chargé d'affaires*, Carlos Arcos y Cuadra, arrived in Bratislava in August 1939.⁹⁰ The Slovak diplomatic mission in Madrid was established in October 1939 and was headed at first by the Slovak ambassador in Rome Juraj Zvrškovec and then by the later (since April 1940) *chargé d'affaires* Jozef Mikuš.⁹¹ Even though, the administrative subordination to the Slovak embassy in Rome was maintained – for this reason, it could be argued that Slovak-Spanish relations were understood by Bratislava only as an offshoot of the Slovak Mediterranean policy.⁹² Mikuš's main task in Madrid was to gain a wide international recognition of the Slovak Republic, while Spain ought to function as a bridge to Latin American countries; however, Mikuš was in this respect not very successful (only Costa Rica and Ecuador officially recognised the Slovak state, other Latin American states followed the US foreign policy).⁹³ In mid-December 1940, Spain elevated their representative in Bratislava, Cano y Trueba, to the function of the Minister Plenipotentiary. While Slovakia did not immediately reciprocate this action, Bratislava was eventually represented in Madrid by Minister Plenipotentiary Jozef Cieker after his arrival in Madrid in February 1944.⁹⁴

Despite the ideological proximity of the two states (Catholicism, Nationalism, Fascism and Anti-Communism all being crucial aspects of both regimes)⁹⁵ and the theoretical possibilities of rapprochement, Slovak-Spanish relations did not play a dominant role within the foreign policy of these countries, due to the geographical distance, little mutual necessity as well as the ongoing conflict.⁹⁶ Still, the Spanish-Slovak trade agreement on goods and payments entered into force on July 1, 1943 (negotiations had started already in 1940) and its validity was

⁹⁰ SZÁRAZ, "Relaciones", p. 273.

⁹¹ Ibidem, pp. 272-273.

⁹² Idem, "Dlhá cesta", p. 82.

⁹³ VURM, "Las relaciones", p. 289.

⁹⁴ MIKUŠ, *Pamäti*, pp. 55, 92; SZÁRAZ, "Relaciones", pp. 278-280.

⁹⁵ Alfonso PÉREZ-AGOTE, "Sociología histórica del nacional-catolicismo español", *Historia Contemporánea* 26, 2003, pp. 207-237; EIROA, "España", pp. 22-23.

⁹⁶ SZÁRAZ, "Relaciones", pp. 271-272.

set for 1 year.⁹⁷ However, the limited level of mutual economic relations, marginal cultural contacts (exchange of students, exhibitions of books and ceramics),⁹⁸ as well as the above-mentioned short-term trade agreement insinuate not only the political realism of both states but also the fact that relations between the two countries were not priorities within their foreign policies.⁹⁹ The main reasons for this commercial treaty with Spain were primarily political for the Slovak state – (economic) relations with friendly governments (such as Spain) ought to strengthen the international position of the Slovak regime after the Second World War.¹⁰⁰

However, the Allied Powers started to gain the upper hand in the war, which became increasingly evident after the German defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943. Eventually, after the successful Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943, Franco returned to the Spanish policy of “vigilant neutrality” in October 1943 (exercised already until June 1940), instead of its actual position of a “non-belligerent state”.¹⁰¹ In 1944, with the Allied landings in Normandy in June and the persistent advance of the Red Army on the Eastern Front, the situation became increasingly complicated for the Axis, its satellites and supporters. The Slovak National Uprising (August-October 1944) against the collaborationist regime and the German occupation, although suppressed, epitomised the decay of Nazi power in Europe and adumbrated the fall of the Slovak clero-fascist regime, as already in October 1944 Soviet and Czechoslovak troops were fighting Germans in the Dukla Pass (Northern Slovakia).¹⁰²

Thus, it is not surprising that the Spanish ambassador departed from Bratislava as soon as the end of 1944, leaving at the head of the mission the *chargé d'affaires* Luis Torres-Quevedo, who eventually evacuated the embassy from the advancing Soviet Army on April 1, 1945. The Spanish representative was followed in his actions by his Slovak counterpart Cieker, who terminated the Slovak diplomatic mission in Madrid during the same month.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, already at the end of 1944 Cieker was probing with Zdeněk Formánek the possibility of mutual contacts and cooperation with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and he joined, together with the rest of the Slovak legation in Madrid, the service of the

⁹⁷ Idem, “Dlhá cesta”, pp. 84, 89.

⁹⁸ VURM, “Las relaciones”, p. 289; MIKUŠ, *Pamäti*, pp. 70, 72.

⁹⁹ SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta”, pp. 83, 89.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, p. 86.

¹⁰¹ See for example: Ángeles EGIDO LEÓN, “Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Una neutralidad comprometida”, *Ayer* 57, 2005, pp. 105, 122.

¹⁰² Dušan KOVÁČ, *Dejiny Slovenska*, Praha 2007, pp. 234-243; William M. MAHONEY, *The History of the Czech Republic and Slovakia*, Santa Barbara 2011, pp. 185-188.

¹⁰³ SZÁRAZ, “Relaciones”, pp. 282-283. Száraz here nevertheless claims, that it was most probably the Spanish side who initiated the closure of the Slovak diplomatic mission.

Czechoslovak MFA on April 10, 1945, also through Formánek.¹⁰⁴ However, Ciekler decided not to return to the restored Czechoslovak Republic and to remain in Madrid, as well as did the rest of the Slovak diplomatic mission.¹⁰⁵ As will be shown in the next chapter, this decision laid the foundations for the future Slovak separatist exile in Franco's Spain, formed around Ciekler and the staff of the former Slovak legation in Madrid. The victory of Allied forces in WWII meant the change of international geopolitical situation, influencing not only Slovaks and Czechs who remained in or returned to Spain after the end of the war but also the mutual relations between Prague and Madrid.

2.2.2 The Czechoslovak government-in-exile, the Third Czechoslovak Republic and Francoist Spain (1939-1948)

After the occupation of the Czech lands in March of 1939, Zdeněk Formánek was able to leave Prague and return to the Spanish capital, where he acted there during WWII as an unofficial, "tolerated", representative of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile based in London.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, thanks to his credit gained during the Civil War, when he offered asylum at the Czechoslovak embassy to Spanish rightists, Formánek was allowed to carry out various activities in Madrid during WWII, such as the protection of Czechoslovak citizens in Spain – many of who were former volunteers from the International Brigades imprisoned in Spain,¹⁰⁷ as long as he did not present publicly his anti-German opinions.¹⁰⁸ Also, when the Francoist government decided, due to the changing international situation, to reorient its foreign policy from the support of the Axis towards the Allied Powers, Formánek's position in Madrid became from 1944 stronger, enabling him, for example, to intervene in Madrilenian diplomatic circles even against the Slovak legation.¹⁰⁹

As has been already mentioned, with the changing development in WWII, Francoist Spain decided from late 1943 to reorient its foreign policy towards the Allies.¹¹⁰ Even though, Spanish sondage regarding the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia

¹⁰⁴ Archiv MZV (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, hereinafter AMZV), fund (f.) Teritoriální odbory – Tajné (Territorial Section – Secret, hereinafter TO – T) 1945-1954 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/151 (1) Spain. No. 43779/V-1/48. Memo (J. Ciekler), 19.12.1945; SZÁRAZ, "Relaciones", p. 283.

¹⁰⁵ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁶ MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, p. 159; AMZV, f. Osobní spisy (Personal files), file: Formánek Zdeněk JUDr., no: 40.524/I-2/39. Formánek to the Presidium of the MFA in Prague, 31.3.1939.

¹⁰⁷ Eiroa in this sense mentions that Formánek tried with his activities to avoid the repatriation of Czechoslovaks from Spain to the Protectorate as the manpower for the German industry, in: EIROA, "Refugiados", pp. 140-142.

¹⁰⁸ VURM, "Las relaciones", p. 288.

¹⁰⁹ SZÁRAZ, "Relaciones", p. 281.

¹¹⁰ EGIDO LEÓN, "Franco", pp. 121-122.

encountered a negative response from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in January 1945 (position communicated by London to Formánek already in autumn 1944). Zdeněk Formánek thus informed Madrid about the official standpoint of Czechoslovak diplomacy in this respect – opening of an official Czechoslovak diplomatic mission was conditioned by the closure of the Slovak one; this requirement was however rejected by the Spanish diplomacy.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, Formánek stayed in Madrid after WWII – in September 1945, in one of his reports to the MFA in Prague, he argued that considering the international situation and the expected change of regime in Spain, it would not be opportune from the Czechoslovak point of view to accept the Spanish proposal from March 1945 to re-establish normal diplomatic relations and he recommended to wait with this question for the implementation of a “new Spanish constitutional regime”.¹¹² On the other hand, he was against the potential closure of the current Czechoslovak (*de facto*) representation in Spain, as there were 76 Czechoslovak refugees waiting for repatriation and also 300 Czechoslovak citizens living in Spain would risk becoming stateless persons as Spain would stop recognising Czechoslovak passports. As another reason against this step he mentioned the economic damages, as Prague would thus not be able to participate in the Spanish market and even though Czechoslovakia was at that time not the only state without diplomatic relations with Spain, it would be the only country, which would break even semi-official relations, while the international political effect of this move would be minimal.¹¹³ Notwithstanding that, the next month, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk, decided that it would not be convenient to change the decision that Formánek would not continue in his function in Spain and agreed only to Formánek’s short-term return to Madrid in order to solve the problems with the transfer of his clothes.¹¹⁴

Around the same time, diplomats of the former Slovak embassy, who remained in Madrid and offered their service to the re-established Czechoslovak Republic, were summoned back to Prague and wrote to the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris about the issuance of their passports, which were received, together with French transit visas, in January 1946. However, the Slovak diplomats requested the extension of the visas in order not to “travel to the unknown”

¹¹¹ SZÁRAZ, “Relaciones”, p. 281.

¹¹² AMZV, f. Generální sekretariát – A (General Secretariat – A, hereinafter GS – A) 1945-1954 (USSR, Syria, Spain), c. 188, file: Spain (057/4143). Report (Z. Formánek), 26.9.1945.

¹¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁴ AMZV, f. GS – A 1945-1954 (USSR, Syria, Spain), c. 188, file: Spain 057/146 – Dipl. věci (Diplomatic issues). MFA, no. 50/86/1945. Issue: Poměr Československa ke Španělsku (The standpoint of Czechoslovakia towards Spain). Pro domo, 18.10.1945.

and demanded the right to be able to travel with diplomatic passports.¹¹⁵ In one of his reports, Formánek informed the MFA that “everything necessary for the journey of the officials of the former Slovak embassy (to Czechoslovakia – M. T.) has been arranged [...]” and that the Slovak diplomats declared that their trip would take place by the end of January 1946.¹¹⁶ During the same month (January 14, 1946) Cieker also handed over to Formánek the archive, the inventory, the final account and the cash stock of the former Slovak legation in Madrid.¹¹⁷

We know that at least Cieker and his family actually left Spain, however, in contradiction with the official instructions of the Czechoslovak government, they returned from Paris back to Madrid.¹¹⁸ The reason for this return was most probably the interview between the Slovak diplomat and Formánek, who informed him, that his return to Czechoslovakia is linked to the threat of prosecution against him.¹¹⁹ In this case, Formánek was right, as Cieker was sentenced *in absentia* to imprisonment for four years and to confiscation of a quarter of his property, his crimes being national treason and collaborationism.¹²⁰ Eventually, in 1946 and in contrast with Cieker, who remained in Madrid, Zdeněk Formánek was definitively summoned back to work at the headquarters of the Czechoslovak MFA in Prague, as post-war Czechoslovakia did not wish to maintain diplomatic relations with Francoist Spain.¹²¹

However, Formánek returned to Madrid after the communist coup d'état of February 1948 and stood at the forefront of the newly established Czech(oslovak) exile group. This collective, a result of the communist persecution in Czechoslovakia after 1948, was formed mostly by emigrants from the Czech lands, of pro-Czechoslovak and anti-communist orientation, reaching 112 Czechoslovak citizens living in Spain (90 Czechs, 13 Slovaks and 9 Sudetes) by 1954.¹²² Apart from this group stood the Slovak exile collective, formed around

¹¹⁵ AMZV, f. Personal files, file: Dr. Cieker Jozef, Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Paris to the MFA (Prague), no. 25/dův./46. Issue: Dr. Cieker. Vypravení personálu býv. slovenského vyslanectví v Madridu do ČSR (Dispatch of the staff of the former Slovak embassy in Madrid to Czechoslovakia), 31.1.1946.

¹¹⁶ AMZV, f. Personal files, file: Dr. Cieker Jozef. Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Madrid (in liquidation) to the MFA, no. 143/46. Issue: Dispatch of the staff of the former Slovak embassy in Madrid to Czechoslovakia, 15.1.1946.

¹¹⁷ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1945-1954 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/151 (1) Spain. MFA, no. 43.779/V-1/48. MZV Povereníctvu financií v Bratislave (The MFA to the Commissioner of Finance in Bratislava). Issue: Liquidation of the former Slovak MFA – Former Slovak Embassy in Madrid, 21.6.1948.

¹¹⁸ Alena BARTLOVÁ, “Dr. Jozef Cieker, veľvyslanec Slovenskej republiky (koreferát)”, in: CHOVAN-REHÁK (ed.), *Dr. Jozef*, p. 68.

¹¹⁹ SZÁRAZ, “Relaciones”, p. 284.

¹²⁰ AMZV, f. Personal files, file: Dr. Cieker Jozef, no. Tk 391/48. Ľudový súd v Bratislave (The People's Court in Bratislava), dr. Jozef Cieker: Sentence, 28.5.1948.

¹²¹ AMZV, f. Personal files, file: Formánek Zdeněk JUDr. Personal report: JUDr. Zdeněk Formánek, n. d.

¹²² Archivo General de la Administración (The General Administration Archives, hereinafter AGA), f. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereinafter MAE), c. 82/11623, legajo (l.) R.4435/21, no.

Cieker and the staff of the former Slovak legation in Madrid, consisting almost exclusively of students of separatist orientation fleeing Czechoslovakia as early as 1945, often because of their activities during WWII. However, in this sense, it is necessary to add that Slovak, as well as Czech¹²³ exiles were only a small part of Eastern and Central Europeans that sought refuge in Francoist Spain during and after WWII.

2.3 Czechoslovak relations with the Spanish Republic in exile (1939-1948/49)

2.3.1 Czechoslovak-Spanish cooperation since 1939. Organisations and cultural contacts

During World War II, the above-mentioned Spanish and Ibero-American Institute, headed by Jaroslav Lenz and supporting the cause of Spanish Nationalists since the late 1930s, maintained its activities in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Under the presidentship of Lenz, honorary vice-consul of Spain, and thanks to the financial support from the Spanish consulate in Prague, this institute was able to organise various cultural events (conferences, expositions, theatrical performances and book publications by Spanish authors) in order to promote a more positive image of Franco's Spain.¹²⁴ With the advance of the Allied troops and the reorientation of Spanish foreign policy from supporting the Axis, the Spanish mission in Prague was abandoned by the Francoist consul, who left the city as early as 1944.¹²⁵ The building of the consulate, after the departure of its Spanish chancellor in April 1945, ended up under the control of honorary vice-consul Lenz, now also the administrator of the Spanish consulate. However, Lenz eventually handed over the building of the consulate in May 1945 to the newly founded Spanish National Committee (*Comité Nacional Español*) in Czechoslovakia.¹²⁶

This committee was founded by a group of Spaniards living in the Protectorate, based on an initiative from the Czechoslovak MFA. Its main task was the protection of interests of Spanish citizens that were encountered in Czechoslovakia (issuing of passports and

301/54. Z. Formánek to Daniel Castell Marco. Annex: Exiliados y residentes checoslovacos en España (Czechoslovak exiles and residents in Spain), 8.6.1954.

¹²³ In this thesis we work with the term "Czech exile(s)" in Francoist Spain, which should include all exiles coming from the Czech lands, who spoke Czech, regardless of their ideological beliefs. However, taking into account that the Czech pro-Czechoslovak exiles numerically dominated within the Czech exile in Spain (with Bohdan Chudoba being probably the only prominent Czech exile in Spain who rejected the concept of Czechoslovakism), the term "Czech exile(s)" in Francoist Spain functions in our thesis as a synonym for the "Czech exile(s) of Czechoslovak orientation" in Spain, unless indicated otherwise. Similarly, the term "Slovak exile(s)" serves as a synonym for "Slovak separatist exile(s)" in Franco's Spain.

¹²⁴ VURM, "La misión", p. 183.

¹²⁵ SZÁRAZ, "Relaciones", p. 282.

¹²⁶ EIROA, *Españoles*, p. 46.

repatriation), while it acted not only as the *de facto* representation of the Spanish Republican government in exile, but later also as the administrator of the Spanish and Ibero-American Institute.¹²⁷ This was possible only after the resignation of Jaroslav Lenz on the function of honorary vice-consul of Spain and his consent with the occupation of the Spanish consulate by the Spanish National Committee, once he was informed in the summer of 1945 that the standpoint of the Czechoslovak state was that the Spanish representation after March 1939 *de jure* ceased to exist and even the take-over of the consulate by Lenz was legally non-existing.¹²⁸

Francisco Lluch was elected as the president of the aforementioned Spanish National Committee (and thus the person responsible for Spanish citizens in Czechoslovakia, many of whom were former prisoners from concentration camps). Notwithstanding his anti-Nazi past, Lluch was shortly after WWII accused of “treason and fascism” and of contacts with the former Spanish Francoist consul.¹²⁹ Even though that within this Committee, some pro-Francoist elements were undeniably active, the procedure of state organs against Lluch was the result of the pressure from the PCE on Czechoslovak authorities and contained multiple irregularities. Eventually, in November 1945 Lluch, now a person widely criticised within the Spanish colony in Spain, was deprived of his function, after a vote – even though he did not accept this decision, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior (MOI) in December 1945 dissolved the Spanish National Committee.¹³⁰ Still, Lluch maintained contacts with the Spanish Republican government in exile, criticising the communist party in his reports and continuing to act as the president of the Committee at least until the termination of its functioning in February 1946; nevertheless, he no longer enjoyed the support of the Czechoslovak government.¹³¹ Those Republican Spaniards in Czechoslovakia, who were in opposition to Lluch and his direction of the Spanish National Committee, created the Committee of Republican Spaniards (*Comité de los Españoles Republicanos*) in November 1945, presided by socialist Agustín Gimeno (later deported to Yugoslavia due to his articles critical towards Soviet policies) and with the main objective of propaganda in favour of the Spanish Republic and the support of mutual cultural relations.¹³²

¹²⁷ Ibidem; VURM, “Las relaciones”, p. 290.

¹²⁸ AMZV, f. Diplomatický protokol – Cizí zastoupení v ČSR (Diplomatic protocol – Foreign Representation in Czechoslovakia), 1950-1955 (Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), c. 51, file: 057/162 Konzulární zast. v ČSR (Consular Representation in Czechoslovakia) – Španělsko – Dr. Jaroslav Lenz, prof. Lluch. The Spanish Consulate in Prague to the MFA in Prague. Statement of the Section No. II, 17.5.1945 (6.6.1945); AMZV, f. Diplomatický protokol – Foreign Representation in Czechoslovakia, 1950-1955 (Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), c. 51, file: 057/162 Consular Representation in Czechoslovakia – Španělsko – Dr. Jaroslav Lenz, prof. Lluch. The MFA to Dr. J. Lenz. Issue: Dr. Jaroslav Lenz, former Spanish honorary vice-consul in Prague, 27.7.1945.

¹²⁹ EIROA, “Republicanos”, pp. 312-313; NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 77.

¹³⁰ VURM, “La misión”, pp. 186-187.

¹³¹ Idem, “Las relaciones”, pp. 291-292.

¹³² Idem, “La misión”, p. 186.

Even though at the end of 1945 there were no objections from the part of the Czechoslovak MOI regarding the foundation of this new Committee, already in the spring of 1946, the Committee of Republican Spaniards announced to the Ministry that due to the change of circumstances, there were no more conditions for the existence and activities of an organisation of democratic Spaniards in Czechoslovakia and this Committee therefore did not insist on its official recognition.¹³³

At the same time, the Society of Friends of Democratic Spain (*Společnost přátel demokratického Španělska* – SPDŠ), founded in Prague in 1936 as the Committee for the Help for Democratic Spain (*Výbor pro pomoc demokratickému Španělsku*), renewed its pre-war activity. This organisation was initially created during the Spanish Civil War with the objective of helping the Spanish Republicans through various activities (publications, collections, cultural and propagandistic actions) and although having widespread public support and collaborating with the Spanish Republican embassy, after March 1939 it was dissolved.¹³⁴ Once renewed after WWII, the SPDŠ started to organise, under the presidency of the Czechoslovak resistance fighter Emanuel V. Voska, various events in support of the enemies of the Francoist regime – as soon as January 27, 1946, manifestations in support of Spanish Republicans took place in several places in Prague. At the beginning of February, the Committee for the Help for Democratic Spain was set up in Brno. Simultaneously, Czechoslovak authorities received hundreds of resolutions from various Czechoslovak organisations in support of democratic Spain.¹³⁵ On February 12, 1946, the SPDŠ organised an event in support of Spanish exiles in the Lucerna Palace in Prague with the attendance of many public figures (future leader of the Spanish communist exiles in Czechoslovakia Enrique Líster also participated).¹³⁶ At the same time, Francisco Lluch organised in front of the Lucerna Palace, in the Barok Café, another event in support of Spanish Republicans, under the heading of the Spanish and Ibero-American Institute. However, Lluch's action attracted more the State Security (StB) than public and this Institute was dissolved in May 1946.¹³⁷ Francisco Lluch was arrested in September 1946 due

¹³³ AMZV, f. Teritoriální odbory – Obyčejné (Territorial section – Regular, hereinafter TO – O), 1945-1959 Spain, c. 2, file: Spolky, společnosti (Societies, Associations) 1945-1946 (5). The MOI to the MFA, Issue: The Organisation of Spanish Republicans in Czechoslovakia, 14.5.1946.

¹³⁴ CASANOVA, *La diplomacia*, pp. 195-197; BORTLOVÁ, “Los españolotes”, p. 254; Idem, “La participación”, p. 167.

¹³⁵ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, pp. 77-78.

¹³⁶ VURM, “Las relaciones”, p. 292.

¹³⁷ EIROA, *Españoles*, pp. 49-50.

to accusations of his collaboration during the Protectorate and sympathies with Francoism and eventually, in October 1946, was banished from Czechoslovakia together with his family.¹³⁸

Another activity in favour of the Spanish Republic was a literary evening in Prague in April 1946, during which poems of Federico García Lorca, as well as critiques towards the Francoist regime were read.¹³⁹ However, the cultural and social event in support of democratic Spain with the greatest echo in Czechoslovakia was the exhibition “The Art of Republican Spain. Spanish artists of the Paris school” (*Umění republikánského Španělska. Španělští umělci pařížské školy*), inaugurated on January 30, 1946, in the Mánes Exhibition Hall.¹⁴⁰ A total of 244 works by many renowned painters (Pablo Picasso, Óscar Domínguez, Antoni Clavé) were exhibited and 80,000 visitors saw the exposition (including President Beneš), which was later moved to other Czech cities and became the Czechoslovak event of the year 1946.¹⁴¹ Another exhibition called “Three Spaniards” (*Tres Españoles*), dedicated to three Spanish painters from the event “The Art of Republican Spain” took place in Prague at the end of 1946. Further expositions of Spanish artists were realised or repeated in the future years, up until the communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.¹⁴²

2.3.2 Czechoslovak relations with the Spanish government in exile (1945-1948/49)

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had played a crucial role within Czechoslovak-Spanish relations since the end of the 1930s and its involvement in the recruitment of International Volunteers to the Spanish Civil War.¹⁴³ After WWII, the communists, as one of the main protagonists of resistance against Nazi Germany, enjoyed widespread support in the restored Czechoslovak Republic from the public (and also from the USSR) and after the general elections of May 1946 became the strongest political party with the Prime Minister (Klement Gottwald) and 9 members in the cabinet, controlling the crucial offices (MOI, Ministry of Information).¹⁴⁴ The communist ascent to power was linked with the reorientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy – even though the country planned to cooperate with its traditional allies – Western democracies (Great Britain, France), as well as with the USSR and thus functioning as a “bridge” between the East and the West, Prague started to lean

¹³⁸ VURM, “La misión”, p. 187.

¹³⁹ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 79.

¹⁴⁰ VURM, “La misión”, p. 188.

¹⁴¹ UBIETO ARTETA et al., *Dějiny*, p. 798; NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, pp. 78-79.

¹⁴² EIROA, *Españoles*, pp. 52-53.

¹⁴³ See for example BORTLOVÁ, “Los españolotes”, pp. 253-268; NÁLEVKA, “Los voluntarios”, pp. 135-139; NEDVĚD, *Českoslovenští*, pp. 85-140; TIMKO, “Los voluntarios”, pp. 93-108.

¹⁴⁴ KOVÁČ, *Dejiny*, pp. 247, 249-250; MAHONEY, *The History*, pp. 196-199.

increasingly towards Moscow and the emerging Eastern Bloc from 1946. After failed negotiations about the Czechoslovak-French *entente* (1946-1947) and the signing of treaties of alliance with Yugoslavia (May 1946) and Poland (March 1947) instead, the definitive turnover of the Czechoslovak foreign policy was completed in the summer 1947, when due to the pressure from the USSR, Czechoslovakia had to revise its decision of participating in the Marshall Plan.¹⁴⁵ Despite the MFA being led by the non-partisan Minister Jan Masaryk until March 1948, the omnipresent influence of the KSČ (a consequence of the long-term process of increasing communist and Soviet power in the country) facilitated the reorientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy also in relation to Spain and the Spanish Republic as soon as 1946.

At the first session of the reconvened Spanish *cortes* in Mexico City in January 1945, it was decided to send representatives of the Spanish exile to the San Francisco Conference of the UN with a memorandum against the Francoist regime.¹⁴⁶ Despite a general sympathy and rhetorical support for the Spanish Republic among the victorious Allies, the Spanish exiles struggled to ensure significant steps to be taken in support of the Republican cause. Even though France had closed its border with Franco in March 1946 as a reaction to Francoist executions,¹⁴⁷ and the UN Security Council between May and June investigated the possibility of further actions towards Spain,¹⁴⁸ neither the UK nor the US were planning to break diplomatic or commercial relations with Franco and no military actions were to be taken against Madrid.¹⁴⁹ The first Spanish Republican government in exile was *de facto* a continuation of the last war-time cabinet of Juan Negrín, and as such, it inherited the problems of the Spanish Republicans from the Civil War: internal struggles, economic difficulties, restraint from the Western democracies in gaining their full support and an unresolved question of the international ostracisation of the Francoist Spain.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the new exile government, presented in November 1945 and led by a member of *Izquierda Republicana*, José Giral, was in the period between March-May 1946 enhanced by the PCE, Galician Nationalists and the Republican Right, in order to unite all anti-Francoist forces, to become more representative and to receive concrete support from the UK, US, as well as from the USSR.¹⁵¹ After the recognition of the Spanish

¹⁴⁵ DEJMEK, *Československo*, pp. 27-30; Idem, “Postoj”, pp. 11-29.

¹⁴⁶ Xavier FLORES, “El Gobierno de la República en el exilio. Crónica de un imposible retorno”, *Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea* 14, 2001, pp. 311-313.

¹⁴⁷ EIROA, *Espanoles*, pp. 28-30.

¹⁴⁸ UN General Assembly, Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain [on-line], 12 December 1946, A/RES/39, <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f08d8.html>>, [accessed 8 March 2022].

¹⁴⁹ FLORES, “El Gobierno”, pp. 313-315.

¹⁵⁰ Ibidem, pp. 317-321.

¹⁵¹ José A. FERRER BENIMELLI, “Historia de la República española en el exilio (1939-1977) (I)”, *Tiempo de historia* 32, 1977, pp. 12-14.

exile government by various Latin American countries (August-November 1945), the first European country to follow this step was Poland on April 4, 1946; however, only after the incorporation of the Spanish communist Santiago Carrillo into the government.¹⁵² Considering the emergent Cold War division, the conditioning of support of Eastern European countries by the integration of the PCE into the cabinet is understandable; nonetheless, the approach of Prague, in 1946 still not fully under Soviet influence, towards recognition of Giral's government, was more complex.

Already in the first half of April 1946, Miloš Ruppeltdt, the communist secretary at the MFA, informed his superior, the Vice-Minister and member of the KSČ, Vladimír Clementis, about his interview with Enrique Líster. The Spanish communist leader told Ruppeltdt, that he had received a telegram from Francisco Antón ("number two" of the PCE at that time – M. T.) in the sense that the PCE thinks that the recently broadened government of Giral is firm, Carrillo has accepted his ministerial post and that it would be desired if Czechoslovakia would acknowledge the Spanish Republican government. To be sure that in case there would be some problems between Giral and the more progressive elements in his government, Ruppeltdt recommended to Clementis, that in the official Czechoslovak declaration about the recognition it would be useful to underline that Czechoslovakia decided to acknowledge Giral's government because recently it has become more representative.¹⁵³ Still, Jaroslav Císař, the Czechoslovak *chargé d'affaires* in London, informed Prague that the Spanish diplomat Pablo de Azcárate took note of this Czechoslovak position, but was not thrilled about it, as the recognition of the Spanish Republican government by Poland did more harm than help Giral's cabinet, due to accusations of the Soviet influence in Eastern European countries and the possible referring to the exile government as communist by Madrid. Císař thus brought up the question of whether the Czechoslovak recognition should not be combined with the acknowledgement by another country outside of the Soviet sphere (Norway, Belgium, France), as Spanish Republican circles did not doubt the Czechoslovak position even without official recognition.¹⁵⁴ Thus, it seems clear that not only Spanish but also Czechoslovak diplomats realised that the recognition of the

¹⁵² EIROA, "Republicanos", pp. 302-304.

¹⁵³ AMZV, f. GS – A, 1945-1954 (USSR, Syria, Spain), c. 188, file: 057/415 Politické věci (Political issues) – Spain. Report for Mr. Vice-Minister, (Ruppeltdt), 11.4.1946. Furthermore, Ruppeltdt in this report also warned about Francisco Lluch, "known for his anti-Soviet and anti-Czechoslovak position", who ought to be designated as a *persona non grata*, considering that his reports to Giral could lead to situation, when he would be appointed by the Spanish Republican government as its official representative in Czechoslovakia.

¹⁵⁴ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/23 Státy (States) – Spain – Political Issues (General). Telegram from (the Czechoslovak Embassy in) London to Minister Masaryk and Prime Minister Fierlinger. Issue: Uznání republikánské španělské vlády (Recognition of the Spanish Republican government), 12.4.1946.

Spanish Republican government in exile by countries under Soviet influence was in the context of the nascent Cold War a double-edged sword – even though inspiring other states, the affiliation with Eastern European countries could damage the image of the Spanish exile government, as its proximity to the USSR might have been criticised by the West.¹⁵⁵ For this reason, Czechoslovakia waited with the official recognition of Giral's government until the summer of 1946; nevertheless, it was once again the communist influence, that dictated the approach of the Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Republican Spain.

On August 20, 1946, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Clementis informed Prime Minister Gottwald about his interview in Paris with José Giral. Nevertheless, Clementis focused in his report more on his meeting with Spanish communists Carrillo and Antón the day before – they had both thought that the moment was right for the recognition of the Republican government as it would help them to solve the “Spanish Question” within the UN. Considering that Prague had already decided to recognise the Spanish Republican government and it had let the Czechoslovak MFA decide when the moment for this step would be right, Clementis notified Giral that the next day a note regarding its recognition would be sent to the Spanish government.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the *de jure* recognition by Czechoslovakia took place on August 22, 1946, and was being followed by the wide support of the Czechoslovak public.¹⁵⁷ After disputes regarding the potential Spanish representative in Prague (both the communist Tomás García and the pre-war lector of Spanish at Charles University, Javier Fariña, were rejected – the former by Giral, the latter by Czechoslovak authorities),¹⁵⁸ Manuel García de Miranda was appointed as the new Minister Plenipotentiary of the Spanish Republic in exile in Prague.

Miranda arrived in Prague in November 1946 and his activities in Czechoslovakia consisted, apart from his diplomatic and consular duties, of co-organisation of Spanish courses, conferences about Spanish history and art, publication of articles about Spain and Spanish exile in Czech newspapers and participation in the Spanish broadcast of the Czechoslovak Radio, *Radio Praga* (controlled by the PCE).¹⁵⁹ Miranda, as well as other Republican diplomats in

¹⁵⁵ EIROA, *Espanoles*, p. 27.

¹⁵⁶ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/24 States – Spain – Political issues (General). Telegram from (the Czechoslovak embassy in) Paris to Prime Minister Gottwald, 20.8.1946.

¹⁵⁷ VURM, “La misión”, p. 190.

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem; AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/3 (2) Diplomatický sbor cizí v ČSR (Foreign diplomatic corps in Czechoslovakia) – Španělský kons. v Praze (Spanish consulate in Prague). The MFA to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris. Issue: Prof. F. J. Fariña, Spanish citizen – info, 8.11.1946. Fariña was eventually banished from Czechoslovakia in 1949 based on the accusation of spying against the Czechoslovak state, in: NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 77.

¹⁵⁹ EIROA, *Espanoles*, pp. 54-56.

Eastern Europe, tried to establish contacts with other foreign representations and to make propaganda against Franco's Spain while cooperating with the former *interbrigadistas*, many of whom occupied high-ranking positions within the state apparatus after WWII.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, he intended to create an organisation that would substitute the Spanish and Ibero-American Institute; nevertheless, his labour clashed with the lack of financial resources, as well as with antagonism of both Czechoslovak and Spanish communists.¹⁶¹ Even before the presentation of his credentials to President Beneš on November 28, 1946, Miranda had an interview with the above-cited Miloš Ruppeltdt, in which the former presented the plan of his activities in Czechoslovakia.¹⁶² According to Ruppeltdt, this plan was unrealisable and abstract, while the Czechoslovak communist secretary expressed in his report a suspicion that Miranda's real objective was to live a good life without much work in Prague. Ruppeltdt was also convinced that Miranda, in contrast to his official promises of creating in Prague an embassy for Central Europe with the communist Tomás García (as the First Secretary), did everything possible to not let García arrive in Czechoslovakia, as his activity would overshadow him.¹⁶³ One day after Miranda, Ruppeltdt spoke with the Spanish communist leader Francisco Antón: this had a negative standpoint to all points of Miranda's plan in Czechoslovakia while describing his project of mutual recognition of academic titles as an "idiocy".¹⁶⁴ Regarding the issue of García (as a potential Spanish representative in Prague) Antón said, that the PCE had done what it could and that it was visible that Miranda intrigues against García. Ruppeltdt concluded his report with a statement that based on the interview with Antón he had a feeling that the PCE makes realistic politics, as it wanted to maintain the Republican government strong and to prevent compromise manoeuvres between Spaniards in exile and in Spain.¹⁶⁵

Soon after Miranda's arrival to Prague, the attempts of Spanish Republicans to internationally ostracise Franco materialised themselves in the adoption of the Resolution 39 of the General Assembly of the UN in December 1946, which "condemned the Franco regime in Spain and [...] recommend[ed] that all Members of the UN immediately recall from Madrid

¹⁶⁰ PETHŮ, *El exilio*, p. 52; BORTLOVÁ, "Los españolotes", p. 260.

¹⁶¹ EIROA, *Españoles*, pp. 56-57

¹⁶² AMZV, f. GS – A, 1945-1954 (USSR, Syria, Spain), c. 188, file: 057/146 Diplomatic issues. Záznam pre pána štátneho tajomníka o rozhovore so španielskym vyslancom Manuelom García Mirandom (Record for Mr. Vice-Minister about an interview with the Spanish ambassador Manuel Garcia Miranda) – (Ruppeltdt), 19.11.1946.

¹⁶³ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁴ AMZV, f. GS – A, 1945-1954 (USSR, Syria, Spain), c. 188, file: 057/41 Political issues, 418 – Asyl (Asylum), 419 – Rozhovory (Interviews). Záznam o rozhovore s členom PB KSŠ Antonom (Record about the interview with the member of the PB of the PCE Antón) – (Ruppeltdt), 20.11.1946.

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem.

their Ambassadors [...]”.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, it also prohibited Spain from being admitted into international organisations, as “the Franco regime is a fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from, Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist Italy”.¹⁶⁷ However, as soon as the beginning of 1947, new cracks in the relationship between the Spanish exile government and Czechoslovakia became visible. Even though Miranda initially found at least rhetorical solidarity and support for the Republican cause not only by President Beneš, but also by the communist Prime Minister Gottwald,¹⁶⁸ with the increasing internal problems of the Spanish Republican government in January 1947, Miranda’s position in Prague became more complicated and less desired, especially by the KSČ. Thus, when during his interview with the communist Vice-Minister Clementis (a few days before the fall of Giral’s government at the end of January 1947) Miranda asked the Czechoslovak politician if Prague will eventually send its representative to the Republican government, Clementis answered without obligation and only vaguely.¹⁶⁹

This position of Clementis was at this time based on the initially unclear standpoint of the PCE in the newly established (February 1947) exile government of socialist Rodolfo Llopis – even though the Spanish Communist Party maintained their ministerial position, the gradual split within the Spanish exile seemed to be inevitable, as Llopis tried to find understanding with Spanish anti-Francoist monarchists. This step was criticised by various members of the exile government (communists, as well as a socialist group led by Prieto – who also criticised the inclusion of the PCE in this government), leading to the fall of Llopis’s cabinet, harming not only the Republican exile, as this was the last government of national concentration, but also Czechoslovak-Spanish relations.¹⁷⁰ The new cabinet of Álvaro de Albornoz formed in August 1947 did not have the support of the PSOE nor the PCE and was just another symbol of ambivalences in Spanish exile and of the declining interest in the Spanish matter, not only in Western democracies but also by the Eastern Bloc.¹⁷¹ Another sign of conflicts within the exile was the departure of ambassador García de Miranda, who left Prague in February 1947,

¹⁶⁶ UN General Assembly, Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain [on-line], 12 December 1946, A/RES/39, <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f08d8.html>>, [accessed 8 March 2022].

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁸ VURM, “La misión”, pp. 190-191.

¹⁶⁹ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/25 States – Spain – Political issues (General). No. 16.571/A/1947. Záznam o rozhovore p. štátneho tajomníka Dr. Vl. Clementisa so španielskym vyslancom de Mirandon (Report about the interview between the Vice-Minister Dr. Vl. Clementis with the Spanish ambassador de Miranda), 22.1.1947.

¹⁷⁰ FLORES, “El Gobierno”, pp. 328- 331; PETHŮ, *El exilio*, p. 40.

¹⁷¹ José A. FERRER BENIMELLI, “Historia de la República española en el exilio (1939-1977) (y II)”, *Tiempo de historia* 33, 1977, pp. 53-55; CIECHANOWSKI, “Las relaciones”, pp. 51, 71.

officially abdicating in order to share the destiny of his Prime Minister Giral¹⁷² – his position was assumed by the First Secretary and then *chargé d'affaires* Juan Climent.

The departure of the PCE from the Spanish Republican government took place at the time of the increasing sovietisation of Eastern European countries – the Hungarian communist coup d'état from May 1947 was followed by the creation of the Cominform (September 1947) and the seizure of power by the communist party in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.¹⁷³ Furthermore, at the same time, France opened its border with Francoist Spain – the intensification of the Cold War, leading to the gradual end of the international isolation of Franco, did not play in favour of the Spanish Republican cause.¹⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the absolute dominance of the KSČ over Prague's (not only) foreign policy after February 1948 was visible also in mutual relations with the Spanish government in exile – based on recommendations from members of the PCE, Líster and Carrillo, Spanish cultural attachés Juan Manuel de Epalza and Iñaki de Rentería were declared *personas non-grata* by Czechoslovak state organs in March 1948 (based on fabricated suspicion that they were in the service of British intelligence).¹⁷⁵ In the same way, when in May 1948 the Spanish Republican government asked for an agreement for Ricardo Begoña as the Minister Plenipotentiary for Czechoslovakia (as well as Hungary and Romania, with headquarters in Prague), Czechoslovak authorities decided in July 1948, once “the issue was discussed with the representatives of Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia and with Dolores Ibárruri”, that this agreement must be for now refused.¹⁷⁶

Thus, despite the official recognition of the Spanish Republican government by Czechoslovakia in 1946, Prague had already since the departure of the PCE from the exile government in 1947 started to switch its foreign policy from supporting the Spanish exile into

¹⁷² AMZV, f. Diplomatic protocol – Foreign Representation in Czechoslovakia, 1950-1955 (Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), c. 51, file: 057/161 Diplomatic corps – Spain: Ambassador Manuel García de Miranda y Noguero, Ambassador Ricardo Begoña y Calderon. Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic in Paris to the MFA. No. 145/dův/47. Issue: Činnost Llopisovy vlády (Activities of Llopis' Government), 11.3.1947. However, Miranda allegedly claimed in private talks with his friends that another reason for his resignation was the animosity of Czechoslovak public, encountered at every place.

¹⁷³ Karel DURMAN, *Popely ještě žhavé: velká politika 1938-1991. Díl I: Světová válka a nukleární mír 1938-1964*, Praha 2004, pp. 227-230. For more on “Victorious February” of 1948 see for example DEJMEK – LOUŽEK (eds.), *Únor 1948: šedesát let poté*, Praha 2008.

¹⁷⁴ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 52.

¹⁷⁵ EIROA, “Republicanos”, p. 313.

¹⁷⁶ AMZV, f. Diplomatic protocol – Foreign Representation in Czechoslovakia, 1950-1955 (Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), c. 51, file: 057/161 Diplomatic corps – Spain: Ambassador Manuel García de Miranda y Noguero, Ambassador Ricardo Begoña y Calderon. MFA, no. 142.374/P-48. Issue: Vyřízení agrémentu pro min. Begoňu (Handling of an agreement for Minister Begoña). Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris for the MFA, no. 334/dův/48. Issue: Žádost španělské republikánské vlády o agrément pro ministra Begoňu (Request of the Spanish Republican government for an agreement for Minister Begoña), 19.5.1948 (9.7.1948).

collaborating exclusively with the PCE, finalising this process after the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, while the Czechoslovak approach towards the official representation of Spanish exile in Prague could be described as indifferent, since the departure of Miranda.¹⁷⁷ Instead of his official successor, seriously ill Juan Climent, it was his wife Paquita, who together with Juan de Epalza (since February 1948 executing the function of *chargé d'affaires* ad interim) led the Spanish Republican embassy in Prague until their departure at the end of 1949.¹⁷⁸ Manuel Sánchez Arcas, Spanish ambassador accredited in Warsaw and a member of the PCE, was named as their successor; however, he never exercised his function in Prague and presented his resignation as a representative of the Republic in Warsaw already in January 1950, due to pressure from Moscow as well as from the PCE.¹⁷⁹ When at the end of 1949, the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris announced to the MFA the request from the Spanish government for an agreement for Sánchez Arcas, they also asked if Prague could financially support the Spanish Republican embassy.¹⁸⁰ The absence of an answer from the Czechoslovak part on this request was symptomatic – at this point, Czechoslovak support for the Spanish exile was already oriented exclusively to the PCE, whose members started to arrive in Czechoslovakia already after WWII. Czechoslovakia soon became a haven for Spanish communist exiles – their numbers began to grow rapidly from 1948 onwards and Prague turned into one of the centres of the Spanish communist exile at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, Czechoslovak organisations for the support of Republicans (such as the SPDŠ), were also under the control of the KSČ, which was, after the departure of the PCE from the government, not interested anymore in coordinating activities with the Spanish embassy.¹⁸¹

Another blow for the Spanish Republican government in exile was the Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN from November 1950, which revoked the recommendation from December 1946 for the withdrawal of Ambassadors from Madrid as well as for the debarment of Francoist Spain from membership in international organisations.¹⁸² With the Cold War fully erupting, Madrid became an important ally of the West in its fight against the Soviet Bloc since the early 1950s, while the Spanish government in exile was never fully recognised by the

¹⁷⁷ EIROA, *Españoles*, p. 59.

¹⁷⁸ VURM, “La misión”, p. 194.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibidem*; CIECHANOWSKI, “Las relaciones”, pp. 73-76.

¹⁸⁰ AMZV, f. Diplomatic protocol – Foreign Representation in Czechoslovakia, 1950-1955 (Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), c. 51, file: 057/161 Foreign representation in Czechoslovakia, Spain. Ambassador Manuel Sanchez Arcas. Record. Request for an agreement for the Spanish Republican ambassador Manuel Sanchez Arcas, 12.12.1949.

¹⁸¹ VURM, “La misión”, p. 193.

¹⁸² UN General Assembly, Relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Spain [on-line], 4 November 1950, A/RES/386, <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f08944.html>>, [accessed 8 March 2022].

Western democracies.¹⁸³ Thus, the financial problems of the Spanish embassy in Prague (limited possibilities of the Spanish government and lack of goodwill from the Czechoslovak regime, whose foreign policy was since 1946 more and more controlled by the KSČ), as well as the internal problems of the Spanish Republic in exile (departure of communists from the cabinet), meant that already in the late 1940s Czechoslovak relations with Republican Spain gradually disappeared, even though they were never officially interrupted.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 52-53.

¹⁸⁴ NÁLEVKA, "Španělé", pp. 94-95. This also meant that unsuccessful attempts from the Spanish Republican government in exile for an establishment of a representative office in Prague (with Czechoslovak financial support) or an honorary vice-consulate date as late as to 1956, in: AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959 Spain, c. 205, file: 057/115 Spain. MFA, no. 014301/56. Issue: Zastoupení španělské republikánské vlády v ČSR (Representation of the Spanish Republican government in Czechoslovakia). Telegram from (the Embassy in) Paris to the MFA, 18.7.1956.

3. Cold War (im)mobilities and (anti)communist moorings

In Central and Eastern Europe, the first years after WWII could be described as an era of extensive mobility of the population, including various waves of emigrants, expatriates, prisoners of war and soldiers moving in many directions.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, an increasing amount of recent research on the topic of mobility during the Cold War demonstrates,¹⁸⁶ that mobilities formed an integral part also of the Cold War's everyday reality. Cross-border transfers and connections were carried out and maintained via different measures and ways; still, on a regular basis, throughout the forty-year-long conflict, considering that "confrontation does not automatically mean suppression of contacts".¹⁸⁷ In this sense, we are not referring only to the mobility within the respective blocs or the escapes through the Iron Curtain (mostly) westwards¹⁸⁸ – migration and transborder mobility were an essential aspect of the Cold War in the history of Eastern European countries also in relation to the Third World and in the West-East direction.¹⁸⁹

As mentioned in the introduction, the barrier erected by the USSR was "less an Iron Curtain than a semipermeable membrane", and this dividing line between the East and the West was dynamic and porous, which enabled transfers of people, products, ideas and information, as well as the maintenance of contacts through this selectively permeable East-West divide.¹⁹⁰ However, the permeability of the Iron Curtain differed not only according to the respective countries and the concrete period but also due to the reasons and the socio-political status of those, who wanted to penetrate through it. Throughout history, different regimes reacted differently in their attempts to control the mobilities of people, products and information across and within their borders, with the divulgence of information and ideas often surpassing state control.¹⁹¹ Nonetheless, the perception and interpretation of mobility and migration always depended on the dominant political discourse existing on the regional, national and international

¹⁸⁵ BÁRTA, "Právo", p. 15. For example, only from Czechoslovakia were between 1945-1946 expelled more than 2,5 million Germans, in: DEJMEK, *Československo*, pp. 62-63.

¹⁸⁶ See e.g., BURRELL – HÖRSCHELMANN, (eds.), *Mobilities in Socialist and Post-Socialist States: Societies on the Move*, Houndmills, New York 2014; MIKKONEN – PARKKINEN – SCOTT-SMITH (eds.), *Entangled East and West: Cultural Diplomacy and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War*, Berlin, Boston 2018; BURTON – DIETRICH – HARISCH et al., *Navigating Socialist Encounters. Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements between Africa and East Germany during the Cold War*, Berlin, Boston 2021; SCHWENKEL, "Socialist", pp. 13-25.

¹⁸⁷ Simo MIKKONEN – Jari PARKKINEN – Giles SCOTT-SMITH, "Exploring Culture in and of the Cold War", in: Idem (eds.), *Entangled*, p. 3.

¹⁸⁸ CARRUTHERS, "Between", pp. 911-942.

¹⁸⁹ KOURA, "Geneva", pp. 1-2.

¹⁹⁰ DAVID-FOX, "The Iron", p. 18.

¹⁹¹ Kathy BURRELL – Kathrin HÖRSCHELMANN, "Introduction: Understanding Mobility in Soviet and East European Socialist and Post-Socialist States", in: Idem (eds.), *Mobilities*, pp. 6-7.

levels.¹⁹² Thus, for example, business journeys of Eastern European communist functionaries westwards or trips of Western tourists behind the Iron Curtain were not a scarce and often mutually desired phenomenon throughout the Cold War.¹⁹³

Inhabitants of post-war Czechoslovakia that fled to Spain and Spanish communists seeking refuge in Prague after 1945 were another example of the Cold War (im)mobility. Considering that mobility inevitably includes encounters, these emigrants were in their host countries confronted with the reality of Czechoslovak state socialism and Francoist authoritarian dictatorship, respectively. Often, their confrontation with everyday reality gave place to experiences contrasting with their expectations and leading to frustration, resistance or eventual departure – mobility outside of the host country. Based on the example of these emigrants, in this chapter we argue that not only “reproduction is mobile”¹⁹⁴, but also that (im)mobilities are (re)productive. Through fixities and (infra)structures, mobility could enable and/or lead to another (im)mobility (and vice versa), also, one mobility (movement of people) could also carry another one (transfer of ideas).¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, the destinies of Spanish, as well as Slovak and Czech(oslovak) exiles epitomise the dynamics of (anti)communist (im)mobilities during the Cold War – in particular, Spanish communists, sometimes even those in conflict with the leadership of the party, were able to cross the Iron Curtain into/outside of Czechoslovakia on several occasions, all of it during the course of the full-blown Cold War.

3.1 (Im)mobilities, moorings and the new mobilities paradigm

Mobility and movement have formed an integral part of everyday life for centuries – the controlled or uncontrolled, voluntary or enforced flow of people, products, information, ideas, capital and even diseases, in significant amounts and on a global scale, but also in small proportions on a local level is one of the symbols, as well as one of the causes of the interconnected world of the 20th century. To exist means to move, to live means to move with a purpose.¹⁹⁶ Thus, mobility, *mobilitas* in Latin (the capacity to move and to change)¹⁹⁷ “is a

¹⁹² Nina GLICK SCHILLER – Noel B. SALAZAR, “Regimes of Mobility Across the Globe”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2, 2013, p. 190.

¹⁹³ Sune BECHMANN PEDERSEN – Christian NOACK, “Crossing the Iron Curtain: An introduction”, in: Idem (eds.), *Tourism*, pp. 1-11.

¹⁹⁴ FROHLICK – LOZANSKI – SPEIER et al., “Mobilities”, p. 95; SELLER, “The reproduction”, pp. 188-195.

¹⁹⁵ Peter ADEY, *Mobility*, Abingdon, New York 2017, p. 209.

¹⁹⁶ HANNAM – SELLER – URRY, “Editorial”, pp. 1-2; ADEY, *Mobility*, pp. 7, 11; Andrew DUFFY, “Wherever I Go, There You Are”. The mobility/mooring paradigm in travel journalism”, *Journalism Studies* 6, 2018, pp. 863, 867.

¹⁹⁷ Sven KESSELRING, “Mobility – why actually?” in: Sven Kesselring – Ole Jensen – Mimi Sheller (eds.), *Mobilities and Complexities*, Abingdon, New York 2019, p. 164.

fact of life. To be human [...] is to have some kind of capacity for mobility”.¹⁹⁸ Nonetheless, it must be underlined that mobility is more than just the movement from one place to another – Tim Cresswell argues that mobility is a social product coproduced by objects and ideas and also a movement, which carries meaning.¹⁹⁹ On the other hand, for Peter Adey, mobility is a (lived) relation, “a way of addressing people, objects, things and places [...] a way of communicating meaning and significance, while it is also a way to resist authoritarian regimes.”²⁰⁰ Moreover, the concept of mobility also “travels” – not only throughout the years but also within disciplines. Adey in this sense claims that the understanding (whether positive or negative) of the notion of mobility always succumbs to the societal and political context of a concrete era. For example, in the 1970s, the interpretation of mobilities conformed to the Cold War political needs, while these representations made the visualisation of flows of movement possible and thus helped the understanding of mobility in one possible way.²⁰¹

Even though that mobility and movement as such have been the subject of investigation by various disciplines for many decades, it has only been since the end of the 20th century, when mobility and its analysis as a process – this “move [...] from fixity to motion”, has come into the centre of attention of researchers.²⁰² This mobility turn is linked mainly with the work of British sociologist John Urry and could be considered a furthering and a re-articulation of the spatial turn.²⁰³ By changing the subject and the methodology of the research of mobility, it paved the way for the new mobilities paradigm, which “challenges the ways in which much social science research has been relatively ‘a-mobile’ [...].”²⁰⁴ As soon as 2000, Urry in his book “Sociology Beyond Societies” proposed the shift within sociology from its focus on societies to interconnected mobility system(s), arguing that this “sociology of mobilities” should orient towards “movement, mobility and contingent ordering, rather than upon stasis, structure and social order”, while including the socio-spatial aspect of mobilities into their analysis.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁸ Tim CRESSWELL, *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World*, Abingdon, New York 2006, p. 22.

¹⁹⁹ Ibidem, pp. 6-7, 199.

²⁰⁰ ADEY, *Mobility*, p. XV.

²⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 102.

²⁰² Emmanuel-Pierre GUITTET, “Unpacking the new mobilities paradigm: lessons for critical security studies?”, in: Matthias Leese – Stef Wittendorp (eds.), *Security/Mobility: Politics of Movement*, Manchester 2017, p. 212.

²⁰³ Mimi SELLER, “From spatial turn to mobilities turn”, *Current Sociology Monograph* 4, 2017, pp. 623-626.

²⁰⁴ HANNAM – SELLER – URRY, “Editorial”, p. 5.

²⁰⁵ John URRY, *Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century*, New York 2000, pp. 19-20, 38.

Traditionally, migration has been understood as a rational movement of people from one place to another for various (political, economic, social) reasons, with the explanation of push and pull factors for their displacement,²⁰⁶ while places were conceptualised as separated from their visitors. However, the new mobilities paradigm, one of the results of the mobility turn and an analytical approach increasingly popular since 2006, has the aim of overcoming the dichotomy between travel and social research and incites us to think about mobility not only geographically, as it understands the relationship between places and people as complex and interconnected.²⁰⁷ According to Urry and Sheller, mobilities are organised in complex mobility systems, which include not only mobility (movement) but also (relative) immobilities, or “those immobile infrastructures, that organise the intermittent flow of people, information and image, as well as the borders or ‘gates’ that limit, channel, and regulate movement [...]”²⁰⁸ Within these immobile infrastructures, it is moorings – not only as anchorings but also as “topographic grounds and resources for enabling or entraining mobility practices”,²⁰⁹ which play a crucial role in (im)mobilities, as they not only configure the mobility, they also make it possible. Thus, mobilities cannot be properly analysed without multi-scale (im)mobilities.²¹⁰

Mobilities are a relational phenomenon – multiple (im)mobilities exist and coexist in relation to one another, they are interconnected in many ways and under diverse conditions to various objects, places or people; furthermore, these (im)mobilities interact with each other differently, while they receive their meaning through their conceptualisation within society, culture or politics and as such must also be investigated.²¹¹ Thus, mobilities – “socially produced motion(s)”, must be interpreted in relation to one another.²¹² Still, (im)mobility receives its meaning from those who study it – for this reason, this attributed meaning might be interpreted in diverse ways, depending on the context in which it is carried out and on those who analyse it.²¹³ The strength of the approach presented by Urry lies in its capacity to fully capture the complex character of mobile everyday life, especially by focusing on the actors of

²⁰⁶ Tim CRESSWELL, “Mobility as Resistance: A Geographical Reading of Kerouac’s ‘On the Road’”, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 2, 1993, p. 259.

²⁰⁷ SHELLER – URRY, “The new mobilities”, p. 208; HANNAM – SHELLER – URRY, “Editorial”, p. 13.

²⁰⁸ HANNAM – SHELLER – URRY, “Editorial”, pp. 3, 11.

²⁰⁹ Peter MERRIMAN, “Mobility and simplicity”, in: KESSELRING – JENSEN – SHELLER (eds.), *Mobilities*, p. 219.

²¹⁰ SHELLER – URRY, “The new mobilities”, p. 210.

²¹¹ Peter ADEY, “If Mobility is Everything Then it is Nothing: Towards a Relational Politics of (Im)mobilities”, *Mobilities* 1, 2006, p. 83; Katharina MANDERSCHIED, “Critical mobilities – mobilities as critique?”, in: Monika Büscher – Malene Freudendal-Pedersen – Sven Kesselring et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Research Methods and Applications for Mobilities*, Cheltenham, Northampton 2020, p. 366.

²¹² CRESSWELL, *On the Move*, pp. 3, 9.

²¹³ ADEY, *Mobility*, p. 66.

mobility, their “multiple agencies, experiences, lives, sensations and performances [...] as well as the infrastructural work entailed in facilitating these movements.”²¹⁴ Also, in any analysis of (im)mobility, time and space play a crucial role, as both are not only the context for but also the product of the movement and thus also of mobility, which takes place in the universe of concrete space and time.²¹⁵ Therefore, mobility research must be put into a broader historical and societal perspective, outside of the dichotomic perception of fixity vs. movement, which are both relative and interrelated – only then could mobility serve as a key to understanding the life in the past, present and future.²¹⁶

The new mobilities paradigm, nowadays a dominating analytical approach in the study of mobility,²¹⁷ meant a shift within mobility research due to its interest “in movement itself, in its production, and in the social, political, and economic repercussions generated by distinct forms of movement and its underpinning enablers.”²¹⁸ Notwithstanding its criticism²¹⁹ and taking into account many possible methodologies, approaches and topics in the field of mobility studies,²²⁰ we also part in our analyses from the new mobilities paradigm, which we recognise as a suitable interdisciplinary analytical approach, as it concentrates on complex mobility systems rather than on simple movements and fixed places.²²¹ Within these interconnected and symbiotic systems, there is a type of immobility on which we focus – it is mooring, not only as an activity but also as a space with structures and fixities, enabling and producing (im)mobility.²²²

Undoubtedly, one of the most common modes of long-distance “macro-mobilities” are migration and exile.²²³ Exile, “a particular condition of displacement”, is not just a theoretical

²¹⁴ MERRIMAN, “Mobility”, p. 221.

²¹⁵ CRESSWELL, *On the Move*, p. 4; Juliet JAIN, “It’s about time ...”, in: KESSELRING – JENSEN – SHELLER (eds.), *Mobilities*, pp. 119-125.

²¹⁶ GLICK SCHILLER – SALAZAR, “Regimes”, p. 186.

²¹⁷ Mimi SHELLER – John URRY, “Movilizando el nuevo paradigma de las movilidades”, *Quid 16* 10, 2018, pp. 338-339; Tim CRESSWELL, “Towards a politics of mobility”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1, 2010, p. 17.

²¹⁸ Matthias LEESE – Stef WITTENDORP, “The new mobilities paradigm and critical security studies: exploring common ground”, *Mobilities* 2, 2018, p. 172.

²¹⁹ See for example MANDERSCHIED, “Critical”, pp. 365-370; Maximiliano E. KORSTANJE, *The mobilities paradox: a critical analysis*, Cheltenham 2018; or CRESSWELL, “Towards a politics”, pp. 17-29.

²²⁰ Monika BÜSCHER – Malene FREUDENDAL-PEDERSEN – Sven KESSELRING et al., “Introduction to the Handbook of Research Methods and Applications for Mobilities”, in: Idem (eds.), *Handbook*, pp. 1-8.

²²¹ SHELLER, “From spatial”, pp. 625, 630; SHELLER – URRY, “The new mobilities”, pp. 209-214.

²²² Tauri TUVIKENE, “Mooring in Socialist Automobility: Garage Areas”, in: BURRELL – HÖRSCHELMANN (eds.), *Mobilities*, pp. 105-110; SHELLER – URRY, “The new mobilities”, p. 210; Leopoldina FORTUNATI – Sakari TAIPALE, “Mobilities and the network of personal technologies: Refining the understanding of mobility structure”, *Telematics and Informatics* 2, 2017, p. 564.

²²³ FORTUNATI – TAIPALE, “Mobilities”, pp. 562-564.

concept and political issue, but also a research subject and a form of existence, although undeniably, often a harsh experience.²²⁴ As a form of mobility, exile is directly linked to emigrants, migrations, tourism, diaspora or transnationalism – focus on these concepts, as well as on relations between them, is crucial for mobility research.²²⁵ Seeing that “mobile lives” of exiles, which include long-distanced travel, the danger of crossing borders and often ostracisation in the recipient country are one of many examples of how complex mobility systems influence everyday lives,²²⁶ we agree that mobilities can clarify the relationship between state and citizens, their internal inequalities and the power relations existing in these societies.²²⁷

Burrell and Hörschelmann further claim that “mobility was central to socialist politics, economics, ideology and everyday life”; however, it should be noted that “in socialist societies [...] the question was thus not one of mobility or immobility, but whose mobility was enabled or restricted and how specific relations of power and mobility were managed.”²²⁸ In this respect, the economic benefits eventually prevailed over Soviet socialist norms and mobility and transfer throughout the East-West border, although a security problem for socialist countries, was possible, even though regulated, controlled and allowed only after several authorisations.²²⁹ Similarly, in National-Catholic Francoist Spain, the arrival and presence of anti-communist foreigners ought to serve mainly as proof of the anti-communism, tolerance and openness of the Francoist regime *vis-à-vis* Western powers.²³⁰ Thus, in the centrally controlled authoritarian regimes (such as state socialist Czechoslovakia or Francoist Spain) the problematic distinguishing line between wanted/desired and unwanted/undesired mobility, between “good” vs. “bad movers”,²³¹ was drawn by the state authorities. Examples of “politically heterodox” members of the fraternal PCE, whose attempts to seek refuge in Czechoslovakia were negated by the Czechoslovak authorities (in accordance with the leadership of the PCE), as well as those Czech and Slovak refugees, who did not receive entry visas or were not allowed to join the exile

²²⁴ Andreas HACKL, “Key figure of mobility: the exile”, *Social Anthropology* 1, 2017, pp. 55-56.

²²⁵ HANNAM – SELLER – URRY, “Editorial”, p. 10.

²²⁶ Anthony ELLIOTT, “From mobilities to mobile lives and beyond: The world according to John Urry”, in: KESSELRING – JENSEN – SELLER (eds.), *Mobilities*, p. 203.

²²⁷ BURRELL – HÖRSCHELMANN, “Introduction”, p. 15.

²²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 5, 8.

²²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 8; BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK, “Crossing”, pp. 2-4.

²³⁰ EIROA, “From The Iron”, p. 3.

²³¹ MANDERSCHEID, “Critical”, p. 368.

collectives in Spain due to their ideological discrepancy with leaders of the exile groups, confirm this assertion.²³²

The new mobility paradigm makes us think about how (im)mobilities are carried out and experienced and the (power) relations they are interconnected with; furthermore, mobility theories give us the possibility to see the spatialities of everydayness in authoritarian regimes in a new way.²³³ This approach fixates on the interconnections between mobility and immobility – the “other face of mobility”, seeing that there is always (relative) immobility inside of mobility (and vice versa).²³⁴ One could argue that this entanglement between mobility and mooring might be best expressed via metaphor: “[A]ircraft cannot exist without airports, just as airports would find it very difficult to survive without aircraft flying to and from. As the aircraft relies upon the mooring or immobility of the airport to ‘stand reserve’, the aircraft too ‘stands reserve’, or as mooring, for the airport and for passengers”, meanwhile the airport, as “spatially fixed [...] provides the technological context for the aircraft’s flight.”²³⁵ The “life on the move”²³⁶ of the (anti)communist Spanish, Slovak and Czech(oslovak) émigrés – their mobility into/outside of/within Czechoslovakia and Spain, their moorings and its (re)productive character, are the subject of the following subchapters.

3.2 Anti-communist and right-wing exiles in Francoist Spain

3.2.1 Madrid, a refuge of the Eastern and Central European exiles

During the last years of WWII, Madrid began to change into a hub and a meeting point for anti-communist and ultra-right (even fascist) emigrants from the whole of Europe. In total, there were approximately 2,000 Eastern and Central European exiles living in Francoist Spain after WWII.²³⁷ For this reason, it is no surprise that Francoist Spain, this “oddity within Europe”²³⁸ and its capital, became a node within the transnational neofascist network from 1945

²³² As was the case of the Slovak student in Spain Ján Šároši (Czechoslovak orientation) or the unsuccessful request for the granting of asylum in Czechoslovakia of a Spanish citizen and a member of the PCE, Gabriel Torrens Llompart, in: AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/11623, l. R.4435/21, no. 301/54. Z. Formánek to Daniel Castell Marco, 8.6.1954. Annex: Antonín Blaha to José M. Otero Navascués, 14.5.1954; Národní archiv Praha (National Archive Prague, hereinafter NA, Fund (f.) Mezinárodní oddělení ÚV KSČ (International Department of the CC CPCz, hereinafter MOÚV KSČ), sv. 187, a. j. 651, l. 120. Záznam (Record), 13.1.1955; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 651, l. 113. (Kaderka), 22.2.1955.

²³³ BURRELL – HÖRSCHELMANN, “Introduction”, p. 9.

²³⁴ FORTUNATI – TAIPALE, “Mobilities”, p. 564.

²³⁵ ADEY, “If Mobility”, pp. 87, 89.

²³⁶ ELLIOTT, “From mobilities”, p. 203.

²³⁷ FARALDO, “Dreams”, p. 96.

²³⁸ Nigel TOWNSON, “‘Spain is Different’? The Franco Dictatorship”, in: Idem (ed.), *Is Spain Different? A Comparative Look at the 19th and the 20th Centuries*, Eastbourne 2015, p. 136.

and eventually a referential point and a centre of operation for the European far-right.²³⁹ Furthermore, from the end of WWII the Spanish capital functioned as a haven for many anti-communist and Catholic refugees, who with their presence and activities made Madrid a safe urban space in alternation to Western liberalism.²⁴⁰ Spanish moorings of Eastern and Central European exiles, both in the sense of anchoring, as well as a space that includes fixities and (relatively) immobile structures (contacts, institutions, communications media),²⁴¹ enabled them to carry out a fruitful activity and produced mobility into, within and outside of Spain.

In the first wave (until the end of the war), émigrés who arrived in Spain could be described as members of the ultra-right or fascist organisations and parties (the Romanian Iron Guard, Croatian *Ustaše* and members of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party), in total, approximately 700 members. In the second, more socially heterogeneous wave (during the first decade of the Cold War, from 1946 until 1956), exiles could be generally described as anti-communists, may it be aristocrats, diplomats or simply students.²⁴² Thus, between the years 1945-1956, there were 425 emigrants from Hungary and Romania each, 110 from Yugoslavia and 60 from Bulgaria; meanwhile Czechs, Slovaks, as well as Polish were numerically very limited until 1955. Only then the number of refugees from Poland increased (in total up to 150 Poles until 1990), there were also 140 Ukrainians during the same period.²⁴³ These exile groups were concentrated mostly in Madrid (and to a lesser extent Barcelona) and although numerically small, they were able, as will be shown in the following pages, to develop a fruitful social, cultural and even consular activity.²⁴⁴ EIROA further divides these exiles into two categories: the first one, numerically reduced and with “less mutual instrumentalisation”²⁴⁵ was formed by Romanian,²⁴⁶ Polish²⁴⁷ and Czech(oslovak) exiles. The second one, with higher numbers and more rentability for Spain included Hungarians – a socially and politically heterogeneous group, which after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 radically increased (in total 5,000-7,000 members),²⁴⁸ Bulgarian exiles (numerically reduced after 1946)²⁴⁹ and Catholic youth and students supported by *Pax Romana*, who found refuge at the Santiago Apostol College (*Colegio*

²³⁹ DEL HIERRO, “The Neofascist”, pp. 2-4.

²⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 6, 23.

²⁴¹ TUVIKENE, “Mooring”, pp. 106-107.

²⁴² EIROA, “España”, pp. 24, 27.

²⁴³ FARALDO, “Dreams”, p. 96; EIROA, “Una mirada”, p. 482.

²⁴⁴ Ibidem.

²⁴⁵ EIROA, “España”, p. 29.

²⁴⁶ More on the Romanian exile see ALBU, “Romanian”, pp. 115-135 or PETRESCU, “Eastern”, pp. 231-249.

²⁴⁷ Regarding the Polish exile in Spain: BAK, “Civilización”, pp. 229-241; FARALDO, “Patronizing”, pp. 189-197.

²⁴⁸ For more on the Hungarian legation in Spain see: RÓNAI, “Königlich-Ungarische”, pp. 147-161.

²⁴⁹ On the Bulgarian exile in Spain: DRAGANOV, “Las relaciones”, pp. 119-135.

Mayor Santiago Apóstol – CMSA).²⁵⁰ Other, numerically limited exile groups finding asylum in Spain, included Ukrainians (in total more than 70 students within the CMSA), Albanians, Belarussians, Slovenes, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Serbs, Georgians, Croats and even anti-communist Chinese from Taiwan.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, the coexistence of these émigrés was often problematic and conflicts between nationalities (Serbs against Croats or Slovaks vs. Czechs) or also within diasporas (between members of various exile governments or committees) were not scarce.²⁵²

In general, the reasons why all these emigrants sought asylum in Francoist Spain were the ideological proximity (anti-communism, nationalism, Catholicism), as well as the possibility of a safe place to live (and to hide – Madrid was also a node of the infamous ratlines of WWII criminals), to study or work, being Spain their final destination or just a “changing station” before leaving for America, Australia or other Western European countries.²⁵³ On the other hand, the Francoist regime capitalised on the tolerance of its existence by Western powers, thanks to its anti-communist policy (which included opening doors to exiles from Eastern Europe) and the image of a tolerant country in the nascent Cold War; still, without jeopardising the survival of the regime.²⁵⁴ Franco in this new situation presented himself as the “watchmen of the West” and as an executor of Truman’s doctrine of containment through his culminating anti-communist crusade, which, according to Francoist propaganda, had began already in July 1936 with the “National Uprising”.²⁵⁵

In this sense it should be mentioned, that in order to end its international ostracisation (by promoting its anticommunism and Catholicism at the outset of the Cold War), from 1949 Spain enabled the functioning of legations of former governments of Eastern European countries, now under communist rule (Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia) but also of post-war inexistent states such as Croatia and Slovakia.²⁵⁶ These informal delegations were headed by Ministers Plenipotentiaries – personalities such as Count Potocki and Marian Szumlakowski (Poland), Ferenc Marosy (Hungary), Ilia Boyadjieff (Bulgaria), Srećko Dragičević (Croatia), Georges Dimitrescu (Romania), and the previously discussed

²⁵⁰ EIROA, “España”, pp. 29-37.

²⁵¹ JARYMOWYCZ – BILYK – WOLYNSKYJ, *Breve historia*, pp. 185-186, 189.

²⁵² EIROA, “Las relaciones”, pp. 311-312.

²⁵³ VONTORČÍK, *Za krajanmi*, pp. 9-10; DEL HIERRO, “The Neofascist”, pp. 6, 23.

²⁵⁴ FARALDO, “Dreams”, p. 97; KATREBOVÁ-BLEHOVÁ, “Ako a čím“, <<https://www.christianitas.sk/ako-a-cim-zilo-slovenske-katolicke-studentstvo-v-minulosti-cast-iii-ucinkovanie-zdruzenia-slovenskych-katolickych-studentov-v-zahranici-v-spanielsku-v-50-rokoch/>>, [accessed 30 March 2022].

²⁵⁵ EIROA, “Pax”, pp. 264-265.

²⁵⁶ Idem, “Una mirada”, p. 483.

Zdeněk Formánek and Jozef Cieker, mostly former representatives of the above-mentioned countries in Spain, but still exercising full diplomatic privileges.²⁵⁷ Eastern European legations in Madrid effectuated consular and public relations activity and were regularly visited for these purposes by exiles living in Spain,²⁵⁸ while in June 1949 their leaders formed the Committee of the Nations Oppressed by Communism (*Comité de las Naciones Oprimidas por el Comunismo*), with its own political, social and propagandistic activity.²⁵⁹ An important role within the exile groups was played also by former rulers and members of deposed European royal families, for example, Bulgarian Tsar Simeon II, Archduke Otto von Habsburg, Prince Nicholas of Romania and the Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich of Russia.²⁶⁰

Another field of support for exiles from communist countries was the academic and publishing sphere – there were not only attempts of promoting Eastern and Central European studies at the newly-founded *Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* and at the University of Madrid, but also the foundation of academic journals, such as *Oriente, Oriente Europeo* or *Re-Unión*, published since the beginning of the 1950s by the Centre for Eastern Studies (*Centro de Estudios Orientales*).²⁶¹ This centre was directed by Santiago Morillo (chaplain of the CMSA) and in the above-mentioned journals were published articles dedicated to countries ruled by communist regimes, written by various Eastern European exiles. From June 1949, the Committee of the Nations Oppressed by Communism published *Boletín Informativo de las Naciones Oprimidas por el Comunismo* (name changed in 1953 to *Europa Oprimida*), which comprised articles written by members of this Committee with the aim of criticism of communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc. Other publications of exiles included *Polonia. Revista Ilustrada* or *Libertatea*; however, all these publications suffered from the lack of economic resources, and due to limited distribution, their influence also remained narrow.²⁶²

The change in the international situation after WWII – the emergence of a bipolar system, significantly influenced Spain's foreign policy, which tried to get out of its international isolation decreed by the UN in 1946, especially by changing the public appearance of the Francoist regime. One of the means of ending this ostracisation was *Pax Romana*, an

²⁵⁷ FARALDO, "Dreams", pp. 95-96; VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 53.

²⁵⁸ EIROA, "From The Iron", p. 7.

²⁵⁹ FARALDO, "Dreams", p. 96; EIROA, "Una mirada", p. 483.

²⁶⁰ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 53.

²⁶¹ EIROA, "From The Iron", p. 14; FARALDO, "Dreams", p. 99.

²⁶² VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 54-55; EIROA, "Una mirada", pp. 481, 491.

international Catholic intellectual and student movement and peace-promoting organisation.²⁶³ In general, it could be argued that the measures adopted by the Spanish government in the face of this new situation included “[C]atholicism, the consequent strengthening of relations with the Vatican and the propagandistic deployment of its anticommunism, in the end, a shift from National-Syndicalism to National-Catholicism”.²⁶⁴ Thus, the collaboration of Franco’s ministries with an organisation such as *Pax Romana* was a well-calculated step, whereas the fruit of this cooperation was the creation of the Catholic Association of Student Aid (*Obra Católica de Asistencia Universitaria* – OCAU) in October 1946 – Spain decided to offer 150 scholarships to students fleeing Eastern Europe from communist regimes.²⁶⁵ Spanish help to these young people culminated in December 1946 with the founding of the residence hall for foreign students at the University of Madrid, denominated the Santiago Apostol College, managed by the OCAU – its functioning began in May 1947 at the address Donoso Cortés 63.²⁶⁶

3.2.2 Slovak and Czech(oslovak) exiles in Franco’s Spain. Organisations, contacts, activities and conflicts²⁶⁷

The first students hosted by the OCAU (25 Polish and 17 various other nationalities) arrived in Spain as early as November 1946, followed by another two groups consisting of Polish and Ukrainians the following month;²⁶⁸ nonetheless, the first Slovak students left for Barcelona from Genoa only on December 23, 1947. This group consisted of Eduard Moščovič, Viliam Koňa, František Chajma and Jozef Kolmajer,²⁶⁹ and as the latter recalls, during the spring of 1947 Slovak students, who had fled from the Red Army as far as Rome, received a message from Jozef Cieker that in Madrid the CMSA has been opened and that scholarships have been offered for four Slovak students.²⁷⁰ Kolmajer adds that after their arrival in Madrid, they were accommodated in the CMSA, where students from various European countries

²⁶³ Glicerio SÁNCHEZ RECIO, “Pax Romana como vehículo de las relaciones exteriores del Gobierno español, 1945-1952”, in: Idem (ed.), *La Internacional*, p. 252.

²⁶⁴ EIROA, “Pax”, p. 262.

²⁶⁵ Feliciano MONTERO, “Asistencia social, catolicismo y franquismo. La actuación de la Acción Católica en la posguerra”, in: Carme Agustí i Roca – Josep Gelonch Solé – Concepción Mir Curcó (eds.), *Pobreza, marginación, delincuencia y políticas sociales bajo el franquismo*, Lleida 2005, pp. 126-127; JARYMOWYCZ – BILYK – WOLYNSKYJ, *Breve historia*, pp. 185-186.

²⁶⁶ EIROA, “From The Iron”, p. 9; KOLMAJER, “Vznik“, p. 293; VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 56-57.

²⁶⁷ This section is partially based on the article: TIMKO, “De Gottwald”, pp. 153-167.

²⁶⁸ EIROA, “Pax”, pp. 269-270.

²⁶⁹ Archiv bezpečnostních složek (Security Services Archive, hereinafter ABS), f. Studijní ústav MV – Odbor politického zpravodajství MV – 2M (Study Institute of the MOI – Department of the Political Intelligence of the MOI – 2M), hereinafter SÚ MV/2M, sign. 2M: 12824, l. 168, no. 03214/48. Group III/Ab to Group III/Aa. Issue: Slovenská emigrace – zprávy (Slovak emigration – reports), 14.1.1948.

²⁷⁰ KOLMAJER, “Vznik“, p. 285.

lived.²⁷¹ The total number of Slovak students in the CMSA until its closure in 1969 reached 18,²⁷² the initial problem of the newly arrived being the lack of knowledge of the Spanish language. In total, approximately 800 students proceeding from 16 (not only European) countries with communist regimes lived in the CMSA.²⁷³ The crucial problem and one of the causes of its eventual closure was its funding, a fact that was mirrored, not only in the limited capacity of the residence but also, as another Slovak student Karol Belák remembers, in students' food: "rations were small [...] hunger was the symbol of good health" and also "possibilities of employment were very scarce."²⁷⁴ It could be said that economic support was also the main issue for the OCAU (in charge of taking care of these students), which often had to seek funding for the support of Eastern European exiles at ecclesiastic hierarchies or through private donations.²⁷⁵

The position of the director of the CMSA was, after the Spanish diplomat and politician Alfredo Sánchez Bella, held from February 1948 by the former Slovak Minister Plenipotentiary in Madrid, Jozef Cieker. This fact had a positive influence on the number of Slovak students hosted by the OCAU, living at the CMSA – in the first half of the 1950s their number followed an increasing trend: from 7 in the academic year 1949/50 to 12 Slovaks in the year 1954/55. On the other hand, the number of Czech students decreased to such an extent that there were no Czechs supported by the OCAU in the school year 1954/55.²⁷⁶ It seems that the main reasons for this decrease were Cieker's actions as the director, as he was repeatedly criticised for his separatist orientation, the rejection of Czechoslovakia and the concept of Czechoslovakism and his preference for Slovak students.²⁷⁷ One of the few Czech students at the CMSA, Antonín Blaha, in a letter addressed to the president of the OCAU, José María Otero Navascués, accused Cieker of discrimination, lack of a sense of objectivity and the creation of a base for the separatist Slovak movement in Madrid and claimed that without Formánek's help, no Czech

²⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 286. However, it should be noted that Kolmajer was sentenced in 1947 in Czechoslovakia (*in absentia*) to 30 years of imprisonment for his collaboration with the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) in the arrest of antifascists and Jews in Slovakia during WWII, in: ABS, f. Studijní ústav MV – Mapy zpráv zpracované Studijním ústavem MV – Z (Study Institute of the MOI – Maps of Reports processed by the Study Institute of the MOI – Z), hereinafter SÚ MV/Z, sign. Z-10-651-14, l. 7-8, Kohlmajer Josef, n. d.

²⁷² VONTORČÍK, *Za krajanmi*, p. 27.

²⁷³ EIROA, "From The Iron", p. 9.

²⁷⁴ BELÁK, *Madrid*, pp. 37-38, 74.

²⁷⁵ JARYMOWYCZ – BILYK – WOLYNSKYJ, *Breve historia*, p. 186.

²⁷⁶ EIROA, "Pax", p. 279. Furthermore, the academic years 1949/50 and 1950/51 were the most "generous ones" – not only the income of the CMSA had reached its highest level; also, there were 170 and 175 students, respectively, accommodated in the CMSA (students attending the Summer University included), in: Ibidem.

²⁷⁷ Ibidem, p. 293.

student would have been admitted to the College.²⁷⁸ There were conflicts also between Cieker and Formánek, the latter accused Cieker of being an “agent of Nazi Germany”.²⁷⁹

Thus, it could be stated that despite the anti-communism of these two diplomats, their relations were dominated by personal antipathy and the contradiction of their accreditations: they both represented a country, which had not been recognised by the other.²⁸⁰ Interestingly, Cieker, ostracised in diplomatic circles already in 1944, was better integrated into the exile diaspora and had a higher public profile in Madrid than Formánek.²⁸¹ Nonetheless, even though Cieker’s contacts at Spanish ministries reached higher than Formánek’s,²⁸² they were both able to contact senior executives of the Francoist government (e.g., José Sebastián de Erice, Ramón Sedó Gómez or Mariano de Iturralde – Directors General of Foreign Politics, Fernando María Castiella – Minister of Foreign Affairs or Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez – Minister of Education). Furthermore, Slovak and Czechoslovak exile organisations abroad were regularly contacting Madrid with proposals to acknowledge them or to push their agenda on the floor of international organisations (such as the UN) and thus change the direction of Spanish foreign policy regarding Czechoslovakia (and also Slovakia). Still, the support they received was limited, and Spain was not consulting these exiles within the creation of their foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia – the approach of Spanish representatives never surpassed “the best wishes” for Czechoslovak or Slovak people.²⁸³

Obviously, in the memoirs of Slovak students of the CMSA, Cieker is described in an exclusively positive way, while his activities in favour of Slovak students and Slovak independence are praised.²⁸⁴ One of these students, the previously mentioned Belák, described Cieker as “the spiritual pillar of an international college”.²⁸⁵ In this sense it should be mentioned that the group of Slovak exiles could, thanks to Cieker’s political contacts, develop a remarkable activity in Madrid: the annual commemoration of the day of the declaration of the Slovak state

²⁷⁸ AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/11623, l. R.4435/21, no. 301/54. Z. Formánek to Daniel Castell Marco, 8.6.1954. Annex: Antonín Blaha to José M. Otero Navascués, 14.5.1954.

²⁷⁹ AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/9309, l. R.3358/18. Extranjeros en España – Vigilancia – Checoslovaquia (Foreigners in Spain – Surveillance – Czechoslovakia). Z. Formánek to Mariano de Iturralde, 16.3.1953.

²⁸⁰ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 53-54.

²⁸¹ EIROA, “From The Iron”, p. 8.

²⁸² A condolatory telegram was sent to Cieker’s family after his death in 1969 also by the Spanish Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who designated Cieker as “his distinguished and dear friend”, in: Slovenský národný archív (Slovak National Archive, hereinafter SNA), f. Osobný fond (Personal fund, hereinafter OF) J. Cieker, c. 1, l. 72. Telegram from Minister of Information and Tourism, 21.1.1969.

²⁸³ AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/15017, l. R.5962/22. Refugiados políticos eslovacos en España (Slovak political refugees in Spain). Fernando María Castiella to José Cieker, 9.1.1960.

²⁸⁴ See e.g., CHAJMA, “Slovenský post”, pp. 143-147; KOLMAJER, “Slovenské vysielanie”, pp. 354-356.

²⁸⁵ BELÁK, *Madrid*, p. 10.

(March 14) – remembered also in the Spanish press; the visits of prominent personalities of the Slovak exile from the US (Abbot Theodor Kojiš, Mons. František Duboš) in Spain or the annual demonstrations in favour of the Church of Silence in the 1950s.²⁸⁶ Moreover, in 1950 a branch of the Association of Slovak Catholic Students Abroad (*Združenie slovenských katolíckych študentov v zahraničí* – ZSKŠvZ) was founded in Madrid – an organisation created in 1947 (from 1948 a member of *Pax Romana*), whose headquarters resided in Madrid from 1952 (within the CMSA) as well. For this reason, the Spanish capital also hosted the V, VI and VII General Assembly of ZSKŠvZ (1953-1954).²⁸⁷ On the other hand, Cieker's activity raised concerns in Czechoslovakia – in the information from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris, briefed to the MFA, the CMSA was conceived as “the headquarters for the preparation of the anti-revolutionary agents, spies and saboteurs, which should work in the service of the US secret service in the countries of people democracies.”²⁸⁸ Cieker ought to be the head of this base, which included 70 agents of various nationalities, recruited by the OCAU.²⁸⁹

Another of Cieker's activities, the organisation of Slovak broadcasts within the Spanish National Radio (*Radio Nacional de España* – RNE) was the most obvious example of conflicts between Slovak and Czech(oslovak) exiles in Franco's Spain. Broadcasting in foreign languages in the RNE began in January 1949 (with the first broadcast in Russian), with the propagandistic and anti-communist aim in the countries of the Soviet Bloc.²⁹⁰ The proposal for the creation of broadcasts in foreign languages came from Otto von Habsburg during his meeting with Franco, as a way of fighting against communism, while the financial support for the radio came from the Spanish state and the Eastern European exile groups and organisations abroad (Canada, US).²⁹¹ Jozef Kolmajer recalls that the Slovak broadcast started on October 1, 1949, at first with 15-minute programs and 3 days per week, later with a daily broadcast lasting 30 minutes and for which the two Slovak employees (Cieker, Kolmajer) received 896 pesetas monthly each.²⁹² This broadcast recognised the continuity of Slovak sovereignty and like the

²⁸⁶ CHAJMA, “Slovenský post”, p. 145; Juraj CHOVAN-REHÁK, “Duchovná orientácia dr. Jozefa Ciekra a jej odraz v živote slovenského katolíckeho exilu”, in: Idem (ed.), *Dr. Jozef*, pp. 45-46.

²⁸⁷ KOLMAJER, “Vznik”, pp. 284-288; KATREBOVÁ-BLEHOVÁ, “Ako a čím”, <<https://www.christianitas.sk/ako-a-cim-zilo-slovenske-katolicke-studentstvo-v-minulosti-cast-iii-ucinkovanie-zdruzenia-slovenskych-katolicckych-studentov-v-zahranici-v-spanielsku-v-50-rokoch/>>, [accessed 30 March 2022].

²⁸⁸ ABS, f. Hlavní správa rozvědky – I. správa (Main Foreign Intelligence Directorate – Directorate I), Objektové svazky I. Správy SNB (Object Files Group of the Directorate I of the SNB), reg. no. 12227, arch. no. AS-3604. The MFA to the MOI, no. 146.860/A-III-2. Issue: Info about Spain, 4.11.1949.

²⁸⁹ Ibidem.

²⁹⁰ EIROA, “From The Iron”, pp. 9-10.

²⁹¹ Ibidem, pp. 10-11.

²⁹² KOLMAJER, “Slovenské vysielanie”, pp. 352-355. By way of comparison, the tram ticket cost 2 pesetas.

other broadcasts in foreign languages, was not subordinated to Francoist censorship. Its program contained interviews with several Slovak exiles, as well as political, cultural or sports topics.²⁹³ In one of its emissions, it was stated:

[I]t is necessary to underline that this broadcast is not a broadcast of destruction, of negativity and flounder, but in the first place a constructive and creative broadcast. To disagree with the lie, to defy the evil, to condemn the violence, to denounce the falseness, this is not and has never been a destructive activity [...] the listeners of this broadcast could have convinced themselves, that our word is Slovak, it is Christian and European. It speaks and it wants to speak the truth and it wants to fight [...] for justice.²⁹⁴

Two years after the Slovak broadcast the Czech broadcast started, at first with Slovak students Michal Ševc, Jozef Šiky and Boris Gašpar as announcers.²⁹⁵ To underline the conflict between the Slovak and Czech(oslovak) exile groups, it should be noted that Formánek, as a member of the Czechoslovak exile organisation the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (*Rada svobodného Československa*), did not recognise the legitimacy of this Czech broadcast in the RNE and protested against the whole situation.²⁹⁶ In general, redactors and announcers of broadcasts in foreign languages were intellectuals and in many cases former students of the CMSA. Within their programmes, they praised Francoist Spain as a Christian and anti-communist country, tried to incite an anti-regime revolt in their home countries (through criticism of communism and religious persecution in the Eastern Bloc), while it could be argued that these broadcasts had respectable acceptance not only between exiles in Spain and Western Europe but also by the listeners behind the Iron Curtain.²⁹⁷

The Czech broadcast of the RNE was run by another exile organisation and a rival of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, the Czech National Committee (*Český národní výbor*) – led by general Lev Prchala.²⁹⁸ As one of the announcers of this broadcast, Slovak student in the CMSA Boris Gašpar recalls, an associate of Prchala's Committee, Bohdan Chudoba, visited Cieker in Madrid in 1955 and agreed with a Slovak broadcaster, as he had no confidence in either of the two Czech students in the CMSA.²⁹⁹ Bohdan Chudoba, a Czech historian and

²⁹³ VONTORČÍK, *Za krajanmi*, pp. 70-72. More concretely, the Slovak broadcast of the RNE included topics such as anti-communism (in Spain, Slovakia, as well as in the world); Franco; life in Slovakia and its position within Czechoslovakia; actual international situation; internal situation in Spain; anti-communist dissidents; activities of the Czechoslovak government in Spain; issues of the Catholic Church or personalities of Slovak history and of the Slovak separatist movement, in: SNA, f. OF J. Cieker, c. 1, file: Backup articles – Sr. D. José Cieker (1997).

²⁹⁴ SNA, f. OF J. Cieker, c. 1, file: Backup articles – Sr. D. José Cieker (1997), l. 780. (Untitled), n. d., 1967(?).

²⁹⁵ KOLMAJER, "Slovenské vysielanie", p. 354.

²⁹⁶ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 56.

²⁹⁷ EIROA, "Una mirada", pp. 489-491.

²⁹⁸ KOLMAJER, "Slovenské vysielanie", p. 354.

²⁹⁹ GAŠPAR, *Z ostravských*, pp. 193-194.

politician, arrested for his criticism of communism already in 1946, fled Czechoslovakia as early as February 1948 first to Germany and France and in 1949 went into exile in the US.³⁰⁰ Chudoba, a life-long anti-Communist, was, apart from Formánek, the most prominent representative of the Czech exile in Franco's Spain, but unlike the latter, he rejected the concept of Czechoslovakism and the ideals of the liberal Masaryk's First Republic.³⁰¹ In the mid-1950s, Chudoba began to collaborate with the foreign broadcast of the RNE, being responsible for Czech radio broadcasting and travelling regularly to Spain until 1964, when he finally settled in Madrid.³⁰² More concretely, his cooperation with the Czech broadcast began on Christmas 1955 and lasted until 1965, while Chudoba in his many contributions criticised for example trends of modernisation in the Catholic Church and also acted as a defender of the Francoist regime.³⁰³ His criticism of Czechoslovak politicians (Beneš, Masaryk), his conflicts with other members of the Czech(oslovak) exile, as well as his Christian, traditionalist and anti-liberal orientation,³⁰⁴ resulted in his correct relations with representatives of the Slovak exile, in contrast to Formánek.

During his exile, Chudoba wrote various monographs and articles in the Spanish language, some of them even published in Spain.³⁰⁵ Firstly, regarding the publication activity of Chudoba, even though a member of Czech exile in Franco's Spain, we must highlight the problem of his physical distance from Spain (at least until the mid-1960s), leading to many misapprehensions. One of the main issues visible in his works was his interest in the Habsburgs and Modern Age Spain, just as in the historical contacts between Spain and Bohemia (most probably a direct consequence of his studies in Madrid in the 1930s), which he praised. Moreover, as Putna argues, Chudoba was known to have recognised Franco as a fighter against communism, even though he criticised his support of modern art.³⁰⁶ Also, "it is possible to interpret Chudoba's support of Franco's National-Catholic state as the realisation of his dreams", although in his most representative publications he did not explicitly mention

³⁰⁰ BENEŠ – STANKOVIČ – BORECKÝ, et al., *Na ztracené*, pp. 419-422.

³⁰¹ Jiří HANUŠ, "Bohdan Chudoba: the Tragic Story of a Talented Man", *Prague Economic and Social History Papers* 1, 2014, pp. 78-80.

³⁰² Pablo BLANCO SARTO, "Bohdan Chudoba (1909-1982). Teologické pojetí dějin", in: Bohdan Chudoba, *Člověk nad dějinami*, Praha 2018, pp. 608-609.

³⁰³ BENEŠ – STANKOVIČ – BORECKÝ, et al., *Na ztracené*, p. 423.

³⁰⁴ BLANCO SARTO, "Bohdan", pp. 608-609.

³⁰⁵ For example Bohdan CHUDOBA, "Arte y ciencia en la Europa oriental", *Atlantida* 52, 1971, pp. 522-528; Idem, "El pasado histórico y su sentido", *Atlantida* 7, 1964, pp. 29-40; Idem, "El tiempo como antecedente de la historia", *Atlantida: Revista del pensamiento actual* 47, 1970, pp. 557-562; Idem, *España y el Imperio (1519-1643)*, Madrid 1963; Idem, *Los tiempos antiguos y la venida de Cristo*, Madrid 1965.

³⁰⁶ Martin C. PUTNA, "'Summy' a polemiky v rukopisném díle Bohdana Chudoby", *Souvislosti* 3, 2005, p. 228.

“Franco’s Spain”.³⁰⁷ Even though Chudoba’s relation to the Francoist regime was not unconditionally positive, he did not consider Franco to be fascist and even though he admitted his mistakes, he justified them and interpreted them as an attempt to save the traditional values of European culture, while criticising the government of the Spanish Popular Front as anarchist and Bolshevik.³⁰⁸ In general, Chudoba’s works were dedicated to Spanish and Eastern European history from a conservative and Catholic point of view, while interconnecting traditionalism with nationalism. In his texts, one could see the anti-communist, anti-fascist and anti-modernist elements, the influence of philosopher Miguel de Unamuno and instead of Catholicism, Christianity was being emphasised.³⁰⁹ Moreover, we argue that the absence of the concept of Czechoslovakism and lack of faith in the restoration of a democratic Czechoslovakia were the ideological connections, which made possible the coexistence between Chudoba and Slovak separatists (in contrast to the majority of Czech(oslovak) exiles headed by Formánek) in Spain.

Nevertheless, it was not only Chudoba, who was an active author among Czech(oslovak) and Slovak exiles in Madrid – Jozef Cieker, apart from being the Director of the CMSA, the Vice-President of the Slovak National Council Abroad (*Slovenská národná rada v zahraničí*), the representative of Slovak interests in Spain and the chief editor of the Slovak broadcast of the RNE, he was also the author of dozens of essays and historical studies. Some of them were published in the official bulletin of the CMSA *Nosotros*, as well as in the above-mentioned journals such as *Oriente (Europeo)* and *Re-Unión*, others in the magazines of Slovak exile (*Slovák v Amerike, Slovakia*) or pronounced in the Slovak broadcast of the RNE.³¹⁰ Taking into account Cieker’s political orientation as well as the character of his diplomatic accreditation, the presence in his works of criticism of Czechoslovakism, Czechoslovakia and its political representatives and the defence of the Slovak state and the legitimacy of its representatives are all understandable. Especially taking into account that Formánek, a representative of Czechoslovak interests and his rival in Spain, was conceived by Slovak separatists as the “man of Beneš”. Cieker’s works were mainly noted for his nationalism and anti-communism, which he used, together with Catholicism and anti-Orientalism, as a tool in

³⁰⁷ FARALDO, “Dreams”, p. 99.

³⁰⁸ BENEŠ – STANKOVIČ – BORECKÝ, et al., *Na ztracené*, pp. 424-25, 430.

³⁰⁹ FARALDO, “Dreams”, pp. 98-99.

³¹⁰ See for example Jozef CIEKER, “Al margen de un aniversario”, *Nosotros: Boletín del Colegio Mayor Santiago Apóstol* 1-3, 1950, pp. 71-73; Idem, “El análisis de un mito: Ficciones y realidades del estado checo-eslovaco”, *Oriente Europeo* 13, 1963, pp. 113-133; Idem, “El legado perenne de los santos Cirilo y Metodio (863-1963)”, *Re-Unión* 36, 1963, pp. 217-222; Idem, “La causa común cristiana”, *Oriente Europeo* 1-2, 1960, pp. 77-88; Idem, “La entrada de los eslovacos en la comunidad cristiana”, *Oriente* 2, 1951, pp. 61-74; Idem, “La lucha por el espacio centroeuropo”, *Oriente* 3, 1952, pp. 147-158; Idem, “La lucha por el espacio centroeuropo”, *Oriente* 4, 1952, pp. 213-230; Idem, “Reflexiones sobre Europa”, *Oriente Europeo* 12, 1962, pp. 169-185.

his search for Spanish support of the independence of Slovakia – a traditionally Christian country with a Western orientation in the ongoing Cold War. Also visible in Cieker’s studies published in Spain were his emphasis on (Spanish) Catholicism, criticism of modernity, interpretation of national history as an anti-communist mission (or crusade) and even a consubstantial existence of Catholicism (Christianity) and the fatherland. We argue that these aspects were supposed to function as proof of the closeness between Spain and Slovakia, as Cieker in his works also opportunistically praised Spain and its *Caudillo*, while emphasising sympathies of Slovaks with Francoists even as early as during the Spanish Civil War. In this sense, Cieker also accused the Czechoslovak government of arms shipments to the Republicans during the Civil War – a false accusation, as has been proved above. Overall, the reason for his positive stance towards Franco was most probably his gratitude for granting asylum to Slovak emigrants, while he highlighted the role of Spain, the victor over communism, which was able to fulfil its national and universal mission. Unlike Slovakia – even though (according to Cieker) Catholic and anti-communist, but still a victim of global communism.

One of Cieker’s most active disciples in exile was Štefan Glejdura. As a war invalid, he managed to flee Czechoslovakia in November 1949, together with another future student at the CMSA, Karol Belák. The reason for their departure was their dissatisfaction with the situation at the Faculty of Law in Bratislava, as well as with the political and social changes in Czechoslovakia after February 1948.³¹¹ After his stay in Germany and studies in Belgium, Glejdura arrived at the CMSA in 1954.³¹² Once finished with his studies, he started to work at the Ministry of Information and Tourism at the beginning of the 1960s and became a professor at the Complutense University of Madrid, while being also a member of the Centre for Constitutional Studies (*Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*), as well as an editor of the Journal of International Politics (*Revista de Política Internacional*).³¹³ Regarding Glejdura’s articles published in Spain,³¹⁴ their thematic and ideological orientation was not surprising, considering

³¹¹ BELÁK, *Madrid*, p. 114. Belák here also mentions that Glejdura took part in the Slovak National Uprising; however, it was not known, on which side he had fought.

³¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 113-115; MIHALOVIČ, *Oživené spomienky*, p. 87.

³¹³ František VNUK, “Politológ a historik Štefan Glejdura (1925-1988)”, *Historický zborník* 2, 2000, p. 216.

³¹⁴ Štefan GLEJDURA, “Aniversarios olvidados: treinta años del "Levantamiento Nacional Eslovaco", de 1944, y el "Levantamiento Antiinvasión", de 1968”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 135, 1974, pp. 235-244; *Idem*, “Eslovaquia, en erupción revolucionaria (1945-1975)”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 143, 1976, pp. 115-137; *Idem*, “Checoslovaquia: cinco años después”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 127, 1973, pp. 95-110; *Idem*, “La Ley constitucional sobre la Federación checo-eslovaca”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 111, 1970, pp. 179-185; *Idem*, “Los congresos de los comunistas checos y eslovacos”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 116, 1971, pp. 101-110; *Idem*, “Los grandes problemas del Este europeo: las relaciones sovieto-eslovacas (1939-1971)”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 116, 1971, pp. 63-72; *Idem*, “Los grandes problemas del Este europeo: Eslovaquia”,

that their author was a former student of Cieker and a member of the Slovak exile. Glejdura in them focused on Czecho-Slovak relations (while underlining the nationalist and separatist character of Slovaks), his nationalism was also visible as was his critical view of the concept of Czechoslovakism and Czechoslovak politicians. In the case of his publications, it was also possible to observe the absence of the Catholic element (in contrast to Cieker), while his anti-communism was oriented almost exclusively against Czech and Soviet communists (the criticism of Slovak communists was nearly absent). It can be stated that Glejdura's interpretation of the wartime Slovak state was entirely positive, while the designation of this state as fascist was, according to him, mainly the result of Czech propaganda. However, Glejdura was analysing in his articles also contemporary events, such as the federalisation of Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 (its reasons and consequences) or the situation in Czechoslovakia after the invasion, interpreting the crisis of 1968/69 as not only an attempt at the democratisation of society and a crisis of communism, but also as a problem of Czecho-Slovak relations and the federalisation of the state.

It should be added that Glejdura became, after Cieker's death in January 1969, the director of the Slovak broadcast of RNE and also the leader of the Slovak exile in Madrid; however, his activity was limited to the propagational and academic sphere.³¹⁵ The position of the representative of Slovak interests in Spain was thus left vacant, the reason was not only the death of the last Slovak high-ranking diplomat but also the change in international relations and the emergence of *détente* – policy attempting to relax the tensions between the two blocs. Moreover, since the late 1950s, after being left outside of the European Economic Community (EEC) Spain decided, in the search for new markets and in order to improve its position in future negotiations with the EEC and the US, to strengthen its relations with the Eastern Bloc. This process began at the end of the 1950s with the signing of interbank agreements, then, from 1964 with the opening of commercial representations and since the end of the 1960s with the establishment of consular delegations of Eastern European countries in Madrid.³¹⁶

The afore analysed organisations, radio broadcasts in foreign languages and the publications of exiles in Francoist Spain served a double purpose: for the exile groups, they had the function of “cohesion of the group, the interaction and cultural instrumentation”, while for Spain they functioned as a propaganda tool – both as anti-communist criticism and the defence

Revista de Política Internacional 97, 1968, pp. 9-56; Idem, “Los grandes problemas del Este europeo: Checoslovaquia”, *Revista de Política Internacional* 99, 1968, pp. 11-33.

³¹⁵ CHAJMA, “Slovenský post”, p. 143.

³¹⁶ MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA – PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, “Bajo la influencia”, pp. 44-47.

of the current regime, even though published information was often tendentious.³¹⁷ Thus, it could be said that these Spanish moorings of Eastern and Central European exiles were used by the Francoist regime as proof of its help for the “enslaved Europe”; on the other hand, these refugees agreed with being used, as Franco gave them the means to fight against international communism.³¹⁸ These communication media, legations in Madrid and the CMSA gradually stopped their activity after 1969, due to the change of international position of Franco’s Spain;³¹⁹ nevertheless, for two decades, they enabled an active and fruitful presence of anti-communist Central and Eastern European exiles in Madrid. Furthermore, many of these exiles were able to capitalise on contacts acquired in Spain and abroad (through Spanish officials or the respective exile organisations), to receive a university degree in Madrid or to gain experience in radio broadcasts or academic journals, notwithstanding the possibilities facilitated by the vivid network of Eastern European exiles living in Madrid – all these structures and fixities kick-started further (im)mobilities outside of or within Spain. The Slovak exile group, as well as other collectives of emigrants in Spain, have after all these years abroad disintegrated – some of these exiles died, others got married and integrated into Spanish society. Nonetheless, for some of them, their Spanish moorings had indeed (re)productive character, as these (relative) immobilities led to another mobility: activities carried out, experiences gained and structures and nodes existing and further developed in Spain enabled them to remigrate to other, more promising countries, such as Australia, Canada or the US.

3.3 The PCE across the Iron Curtain

3.3.1 The Spanish communist exile in post-war Czechoslovakia³²⁰

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, from 1946 Czechoslovak foreign policy toward Spain became more and more subjugated to the interests of the KSČ (and the USSR) as the main political power(s), and as early as 1947 Prague started to focus its relationship with the Spanish Republican exile exclusively on the PCE. However, the first contacts of post-war Czechoslovakia with the PCE date back to the campaign for the liberation of Spanish communists Sebastian Zapirain and Santiago Álvarez, who were arrested and sentenced to death after their secret return to Spain in 1945. Thanks to an international campaign, their sentences were commuted to long-term imprisonment and Czechoslovakia decided to offer

³¹⁷ EIROA, “From The Iron”, p. 14; Idem, “Una mirada”, pp. 493-494.

³¹⁸ FARALDO, “Patronizing”, p. 191.

³¹⁹ EIROA, “Una mirada”, pp. 494-495.

³²⁰ This section is partly based on the chapter: TIMKO, “‘Con la maleta”, pp. 139-152.

them political asylum at the end of 1945³²¹ – although Madrid did not accept this offer, since the late 1950s both Spaniards had been living in Prague as members of the leadership of the PCE.³²² Apart from the already mentioned regular talks between Czechoslovak and Spanish communists on the creation of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards the Spanish Republican government, within the first post-war contacts should also be mentioned the attendance of the representatives of Spanish trade unions (Enrique de Santiago, José Moix) at the All-Trade Union Congress, which took place in Prague in April 1946, as well as collections in favour of Spanish partisans (*maquis*) in Czechoslovakia, organised by the SPDŠ.³²³ Also, the General Secretary of the PCE Dolores Ibárruri visited the Czechoslovak Republic before the communist coup d'état – during her visit in the autumn of 1946,³²⁴ she even met with Czech politician and President of the Council of Czechoslovak Women Milada Horáková, who was executed in a show trial based on fabricated charges in June 1950.

At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, Czechoslovakia became one of the havens of the Spanish communist exile. As was the case of the Czech(oslovak) and Slovak anti-communist exiles in Spain, Spanish communists were also able during their Czechoslovak anchorings to capitalise on preexisting and further expanded fixities and structures (official and unofficial contacts, institutions, communication media) located mainly in Prague, which form the focus of the following subchapter. Thus, their mobility into Czechoslovakia led to (relative) immobility in the form of moorings, which eventually (re)produced (both as an activity and a space with structures and nodes) further mobility – both within and outside of Czechoslovakia, while their encounters with the reality of state socialism (moorings), “entangled – and with time, unmoored and disentangled”³²⁵ two countries from the other side of the Iron Curtain.

These Spanish communist emigrants arrived in post-war Czechoslovakia in three waves: 1. The “French wave” (1945-1948); 2. The “Yugoslav group” (1948) and 3. The group of deported Spaniards and their families (1951). The Spanish emigrants from the first wave

³²¹ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/22 States – Spain – Political issues (General), no. 70.426/45-A. Record for Mr. Vice-Minister about the interview with Manuel Azcárate (Ruppeltdt), 30.11.1945.

³²² NÁLEVKA, “Španěle”, pp. 80-81; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 186, a. j. 643, l. 89-90. Record for c. Hendrych, 18.3.1960; NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Kancelář 1. tajemníka ÚV KSČ A. Novotného – zahraniční záležitosti (Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues), c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Vztahy KSČ – KSS (Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain). Španělská politická emigrace v ČSSR (Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia), n. d. (1965).

³²³ NÁLEVKA, “Španěle”, p. 80.

³²⁴ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 39. Eventually, as soon as June 1950, Ibárruri called for the end of the Spanish Republican government in exile, considering that without a representative of the PCE, it allegedly did not represent the interests of Spanish people, in: CIECHANOWSKI, „Las relaciones”, p. 78.

³²⁵ Marcia C. SCHENCK – Immanuel R. HARISCH – Anne DIETRICH et al., “Introduction: Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements between Africa and East Germany during the Cold War”, in: BURTON – DIETRICH – HARISCH et al., *Navigating*, p. 7.

proceeded mostly from France, where they operated during WWII in the French *Résistance*; consequently, Paris became after the war one of the main centres of the PCE. Hence, at that time France played a key role as a haven for the PCE, for example, in 1947 the entire leadership of the PCE was situated there.³²⁶ This was due to their strategy of anti-Francoist resistance, which was then based on the activities of *maquis*, who were sent to Spain where they tried to provoke a nationwide uprising against Franco. This unsuccessful partisan anti-Francoist movement was terminated by the order of Stalin in 1948.³²⁷

Already in 1946, there had been approximately 10 Spanish emigrants living in Czechoslovakia (Prague), who maintained “friendly relations” with the members of the Association of Czechoslovak Volunteers in Spain (*Asociación de los voluntarios checoslovacos en España*) – the main objective of these relations was to support and help the Spaniards, in order to “incorporate (them – M. T.) into the creative process and to feel in Czechoslovakia as in their home.”³²⁸ In the first wave, there were in total 26 Spaniards, some of the exiles were leaders of the PCE, including General Antonio Cordon, professor of Spanish language at Charles University in Prague and long-time leader (1950-1952 and again after the departure of Lister between 1957-1958) of the Spanish political emigration in the Czechoslovak Republic;³²⁹ or General Juan Modesto, sent to Czechoslovakia due to his mistakes committed in France at the beginning of January 1949.³³⁰ However, this group also consisted of regular members of the party, who had been earning their living during their Czechoslovak moorings with manual work – 14 of them worked in Czechoslovakia in the construction industry or in the engineering company ČKD (*Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk*).³³¹ After their arrival, passports and travel documents were taken from them and these political emigrants received temporary Czechoslovak IDs.³³² Official relations, organisation, control, political guidance and financial provision of the Spanish communist exile, as well as of other political exile communities in the

³²⁶ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 38-39.

³²⁷ NÁLEVKA, “Partyzánská válka“, p. 141. Implementation of this decision was extended until the beginning of the 1950s.

³²⁸ Archivo del PCE (Archive of the PCE, hereinafter APCE), f. Emigración (Emigration), c. 96/3 Checoslovaquia (Czechoslovakia), file: 96/3.2 Instituto Español e Iberoamericano de Praga (The Spanish and Ibero-American Institute in Prague). Al caso Agustín Gimeno (Regarding the case of Agustín Gimeno) (Josef Pavel and Miloš Nekvasil), n. d. (1946).

³²⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 62. Přípomínky k rozhovoru s. Moravce se s. Cordonem, ved. špan. pol. emigrace, který je určen na den 16.5.1957 (Comments on the interview of c. Moravec with c. Cordon, leader of the Spanish political emigration, scheduled for 16.5.1957), n. d. (1957).

³³⁰ LÍSTER LÓPEZ, “Vorgeschichte“, pp. 303-304.

³³¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 7-8. Španělská emigrace v ČSR (Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia), 13.9.1949.

³³² BÁRTA, “Právo“, p. 19.

Czechoslovak Republic were provided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (*Mezinárodní oddělení Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa – MOÚV KSČ*), which was headed until September 1951 by Bedřich Geminder, who was executed in the so-called Trial of the Leadership of the Anti-State Conspiracy Centre Headed by Rudolf Slánský in 1952.³³³ These functions of the MOÚV KSČ were exercised in accordance with the leadership of the Spanish political emigration and with other organisations based in Prague – a node of international communism – such as the SPDŠ, which after WWII resumed its activities and provided for the social welfare of Spanish exiles.³³⁴ Nonetheless, after the dissolution of the SPDŠ in September 1952, its function was taken over by the Czechoslovak Red Cross (*Československý červený kříž – ČSČK*), especially its Social Department, which “bore all the financial expenses associated with the stay of political emigrants in our territory, arranged for administrative issues, finding them jobs, fulfilling their material and cultural needs [...]”.³³⁵ The ČSČK was officially the main organisation in taking care of political emigrants – even though theoretically independent, in fact it was under the influence of the KSČ, while acting as an intermediary between the Czechoslovak government and communist emigrants, as well as between the MOÚV KSČ and the National Security Corps (*Sbor národní bezpečnosti – SNB*), all of them interested in the situation of political emigration in Czechoslovakia.³³⁶

The second wave of emigrants consisted mainly of Spanish officers who came with their families (35 persons in total) to the Czechoslovak Republic from Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1948, after a split between Tito and Stalin, a result of the resolution of the Information Bureau on Yugoslavia in June 1948.³³⁷ After negotiations between the KSČ, PCE and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), these exiles took off from Yugoslavia via Hungary on September 10, 1948, and three days later they were already received in Prague.³³⁸ This so-called Yugoslav group was, upon arrival, sent to quarantine in Hejnice (a small town in North Bohemia), where Spanish emigrants underwent a medical examination and partook in language

³³³ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 82. For more on this trial see for example Eugen LÖBL, *Svedectvo o procese s vedením protištátního sprisahaneckého centra na čele s Rudolfom Slánským*, Bratislava 1968.

³³⁴ BÁRTA, “Právo”, p. 18.

³³⁵ OLŠÁKOVÁ, “V krajině”, p. 725.

³³⁶ Ibidem, pp. 724-725.

³³⁷ More on the Tito-Stalin split (and its consequences for Czechoslovakia) see VOJTĚCHOVSKÝ, *Z Prahy proti Titovi!: jugoslávská prosovětská emigrace v Československu*, Praha 2012.

³³⁸ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 84; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 651, l. 2. Záznam ze dne 15.9.1948 (Record from September 15, 1948). Záležitost španělských důstojníků z Jugoslaviie (Issue of Spanish officers from Yugoslavia), 15.9.1948.

courses and political training.³³⁹ The Czechoslovak side demanded that these emigrants prepare a written report on the situation in the Yugoslav party and Tito's Army, as it was considering the possibility of using the experience of these officers for edifying and military-expert lectures within the Czechoslovak Army.³⁴⁰ The PCE also organised a political inspection which was conducted through interviews with emigrants by one of the leaders of the PCE, Vicente Uribe, in order to confirm their party loyalty and position regarding the conflict between Tito and Stalin. The pro-Tito or otherwise politically heterodox Spaniards were to be reassigned to manual labour (based on the decision of the leadership of the PCE) but Uribe, who himself had lived in Yugoslavia, was relatively tolerant of the pro-Tito positions of some Spanish exiles.³⁴¹ This second wave of emigrants also included Manuel Tagüeña Lacorte and his wife Carmen Parga, who refused to condemn Tito and who together with their two children and Parga's mother formed a small community of Spanish emigrants living in Brno. Needless to say, Uribe's tolerance also had its limits: Tagüeña recalled how Uribe explained to him what his mistake in relation to the above-mentioned Cominform resolution and the Tito-Stalin split was. Tagüeña had allegedly "committed an error by thinking, looking out for causes and reasons, while in cases like this, there was nothing more than to obey and accept the decision of the USSR, which could never be wrong".³⁴² Carmen Parga in her memoirs added that the reason why the leadership of the PCE decided that her family remained in Czechoslovakia, instead of moving to the USSR, was her husband's "political vacillation".³⁴³

Among the Spaniards who came to Czechoslovakia in 1948 were, besides officers from the Yugoslav Army, also manual workers and intellectuals.³⁴⁴ After a few months spent in Hejnice, where they lived at the expense of the KSČ (which amounted to up to 129,000 CZK monthly for the whole group),³⁴⁵ but also under the control of the leadership of the Spanish emigration, this group was divided in February 1949. Most of the Spaniards returned to Prague, where they were employed in mental labour (e.g., in the Spanish broadcast of the Czechoslovak Radio), others were sent to France.³⁴⁶ Seeing that the expenditure on the stay of the Spanish communists in Hejnice (where they spent their time mainly studying) reached 450,000 CZK (as

³³⁹ NÁLEVKA, "Španělé", p. 91.

³⁴⁰ NA, f. MOUV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 651, l. 2. Record from September 15, 1948. Issue of Spanish officers from Yugoslavia, 15.9.1948.

³⁴¹ EIROA, *Espanoles*, p. 108.

³⁴² TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio*, pp. 358-359.

³⁴³ PARGA, *Antes*, p. 102.

³⁴⁴ PETHŮ, *El exilio*, p. 84.

³⁴⁵ NA, f. MOUV KSČ, sv. 190, a. j. 665, Přibližný měsíční rozpočet vydání španělských soudruhů žijících v ČSR (Approximate monthly spending budget of Spanish comrades living in Czechoslovakia), 24.3.1949.

³⁴⁶ PETHŮ, *El exilio*, pp. 84-86.

of January 31, 1949), the Czechoslovak party submitted a proposal to the Spanish communists to engage in work in the Czechoslovak Republic, as their way of life so far (spent by study at the expenses of the KSČ) could appeal as demoralising; moreover, Czechoslovakia would welcome their assistance in the building of socialism – this proposition was unanimously accepted by the Spaniards.³⁴⁷

The first detailed report on the Spanish emigrants and their employment in the Czechoslovak Republic dates from September 1949: out of a total of 49 Spanish communists, 2 Spaniards were employed in the direction of the Spanish emigration, 2 as professors, 20 as manual workers, 10 of them were unemployed, 4 of them worked in the Czechoslovak Radio, 1 emigrant was employed in health services, 2 in the International Union of Students (IUS) and 2 women stayed at home as housewives.³⁴⁸ The discrepancy between the official number of emigrants and the aggregate of Spaniards based on their employment can be explained by the statement from the record at the MOÚV KSČ that “wives of Spanish comrades do not work”³⁴⁹ – thus, the number of Spaniards who stayed at home was probably higher. The principle, which the ÚV KSČ tried to enforce – that all Spanish communists be gradually employed and thus become independent from the point of view of social welfare, was progressively achieved.³⁵⁰ In December 1950, almost 60 Spanish communists were living in Czechoslovakia – all of them were employed, mostly as manual workers (18), carrying out “various jobs” (16), as well as 8 employees of the Czechoslovak Radio.³⁵¹ After the arrival of other leaders of the PCE (Enrique Lister, José Moix) to Prague, which, together with Vicente Uribe, Antonio Mije and Antonio Cordón had formed the leadership of the PCE in Prague since 1951; in May 1951, 62 adult Spanish political emigrants together with 41 children were living in Czechoslovakia.³⁵²

As a result of the intensification of the Cold War, related to the radicalisation of anti-communist ideology in Western Europe as well as the militarisation of the conflict (formation of NATO, Korean War), the Police Operation *Boléro-Paprika* took place in France in

³⁴⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 8-10. Záznam o pobytu španělských soudruhů v Hejnicích (Record about the stay of Spanish comrades in Hejnice), 12.2.1949.

³⁴⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 5-6. Španělští soudruzi žijící v ČSR (Spanish comrades living in Czechoslovakia), n. d. (1949); NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 100-104. Španělská soudružská emigrace v ČSR (Spanish comradeship emigration in Czechoslovakia). Annex: Přehled španělských emigrantů v ČSR (Overview of Spanish emigrants in Czechoslovakia), 13.9.1949.

³⁴⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 100-104. Spanish comradeship emigration in Czechoslovakia. Annex: Overview of Spanish emigrants in Czechoslovakia, 13.9.1949.

³⁵⁰ Ibidem.

³⁵¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 13-17. Situační zpráva o španělské politické emigraci v ČSR (Situation report on the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia), n. d. (December 1950).

³⁵² NA, f. KSČ – Ústřední výbor (Central Committee) 1945-1989, Praha – politický sekretariát (Prague – Political Secretariat) 1951-1954, sv. 3, a. j. 39, b. 2. Pro politický sekretariát (For the Political Secretariat), 23.5.1951.

September 1950, resulting in the arrest or expulsion of 395 (mostly Spanish) communists from continental France to Corsica and North Africa.³⁵³ At the same time, the PCE was made illegal in France. All these anti-communist measures resulted in the arrival of the third wave of Spanish exiles to Czechoslovakia, as with the forthcoming French legislative elections (June 1951) there was an existing threat of the extradition of Spanish communists to Franco.³⁵⁴ As early as September 1950, Dolores Ibárruri asked for asylum for these Spanish Republicans in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia – the governments of these countries unanimously agreed.³⁵⁵

Thus, in July 1951, the third wave of Spanish exiles arrived in Czechoslovakia via Poland; more precisely, 32 members of the PCE came in two groups on July 10 and July 16, 1951. Together with their family members, who arrived in the Czechoslovak Republic at the end of the year, their number reached 80 persons.³⁵⁶ As well as in the case of the Yugoslav group, the members of the third wave of Spanish communist emigration were sent to quarantine to Liběchov (a small town in the Central Bohemian Region) after their arrival, where they underwent a medical examination, attended Czech language courses, political training, party meetings and a rich cultural program was prepared for them.³⁵⁷ Most of these exiles were subsequently moved to the North Bohemian industrial city of Ústí nad Labem, which from 1950 became one of the two main centres of Spanish exile in the Czechoslovak Republic. Once the family members of Spaniards, originally deported from France, came to Czechoslovakia in December 1951, the collective of Spanish emigrants grew to 193 persons as of February 1, 1952.³⁵⁸ This was the maximum number of Spanish political emigrants in the Czechoslovak Republic, considering that this figure later changed several times, but it never reached this level again. According to the official report on Spanish emigration, as soon as December 1952, 182 Spaniards were living in the Czechoslovak Republic: 68 children and 114 adults (98 members of the PCE).³⁵⁹

At this time (1952) the Czechoslovak party also made a proposal to conduct a cadre check of the Spanish communists by the MOÚV KSČ (in accordance with the CC PCE), the

³⁵³ D'ANGELO, "El Partido", p. 180.

³⁵⁴ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 42-43, 86-87. More on *Boléro-Paprika*, see LÍSTER LÓPEZ, "Vorgeschichte", pp. 308-312.

³⁵⁵ EIROA, "Sobrevivir", p. 75.

³⁵⁶ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 43.

³⁵⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 651, l. 37-39. Domov (Boarding House) Liběchov – Boží Voda. Zpráva za týden (Report for the week) 9.7.-15.7.1951; 17.7.1951.

³⁵⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 96. Rozmístění španělských polit. emigrantů v ČSR (Location of Spanish political emigrants in Czechoslovakia), 1.2.1952.

³⁵⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 75-76. Přehledná zpráva o španělské politické emigraci za rok 1952 (Overview report on the Spanish political emigration in 1952), 1.12.1952.

reason for this step were security issues – many Spanish communists had served in Tito’s Army, some of them arrived in Czechoslovakia from French concentration camps or other capitalist countries and in some cases have maintained contacts with French International Volunteers since the Spanish Civil War.³⁶⁰ Understandably, former *interbrigadistas* in post-war Czechoslovakia established or further developed the already acquired contacts with Spanish political exiles – paradoxically, in the early 1950s, these connections were more of a burden than an asset for Spanish emigrants. After WWII, and especially after February 1948, several former Czechoslovak *interbrigadistas* occupied crucial positions in the security bodies of the state – a special role played the so-called “Security Five”, created at the ÚV KSČ and during “Victorious February” ensuring the communist rise to power by controlling the police.³⁶¹ In 1949, 69 former International Volunteers worked at the MOI; however, during the era of the political processes of the early 1950s, (especially between 1950-1952) 36 of them were dismissed, 58 former *interbrigadistas* lost their party membership and many of them were victims of repressions.³⁶² Even though that at the beginning of the 1950s a political process against former *interbrigadistas* was originally planned in Czechoslovakia as an “international condemnation of International Volunteers and International Brigades as a Trotskyist-Titoist gang”³⁶³ and despite the imprisonment or execution of several Czechoslovak prominent *interbrigadistas* (Artur London, Osvald Závodský, Josef Pavel, František Kriegel), this prepared mass trial did not take place.³⁶⁴ Ota Hromádka, another former International Volunteer and after the communist coup d’état the General Secretary of communist organisations in the Czechoslovak Army, imprisoned between 1951-1956, in his memoirs remembered:

[i]t was decided that after the Slánský Trial, secret interrogations against approximately two hundred prominent communists would be carried out quickly [...] Spanish volunteers should have been the first in line. Most of them resisted stubbornly, it was not possible to condemn them together and therefore it was decided not to officiate the already prepared process and to divide them into different groups [...] meanwhile the situation changed, Stalin and

³⁶⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 97-99. Souhrnná zpráva o španělské politické emigraci (Summary report on Spanish political emigration), n. d. (1952).

³⁶¹ BORTLOVÁ, “Los españoles”, pp. 260-261. The Security Five consisted of former *interbrigadistas* J. Pavel, L. Hofman, O. Hromádka, O. Valeš, O. Závodský, in: NÁLEVKA, “Španěle”, p. 89.

³⁶² NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Secretariat 1962-1966, sv. 53, a. j. 102, b. 14. Příloha (Annex) III: Zpráva o splnění usnesení sekretariátu ÚV KSČ ze dne 17. února 1965 k prošetření sociálně politického postavení bývalých příslušníků mezinárodní brigády ve Španělsku (Report on the implementation of the resolution of the Secretariat of the ÚV KSČ of February 17, 1965, on the investigation of the social and political status of former members of the International Brigades in Spain), 17.3.1966.

³⁶³ Ota HROMÁDKO – Jaroslav BOUČEK, *Jak se kalila voda: výbor z kriminálních příběhů a úvah*, Praha 2017, p. 106.

³⁶⁴ For more about the destinies of former International Volunteers in Czechoslovakia after 1948 see: BORTLOVÁ, “La participación”, pp. 165-173; BOUČEK, “Čs. interbrigadisté”, pp. 147-180.

Gottwald died [...] and thus, other processes, except for one, took place only after a year or later. And then it was no longer possible to execute all the imprisoned communists indiscriminately [...].³⁶⁵

The arrest of former members of the International Brigades began since 1950, after the imprisonment of Otto Šling, an *interbrigadista* and after WWII the Head of the KSČ in Brno. During the 1950s, the whole “Security Five” (initially responsible for the examination of every International Volunteer) was imprisoned, as well as almost all *interbrigadistas* who got into important positions within the apparatus after 1948 – most of them were released after 1956 and rehabilitated in the 1960s.³⁶⁶ Nálevka argues that as a result of these political processes, the PCE leadership quickly distanced itself from Czechoslovak *interbrigadistas* and forced its members, who were in touch with these volunteers, to cut off these contacts and to undergo self-criticism.³⁶⁷ The Spanish exile Manuel Tagüeña was also interrogated by the Czechoslovak SNB due to his contact with Šling, who was executed in the Slánský Trial in 1952. In the spring of 1952, while waiting for his interrogation, Tagüeña repented for his communist past and finally decided to leave Czechoslovakia: “I regretted to have dedicated the best of my life to a cause capable of devouring its servants [...] and at that moment I took a firm oath to break up forever with everything that represented the <Russian-style communism> [...]”³⁶⁸

One of the main problems of the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia was its funding.³⁶⁹ The KSČ economically supported Spanish political emigrants living in the Czechoslovak Republic and it also provided material and organisational assistance during the transit of Spanish communists to party congresses and sessions in other countries (not only) in the Eastern Bloc. The economic problems of Czechoslovakia in the 1950s (rationing, monetary reform, housing issues) reflected themselves also in the everyday lives of Spanish exiles. Thus, Spanish communists had to share the aggravating economic situation of the country with their Czechoslovak neighbours: “Our economic situation was not nearly as good as the one we had in Yugoslavia, but infinitely better than the one we had had in the USSR. There were ration cards, but provisions were assured without necessary queuing”,³⁷⁰ remembered Parga. It seems that Spaniards, who had lived in a terrible economic and nutritional situation of the post-war USSR, did not complain a lot about the Czechoslovak socialist reality, even though they noticed

³⁶⁵ HROMÁDKO – BOUČEK, *Jak se kalila*, pp. 105-106.

³⁶⁶ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 48-50.

³⁶⁷ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, pp. 93-94.

³⁶⁸ TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio*, pp. 387-388.

³⁶⁹ For more on the economic aspect of the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia, see the chapter “Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations from “Victorious February” to *détente*”.

³⁷⁰ PARGA, *Antes*, p. 105.

the worsening of the economic situation and the fall in the standard of living of the Czechoslovak population after the Prague Coup of 1948. Or, as Manuel Tagüeña affirmed: “In short, all the hardships that happened in Russia had prepared us perfectly for this life. The Czechs sometimes complained about things that we found quite acceptable.”³⁷¹ Still, it must be reminded that even though the economic situation of Spanish exiles could be described in general as “acceptable or good”, with housing conditions getting slowly better, there were discrepancies between the salaries and living standards of manually working Spaniards and the members of the leadership of the party or employees of international organisations in Prague.³⁷²

The economic problems of Czechoslovakia, also reflected in the intensity of support for the PCE, were likewise visible in organisations responsible for Spanish exiles. The SPDŠ, which took care of the provision of Spanish exiles after their arrival (in cooperation with the KSČ), was funded by public collections and donations for Spanish Republicans and its great public acceptance in Czechoslovakia was accompanied by extensive financial support: in 1950, for example, its revenues reached 2,931 million CZK (expenditures amounted to 855,055 CZK), meanwhile the organisation sent 3 million CZK only on the bank account of Dolores Ibárruri.³⁷³ The SPDŠ functioned in post-war Czechoslovakia for six years – its committee decided at the meeting on September 25, 1952, to liquidate the Society (whose activities have passed on to the ČSČK and other mass organisations) and to allocate its library and a part of the money (200,000 CZK) from its budget (which amounted to circa 1 million CZK) to Spanish emigrants in Ústí nad Labem as a “Christmas aid”.³⁷⁴ However, this decision met with protests from the leadership of the Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia – it was required that this aid be provided also to the Spanish collective in Prague. After a meeting at the ÚV KSČ with Cordón (who had emphasised that the aid from the KSČ for the PCE must be exclusively political and not in the sense of the “poor Spanish emigrants”),³⁷⁵ a preliminary agreement was reached. This 200,000 CZK should have been used not only as a “Christmas gift” for Spanish exiles, but part of it ought to have been allocated for the equipment and furnishings of the Spanish clubs in Prague and Ústí, another part went for the Spanish choir. Nevertheless, it seems that the proposal to redistribute

³⁷¹ TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio*, p. 364.

³⁷² GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, pp. 194-195.

³⁷³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 194, a. j. 687, l. 23-25. Zpráva o činnosti na výborovou schůzi 23. října 1951 (Report on activities for the Committee meeting on October 23, 1951), n. d. (October 1951).

³⁷⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 58-59. Issue: Vánoční nádilka pro demokratické Španělsko (Christmas gift for democratic Spain), 20.12.1952.

³⁷⁵ APCE, f. Relaciones Internacionales del PCE (International Relations of the PCE), c. 141, file: 17. Checoslovaquia (Czechoslovakia). Antonio Cordón to the ÚV KSČ, 22.10.1952.

this sum among Spanish emigrants according to their wishes was finally rejected by the ÚV KSČ.³⁷⁶

An event, which significantly influenced the economic situation of Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia, as well as Czechoslovak citizens, was the monetary reform of June 1, 1953. Its objective was to solve the problem of the shortage of consumer goods and to increase the purchasing power of the population; however, one of its consequences was the loss of a large amount of citizens' savings. The monetary reform was carried out, despite the previous assurances of Czechoslovak President Zápotocký that there would be no reform, over the weekend and brought with it the end of rationing.³⁷⁷ Carmen Parga remembered how “[a]fter a campaign of rumours and counter-rumours, we woke up to the news of the reform: a new crown was worth five of the old ones [...] in the banks changed only three thousand old crowns per person. The rest of the money was exchanged in the ratio fifty to one [...]”.³⁷⁸ Her husband Tagüeña added that the monetary reform was favourable to the government, as taxes and other contributions to the state were paid at a rate of five to one, but the payments from the state were made at the rate of fifty to one, while, “the worst it was for those who had savings [...] there were numerous suicide attempts [...]”.³⁷⁹ Total losses from cash exchange and deposits recalculations due to this reform reached the level of 8,525 billion new Czechoslovak crowns and the state authorities received more than 8,000 formal complaints.³⁸⁰ Nonetheless, due to a lack of considerable savings after living just a few years in the country, the consequences of the reform were for the Tagüeña family, as well as for the rest of Spanish emigration, not as devastating as for the majority of the Czechoslovak population.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the objective of the PCE was for the members of the communist emigration to gain as much experience and knowledge as possible by working in the industry in the Czechoslovak Republic, despite the fact that most of them did not have the necessary job qualification. The argument used by the PCE in this case was that Spain, after removing Franco, would have large-scale industrialisation of the country ahead of it, which would require experienced and skilled workers.³⁸¹ Or as one of the members of the Spanish

³⁷⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 58-59. Issue: Christmas gift for democratic Spain, 20.12.1952

³⁷⁷ Milan BARTA, “Peněžní reforma 1953 ve zprávách ministerstva národní bezpečnosti”, *Paměť a dějiny* 3, 2013, pp. 58-60; Zbyšek ŠUSTEK, “Menová reforma v Československu v roce 1953 a jej hospodářsko-politické pozadí”, *Paměť národa* 1, 2014, pp. 3-29.

³⁷⁸ PARGA, *Antes*, p. 126.

³⁷⁹ TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio*, p. 396.

³⁸⁰ ŠUSTEK, “Menová reforma“, pp. 16, 19.

³⁸¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 32-33. Rozmluva se soudruhem Uribe (Talks with comrade Uribe), 2.11.1950.

exile in Czechoslovakia, José Montorio, claimed: “Because this was the policy of the party. To learn, in order to return to Spain [...]”³⁸² Therefore, in December 1952, of 114 adult Spaniards, there were 60 manual workers, 27 exercised white-collar work (academics, doctors, employees in the Czechoslovak Radio, as well as staff of the IUS and the World Peace Council – WPC), 4 exercised “other” jobs, 4 were students, 1 was invalid, 4 were PCE functionaries and 14 were housewives.³⁸³ By the mid-1950s, the predominance of manual labourers and the high percentage of employment (83,3%) of Spanish exiles did not change. Thus, when Lister informed Ibárruri in 1954 about the Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia and its employment, of 117 Spanish exiles that were older than 15 years, 51 worked in factories, 11 in international and national organisations and as PCE officials, 7 in the Czechoslovak Radio, 6 in health service, 4 in education and 5 had “other” jobs – therefore, 71,8% of adult Spaniards were employed.³⁸⁴

Nevertheless, during the 1950s, with the persisting Francoist dictatorship and impossible return to their homeland, Czechoslovak policy towards these emigrants changed and initiatives to integrate them into Czechoslovak society and to strengthen the control over them intensified.³⁸⁵ According to Nálevka, the Prague delegation of the CC PCE should have ensured the incorporation of Spanish immigrants into everyday life in Czechoslovakia, in cooperation with the MOÚV KSČ.³⁸⁶ Understandably, this integration encountered several complications – apart from an almost insuperable language barrier (most of these exiles spoke Spanish and French, perhaps even Russian, but had difficulty with Czech), Spanish political emigrants were initially almost unable to understand the “problems of people’s democratic Czechoslovakia”, as they did not initially have the opportunity “to get acquainted in practice with various problems of building socialism in the Czechoslovak Republic”.³⁸⁷ In this regard, the MOÚV KSČ understood the PCE’s plea for assistance to the Spaniards regarding the theoretical familiarisation with the problems of Czechoslovakia as a “comrade’s duty.”³⁸⁸ Nonetheless, the incorporation of Spanish emigrants into Czechoslovak society was slow and complaints from

³⁸² FANDOS, *Dos tonalidades*, 4:02–4:06, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhN3Iw3pHz0&t=84s&ab_channel=DiegoFandos>, [accessed 16 March 2022].

³⁸³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 75-76. Overview report on the Spanish political emigration in 1952, 1.12.1952.

³⁸⁴ Quoted in: PETHŮ, *El exilio*, p. 95.

³⁸⁵ BÁRTA, “Právo”, p. 20.

³⁸⁶ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 90.

³⁸⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 2-7. Zpráva o činnosti španělských soudruhů v Praze (Report on the activities of Spanish comrades in Prague), 3.3.1950.

³⁸⁸ *Ibidem*.

Czechoslovak authorities and factories about the work commitment, language skills or the belief of Spaniards in their “special position” were not rare even in the mid-1950s.³⁸⁹

The situation in Spain from the beginning of the 1950s did not develop as expected by the PCE: Franco’s Spain slowly managed to break out of international isolation, obtained the necessary loans (in exchange for military cooperation with the US) and in 1955 even became a member of the UN.³⁹⁰ Still, despite the termination of the partisan movement in the late 1940s, Spanish communists did not stop fighting Franco – with the “Khrushchev Thaw”, they only changed their tactics. At the Plenary Session of the CC PCE in the summer of 1956, it was decided to support the voluntary return of Spanish exiles from the Eastern Bloc to Spain.³⁹¹ This decision was a consequence of the PCE’s new strategy, the Policy of National Reconciliation, which sought the common action of the anti-Francoist opposition to overcome the polarisation of Spanish society existing since the Civil War, while the resistance against Franco’s regime should have been conducted with pacifist methods: nationwide strike movement and the infiltration of Francoist trade unions.³⁹² As one of the former Spanish exiles Pedro García Iglesias remembers, the return to the homeland was “[f]or all of us who formed a part of Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, the majority communists and the rest considered to be sympathising, the permanent idea, the obsession [...] which [...] we did not see very distanced”.³⁹³ Nevertheless, the final return to the homeland was not easy. It was often preceded by visits of communist exiles of their relatives living in Spain, which served as a probing and preparation for their permanent departure to Spain. The PCE asked in this issue the countries of the Eastern Bloc for financial assistance; in the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, the ÚV KSČ approved this financial support for the return of the Spanish communists to their fatherland at the beginning of 1957. On the other hand, this “fraternal aid” had its economical limits: the Czechoslovak side refused financial subvention of simple visits to Spain (i.e., only one-way trips with permanent departure were financed) and the foreign currency was provided to exiles only in the amount of diets during the first two weeks, due to the lack of foreign

³⁸⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 125. Usnesení ve věci španělské a italské emigrace z ledna 1956 (Resolution on the Spanish and Italian emigration of January 1956), n. d. (January 1956).

³⁹⁰ More on the internal development and international position of Spain in the 1950s, e.g.: Santos JULIÁ – José Luis GARCÍA DELGADO – Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ et al., *La España del siglo XX*, Madrid 2007, pp. 182-193, 439-451; Ángel VIÑAS, “Autarquía y política exterior en el primer franquismo 1939-1959”, *Revista de Estudios Internacionales* 1, 1980, pp. 61-92 or TOWNSON, “Spain”, pp. 135-158.

³⁹¹ PETHÓ, *El exilio*, pp. 67-68; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 143-144. Záznam pro s. Kouckého (Record for c. Koucký), n. d., (1960).

³⁹² TREGLIA, “El PCE y la huelga”, pp. 250-251; Carmen MOLINERO – Pere YSÁS, “El Partido del antifranquismo (1956-1977)”, in: BUENO – HINOJOSA – GARCÍA (eds.), *Historia*, pp. 14-16.

³⁹³ GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, p. 161. But he also admits that the information about the situation in Spain which they received was not objective and, in this sense, they were victims of their own desires and propaganda.

exchange in the Czechoslovak Republic during those years.³⁹⁴ Thus, from 158 Spanish emigrants who still lived with their families in Czechoslovakia in the second half of 1955,³⁹⁵ between the years 1957-1960, 92 Spanish political exiles returned from the Czechoslovak Republic to Spain. Furthermore, “none of the political emigrants who left permanently, have returned back (to Czechoslovakia – M. T.) and according to the PCE leadership, all comrades behave very well, even though they are often harassed by the Francoist authorities”.³⁹⁶ This gradual return of Spanish communist exiles to Spain, tolerated (with restrictions) by Franco’s state organs, decreased in the early 1960s due to the intensification of the anti-communist repression by the Francoist regime.

The beginning of the 1960s was also the time of intensification of anti-Francoist struggles and open protests against the regime through mass strikes in Spain. This strike movement, which the PCE sought to unsuccessfully develop already in the late 1950s, erupted fully in 1962 after the Asturian mining strike, while it had the support of the Eastern Bloc countries.³⁹⁷ In the case of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, it was the financial assistance – mainly with the sum of 250,000 CZK dedicated to Spanish strikers from the Central Council of Trade Unions (*Ústřední rada odborů – ÚRO*),³⁹⁸ as well as the establishment of an inter-ministerial work group for Spain at the end of 1962, considering that the Spanish issue “[s]hould be given more attention at the MFA than has been the case so far.”³⁹⁹ Another form of Czechoslovak help, initiated and appreciated by the PCE, consisted of the sending of packages to Spanish political prisoners. The Social Department of the ČSČK was entrusted with the implementation of this action, the content of these packages varied – they involved various groceries, clothes, shoes and medicine. In the year 1960 alone, 217 packages for the total value of 111,201 CZK were sent to Spain, in the period between 1962-1965 another 250 packages for the value of 150,000 CZK left the Czechoslovak Republic.⁴⁰⁰ Desired help for the imprisoned

³⁹⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 143-144. Record for c. Koucký, n. d. (1960).

³⁹⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 67-70. Zpráva o španělské politické emigraci v ČSR (Report about the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia), n. d. (2nd half of 1955).

³⁹⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 143-144. Record for c. Koucký, n. d. (1960). For comparison, in the same period, up to 1,500 Spanish communists returned from the USSR to Spain.

³⁹⁷ ESTRUCH TOBELLA, *Historia*, pp. 205-206; TREGLIA, “El PCE y la huelga“, pp. 251-255.

³⁹⁸ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Nejvýznamnější čs. akce v posledních letech na podporu boje španělského lidu (The most important Czechoslovak actions in the recent years in support of the struggle of Spanish people), n. d. (1965).

³⁹⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 121. Záznam o Španělsku (Record about Spain), 5.11.1962.

⁴⁰⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 667, l. 73-74. Sociální odbor (Social Department) ČSČK to the MOÚV KSČ. Issue: Zpráva o průběhu a ukončení balíčkové akce „Š“ (Report on the progress and completion of the “Š” package action), 21.12.1960; NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. The most important Czechoslovak actions in the recent years in support of the struggle of Spanish people, n. d. (1965).

Spanish communists by the KSČ was the invitation of released prisoners or their family members for treatment or recreation in Czechoslovak spas and recreational centres (5 places offered at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, which were broadened to 15 in 1962).⁴⁰¹

However, it must be added, that the opportunity to travel abroad was, for the Spanish communist exiles, as well as for Czechoslovak citizens, after February 1948 radically reduced, even though it was not universally prohibited.⁴⁰² It was limited mainly to the Eastern Bloc, conditioned by authorisations from state authorities, and in the case of the Spanish exiles, it was mostly the employees of international organisations and leaders of the party, who travelled abroad – the latter were also regularly invited to spend the summer holidays with their families in other socialist countries.⁴⁰³ Thus, until the end of the 1950s, one of the characteristics of “regular” Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia was their minimal mobility abroad, while authorisations from the PCE and the KSČ were required also in the case of visits to Spain.⁴⁰⁴ In this respect, the commentary of José Montorio is eloquent: “The Direction of the party [...] were dictators, nothing more”.⁴⁰⁵

The bureaucratic obstacles of the Czechoslovak communist regime, which radically reduced the opportunity to travel westwards, were also experienced by the family of Manuel Tagüeña, who decided to definitively leave Czechoslovakia after his interrogation at the SNB in 1952. Three and half years later, before leaving for Mexico in the autumn of 1955, they had to present to the Czechoslovak authorities: a letter of invitation for Tagüeña’s research stay at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, visas issued by the Mexican embassy, an official permit to enter Mexico sent to Tagüeña by his family, authorisation to leave the Czechoslovak Republic issued by the KSČ and the PCE, permission from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Finance regarding the right to pay for the journey in Czechoslovak crowns and in addition, the family was subjected to police interrogation.⁴⁰⁶ Thus, the possibility to cross the

⁴⁰¹ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Secretariat 1954-1962, sv. 232, a. j. 392, b 14. Žádost ÚV KSŠ (Request from the CC PCE). Annex III: Zdůvodnění (Justification), 12.6.1962.

⁴⁰² In this respect, Mücke on one hand mentions the existence of multiple obstacles created by the Czechoslovak regime in the cross-border travel after 1948; on the other, he indicates that only in 1949 there were still 91,112 incoming foreigners and around 47,000 Czechoslovak citizens traveling abroad, in: Pavel MÜCKE, “Proměny politiky cestování a cestovního ruchu v Československu 1945 až 1989: politické a národohospodářské aspekty”, in: MÜCKE – KRÁTKÁ (eds.), *Turistická*, pp. 67, 142-143.

⁴⁰³ GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, pp. 194-195; PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 129-130.

⁴⁰⁴ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 129-130.

⁴⁰⁵ FANDOS, *Dos tonalidades*, 6:24–6:40,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhN3Iw3pHz0&t=84s&ab_channel=DiegoFandos>, [accessed 16 March 2022].

⁴⁰⁶ TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio*, pp. 405-415.

Iron Curtain was realistic also for “politically heterodox” Spanish exiles in the mid-1950s; nevertheless, the obstacles were numerous and not easy to overcome.

As a result of the return of the Spanish communists to their fatherland, the number of Spaniards living in Czechoslovakia gradually decreased. In June 1959 there were 106 Spanish communists in the country,⁴⁰⁷ in the early 1960s there were 108 adult Spanish emigrants (71 in Prague and 37 in Ústí)⁴⁰⁸ and in 1965 102 adult Spaniards were still living in the Czechoslovak Republic.⁴⁰⁹ As Santiago Álvarez, a member of the Politburo of the CC PCE, claimed in his report for the ÚV KSČ in 1959, the decline of Spanish exiles was mainly due to their departure to Spain (29 emigrants) or other countries (10 Spaniards).⁴¹⁰ At the same time, however, several of these exiles decided to leave from the beginning of the 1960s for Castroist Cuba or Mexico. In addition, during the first half of 1968, Spanish opponents of the Prague Spring left the Czechoslovak Republic. On the other hand, after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, Spanish opponents of Operation Danube left; the last part of the Spanish communist emigrants decided to return to their homeland after Franco’s death.⁴¹¹

Despite the functioning of the Secretariat of the PCE in Prague since the beginning of the 1950s and the frequent meetings between the Spanish leaders and the KSČ, the first official visit of the delegation of the PCE to Czechoslovakia did not occur until January 1966. During these negotiations, the internal situation in Spain and Czechoslovakia, as well as the relations between both parties and their collaboration in the future were discussed.⁴¹² As a result of the intensification of the PCE’s activities in the fight against Franco in Spain, the expenses necessary to strengthen the influence of the PCE on Spanish domestic political development also increased. For this reason, in the summer of 1968, Spanish communists asked fraternal parties for financial help – the ÚV KSČ agreed to transfer \$15,000 to the Spanish communists.⁴¹³ Nevertheless, with the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent

⁴⁰⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 94-96. Santiago Álvarez to the ÚV KSČ, 10.6.1959.

⁴⁰⁸ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.4 – Checoslovaquia, PCE – Informes (Reports). Confidential (Confidential), n. d., 1960(?).

⁴⁰⁹ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (1965).

⁴¹⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 94-96. Santiago Álvarez to the ÚV KSČ, 10.6.1959.

⁴¹¹ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 95.

⁴¹² NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Praha – předsednictvo (Prague – Presidium) 1962-1966, sv. 132; a. j. 140, b. 8. Průběh a výsledky jednání mezi delegacemi KSČ a KS Španělska (Course and results of the negotiations between the delegations of the KSČ and the PCE). Annex III: Záznam z jednání mezi delegacemi KSČ a KS Španělska (Record from the meeting between the delegations of the KSČ and the PCE), 8.2.1966.

⁴¹³ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 75, a. j. 101, b. 10. Žádost Komunistické strany Španělska o poskytnutí finanční pomoci (Request of the PCE for the provision of financial help). Annex III: Report, 25.6.1968.

normalisation, the comradely relations between the two parties were *passé*. The PCE, under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo, had already expressed its favourable stance regarding the Prague Spring, criticised the invasion of Czechoslovakia and from 1969 rejected the idea of traditional proletarian internationalism (under the “guidance” of the USSR), while advocating a polycentric communist movement, in which the respective parties could develop their own models and strategies according to their specific national conditions.⁴¹⁴ Also, the schism in the PCE fully erupted, even though the events of 1968 served only as a “detonator of internal contradictions existing between identities within the PCE”.⁴¹⁵

Enrique Lister, already critical of Carrillo and the PCE’s orientation under his leadership, began an open confrontation with the General Secretary from 1969. This conflict culminated in the gradual ostracisation of Lister, his consequent expulsion from the party (1970), and his founding of the marginal Spanish Communist Workers’ Party (*Partido Comunista Obrero Español*) in 1973, characterised by a pro-Soviet line and Marxist-Leninist ideology,⁴¹⁶ a direct antithesis of Carrillo’s Eurocommunism.⁴¹⁷ Lister in his publication “Thus Carrillo destroyed the PCE” (*Así destruyó Carrillo el PCE*) presented the main difference between him and Carrillo with respect to the occupation of Czechoslovakia:

[i]n relation to the Soviet Union, I, as a convinced Marxist-Leninist, have always defended what is and what represents the October Revolution [...] what the Soviet Union represents historically and currently [...] [a]nd there lies the profound difference between my disagreement with the August 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, which is nothing more than disagreement with this particular event and the attacks from the whole group of people, headed by Carrillo, against everything the Soviet Union represents.⁴¹⁸

However, it must be added that even Lister’s opinion on the invasion underwent a certain metamorphosis. During his stay in Prague in August 1968, he considered the invasion a huge mistake; nevertheless, after leaving for Paris, his approach towards the Czechoslovak resistance to the occupation became stricter. In September 1968, at the session of the CC PCE, he stated regarding the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that “[t]o deny that (in Czechoslovakia – M. T.) in the radio, in newspapers, at universities and in other places there were no anti-socialist, no right-wing elements that there was not [...] a counter-revolutionary activity, that would mean

⁴¹⁴ ESTRUCH TOBELLA, *Historia*, pp. 217-219; TREGLIA, “El PCE y el movimiento”, pp. 228-229.

⁴¹⁵ ABAD GARCÍA, “El otoño”, p. 999.

⁴¹⁶ MORÁN, *Miseria*, pp. 569-572; MARTÍN RAMOS, *Historia*, pp. 165-166.

⁴¹⁷ For more on Eurocommunism see e.g., FARALDO, “Entangled”, pp. 647-668 or MARTÍN RAMOS, *Historia*, pp. 172-175.

⁴¹⁸ LÍSTER FORJÁN, *Así destruyó*, p. 193.

denying the evidence [...]”.⁴¹⁹ General Líster’s son, Enrique Líster López, a direct witness to the August 1968 events in Prague, only confirmed in his memoirs the split between Líster and Carrillo, as well as his father’s pro-Soviet position concerning the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which his father considered a mistake. Nevertheless, while in Prague, General Líster claimed:

[t]here are honest people who demonstrate against the intervention [...] [a]nd there are others, not few, who show their hostility against socialism [...] [b]ecause people know, that many of these demonstrators are the real anti-socialist elements, prepared to lynch all of those, who dare to oppose the openly anti-Soviet expressions.⁴²⁰

Still, the Carrillo-Líster split was just one of many conflicts in the direction of the PCE in the 1960s. In 1965, Jorge Semprún and Fernando Claudín were expelled from the party for their “factionalism” and “right-wing deviation” (questioning Carrillo’s strategy of the PCE)⁴²¹ and after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, in addition to Líster, Agustín Gómez and Eduardo García were expelled in 1969 in response to their disagreement with party’s official position on the invasion and towards the CPSU.⁴²² Thus, with the incipient normalisation in Czechoslovakia, official relations between the KSČ and the PCE began to deteriorate, while the KSČ became a supporter of the anti-Carrillo tendencies in the PCE, seeking to unite them into one party that could compete with Carrillo’s PCE.⁴²³ Therefore, Líster’s request addressed in the summer of 1970 for the ÚV KSČ to abolish the activities of Carrillo’s delegation of the PCE in Czechoslovakia comes as no surprise.⁴²⁴

Despite this request, the Prague delegation of the CC PCE still functioned even in the autumn of 1973, and was referred to by the Czechoslovak side as “the Carrillo’s part” of the PCE and of Spanish emigration.⁴²⁵ Carrillo’s party further controlled the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia and in 1971 there were still 77 Spanish communists in Czechoslovakia

⁴¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 188.

⁴²⁰ LISTER LÓPEZ, *Praga*, p. 212.

⁴²¹ ESTRUCH TOBELLÁ, *Historia*, pp. 206-214.

⁴²² MOLINERO – YSÁS, “El Partido”, pp. 23-24.

⁴²³ ABAD GARCÍA, “El otoño”, pp. 984-999.

⁴²⁴ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 135, a. j. 213, b. 15. Zpráva o vývoji v KS Španělska a rozhovor vedoucího odd. MP ÚV KSČ se členem výkonného výboru KSS s. E. Lísterem k současnému vývoji v KSS (Report on the developments in the PCE and interview between the Head of the dep. MP ÚV KSČ and the member of the EC PCE, c. E. Lister, on the current developments in the PCE). Annex IV: Záznam o přijetí delegace KS Španělska v oddělení mezinárodní politiky ÚV KSČ dne 19. srpna 1970 (Record from the audience with a delegation of the PCE at the International Policy Department of the ÚV KSČ on August 19, 1970), 22.8.1970.

⁴²⁵ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1971-1976, sv. 95, a. j. 93, b. 11: Přiznání osobního důchodu vdově po členovi výkonného výboru ÚV KS Španělska (Granting of a personal pension to the widow of a member of the Executive Committee of the CC PCE). Annex III: Důvodová zpráva (Explanatory report), 9.10.1973.

(67 in Prague), while in Ústí the number of Spanish exiles fell to 10.⁴²⁶ This general decline can be explained by the increased mobility of Spanish political emigrants since the late 1950s, not only to Spain or other Western European countries – most of those who decided to stay in Czechoslovakia preferred, if they were allowed, to transfer to the capital. Nonetheless, the relations between the two parties were irreversibly damaged. This was also evidenced by a letter from the PCE leadership in Czechoslovakia, stating that mutual “relations are too tense to ask the Czech party for anything [...]”.⁴²⁷ During the 1970s, Carrillo’s PCE on one hand became a harsh critic of Czechoslovak normalisation, on the other, the KSČ was at the time more focused on the development of official relations with Francoist Spain, which, soon after Franco’s death, gradually culminated in 1977 in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

3.3.2 Prague, “*plaque tournante*” of Spanish communists

With the outbreak of the Cold War and the subsequent division of Europe into two blocs, Prague started to fulfil the function of a hub of various (not only) European communists and revolutionaries from the second half of the 1940s, as well as a centre of many left-wing international organisations. For this reason, the Czechoslovak capital was labelled by French historian Annie Kriegel as the “communist Geneva”.⁴²⁸ However, it was not only the regime established after February 1948 and the uninterrupted relations with the West, that made Prague an important international leftist node.⁴²⁹ As other reasons Koura mentions that Czechoslovakia was “[l]ocated in the heart of Europe (with – M. T.) high living standards, good transport connections, and a legacy of past transnational and multilingual links”, while “Prague became the seat of several exile communist parties and international socialist organisations.”⁴³⁰ In this sense, the country was capitalising on the tradition of Czechoslovak foreign policy from the interwar period, with representative offices opened in 41 countries (August 1938) worldwide.⁴³¹ Also, Czechoslovak communists were ready to offer shelter, as a gesture of fraternal solidarity, to political emigrants and left-wingers persecuted in their homeland for their political orientation,⁴³² while the limited and often secret help since WWII became more extensive after

⁴²⁶ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file 96/3.1.4 – Czechoslovakia, PCE – Reports. Organización del PC de España en Praga (Organisation of the PCE in Prague) (Grupo n° 1); Organización del PC de España en Praga (Grupo n° 2); Organización del PC de España en Ústí nad Labem (Checoslovaquia), 1971.

⁴²⁷ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 102/4 Cuba, file 102/4.4. Cuba – correspondencia (correspondence) 1971. Letter from Prague to Rancaño, 15.8.1971.

⁴²⁸ BARTOŠEK, *Zpráva*, p. 103.

⁴²⁹ VRÁNA, “Česká španělská“, <https://www.tyden.cz/tema/ceska-spanelska-vesnice_61.html>, [accessed 16 March 2022].

⁴³⁰ KOURA, ““Geneva”, p. 1.

⁴³¹ DEJMEK, *Československo*, pp. 343-344.

⁴³² GEANEY, “Špatná strana“, p. 44.

February 1948, with the possibility of using resources of the Czechoslovak state – eventually, this support became part of the official policy of the state.⁴³³ Spanish communists seeking refuge in Eastern Europe, whose General Secretary Carrillo even designated Prague as their “*plaque tournante*”⁴³⁴ (railway turntable), were in this sense no exception and the Czechoslovak capital played a crucial role in their Cold War (im)mobilities.

Thus, Czechoslovakia functioned as an anchor for many left-wing political exiles from various countries, almost always members of fraternal communist parties – often with new party headquarters established in Prague, even though the Czechoslovak legal system did not officially recognise the institution of political asylum until 1960. Before that, political emigrants were granted temporary asylum based on a proposal drafted by the MOÚV KSČ, according to the organization and size of the collective of political exile.⁴³⁵ Apart from Spanish exiles, the largest “group of political emigration” in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s consisted of Greeks – as of December 15, 1950, it amounted to 12,095 migrants.⁴³⁶ On the other hand, the number of Yugoslav political exiles oscillated between 160 and 180 adults since the late 1940s, while Italian emigration included approximately 300 adults.⁴³⁷ Numerically more limited exile in Czechoslovakia were the Portuguese, amounting in the 1950s and 1960s only to 10-15 communists.⁴³⁸ Furthermore, there were also some English-Speaking (at least 120 British, American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealander) long-term living or working emigrants⁴³⁹ and a few French political exiles in Czechoslovakia,⁴⁴⁰ even though, these could hardly be described as unified exile groups with overarching political organisation. However, as Vojtěchovský points out, political emigration in Czechoslovakia remained a marginal phenomenon due to the requirement of ideological and security control, as well as a certain mistrust of Czechoslovak citizens of foreigners.⁴⁴¹

As has been already mentioned, apart from being a crossroads and a meeting point of various intellectuals, politicians, revolutionaries, students or workers of left-wing orientation (and thus also of diverse ideas, publications or goods), even before 1948 Prague also became

⁴³³ BÁRTA, “Právo“, pp. 15-16.

⁴³⁴ MORÁN, *Miseria*, p. 552.

⁴³⁵ HOLEČKOVÁ, *Príběh*, p. 36; BÁRTA, “Právo“, pp. 16-19.

⁴³⁶ TSIVOS, *Řecká emigrace*, p. 55.

⁴³⁷ VOJTĚCHOVSKÝ, “Soudruzi“, p. 28.

⁴³⁸ SZOBI, “Portugalci“, p. 613.

⁴³⁹ GEANEY, “Špatná strana“, p. 41.

⁴⁴⁰ OLŠÁKOVÁ, “V krajině“, p. 728.

⁴⁴¹ VOJTĚCHOVSKÝ, “Soudruzi“, p. 28.

the headquarters of several international leftist “progressive” organisations.⁴⁴² Nonetheless, these were controlled and to a great extent financed by the USSR, and their function was not only propagandistic and political but also as a cover for the intelligence service of socialist countries.⁴⁴³ In 1946, the International Union of Students was founded in Prague (its secretariat was also located in the Czechoslovak capital) and from 1951 until 1954 the World Peace Council, a communist international peace movement, had its headquarters in Prague. Other international left-wing organisations residing in Prague included the World Federation of Trade Unions (between 1956-2006), as well as the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ), with the seat transferred from London to the Czechoslovak capital in 1947.⁴⁴⁴ Also, Prague provided a temporary shelter for the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in 1956, and for international socialist magazines “Problems of Peace and Socialism/World Marxist Review” (since its foundation in 1958) and “Solidarity/Solidarité” (from 1962).⁴⁴⁵

Last but not least, during the Cold War, Prague also offered shelter to many leftists from Third World countries, in order to strengthen contacts with Africa, Asia and Latin America, and to support the export of socialist revolutions to the Global South. Some of them studied at Czechoslovak universities, the University of 17th of November in Prague being the most emblematic (657 of 3,500 foreign students in Czechoslovakia in 1963) example of socialist internationalism within academia.⁴⁴⁶ Others came to Czechoslovakia (and especially to Prague) as interns and workers for educational training within exchange work programmes between socialist countries.⁴⁴⁷ Nevertheless, this internationalism had limits – frequent conflicts with the Czechoslovak environment were based on racial and xenophobic prejudices, linguistic and cultural misunderstandings, ignorance of distant parts of the world, alleged protectionism of these foreigners but also due to changes in Czechoslovak foreign policy and doubts about the effectiveness of such help.⁴⁴⁸ The situation of Spanish exiles living in Prague, with unsuccessful attempts to integrate them into Czechoslovak society, was similar in many aspects.

With this in mind, there can be no doubt about the eminent role of Prague as a hub of international socialism in the Eastern Bloc, even before 1948. Also, for this reason, Geaney

⁴⁴² ZEŽULÁKOVÁ SCHORMOVÁ, *African American*, pp. 18-19.

⁴⁴³ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, pp. 81-82; HOLEČKOVÁ, “Konfliktní lekce”, p. 162.

⁴⁴⁴ HOLEČKOVÁ, *Příběh*, p. 34; GEANEY, “Špatná strana”, p. 44.

⁴⁴⁵ KOURA, “Geneva”, p. 7; ZEŽULÁKOVÁ SCHORMOVÁ, *African American*, p. 19.

⁴⁴⁶ HOLEČKOVÁ, *Příběh*, pp. 57-59.

⁴⁴⁷ See for example: SCHWENKEL, “Socialist”, pp. 13-25; ALAMGIR, “Recalcitrant”, pp. 133-155.

⁴⁴⁸ HOLEČKOVÁ, “Konfliktní lekce”, pp. 162-172.

uses for the Czechoslovak capital the denomination the “Little Moscow of satellite Europe”.⁴⁴⁹ Indeed, from Prague, contact was ensured between the communist parties of Eastern and Western Europe⁴⁵⁰ – one of these parties being the PCE, which at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s converted Prague into one of the headquarters of the Spanish communist exile (together with Moscow and Paris).⁴⁵¹ Prague in this role substituted, after the Tito-Stalin split, Belgrade and during the 1950s, the PCE managed to create from Prague a centre and a transit point for Spanish communists, despite the complex political situation in the Czechoslovak Republic, infamous for its political processes and party purges of the early 1950s. In Prague, it was possible for the members of the Spanish party to meet freely, organise congresses and sessions, as well as to establish contacts and to plan strategies in the further fight against Franco.⁴⁵² Eiroa posits that the PCE delegation in Prague (created in 1950), fulfilled a triple function: linking the PCE Executive Committee with party collectives in other Eastern Bloc countries; ensuring the application of the party’s political direction and controlling the activities of Spaniards; whereas maintaining contacts with international organisations of the Soviet Bloc.⁴⁵³ The delegation of the CC PCE controlled from Prague the Spanish communist exile not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in other (mostly socialist) countries: Poland, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Austria (Vienna), China (since 1959) and, from 1960, even Bulgaria.⁴⁵⁴

From the beginning of the 1950s, several members of the CC PCE had been living in Prague, such as Juan Modesto, José Moix, Antonio Cordón, Vicente Uribe, Antonio Mije or Enrique Lister. It was Lister, who took control of the Prague centre (and of Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia) after his arrival into the country in 1951. The delegation of the CC PCE in the Czechoslovak Republic had at the time of its peak up to 10 Spanish representatives paid by the KSC; nonetheless, after fulfilling its main tasks, this delegation was reduced to 4 members.⁴⁵⁵ At the request of the Spanish communists from the autumn of 1951, an office with two rooms

⁴⁴⁹ GEANEY, *English-Speaking*, pp. 123-124.

⁴⁵⁰ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, pp. 81-82.

⁴⁵¹ However, since the late 1940s, it was Moscow, where the General Secretary of the PCE Dolores Ibárruri was based and where reports from the Spanish exile collectives were sent – the Soviet capital therefore played a crucial role in the functioning of the PCE, the primacy of the USSR within the Eastern Bloc also played its part. While there were 1,300 (2,000 with family members) Spanish communist emigrants in the USSR in the late 1930s and 4,221 Spaniards in 1941; on the other hand, collectives of Spanish exiles in other Soviet Bloc countries began to form only after WWII: in 1954, 191 Spanish communists lived in the Czechoslovak Republic, 144 in Poland, 113 in Hungary, 94 in the GDR and 8 in Austria, in: PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 47-48, 58; ALTED VIGIL, “El exilio”, pp. 138-143; LÍSTER LÓPEZ, “Vorgesichte”, pp. 291, 314.

⁴⁵² EIROA, “Republicanos”, p. 314.

⁴⁵³ Idem, *Espanoles*, p. 128.

⁴⁵⁴ NA, f. MOUV KSC, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 5. Santiago Álvarez to the UV KSC, 19.2.1960.

⁴⁵⁵ NA, f. KSC UV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSC: Spain. Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (1965).

was set up for the Prague secretariat of the CC PCE and José Rancaño was placed at their disposal to lead the administration of this secretariat, his income amounted to 8,000 CZK (all of this at the expenses of the ÚV KSČ).⁴⁵⁶ The secretariat of the PCE leadership was eventually established in June 1952 on Mánesová Street in Prague, it consisted of three offices and one meeting room, for the “small expenses” of the secretariat, the ÚV KSČ contributed in 1952 with the sum of 100,000 CZK.⁴⁵⁷

Bárta argues that the leaderships of political emigrations in Czechoslovakia (the PCE being no exception) wanted to maintain stern control over its members. He further adds:

The leaders of the communist parties [...] therefore required that emigrants would be kept together and if possible, separated from Czechoslovak citizens and the party organs of the KSČ in this aspect initially did not object [...] [g]roups were for this reason created on the spatial basis according to strict centralist order, which should have enabled unified management and control of emigration.”⁴⁵⁸

Thus, since 1950, the Spanish communist exile in the Czechoslovak Republic consisted of two collectives (Prague and Ústí nad Labem), established in order to streamline their control and to avoid the formation of a larger centre (and the potential deconspiracy).⁴⁵⁹ Spaniards were allocated to the respective city upon arrival, based on their relationship to the PCE, (personal) relations with the direction of the Spanish emigration and their professional skills. Taking into account the fact that Prague was a bureaucratic centre from which the activities of Spanish communists in several Eastern Bloc countries were directed, it is not surprising that Spaniards living in Prague were mainly engaged in white-collar work often directly related to the PCE activities and on the other hand, in Ústí lived mostly manually working Spanish communists.⁴⁶⁰

Spanish emigrants arriving in Czechoslovakia after WWII settled at first mainly in the capital, where they formed a PCE collective (51 members in March 1950).⁴⁶¹ Both Spanish collectives (in Prague as well as in Ústí nad Labem) were divided into groups, each headed by one leader (*responsable*) and another 2-3 members of the group leadership. These leaders of groups formed together with the leader of the collective the direction of the Prague collective. At the beginning of the 1950s, the respective groups of the Prague collective met once a week,

⁴⁵⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 649, l. 3. Mezinárodní oddělení (International Department). Žádost KS Španělska – schváleno podle návrhu (Request from the PCE – approved according to the proposal), 4.10.1951.

⁴⁵⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 16-18. Summary report on the Spanish political emigration, n. d. (1952); NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 75-76. Overview report on the Spanish political emigration in 1952, 1.12.1952.

⁴⁵⁸ BÁRTA, “Právo”, p. 20.

⁴⁵⁹ LÍSTER LÓPEZ, “Vorgeschichte”, p. 312.

⁴⁶⁰ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 97-102.

⁴⁶¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 2-7. Report on the activities of Spanish comrades in Prague, 3.3.1950.

the entire Prague collective met once every 14 days. In addition to these regular meetings, Spanish emigrants also gathered on special occasions: the anniversaries of Stalin, Gottwald or Ibárruri.⁴⁶² The leadership of the above-mentioned groups should have been theoretically elected every three months, but the elections were in reality only a formality and most of the leaders were re-elected for the following period.⁴⁶³

At the beginning of 1950, the Prague collective was divided into 4 groups: the “factory group” (14 Spaniards working in the ČKD); the “urban group” (14 members); the “urban – Yugoslav group” (also 14 members, almost all of whom had arrived from Yugoslavia) and the “radio organization” (6 members). Outside these groups, but within the Spanish collective in Czechoslovakia, lived Antonio Cordon (leader of the Prague collective between 1949-1955), Juan Modesto (working in the SPDŠ) and Manuel Tagüeña, who lived with his family in Brno.⁴⁶⁴ In addition, in the report on the activities of Spaniards in Prague, it was stated by an ÚV KSČ employee, that the group of Spaniards that had arrived from Yugoslavia was “intellectually – I don’t know if also politically – the most advanced” and the existing division into groups was described as incorrect and unhealthy, as it could lead to isolation between *intelligentsia* and workers.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, in May 1950, these groups were reorganised, while the new division made groups more heterogeneous and took into account particularly the political and theoretical preparedness of Spanish exiles.⁴⁶⁶ The primary activity of groups of Spanish communists were meetings, the main objective of which was studies, these reunions could therefore be called “political indoctrination”. In 1951, there were 4 study groups within the Prague collective, meeting every week, while at the bi-weekly meetings of the collective, the “actual political problems” were being discussed.⁴⁶⁷

Former Spanish exile Pedro García Iglesias rather idyllically described how “[r]elations among the members of the Prague collective of Spaniards were ruled [...] by affinities and mutual sympathies and antipathies, although always with a high degree of solidarity in cases of difficulties or personal or family misfortunes.”⁴⁶⁸ However, in the early 1950s, with the ongoing political processes in Czechoslovakia, meetings of Spanish emigrants began gradually to turn

⁴⁶² Ibidem; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 189, a. j. 658, l. 1-3. Plan de trabajo del colectivo de españoles en Praga. Periodo Enero-Junio 1951 (Work plan of the Spanish collective in Prague. Period January-June 1951), 1.2.1951.

⁴⁶³ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 45.

⁴⁶⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 2-7. Report on the activities of Spanish comrades in Prague, 3.3.1950.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 9-11. Antonio Cordon to the ÚV KSČ, 26.5.1950.

⁴⁶⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 189, a. j. 658, l. 1-3. Work plan of the Spanish collective in Prague. Period January-June 1951, 1.2.1951.

⁴⁶⁸ GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, p. 194.

into a platform for self-criticism in order to discipline the “heterodox” party members, often resulting in resolutions about their expulsion from the PCE or disputes within Spanish groups and collectives.⁴⁶⁹ Regarding the reunions of Spanish groups, even as early as February 1950 it was stated that “[a]t the meetings, everything is openly and directly criticised, the critiques are sometimes even sharper. Nonetheless, Spanish comrades are also able to subject themselves to just criticism and not cowardly, but to fairly criticise themselves.”⁴⁷⁰ On the other hand, a report by the ÚV KSČ from December 1952 noted the sectarianism of some Spanish partisan organisations; this defect of Spaniards living in Czechoslovakia was explained by not knowing the Czech language.⁴⁷¹

Critical evaluations of the Spanish groups, as well as party members, their performance in employment or political-ideological obedience, were a crucial part of meetings of Spanish collectives in Czechoslovakia, while their evaluation was carried out based on questions by the leader of the collective.⁴⁷² However, as Pethő continues, reunions have over time become, whether at the level of groups or collectives, less and less frequent – for example, study groups had been meeting since 1953 only once a month.⁴⁷³ Later, in the school year 1954/55, the number of study groups in the Prague collective was reduced to 3 and during this time each of these groups met 27 times.⁴⁷⁴ Nevertheless, for the academic year 1955/56, only 11 reunions within the groups were planned.⁴⁷⁵ As a result of the meetings of Spanish communists were prepared reports, later submitted to the KSČ. As will be shown in the next chapter, self-criticism and expulsions from the PCE were in the case of Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, not as rare as it might seem in such a socially and politically homogeneous group.⁴⁷⁶

The number of members of the Prague collective of Spaniards was regularly changing during the 1950s. In the spring of 1950, the Spanish collective of the PCE in Prague consisted of 51 comrades, 19 of them were manual workers, 6 were “employees”, 12 were housewives,

⁴⁶⁹ EIROA, “Republicanos”, p. 315; Idem, “Sobrevivir”, p. 78.

⁴⁷⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 12-13. Španělští soudruzi v Praze (Spanish comrades in Prague), February 1950.

⁴⁷¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 75-76. Overview report on the Spanish political emigration in 1952, 1.12.1952.

⁴⁷² PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 110-111.

⁴⁷³ Ibidem, p. 105.

⁴⁷⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 58-60. Informace o aktivitě španělské skupiny emigrantů sídlící v Praze (Information about the activities of the Spanish emigrant group based in Prague), 1.6.1955.

⁴⁷⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 117-118. Proyecto de plan de estudio político para el curso 1955-1956 (Draft political study plan for the academic year 1955-1956), n. d. (1955).

⁴⁷⁶ This is evidenced not only by José Valledor and Pilar Gómez, whose resistance will be analysed in the next chapter, but also by the cases of Celestino Castellvi and Ramón Rubio Miranda from Ústí nad Labem or José Vela and Vicente Uribe (son), whose activities were also investigated and criticised at the PCE meetings, while these exiles were disciplined and/or expelled from the party, in: EIROA, “Republicanos”, p. 315.

2 were professors, 1 was an SPDŠ secretary, 2 were students, 2 worked in the IUS and 7 were employed in the Czechoslovak Radio.⁴⁷⁷ As of December 31, 1950, there were 52 Spanish communist emigrants living in Prague, 11 of whom worked in the machine-building industry, 4 in the food and 2 in the construction industry. In addition, 22 Spaniards were employed in jobs described as “various”, 5 of them studied, 7 did not work (housewives) and one emigrant worked in the ceramics industry.⁴⁷⁸ After the arrival of the Spaniards from the third wave of emigrants (and their family members), as of February 1, 1952, 50 adult Spanish political émigrés and 42 children lived in Prague. According to their job classification, 9 of them worked manually (industry and “various professions”), 23 exercised white-collar work (students, professors, doctors, employees in the Czechoslovak Radio, as well as staff of the IUS, WFDY and WPC). The Prague collective also included 6 PCE officials and 12 housewives.⁴⁷⁹ At the end of the following year, 50 adult Spanish political emigrants belonged to the Prague collective – 6 of them worked at Czechoslovak Radio, 5 as workers in factories, some as translators in the WPC, the IUS or as manual labourers, others studied at universities or at the Professional School in Bělohrad.⁴⁸⁰

In the integration into Czechoslovak society, the Spanish collectives were to be supported by clubs that ensured the cultural life of Spaniards – they were places for organising sessions, meetings, training, celebrations, reading of the party press and literature selected by the direction of the PCE, as well as for various educational courses.⁴⁸¹ At first, the PCE leadership was not too keen on the idea of clubs as places for regular reunions of Spanish exiles; nonetheless, the fear that they would be counterproductive in the integration of Spaniards into Czechoslovak society quickly fell away, once the clubs began functioning.⁴⁸² The clubs of Spanish political emigrants were located in Prague and Ústí nad Labem and as well as in other Eastern Bloc countries, the expenses for the establishment, operation and services were covered by the “fraternal” party, the KSČ. All clubs were run by a commission headed by a leader, who

⁴⁷⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 22-27. Report on the activities of Spanish comrades in Prague, 3.3.1950.

⁴⁷⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 125. Přehled o stavu španělské politické emigrace v ČSR ke dni 31.12.1950 (Overview of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia as of 31.12.1950), 16.1.1951.

⁴⁷⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 96. Location of Spanish political emigrants in Czechoslovakia, 1.2.1952.

⁴⁸⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 50. Přehled pracovního zařazení a materiálního zajištění španělské polit. emigrace v ČSR (Overview of the employment and material security of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia), 29.12.1953. This school in Lázně Bělohrad served since 1953 as a centre for young foreign workers in preparation for their future studies at Czech universities, in: GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, pp. 91-92.

⁴⁸¹ EIROA, “Sobrevivir”, pp. 78-80.

⁴⁸² PETHŮ, *El exilio*, p. 65.

was also controlled by a member of the CC PCE responsible for education and propaganda.⁴⁸³ The Prague collective already had a Spanish club in 1949, but this club functioned within the SPDŠ as its cultural section, while bringing together Spanish exiles in order to develop political and cultural activities, such as lectures on literature and art or exhibitions of Spanish artists.⁴⁸⁴ An independent Spanish club was first established in Prague in 1953 – as a result of the dissolution of the SPDŠ in September 1952, Antonio Cordón applied at the ÚV KSČ for a provision of a place for meetings and the library of the Spanish collective, he specifically proposed to use the rooms left vacant after the SPDŠ. Czechoslovak authorities agreed with this proposal and from January of the following year, the club of Spanish exiles was to be established at Sobotecká Street in Prague.⁴⁸⁵ Activities taking place in Spanish clubs were carried out on the basis of a predetermined and beforehand approved plan, in the school year 1955/56 they included conferences, discussions and trips, as well as courses of the Czech language, Spanish grammar and literature, and also arithmetic.⁴⁸⁶

Considering its position as one of the main centres of the PCE, Czechoslovakia (and especially Prague) became the scene of several important events in the history of the Spanish party. In November 1954, the Czechoslovak capital hosted more than 60 delegates of the PCE, who celebrated their V Congress at Lake Mácha (Doksy), some 70 km from Prague. There, the party's new tactic was adopted: a program of creation of a broad National Anti-Francoist Front, that would end Franco's dictatorship through popular rebellion, form a provisional government and through elections re-establish democracy.⁴⁸⁷ This congress also symbolised the growing influence of Santiago Carrillo, as well as the definitive end of communist guerrillas in Spain.⁴⁸⁸ The expenses of the Czechoslovak side for this "Action Š" exceeded 812,000 CZK.⁴⁸⁹ In August 1957, the III Plenary Session of the CC PCE took place in the surroundings of Prague (65 Spanish comrades attended and total expenditures of the KSČ reached 86,776 CZK)⁴⁹⁰ and at the turn of 1959 and 1960, the VI Congress of the PCE was carried out in the outskirts of Prague.

⁴⁸³ Ibidem, p. 66.

⁴⁸⁴ EIROA, "Republicanos", p. 312; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 7-8. Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia, 13.9.1949.

⁴⁸⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 53. Antonio Cordón to the ÚV KSČ, 11.10.1952.

⁴⁸⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 112-115. Zpráva o činnosti španělské pol. emigrace za rok 1954-55 (Report on the activities of the Spanish political emigration in 1954-55), n. d. (1955).

⁴⁸⁷ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 43-44; MARTÍN RAMOS, *Historia*, pp. 148-149.

⁴⁸⁸ NÁLEVKA, "Španěle", p. 94; ESTRUCH TOBELLA, *Historia*, pp. 193-194.

⁴⁸⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 186, a. j. 638, l. 33. Přehled vydání v "Akci Š" (Overview of the expenses in the "Action Š"), 3.2.1955.

⁴⁹⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 144. Dodatek k vyúčtování akce Š-1957 za měsíc září-listopad 1957 (Annex to the account of the Action Š-1957 for September-November 1957), 29.10.1957; EIROA, *Espanoles*, p. 128.

At this congress, Carrillo was elected as the new General Secretary and the honorary position of President of the PCE was created and occupied by Ibárruri.⁴⁹¹ In line with Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence, the VI Congress confirmed the Policy of National Reconciliation (1956) and the soundness of social mobilisation against Franco through the National Pacific Strike (despite its failure in June 1959), while Carrillo optimistically exaggerated the power of the PCE in Spain.⁴⁹² Czechoslovak expenses for this event surpassed 579,000 CZK.⁴⁹³ In 1961, a session of the PCE Executive Committee took place in Czechoslovakia, three years later a meeting of the leadership of the party took place in Prague-Zbraslav, with the aim of discussing the position of the party in Spain and to determine further strategy in the fight against Franco.⁴⁹⁴

At the same time, the Czechoslovak capital became the place where the PCE published some of its official periodicals. Since 1951, the "Information Bulletin" (*Boletín de Información*) was being published in Prague, coming out since 1952 twice a month (350 copies per issue in 1953), serving as a study and information material for Spanish exiles also in other socialist countries, taking over news from other communist newspapers. Also, between 1949 and 1954, a theoretical-military magazine called "The National Democratic Army" (*Ejército Nacional Democrático*) was published here, under the leadership of Antonio Cerdón, with the collaboration of other former military advisors from Tito's Yugoslavia.⁴⁹⁵ Even though that in 1965 *Boletín de Información* was still issued with 3,000 copies monthly (at the expense of the ÚV KSČ),⁴⁹⁶ it ceased to be published in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1968 at the request of the PCE leadership, which did not want to "cause problems (to the KSČ – M. T.) that could have eventually appeared – given the content of its official party press – in the relationship of Czechoslovakia to the five socialist countries."⁴⁹⁷

In the 1950s, various books written by the leaders of the Spanish party were also published in Prague: a collection of texts from members of the CC PCE (Ibárruri, Uribe, Mije

⁴⁹¹ MOLINERO – YSÁS, "El Partido", p. 17.

⁴⁹² MORÁN, *Miseria*, pp. 411-417; ESTRUCH TOBELLA, *Historia*, pp. 204-205.

⁴⁹³ NA, f. MOUV KSČ, sv. 186, a. j. 643, l. 149-151. Zdůvodnění překročení rozpočtu VI. sjezdu KS Španělska (Justification for the budget overrun of the VI Congress of the PCE), 8.3.1960.

⁴⁹⁴ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Akce KSŠ, které se konaly v ČSSR s pomocí KSČ (Actions of the PCE that took place in Czechoslovakia with the help of the KSČ). n. d. (1965); EIROA, *Espanoles*, p. 128.

⁴⁹⁵ EIROA, "Sobrevivir", pp. 86-87; LÍSTER LÓPEZ, "Vorgeschichte", pp. 304, 312-313.

⁴⁹⁶ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (1965).

⁴⁹⁷ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 85, a. j. 132, b. for info 3. Záznam o rozhovoru s. B. Šimona s členem výkonného výboru KS Španělska José Moixem (Record of a conversation between c. B. Šimon and José Moix, member of the Executive Committee of the PCE), 14.10.1968.

and Modesto) under the title “The Spanish People Fighting” (*Španělský lid v boji*) or Cordón’s pamphlet against his former host “I saw Tito’s betrayal: The Betrayal of Tito’s gang during the war” (*Viděl jsem Titovu zradu: Zrada Titovy bandy za války*).⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, the Czechoslovak party enabled the PCE to print in Prague materials (brochures, statutes, programmes) from congresses and sessions of the PCE, all on Czechoslovak expenses. Nonetheless, already in 1960, the ÚV KSČ on one hand agreed with the print of materials from the VI Congress of the PCE, covered by Czechoslovakia (40,000 CZK) due to the persecution of the party in Spain; on the other, some sections of the Czechoslovak party also expressed their opinion that in the future, the print of these materials should be economically covered by Spanish communists.⁴⁹⁹

Apart from the above-mentioned publications, another communication medium of the Spanish exiles, with headquarters in Prague, was the Spanish Redaction of the Foreign Broadcast of the Czechoslovak Radio (*Radio Praga*), which began its broadcast service for Spain already at the end of 1945. Various Spanish political emigrants living in Prague were working in this broadcast – Tereza Pàmies, Antonio Cordón and his wife Rosa, José Vela, Petra Inciarte or Manuel Márquez – in December 1952 there were already 9 Spanish emigrants working at *Radio Praga*.⁵⁰⁰ Although, based on a report from 1954, the number of Spaniards employed there decreased to 7,⁵⁰¹ this did not mean that the popularity of the broadcast was declining. Quite the opposite – while in 1959 the number of letters the redaction received from its listeners in Spain amounted to 800, in 1960 this number doubled,⁵⁰² and by 1964, Spanish Redaction of the Foreign Broadcast received 300-400 letters from Spanish listeners monthly.⁵⁰³

Radio Praga, as well as other radio broadcasts of Spanish exiles in the Eastern Bloc (*Radio Moscú, Radio Belgrado, Radio Varsovia, Radio Budapest*), acted as a propaganda weapon of the Spanish communist exile in its fight against Franco. These broadcasts had the material and technical support of their host countries, while in their programs (usually 15-20

⁴⁹⁸ Dolores IBÁRRURI – Vicente URIBE – Antonio MIJE – Juan MODESTO – Josef ŠTEFÁNEK, *Španělský lid v boji*, Praha 1951; Antonio CORDÓN – Karel MAREK, *Viděl jsem Titovu zradu: zrada Titovy bandy za války*, Praha 1951.

⁴⁹⁹ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Secretariat 1954-1962, sv. 185, a. j. 297, b. 29. Záležitosti ÚV KS Španělska (Issues of the CC PCE), 11.3.1960.

⁵⁰⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 75-76. Overview report on the Spanish political emigration in 1952, 1.12.1952.

⁵⁰¹ Quoted in: PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 95.

⁵⁰² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 648, l. 72-92. Naše propagace do Španělska a Portugalska a možnosti jejího rozšíření (Our propagation to Spain and Portugal and the possibilities of its expansion), n. d., 1961(?).

⁵⁰³ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/112 (2). MFA, no. 022.144/64-4. Issue: Informace o plnění závěrů kolegia ke zprávě o Španělsku a Portugalsku z 25.7.1963 (Information about the fulfillment of decisions of the Collegium regarding the report about Spain and Portugal from July 25, 1963). For the meeting of the Collegium of Minister on March 12, 1964. Annex: Information about the fulfilment of decisions of the Collegium from July 25, 1963, about Spain and Portugal, 12.3.1964.

minutes several times a day) they tried, through Spanish redactors and announcers (communist exiles), to negatively portray the political, economic and social situation in Francoist Spain; on the other hand, they offered an idealised picture of life in people's democracies.⁵⁰⁴ Eiroa also points out that *Radio Praga* has been in the past often mistakenly identified with *Radio España Independiente*, the so-called *La Pirenaica*, which was first based in Moscow, in Ufa from 1941 and in 1955 it settled in Bucharest.⁵⁰⁵ This information was also confirmed by the redactor of the Czechoslovak Foreign Broadcast Vladimír Landovský, who in his report from a stay in Spain in 1959, explained this confusion mainly as the disinformation campaign against the Spanish population by the Francoist press.⁵⁰⁶ Landovský in his report added that “[t]he broadcasting of the Czechoslovak foreign broadcast for Spain is known and listened to in Spain [...] [but] many people, who listen to us, are afraid to write to us. They fear persecution because listening to foreign radio stations is officially banned in Spain.”⁵⁰⁷

La Pirenaica was organised and run by the PCE and the erroneous designation of Prague as its residence can be explained by the high number of PCE functionaries in Czechoslovakia, as well as by the importance of the country for the party within the Eastern Bloc, intentional misinformation by Spanish communists for security reasons cannot be ruled out either.⁵⁰⁸ Unlike *La Pirenaica* was *Radio Praga*, as part of the Czechoslovak Radio, subjected to regulations from the Czechoslovak side; nonetheless, once the processes against former members of International Brigades had started, the PCE demonstrated in *Radio Praga* its allegiance to the USSR and incited its members in people's democracies to self-criticism.⁵⁰⁹ The Spanish Redaction of the Foreign Broadcast of the Czechoslovak Radio continued to operate during the 1960s, with a separate broadcast for Spain that began in September 1965 (until then, a joint Spanish broadcast served both for Spain and Latin America) with three programs daily (90 minutes during workdays, 120 during weekends) and the number of received letters increased from 330 in September 1965 to 1950 in December of that year.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁴ EIROA, *Españoles*, p. 171.

⁵⁰⁵ Idem, “Sobrevivir”, p. 83.

⁵⁰⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 190, a. j. 662, l. 41-50. Zpráva o studijním pobytu ve Španělsku (Report about the study stay in Spain), 12.6.-7.7.1959. Vladimír Landovský, July 1959.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibidem.

⁵⁰⁸ EIROA, “Sobrevivir”, pp. 83-86.

⁵⁰⁹ NÁLEVKA, “Španěle”, pp. 93-94.

⁵¹⁰ NA, f. KSC ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSC: Spain. Vývoj československo-španělských vztahů (Development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations). Informace o účinku vysílání čs. rozhlasu do Španělska (Information on the effect of the broadcast of the Czechoslovak Radio to Spain), n. d. (1965).

As a result of the departure and the subsequent decrease in the number of Spanish emigrants in the Czechoslovak capital, changes were also planned in the Prague PCE centre – after Lister’s departure in February 1957, a 3-member committee of the PCE (Cordón, Modesto, Bonifaci) was to remain in the Czechoslovak Republic, which ought to manage the functioning of Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and GDR, as well as to maintain contact with the CC PCE through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France.⁵¹¹ Also, the importance of Prague for the PCE has gradually decreased, as since 1956 was almost the whole leadership of the party living in Paris.⁵¹² The Prague Delegation of the CC PCE, which continued to control Spanish communist emigration also in other socialist countries, had been led since 1959 by Santiago Álvarez, leader of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia.⁵¹³ In a report for the ÚV KSČ from June 1959, he stated that out of the total number of 106 Spanish communists in Czechoslovakia, the Prague collective consists of 69 exiles, the classification of Spaniards according to their job was not included in this report.⁵¹⁴ As a result of the return of Spanish communists to their fatherland since the late 1950s, the number of groups in the Prague collective had also decreased – more concretely, in 1959 there were 3 groups of Spanish exiles (meeting monthly), their study activity was carried out in “study circles”, meeting once a month.⁵¹⁵ Throughout the 1960s, the decline of Spaniards living in Prague continued – the collective, divided now only into 2 groups, included in 1971 67 members, of whom 10 were already retired. The remaining 57 exiles living in Prague performed various professions (blue-collar worker, stenotypist, waiter, doctor, translator, professor, but also director or notary); however, it should be noted that the number of manual workers in the Prague collective had been reduced to a minimum.⁵¹⁶

The situation in the Prague collective got especially complicated after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, as its members had to face a major dilemma – many of them had considered the USSR their second homeland (in addition to the leading role of the CPSU); on the other hand, it was Czechoslovakia that offered them refuge.⁵¹⁷ In his memoirs, Enrique Lister López criticised the Prague collective for its opportunism, divergent and changing

⁵¹¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 47-49. Záznam o rozhovoru se s. Lísterem, členem politického byra ÚV KS Španělska (Record about an interview with c. Lister, member of the Politburo of the CC PCE), 13.11.1956.

⁵¹² LÍSTER LÓPEZ, “Vorgeschichte”, pp. 314-315.

⁵¹³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 71-72. Santiago Álvarez to the ÚV KSČ, 26.1.1959.

⁵¹⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 94-96. Santiago Álvarez to the ÚV KSČ, 10.6.1959.

⁵¹⁵ Ibidem.

⁵¹⁶ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file 96/3.1.4 – Czechoslovakia, PCE – Reports. Organisation of the PCE in Prague (Group no. 1); APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file 96/3.1.4 – Czechoslovakia, PCE – Reports, Organisation of the PCE in Prague (Group no. 2), 1971.

⁵¹⁷ EIROA, *Españoles*, p. 123.

positions and inability to take an immediate and firm standpoint regarding the invasion (in contrast to the collective in Ústí), based on the fear of losing their jobs.⁵¹⁸ Nevertheless, at the end of 1968, in accordance with the leadership of the PCE, almost the entire Prague collective condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.⁵¹⁹ Spanish communist exile Teresa Pàmies, a former member of the Prague collective, commented retrospectively on the invasion:

Our Soviet comrades appeared in Prague with tanks because they believe that men like (Josef – M. T.) Pavel should not be ministers, as if it weren't the Czech and Slovak citizens who should choose their ministers [...] Nobody expected them, nobody had called for them. Nobody needed them. In Budapest, in 1956 they had called for them and they needed them. In Prague, no [...] I am right to oppose the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.⁵²⁰

Subsequently, in November and December 1970, both groups of the Prague collective approved the decision of the CC PCE regarding the expulsion of Enrique Líster, Celestino Uriarte, José Bárzana, Luis Balaguer and Jesús Saiz due to their “factional work” and expressed their agreement with the official policy of the PCE, headed by Carrillo and Ibárruri.⁵²¹ Furthermore, a resolution from the organisation of Spanish communists in Prague from the summer of 1972 also expressed their support for the leadership of the PCE and thanked the KSČ and Czechoslovak people for their hospitality.⁵²² Nevertheless, at this time, the limited number of Spaniards in Prague, as well as broken relations between the two parties, epitomised the gone-by position of the Czechoslovak capital as the centre of the Spanish communist exile.

Thus, based on the above-stated, it is clear that Prague had for two decades played, as a centre of the PCE, a crucial part within these “Czechoslovak moorings” of Spanish exiles. The Czechoslovak capital functioned both as a space with fixities and structures and the background of which the activities and experiences of Spanish communists with state socialism were carried out. The (un)official contacts acquired in Prague (leading to cooperation or conflicts), Prague’s institutions and organisations (created in order to facilitate the moorings of these Spaniards), as

⁵¹⁸ LÍSTER LÓPEZ, *Praga*, pp. 232-233.

⁵¹⁹ *Idem*, “Vorgeschichte”, p. 313.

⁵²⁰ PÀMIES, *Testament*, pp. 14-15, 18.

⁵²¹ APCE, f. Divergencias (Divergences) – E. Líster, E. García, c. 109, file 2 – Resoluciones (Resolutions). Resoluciones de diferentes organizaciones del PCE sobre el “Caso Líster” (Resolutions of different organisations of the PCE about the “Líster Case”). Resolución del grupo I. de la organización de Praga del PCE sobre la resolución política del pleno ampliado del CC de septiembre de este año (Resolution of the group I of the Prague organisation of the PCE about the political resolution of the enlarged plenary of the CC from September of this year), 1.12.1970; APCE, f. Divergencias – E. Líster, E. García, c. 109, file 2 – Resoluciones. Resolución del grupo no. 2 de la organización del PCE en Praga (Resolution of the group no. 2 of the organisation of the PCE in Prague), 24.11.1970.

⁵²² APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.2 – Checoslovaquia, PCE – Actas (Records). Resolución de la conferencia de la organización de comunistas españoles residentes en Praga (Resolution of the conference of the organization of Spanish communists residing in Prague), 3.6.1972.

well as the communication media of Spanish emigrants based in the Czechoslovak capital – all of it helped to strengthen the transnational network of the PCE transcending the Iron Curtain. The case of Spanish communist exiles in Czechoslovakia shows how mobility and mooring have the potential and significance in juxtaposition to each other and the necessity of their interpretation in relation to each other – “if a safe haven is sought, then mobility becomes undesirable; if in prison, mobility is to be preferred.”⁵²³ Seeing that by 1971 only one-third of Spanish exiles from 1952 remained in Czechoslovakia, it could be stated that their Czechoslovak moorings had truly (re)productive character – (infra)structures and fixities existing before their arrival and further developed during their stay, as well as activities carried out during these anchorings, enabled another mobility of Spaniards both within and outside of Czechoslovakia – all in the midst of the Cold War, and notwithstanding the complex relationship between the KSČ and the PCE after 1968. Moreover, as will be shown in the next chapter, Czechoslovakia, “a safe haven” of Spanish communists, had for some of them indeed turned into a state-socialist “prison” behind the Iron Curtain.

⁵²³ DUFFY, “Wherever”, pp. 867, 870.

4. “As a punishment, to Ústí nad Labem!” Everyday resistance of Spanish communist exiles in Czechoslovakia

The previous chapter was dedicated to the research of the (im)mobility of Spanish communist emigrants into, within and outside of state socialist Czechoslovakia, with a special focus on its (re)productive character. As has been discussed previously, during the Cold War, socialist states tried to control the mobility of the population. However, through (im)mobility they also created new possibilities for various forms and spaces of resistance. These included a myriad of agents, tactics and places; not only the infamous cross-border defections.⁵²⁴ Mobility is a relational phenomenon – in one circumstance it could be interpreted as resistance, in another as domination,⁵²⁵ while it has the potential to bring to light (unequal) power relations, to contest various forms of domination or also the ability to preserve or even (re)produce these inequalities.⁵²⁶ For this reason, in this chapter we push our argument further – based on two case studies of everyday resistance of Spanish heterodox exiles from Ústí nad Labem we claim that the (im)mobility of Spaniards who found refuge in Czechoslovakia had a “by-product” – the experiences with state socialism led to everyday resistance of heterodox emigrants, meanwhile they influenced the existing power relations between Spanish exiles, the leadership of the PCE and the Czechoslovak authorities.

In his essay “The Power of the Powerless” Václav Havel explains through the example of a manager of a fruit and vegetable shop who places in his window the slogan “Workers of the World, Unite!”, the difference between “living within the truth” and “living within a lie” in a post-totalitarian system.⁵²⁷ The manager, who does not care about nor believes in the global unification of the proletariat, accepts the prescribed ritual and thus declares loyalty to the regime in order not to lose his tranquility and security – by “living within a lie”, he puts on the mask of an obedient citizen.⁵²⁸ However, once he “breaks the rules of the game” and opposes the regime, this mask is taken away and the manager starts “living within the truth” – still, this truthful life, “humanity’s revolt against an enforced position”,⁵²⁹ was not the only possible form of resistance in state socialist countries. Recent research demonstrates that the anti-regime resistance in the people’s democratic Czechoslovakia took various forms and was not as rare as

⁵²⁴ BURRELL – HÖRSCHELMANN, “Introduction”, p. 3.

⁵²⁵ ADEY, “If Mobility”, p. 83.

⁵²⁶ Idem, *Mobility*, p. 153.

⁵²⁷ HAVEL – KEANE, *The Power*, pp. 27-29.

⁵²⁸ Ibidem, pp. 31, 36

⁵²⁹ Ibidem, pp. 39, 45.

could be expected in a state with an authoritarian regime.⁵³⁰ Nevertheless, it was only seldom openly critical of the regime, as “in an effort to enforce one’s worldview or pursue one’s interests in work and everyday life, the resister does not a priori seek conflict with the regime.”⁵³¹ Sometimes even, this resistance was not carried out directly against the establishment – it was more ambiguous and hidden; moreover, it was not always Czechoslovak citizens, but also foreign political emigrants, who were resisting the decision of state authorities and/or their own communist party. In the case of the Spanish communist exiles, it was the members of the collective from Ústí, whose acts of (everyday) resistance will be analysed in the following chapter.

4.1 Ústí nad Labem, the “purgatory” of Spanish communist emigrants

It has been already mentioned that the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia was neither socially nor politically homogeneous: it was formed not only by the leadership of the party and obedient cadres living mainly in Prague, a centre of the PCE in the Eastern Bloc and an interlink between Paris and Moscow, but also by Spanish communists who came into conflict with the direction of the PCE. These Spaniards were transferred to the North Bohemian industrial city of Ústí nad Labem, where another Spanish collective resided, formed mainly of manual workers as well as politically heterodox exiles. The existence of these two collectives underlines the dualism and dichotomy of the Spanish exile in state-socialist Czechoslovakia considering that in contrast to the Prague collective, which was formed by exiles mainly engaged in white-collar work, often related to the activities of the party, exiles living in Ústí nad Labem had to make their living by manual labour. Many of them were employed in factories in North Bohemia (North Bohemian Fat Works – *Severočeské tukové závody*, STZ; North Bohemian Garniture – *Severočeská armaturka*; The Ústí chemical plant). Thus, in addition to political heterodoxy and social challenges, members of this collective had to cope with economic difficulties as the majority of them were occupying lower-paid manual working positions.

The proposal to create a new Spanish collective in Ústí appeared already in the summer of 1950, the first four Spaniards (Alcolea, Amoros, Gómez, Bravo Perez and his family) arrived

⁵³⁰ See for example: SCHRIFFL – GEHLER (eds.), *Violent Resistance: From the Baltics to Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe 1944-1956*, Paderborn 2020; HOUDA, *Normalizační Festival: Socialistické paradoxy a postsocialistické korekce*, Praha 2019; ZÍTEK, “Hodina”, pp. 65-107.

⁵³¹ VILÍMEK – TŮMA – CUHRA et al., *Projevy*, p. 6.

there on August 31, 1950.⁵³² Out of these four Spanish emigrants, who continued to live in Ústí nad Labem as of December 31, 1950, 3 worked in light industry and one was unemployed.⁵³³ In April 1951, it was decided to move another group of Spaniards to this North Bohemian city. The initiative to transfer part of the Spanish emigrants from Prague to Ústí came from the KSČ and, as Antonio Córdón claimed, the reasons for this step, instigated by the Czechoslovak side, were the “desirability and necessity” of this move.⁵³⁴ In his letter to the ÚV KSČ, Córdón also listed Spaniards willing to move to Ústí;⁵³⁵ although, based on claims and memories of the Spanish exiles (and their descendants), the “voluntariness” of their transfer can be questioned. Gerónimo Casado and his family were also on the list of exiles allegedly willing to move there. Nevertheless, Casado’s son recalled in hindsight this move with the words: “Probably because he (father – M. T.) did not like some things, they later transferred us to Ústí nad Labem [...]”.⁵³⁶ Besides, at the Plenary Session of the Politburo of the PCE in the spring of 1956, before being eliminated from the leadership of the party, Vicente Uribe was accused of malpractice by Enrique Lister regarding the establishment of the collective in Ústí. Lister claimed:

Geminder gave the order that our comrades who were not indispensable in Prague should go to Ústí. Uribe asked Córdón to draw up the list. He saw it, gave his approval... No one agreed to leave, but only a few dared to say so. New orders from Uribe through Córdón and at last everyone leaves. All except one. Then a new order from Uribe to Córdón: “Tell him that if he doesn’t leave, we will turn him over to the police” [...] Among those who were forced to leave Prague were Paisano and Amagan, who are well known to all of you as excellent comrades. Well, these two comrades were married in Prague to two Czechs who worked and had their home in Prague and did not want to leave with their husbands. These marriages were separated for more than three years [...].⁵³⁷

The number of Spaniards living in Ústí nad Labem gradually increased during 1951 – after the arrival of the group, about which Córdón informed in his report from April 1951, 17 adult Spanish exiles lived in Ústí in June 1951, together with their 6 children.⁵³⁸ In the summer of that year, these exiles were joined by the majority of the Spaniards originally deported from France, who came to the Czechoslovak Republic in July 1951.⁵³⁹ Together with their newly

⁵³² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 2-3. Nový španělský kolektiv v Ústí n/ Labem (The new Spanish collective in Ústí nad Labem), 4.9.1950.

⁵³³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 125. Overview of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia as of 31.12.1950, 16.1.1951.

⁵³⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 12. Antonio Córdón to the ÚV KSČ, 19.4.1951.

⁵³⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 9-11. Relación de los camaradas españoles dispuestos a trasladarse a Ústí nad Labem (List of Spanish comrades willing to move to Ústí nad Labem), 19.4.1951.

⁵³⁶ VRÁNA, “Česká španělská”, <https://www.tyden.cz/tema/ceska-spanelska-vesnice_61.html>, [accessed 16 March 2022].

⁵³⁷ MORÁN, *Miseria*, p. 335.

⁵³⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 34-38. Zpráva o španělské politické emigraci v ČSR (Report on the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia), 3.7.1951.

⁵³⁹ PETHŮ, *El exilio*, pp. 97-98.

arrived family members, as of February 1, 1952, 61 adult Spanish emigrants and their 36 children lived in Ústí nad Labem.⁵⁴⁰

As was the case of the Prague collective, attempts to integrate the Spaniards from Ústí nad Labem into Czechoslovak society also encountered several obstacles: it was not only a problem of cultural differences and a language barrier, the Ústí collective also had to face specific social problems present in the war-ravaged border region of the Sudetes. As a former member of the collective in Ústí, Pedro García Iglesias, remembers, after WWII and in the first half of the 1950s Ústí nad Labem was, “a kind of Czechoslovak Far West” – a territory, that needed to be repopulated and in need of workers after the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetes.⁵⁴¹ Unfortunately, this repopulation was also performed by people often “hardly ripe to integrate into the society”. Thus, according to García Iglesias, the new members of the KSČ in this area also included careerists and swindlers.⁵⁴² Furthermore, Spanish exiles from the Ústí collective were often encountered with the antipathy of the Czechoslovak population. In her summary report evaluating the relocation, employment, financial support and social welfare of Spanish emigrants in Ústí nad Labem, Anna Alešová, responsible at the Ministry of Manpower for the “Action Š” (relocation of Spanish emigrants to Ústí nad Labem), complained in June of 1952: “I did not find understanding for this action from anyone in the Region of Ústí nad Labem. Everywhere they looked at Spanish comrades as parasites.”⁵⁴³

In addition, the housing conditions in Ústí nad Labem were far from ideal at the beginning of the 1950s, and the Spanish exiles were residing in the houses of the expelled Sudeten Germans, which, after being abandoned for some time, were in bad conditions and often even rat-infested. Nevertheless, during the 1950s, the housing and living situation of the Spaniards in Ústí slowly improved.⁵⁴⁴ On the other hand, according to Czechoslovak officials, the Spanish comrades were very demanding about the housing issue, comparing the situation in Ústí nad Labem with other socialist countries, where their comrades received modern flats, mostly even with bathrooms.⁵⁴⁵ Within the question of housing conditions, the cases of Spaniards José Soriano and Domingo Alonso were also interesting. In both cases, they refused

⁵⁴⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 96. Location of Spanish political emigrants in Czechoslovakia, 1.2.1952.

⁵⁴¹ GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, p. 85.

⁵⁴² Ibidem.

⁵⁴³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 52-53. Celková zpráva španělské akce Ústí n/L. (Overview report of the Spanish action Ústí nad Labem), 1.8.1951-19.6.1952, 20.6.1952.

⁵⁴⁴ GARCÍA IGLESIAS, *Memorias*, pp. 85, 194.

⁵⁴⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 75. (Record), 15.4.1955.

to pay rent for their flats in Ústí nad Labem for almost three years (from December 1951 till June 1954) with the argument that “if they would had to pay for the rent, they would have stayed in Spain and would not live in Czechoslovakia”. Nonetheless, it was recommended that their debts should be covered by the Czechoslovak side.⁵⁴⁶ Based on the above stated, it seems clear that the everyday experiences of the Spanish communist emigrants in the people’s democracy (especially in Ústí) were often accompanied by bitter disillusion.⁵⁴⁷

At the beginning of 1952, the Ústí nad Labem collective, which included 61 adults and 36 children, was more numerous than the collective in Prague. Also, its employment structure was different: the majority of the adults (42 emigrants) worked in industry (29 in the chemical and 13 in light industry), 9 exercised occupations labelled as “various”, 6 women were housewives and 4 exiles were unable to work due to health reasons.⁵⁴⁸ As was the case with the Prague collective, the Spaniards in Ústí were also organised into various groups, meeting regularly from 1951: at the end of May 1952, the Ústí collective consisted of four study groups, which involved a total of 63 adult Spaniards.⁵⁴⁹ At the end of the same year, the number of Spaniards living in North Bohemia did not change substantially: 64 adults in Ústí nad Labem, the total amount of children of Spanish emigrants in the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague and Ústí) decreased to 68.⁵⁵⁰ Although this report stated that in 1952, 14 Spaniards left Czechoslovakia (9 adults and 5 children) and there was also one death, within the statistics on the classification of Spanish emigrants by employment, the distribution by place of residence is absent. Nevertheless, it is clear that manual labourers (living mainly in Ústí) continued to dominate numerically (60 workers and 4 with “other jobs”, out of a total of 114 adults in Czechoslovakia).⁵⁵¹ In December of the following year, there was a slight decrease within the Ústí nad Labem collective: 57 adult Spanish political emigrants lived there, while their housing,

⁵⁴⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 96-97. Zpráva ze služební cesty konané ve dnech 27.-28. července 1954 do Ústí nad Labem a Litoměřic (Report on the business trip to Ústí nad Labem and Litoměřice on 27-28 July 1954), 29.7.1954.

⁵⁴⁷ An example of this disappointment with the Czechoslovak state socialism, due to his exaggerated expectations, was the case of the Spanish communist emigrant Ramón Rubio Miranda, who claimed that “when I left France to come to Czechoslovakia, I thought I would find a happy life there, because people’s democracy is our first goal [...]”. However, Miranda regularly complained to the Czechoslovak authorities about inadequate medical care and bad living conditions in the country, in: NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 105-106. Ramón Rubio to the MOÚV KSC, 27.1.1956.

⁵⁴⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 96. Location of Spanish political emigrants in Czechoslovakia, 1.2.1952.

⁵⁴⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 48. Plan d’organisation des cours de langue tcheque (Organizational plan of the Czech language courses), 26.5.1952.

⁵⁵⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 75-76. Overview report on the Spanish political emigration in 1952, 1.12.1952.

⁵⁵¹ Ibidem.

as well as health situation (with 3 exceptions), was described as good. Their job placement did not vary a lot, with an average monthly salary of 900-1,200 CZK, slightly lower than in the Prague collective.⁵⁵² According to the report by Enrique Líster from February 1954, there were 90 Spanish exiles in Ústí nad Labem, 49 of which were adults, organised in 4 (study) groups.⁵⁵³

In accordance with the above-stated, Pethő argues that the collective in Ústí was more homogeneous than in Prague, both in terms of employment (the majority of Spanish exiles made their living with manual work in industry) and in terms of their political indoctrination – these exiles were less politically prepared, at least from the PCE’s point of view.⁵⁵⁴ The collective in Ústí, which was in need of professional and political training, was allegedly also insufficiently familiarised with the problems of building socialism in Czechoslovakia, resulting in the misapprehension of some of its accompanying problems.⁵⁵⁵ Considering its distance from the capital, as well as the political profile of the Spaniards living there, it must be noted that the transfer to Ústí nad Labem, which often meant a shift from intellectual to manual work, was understood within the Spanish emigration as a punishment. Or, as former Spanish exile José Montorio remembers: “[T]hey sent me to Ústí [...] because it’s like when the Soviets sent to [...] Siberia. As a punishment, to Ústí nad Labem!”⁵⁵⁶

Although being geographically isolated, both Spanish collectives in Czechoslovakia were similar in many aspects. For example, in both Prague and Ústí nad Labem the Spaniards gathered in their clubs; though the Spanish club in Ústí was created in 1952 and was bigger than the club in Prague – it consisted of 5 rooms (one of them even with the capacity for 100 persons).⁵⁵⁷ Also, the activities carried out in this club and its organisation were the same as those in Prague. They held regular meetings, cultural, propagandistic and free-time activities which were organised and planned by the PCE, and the club also included a library.⁵⁵⁸ What is more, according to some members of this collective and despite the above-mentioned problems in this North Bohemian city, “the collective in Ústí nad Labem was much better than in here

⁵⁵² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 50. Overview of the employment and material security of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, 29.12.1953.

⁵⁵³ Quoted in: PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 104; EIROA, *Espanoles*, p. 88.

⁵⁵⁴ PETHŐ, *El exilio*, pp. 103-104.

⁵⁵⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 43-47. Report on the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (1952).

⁵⁵⁶ FANDOS, *Dos tonalidades*, 4:55-5:07,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhN3Iw3pHz0&t=84s&ab_channel=DiegoFandos>, [accessed 16 March 2022].

⁵⁵⁷ Quoted in: PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 115.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibidem; EIROA, *Espanoles*, pp. 116-117.

(Prague – M. T.) [...] because in Ústí nad Labem everybody was working, there was no one with the ‘good connections’”.⁵⁵⁹

Nonetheless, the situation in the collective in Ústí was far from ideal and official complaints were directed not only from the party leadership towards regular members of the PCE (and vice versa). In his report from July 1954, the leader of the collective in Ústí, Angel Gracia, complained to the ÚV KSČ about the insufficient health care provided by the ČSČK, the absence of Czech language courses and the unresolved housing issues of some of the Spaniards.⁵⁶⁰ In his next report from February 1955, it was stated that notwithstanding repeated requests by the Spanish emigrants from Ústí nad Labem, since March 1954, there had been no Czech course, despite the promise that it will begin soon. The result of this negligence – the lack of knowledge of Czech, was also one of the reasons why Spaniards were lagging in the theoretical and practical courses in their factories. This report once again included a critique of the unhygienic state of some of the flats of the Spanish exiles – despite the visit and promises by the ČSČK, housing issues of the Spaniards were not being resolved.⁵⁶¹ Additional problems of the collective in Ústí were mentioned in another report from the same year. It was claimed that due to some cases of indiscipline within the collective in Ústí, the Czechoslovak side would also have to transmit the experiences (organisation, activities, cadre checks) from the Prague collective to Ústí.⁵⁶² One of the reasons for this step was the presence in Ústí of those exiles, whose behaviour was:

[t]he result of [...] being demoralized [...] as they can find different ways to acquire benefits from their status of political emigrants without serious employment. Unfortunately, often our public and state institutions carry out interventions in their favour [...] and thus help their demoralization.⁵⁶³

From the mid-1950s, when the PCE decided to support the voluntary return of Spanish exiles to their homeland, the characteristic feature of the collective in Ústí nad Labem – a centre of “politically heterodox” and “unreliable” emigrants – also influenced the possibility of their mobility outside of the country. Thus, during an interview at the ÚV KSČ regarding the return of Spanish exiles living in Czechoslovakia back to Spain, the leader of the Spanish emigration,

⁵⁵⁹ FANDOS, *Dos tonalidades*, 6:00-6:14, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhN3Iw3pHz0&t=84s&ab_channel=DiegoFandos>, [accessed 16 March 2022].

⁵⁶⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 190, a. j. 665. (Report by) Angel Gracia, 17.7.1954.

⁵⁶¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 71-74. Committe of the collective of Spaniards living in Ústí nad Labem (Angel Gracia) to the ÚV KSČ, 29.2.1955.

⁵⁶² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 67-70. Report about the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (2nd half of 1955).

⁵⁶³ Ibidem.

Líster, stated that only those Spanish communists living in Ústí nad Labem, whose loyalty to the PCE is clear, would be taken into consideration for return to Spain. Emigrants with discovered “uncertainties” (mainly dating to WWII) would not yet be allowed to return to their homeland.⁵⁶⁴ At this time, however, due to the increasing number of Spanish exiles leaving the country, and the allocation of the preponderance of the leadership of the PCE in Paris, the importance and exclusivity of Prague for the party had gradually decreased, enabling the progressive transfer of also those “problematic” Spaniards, once sent to Ústí, back to Prague.

Consequently, the report by Santiago Álvarez to the ÚV KSČ from June 1959 mentioned that “there are currently 106 Spanish communists who work, study and live in Czechoslovakia,” meanwhile the Ústí nad Labem collective consisted of 2 groups with a total of only 37 people (the classification by their employment was not included).⁵⁶⁵ Unfortunately, documents containing information on the numbers and employment of Spaniards during the 1960s have not been preserved in the consulted archives – the last statistics date from 1971. At this time, a total of 77 Spanish communists lived in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the number of emigrants in the single Spanish group in Ústí nad Labem kept decreasing.⁵⁶⁶ The reason being was that, over time, Spanish emigrants (also the second generation fluent in Czech) were allowed to transfer to Prague, where they had better job opportunities⁵⁶⁷ – thus, the job classification of Spanish exiles was quite different from the 1950s. The Ústí collective consisted of only 10 members in 1971, of which 6 worked (a metallurgist, a lathe operator, a mason, a welder and two “manual workers”), 4 exiles were already retired.⁵⁶⁸

The position of the Ústí nad Labem collective regarding the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 is also intriguing. Enrique Líster López, who in his memoirs criticised the Prague collective for its restrained position towards the invasion, on the other hand praised the collective in Ústí.⁵⁶⁹ Líster López claimed that in Ústí nad Labem:

[a]lmost the entire leadership and the membership base have from the beginning declared in favour of intervention. Undoubtedly, this radical and clear attitude can be explained by the social composition of this collective,

⁵⁶⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 47-49. Record about an interview with c. Líster, member of the Politburo of the CC PCE, 13.11.1956.

⁵⁶⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 94-96. Santiago Álvarez to the ÚV KSČ, 10.6.1959.

⁵⁶⁶ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file 96/3.1.4 – Czechoslovakia, PCE – Reports. Organisation of the PCE in Ústí nad Labem (Czechoslovakia), 1971.

⁵⁶⁷ EIROA, *Espanoles*, p. 211.

⁵⁶⁸ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file 96/3.1.4 – Czechoslovakia, PCE – Reports. Organisation of the PCE in Ústí nad Labem (Czechoslovakia), 1971.

⁵⁶⁹ LISTER LÓPEZ, *Praga*, pp. 232-233.

constituted especially of proletarians. And the proletarians [...] have nothing to lose in the struggle, only their chains.⁵⁷⁰

However, taking into account the official position of the PCE, which condemned the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as well as the fact that there were no mass purges within the collective in Ústí at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, we assume that the majority of the Spanish collective in Ústí nad Labem changed their attitude towards the occupation, following the official line of the PCE. This is also evidenced by the resolution of the party organisation in Ústí nad Labem in November 1970, in which Spaniards from Ústí approved the expulsion of General Enrique Líster and the “factionary group” from the PCE, while expressing their support for Ibárruri and Carrillo and the party’s line led by the then current leadership on the national and international level.⁵⁷¹

Having said that, we posit that Ústí nad Labem functioned as a social space (“place[s] where social life is structured in a place-specific way”),⁵⁷² with the role of a “purgatory” of the Spanish communist exile or even, as one of the members of the collective in Ústí, José Valledor, described this city in 1955, a “concentration camp without barbed wire”.⁵⁷³ Spanish communist exiles and especially those living in Ústí, were in the 1950s subjected to “the celebration of assemblies, where self-criticism functioned as a tool for the elimination of dissident militants”, whereas resulting from these reunions were “expulsions and internal crises derived from accusations of opportunism, revanchism, disloyalty, liberalism or deviationism, only forgiven with the continuous reiterations of submission to the all-powerful party.”⁵⁷⁴ Nevertheless, this party disciplination could result not only in criticism or even expulsion from the PCE, but also in the imperative move to Ústí nad Labem – politically heterodox Spaniards were sent there as a form of punishment with the aim of normalising their conduct.

Considering that space should not be understood only as a location where social interaction occurs, but rather as “the outcome of the interaction among people and between people and nature”,⁵⁷⁵ we claim that the PCE leadership in Czechoslovakia unknowingly

⁵⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 233.

⁵⁷¹ APCE, f. Emigration (Microfilms). Países socialistas (Socialist countries), jacq. 1149. Resolution of the organisation of the PCE in Ústí nad Labem, 22.11.1970.

⁵⁷² JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, “Dimensions”, p. 425.

⁵⁷³ NA, f. MOUV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Resoluce skupiny č. I stranické organizace KSŠ Ústí nad Labem o vyloučení José Antonio Valledora z KSŠ (Resolution of the group no. I of the organisation of the PCE in Ústí nad Labem about the expulsion of José Antonio Valledor from the PCE), 8.6.1955.

⁵⁷⁴ EIROA, “Republicanos”, p. 315.

⁵⁷⁵ Steffi MARUNG – Matthias MIDDELL, “The Respatialization of the World as one of the Driving Dialectics under the Global Condition”, in: Idem (eds.), *Spatial Formats under the Global Condition*, Berlin, Boston 2019, p. 4.

created in this North Bohemian city at the beginning of the 1950s a centre and a space of resistance against the direction of the PCE and by them enforced party discipline.⁵⁷⁶ This happened simply by purposely transferring the heterodox Spanish exiles outside of Prague (for security reasons) in order to correct their behaviour, homogenise them and to punish them by living in a peripheral industrial city distanced from the capital, as well as by manual work professions with lower salaries. In this way, the leadership of the party unwillingly created a “mycelium” in Ústí for the undermining of their power position, both in relation to these heterodox Spanish exiles, as well as the Czechoslovak authorities.

Besides, based on examples of (im)mobility of Spanish emigrants both into, within and outside of Czechoslovakia (with a special focus on Ústí nad Labem), we argue that mobility is an expression of power that has the capacity to (re)produce power relations, while the most visible aspect of the relationship between (im)mobility and power (structures) is the different access to mobility. Some individuals or groups are able to use their privileged position towards mobility to their benefit – those with a better approach to mobility (or the decision-making capacity) might capitalise on it in order to strengthen their social position.⁵⁷⁷ This was clearly the above-mentioned case of Enrique Líster (and the leadership of the PCE), deciding whose mobility within and outside of Czechoslovakia was desired/required or not and in which direction it should be heading. In the same way, also Frello underlines the importance of the research of mobility within the power (structures) while claiming that “[a]n analytics of movement is also an analytics of power [...]”.⁵⁷⁸ Considering the afore-cited, it is clear that (im)mobility and its research are entangled with discipline, inequalities and power (relations); meanwhile resistance, a possible result of the control of (im)mobility, is one of the ways to fight the existing power structures and hierarchies.

4.2 Resistance: definitional ambiguity, analytical categories and its relation to power

Resistance is a broad, socially constructed and profoundly complex notion,⁵⁷⁹ “a popular and largely misunderstood concept”⁵⁸⁰ which is rather uneasy to define. Although the concept

⁵⁷⁶ By discipline we understand, in accordance with Michel Foucault, “a mechanism of power that regulates the behaviour of individuals, inscribing behavioural norms in the memory of the subjugated body [which] is enforced with the means of complex systems of punishments and rewards, and surveillance,” in: LILJA – BAAZ – VINTHAGEN, “Exploring”, p. 207.

⁵⁷⁷ ADEY, *Mobility*, pp. 106, 118.

⁵⁷⁸ Birgitta FRELLO, “Towards a Discursive Analytics of Movement: On the Making and Unmaking of Movement as an Object of Knowledge”, *Mobilities* 1, 2008, p. 46.

⁵⁷⁹ Jocelyn A. HOLLANDER – Rachel L. EINWOHNER, “Conceptualizing Resistance”, *Sociological Forum* 4, 2004, pp. 548-549.

⁵⁸⁰ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, p. 2.

of resistance has been for a long time considered explicit, with its understanding based on the binary system “domination vs. resistance”, in which the latter stood in opposition to domination – the “fixed and institutionalized form of power”,⁵⁸¹ only in recent decades newer and more complex analyses and attempts to redefine this term have appeared. This process began in the 1970s with the change of traditional views on power and the re-orientation of its research to the micro-techniques of power, represented by authors such as Steven Lukes, Gene Sharp and Michel Foucault,⁵⁸² leading to the questioning of the unambiguity of the concept of resistance (as opposed to dominance) and the subsequent thematic shift within its research from collective rebellions and (un)successful revolutions to hitherto unexplored and, at first sight, invisible forms of resistance.⁵⁸³ Therefore, the concept of resistance and its multidisciplinary research usually refers to power (in its many forms), while resistance studies nowadays hinge on existing diverse interpretations of power (relations).⁵⁸⁴ Even though the discussion regarding one clear definition of resistance has not been concluded till this day, the concept of resistance has been increasingly applied in sociology or anthropology, as well as in other social sciences since the 1990s, including studies dedicated to (the history of) everyday life or mobilities, considering that “mobility is not essentially resistance or domination; it is potentially both or either.”⁵⁸⁵

To begin with, the “minimalist” definition by Rubin identifies as resistance only the “visible, collective acts that result in social change”, and does not include forms of resistance on an everyday basis affecting power relations in a seemingly negligible manner.⁵⁸⁶ On the other hand, Iñiguez de Heredia offers a more inclusive approach when she defines resistance as “the pattern of acts undertaken by individuals or collectives in a subordinated position to mitigate or deny elite claims and the effects of domination, while advancing their own agenda”, adding that resistance is always a practice (a pattern of acts).⁵⁸⁷ Stellan Vinthagen and Mona Lilja also introduce their own, more detailed, definition of resistance. They understand it as an act/pattern of actions and a “practice(s) that might be played out by organized larger groups and

⁵⁸¹ Sherry B. ORTNER, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1, 1995, pp. 174-175.

⁵⁸² See e.g., Steven LUKES, *Power: A Radical View*, Houndmills 2005; Gene SHARP, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part One: Power and Struggle*, Boston 1973; or the further mentioned works of Michel Foucault.

⁵⁸³ ORTNER, “Resistance”, pp. 174-175.

⁵⁸⁴ LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 17.

⁵⁸⁵ ADEY, *Mobility*, p. 152.

⁵⁸⁶ Quoted in: HOLLANDER – EINWOHNER, “Conceptualizing”, p. 541.

⁵⁸⁷ IÑIGUEZ DE HEREDIA, *Everyday*, p. 69.

movements as well as based on individuals, subcultures and everyday relations. It might be directed by power-relations, violent practices or inspired by other resisters”.⁵⁸⁸

Unlike scholars who dedicate their research to resistance in the broadest sense (synonymous to opposition), we argue that it is, first and foremost, necessary to distinguish between rebellion, revolution and resistance – the latter being, according to Selbin, “a form of insurgency denoted by the refusal of people to cooperate actively with, or express support for, the current regime of authority figures; even when this may appear passive, it is an activity, an ‘action’.”⁵⁸⁹ The above mentioned definitional discrepancies serve as proof that currently there is no universally valid definition of resistance, as it is a “plural, malleable, and evolving [...] phenomenon with many faces”, although the theoretical demarcation of even such a complex concept still has its limits, and therefore, “not anything goes.”⁵⁹⁰ Nevertheless, there is an existing consensus between academics in the brief characterisation of resistance as an “oppositional act”, as almost all its applications include two crucial elements: action (broadly speaking) and opposition, while it is also located in a concrete time, space and relations and linked to various actors, methods and discourses.⁵⁹¹ Furthermore, this minimalist definition of resistance as an “oppositional act” in fact offers researchers greater analytical flexibility.

Considering that resistance is such a complex and broad concept, it needs to be researched in a specific context with a concrete purpose – there is no need to limit the understanding of this notion to the well-known forms of opposition (protests, strikes, riots or revolutions).⁵⁹² Thus, resistance needs to be, as well as any other concept(s), contextualised – put into the broader “context of a theoretical perspective in which they are used to describe and explain phenomena they abstract from reality”⁵⁹³ and researched with concrete analytical categories, questions and (inter)connections existing between them. Therefore, in any analysis, the resister, as well as his/her actions, must be put into a broader historical-sociological background, considering that the concept of resistance also has its limits; it is “a patterned practice” and not “an effect” – an undeniably unintended act (e.g., oversleeping and being late for work) can be hardly considered resistance.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁸⁸ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed”, p. 214.

⁵⁸⁹ Eric SELBIN, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story*, London, New York 2010, p. 11.

⁵⁹⁰ BAAZ – LILJA – SCHULZ et al., “Defining”, p. 138.

⁵⁹¹ VINTHAGEN – JOHANSSON, “Everyday”, p. 1; HOLLANDER – EINWOHNER, “Conceptualizing”, pp. 538–539.

⁵⁹² LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed”, p. 214.

⁵⁹³ Robert A. ALFORD – Roger FRIEDLAND, *Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy*, Cambridge 1985, p. 2.

⁵⁹⁴ ÑIGUEZ DE HEREDÍA, *Everyday*, pp. 62, 69.

In their study on the conceptualisation and categorisation of resistance, Chin and Mittelman offer four different analytical elements (forms, agents, sites and strategies of resistance), whose interactions are, according to these scholars, decisive within the conceptual framework of the resistance research.⁵⁹⁵ On the other hand, authors from the University of Gothenburg (Baaz, Lilja, Schulz et al.) propose a broader framework with seven categories that are crucial for the proper analytical study of resistance:⁵⁹⁶

1. *Repertoires of resistance in relation to particular configurations of power*: as power and resistance are entangled, there are various strategies (repertoires) of resistance, which are shaped by and respond to different forms of power.
2. *Resistance reinforcing and/or creating new performances of resistance*: one form of resistance might inspire, provoke, lead to but also dissuade another one, depending always on context and concrete circumstances.
3. *The spectrum between organised and individual resistance*: as resistance is not always organised formally nor collectively, this spectrum involves many different resistance practices (whistle-blowers, proletarian shopping).
4. *The spatial dimensions of resistance*: resistance is always carried out in a concrete location, while the sites of resistance are social spaces, which are organised politico-legally, socio-culturally and socio-economically.
5. *The temporal aspect of resistance* (time and temporality of the resistance).
6. *The relationship between bodies and representations* (the effect of various materialities on resisters' thinking and bodies – these can (re)produce the character of given materiality).
7. *Processes of self-reflection and affects*: the reflection of the subjects upon themselves in relation to domination and the analysis of emotions that stimulate and/or discourage resistance, as resisters, whether their resistance is intentional or not, arise from self-formative processes.⁵⁹⁷

As we also consider the above-mentioned analytical categories (in particular the “repertoires of resistance in relation to particular configurations of power” and the “spatial dimensions of resistance”) to be crucial in the research on resistance, in our analysis we will

⁵⁹⁵ Christine B. N. CHIN – James H. MITTELMAN, “Conceptualising Resistance to Globalisation”, *New Political Economy* 1, 1997, pp. 34-36.

⁵⁹⁶ BAAZ – LILJA – SCHULZ et al., “Defining” pp. 145-148; JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, pp. 121-122.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibidem.

proceed according to them, while respecting their attributes as well as their (inter)connections. Still, we must add, that the key elements in any resistance study would be its “forms” (individual/collective, public/hidden, everyday/loud, etc.); “actors” (agent, target, observer); “time”; “sites” and “tactics of resistance”, as well as its “relation to power”.⁵⁹⁸ In short, it is crucial to ask “who is carrying out the practice, in relation to whom, where (the spatial aspect – M. T.), when (the temporal aspect – M. T.) and how?”⁵⁹⁹ Therefore, it is necessary to recognise the agents of resistance (individuals or groups/collectives, who are carrying out the practice of resistance) and to analyse their relation to authority/power holders,⁶⁰⁰ as these agents of resistance “emerge from interactions between structure and agency that lead to the contextual privileging of particular intersections of different modalities of identity [...]”.⁶⁰¹ The targets of resistance (“In relation to whom?”) are those against whom the act of resistance is directed and their social identity may vary: a person, group, collective, organisation, institution, social structure, discourse or symbol – generally, any actor in the resistance act that has its defenders, which can be mobilised, while their relations to the agents of resistance are being plural, complex and depending on the specific context.⁶⁰² Also, resistance is always interconnected with power and their entanglement is carried out in “a historic and dynamic interaction”, which is shaped by relations between the actors of resistance and their relation in/to time (“When?”) and in/to space (“Where?”).⁶⁰³ By tactics⁶⁰⁴ of resistance (“How?”) we understand, what Chin and Mittelman define as “strategies of resistance” – “the actual ways that people, whose modes of existence [...] are threatened [...] respond in a sustained manner towards achieving certain objectives.”⁶⁰⁵

Additionally, according to scholars such as James C. Scott, another important element in the research of resistance is the intention (intent) of the resisters, taking into account that for

⁵⁹⁸ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, “Dimensions”, p. 419; Idem, *Conceptualizing*, p. 10.

⁵⁹⁹ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, p. 7.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibidem, pp. 106-107.

⁶⁰¹ CHIN – MITTELMAN, “Conceptualising”, p. 35.

⁶⁰² HOLLANDER – EINWOHNER, “Conceptualizing”, p. 536; JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, pp. 106-107, 119-120.

⁶⁰³ VINTHAGEN – JOHANSSON, “Everyday”, pp. 26-27, 36.

⁶⁰⁴ In our research, we distinguish between “models/forms” of resistance and the concrete “tactics” of resistance – specific ways of carrying out the particular resistance acts (foot-dragging, arson, collaboration, etc.).

⁶⁰⁵ CHIN – MITTELMAN, “Conceptualising”, p. 35. In this sense, we follow Michel de Certeau’s understanding of tactic as the “art of the weak” and “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus”, instead of strategy, which is “the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships, that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated”, in: Michel DE CERTEAU, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1988, pp. 35-37.

him, resistance “is an intentional act.”⁶⁰⁶ On the other hand, Vinthagen and Johansson argue that in the analysis of resistance, it is necessary to disengage from the issue of the consciousness and intentions of resisters, considering that whenever people act, they have some intent.⁶⁰⁷ These authors further add that although resistance is carried out with various intentions, these are not crucial for defining the type of action; although they are still significant for the interpretation of ideas, plans, inner world or cultural implications that agents underline by their resistance. In the same way, we argue that it is necessary to focus more on understanding and analysing the ways of carrying out the resistance acts (tactics) and their creativity.⁶⁰⁸

In her study, Iñiguez de Heredia tries to interconnect resisters’ intents, “the aim(s) of denying or mitigating an authority claim or the effects of domination” and their motivations, “the reasons, justifications and agendas behind those aims”,⁶⁰⁹ claiming that even if the motivation involves a specific understanding of subject’s subordinated position, the intention usually does not substantially transcend the act of resistance itself.⁶¹⁰ We agree with this argumentation and instead of focusing exclusively on the intentions of resisters, we also pay attention to the motivations behind their resistance, while taking into account the organisational and societal context of acts of resistance, considering that individual motives, interests or perceptions alone cannot accurately clarify one’s conduct.⁶¹¹ One way or another, in order to detect and research resistance, it is not necessary for the agent of resistance to be able to express motivations, what is crucial is the ability of the researcher to understand the background of the act of resistance and the context of existing power relations.⁶¹²

As has been already mentioned, since the 1970s, the shift within the research on power (relations) has led to the situation, where the once generally recognised perspective of seeing power and resistance as inevitably opposed is nowadays being gradually abandoned.⁶¹³ On the contrary, Foucault views resistance as a way of conceptualising power, which “bring[s] to light

⁶⁰⁶ Asef BAYAT, “From ‘Dangerous Classes’ to ‘Quiet Rebels’: Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South”, *International Sociology* 3, 2000, p. 543. Scott also claims that “the question of intention is perhaps the most fraught issue in analysing everyday resistance [...] [t]he social understanding of intention is, in fact, more important in the study of resistance than either the act itself or the intention of the individual actor performing the act”, in: JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, pp. X-XI.

⁶⁰⁷ Idem, “Everyday”, p. 20.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibidem, pp. 20-22.

⁶⁰⁹ IÑIGUEZ DE HEREDIA, *Everyday*, p. 63.

⁶¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 52.

⁶¹¹ ALFORD – FRIEDLAND, *Powers*, p. 15.

⁶¹² Gumira Joseph HAHIRWA – Camilla ORJUELA – Stellan VINTHAGEN, “Resisting resettlement in Rwanda: rethinking dichotomies of “survival”/“resistance” and “dominance”/“subordination”, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4, 2017, p. 737.

⁶¹³ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Sovereign”, p. 111.

power relations, locate[s] their position, find[s] out their point of application and the methods used.”⁶¹⁴ For this reason, the relationship between power and resistance could be understood as a dynamic interaction of two categories, which are both de-centred and intersectional and at the same time interdependent and influencing each other, thus becoming entangled.⁶¹⁵ It is this (inter)relation, that is crucial in the analysis of both concepts, especially considering their parasitic, mutually undermining/reinforcing and interconnected relationship, as resistance could challenge and/or strengthen the power, as well as profit from it – the concept of power is fundamental for any resistance practice.⁶¹⁶ Therefore, any research on resistance becomes, in its full complexity, also research on the existing and constantly changing power (relations), taking into account that power, as well as resistance, exists in multiple forms, temporalities and spaces and the relation between power and resistance, although being two sides of the same coin, is in principle oppositional.⁶¹⁷ Hence, Vinthagen and Johansson present three conditions that need to be fulfilled in the recognition of any act as resistance: 1. The practice must be related to power; 2. Carried out by an agent in a position subordinated to that power; 3. It should have a chance to undermine or disrupt that power, even if only provisionally.⁶¹⁸

Regarding the character of power and its relationship to individuals, in our research, we lean towards the interpretative stream represented for example by Foucault and Sharp, who claim that power is omnipresent and multifocal. This view could be designated as rather optimistic, as it interprets individuals as the main agents of their lives, capable of negotiation, manipulation, intrigue and also resistance – they can manoeuvre within power relations, regardless of their social or economic situation.⁶¹⁹ For this reason, we analyse the existing power relations and their entanglement with the acts of resistance through the concept of power (relations) as understood by Foucault, who views power as omnipresent (“Power is everywhere”), multifocal (“it comes from everywhere”) and dynamic (“it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relations from one point to another”).⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁴ Michel FOUCAULT – James D. FAUBION (ed.), *Power. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*, New York 2000, p. 329.

⁶¹⁵ VINTHAGEN – JOHANSSON, “‘Everyday’”, p. 26.

⁶¹⁶ LILJA – BAAZ – VINTHAGEN, “Exploring”, p. 212.

⁶¹⁷ VINTHAGEN – JOHANSSON, “‘Everyday’”, p. 26. Moreover, as Foucault claims: “Resistances do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles; but neither are they a lure or a promise that is of necessity betrayed. They are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite”, in: Michel FOUCAULT, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*, New York 1978, p. 96.

⁶¹⁸ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, p. 68.

⁶¹⁹ Julian McAllister GROVES – Kimberly A. CHANG, “Romancing Resistance and Resisting Romance. Ethnography and the Construction of Power in the Filipina Domestic Worker Community in Hong Kong,” *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 3, 1999, p. 261.

⁶²⁰ FOUCAULT, *The History*, p. 93.

According to him, power is also productive, provoking, inciting, “it makes people act and speak”,⁶²¹ meanwhile it exists in society in three different forms (disciplinary power, sovereign power and biopower), which are all intersecting, self-(re)producing and hybrid.⁶²²

What is more, Foucault argues that power stems from below and that there is always a possibility to rebel against it.⁶²³ Therefore, if we part from his understanding of power, then both power and resistance are (re)productive and (re)constitutive,⁶²⁴ considering that resistance is a “response to power from ‘below’, a subaltern practice that could challenge, negotiate and undermine power.”⁶²⁵ Foucault also claims that the existence of power (relations) is based on the plurality of points of resistance and by being pluralistic as well as productive,⁶²⁶ resistance can inspire, provoke, and encourage but also discourage resistance.⁶²⁷ Seeing that from his perspective, power is heterogenous, omnipresent, mobile and dispersed, productive as well as repressive (as are the power relations within the practice of resistance);⁶²⁸ therefore, the agents of resistance could at the same time be the exercisers of power and be subordinated to it, they can also be in an “ambivalent in-between position”, linking power holders and subalterns.⁶²⁹

With regard to the three forms of power suggested by Foucault, Lilja and Vinthagen differentiate various responses to these modalities of power in the forms of diverse resistance practices: resistance to sovereign power; to biopower and to disciplinary power.⁶³⁰ Although these three Foucauldian types of power are not exclusive and often exist together, in our analysis of the resistance of Spanish exiles we will proceed by focusing on the Foucauldian notion of disciplinary power and the resistance to this modality of power, when the practice of resistance is based on “openly or covertly refusing to participate in self-disciplinary practices, which normalise subjects according to the norm”.⁶³¹ We claim that those who dare to deviate from disciplinary standards and norms, although referred to as “abnormal(s)”,⁶³² evade the discipline

⁶²¹ FOUCAULT – FAUBION (ed.), *Power*, p. 172.

⁶²² LILJA – BAAZ – VINTHAGEN, “Exploring”, p. 208. For more on these forms of power see e.g., LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Sovereign”, pp. 108-123.

⁶²³ FOUCAULT – FAUBION (ed.), *Power*, p. 324; FOUCAULT, *The History*, p. 94.

⁶²⁴ BAAZ – LILJA – SCHULZ et al., “Defining”, p. 148.

⁶²⁵ LILJA – BAAZ – VINTHAGEN, “Exploring”, p. 209.

⁶²⁶ FOUCAULT, *The History*, pp. 95-96.

⁶²⁷ LILJA – BAAZ – SCHULZ et al., “How resistance”, p. 52.

⁶²⁸ FOUCAULT, *The History*, p. 93; Roger DEACON, “Strategies of Governance. Michel Foucault on Power”, *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 92, 1998, p. 119.

⁶²⁹ HAHIRWA – ORJUELA – VINTHAGEN, “Resisting”, pp. 737-738, 746; VINTHAGEN – JOHANSSON, “Everyday”, pp. 13-14.

⁶³⁰ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Sovereign”, pp. 112-121.

⁶³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 122.

⁶³² LILJA – BAAZ – VINTHAGEN, “Exploring”, p. 208.

through different methods and ways – these also include hidden or everyday forms of resistance (e.g., showing outward compliance and maintaining inner dissent).

In his seminal work “Discipline and Punish”, Foucault argues that “the (disciplinary – M. T.) power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps [...] and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another.”⁶³³ Within the Spanish collective in Ústí, the leadership of the PCE in Czechoslovakia tried to submit its heterodox members to their (partisan) discipline, and in accordance with the Czechoslovak authorities, it focused on controlling their lives by deciding about their place of stay, job positions and mobility within the country and abroad. The main objective in this sense was their coercion and “normalization”; however, as the presented examples of everyday experiences and resistance of Spanish exiles will show, (power) relations between the leadership of the PCE, its heterodox members and the Czechoslovak authorities were complex but also fragile. Moreover, as the below analysed cases of Spanish exiles demonstrate, resistance against disciplinary power and intended homogenisation could also lead to the change/reversal of the discursive norm and/or knowledge (re)production by means of “reiteration, rearticulation or repetition of the dominant discourse with a slightly different meaning.”⁶³⁴

4.3 Everyday forms of resistance: Scott and beyond

As a matter of fact, it was the implementation of the notion of resistance into everyday life which together with the application of this concept within the existing power relations led to the development of the concept of “everyday resistance”. As was the case with the notion of resistance, also everyday resistance has neither a universally valid definition nor categorisation. The mere fact that some authors (for example, Gerald Mullin and Eugene Genovese) do not consider everyday (hidden) forms of resistance as “real resistance”⁶³⁵ is proof of its problematic definition and further analysis. The above-mentioned scholars thus overlook the existing power relations in the acts of resistance and the danger of open confrontation – when only public, collective and organised forms of opposition could be addressed as resistance, then “all that is being measured may be the level of repression that structures the available options.”⁶³⁶

⁶³³ Michel FOUCAULT, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, New York 1995, p. 184.

⁶³⁴ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Sovereign”, pp. 114-115, 122; Judith BUTLER, *The Psychic Life of Power. Theories in Subjection*, Stanford 1997, pp. 92-93, 98-99.

⁶³⁵ SCOTT, “Everyday Forms of Peasant”, pp. 23-24.

⁶³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 27; *Idem*, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, p. 51.

Notwithstanding various existing typologies and categorisations of resistance,⁶³⁷ it could be argued that it was the North American anthropologist James C. Scott, who deserves the most credit for the shift within the research of resistance from organised mass revolts and rebellions to informal, covert, and seemingly invisible “everyday forms of resistance”. The theoretical concept of everyday resistance was introduced by Scott in his book “Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance” (1985).⁶³⁸ Scott here underlines that in the research on resistance, it is necessary to focus not only on collective revolts, revolutions, or other forms of public confrontation of dominant power, but also on everyday forms of resistance – the resistance of marginalised or subaltern individuals/groupings, for whom the open contestation of authority may often be too risky and its consequences catastrophic. Still, his interpretation of everyday resistance is based on the power relations existing in a concrete community.⁶³⁹ He argues that “[e]veryday forms of resistance make no headlines”⁶⁴⁰ and points out that the aim of resistance of subaltern groups is usually not the overthrowing or the change of structures of domination but persistence and survival.⁶⁴¹ As the title suggests, Scott focuses on the “weapons of the weak” – latent but persistent resistance of subaltern groups/individuals, who must often resort to disguise when confronted with power, considering that “[d]issimulation is the characteristic and necessary pose of subordinate classes everywhere most of the time [...]”.⁶⁴² Thus, everyday forms of (peasant) resistance are defined by Scott as the perpetual struggle “between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents and interest from them [...] the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot-dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson [...]”.⁶⁴³

Scott also studies the issue of everyday resistance in his other works,⁶⁴⁴ gradually disengaging from the interpretation of resistance as class conflict,⁶⁴⁵ focusing instead on the

⁶³⁷ On the categorizations of resistance see for example: HOLLANDER – EINWOHNER, “Conceptualizing”, pp. 533-551; CHIN – MITTELMAN, “Conceptualising”, pp. 25-37.

⁶³⁸ In this work, Scott focuses on everyday forms of peasant resistance in a small Malaysian village during the 1970s. Paradoxically, the technological development in agriculture that took place in the area led to the enhancement of social inequality through the worsening of the income distribution and the escalation of class conflict.

⁶³⁹ SCOTT, *Weapons*, pp. 28-30, 32-35.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 36.

⁶⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 301.

⁶⁴² Ibidem, p. 284.

⁶⁴³ Ibidem, p. 29.

⁶⁴⁴ For example, in his publication “Seeing Like a State” (1998), Scott demonstrates the interconnection between (im)mobilities and resistance by focusing on urban planning and showing “how the streets and spaces of insurrectionary politics can be used to support different sorts of mobilities in order to quash and disrupt rebellion”, in: ADEY, *Mobility*, p. 155.

⁶⁴⁵ SCOTT, *Weapons*, p. 290.

state-society relations and arguing that the success of resistance depends on power relations, as everyday forms of resistance are carried out against an entity that disposes of more power – such an entity is often the state.⁶⁴⁶ In his next book, “Domination and the Arts of Resistance” (1990), he further develops the concept of everyday resistance, while offering examples of (un)successful everyday resistance in the Eastern Bloc as well as his own categorisation of resistance.⁶⁴⁷ Besides, Scott here introduces the term the “infrapolitics of subordinate groups” (later a synonym for everyday resistance),⁶⁴⁸ understanding behind this notion various forms of contention: gossip, songs, gestures and jokes (ways of disguising ideological insubordination, while trying to conceal the identity of the resister or the nature of the act of resistance itself). On the other hand, he mentions poaching, foot-dragging, dissimulation or theft – ways by which subalterns try to disguise their endeavour to prevent the appropriation of their labour or property by the authority.⁶⁴⁹ Furthermore, Scott here accentuates the entanglement between resistance and power, claiming that “[p]ower means not having to act or, more accurately, the capacity to be more negligent and casual about any single performance.”⁶⁵⁰

Thus, Scott introduces everyday resistance as a theoretical concept that can be summarised as a resistance, that is “informal, often covert and concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains”⁶⁵¹, characterised by its “pervasive use of disguise”.⁶⁵² This disguise exists in two forms: concealment of the agent of resistance or the concealment of the act of resistance itself, when the “act of resistance is [...] often accompanied by a public discursive affirmation of the very arrangements being resisted” – both in order to ensure the safety of resisters.⁶⁵³ Everyday resistance is a relatively safe form of insubordination of individuals/groups as it requires minimal or no formal coordination. Its goals are often egocentric and provide immediate material gains while avoiding direct symbolic or overt challenging of the authority.⁶⁵⁴ At the same time, it is directed against an actor with more power (in countries of state socialism against the state and its authorities).⁶⁵⁵ Still, only rarely do the “officials of the state wish to publicise the insubordination. To do so would be openly to confess

⁶⁴⁶ Idem, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, pp. 41, 52.

⁶⁴⁷ Idem, *Domination*, pp. 198, 210-212.

⁶⁴⁸ LILJA – BAAZ – SCHULZ et al., “How resistance”, p. 42.

⁶⁴⁹ SCOTT, *Domination*, p. XIII.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 29.

⁶⁵¹ SCOTT, *Weapons*, p. 33.

⁶⁵² Idem, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, p. 54.

⁶⁵³ Ibidem, pp. 54-56.

⁶⁵⁴ Idem, *Decoding*, pp. 70-73; Idem, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, pp. 34-37.

⁶⁵⁵ Idem, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, pp. 36, 43-48.

that their policy is unpopular [...]”.⁶⁵⁶ Lastly, although everyday resistance might not rupture dominant symbolic structures, it could be still understood as a constant pressure against the authority, looking for its weaknesses, as well as for the limits of the resistance, which in the case of a change in power relations in favour of subalterns may turn into a public challenge.⁶⁵⁷

Unsurprisingly, Scott’s theories were subjected to criticism, in recent years even from their author proper.⁶⁵⁸ Taking into account the amount of criticised flaws in Scott’s “umbrella concept” of everyday resistance, we decided not to proceed unilaterally with the application of his concept on the resistance of Spanish exiles, but to overreach it. Even though we are well aware of its importance and relevancy, in the case of state socialist countries, Scott applies his theories only in the context of collective resistance and also in a different period.⁶⁵⁹ In this respect, the most remarkable progress regarding the rearticulation of Scott’s foundational concept was done by Swedish sociologists Stellan Vinthagen and Anna Johansson. In their investigation, they intend to reformulate and “go beyond” Scott’s concept of everyday forms of resistance by offering their own trans-disciplinary analytical framework, still maintaining Scott’s theories as a crucial referential point for their resistance research.⁶⁶⁰

According to a definition posited by Vinthagen and Johansson, everyday resistance is “a pattern of acts (practice) done by someone subordinated in a power relation and that might (temporary) undermine or destabilize (some aspect of) dominance [...] conducted in certain situations and contexts, when public resistance for some reasons is not an alternative [...]”.⁶⁶¹ Their understanding of everyday resistance is therefore based on two main features: it is an everyday act done in an oppositional relationship to power, while it provokes its response.⁶⁶² Everyday resistance is, according to Johansson and Vinthagen, carried out by an individual or small groups absencing formal organisation, with a potential to undermine power relations, still without being recognised as resistance (or excluding the detection of agents), while forming a

⁶⁵⁶ Idem, *Decoding*, p. 71.

⁶⁵⁷ Idem, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, pp. 57-59.

⁶⁵⁸ See for example: JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, pp. IX-XI, 34-39; BAAZ – LILJA – SCHULZ et al., “Defining”, pp. 139-140; IÑIGUEZ DE HEREDÍA, *Everyday*, p. 58; Helena FLAM, “Anger in Repressive Regimes. A Footnote to *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* by James Scott”, *European Journal of Social Theory* 2, 2004, pp. 171-188.

⁶⁵⁹ We agree with the criticism by Flam – she questions the possibility of applying Scott’s “politics of disguise and concealment” on the cases of state socialist Czechoslovakia or the Polish People’s Republic, mentioning the examples of *KOR* in Poland and *Charta 77* in Czechoslovakia and claiming that Scott „ignores the importance of the historical evolution of discourses about protest and the forms it takes”, in: FLAM, “Anger”, pp. 178-179.

⁶⁶⁰ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, “Dimensions”, pp. 417-435; Idem, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: the Palestinian”, pp. 109-139. These scholars base their research vastly on the works of Scott and Michel de Certeau, while operating with the interpretation of power as understood by Foucault or Sharp.

⁶⁶¹ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, pp. 9, 28.

⁶⁶² Ibidem, p. 45.

pattern of acts being “done in a regular way”.⁶⁶³ The acts of everyday resistance are therefore hard to uncover since they do not contain a long-lasting collective strategy and instead depend on “contextual tactics, opportunities, individual choices, temporality [...]”.⁶⁶⁴ Furthermore, these scholars claim that in the detection of everyday resistance, neither the intention and consciousness of the agent, nor the recognition by the target play an important role. What matters is the proper act of resistance and “the way of acting” (as well as the context) – compulsory in its recognition must be the potential of undermining power (relations).⁶⁶⁵

These authors also propose a new theoretical platform for the study of everyday resistance that consists of four main hypotheses:⁶⁶⁶

1. Everyday resistance is a practice.
2. Everyday resistance is entangled with (everyday) power.
3. It should be perceived as intersectional with the powers that it interacts with.
4. Everyday resistance is heterogeneous and contingent due to altering contexts.

Vinthagen and Johansson have also elaborated a trans-disciplinary theoretical framework for the research of resistance in everyday life, applicable to various conceptual models and consisting of four dimensions of everyday resistance, broadened by Baaz et al. into seven analytical categories.⁶⁶⁷ Apart from the above-mentioned “repertoires of everyday resistance” and its “spatiality”; we perceive “relationships of agents/actors” of resistance (an analytical dimension presented by Vinthagen and Johansson) as crucial, and thus, we will focus on it in our research, while taking into account the complexity and relational context between resistance actors.⁶⁶⁸ Nonetheless, Johansson’s and Vinthagen’s framework also maintains some limitations – the authors proper admit that one of the issues not developed in their theory is the question of how various practices of everyday resistance are related and what their connection to other forms of resistance is.⁶⁶⁹ Still, in light of the above-mentioned, it is clear that Scott’s framework of everyday resistance (as well as its rearticulation by Johansson and Vinthagen)

⁶⁶³ Ibidem, p. 183; Idem, “Everyday”, pp. 2, 37.

⁶⁶⁴ Idem, *Conceptualizing*, p. 52.

⁶⁶⁵ Idem, “Everyday”, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibidem, p. 39 ; Idem, “Dimensions”, p. 418.

⁶⁶⁷ See page 112.

⁶⁶⁸ According to these scholars, research of every resistance requires the identification of an agent (individual or groups), who carries out the resistance act (against some target); inevitably, it is also an analysis of relations between the agents of resistance and the power holders, in: JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, “Dimensions”, pp. 422-423.

⁶⁶⁹ Idem, *Conceptualizing*, p. 189.

forms a complex theoretical concept which can serve as an analytical tool suitable for the resistance research of a selected phenomenon in a specific context. Therefore, through the concept of everyday resistance (as reformulated by these Swedish authors), we can analyse how “a less visible kind of politics is finding its ways, utilizing the ambiguity of power/resistance and fissures of dominance, however tiny and transient.”⁶⁷⁰ Notwithstanding many theoretical models of resistance, which are stemming from Scott’s concept of everyday forms of resistance (but overcome it in many aspects), such as, Bayat’s “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” for example,⁶⁷¹ or the concept of “rightful resistance”, elaborated by O’Brien,⁶⁷² we decided to focus in our research on the everyday resistance of Spanish exiles in state socialist Czechoslovakia on two such models: “consentful contention” and “dispersed constructive/productive resistance”.

4.4 Everyday resistance of heterodox Spanish exiles from Ústí nad Labem

The Iranian-American sociologist Asef Bayat argues that “[i]n the war of unequals, the weak will certainly lose if it follows the same rules of the game as those of the powerful. To win an unequal battle, the underdog has no choice but to creatively play different, more flexible, and constantly changing games.”⁶⁷³ In the following pages, we analyse two cases of everyday resistance of Spanish communist emigrants, stemming from Scott’s theoretical framework of everyday resistance as reformulated by Johansson and Vinthagen. Within these examples of “unequal battles”, we will apply two different models/forms of everyday resistance (consentful contention/constructive resistance), still following the chosen analytical categories (repertoires of everyday resistance in relation to configurations of power, spatiality and relationship between actors).

In the report at the ÚV KSČ from 1965 regarding the Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia it was stated that “the characteristic feature of the Spanish political emigration is its high political morale and discipline. Despite the long-term stance abroad, the deconstructive elements nor vacillation are not manifested within its members (not counting some exceptions) [...]”.⁶⁷⁴ On the other hand, as Cook argues, resistance “always accompanies disciplinary power and biopower [...] [a]lthough resistance may be undermined by the disciplinary and biopolitical

⁶⁷⁰ Idem, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: the Palestinian”, p. 117.

⁶⁷¹ For more on the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” see Asef BAYAT, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*, Stanford 2013, pp. 33-55, 80-85.

⁶⁷² See Kevin J. O’BRIEN, “Rightful Resistance”, *World Politics* 1, 1996, pp. 31-55.

⁶⁷³ BAYAT, *Life*, p. 24.

⁶⁷⁴ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (1965).

norms [...] disciplinary power and biopower presuppose resistance [...]”.⁶⁷⁵ Considering that in the next sections two of the above-quoted exceptions from the discipline within the Spanish emigration will be analysed, we argue that the mobility of Spanish communists, who found refuge in Czechoslovakia, had (re)productive, as well as multidimensional character – it led not only to (im)mobility, but also to the resistance of the Spaniards from Ústí. Moreover, we interpret their indiscipline as cases of everyday resistance against the PCE leadership, which intended to impose homogeneity on its party members through the power of normalisation;⁶⁷⁶ while we focus on the complex relationship between the PCE and Czechoslovak authorities.

4.4.1 Preventing a scandal: José Antonio Valledor and his consensual contention

One of those Spaniards residing in Ústí nad Labem – the domicile of the Spanish communist collective formed by manual workers, as well as politically heterodox exiles,⁶⁷⁷ was José Valledor. On his below-analysed case of everyday resistance we examine the thesis, that through “consensual contention” it was possible in state socialist Czechoslovakia to push authorities to make concessions in one’s favour – by appealing to the regime’s legitimating value system, a citizen could menace government officials with the loss of international prestige of the regime. Furthermore, we posit that it was Valledor’s Ecuadorian contacts, as well as the complex relationship between the PCE and the KSČ, that influenced the outcome of his everyday resistance.

Consensual contention is one of many forms/models of resistance, stemming both from O’Brien’s concept of “rightful resistance” as well as from Scott’s framework of “everyday resistance”. This analytical model was first introduced by the North American sociologist Jeremy B. Straughn in the context of state socialism in the GDR in the 1960s and 1970s, where the acts of resistance masked as consensual contention emerged as a result of the regime’s ideological orthodoxy and political repression.⁶⁷⁸ Straughn claims that in countries of state socialism, the state’s official claim to rule in the name of the proletariat gives potential resisters many possible ways to contest the seriousness of this public promise by taking it word for word; still, “the ruling party’s rigid intolerance of political opposition substantially magnifies the risk

⁶⁷⁵ Deborah COOK, “Really existing socialization: Socialization and socialism in Adorno and Foucault”, *Thesis Eleven* 1, 2015, p. 84.


⁶⁷⁶ FOUCAULT, *Discipline*, p. 184.

⁶⁷⁷ PETHÓ, *El exilio*, pp. 102-104.

⁶⁷⁸ STRAUGHN, “Taking”, p. 1603. Straughn here uses the term “contention” (synonym for contestation) instead of “resistance”, arguing that contention includes resistance. We consider resistance to be a practice, an “oppositional act”, applicable also for the “consensual act(s) of contention” in which subalterns confront the power holder(s), in case of state socialism – the state and its authorities; and thus, in our analysis, resistance works as a synonym for contention.

that any citizen petition [...] will be construed as an act of defiance.”⁶⁷⁹ Therefore, consentful contention is a savvy manoeuvre, through which resisters in state socialism, in order to advance their interests, use the regime’s own logic and “contest a state of affairs or a government policy or decision by performing the role of a dutiful citizen [...]”,⁶⁸⁰ thus leaving their loyalty to the regime and its values uncontested.⁶⁸¹ Even though their petitions might be ambiguous – at the same time contesting and complying with the state, these resisters remain a part of society.⁶⁸²

In state socialist countries, the acts of consentful contention through petitions and appeals to state authorities became a routinised practice – in the GDR, this way of conflict-solving helped to internally stabilise the regime.⁶⁸³ Although the “arts of consentful contention” are not exclusive to state socialist countries, in these regimes Straughn’s concept disposes of two distinctive characteristics: 1. Higher political sensitivity, as a result of the problematic definition of insubordination and subversion by state authorities; 2. The frontier between consent and dissent is uncertain and can be disputed, due to the regime’s ideological orthodoxy and the repression of freedom of speech.⁶⁸⁴ Still, the crucial question remains: “When is consentful contention in a position to succeed?” Regarding the state compliance to consentful contention in an authoritarian regime, Straughn offers a detailed hypothetical causal model including six variables:⁶⁸⁵



Source: STRAUGHN, “Taking”, p. 1640. All effects are positive unless they are depicted as negative (--).

⁶⁷⁹ Ibidem, p. 1602.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibidem, pp. 1603-1604.

⁶⁸¹ Ibidem, pp. 1601-1602.

⁶⁸² Catherine OWEN, “‘Consentful contention’ in a corporate state: human rights activists and public monitoring commissions in Russia”, *East European Politics* 3, 2015, p. 279.

⁶⁸³ Udo GRASHOFF, “Cautious occupiers and restrained bureaucrats: Schwarzwohnen in the German Democratic Republic. Somewhat different from squatting”, *Urban Studies* 3, 2019, p. 554.

⁶⁸⁴ STRAUGHN, “Taking”, pp. 1604-1606.

⁶⁸⁵ The essential implication of this model sounds like this: an individual resister (petitioner) with higher social worthiness ought to have, on issues that are uncontroversial and maintain a low-profile, the highest chance to succeed in his act of consentful contention. Still, Straughn claims that this “model is probabilistic rather than deterministic, and the likelihoods in question are relative; hence, the chances of obtaining compliance from the state may be quite small in absolute terms”, in: Ibidem, pp. 1639, 1641.

By “petitioner capacity” he understands the resister’s capability to demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment within his/hers petitions to the state – increased capacity in these aspects means increased chances of state compliance. “Petitioner leverage” alludes to “the relative power of subordinate actors (petitioners) to coerce the state on a given occasion [...] [and] the direct effect of petitioner leverage on state compliance is [...] negative”, as organised actions with coercive petitions towards the state are often counterproductive.⁶⁸⁶ The “issue profile”, through which “petitioner capacity” indirectly affects “petitioner leverage”, reflects the degree of the potential influence of the issue on society, seeing that petitioners can strengthen their power position by publicising (“going public”) their claim.⁶⁸⁷ “Consentful petition” is a possible result of consentful contention – in contrast to openly oppositional political acts, a request from a dutiful citizen, consistent with the regime’s ideology, has a higher chance to succeed.⁶⁸⁸ Lastly, the state “saves its face” when it conforms to citizen’s demands – when confronted with the threat of “losing its face”, the state feels that its legitimacy or international prestige might have risen. In state socialist countries, the regime must “weigh the expected benefits of making a good impression (saving face) against the potential loss of credibility if it acceded to pressure from contentious petitioners.”⁶⁸⁹

Notwithstanding its theoretical flaws,⁶⁹⁰ Straughn’s concept of consentful contention appears as an analytical model suitable for the research of everyday resistance of a heterodox Spanish exile from Ústí nad Labem, due to its focus on a country of state socialism in the 1960s, as well as its tactics of resistance (through petitions and with a “discursive attack from the left”, thus concealing the frontier between consent and dissent). Generally, it could be said that resisters in an authoritarian regime aim(ed) with their consentful contention at the evasion of direct conflict with state power, while “linking grievances with endorsement of official policy reflected the asymmetric power relations in the dictatorship and allowed the state to act in a paternalistic way [...]”.⁶⁹¹ Moreover, the model of consentful contention is an example of how deviation from the disciplinary norms may “be possible through other means, such as the following: retreating into one’s own mental world; by showing outward compliance while maintaining inner aggression towards the values and norms of discipline [...]”.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁶ Ibidem, pp. 1639-1640.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibidem, p. 1640.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibidem, p. 1641.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibidem, pp. 1640-1641.

⁶⁹⁰ See for example: Ibidem, pp. 1616, 1639, 1641; or OWEN, “‘Consentful’”, p. 278.

⁶⁹¹ GRASHOFF, “Cautious”, p. 555.

⁶⁹² LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Sovereign”, pp. 114-115.

José Antonio Valledor (b. 1906, Oviedo), a member of the first wave of Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia, joined the PCE in 1925 and during the Civil War fought in the Republican Army while reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel and commander of one of the International Brigades.⁶⁹³ At the end of the war, he crossed the border into France, where he was interned in the concentration camps of Saint-Cyprien, Argelès-sur-Mer and Septfonds. After his escape in September 1939, he fought in the French *Résistance* with the rank of colonel and acted as one of the leaders of the PCE in Occitania.⁶⁹⁴ Furthermore, at the end of 1940 Valledor founded a lumber company in the French department of Aude. Two years later, this company had become a political-military centre of *maquis*, and, from 1946, bore the name *Enterprise Forestier du Sud-Ouest*, also known as *Fernández, Valledor y Cía.*, whose main objective was the liberation of Spain from Franco's regime.⁶⁹⁵ Nonetheless, Valledor was the owner only *de jure* – in fact, the company was a property of the PCE while it operated as a cover for a communist political and tactical training centre and a support establishment for the crossings of *maquis* from France into Spain. But the company found itself in difficulties even before the PCE was outlawed in France in 1950 and thus became more of an economic burden for the party.⁶⁹⁶ For this reason (as well as for Valledor's unreliability – he allegedly acted as a real owner and not as a communist), he was dismissed from his position and, based on the decision of the PCE, sent to Prague.⁶⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the above-mentioned firm *Fernández, Valledor y Cía.* was not the only PCE cover company – another example was the company *Joaquín González Estarriol S. A.*, based in Venezuela (with a branch in Barcelona), through which the exchange of products

⁶⁹³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Cuestionario – Dotazník (Questionnaire): José Antonio Valledor Alvarez, 4.7.1953; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V – Valledor José Antonio (93). Biografía del camarada Valledor (Biography of comrade Valledor), 4.7.1953.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibidem; ABS, f. Objektové svazky – centrála a Praha (Subject Files Group – Headquarters and Prague, hereinafter OB/MV), a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Španělská emigrace“ („Spanish emigration“) sv. 1/3, l. 59-65. Seznam cizinců zaměstnaných v STZ v Ústí nad Labem (List of foreigners employed at the STZ in Ústí nad Labem), n. d. It should be noted, that after the end of WWII, Valledor was awarded the highest French order of merit, the Legion of Honor.

⁶⁹⁵ Alfredo LÓPEZ CARRILLO, *Manuel López Castro: A modo de biografía*, San Sebastián de los Reyes 2011, p. 68.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 68-69; HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, “Comerciendo”, pp. 3-5, <<http://historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/43/fernandohernandezsanchez.pdf>>, [accessed 17 February 2022].

⁶⁹⁷ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 122. Výpis z agenturní zprávy ze dne 28.12.1954. Věc: Valledor José Antonio, španěl. polit. emigrant – poznatky získané od agenta „Konča“ (Summary from the agency report from 28.12.1954. Issue: Valledor José Antonio, Spanish polit. emigrant – information received from the agent „Konča“), 28.12.1954.

between Spain and socialist countries was carried out; still, as will be shown in the next chapter, its main objective was the subvention of the PCE and its activities.⁶⁹⁸

Valledor arrived in Czechoslovakia on January 17, 1949. At first, he was employed as a translator with Czechoslovak Radio and received monthly support from the KSČ for his temporary accommodation in a hotel before finding himself an apartment.⁶⁹⁹ However, at the beginning of 1950, Valledor was still staying in a hotel in Prague – a fact related to the first complaint in Czechoslovakia against him. A record elaborated at the MOÚV KSČ in February 1950 stated that Valledor does not agree with the offered accommodation outside of his hotel, in which he “ruins the reputation of the Spaniards [...] refuses to pay, prolongs and postpones payment as much as possible, reproaches other Spanish comrades for paying, saying that they are stupid [...]”.⁷⁰⁰ His job search was also criticised as he was visiting companies with his own offers for translation, disregarding the fact that translations in these institutions were already being done by other Spanish emigrants.⁷⁰¹ Valledor was therefore criticised at the meeting of the Spanish collective in Prague at the beginning of 1950 for his “excessive selfishness”, but at the same time, he acknowledged his mistakes and underwent self-criticism.⁷⁰²

Another criticism of Valledor coming from Czechoslovak authorities dates to March 1950. It was stated that he is “a man who wants to live easily, if possible, at the expenses of the KSČ. He refused to accept an apartment from us and then asked for money to pay for the hotel.”⁷⁰³ As a translator at several companies and as a Spanish tutor, he was living in Prague until 1951, when he expressed his readiness to move with his future wife Heloisa Horcajo to Ústí nad Labem – the PCE did not have any objections against their transfer.⁷⁰⁴ Valledor allegedly claimed that he could also do translations in Ústí and, at the same time, he showed his willingness to work in a factory. However, his condition did not allow physical labour.⁷⁰⁵ On the other hand, Valledor stated in 1953 in his CV that in 1951 “he had been told he had to

⁶⁹⁸ HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, “Comerciendo”, pp. 10-13,

<<http://historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/43/fernandohernandezsanchez.pdf>>, [accessed 17 February 2022].

⁶⁹⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file V. Questionnaire: José Antonio Valledor Alvarez, 4.7.1953; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 7-8. Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia, 13.9.1949.

⁷⁰⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 12-13. Spanish comrades in Prague, February 1950.

⁷⁰¹ Ibidem.

⁷⁰² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 14-28. Informe al PC checoslovaco sobre la organización y trabajos del colectivo de camaradas, miembros del PC español, en Praga (Report for the KSČ about the organisation and work of the collective of comrades, members of the PCE in Prague), 16.2.1950.

⁷⁰³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 22-27. Report on the activities of Spanish comrades in Prague, 3.3.1950.

⁷⁰⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 89-90. Zpráva o španělských soudruzích, kteří jsou ochotni přestěhovat se do Ústí nad Labem (Report on the Spanish comrades who are willing to move to Ústí nad Labem), 19.4.1951.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibidem.

go to live to Ústí”⁷⁰⁶ and was eventually transferred there on July 27, 1951. Three days later, he started working in the laboratory of the North Bohemian Fat Works as a clerk, and his work attitude was evaluated as “good”.⁷⁰⁷ Horcajo joined her husband (they got married in July 1951) in Ústí nad Labem in December of that year.⁷⁰⁸

In July 1953, Valledor was living in a flat with his wife in Ústí, where their son José was born on February 12, 1952.⁷⁰⁹ At that time, Valledor was still a member of the Ústí nad Labem collective of the Spanish emigration and had been employed at the STZ, but his wife was not able to work due to the poor health condition of their son.⁷¹⁰ It should be added that in July 1953 Valledor stated that his health condition was poor – his throat was in bad condition due to the unsuccessful recovery from injuries, he regularly visited doctors and described his son’s health state as “bad since the sixth month of his life”.⁷¹¹ Valledor was still living in the North Bohemian city and working in the laboratory of the STZ in March 1954, while his wife took care of the household. The main problem of the family was their son, who suffered from anaemia.⁷¹² Besides, Valledor and his wife complained that their apartment was too cold and that their son needed a change of ambience.⁷¹³ For this reason, at the beginning of 1954 Valledor obtained medical certificates for himself and his son stating that the climate in Ústí was bad for their health and he requested authorisation from the Ústí nad Labem organisation of the PCE to be allowed to relocate to Prague. Despite the rejection of his petition, the Valledor family, without the knowledge of the PCE nor the KSČ, moved in April 1955 to Prague and Valledor began working as a translator for the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT).⁷¹⁴

At this time, Valledor’s conflict with the direction of the PCE in Czechoslovakia culminated. In a letter sent by Enrique Líster to the MOÚV KSČ it was argued that Valledor

⁷⁰⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V – Valledor José Antonio (93). Biography of comrade Valledor, 4.7.1953. However, it should be added that his autobiography was written (as was the case of the majority of Spanish emigrants in Czechoslovakia) in the period between June and July 1953 at the request from the ÚV KSČ, it was based on questions created beforehand by the PCE leadership in Prague and as Pethő argues, these autobiographies could be generally described as self-criticism required by the ÚV KSČ, in: PETHŐ, *El exilio*, p. 120.

⁷⁰⁷ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 59-65. List of foreigners employed at the STZ in Ústí nad Labem, n. d.; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. José Valledor to Chaluš, 20.6.1955.

⁷⁰⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 197, a. j. 689, file: H. Questionnaire: Eloisa Horcajo Perez, 4.7.1953.

⁷⁰⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Questionnaire: José Antonio Valledor Alvarez, 4.7.1953.

⁷¹⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V – Valledor José Antonio (93). Biography of comrade Valledor, 4.7.1953.

⁷¹¹ Ibidem.

⁷¹² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 91-95. Sociálně-zdravotní průzkum španělských rodin žijících v Ústí n./L. (Social and health examination of Spanish families living in Ústí n./L.), 15.3.1954.

⁷¹³ Ibidem.

⁷¹⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 53. Záznam o španělském pol. emigrantu Valledorovi José (Record about the Spanish political emigrant José Valledor), n. d.

was criticised and punished by the Ústí nad Labem collective for his indiscipline – he refused to continue living there.⁷¹⁵ However, after being punished, Valledor addressed the PCE leadership with the ultimatum that if the criticism towards his person would not be dropped, he would ask for his expulsion from the party. As the reason for his actions, Valledor declared that the PCE wanted to sentence him and his son to death as they could no longer live in Ústí due to the health issues stated in the presented medical certificates.⁷¹⁶ Lister also mentioned that Valledor refused any treatment in Ústí on the grounds that Prague doctors had recommended him treatment in the Czechoslovak capital.⁷¹⁷

Considering his feud with the leadership of the PCE, Valledor decided at the end of May 1955 to inform the Czechoslovak authorities about the “true reasons” for his relocation to Prague.⁷¹⁸ He claimed that after receiving a medical recommendation to leave the factory in Ústí (due to chronic respiratory disease), he asked the local organisation of the PCE for authorisation to go to Prague to visit a specialist. Once his request was approved, Valledor came to the capital in January 1955, where he was prescribed a therapy – his return to Ústí was supposed to minimise the effect of this treatment.⁷¹⁹ However, Valledor could not undergo this therapy as he was ordered by the party to return to Ústí. At the end of his letter, Valledor stated that he had backed up his request for his definitive departure from Ústí with various medical certificates; nevertheless, the local organisation of the PCE rejected his petition, claiming that the presented certificates were falsified and that he should remain in Ústí despite his health problems.⁷²⁰

Given his ongoing insubordination against the decisions of the PCE leadership, it is not surprising that on May 12, 1955, at the meeting of group no. I of the Spanish collective in Ústí, an agreement regarding Valledor’s expulsion from the party was pronounced.⁷²¹ Subsequently, on June 8, 1955, a resolution confirming this expulsion was discussed and approved. The presented reasons for this step were that Valledor preferred personal interests to those of the PCE and fought against the party discipline and its leadership. Since his arrival to Czechoslovakia, he had acted as an element alien to the party, and by 1949 he had already been

⁷¹⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: R – Rubio Ramon (88). E. Lister to the MOÚV KSČ (Baramová), 14.4.1955.

⁷¹⁶ Ibidem.

⁷¹⁷ Ibidem.

⁷¹⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. José A. Valledor to the MOÚV KSČ, 31.5.1955.

⁷¹⁹ Ibidem.

⁷²⁰ Ibidem.

⁷²¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Resolution of the group no. I of the organisation of the PCE in Ústí nad Labem about the expulsion of José Antonio Valledor from the PCE, 8.6.1955.

punished by the organisation of the PCE in Prague for his behaviour. After that, he was expressing political indiscipline, especially by refusing to comply with the PCE's decision to move to Ústí and then, once living there, trying to relocate to Prague.⁷²² He was accused of provocation and the discreditation of comrades while pointing out the imperfections of people's democratic establishment. For these reasons, Valledor was officially reprimanded at the party meeting in March 1955; however, he was also given the opportunity to correct his behaviour. Although Valledor, for appearances' sake, accepted the PCE's decisions, in reality, he continued to resist them and in addition, he allegedly took advantage of his illness, presenting himself as a victim of the party and concealing the medical and economic aid received from the PCE and the KSČ.⁷²³ After being asked to explain his conduct towards the party, Valledor requested to be removed from the PCE. At the end of this partisan resolution, group no. I. of the PCE organisation in Ústí admitted that in the case of Valledor, who "unmasked himself as an anti-party element", the group did not maintain revolutionary vigilance and then unanimously adopted a decision to expel Valledor from the party.⁷²⁴ Subsequently, his wife was also expelled from the PCE the next day.⁷²⁵

However, on June 3, 1955, during the period between the partisan meeting regarding his expulsion and the adoption of the resolution confirming this decision, Valledor visited the Social Department of the Czechoslovak Red Cross, which was responsible for the material welfare of Spanish exiles in Czechoslovakia. An interview took place during which Valledor stated that the reason for his move to Prague was his illness – chronic catarrh of the upper respiratory tract.⁷²⁶ The climate in Ústí was allegedly detrimental to his health and he supported this statement with a medical report. Another reason for his departure was the health condition of his son, who was suspected of having whooping cough. Eventually, his son was hospitalised with chronic bronchitis and it was advised to him by doctors to change the ambience. During this interview, Valledor claimed that he was not willing to return to Ústí and that there was no reason why he could not work and live as a political emigrant in Prague, where he had access to the conditions for improving his own as well as his son's health states and also adequate labour conditions.⁷²⁷ However, he added, that if his stay in Prague was undesirable for the

⁷²² Ibidem.

⁷²³ Ibidem.

⁷²⁴ Ibidem.

⁷²⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Resolution of the group no. IV of the organisation of the PCE in Ústí nad Labem about the expulsion of Heloisa Horcajo (Valledor) from the PCE, 9.6.1955.

⁷²⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Záznam – J. Chaluš (Memo – J. Chaluš), 7.6.1955.

⁷²⁷ Ibidem.

Spanish collective, he was willing to live in another city; nevertheless, in case the health of his family would be jeopardised, he would then ask Prime Minister Široký or President Zápotocký for help. The Social Department of the ČSČK recommended that in this case, Valledor's return to Ústí should not be insisted upon, but rather decided in agreement with him and the ÚV KSČ that he be allowed to choose his place of residence (aside from Prague).⁷²⁸ Despite this recommendation, another report was elaborated at the MOÚV KSČ, stating that the PCE leadership was requesting from the KSČ the forced return of Valledor to Ústí with the help of the National Security Corps.⁷²⁹ When asked for his statement, Enrique Líster refused Valledor's banishment from the country as he arrived in Czechoslovakia as a member of the party and he and his wife had cognisance of the internal affairs of the PCE. Therefore, it was proposed by the Czechoslovak side that Valledor should be handed over to security organs and relocated to some Czech city (aside from Ústí and Prague). Líster agreed with this proposal and the matter was forwarded for settlement to the SNB and the Social Department of the ČSČK.⁷³⁰

In the second half of June 1955, Valledor once again got in touch with the ČSČK. In a letter he presented his assumption that there was no justification for the deprivation of his right of asylum which had been granted to him by the Czechoslovak government and that the decision regarding the urgency of his departure from Ústí was issued at the beginning of 1955 by the Health Commission of the Ústí nad Labem Region.⁷³¹ For this reason, he returned to Prague where he wanted to stay and could not agree with the directive to leave the capital for "petty reasons".⁷³² He added that in case he would not be allowed to live and work in Prague, he demanded the decree of the respective ministry regarding the deprivation of his right of political asylum.⁷³³ This letter was forwarded by the Head of the Social Department of the ČSČK Chaluš to the MOÚV KSČ with a commentary that attempts to persuade Valledor to return to Ústí or to live in another city other than Prague had been unsuccessful.⁷³⁴ Chaluš added, that during their talks, Valledor had appealed to his right of asylum as a refugee in Czechoslovakia, to his health conditions and a better opportunity to implement his skills in Prague and as a political emigrant, he expected his case to be solved by the ÚV KSČ. In the meantime, Valledor was

⁷²⁸ Ibidem.

⁷²⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. Zpráva o býv. španělských polit. emigrantech Valledor a Rubio (Report about the former Spanish political emigrants Valledor and Rubio), 7.6.1955.

⁷³⁰ Ibidem.

⁷³¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. José Valledor to Chaluš (ČSČK), 20.6.1955.

⁷³² Ibidem.

⁷³³ Ibidem.

⁷³⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V. ČSČK Social Department (Chaluš) to the MOÚV KSČ, 5.7.1955.

refusing financial support from the ČSČK as he was capable of working – all he asked for was the authorisation to work in the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce.⁷³⁵

In the autumn of 1955, Valledor once again addressed the MOÚV KSČ. He complained, that at the beginning of October 1955 while at a police station, he had been deprived, now as a former political emigrant, of his temporary identity card, obtained after his arrival to Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, he was given a “*carte d’apatride*” (ID card of a stateless person – M. T.) and permanent residence in Prague was to be forbidden to him.⁷³⁶ Valledor refused to accept the new ID card and wanted to know by what right was he, a fighter against Francoism and fascism, denied the status of Spanish political emigrant as he had come to Czechoslovakia at the government’s invitation. He claimed to know the real reason behind his situation – it was his conflicts with the direction of the PCE in Czechoslovakia, as he disagreed with some of the methods employed against him within the party, although he did not criticise all aspects of the PCE policy.⁷³⁷ Valledor argued that some Spaniards used their authority within Spanish exile groups, as well as their influence over Czechoslovak state organs against him, with the objective of his persecution – he stated, that these practices were not beneficial to the PCE, the KSČ nor to Czechoslovakia; and that disregarding his position, he would always refer in the first place to the KSČ, which he informed truthfully about the situation, considering the “Marxist-Leninist ideas, deeply rooted in me [...]”.⁷³⁸ At the end of his letter, he summarised his decisions: he rejected every “*carte d’apatride*”, as he was a Spanish emigrant regardless of the country of his residence and, in case he would be prohibited from staying in Prague and would be stripped of his status of political emigrant, he would understand it as a restriction of his right of asylum. Besides, he claimed he was forced to appeal to Czechoslovak government officials to inform them about the persecution against him, as well as to apply for a revision of his position as a political emigrant in Czechoslovakia so that it could be decided whether his presence in this country was desirable or not. Valledor concluded that he did not wish to leave Czechoslovakia and that it would be unfortunate if his conflicts with some Spaniards would negatively affect the examination of his situation and warned the MOÚV KSČ that in case his old ID card would not be returned, he would contact the highest state authorities.⁷³⁹

⁷³⁵ Ibidem.

⁷³⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V – Valledor José Antonio (93). José A. Valledor to the MOÚV KSČ, 7.10.1955.

⁷³⁷ Ibidem.

⁷³⁸ Ibidem.

⁷³⁹ Ibidem.

In reaction to this letter, a record regarding his case was elaborated at the MOÚV KSČ: it pointed out that after Valledor's refusal to return to Ústí a conversation took place with the doctor who treated Spanish emigrants and who claimed that Valledor was "a fraudster who is healthy and who tries to get out of physical labour in every possible way".⁷⁴⁰ This record also mentioned that Valledor was able to find, despite his poor knowledge of Czech, a job as a translator at the MFT and was still refusing to return to Ústí. Based on an interview with Líster, it was decided to settle with the MFT to no longer offer translations to Valledor and to find him employment and accommodation outside Prague.⁷⁴¹ However, these measures were not accomplished and, in the autumn of 1955, Valledor was still working as a translator for the MFT. For this reason and in reaction to Valledor's letter, the MOÚV KSČ recommended letting Valledor keep his old ID card, to find him employment in a less prominent position (or eventually outside Prague) and to find out how was Valledor able to get a job at the MFT.⁷⁴²

Further efforts to forcibly transfer Valledor back to Ústí or at least outside Prague, were equally unsuccessful. At the end of 1956, he was still living in the Czechoslovak capital and thanks to his contacts, he had managed to gain support from a prominent personality from an international organisation. More specifically, it was José Vicente Trujillo, Ecuador's Permanent Representative to the UN, who during his visit to Czechoslovakia in August 1956 asked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Valledor's destiny as he was allegedly (according to information from Trujillo's friends) imprisoned in Czechoslovakia or had been denied the possibility to leave the country.⁷⁴³ In a communiqué for the MOÚV KSČ, the MFA stated that Trujillo is an influential figure within the UN and the Ministry insisted on maintaining his positive attitude towards Czechoslovakia. For this reason, Trujillo ought to be informed in September 1956 by the Czechoslovak side that Valledor lives in Prague, works as a translator and was never imprisoned in the Czechoslovak Republic. Information about Valledor's problems regarding his relocation to Prague, his health condition, his expulsion from the PCE and his threats of leaving the country was not communicated to Trujillo.⁷⁴⁴

⁷⁴⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: V – Valledor José Antonio (93). Záznam k případu Valledor (Record about the case Valledor) – MOÚV KSČ, 7.10.1955.

⁷⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁷⁴² Ibidem.

⁷⁴³ AMZV. f. TO – T, 1955-1959 Spain, c. 205, file: 057/115 (3) Spain. MFA, no. 015.583/56. Issue: Zjištění osudu španělského emigranta Valledora (Findings about the destiny of the Spanish emigrant Valledor). MFA to the MOÚV KSČ, 24.9.1956.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibidem.

The problem with Valledor's departure from Czechoslovakia culminated in the autumn of 1957. In September of that year, he applied for the authorisation of his definitive leave to Morocco (Tétouan),⁷⁴⁵ where he was to be employed as a professor; however, he did not receive his passport on time. In his letter to the ÚV KSČ Valledor asked for quick processing of his application and the issuance of his and his wife's passports as he was not able to apply for entry visas to Morocco without them.⁷⁴⁶ However, in case the ÚV KSČ would not intervene in his matter, he planned to turn to President Novotný for help. At the end of his letter Valledor stated:

[W]e do not forget what our duty as communists is and we are determined as such to try all means to solve our problems within the party. In our current position towards the Spanish party, we can only turn to your party, which we can always rely on, as you have already proven on other occasions.⁷⁴⁷

A record at the ÚV KSČ from the end of November 1957 stated that Valledor and his wife wanted to leave the country but the PCE leadership was against their departure.⁷⁴⁸ Enrique Líster informed the ÚV KSČ that even if they had both remained members of the party, their departure would not be recommended by the party leadership, as Horcajo had been working as a secretary in the PCE direction and disposed of confidential information. However, the main problem for the Czechoslovak authorities was that Valledor already had in his above-mentioned letter from November 1957 threatened that if he would not be allowed to leave Czechoslovakia, he was planning to turn to one of the embassies in Prague and apply for the authorisation to leave for the West – the risk of his provocation against the state by contacting a Western embassy menaced the Czechoslovak authorities. For this reason, the ÚV KSČ suggested that the PCE leadership re-evaluate once again the potential threat of deconspiracy posed by Valledor and his wife, as Horcajo had worked in the party's direction a long time ago and their departure would eliminate the danger of their provocation against Czechoslovakia, whilst it would be difficult to keep them in the country by force.⁷⁴⁹ In response to this suggestion, Líster told the ÚV KSČ in December 1957 that Valledor should be kept in the Czechoslovak Republic for as long as possible and, if unavoidable, he should be allowed to leave; nevertheless, any kind of scandal had to be avoided.⁷⁵⁰ Valledor eventually left Czechoslovakia for Morocco on

⁷⁴⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 54-55. ČSČK Social Department to the MOÚV KSČ. Issue: Odjezdy Španělů (Departures of Spaniards), 25.9.1957.

⁷⁴⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 44-45. José Antonio Valledor to the ÚV KSČ, 25.11.1957.

⁷⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁷⁴⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 43. Záznam ze dne 28.11.1957 (Memo from 28.11.1957).

⁷⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibidem.

February 14, 1958, one week after the departure of his wife and son.⁷⁵¹ Although we do not have much information about his future destiny, we know that as the commander of the XV International Brigade, he was a frequent guest of honour of former *interbrigadistas* in Britain and France. Valledor returned to Spain after Franco's death and died in Alicante on December 7, 1995.⁷⁵²

Valledor's everyday resistance from his self-willed move from Ústí to Prague consisted of two resistance practices: one carried out against the leadership of the PCE and another contra Czechoslovak state authorities; however, both were interconnected and entangled (as is also the relationship between power and resistance).⁷⁵³ His insubordination against the leadership of the PCE took the form of rejecting their directive (pronounced in order to discipline and "normalise" a party member), leading to Valledor's exemplary punishment – his expulsion from the PCE, resulting in his social ostracism, worsening of his economic situation and the loss of benefits provided to other Spanish exiles. As he refused to return to Ústí and insisted on living in Prague, the spatiality of his resistance emerges as a crucial element – by resisting the return to the social space of Ústí ("purgatory" of Spanish exiles), his case confirms Lilja's thesis that the space and spatiality of resistance function as a (pre)condition for resistance itself.⁷⁵⁴

Subsequently, Valledor attempted to seek help from the Czechoslovak authorities – when they also insisted on his departure from Prague (in line with the PCE), Valledor then reoriented his resistance toward the Czechoslovak state organs, converting them into another target of his resistance. He threatened them with informing the government officials about his problems and to contact a Western embassy, and, thanks to his connections abroad, he successfully received support from the Ecuadorian representative to the UN. Valledor's objectives and motivations behind them were personal (medical treatment for him and his son) and professional (employment in Prague); still, they have also transformed with time due to problems with their fulfilment. Eventually, his main aim became the departure from the country (motivated by his bitter experience with state socialism and better opportunities abroad), while he was trying to use to his advantage the complex relationship between the two targets of his resistance (the PCE and the Czechoslovak state bodies), by underlining his trust in the Czechoslovak party and thus winning Czechoslovak authorities to his side. The primary

⁷⁵¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 56. Záznam ze dne 19.2.1958 (Memo from 19.2.1958); NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 670, l. 132. Záznam ze dne 10.2.1958 (Memo from 10.2.1958).

⁷⁵² Howard GODDARD, "José Antonio Valledor", *The Volunteer. Journal of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade* 1, 1996, p. 10.

⁷⁵³ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, "Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: the Palestinian", pp. 111-112.

⁷⁵⁴ LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 78.

objective of the Czechoslovak state organs in their relation to Valledor was the same as that of the PCE and was motivated by safety reasons – at first, to control a heterodox exile and later, to prevent an international scandal and the deconspiracy of the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia.

Considering the above, Valledor's everyday resistance answers to the model of consensual contention. With his resistance against Czechoslovak authorities, the agent was not directly opposing the regime; instead, he contested concrete decisions of the state apparatus and by presenting himself as a dutiful citizen (convinced antifascist and communist) he tried to redeem the commitments of the state.⁷⁵⁵ With his petitions, which can be understood as a discourse repetition/reversal, he was parasitising on and misusing for his own benefit the regime's legitimating discourse of anti-fascist people's republic,⁷⁵⁶ as overpassing the boundary of Czechoslovak political norms would be too risky.⁷⁵⁷ Valledor intended with his resistance against Czechoslovak authorities (through his petitions) to repeat and reverse the dominant discourse existing in state-socialist Czechoslovakia: he was underlining people's democratic character of the state, its antifascist and Marxist-Leninist ideology, as well as its commitment to secure basic material welfare for its citizens and guests. However, as he was obstructed in solving his health issues and was not allowed to leave the country, he criticised Czechoslovak state organs, by "taking the state at its word",⁷⁵⁸ for not fulfilling these commitments.

Thus, we argue that Valledor was with his petitions trying to "beat the authorities at their own game: by appealing to their own legitimating value system, by being 'more left' than the comrades".⁷⁵⁹ With his "discursive attack from the left", he was trying to push the state bodies to concessions in his favour by confronting the Czechoslovak state with the menace of "losing its face" – an international scandal and loss of credibility of the regime.⁷⁶⁰ Valledor's resistance against Czechoslovak authorities was therefore "accompanied by a public discursive affirmation of the very arrangements being resisted"⁷⁶¹ – even though he challenged the decisions of communist authorities, in order to ensure his safety, he was underlining his own communist identity.⁷⁶² Hence, taking into account Straughn's model, it was the "petitioner

⁷⁵⁵ STRAUGHN, "Taking", pp. 1603-1604.

⁷⁵⁶ In this respect, Lilja claims that "[t]his reverse discourse is [...] parasitic on the 'dominant discourse' and resistance then appears as the effect of power, and as a part of power itself [...]", in: LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 146.

⁷⁵⁷ OWEN, "'Consensual'", p. 284.

⁷⁵⁸ STRAUGHN, "Taking", p. 1602.

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1626.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 1630, 1639-1641.

⁷⁶¹ SCOTT, "Everyday Forms of Resistance", p. 56.

⁷⁶² GRASHOFF, "Cautious", pp. 554-555.

(Valledor's) capacity" – the capability to prove worthiness and commitment, together with the "issue profile" ("the extent to which a controversy has become public"), both interconnected with his contacts abroad, what enabled him to successfully contest the Czechoslovak authorities.⁷⁶³ To preserve its international prestige, the Czechoslovak state agreed to give away to Valledor's requests, thus confirming Straughn's hypothesis, that "a 'consentful' petition, which presents the petitioner as a dutiful citizen, pressing claims consistent with socialist principles, should stand a better chance of success [...] than one articulating an oppositional political platform."⁷⁶⁴

In the case of Valledor, not even illusory acceptance of the decision of the PCE leadership took place, nor was the successful "normalisation" of his behaviour carried out. Therefore, not only could Valledor's everyday resistance be considered eventually successful (as his objectives were achieved), but his insubordination also proves that the life experiences of Spanish exiles in people's democratic Czechoslovakia were not always positive and in the case of "heterodox" exiles, one could even label them as Kafkaesque. Moreover, the story of José Antonio Valledor, a noteworthy but up until now rather unknown Spanish exile and fighter of *Résistance*, is an interesting example of the complex relations between the KSČ, the leadership of the PCE and a "problematic" Spanish emigrant – all consequences of the global network of the PCE, as well as of the ingeniousness of citizens living under state socialism.

4.4.2 Creating new "truths": Pilar Gómez and her constructive/productive resistance

Within the Spanish exiles from Ústí nad Labem, another example of insubordination against the party leadership which led to the expulsion from the PCE, loss of employment in Prague, forced transfer to Ústí and subsequent everyday resistance was Pilar (Villar) Gómez. As has been already mentioned, from the Foucauldian perspective, power relations are "dispersed and heterogenous [...] [and] as productive as they are repressive [...]".⁷⁶⁵ Thus, considering the entanglement between power and resistance, it could be well argued that both are also pluralistic and dispersed. Therefore, Vinthagen and Lilja also expand Scott's concept of everyday resistance by introducing their own framework of "dispersed resistance" – a collected concept, that emanates from the Foucauldian interpretation of power and compiles various forms of everyday resistance.⁷⁶⁶ This concept includes many types of individual/small-

⁷⁶³ STRAUGHN, "Taking", pp. 1639-1640.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibidem, p. 1641.

⁷⁶⁵ DEACON, "Strategies", p. 119.

⁷⁶⁶ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, p. 191.

scale resistance, regardless of its character (everyday and/or hidden and/or public and/or extraordinary), which can be carried out by individuals, small groups or as nonorganized resistance undertaken by multiple resisters at different sites.⁷⁶⁷ These scholars present their concept of dispersed resistance in its two variants: the first being the “counter-repressive resistance”, by which they understand individual or petty resistance against repressive or sovereign power, a form of resistance stemming from subaltern positions and/or class relations, oriented towards sovereigns, legislative bodies or authorities (people or institutions with the power of control over the population or territory), with the objective of avoiding or undermining (instead of direct confrontation).⁷⁶⁸ The second form of dispersed resistance is the “productive/constructive resistance”.⁷⁶⁹ This variant is, according to Vinthagen and Lilja, rather paradoxically not based exclusively on a contradiction – it is resistance in its proactive form, which could create alternative social institutions and thus enable the practice of resistance.⁷⁷⁰ It originates from the understanding of power, in which domination is exercised by means of “creating truths, ways of life and subjectivities, rather than limiting people’s options”. Also, while this modality of dispersed resistance takes place within dominant discourses and systems, it is simultaneously oriented against domination.⁷⁷¹

Besides, according to a definition by Sørensen, constructive resistance takes place “when people start to build the society they desire independently of structures of power” and “[i]n order to be considered ‘constructive resistance’, they necessarily have to be both constructive and provide a form of resistance [...]”.⁷⁷² Sørensen adds that the element of resistance could be understood as a hidden or public critique of existing power structures, while the constructive aspect might include variations of concrete or symbolic practices conducive to undermining or exchanging the dominant form of behaviour and/or logic, whereas constructive resistance “focuses on creating, building, carrying out and experimenting with what is considered desirable.”⁷⁷³ Thus, this form of dispersed resistance stems from a different understanding of power than Scott’s – instead of being repressive, power in this case also works

⁷⁶⁷ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed”, p. 212.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibidem, pp. 217-219. Lilja and Vinthagen include into this variant of dispersed resistance also Bayat’s framework of the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”.

⁷⁶⁹ Instead of the term “productive resistance”, Lilja, Vinthagen or Sørensen use in their works the notion “constructive resistance”; however, we argue that this denominational permutation does not mean any semantical, analytical or theoretical change, and thus both terms function in our thesis as synonyms.

⁷⁷⁰ Quoted in: Majken Jul SØRENSEN, “Constructive Resistance: Conceptualising and Mapping the Terrain”, *Journal of Resistance Studies* 1, 2016, p. 50.

⁷⁷¹ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed”, pp. 219-221.

⁷⁷² SØRENSEN, “Constructive”, p. 57.

⁷⁷³ Ibidem.

via “production of truths, subject positions and subjectivities [and these] truths are constructed in a complex interplay between discourses and materialities” and this model of resistance might also be the most powerful one.⁷⁷⁴ As productive/constructive, this resistance can (re)form social institutions, communities or subjugated knowledge in a manner that undermines domination (even though without full liberation), while it answers to discursive truths, biopolitics and disciplinary measures.⁷⁷⁵ This modality of dispersed resistance is usually based on negotiating and/or (re)creating alternative discourses and deals with different rhetorical repetitions or with discourse, that stems from another position, while it utilises language and symbolism for a discursive change and the (re)production of knowledge.⁷⁷⁶

Considering the above, in the analysis of resistance of Gómez, which was carried out through collaboration with the StB, we use the concept of dispersed constructive/productive resistance, which we consider a suitable analytical instrument for the research of a heterodox female Spanish emigrant due to its freshness and definitional accuracy. On the case of her everyday resistance, we show (once again) how Ústí played within the Spanish exile a double role, not only as a material geographic location but also as a social space, a symbolic place of correction and the “purgatory” of Spanish emigration.⁷⁷⁷ Moreover, we posit that it was the constructive aspect of her resistance, which led on the discursive level to the (re)creation of knowledge on Spanish exiles and was capable of destabilising existing power structures.

Pilar Gómez was born on November 1, 1921, in the Navarrese village of Cintruénigo. She attended secondary school in Spain and in 1936 she joined the General Union of Workers (*Unión General de Trabajadores* – UGT). Subsequently, in 1937 she became a member of the Unified Socialist Youth (*Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas* – JSU) and in March 1938 of the PCE.⁷⁷⁸ During the Spanish Civil War, she organised women within the Association of Spanish Antifascist Women (*Asociación de Mujeres Antifascistas Españolas*), acted as a secretary of the PCE for work among women in Almansa and worked in the provincial committee of the International Red Aid (*Socorro Rojo Internacional*) in Jaén.⁷⁷⁹ After fleeing into exile in France in February 1939, she spent almost a year in the internment camp in Angoulême. During the Nazi occupation of France, Gómez functioned as a liaison between the

⁷⁷⁴ LILJA, *Constructive*, pp. 2-3.

⁷⁷⁵ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed”, pp. 221-222.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibidem, pp. 219-221; LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 87.

⁷⁷⁷ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, p. 122.

⁷⁷⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 197, a. j. 689, file: G. Questionnaire: Villar Gómez Marín, 26.6.1953.

⁷⁷⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 197, a. j. 689, file: G – Gomez Pilar (197). Autobiography of Pilar (Villar) Gómez Marín, 20.2.1951.

communist party and partisan organisations and after the liberation of the country, she acted as the Secretary General of the JSU and of the Association of Antifascist Women in Bordeaux.⁷⁸⁰ Gómez came to Czechoslovakia from Paris on July 4, 1950, as an unmarried and childless political refugee, based on instructions from the CC of the PCE, in order to settle permanently in the Czechoslovak Republic.⁷⁸¹ Still, her transfer to Czechoslovakia must be understood within the context of the Cold War – the position of Spanish communists in France had become at that time unprotected due to the absence of the French Communist Party from the government (since 1947) and an intensifying anti-communist campaign. Moreover, PCE's strategy of fighting against Franco based on dispatching *maquis* through the Pyrenees to Spain was definitely abandoned after 1948.⁷⁸² As a result, the PCE decided to create a new bureaucratic centre of the party in Prague – for this reason, a reshuffle of proven party members such as Gómez from France to Czechoslovakia was inevitable.

Initially, Pilar Gómez was accommodated with other Spaniards in a hotel in Prague, the expenses of the Czechoslovak party for her stay amounted to 11,500 CZK (hotel and food) and 1,000 CZK as allowance.⁷⁸³ At the end of August 1950, she was transferred with the first group of Spanish exiles to Ústí nad Labem,⁷⁸⁴ where a new centre of the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia was being formed. As has been already mentioned, the initiative to move part of the Spanish exiles out of Prague came from the KSČ due to the housing crisis in the capital at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s and the necessity to repopulate the region of Sudetes.⁷⁸⁵ In Ústí nad Labem Gómez, as well as other Spaniards, received accommodation, food allowance for one month and was provided with clothes.⁷⁸⁶ Subsequently, she was employed from September 12, 1950, in the Cosmetics Department of the North Bohemian Fat Works until December 1950, when she was transferred to Prague again. There she was working on a milling

⁷⁸⁰ Ibidem.

⁷⁸¹ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 80. Krajské velitelství StB, Ústí n. Labem (Regional Headquarters of the StB, Ústí n. Labem). Issue: Gomezová Villar – šetření (investigation), 20.3.1951.

⁷⁸² NÁLEVKA, “Partyzánská válka”, p. 141.

⁷⁸³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 30. Španělská emigrace (Spanish emigration), 21.8.1950.

⁷⁸⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 2-3. The new Spanish collective in Ústí nad Labem, 4.9.1950.

⁷⁸⁵ At that time, Prague suffered from a severe lack of apartments, caused partly by their destruction during WWII, as well as by the stagnation of housing construction, which started to expand only at the end of the 1950s. In 1949, there were 70,000 applications for flats in the capital alone, in: Blanka SOUKUPOVÁ, “Father Frost Welcomes You or the Myth of New Prague as a Beautiful City in a Socialist Way 1948–1953“, *Lidé města [Urban People]* 2, 2009, p. 275.

⁷⁸⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 28-29. The new Spanish collective in Ústí n/Labem, 4.9.1950.

machine in Tesla Karlín for several months and lived in a villa of the KSČ, which also covered the expenses for her accommodation.⁷⁸⁷

The first request to conduct a police investigation on Villar (Pilar) Gómez, preserved in the Security Services Archive, dates back to the end of February 1951. During this investigation, nothing suspicious was found on Gómez. The report only stated that she did not have any criminal record in the Czechoslovak Republic, had come to the country as a political refugee and planned to return to Spain after the fall of Franco's regime.⁷⁸⁸ In the summer of 1951, Gómez was initially supposed to move back to Ústí nad Labem; however, from June 1951 she took up a position in the bureau of the World Peace Council in Prague, where she was employed as a political collaborator and French-Spanish interpreter until February 1953.⁷⁸⁹ Compared to her income in the STZ (2,300 CZK in the autumn of 1950), her wage in the WPC went up to 5,000 CZK in the summer of 1951 and at the end of that year it increased further to 7,329 CZK.⁷⁹⁰ In this respect, the amount of her salary, which was at that time more than above-average, could be explained by her office work in an international organisation (WPC), while her employment at this position was most probably an appreciation of her merits during the Civil War and WWII, as well as her role within the French *Résistance*.

Nevertheless, on February 7, 1953, Antonio Cordón (at that time the leader of the Prague collective) informed the MOÚV KSČ on behalf of the whole PCE leadership in Czechoslovakia that Gómez was recalled by the PCE from the WPC.⁷⁹¹ He added, that disciplinary proceedings at the level of the PCE direction had been initiated against her, stating as the main reason "the moral decline – homosexual relations with another female employee in the WPC, evidenced by confessions from both sides."⁷⁹² The case of Gómez's "disciplinary misdemeanour" was further investigated by Cordón and discussed at a meeting of the PCE leadership, which in this regard proposed and demanded help from the KSČ – to transfer Gómez to the Spanish collective in

⁷⁸⁷ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 59-65. List of foreigners employed at the STZ in Ústí nad Labem, n. d.; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 14-15. Report about Spanish comrades that are willing to move to Ústí nad Labem, 19.4.1951.

⁷⁸⁸ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 80. Regional Headquarters of the StB, Ústí n. Labem, Issue: Gomezová Villar – investigation, 20.3.1951.

⁷⁸⁹ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 59-65. List of foreigners employed at the STZ in Ústí nad Labem, n. d.; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 16. Záznam o přestěhování španělských rodin do Ústí n./L. (Record of the relocation of Spanish families to Ústí n./L.), 7.6.1951.

⁷⁹⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652. Liste nominale des camarades qui forment le Collectif des communistes espagnols a Prague (Nominal list of comrades who form the collective of Spanish communists in Prague), 22.11.1951. It should be noted that based on this list, salaries of Spanish communists in Czechoslovakia at that time oscillated between 4,000 and 14,000 CZK.

⁷⁹¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 653, l. 57. Španělská polit. emigrace (Spanish political emigration), 7.2.1953.

⁷⁹² Ibidem.

Ústí as soon as possible and to find her a job in a factory and a suitable accommodation in this North Bohemian city, where she ought to stay until her matter would be solved within the PCE leadership.⁷⁹³ The following month Pilar Gómez was expelled from the PCE (officially for her homosexual orientation),⁷⁹⁴ and from March 3, 1953, she worked again in Ústí at the STZ in the Cosmetics Department with a significantly lower salary (3,000 CZK) than in the WPC; meanwhile, her work ethic was described as “good”.⁷⁹⁵ However, at the same time, she was labelled by the Czechoslovak StB as “a suspicious person who maintains contacts with unreliable elements and also due to her contacts with the (French – M. T.) embassy.”⁷⁹⁶ This labelling was most probably influenced by a negative reference from the Czechoslovak WPC employee, Jan Křížek, who claimed that Gómez was still in contact with “shady elements from the World Peace Council” – as an example he mentioned an English citizeness, Grunberger.⁷⁹⁷ The report at the MOÚV KSČ also stated that Gómez, despite her departure from Prague, was still returning to the capital and was repeatedly seen in front of the French embassy.⁷⁹⁸

Gómez was therefore punished by the PCE leadership by moving from an office job in Prague to manual work in Ústí nad Labem, paradoxically to a similar job to the one she had been already exercising before her “moral decline” in Czechoslovakia. Thus, her example confirms the above-mentioned thesis that the transfer to Ústí was understood within the framework of Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia as a form of punishment. Nevertheless, it was in this North Bohemian city, where Gómez decided to resist the disciplination at the behest of the PCE – in this case, her resistance was carried out through collaboration with the StB.

The agency report from June 1954 regarding the interview between the StB agent “Eman” (Manuel Perez Lopez) and the Spanish exile Juan Bravo Perez contained the following statement by Bravo Perez: “We expelled Gómez (from the PCE – M. T.) because she made one mistake and we must not talk about this in front of anyone, otherwise we would be also expelled from the party.”⁷⁹⁹ He added that the PCE had recently carried out recruitment into the party,

⁷⁹³ Ibidem.

⁷⁹⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 190, a. j. 664, l. 89. Antonio Cordón to the ÚV KSČ, 25.3.1953.

⁷⁹⁵ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration”, sv. 1/3, l. 59-65. List of foreigners employed at the STZ in Ústí nad Labem, n. d.

⁷⁹⁶ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration”, sv. 1/3, l. 45-58. Krajská správa StB, Ústí nad Labem pro Ministerstvo národní bezpečnosti (Regional Directorate of the StB in Ústí nad Labem to the Ministry of National Defence). Španělská politická emigrace – souhrná zpráva (Spanish political emigration – Summary report), 25.6.1953.

⁷⁹⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 197, a. j. 689, file: G – Gomez Pilar (197). Záznam ze dne 2.6.1953 (Report from 2.6.1953). Unfortunately, we do not dispose of any more information regarding Ms. Grunberger.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibidem.

⁷⁹⁹ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 3/3, podsv. 5: Perez Juan Bravo, l. 11. Agency report, „Eman“. Issue: Bravo Perez Juan, Spanish political emigrant – report, 17.6.1954.

which was nonetheless not permitted for the already expelled Spaniards, such as Gómez. The task given by the State Security to “Eman” was in this case to get into touch with Gómez under the pretext of her visit as an old friend, to engage in a conversation with her, at first only on general matters, in order to find out her political orientation and later also regarding her position on the issue of Spanish exiles.⁸⁰⁰ In this respect, it should be mentioned that a hostile approach towards the object of interest of State Security (in her case a conflict with the leadership of the PCE), as well as social marginalisation and the possibility of material gains, were frequent preconditions for the selection of collaborators by the StB.⁸⁰¹ Pilar Gómez, a Spanish emigrant expelled from the PCE, socially ostracised and in economic need, transferred from Prague to an unknown environment in Ústí nad Labem, was thus an unsurprising adept for collaboration with the StB, effectuated in her case as a tactic of everyday resistance.

The attempt of the StB to recruit Gómez as a collaborator through agent “Eman” was an obvious and quick success: her first report, dedicated to Antonio Cerdón, dates back to the end of 1954. In this report Gómez claimed, that many Spanish emigrants in Czechoslovakia began to hate Cerdón, while Gómez herself, after arriving in the Czechoslovak Republic and meeting with Cerdón, found out that he is “a cold and indifferent person who has no connection with people, he appeared to her as a big gun who needs servants and not as a man with a connection to comrades.”⁸⁰² Gómez continued in her report with the criticism of Cerdón claiming that the political life of Spanish exiles was chaotic – Cerdón told Spaniards that their job in the Czechoslovak Republic was only constant study, whereas unlike many Spaniards living in difficult housing or financial conditions, he lived in luxury and with enough money.⁸⁰³ Gómez claimed that when it was being decided in 1951 which Spaniards would be transferred to Ústí nad Labem, the list ought to include all those who had some disputes with Cerdón. As has been already mentioned above, before her employment in the WPC, Gómez should have been initially transferred in the summer of 1951 to Ústí nad Labem as well. At that time, she asked Cerdón about the reason for her transfer and about the identity of the person responsible for the selection of Spaniards that should have been displaced. Cerdón explained this transfer as a decision of the KSČ caused by the lack of flats in Prague, while the selection of Spaniards that

⁸⁰⁰ Ibidem.

⁸⁰¹ Pavel ŽÁČEK, “‘Ostrá zbraň’ Štátnej bezpečnosti. Spolupracovníci politickej polície v smerniciach pre agentúrno-operatívnu prácu, 1947-1989“, *Pamäť národa*, 2004, pp. 8, 12.

⁸⁰² ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 119-120. Issue: General Antonio Cerdón – report, n. d. (December 1954).

⁸⁰³ Ibidem.

were sent to Ústí nad Labem was to be decided according to the direction of PCE.⁸⁰⁴ Gómez's report ended with a brief description of Cerdón, who "acts dictatorially and not democratically [...] Spaniards looked at him mistrustfully and did not confide in him. They were afraid to say what they thought for fear that one of his favourites would inform him against them [...]."⁸⁰⁵

Regarding the veracity of Gómez's report, it is necessary to add that Cerdón's income in Czechoslovakia exceeded the average wage – the income of workers in the socialist sector in the Czechoslovak Republic amounted in 1953 (after the monetary reform) on average to 1,097 CZK.⁸⁰⁶ At the end of 1953, Cerdón was earning, as a professor at Charles University, 2,200 CZK and was living in a two-room apartment.⁸⁰⁷ His daughter, Teresa Cerdón Vilas, in her testimony does not remember quarrels between her father and the other Spanish exiles, nor their luxurious life and claims that the Cerdón family lived in Prague only modestly and always surrounded by Spanish friends: "My parents went to work, I went to school and later we have been living at home the Spanish way [...] [o]n weekends our Spanish friends came to our house to eat, to chat [...] [m]y home has always been full of Spanish friends [...]".⁸⁰⁸ On the other hand, Manuel Tagüeña also criticised Cerdón in his memoirs, especially for his role in the anti-Tito campaign, during which Cerdón designated his former host as Hitler's agent and misused the information obtained during his stay in Belgrade resulting in his already mentioned book "I saw Tito's betrayal". Moreover, Tagüeña in his memoirs further claims that Cerdón's lack of scruples, cowardliness and servility brought him into a position where even though he "became the leader of Spaniards, [H]e did not show much nobility in this position [...] He interfered according to his liking [...]."⁸⁰⁹

We can only speculate as to whether Cerdón really acted in relation to other Spanish comrades "dictatorially" and "undemocratically". Nonetheless, his answer to Gómez in the case of her transfer to Ústí corresponds to the official report of Cerdón for the ÚV KSČ, in which he informed the Czechoslovak party about the elaboration of a list of a group of Spaniards willing to move from Prague to Ústí nad Labem (due to lack of apartments in Prague), as had

⁸⁰⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibidem.

⁸⁰⁶ Václav PRŮCHA et al., *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918-1992. 2. Díl: Období 1945-1992*, Brno 2009, p. 638.

⁸⁰⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 50-54. Overview of the employment and material security of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia. Annex, 21.12.1953 (29.12.1953).

⁸⁰⁸ EIROA, *Españoles*, p. 218.

⁸⁰⁹ TAGÜEÑA LACORTE, *Testimonio*, p. 370.

been requested by the KSČ.⁸¹⁰ However, in his report Cordón also asked the Czechoslovak authorities to provide adequate employment and accommodation for the Spanish emigrants leaving for Ústí.⁸¹¹ Still, it must be noted that the above-mentioned criticisms of Cordón and his activity as the leader of the Spanish collective came mostly from heterodox Spanish emigrants or Spanish communists already expelled from the party, therefore their objectivity can be questioned. Hence, we posit that these testimonies against Cordón (including Gómez's) most probably served as a "payback" against one of the leaders of the PCE in Prague for the loss of privileged positions by these "problematic" Spanish exiles.

Another of Gómez's agency reports dating to January 1955 was dedicated to another Spanish emigrant, Francisco Bosch (b. 1902, Calaf). Gómez first met Bosch in France in 1945 at the Spanish refugee convalescent hospital in Lourdes, where Bosch occupied the position of director. To her, Bosch seemed "hard, cold, unsympathetic, acting unfriendly and ungraciously to comrades".⁸¹² Gómez had the opportunity to learn the details of Bosch's private life while working with his wife in Ústí and Labem. In this agency report, her critique continued with the statement that Bosch had retained his petty-bourgeois customs – a bottle of cognac and 30-40 cigarettes a day, regardless of the family budget and provision for his children.⁸¹³ Spanish comrades allegedly knew about these circumstances, and they did not like Bosch, but he was allowed to move from Ústí to Prague thanks to his good relations with the leadership of the Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia. In the conclusion of her report, Gómez added that Bosch's wife is to him rather "a servant than a friend, who has suffered all her life due to his love affairs [...]".⁸¹⁴ Nonetheless, in contrast with Gómez's affirmations about Bosch's conflicts with Spanish comrades, in his official CV, elaborated by the PCE for the KSČ, it was stated that in February 1953, Bosch was enjoying "the full support of the party".⁸¹⁵ On the other hand, this source confirms his activities in France and also his employment in Ústí nad Labem as a doctor, just as Gómez stated in her report. Confirmed in his CV is also his marital status – nevertheless, without any mentions of alleged love affairs.⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 9-11. List of Spanish comrades willing to move to Ústí nad Labem, 19.4.1951; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 654, l. 13. Antonio Cordón to the ÚV KSČ, 19.4.1951.

⁸¹¹ Ibidem.

⁸¹² ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration”, sv. 1/3, l. 136. Agenturní zpráva (Agency report) „Alvarez” 1248. Issue: dr. Francisco Bosch – report, 6.1.1955.

⁸¹³ Ibidem.

⁸¹⁴ Ibidem.

⁸¹⁵ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Political Secretariat 1951-1954, sv. 54, a. j. 141, b. 15. Vyslání španělských soudruhů Moixe a Bosche do Vídně (Sending of Spanish comrades Moix and Bosch to Vienna), 18.2.1953.

⁸¹⁶ Ibidem.

However, even before Gómez submitted her agency report in January 1955, another report on Bosch had been elaborated in March 1954 by the Public Security in Ústí nad Labem and subsequently sent to the MOI in Prague. In this report, it was stated that Bosch's working morale was "very indifferent", as he did not speak Czech and was not interested in learning it, he rather visited coffee houses and carried out second-rate jobs.⁸¹⁷ Politically, he was uninterested, as he did not attend meetings of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement; although regarding his stance towards the regime, this report could not provide a clear answer. But it contained a presumption that until he would be able to talk to his patients in Czech, his capabilities (which were unquestionable) could not be fully used, even though from the criminal and safety-related point of view, nothing compromising was found on him.⁸¹⁸ In contrast to Gómez's report, within this police investigation, no comments regarding Bosch's unfriendliness to comrades, nor his mistreatment of his family and his love affairs were present, even though his "petty-bourgeois customs" (visiting cafés) also appeared in the report elaborated in March 1954 by the Public Security. On the contrary, in this report it was stated, that Bosch was meeting with other Spaniards in his place of stay on daily basis.⁸¹⁹

Taking into account Bosch's journey to Spain with his wife in the summer of 1960 (for a visit of their daughters and in order to investigate the possibility of their permanent return),⁸²⁰ Gómez's allegations about his dysfunctional marriage and family life seem to be far from the truth, especially if we take into account that the ČSČK, responsible for the social welfare of Spanish exiles, usually informed the MOÚV KSČ about the marital problems of Spanish exiles, as was, for example, the case of the Bargaño family.⁸²¹ Furthermore, as Bosch's travel was at that time (1959) recommended by the PCE, his quarrels with other Spanish exiles (even in the party leadership) could also be easily disapproved. Thus, as well as in the case of Cordón, Gómez's agency report on Bosch contained much information that was most probably false, or to say, at least imprecise.

On the same day as the report on Bosch (6 of January 1955), Gómez also submitted an agency report dedicated to Ángel Celada (b. Madrid, 1917). Gómez met Celada for the first

⁸¹⁷ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 99. Městská správa VB Ústí nad Labem pro Ministerstvo vnitra (Municipal Directorate of the Public Security in Ústí to the MOI), 31.3.1954 (1.4.1954).

⁸¹⁸ Ibidem.

⁸¹⁹ Ibidem.

⁸²⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 100. Record for c. Hendrych, 21.6.1960.

⁸²¹ The MOÚV KSČ was in this case well-informed about the alleged wife beating by the Spanish exile Ramon Bargaño, in: NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 132. Záznam o manželském rozvratu v rodině s. Bargaño Ramona (Report about the breakdown of marriage in the family of Bargaño Ramon), 23.10.1959.

time in Toulouse in 1946 when he was working in the structures of the party and was respected among the cadres.⁸²² After arriving in Czechoslovakia in July 1951, he was assigned to work in the WPC by Enrique Líster. Knowing him from France, Celada seemed to Gómez as “good for the party, but full of conceit and self-satisfaction. Collaborator (Gómez – M. T.) had only little sympathy for him.”⁸²³ After Gómez’s arrival to the WPC, Celada behaved coldly and arrogantly also in relation to another Spaniard who was working as a translator; meanwhile, Celada was constantly emphasising Líster’s trust in him. For these reasons, Gómez had few affections for him, despite the fact that Celada was shortly after his arrival in the WPC appointed as the Head of the Organisational Department and Gómez was to be his deputy in the Latin American Section – a fact that presupposed their cooperation. According to her report, Celada’s behaviour at that time changed – he became more pleasing; however, Gómez did not understand the change in his conduct.⁸²⁴ Probably the most interesting aspect of this report is Celada’s scandalous intimate relationship with “a young Frenchwoman Jacky Cailloux” (correctly Jackie Caillot, b. 1929 – M. T.). Even though the scandal broke out at the time of the arrival of Celada’s wife and their two children from France and despite the public criticism, Celada did not end his relationship with Caillot. Far from this – according to Gómez, after several unfortunate months with his wife, he decided to leave her for good and to go to Caillot; at the time of the elaboration of this agency report, the two were to live together in Vienna. At the end of her report Gómez stated, that Celada is “ambitious, dishonest, very conceited and able to win the love of responsible comrades”.⁸²⁵

Based on available archival materials, we can confirm that Celada really arrived in Czechoslovakia in July 1951 and was subsequently employed in the WPC with a salary of 11,036 CZK at the end of 1951,⁸²⁶ while at that time, his wife Sardina Merino Trinidad with their two children and her mother also arrived in Czechoslovakia.⁸²⁷ In a report from February 1952, Ángel Celada and Sardina still appear as a couple living together in Prague with their two children.⁸²⁸ However, according to information at our disposal, Celada indeed had an “affair”

⁸²² ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 135. Agency report „Alvarez” 1248. Issue: Angel Celada – report, 6.1.1955.

⁸²³ Ibidem.

⁸²⁴ Ibidem.

⁸²⁵ Ibidem.

⁸²⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652. Nominal list of comrades who form the collective of Spanish communists in Prague, 22.11.1951. Gómez’s salary at the same time amounted to 7,329 CZK.

⁸²⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 24-25. Seznam rodin španělských politických emigrantů v ČSR, které mají přijet z Francie do ČSR (List of families of Spanish political emigrants in Czechoslovakia, who should arrive from France to Czechoslovakia), n. d. (1951).

⁸²⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 97-98. Španělská emigrace – středisko Praha – abecední seznam (Spanish emigration – centre Prague – alphabetical list), 1.2.1952.

with Jackie Caillot, with whom he had a son born in September 1953 in Prague and the couple eventually married.⁸²⁹ In March of the following year, Celada was still working in the WPC and living in Prague with his wife (Jackie Caillot), who was not employed at that time.⁸³⁰ Considering that in the list of Spanish exiles from the end of 1953, Sardina Merino Trinidad appears as divorced with two children, while living in Prague and working in Tesla Karlín,⁸³¹ Gómez's information about the separation of Celada and Merino and about his stay in Vienna with Caillot, where the WPC's headquarters moved in 1954,⁸³² was therefore correct. Hence, we can say that when Celada and his wife eventually left Czechoslovakia for Berlin (with the approval of the PCE and the KSČ) in August 1959,⁸³³ his spouse was at that time most probably Jackie Caillot. However, Gómez's agency report regarding Celada's private life, even though based on truthful information, was still imprecise (she did not mention Celada's and Caillot's child). Furthermore, the archival documents illustrate that the Czechoslovak authorities already possessed more accurate information about Celada's life than those submitted by Gómez – the intelligence offered by her could thus be characterised as uninteresting for the StB.

Still, Gómez did not appear in documents from the Security Services Archive only as a collaborator: in the agency report from the agent "Eman", dedicated to the Spaniard Eduardo Quevedo (b. 1911) it was stated that Quevedo is applying for a state loan to buy furniture, as he is planning to marry Gómez, who is expecting a baby with him.⁸³⁴ Quevedo visited the Regional Directorate of the Public Security in Ústí nad Labem on March 11, 1955, in the matter of his marriage – even though the woman who appeared in his passport as his wife, Eusebia, had come to Czechoslovakia from France, Quevedo stated that they were not married. Despite his relationship with Eusebia (employed as well as Gómez at the STZ in the Cosmetics Department), with whom he had a daughter, Quevedo claimed that their appearance as a married couple was to serve only as a cover manoeuvre for getting into Czechoslovakia.⁸³⁵ Moreover, he planned to marry Gómez and asked the responsible authorities to be recognised as unmarried. At the Foreigners' Department of the Regional Directorate of the Public Security in Ústí,

⁸²⁹ C Carré Family Tree – Lorenzo Celada, www.myheritage.fr, <<https://www.myheritage.fr/site-family-tree-678205071/carre>>, [accessed 20 August 2021].

⁸³⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 187, a. j. 652, l. 76-77. Seznam Španělů žijících v Praze, jejich bydliště a zaměstnání (List of Spaniards living in Prague, their accommodation and occupation), 15.3.1954.

⁸³¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 50-54. Overview of the employment and material security of the Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia. Annex, 21.12.1953 (29.12.1953).

⁸³² BARTOŠEK, *Zpráva*, p. 111.

⁸³³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 118. Sebastián Zapirain to the ÚV KSČ, 24.8.1959.

⁸³⁴ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, podsv. 1: Quevedo Eduardo, l. 159. Agency report „Eman“. Issue: Quevedo – Spanish citizen – information, 22.3.1955.

⁸³⁵ Ibidem.

Quevedo was told that his case did not fall within their cognisance and was advised to address his request to the court; he received a similar answer after presenting his problem to the direction of the PCE – he ought to solve his matters by himself. In this case, the StB tasked “Eman” with visiting the court with Quevedo in order to help him with his problems.⁸³⁶ Taking into account the information provided by Quevedo and his wife Eusebia in the questionnaires in July 1953, the issue of the legal validity of their marriage seems clear: both indicated their civil status as married, their address was the same and both stated that they got married in 1936.⁸³⁷ On the other hand, Quevedo’s claim that their marriage was only a manoeuvre allowing them to travel to Czechoslovakia supports the fact that despite the deportation of Quevedo to Corsica in September 1950, he managed to enter the Czechoslovak Republic in July 1951, followed in December 1951 by Eusebia and their daughter.⁸³⁸

Given Gómez’s alleged homosexuality, the information about her life together with Quevedo is rather surprising – therefore, it is worth raising the question of whether the true reasons for her disciplinary punishment were in reality not based on personal issues with the leadership of the PCE, possibly manifested even before her forced departure from the WPC. Her agency reports critical towards the Spaniards, which in our understanding served as revenge against the leadership of Spanish communists, play in favour of this hypothesis. Unfortunately, as we do not dispose of more information regarding Gómez’s activities in the WPC, nor on her relationships with her Spanish comrades, we can only speculate about the genuine causes behind her expulsion from the PCE and her disciplinary punishment.

In contrast, her common life with Quevedo can be confirmed by another agency report from “Eman” on Quevedo from April 23, 1955.⁸³⁹ This report described Quevedo’s dissatisfaction with his job, related to his low salary and, once again, his application for a state loan in order to buy furniture was mentioned, while the references for his application were positive. It also included Quevedo’s statement, that he “cannot understand that after the V Congress (of the PCE – M. T.) some Spanish comrades have opinions that do not correspond with the resolutions of the V Congress.”⁸⁴⁰ Quevedo mentioned the examples of the Spaniards who had been expelled from the party and no one was allowed to speak to them, which, in his

⁸³⁶ Ibidem.

⁸³⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: Q. Questionnaire: Quevedo Eduardo, 1.7.1953; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 198, a. j. 689, file: Q. Questionnaire: Quevedo Eusebia b. Asarta, n. d. (1953).

⁸³⁸ Ibidem.

⁸³⁹ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, podsv. 1: Quevedo Eduardo, l. 157. Agency report „Eman”. Issue: Quevedo – Spanish emigrant – Information, 23.4.1955.

⁸⁴⁰ Ibidem.

opinion, could in the future lead to the falling of these comrades into the hands of the enemy. He added that the party should not isolate itself from the people who had been expelled from it, especially referring to the case of the already expelled Gómez, with whom he was living in a common household and planned to marry, but to whom no other Spanish communist was allowed to communicate. Understandably, due to his relationship with Gómez, Quevedo was also being criticised at the PCE meetings.⁸⁴¹

Czechoslovak State Security decided to use the above-mentioned intelligence to its benefit: one of the tasks mentioned during instruction at the Regional Directorate of the MOI in Ústí nad Labem on May 6, 1955, was the processing of Eduardo Quevedo with the aim of recruiting him for collaboration with the State Security.⁸⁴² Quevedo was chosen as a prospective collaborator since he got into a conflict with the leadership of the Spanish collective in Ústí – at least according to the aforementioned agency report from “Eman”. Another task was to focus on the collaborator “Alvarez” (Pilar Gómez), in order to obtain information on the Spanish emigrants José Esquerre and Artemio Precioso (leader of the Prague Spanish collective since 1955). However, the acquisition of these reports should have taken place only after Gómez’s return from maternity leave.⁸⁴³ Still, archival materials do not prove that the obtaining of information on these exiles from Gómez took place, nor do we have cognisance of the concrete level of Gómez’s collaboration – in the documents from the Security Services Archive, instead of a clear denomination (resident, agent, informer, owner of conspiracy flat or confidant),⁸⁴⁴ Alvarez obtained only the general designation of “collaborator”.

Another agency report from “Eman” on Quevedo from late May 1955 once again confirms Quevedo’s relationship with Gómez and her pregnancy.⁸⁴⁵ In this regard, it was stated that Quevedo was denied a state loan which he requested for the purchase of supplies for their child – the rejection of his application made Quevedo upset. “Eman” in this report further described Quevedo’s financial problems (he needed to borrow 500-1,000 CZK to buy equipment for their newborn child) and when asked why does he not borrow from Spanish

⁸⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁸⁴² ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, l. 148. Regional Directorate of the MOI in Ústí nad Labem. Issue: Zázpis o instruktáži v referátě 253 na KS MV Ústí (Memo about the instruction at the Department 253 at the Regional Directorate of the MOI in Ústí), 6.5.1955.

⁸⁴³ Ibidem.

⁸⁴⁴ Libor BÍLEK, “Zavazují se dobrovolně... Režidenti, agenti, informátoři a další. Tajní spolupracovníci Státní bezpečnosti v letech 1945-1989“, *Paměť a dějiny* 4, 2015, p. 9.

⁸⁴⁵ ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV „Spanish emigration“, sv. 1/3, podsv. 1: Quevedo Eduardo, l. 158. Zázpis na KS MV Ústí (Record at the Regional Directorate of the MOI in Ústí) “Eman”. Issue: Ústní zpráva agent. Eman o španělském emigrantu Quevedovi (Oral report from agent “Eman” about Spanish emigrant Quevedo), 20.5.1955.

comrades in Czechoslovakia or the PCE, Quevedo replied that he came into conflict with them over his relationship with Gómez and because he had left his wife – for these reasons, they were not willing to lend him any money.⁸⁴⁶ The final evaluation of this report included a statement that the need for financial provision on the part of Quevedo could be used in favour of the Czechoslovak authorities, considering that Quevedo got into conflict with his PCE group in Ústí and is also exasperated at the establishment due to the refusal of the loan. It was suggested that his situation could be exploited by the StB in two ways: either lend him 500 CZK directly – in this manner, the StB would gain his trust and the loan could also function as compromising material. The second option was to help him acquire the loan – the State Security would thus gain his trust and after the initial establishment of contacts (providing information on his colleagues at work) and after evaluating his attitude to cooperation, he would be given intelligence tasks within the Spanish emigration. The conclusion of this report from “Eman” contained a note stating that it would be opportune for the collaborator “Alvarez” (Gómez) to receive a financial reward from the StB, given her pregnancy and her current unflattering economic situation, whereas a financial gift would strengthen her trust and sympathies.⁸⁴⁷

As has been already mentioned, financial problems and material benefits were one of the issues on which the StB was trying to capitalise in order to recruit new collaborators.⁸⁴⁸ Still, due to the nonexistence of archival documents proving Quevedo’s further contacts with the State Security, it can be presumed that Quevedo was eventually not recruited for collaboration by the StB. On the other hand, his position within the Spanish emigration appears to have eventually improved, as in July 1957 he was among the few Spaniards officially nominated by the PCE as translators for the VI World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow.⁸⁴⁹ Still, the scarce archival materials at our disposal do not clarify the reasons behind the change of his position within the Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia.

Once it was decided by the PCE in 1956 to support the voluntary return of Spanish exiles from the Eastern Bloc to Spain, both Pilar Gómez and Eduardo Quevedo chose to leave for their homeland with their three children – an understandable step considering their long-term social ostracism as well as their unsatisfactory economic situation in Czechoslovakia. Already in July 1957, Gómez had applied at the Czechoslovak Red Cross for assistance with obtaining travel documents necessary to visit her parents in Spain; she had also asked the Czechoslovak MFA

⁸⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁸⁴⁸ ŽÁČEK, “‘Ostrá zbraň”, pp. 5, 12.

⁸⁴⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 670, l. 122. Antonio Cordón to the ÚV KSČ, 20.7.1957.

for the emission of these documents a few months earlier.⁸⁵⁰ The subject of her application was the authorisation of her journey to Spain, as Gómez, at that time pregnant, already had her Spanish passport ready in Vienna. This visit to Spain was intended as a probe of the possibility of her return to her homeland and although she was willing to pay for the journey by herself (expenses in foreign currency should have been covered by another Spanish comrade that was supposed to arrive from France), in the summer of 1957 she was not allowed to travel to Spain.⁸⁵¹ At the end of September 1957, when Gómez had already received the foreign currency needed for travelling to Spain, she was still waiting for her Czechoslovak travel documents to be issued.⁸⁵² It is not clear whether this trip to Spain really took place – in a letter from the ČSČK to the MOÚV KSČ from October 1958 it was stated, that Gómez and her three children will return to their home country, even though her husband (Quevedo) was to remain in Ústí.⁸⁵³ In this letter, the Czechoslovak Red Cross also asked for the reimbursement of tickets to Madrid and the pay-out of 125,000 francs – the amount provided at the time by the Czechoslovak Republic in the case of the return of 1 adult with 3 children to Spain, which was meant to cover their living expenses for the first weeks abroad.⁸⁵⁴

Nonetheless, taking into account the already mentioned restriction of the mobility of Spanish emigrants from Ústí to Spain to only those loyal to the PCE,⁸⁵⁵ both Quevedo's, as well as Gómez's relationship towards the leadership of the PCE must have changed in order for their journey to have been allowed. Thus, just before she departed for Spain at the end of 1958, Gómez applied for the re-admission into the PCE. Eventually, she was allowed to join the party anew, based on improving her behaviour since her expulsion, as well as due to the change of her relationship with the PCE and the correction of the cause that had originally been the reason for her exclusion (homosexual relations with a Frenchwoman from the WPC).⁸⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Gómez received a positive response from the PCE to her request only at the time of her return to Spain, this decision was based on reports about Gómez from the Spanish collective in Ústí

⁸⁵⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 26-27. ČSČK Social Department to the MOÚV KSČ. Issue: Urgence cest. průkazů (Reminder of travel documents), 22.7.1957.

⁸⁵¹ Ibidem; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 7-8. Přehled o vyřizovaných žádostech pro odjezdy Španělů (Overview regarding processed applications for the departure of Spaniards), n. d. (1957).

⁸⁵² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 54-55. ČSČK Social Department to the MOÚV KSČ. Issue: Departures of Spaniards, 25.9.1957.

⁸⁵³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 77. ČSČK Social Department to the MOÚV KSČ. Issue: Departures of Spaniards, 14.10.1958.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 47-49. Record about an interview with c. Líster, member of the Politburo of the CC PCE, 13.11.1956.

⁸⁵⁶ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.4 – Checoslovaquia, PCE – Reports. Confidential, n. d., 1960(?).

nad Labem, which received her re-admission into the party “with a storm of applause”.⁸⁵⁷ At the beginning of 1959, she was living with her children in Madrid,⁸⁵⁸ where they were joined in the spring of that year by Eduardo Quevedo, who also decided to definitively return to Spain. A record at the MOÚV KSC from March 29, 1959, reiterated the request from the ČSČK from the beginning of the same month for his travel documents, 50,000 French francs, 500 Austrian shillings, as well as the purchase of tickets for Quevedo, who was returning to Spain permanently.⁸⁵⁹

As we do not dispose of further reports submitted to the StB by Gómez after the State Security planned to use her for obtaining information on the Spanish emigrants Esquerre and Precioso in May 1955 (after her maternity leave), one possible explanation is that Gómez voluntarily ceased her collaboration with the StB in order to not run the risk of being exposed by the leadership of the PCE, as she needed its approval for her return to Spain. This theory seems probable in view of her newborn child – her collaboration, which, albeit secured her material and “immediate, de facto gains”⁸⁶⁰ (purchase of furniture), eventually did not lead to a long-term and desired improvement in her material security. Moreover, if our hypothesis about personal vengeance is correct, nor was she able to deteriorate the situation of those Spanish exiles, whom she had criticised in her reports. Another possible explanation stems from an executive order from the Czechoslovak MOI regarding the revision of the StB agency network and the elimination of non-prospective collaborators issued in 1955.⁸⁶¹ In this way would Gómez, with her imprecise intelligence on Spanish exiles, be one of those unreliable sources who were no-longer interesting for the StB in the second half of the 1950s.

Still, Gómez’s case is not just an example of punishment by the communist party on the grounds of her homosexuality, which can be questioned given her relationship with Quevedo and their three children. In addition, her collaboration with the StB can be understood as everyday resistance – her activities were a pattern of acts carried out from a subordinated position with the aim of disrupting the system of dominance; meanwhile, this resistance towards the direction of the PCE counted both with the anonymity of the agent of resistance, as well as the concealment of the act of resistance itself – public resistance against the leadership of the

⁸⁵⁷ Ibidem.

⁸⁵⁸ APCE, f. Emigration (Microfilms). Socialist countries, jacq. 1082. Lista de nuevos camaradas regresados al país definitivamente (List of new comrades that returned to the country definitively), 21.1.1959.

⁸⁵⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSC, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 84. Record from March 29, 1959.

⁸⁶⁰ SCOTT, *Weapons*, p. 33.

⁸⁶¹ BÍLEK, “Zavazuji se”, p. 17.

PCE would be too dangerous for Gomez.⁸⁶² Her motivations and aims were also clear and unquestionable – after repression in the form of forced transfer from office work in Prague to manual (and worse paid) work in Ústí, as well as her expulsion from the PCE (directly linked to her ostracism from the Spanish emigration, the loss of party privileges and the deterioration of her economic situation), she decided to collaborate with the StB in order to improve her material conditions and to seek revenge on the target of her resistance (leadership of the PCE). Intending to undermine the position of the leadership of the party, Gómez was using the tactics of resistance available to her (submitting agency reports), which were based on the rearticulation, or rather the reversion of the dominant discourse existing in Czechoslovakia.

Taking into account the entanglement between power and knowledge on a discursive level in situations where resistance is carried out,⁸⁶³ we argue that Gómez, with her resistance against the disciplinary power of the leadership of the PCE, intended to reverse existing power relations by offering in her reports to the Czechoslovak authorities a critical, (re)created and reversed knowledge about prominent members of the Spanish exile. Her (ex)comrades appear in these reports as undemocratic, dictatorial and living in luxury (Cordón); petty-bourgeois alcoholic, mistreating his wife (Bosch); or as an arrogant adulterer who left his family (Celada). Altogether, Gómez characterised her former partisan comrades negatively, in opposition to the existing discourse in Czechoslovak society regarding Spanish exiles as fighters against fascism and heroes of the French *Résistance*.⁸⁶⁴ Even if we take into account that the information that Gómez passed to the StB on the Spaniards was not always correct, or at best, it was imprecise, (as well as considering the questionable reliability of an agency report as a historical source),⁸⁶⁵ Gómez still created in her reports new critical discursive “truths” on Spanish emigrants.

Hence, from the conceptual point of view, Gómez’s contention could be classified as dispersed resistance, more precisely as the productive/constructive variant of this resistance. Considering that this model of everyday resistance is based on negotiating and/or creating alternative discourses/knowledge, while it might also “be about repeating things differently”,⁸⁶⁶ we understand Gómez’s knowledge-making as the tactics of her constructive/productive resistance. Especially taking into account that from the Foucauldian perspective, power and

⁸⁶² JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, pp. 9, 28; SCOTT, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, pp. 54, 56.

⁸⁶³ LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 3.

⁸⁶⁴ For example, Antonio Cordón was in his already mentioned book characterised as a “hero of the Spanish anti-fascist war”, in: CORDÓN – MAREK, *Viděl*, p. 5.

⁸⁶⁵ Prokop TOMEK, “Svazek StB jako historický pramen”, *Soudobé dějiny* 1, 2005, pp. 209-210.

⁸⁶⁶ LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 87.

knowledge are conjoined in discourse,⁸⁶⁷ while this (re)creation of knowledge also directly implies (re)creation of power (relations) within the relationships of actors of resistance.⁸⁶⁸ Even though oriented against domination, it was this discursive level, where Gómez's resistance and its constructiveness/productivity took place, thus "both a starting point for, and an instrument of, resisting practices" was the above-mentioned discourse.⁸⁶⁹ Moreover, as discourse is, according to Butler, although multiple and contradictory, also productive,⁸⁷⁰ we agree that this productive resistance could therefore be transformed into a reverse-discourse as well.⁸⁷¹

Gómez's everyday resistance, carried out as a discursive (re)construction/reversal of knowledge, could be understood as vengeance for the repression effectuated against her in order to subject her to party discipline. This disciplinary repression, officially presented as a punishment for her "moral decline", had the long-term objective of coercion of her behaviour according to the norm demarcated by the leadership of the PCE; however, the motivation behind this aim was to strengthen party discipline also within the Spanish political emigration as a whole, by means of exemplary punishment of Gómez. In this relationship, Gómez emerged as an agent of resistance located in a subordinate position, as she publicly and formally submitted herself to the official decision of the PCE leadership in Czechoslovakia – she broke off her alleged homosexual relationship, moved from Prague to Ústí and transferred from office to manual work. However, she coped with her social ostracism and deteriorating material security only for the sake of appearance – in this regard she decided to resort to constructive/productive resistance against the decisions of the party leadership through her collaboration with the StB.

Interesting in this case is also the role that Gómez played in the relationship between the Czechoslovak authorities (represented by the StB) and the leadership of the PCE – State Security decided to recruit Gómez, a heterodox and marginalised émigré, in order to obtain information on certain Spanish exiles. In this sense, the StB capitalised on the bad economic situation and ostracism of Gómez in order to receive her reports on her former comrades, even against the leaders of the Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia (Antonio Cordón, Artemio Precioso). Meanwhile, via collaboration with Gómez, the StB also pursued its own safety-related agenda, since it was permanently monitoring all activities of the Spanish exile,

⁸⁶⁷ FOUCAULT, *The History*, p. 100.

⁸⁶⁸ Idem, *Discipline*, pp. 27-28.

⁸⁶⁹ LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 142.

⁸⁷⁰ Nicky GREGSON – Gillian ROSE, "Taking Butler elsewhere: performativities, spatialities and subjectivities", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 4, 2000, p. 436.

⁸⁷¹ BUTLER, *The Psychic*, pp. 92-93.

especially of the group of Spanish officers that came from Yugoslavia in September 1948.⁸⁷² Still, another interesting aspect within the complex relationship between the above-cited actors of resistance is the fact that the PCE leadership in Czechoslovakia had no knowledge about the existing contacts between Gómez and the StB, nor had it any awareness (or archival materials do not prove it) of the focus of the State Security on the members of the PCE leadership. Therefore, it can be stated that in this case, the Czechoslovak StB acted from a power position in relation to the leadership of the Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia, as the StB decided to clandestinely obtain information on the members of the Spanish exile through denunciations from those Spaniards, who came into conflict with the leadership of the PCE, such as Gómez. Nevertheless, despite their mutual need, it is difficult to define the relationship between the State Security and Gómez as a relation of mutual complementarity, since the StB had at its disposal more than a hundred adult Spanish exiles as potential informants while Gómez's options to improve her material and social situation were severely limited after her expulsion from the PCE. For these reasons, we argue that Gómez found herself in a subordinate position not only towards the target of resistance (leadership of the PCE) but also in relation to the third actor of resistance (Czechoslovak StB). Thus, her resistance was simultaneously located within various power relations, while some of the involved actors were not aware of all these interconnections.⁸⁷³

Besides, her resistance was stemming from a symbolic space of correction and resistance, and at the same time, a geographical location and a centre of the Spanish exile – Ústí nad Labem. In this sense, the spatiality of resistance comes across as an important analytical category also in Gomez's case. The city of Ústí nad Labem (material space) also formed a social space with the role of a “purgatory” of Spanish communist exiles, thus confirming the thesis that the frontiers between material and symbolic space are fluid and unclear.⁸⁷⁴ Still, even though the control of space is a key aspect of disciplinary power,⁸⁷⁵ based on Gomez's case it appears that the leadership of the PCE was not aware that resistance and indiscipline are carried out as a response to power.⁸⁷⁶ What's more, the PCE willingly created in Ústí a “mycelium” for resistance against its leadership and by them enforced party discipline, by transferring heterodox Spaniards there as a form of punishment and in order to normalise their behaviour.

⁸⁷² NÁLEVKA, “Španěle“, pp. 93-94.

⁸⁷³ JOHANSSON – VINTHAGEN, *Conceptualizing*, p. 63.

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 122.

⁸⁷⁵ *Idem*, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: the Palestinian”, p. 129.

⁸⁷⁶ LILJA, *Constructive*, p. 81.

This social space of Ústí was also a product of power – it must be understood as “performative of power relations”⁸⁷⁷ and considering its indispensability in the resistance practice, also as being able to destabilise power structures. Gomez’s constructive resistance, entangled with Ústí and oriented against the leadership of the PCE, although eventually not liberating her from the subordination to the target of resistance,⁸⁷⁸ still led to a change in power relations as it strengthened the superior position of the Czechoslovak authorities over the leadership of the PCE. Still, as has been already mentioned, everyday resistance does not necessarily have to succeed, nor does the productive/constructive resistance have to overthrow the system of domination, nor to achieve complete liberation of the resister. Its position is more complex – it is located “within-against-and-beyond domination”.⁸⁷⁹ Equally complex was also the relationship between the Czechoslovak authorities and the Spanish emigration in Czechoslovakia, especially taking into account the ambivalent approach to supporting the PCE from the Czechoslovak side, recruitment of heterodox Spaniards as collaborators by the StB, resentment of the Spanish exiles from a part of Czechoslovak society, and (mostly after 1968), ideological discrepancies between the two “fraternal” parties, whose friendship and fraternity, as will be shown in the next chapter, had its economic limits.

⁸⁷⁷ GREGSON – ROSE, “Taking”, p. 441.

⁸⁷⁸ LILJA – VINTHAGEN, “Dispersed”, p. 221.

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibidem*.

5. Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations from “Victorious February” to *détente*

In the previous chapter, the complex relationship between the PCE, its (heterodox) members and the Czechoslovak authorities (and the KSČ) was analysed. From the examples of everyday resistance of the Spanish communists from Ústí we have demonstrated the existence of not only internal divisions and struggles within the Spanish communist exile but have also highlighted the not always fraternal relations between the two parties. In the following pages, we develop this issue further while focusing on the economic aspect of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the 20th century. We argue that the conflicting relationship between the PCE and Czechoslovak authorities (a result of the (im)mobilities of Spanish exiles), epitomised by acts of everyday resistance, also significantly influenced the Prague government in the development of its foreign policy towards the Francoist regime. Despite being denominated by Czechoslovak communists as “fascist”, Prague developed semi-official economic (and also cultural or scientific) relations with Franco’s Spain as early as the late 1950s. This, at first sight contradictory foreign policy, was evolving throughout the Cold War on three interlocking levels: relations between Madrid and Prague; financial support of the Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia; and, Czechoslovak commerce through the cover companies of the PCE.

We argue that the Czechoslovak-Spanish (economic) relations from 1948 to the 1970s must be understood in the broader context of relations between Spain and the Eastern Bloc and between Czechoslovakia and the “capitalist” West. The North American historian Oscar Sanchez-Sibony in his work “Red Globalization” argues that during the Cold War, the USSR was rather pragmatic than autarkic, as the Soviet economy has always been a part of global economic structures (within Western hegemony), while Soviet economic problems led to its cooperation with developed capitalist countries in order to gain foreign currency, technologies and access to Third World markets – thus in the economic sphere, there was no bipolarity during the Cold War.⁸⁸⁰ In accordance with Sanchez-Sibony, we argue that in the case of Czechoslovakia, the situation was rather similar and that political-ideological principles often had to make way for economic pragmatism – the country’s foreign trade with Western countries was (as was the Soviet case) a symbol of its adaptation to the world economy, with its necessity of foreign currency. This was needed by the Eastern Bloc countries, instead of their inconvertible currencies, for the purchase of Western consumer goods or technologies and licenses indispensable for the intensification and innovation of their production of items that

⁸⁸⁰ SANCHEZ-SIBONY, *Red globalization*, pp. 4-9, 94.

could be sold on Western markets for hard currency.⁸⁸¹ For this reason, even though Czechoslovakia was at that time economically (and politically) bound with the Eastern Bloc (COMECON), being the USSR its most significant trade partner (and this economic partnership was increasing from the 1950s), Prague also continued trading with the West.⁸⁸² Still, there was a possibility to evade purchases on Western markets and save much-needed foreign currency – in this case, low-quality Czechoslovak products sold within the Eastern Bloc would secure Soviet and Eastern European raw materials and products, albeit of low quality, for Prague.⁸⁸³

Since the signature of the interbank agreement in 1958, Czechoslovak foreign trade with Spain differed from commerce with other Western countries; nevertheless, the principle remained the same. The export of Czechoslovak machine industry products (but also of tractors or glassware) should have secured Spanish consumer goods and raw materials as well as much-needed hard currency. For this reason, the foreign policy of Prague towards Madrid was rather complex. Instead of being static and resentful to any form of connection with the “fascist” Francoist regime, it was rather calculative and gradually evolving in the context of the Cold War – it was shaped by the political, social and economic changes in both blocs, and with regard to the internal developments in both countries, as well as to the transforming relations between the respective parties (KSCĚ, PCE). Furthermore, the discrepancies between the various Czechoslovak and Spanish ministries, as well as the regular “consultations” with the USSR and with the Spanish comrades based in Prague on the further actions towards Madrid, suggest that Czechoslovakia was developing its foreign policy towards Franco’s Spain by balancing its own economic needs, the political reality of the Eastern Bloc and the interests not only of the CPSU but also of the PCE. Nonetheless, the bases for this conflicting relationship between Madrid and Prague can be seen already before 1948.

5.1 Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations from 1918 until WWII

As already mentioned in the first chapter, the signing of the most-favoured-nation trade treaty between Czechoslovakia and Spain in November 1921 could be considered the first milestone for Czechoslovak-Spanish trade relations.⁸⁸⁴ However, already in September of that

⁸⁸¹ Ibidem, pp. 110-112; Dan MAREK, “Československo, RVHP a Evropské společenství v období 1957-1980“, *Politologica. Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis* 4, 2005, p. 138.

⁸⁸² Jan M. MICHAL, “Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Trade”, *Slavic review* 2, 1968, p. 215. Czechoslovak export to the USSR amounted to 120 million USD in 1948 (16% of the total Czechoslovak foreign trade), in 1952 it increased to 291 million (33,3% of total trade) and in 1965 to 1.023 million USD (38% of total trade). On the other hand, export to capitalist countries fell from 455 million USD (1948) to 245 million (1952) but by 1965 it amounted to 723 million USD. The situation of Czechoslovak imports was very similar, in: Ibidem.

⁸⁸³ SANCHEZ-SIBONY, *Red globalization*, pp. 116-117, 174.

⁸⁸⁴ NÁLEVKA, “Las relaciones”, p. 245.

year, two Spanish representatives arrived at the Prague Trade Fair, demonstrating mutual interest in economic rapprochement between the two countries.⁸⁸⁵ Considering the only slowly developing mutual trade at the beginning of the 1920s, the trade agreement between the two countries signed in July 1925 (entered into force after ratification in February 1927) could be considered more significant, as in addition to the most-favoured-nation clause for mutual trade, it also stipulated annual contingents of goods divided into trimesters.⁸⁸⁶ That is to say, this trade agreement kickstarted the mutual exchange of products, while the main exports from Spain to Czechoslovakia during the interwar period included minerals (mercury and pyrite), wine, fruit (oranges, lemons, grapes, figs and nuts), cork, olive oil, fish and seafood; in the opposite direction, Czechoslovak footwear, textiles, glass, ceramics, bijouterie, porcelain, as well as hops and engineering products were exported.⁸⁸⁷

We agree with Száraz, who, regarding the mutual trade relations during the interwar period, states:

[B]efore the Civil War (in the period 1925-1935), Czechoslovak-Spanish trade very clearly reflected the broader international economic context. Thus, in 1925-1929, we can observe a relatively significant increase in the turnover of mutual trade, while the years 1930-1933 are a period of a steady but gradually easing decline in the intensity of the exchange of goods. The years 1934 and 1935 mark the beginning of a revival which was, however, very drastically interrupted by the Civil War [...] [i]t is interesting that in the period 1925-1935 Czechoslovakia had a passive trade balance with Spain, except for the years 1925 and 1929.⁸⁸⁸

Despite the supplemental trade agreement signed in December 1928, the global economic crisis that broke out at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, together with the devaluation of the peseta, influenced mutual economic relations for the negative.⁸⁸⁹ Still, slow but positive development of these relations took place in the years after the establishment of the Spanish Second Republic (1931) which was evidenced by steps to further liberalise the mutual trade and the negotiations for a new commercial treaty in 1936.⁸⁹⁰ Even though Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations reached their peak in 1935, the imports from Spain accounted for only 1% of total Czechoslovak imports.⁸⁹¹

⁸⁸⁵ MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 137-139.

⁸⁸⁶ SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta”, p. 82.

⁸⁸⁷ NOVOTNÝ – ŠOUŠA, “Acerca”, pp. 238-239; MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 205-206.

⁸⁸⁸ SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta”, p. 82.

⁸⁸⁹ *Ibidem*; MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 206-209.

⁸⁹⁰ MONTILLA AMADOR, *Las relaciones*, pp. 318-321.

⁸⁹¹ NÁLEVKA, “Československo-španělské”, p. 86.

During the Civil War, however, Czechoslovak-Spanish trade did not develop only in the context of the already mentioned shipments and re-export of Czechoslovak arms to Republican Spain. Even though the Czechoslovak Republic continued to maintain trade relations with the Republic and “during the Civil War the Czechoslovak government indeed signed a payment agreement with the Spanish Republican government, this could not have been relevant, considering the development of relations with the Francoists [...]”.⁸⁹² Thus, despite maintaining relations with the Republican government and even signing a new payment agreement between the two countries at the beginning of 1937, from 1938 Czechoslovakia began to lean more toward the Nationalists also in terms of trade relations.⁸⁹³ Understandably, the Spanish conflict increased the sale of military equipment from or via Czechoslovakia.⁸⁹⁴ This fact is evidenced not only by the already stated reexports of military equipment to Republican Spain via “third countries”, but also by Rebels’ attempts to purchase Czechoslovak guns through the British Westminster Bank.⁸⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the Civil War meant a general decrease in mutual trade and as Száraz argues, “the attempt of Czechoslovakia to compensate for Civil War-era losses by establishing relations with Francoists in 1938 proved fruitless [...] [D]espite mutual willingness to conclude a trade agreement, Prague and Burgos had different ideas also about the form of payments” and even though Czechoslovakia “was considering penetrating the Spanish market after the Civil War, even then economists did not count on the scale of our (Czechoslovak – M. T.) exports being higher than in 1938 (about 8 million CZK, i.e. 12-times less than in 1929).”⁸⁹⁶ Therefore, it can be said that the Spanish Civil War, although it did not interrupt Czechoslovak-Spanish trade, significantly weakened it and reoriented it from the Republicans to the Nationalists already during the course of the war.

Notwithstanding the limited role of Czechoslovak-Spanish commerce within the foreign trade of these countries during the interwar period;⁸⁹⁷ subsequently, during WWII, trade contacts were maintained between Francoist Spain and the Slovak state. Still, these were carried out with serious problems – one of the main reasons for this was limited transport capacities. The products exported to Slovakia were fruits, fats, oils, sisal, lead, cork, wine and fish; Spain on the other hand imported wooden products, cellulose, acetone and chemical products.⁸⁹⁸ The

⁸⁹² SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta”, p. 82.

⁸⁹³ NOVOTNÝ – ŠOUŠA, “Acerca”, pp. 238, 241-243.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibidem, p. 243.

⁸⁹⁵ NÁLEVKA, “Československo-španělské”, pp. 101-102.

⁸⁹⁶ SZÁRAZ, “Dlhá cesta”, p. 82.

⁸⁹⁷ CHALUPA, *Dějiny*, p. 629.

⁸⁹⁸ SZÁRAZ, “Relaciones”, p. 277.

already mentioned Slovak-Spanish trade agreement from July 1943 was valid only for one year and the lengthiness of negotiations and the amount of trade (reaching its peak in 1943, while forming only 0,76% of Slovak foreign trade) only confirms the assertion that mutual (economic) relations were not a priority for either of the two countries.⁸⁹⁹ As stated in the first chapter, the main reason for the conclusion of this treaty was an intent to strengthen the position of the Slovak state after the war. In conclusion, due to the military activities of the Allies in France, even this limited mutual exchange of products ended already one year after the signature of this treaty (1944).⁹⁰⁰

Likewise limited was Spanish trade with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia – it was carried out within the economic relations between Spain and the Third Reich, and due to the running war, encountered many obstacles. The main traded products included fruits, cereals, metals and cotton, while Czechoslovak companies participating in this trade included also those active in Spain since the interwar period, such as *ČKD*, *Poldina hut'*, *Omnipol* and *Škoda*.⁹⁰¹ However, after WWII, Nazi Germany, as well as its satellites (the Slovak state included) perished, and the Czechoslovak Republic was re-established.

5.2 The Spanish communist exile in Czechoslovakia and the problem with its funding⁹⁰²

The PCE leadership based in Prague – the bureaucratic centre of the party, from which the Spanish exile in other Eastern Bloc countries was also controlled, was being subsidised by the KSČ from the end of the 1940s in various ways. As already mentioned, the Czechoslovak party covered the salaries and expenses of the PCE's party leaders and financially supported the Spanish party in the organisation of its congresses and plenary sessions in the Czechoslovak Republic. However, the so-called fraternal aid of the KSČ to the Spanish communists had its economic limits – a closer look reveals obvious disparities in the relationships between the Spanish communist emigration and its Czechoslovak hosts, the main causes of which can be found in the economic situation of Czechoslovakia, which (like Francoist Spain), had been suffering since the mid-1950s from a lack of foreign currency.

For instance, the Czechoslovak expenditures for the direction of the PCE amounted to 1,57 million CZK in 1951 (salaries and various allowances of the leadership amounted to

⁸⁹⁹ Ibidem, p. 272; Idem, "Dlhá cesta", pp. 83, 86, 89.

⁹⁰⁰ Idem, "Relaciones", p. 278.

⁹⁰¹ EIROA, *Las relaciones*, pp. 34-35; NOVOTNÝ – ŠOUŠA, "Acerca", p. 242.

⁹⁰² The next three subchapters are partially stemming from the paper: TIMKO, "Moc peněz" (in print).

840,000 CZK).⁹⁰³ More concretely: Juan Modesto obtained a monthly allowance from the KSČ in the amount of 3,000 CZK in addition to his salary from the SPDŠ – 5000 CZK;⁹⁰⁴ Vicente Uribe received a monthly income of 17,000 CZK in 1951; and, Antonio Mije received 15,000 CZK.⁹⁰⁵ At the beginning of 1953, salaries of the leadership of the Spanish political emigration in the Czechoslovak Republic paid by the ÚV KSČ ranged from 7,000 to 17,000 CZK,⁹⁰⁶ and in March 1960 from 1,400 to 3,600 CZK per month.⁹⁰⁷ What is more, according to a letter from Juan Modesto, the total expenses of the delegation of the PCE in Prague increased from 30,785 CZK in 1957 to 82,056 CZK in 1960 (apart from the salaries of the leadership – 80,000 CZK; expenses paid by the Czechoslovak Red Cross; and the help for political prisoners collected between members of the PCE). All of this funding came from the KSČ (help increased from 20,000 CZK in 1957 to 40,000 in 1960), as well as from the contributions of the members of PCE, while Modesto claimed that “thousands of crowns are being spent on useless things [...]”.⁹⁰⁸ This economic support continued even during the mid-1960s – in a record from 1965 it was stated that the total annual costs of the Spanish political emigration covered by the ÚV KSČ amounted to an annual average of 170,000 CZK.⁹⁰⁹

Additionally, apart from salaries, allowances, the provision of accommodation and the creation of customised job opportunities for Spanish emigrants in Czechoslovakia, the KSČ enabled and also financially contributed to the publication of PCE’s periodicals and brochures.⁹¹⁰ However, the “fraternal” help of the KSČ to the Spanish communists had its economic limits – already by the end of 1959, the Head of the MOÚV KSČ Koucký informed Líster, regarding Czechoslovak expenses for the realisation of the VI Congress of the PCE, in the sense that “the leadership of our party is honoured by the trust from the fraternal PCE. That is the reason behind the decision to carry out the (VI – M. T.) Congress in Czechoslovakia;

⁹⁰³ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 49. Španělská polit. emigrace: Finanční náklady na rok 1951 – Vedení strany (Spanish political emigration: Financial expenses for 1951 – Leadership of the party), n.d. (1951).

⁹⁰⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 657, l. 22-27. Report on the activities of Spanish comrades in Prague, 3.3.1950.

⁹⁰⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 19. Pro politický sekretariát (For the Political Secretariat), 11.4.1951 (21.4.1951).

⁹⁰⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 191, a. j. 666, l. 38. Platy jež vyplácí ÚV KSČ španělským vedoucím soudruhům (Salaries paid by the ÚV KSČ to the leading Spanish comrades), 21.1.1953. As has been already mentioned above, the salary of Pilar Gómez in the STZ in 1953 amounted to 3,000 CZK, in: ABS, f. OB/MV, a. č. OB – 1718 MV “Spanish emigration”, sv. 1/3, l. 59-65. List of foreigners employed at the STZ in Ústí nad Labem, n. d.

⁹⁰⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 186, a. j. 643, l. 89-90. Záznam pro soudruha Hendrycha (Record for c. Hendrych), 18.3.1960. For comparison, the average gross income of workers in the socialist sector in Czechoslovakia amounted in 1960 to 1,365 CZK, in: PRŮCHA et al., *Hospodářské*, p. 638.

⁹⁰⁸ APCE, f. Dirigentes (Leaders), c. 32, file 7 – Modesto Guilloto, Juan. Modesto to Santiago, 6.3.1960.

⁹⁰⁹ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Spanish political emigration in Czechoslovakia, n. d. (1965).

⁹¹⁰ EIROA, “Sobrevivir”, p. 86.

however, our party must understandably also follow the economic aspect in organising similar actions, because lately, the party's expenditures have been extraordinary."⁹¹¹ Thus, the travel expenses of Spaniards for this congress in the amount of 10,504 USD had to be paid by the PCE, due to Czechoslovak complaints regarding the high costs of the stay of Spanish communists and the unfavourable foreign exchange situation of Czechoslovakia.⁹¹²

Thus, a closer look reveals visible cracks in the relations between the Spanish communist emigration and its Czechoslovak hosts even in the 1950s, the main causes of which can be found in the economic situation of Czechoslovakia, which had been suffering from a lack of foreign currency since the mid-1950s. This situation was caused not only by the centrally planned economy, the orientation of its foreign trade mainly toward the Soviet Bloc (linked with an unfavourable composition of trade), but also by the decay of the main Czechoslovak export goods (and thus a source of hard currency) to Western markets – products from the machine industry. Their qualitative defects, high production costs and long supply times resulted in their low competitiveness in an era of certain openness of Czechoslovak trade to capitalist markets.⁹¹³ Taking into account the above stated, it is not surprising that some Czechoslovak citizens complained about the Spanish exiles who were being referred to, as has been already mentioned, as “parasites”; nor that as early as the second half of the 1950s, some MOÚV KSČ employees objected to the expenses for Spanish emigration. In this case, the amount of the costs associated with the publication of their *Boletín* was criticised as “too much money at once for those Spanish *experts*”⁹¹⁴ – this ironic denomination of the Spanish communists only demonstrates the problematic nature of financial concerns in the relations between the PCE and the KSČ. Therefore, it can be stated that it was the economic dimension of the contact between the two parties that was often the point of conflict in their relationship and, as the following pages will prove, the economic problems of Czechoslovakia in the late 1950s influenced not only the Spanish communists living in the country but also the formation of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Madrid.

⁹¹¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 186, a. j. 643, l. 4-5. Záznam o rozhovoru s. Kouckého se členy PB KS Španělska s. E. Lísterem a S. Alvarezem (Record about the interview between c. Koucký and the members of the PB PCE c. E. Líster and S. Alvarez), 3.12.1959.

⁹¹² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 186, a. j. 643, l. 149-151. Justification for the budget overrun of the VI Congress of the PCE, 8.3.1960; MICHAL, “Czechoslovakia's”, p. 217.

⁹¹³ Lee Kendall METCALF, “The impact of foreign trade on the Czechoslovak economic reforms of the 1960s”, *Europe-Asia studies* 6, 1993, pp. 1073-1074; PRŮCHA et al., *Hospodářské*, pp. 314, 571.

⁹¹⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 49. Božka (Novotná) to Morávek, n. d., 1957(?). In original “moc peněz najednou pro ty španělské *stručňáky*” (in Serbo-Croatian “*stručnjak*” translates as „expert” – M. T).

One of the aspects of these economic relations, which involved not only both governments but also the PCE, was the effort of Spanish communists to develop trade between the Czechoslovak foreign trade enterprises (*Podniky zahraničního obchodu* – PZO) and PCE's cover companies from the second half of the 1950s. Already in April of 1957, Juan Gómez, who was responsible for economic issues in the PCE, informed the Czechoslovak party of the arrival of a representative of Spanish business circles, Domingo Gonzáles, who planned to conclude a deal in the amount of 800,000 USD in the Czechoslovak Republic. Gómez advised the KSČ to enable this deal and to grant Gonzáles a trading license since Gonzáles “has also the confidence of the PCE and helps the party whenever he can.”⁹¹⁵ Still, Gómez also urged for discretion, considering that Gonzáles' connection to the PCE must not have been revealed.⁹¹⁶ Subsequently, in October 1957, Joaquín González Estarriol, a PCE member who had been living for a long time in Venezuela, where his eponymous company was based, visited Czechoslovakia on business for the first time.⁹¹⁷ Enrique Líster addressed the MOÚV KSČ with a plea to make contact with the company *Joaquín González Estarriol S.A.* (hereinafter JGA), as Estarriol was a party member in charge of economic affairs, who had already represented some Czechoslovak PZO in Venezuela and who was to be a suitable intermediary in trade relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and Spain, taking into account his contacts in Madrid.⁹¹⁸ Líster also stated that the current situation was favourable for the development of trade relations between Spain and Czechoslovakia (interesting also for the PCE), for which Estarriol's Venezuelan business and his influence at the Spanish ministries were to be used⁹¹⁹ – his company was to open a branch in Barcelona, provided that the Czechoslovak PZO would entrust this company with their representation.⁹²⁰

In addition to his letter, Líster also offered a short study elaborated by the PCE about the establishment of commercial relations between Spain and Czechoslovakia to the

⁹¹⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 4-7. Záznam o rozhovoru se soudruhem Juan Gomezem, náhradníkem PB bratské KS Španělska, který byl konán dne 19.4.1957 (Memo about the interview with c. Juan Gomez, substitute of the PB of the fraternal PCE, which took place on 19.4.1957).

⁹¹⁶ Ibidem.

⁹¹⁷ HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, “Comerciendo”, pp. 10-13, <<http://historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/43/fernandohernandezsanchez.pdf>>, [accessed 17 February 2022]; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 110. Záznam ze dne 26.2.1958 (Record from 26.2.1958).

⁹¹⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 116. G. Souček to Hendrych, 11.10.1957; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 126. E. Líster to G. Souček, 8.10.1957.

⁹¹⁹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 121. Záznam o rozhovoru s. Lístera se s. Součkem (Report about the interview between c. Líster and c. Souček) 7.10.1957.

⁹²⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 138-139. Záznam o jednání s J. Gonzales Estarriol – Knap (Record about the negotiation with J. Gonzales Estarriol – Knap), 18.10.1957.

Czechoslovak authorities.⁹²¹ Surprisingly, the information about the possibility of concluding an interbank treaty and re-establishing normal commercial contacts between Spain and Czechoslovakia (as well as other Eastern Bloc countries) was published in the Czechoslovak press, while in this study by the PCE it was claimed that this re-establishment would most probably take place in the near future. This radical change in Spanish foreign policy was influenced by the bad foreign exchange situation of Spain, the necessity of new markets for agricultural products, as well as the overall decay of the regime.⁹²² Regarding the difficulties in obtaining import licenses to Spain, it was claimed that it will be necessary for Czechoslovak companies to nominate suitable correspondents for relations with Spain – the best would be to centralise import and export and to open a Czechoslovak commercial office in Spain. This would, through an organised and centralised network of branches and agents in big cities, control all trade operations with Czechoslovak PZOs – *Ligna*, *Ferromet*, *Chemapol*, *Kovo*, *Motokov* or *Strojexport* were mentioned as the most suitable for the trade with Spain. At the end of this study, it was claimed that these companies should make an exclusive contract of representation with a concrete person who would represent them in Spain and also be able to open the aforementioned commercial office and organise its network.⁹²³ Annexed to this study was a list of imported and exported products to/from Spain from January to September 1956. From this list, it seemed clear that “the economies of Spain and Czechoslovakia are complementary and that the development of commercial transactions between the two countries could evolve in a very important way.”⁹²⁴ It goes without saying that this person with the right of exclusive representation of Czechoslovak PZOs was supposed to be, according to the PCE, González Estarriol.

Notwithstanding the recommendations of the PCE regarding Czechoslovak-Spanish commerce, at the end of the record on negotiations with Estarriol at the Czechoslovak MFT, Knap (an employee at the MFT) stated, that despite Estarriol’s assurances, it was necessary to be careful in this matter since an intervention against the Barcelona branch of the JGA could be detrimental not only to the PCE but also to the Czechoslovak Republic. Knap therefore

⁹²¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 127-128. Sobre la reanudación de las relaciones comerciales entre Checoslovaquia y España y sobre la conveniencia de establecer en España una oficina de negocios encargada de regular dicho comercio (On the resumption of trade relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain and on the desirability of establishing in Spain a business office responsible for regulating such trade), October 1957.

⁹²² Ibidem.

⁹²³ Ibidem.

⁹²⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 129. Annex: Relación de los principales artículos exportados e importados por España durante los meses de enero a septiembre de 1956 (List of the main articles exported to and imported from Spain during the months of January to September 1956), October 1957.

recommended that the Czechoslovak authorities reconsider this offer, which was too obvious for the Francoist authorities already at the first glance.⁹²⁵ He reiterated this assumption during a meeting at the ÚV KSČ in January 1958; furthermore, according to the Czechoslovak authorities, this kind of representation by the JGE would be against Czechoslovak regulations for its commercial representation in capitalist countries. Thus, in this regard, it was considered as more suitable if Spanish communists would announce to the Czechoslovak authorities the companies, the Czechoslovak PZO should focus on. These companies would then be entrusted with the representation for the export of Czechoslovak goods and products into Spain.⁹²⁶

Therefore, as a result of the dangers associated with the representation of Czechoslovak PZO by the JGA and the limited financial possibilities of this company, the development of Czechoslovak trade with Spain through this business firm did not take place until May 1959.⁹²⁷ During this month, a meeting was held at the MOÚV KSČ with members of the PCE, Gómez and López, who emphasised the political damages of developing trade relations between Czechoslovak PZO and companies representing the Francoist regime, while commerce with the JGA was to help the PCE economically – this support was understood as crucial, considering that the PCE was at that time preparing for a mass strike in order to create the conditions for the definitive overthrow of Franco.⁹²⁸ In this respect, the Spanish communists asked for the exclusive right of commercial representation of two or three important Czechoslovak products in Spain for the JGA. In return, Estarriol's company was to secure the most favourable business conditions for Czechoslovakia in the competitive struggle on the Spanish market. The commissions from Spanish companies, which would get Czechoslovak contracts, were consequently to be used to finance the PCE.⁹²⁹ Gómez and López also dealt with the Czechoslovak MFT, where it was decided that Estarriol would be allowed to negotiate about possible cooperation in imports and exports with the Czechoslovak PZO *Ligna* and *Koospol*.⁹³⁰

Eventually, facilitated by Czechoslovak cooperation with the JGA, 340 tons of oranges were exported to Czechoslovakia through this company in 1960,⁹³¹ and these trade relations

⁹²⁵ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 138-139. Record about the negotiation with J. Gonzales Estarriol – Knap, 18.10.1957.

⁹²⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 137. Record about the negotiation with c. Knap from the MZO, 24.1.1958.

⁹²⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 132-133. Krajčír to Novotný, 26.5.1959.

⁹²⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 134-136. Záznam pro soudruha Hendrycha (Memo for c. Hendrych), 16.5.1959.

⁹²⁹ Ibidem.

⁹³⁰ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 132-133. Krajčír to Novotný, 26.5.1959.

⁹³¹ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.7. Asuntos comerciales (Comercial issues) – Confidenciales (Secret). G. Estarriol (Notes), 19.10.1961.

continued in the following years despite several problems mainly linked to the limited possibilities of the JGA to secure the most favourable prices for Prague.⁹³² Thus, already in 1961, during the negotiations at the Czechoslovak MFT, Manuel Lafuente (the person responsible at the PCE for financial issues) as well as Estarriol himself, complained about the low level of commerce between the JGA and Czechoslovakia – despite the approval of the ÚV KSČ, support from the Czechoslovak ministries and contacts at the Spanish MFA, only a limited number of business transactions were carried out during the period in question. At the same time, these PCE members on this occasion requested from the Czechoslovak counterpart to find ways to increase PCE's cooperation with Czechoslovak PZO's.⁹³³ On the other hand, in a report about the possibilities of Czechoslovak propagation in Spain elaborated at the Czechoslovak MFA it was stated that the fact that both companies, the JGA and *Uninci* (importing and distributing Czechoslovak movies in Spain), were composed exclusively of communists, was well known to the Francoist authorities and contracts with these companies meant restraints on the involved Czechoslovak products.⁹³⁴ For this reason, it could be argued that the danger of deconspiracy played a crucial role for the Czechoslovak authorities in their commerce with JGA, leading to limited trade exchange.

Still, probably the most significant re-export action of the JGA via Czechoslovakia took place in the years 1962-1963 and was linked with the intensification of the anti-Franco struggle in Spain through mass strikes at the beginnings of the 1960s. This strike movement, fully developed in 1962 and led by the PCE,⁹³⁵ also gained support in the Eastern Bloc countries – in case of Czechoslovakia, this help was mainly financial and represented by the already mentioned collection of 250,000 CZK donated to Spanish strikers by the ÚRO.⁹³⁶ In the autumn of 1962, on the initiative of the PCE, a proposal was made to convert the amount donated by the ÚRO into foreign currencies – almost a quarter of a million crowns was to be used to buy

⁹³² APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.7. Commercial issues – Secret. Resumen sobre las actividades desarrolladas en el viaje octubre-noviembre 1961 por los países: Checoslovaquia, Alemania y Polonia (Summary about the activities carried out during the journey in October-November 1961 in countries: Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland), 22.11.1961.

⁹³³ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.7. Commercial issues – Secret. Memorandum y motivos de nuestras conversaciones con los camaradas Vnoucek y Kykal del Ministerio de C.E. sobre nuestras relaciones (Memorandum and motives of our conversations with comrades Vnoucek and Kykal from the MFT about our relations), n. d. (1961).

⁹³⁴ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964 Spain, c. 1, file: 057/116 (6) Press, Radio, Propagation. MFA, no. 021.675/61-4. Issue: Propagation of Czechoslovakia in Spain and the possibilities of its broadening. Spain (Report). 16.2.1961.

⁹³⁵ ESTRUCH TOBELLA, *Historia*, pp. 205-206.

⁹³⁶ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. The most important Czechoslovak actions in the recent years in support of the struggle of Spanish people, n. d. (1965).

Czechoslovak products, which were then to be “sold” to Venezuela to the JGA. The latter ought to subsequently re-export the goods from Venezuela to other countries in US dollars and the received amount was then to be put at the disposal of the PCE. Since the cover company in question already maintained trade relations with Czechoslovak PZO, the whole transaction was to be disguised as a commission from the Czechoslovak foreign trade enterprises to JGA for previous shipments.⁹³⁷ Despite the agreement from the Czechoslovak authorities with this proposal, some complications did appear – one-fifth of the mentioned 250,000 CZK went immediately to cover the expenses for the treatments of the Spanish communists in Czechoslovak spas and convalescent homes.⁹³⁸ It was most probably Sebastián Zapirain (a member of the PCE leadership living in Prague), who commented on the whole issue, that it was “a pretty dirty trick” – the remaining 200,000 CZK were converted by the Czechoslovak authorities into US dollars, but in contrast with the usual exchange rate (around 10 CZK for 1 USD),⁹³⁹ the conversion was to be done on the basis of the prices and the exchange rate on the internal Czechoslovak market – 1 USD for 25-30 CZK.⁹⁴⁰ According to the PCE’s plan, the remaining 200,000 CZK was to be used to purchase two Czechoslovak films (*Vyšší princip; Polnočná omša* – each for 25,000 CZK) with the exclusive rights to distribute them, and 150,000 CZK was to be divided for the purchase of rubber boots, alarm clocks and thermoses in Czechoslovakia.⁹⁴¹ In the end, however, the Czechoslovak side set the purchasing price for these products even higher than the price on the Czechoslovak internal market and the final exchange rate changed as well. Thus, in the spring and the summer of 1963, the above-mentioned products were shipped from Czechoslovakia to Venezuela for the company JGA in smaller amounts than originally planned by the PCE and at a final exchange rate of 48 CZK for 1 USD.⁹⁴² Also for this reason, the PCE representatives stated that Czechoslovakia was “the country where we encounter the greatest obstacles, where one often has the impression of going

⁹³⁷ APCE, f. International Relations of the PCE, c. 141, file 17. Czechoslovakia. Sebastián Zapirain to the ÚV KSČ. Annex: Proposición que presentamos al CC del Partido comunista de Checoslovaquia (Proposal that we present to the ÚV KSČ), 6.10.1962.

⁹³⁸ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.7. Commercial issues – Secret. Entrevista celebrada con el c. Palenka, del Ministerio del Com. Ext. por Lafuente (Interview between c. Palenka from the MFT and Lafuente), 30.1.1963.

⁹³⁹ Since the monetary reform of 1953, the official exchange rate in Czechoslovakia remained at the level of 1 USD for 7.2 CZK; however, a more realistic rate was 14 CZK for 1 USD, this discrepancy leading to many complications, in: ŠUSTEK, “Menová reforma”, p. 23.

⁹⁴⁰ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.7. Commercial issues – Secret. (Sebastián) Zapi(rain)(?) to José Luis, 2.2.1963.

⁹⁴¹ APCE, f. Emigration, c. 96/3 Czechoslovakia, file: 96/3.1.7. Commercial issues – Secret. Situación de la convertibilidad de los fondos de ayuda (Situation of the convertibility of the aid funds), 20.5.1963.

⁹⁴² HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, “Comerciendo”, pp. 17-18, <<http://historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/43/fernandohernandezsanchez.pdf>>, [accessed 17 February 2022].

around in circles and always running into an invisible wall [...]”.⁹⁴³ Furthermore, in contrast to other comrades from fraternal communist parties, the representatives of the KSČ were described by the Spanish communists as those who “do not provide the same facilities [and] do not show the same interest and attentions as the (members of – M. T.) other parties.”⁹⁴⁴ Taking into account that further documents about Czechoslovak trade through the company JGA were not found in the consulted archives, it seems that this re-export via Venezuela was not only the biggest but also the last commercial activity of the JGA with Czechoslovakia, which, in need of convertible currencies, was willing to play “dirty tricks” on their Spanish comrades. Moreover, since the second half of the 1960s, we have no further information regarding the activities of the JGA even in relation to other socialist countries.⁹⁴⁵

Despite the above-analysed complications in commerce through PCE’s cover companies, the KSČ even in the mid-1960s still maintained amicable relations with the PCE and consulted it regularly on the development of its foreign policy towards Spain.⁹⁴⁶ In addition, when in August 1964, Dolores Ibárruri asked Czechoslovak President Novotný for the deallocation of 100,000 USD from the account of the PCE (allocated at the ÚV KSČ from 1948 and amounting to almost half a million dollars in 1952),⁹⁴⁷ the Czechoslovak party did not hesitate in helping their Spanish comrades.⁹⁴⁸ Thus, based on Ibárruri’s request, in mid-September 1964, the Presidium of the ÚV KSČ agreed with the petition from the CC PCE – to release 100,000 USD from their fond deposited at the ÚV KSČ (at that time amounting to 441,500 USD and 2030 pounds), for the needs of the PCE and its intensified work in Spain.⁹⁴⁹

⁹⁴³ APCE, f. Checoslovaquia 96/3, file: Commercial issues 96/3.1.7. Secret. Notas sobre el viaje a Checoslovaquia, R.D. Alemana, Polonia, Rumania y Bulgaria (Notes about the journey to Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria), 20.12.1962.

⁹⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁹⁴⁵ HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, “Comerciendo”, p. 21,

<<http://historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/43/fernandohernandezsanchez.pdf>>, [accessed 17 February 2022].

⁹⁴⁶ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Stanovisko MOÚV KSČ (Standpoint of the MOÚV KSČ), n. d. (1965).

⁹⁴⁷ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Political Secretariat 1951-1954, sv. 39, a. j. 116, b. 18. Vracení vypůjčených US dolarů z valutové hotovosti španělské komunistické strany (Return of borrowed US dollars from the PCE funds in foreign currency). Zápis o převzetí valutové hotovosti španělské komunistické strany, která je v úschově ÚV KSČ (Record of the receipt of cash in foreign currency of the PCE in the custody of the ÚV KSČ), 30.1.1952 (9.9.1952).

⁹⁴⁸ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Uvolnění finančních prostředků z fondu KS Španělska (Deallocation of financial resources from the account of the PCE. Ibárruri to Novotný, 21.8.1964; NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Deallocation of financial resources from the account of the PCE. Presidium of the ÚV KSČ. Issue: Deallocation of foreign currencies from the account of the PCE, n. d. (1964).

⁹⁴⁹ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1962-1966, sv. 77, a. j. 82, b. 13. Žádost ÚV KS Španělska – dopis s. D. Ibárruri (Request of the CC PCE – letter from c. D. Ibárruri), 15.9.1964.

5.3 Trade relations between Prague and Madrid in the period 1948-1968

Despite the already mentioned absence of official relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and Francoist Spain after WWII,⁹⁵⁰ mutual commercial relations were developed unofficially (through re-exports via “third states” – Switzerland, Netherlands and France), due to the economic needs of both countries, at least from 1947. An exception in this respect was the direct trade between Czechoslovakia and Spain with pyrites from Rio Tinto (with special government approval).⁹⁵¹ Whereas Czechoslovak exports to Spain during the first half of 1947 were worth almost 245,000 USD, they fell to 192,888 USD in the first half of 1948, while Spanish exports to Czechoslovakia only accounted for 92,840 USD in the first six months of 1948.⁹⁵² Still, these were negligible quantities, as the overall amount of Czechoslovak foreign trade at that time (1948) reached 681 million and 753 million USD for imports and exports respectively. In the Spanish case, total imports amounted to 349,4 million USD while total exports were 257,1 million USD.⁹⁵³

After “Victorious February” and the implementation of a centrally planned economy, Czechoslovakia, as one of the founders of COMECON, reoriented its foreign trade towards closer economic cooperation with the Eastern Bloc. Nevertheless, it still maintained contact with its trade partners from the West. In the Spanish case, the trade via “third countries” was conducted also in the early 1950s. The principal Spanish exports to Czechoslovakia were pyrites, iron ore, non-ferrous metals and fruits; while Spanish imports from Czechoslovakia were machinery products, jewellery, textiles and glass.⁹⁵⁴ At the same time, the first Spanish efforts to intensify mutual commercial relations began to appear. The reason behind this step was that even though the sanctions against Madrid by the UN from 1946 were revoked by the Resolution of the UN General Assembly from November 1950 and the country was admitted into WHO in 1951 and the next year into UNESCO,⁹⁵⁵ Francoist Spain was still an internationally ostracised country in the early years of the 1950s. With its autarkic economy based on state interventionism and protectionism and with a trade deficit and in a need for

⁹⁵⁰ NÁLEVKA, “Španěle”, p. 77.

⁹⁵¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 1. Gregor to Geminder, 29.11.1948.

⁹⁵² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 2-3. Comercio Exterior de España con Checoslovaquia (Foreign trade of Spain with Czechoslovakia), n. d.

⁹⁵³ MICHAL, “Czechoslovakia’s”, p. 215; Jordi CATALÁN, “Sector exterior y crecimiento industrial. España y Europa (1939-59)”, *Revista de Historia Industrial* 8, 1995, p. 103.

⁹⁵⁴ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1945-1954 Spain, c. 1, file 2: Španělsko – obch. a hosp. věci (Spain – trade and economic issues). MFA, no. 424.516/55. Issue: Záznam pro s. ministra: návrh na jednání o navázání přímých obchodních styků se Španělskem, (Memo for c. Minister: Proposal for the negotiation about the establishment of direct trade relations with Spain), 11.11.1955.

⁹⁵⁵ MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, “Spain’s”, p. 49.

foreign investments,⁹⁵⁶ the initiative for intensification of trade with Czechoslovakia came first in the summer of 1953 from the Spanish side. The representative of their commercial department in Berlin contacted the Czechoslovak military mission in the German metropole with a proposal for a verbal agreement based on which the exchange of products between the two countries was to take place. However, the Czechoslovak MFA did not respond to this proposal.⁹⁵⁷ Subsequently, in the summer of 1954, it was the Czechoslovak MFT who approached the MFA in Prague with a proposition to switch to direct trade relations with Spain due to the “very inflexible and totally uncontrollable” trade exchange through “third countries”. Among the proposed products for eventual import from Spain were cited iron ore, pyrites, copper, cork, citruses, dried fruits and wine; Czechoslovak export was to consist of grain, mineral oils, coal, wood, textiles and products from the machine industry.⁹⁵⁸ The MFA’s response to this, although economically profitable proposal, was again negative.⁹⁵⁹

The last unsuccessful attempt to broaden mutual economic contacts was a meeting in Frankfurt in November 1955, at which the delegates of the Czechoslovak PZOs were approached by the representatives of Spanish banks with a proposal for direct (albeit unofficial) commercial relations, based on compensation trade with Czechoslovak machinery and trucks in exchange for Spanish fruit.⁹⁶⁰ Also in this case, the MFT emphasised the advantages of direct relations (on the basis of a potential agreement between banks) and the MFA at first recommended allowing the representatives of the Czechoslovak PZOs to enter into negotiations with the Spanish delegates – provided, of course, that the political situation would allow it.⁹⁶¹ The memo about these Czechoslovak intentions to further Czechoslovak-Spanish relations was submitted for “consultation” to the Soviet Embassy counsellor Arkadij Budakovov – in his opinion, there ought to be no objections from the USSR in this regard.⁹⁶² Despite the above-

⁹⁵⁶ VIÑAS, “Autarquía”, pp. 62-64; Donato FERNÁNDEZ NAVARRETE, “La política económica exterior del franquismo: del aislamiento a la apertura”, *Historia contemporánea* 30, 2005, pp. 57-64.

⁹⁵⁷ KONRÁDOVÁ, “Relaciones”, p. 298.

⁹⁵⁸ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1945-1954 Spain, c. 1, file 2 – Spain – trade and economic issues. MFA, no. 413.913/54-ZEO/2. Issue: Španělsko. Přímé kompenzační obchody s ČSR – návrh (Spain. Direct compensation trade with Czechoslovakia – proposal). The MFT to the MFA, no. 160.421/taj/54. Issue: Přejchod k přímým kompenzačním obchodům se Španělskem (Transition to direct compensation trade with Spain), 25.6.1954.

⁹⁵⁹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1945-1954 Spain, c. 1, file 2 – Spain – trade and economic issues. MFA, no. 413.913/54-ZEO/2. Issue: Spain. Direct compensation trade with Czechoslovakia – proposal. The MFA to the MFT. Issue: Transition to direct compensation trade with Spain, 13.8.1954.

⁹⁶⁰ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1945-1954 Spain, c. 1, file 2 – Spain – trade and economic issues. MFA, no. 424.516/55. Issue: Memo for c. Minister: Proposal for the negotiation about the establishment of direct trade relations with Spain, 11.11.1955.

⁹⁶¹ Ibidem.

⁹⁶² AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/212 (6) – Obchodně-politické jednání – Španělsko – Madrid (Commercial-political negotiation – Spain – Madrid). MFA, no. 425.246/55. Issue: Navázání přímých kompenzačních styků mezi ČSR a Španělskem (Establishment of direct compensational relations between

mentioned consents, the signing of a treaty about direct trade relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain did not take place in Germany at the turn of 1955/1956.⁹⁶³ Also for this reason, the volume of Czechoslovak exports to Spain in 1955 (as well as in 1956) amounted to only 1,5 million CZK (208,333 USD).⁹⁶⁴ Thus, it could be argued that in the mid-1950s, political interests still prevailed within Czechoslovak foreign trade with Franco's Spain.

Nonetheless, at this time, due to its anticommunism and its strategic position, Madrid's government had finally succeeded in its attempts to leave international isolation – concordat with the Vatican and *Pactos de Madrid* (agreements about American economic aid in exchange for US military bases in Spain) were signed in 1953, and Spain was eventually admitted as a member of the UN in 1955.⁹⁶⁵ On the other hand, Spain, like Czechoslovakia, had been suffering from the deficit of foreign currency since the mid-1950s, as a result of mandated increase in salaries in 1956, leading to a devaluation of the peseta and the subsequent inflation. This was further complicated by the deficient Spanish commodity exports, together with high domestic import demand for Western technologies for its growing industries, resulting in a negative balance of trade and waning reserves of foreign currency – as a result, Spain was thus in 1957 on the verge of bankruptcy.⁹⁶⁶ It was mainly for this reason, that its relations with the countries of the Eastern Bloc began to intensify starting from the mid-1950s, focusing mainly on the spheres of foreign trade and culture – such a direction of the socialist countries' relations with Francoist Spain was allegedly in accordance with the PCE.⁹⁶⁷ At the same time, these Spanish initiatives to develop trade relations with socialist countries were correctly interpreted by the Czechoslovak MFA as the result of Spain's poor foreign exchange situation, negative balance of trade and the need for new terminal markets for their agricultural products.⁹⁶⁸

Czechoslovakia and Spain). Dodatek k záznamům pro s. ministra; Osobní dopis s. ministra (Annex to the memos for c. Minister; Personal letter of c. Minister), 7.1.1956 (11.1.1956).

⁹⁶³ KONRÁDOVÁ, "Relaciones", p. 299.

⁹⁶⁴ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file 057/212. MFT, no. 07.171/61. Návrh na zahájení jednání o úpravu československo-španělských obchodních styků na rok 1962 (Proposal for the initiation of negotiation about the change of Czechoslovak-Spanish commercial relations for the year 1962). Zpráva k návrhu usnesení vlády o úpravě zbožíových listin mezi Československou socialistickou republikou a Španělskem (Report to the proposal of the government decree about the change of list of goods between Czechoslovakia and Spain), 27.11.1961.

⁹⁶⁵ JULIÁ – GARCÍA DELGADO – JIMÉNEZ et al., *La España*, pp. 182-183; MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, "Spain's", pp. 49-51.

⁹⁶⁶ Juan VELARDE FUERTES, *Cien años de economía española. El siglo que lo cambió todo en nuestra economía: de Silvela-Fernández Villaverde a Aznar-Rato*, Madrid 2009, pp. 229, 240-241; CHALUPA, *Dějiny*, pp. 533-534.

⁹⁶⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 189, a. j. 660, l. 77-78. Vývoj vztahů mezi ČSSR a Španělskem (Development of relations between the ČSSR and Spain), n. d. (1963).

⁹⁶⁸ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/115 (3) – Španělsko (Spain). No. 001692/56-ZEO/2. Záznam pro s. ministra (Memo for c. Minister). Issue: Zpráva o stycích se Španělskem a návrhy na další postup (Report about relations with Spain and proposals for further advancement), 20.12.1956.

Considering Spanish admittance into the UN and its willingness to trade with the Eastern Bloc, as well as Czechoslovak economic problems from the mid-1950s, the decision to establish commercial contacts based on an interbank treaty or as direct compensation trade was approved by the Czechoslovak government already in April 1956.⁹⁶⁹ Eventually, the first alternative prevailed and in the months preceding the signature of this agreement (January 1958), meetings with representatives of various Spanish companies regarding the possibilities of mutual trade took place at the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (*Státní banka československá – SBČS*).⁹⁷⁰ The signing of this treaty was also preceded by a business trip to Spain in the summer of 1957 by the Head of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce (*Československá obchodní komora – ČOK*), Vojtěch Sedláček, which served to probe Spanish attitudes towards the establishment of direct trade relations.⁹⁷¹ In the conclusion of the report from his journey, Sedláček stated that “the attitude of official (Spanish – M. T.) functionaries towards direct commercial contact between Czechoslovakia and Spain is mostly positive”, proposed four banks suitable for the future interbank agreement (one of these was *Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera – IEME*, with which the treaty was eventually signed) and warned the Czechoslovak authorities against succumbing to interest only in articles such as oranges or wine, as in the future trade with Czechoslovak hard commodities (sheet metal), it was possible to receive Spanish hard commodities (mercury) in exchange.⁹⁷²

Subsequently, in September 1957, after visiting the Trade Fairs in Brno, a delegation from the Spanish Ministry of Trade, headed by Jorge Brosa (Director General at this Ministry), attended a negotiation at the MFT in Prague with mutually satisfactory character. The Spaniards at this point even asked Sedláček to intermediate a meeting with Soviet representatives in order to discuss the Spanish-Soviet exchange of products.⁹⁷³ Although the Czechoslovak government had approved the initiation of negotiations on the interbank agreement with Spain already during the visit of the Spanish delegation in September 1957,⁹⁷⁴ the eventual signing of the interbank treaty between the SBČS and the Spanish Institute of Foreign Currency (*Instituto*

⁹⁶⁹ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, PB ÚV KSČ 1954-1962, sv. 170, a. j. 229, bod 2 k info. Vývoj styků ČSR se Španělskem po roce 1945 (Development of relations of Czechoslovakia with Spain after 1945), n. d. (1958).

⁹⁷⁰ Archiv ČNB (Archive of the Czech National Bank, hereinafter AČNB), f. SBČS S VII/a – 301, c. 08-G-04, file: 301/Návštěvy ze zahraničí (Visits from abroad), 56/Spain 1957-1960.

⁹⁷¹ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 16-37. Zpráva o služební cestě do Španělska (Report about the business journey to Spain), 6.6-30.6.1957, dr. Vojt. Sedláček – ČOK, 2.7.1957.

⁹⁷² Ibidem.

⁹⁷³ AMZV, f. Generální sekretariát (General Secretariat) 1955-1964, c. 8. No.0012/350/dr.Sd/hor. Sedláček (ČOK) to Dvořák (MFT), 26.9.1957.

⁹⁷⁴ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, PB ÚV KSČ 1954-1962, sv. 170, a. j. 229, bod 2 k info. Development of relations of Czechoslovakia with Spain after 1945, n. d. (1958).

Español de Moneda Extranjera) took place only in January 1958. This delay was caused by long-lasting negotiations (from October 1957), which had been transferred from Paris to Bern and protracted on the nature and details of the agreement and had been wrecked and interrupted by an unwillingness to compromise on both sides.⁹⁷⁵

Interestingly, in the autumn of 1957, there were rumours regarding the signing of a commercial treaty between the two countries not only in the Czechoslovak press (leading to the above-mentioned study by the PCE offered to the ÚV KSČ through Líster), but also in commercial circles in Madrid. As a consequence, in September 1957, the Spanish company *Sociedad Ibérica de Comercio Exterior S. A.* offered one of the Spanish communist emigrants, Artemio Precioso (leader of the Prague Spanish collective from 1955 until 1956), the position of a correspondent in Czechoslovakia in order to have a source of information about Czechoslovakia and its products, due to the lack of relations between the countries up until that point.⁹⁷⁶ Although Precioso wanted to accept this offer, Antonio Cerdón informed the ÚV KSČ in February 1958, once the interbank agreement was signed, that the CC PCE did not support Precioso's decision.⁹⁷⁷ The reason behind this step can be found in the resolution of the Prague organisation of the PCE from the February of the previous year, condemning Precioso's "political position, activities and methods [...] directed against the political line of the party, against its unity and its direction represented in Prague by the comrade Enrique Líster [...]"⁹⁷⁸

The interbank agreement signed in January 1958 between the SBČS and the IEME satisfied the Spanish need for Czechoslovak machine industry products, as well as the Czechoslovak interest in Spanish wolfram, iron ore and pyrites (as opposed to its mercury and lead, the export of which was prohibited as a result of an agreement between Spain and the USA and the Spanish inclusion in the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951).⁹⁷⁹

⁹⁷⁵ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955–1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/213 (7) – Finanční otázky, jednání. Španělsko (Financial issues, negotiations. Spain). MFA, no. 012.980/58-4. Issue: Mezibankovní dohoda čs.-španělská (Czechoslovak-Spanish interbank agreement). MFA to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Vienna, 10.3.1958. The apple of discord lied in the Spanish categorical demand of the Czechoslovak rolled steel in the amount of 900,000 USD without accepting the Czechoslovak request for the import of mercury, lead and copper.

⁹⁷⁶ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 57. Sociedad Ibérica de Comercio Exterior S. A. to Artemio Precioso Ugarte, 18.9.1957.

⁹⁷⁷ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 6. Antonio Cerdón to the ÚV KSČ, 10.2.1958.

⁹⁷⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 681, l. 19. Resolución (Resolution), 26.2.1957.

⁹⁷⁹ KONRÁDOVÁ, "Relaciones", pp. 300, 303-305. Even though that Czechoslovak delegates during the negotiations about the prolongation of the interbank agreement in January 1959 once again requested to include into the imported products lead and mercury, the Spanish answer was still negative, in: AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/13036, l. R5101/1. Negociaciones comerciales hispano-checoslovas. Protocolo de la Comisión Mixta firmado en Praga el 24 de enero de 1959 (Spanish-Czechoslovak commercial negotiations. Protocol of the Mixed Commission signed in Prague on January 24, 1959). Director General de Política Comercial y Arancelaria (Ministerio de Comercio) to Director General de Relaciones Económicas, 6.2.1959.

Within the interbank agreement, Czechoslovak exports to and from Spain were to amount to 7,71 million USD (55,512 million CZK) annually, while the contract was valid for one year with the possibility of automatic renewal – Czechoslovakia was only the second Eastern Bloc country (after Poland) to sign such an agreement.⁹⁸⁰ Despite the consent of the Czechoslovak MFA (as well as the Spanish authorities) with the development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations within the field of sport, science and culture,⁹⁸¹ the Prague MFA was reluctant, after the signing of this treaty, to the proposal of the MFT for the establishment of a permanent Czechoslovak trade delegation in Madrid. It rejected this proposal, arguing that short-term business trips of Czechoslovak delegates to Spain would be sufficient to ensure the required trade exchange, as neither the expansion of relations with Spain nor their full normalisation was in the interest of Czechoslovak foreign policy.⁹⁸² Furthermore, neither was the Spanish attitude towards the establishment of such a trade office purely positive in 1958, due to contradictory positions on rapprochement with the East of various Spanish ministries.⁹⁸³

One year later, the ČOK came up with a similar proposal – to open its delegation in Madrid, in order to intensify the trade exchange; nevertheless, this proposal was also rejected by the MFA, as this step was allegedly not in line with the contemporary foreign policy interests of Czechoslovakia.⁹⁸⁴ The attitude of the ČOK employees towards Spain (partly supported by the MFT) was perceived by the Czechoslovak MFA as incorrect, as the objective of the Czechoslovak Republic was not Czechoslovak-Spanish economic cooperation (and neither was the expansion of these contacts) – it was “solely the necessity of commerce with Spain, despite their existing regime” that has led Czechoslovakia to economic contacts with Madrid.⁹⁸⁵ At the

⁹⁸⁰ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, PB ÚV KSČ 1954-1962, sv. 170, a. j. 229, bod 2 k info. Development of relations of Czechoslovakia with Spain after 1945, n. d. (1958). It should be stated, however, that in the first years of the interbank treaty, the established contingents were never fulfilled and the volume of trade did not reach the agreed amount.

⁹⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁹⁸² AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/213 (7) – Financial issues, negotiations. Spain. MFA, no. 012.019/58. Issue: Zpráva MZO o výsledku jednání o mezibankovní dohodu čsl.-španělskou – připomínky MZV (Report from the MFT about the result of negotiations on the Czechoslovak-Spanish interbank treaty – commentaries of the MFA). Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Foreign Trade (Concept), 18.2.1958.

⁹⁸³ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/213 (7) – Financial issues, negotiations. Spain. MFA, no. 012.980/58-4. Issue: Czechoslovak-Spanish interbank agreement. The MFA to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Vienna, 10.3.1958.

⁹⁸⁴ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/211 (5) – Hosp. politická korespondence – všeobecné – Španělsko (Economically-political correspondence – General – Spain), ČOK to the MFA. Issue: Zřízení delegatury ČOK ve Španělsku (Establishment of the delegation of the ČOK in Spain), 9.1.1959 (12.1.1959).

⁹⁸⁵ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959, Spain, c. 1, file 057/3557 (9) – Obch. a hosp. věci – výstavy – veletrhy (Commercial and economic issues – Expositions – Trade fairs). MFA, no. 104.569/59. Issue: Španělsko – účast na veletrhu v Barceloně 1959 (Spain – participation at the Trade Fairs in Barcelona 1959). Záznam o projednávání „Libreta československé účasti na veletrhu v Barceloně 1959“ (Report from the talks about the „Libretto of the Czechoslovak attendance at the Trade Fairs in Barcelona 1959“), (Concept), 2.2.1959.

same time, however, the MFA stated that the Czechoslovak unofficial (albeit regular) participation at the Barcelona Trade Fairs (an instrument for presenting Czechoslovakia and its products in Spain), as well as the general broadening of commercial relations with Spain, were in line with the PCE's policy, which supported the building of commercial relations between socialist countries and Spain as one of the forms of promoting socialism and a way of breaking up Franco's policy of isolation of Spain from socialist countries.⁹⁸⁶ Therefore, it seems clear that the above-mentioned "consultations" of the Czechoslovak ministries with the USSR, as well as with the PCE, regarding the development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations, took place also in the late 1950s.⁹⁸⁷

Even though that in the first year of the treaty, Czechoslovak imports amounted to only 20,7% and exports (formed predominantly by machines and equipment) 48% within the negotiated contingents, it can be stated that after its signature, mutual trade exchange followed a generally increasing trend, while in the ten years following the signing of the interbank agreement, the Czechoslovak export to Spain had increased by 58% and import by 65%.⁹⁸⁸ The first-year low amount of trade was caused by the Czechoslovak unfamiliarity with the Spanish market, slow issuing of importing licenses by Spanish authorities and not fulfilling all agreed contingents; despite this, in expectation of a more positive development of mutual trade, for the year 1959, the contingents of exported products increased for both sides to 8,14 million USD (58,608 mil. CZK).⁹⁸⁹ This desired and fulfilled intensification of trade relations at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, carried out on the basis of clearing, was mainly due to the liberalisation and stabilisation of the Spanish economy at the end of the 1950s. The country left the autarky

⁹⁸⁶ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1945-1959, Spain, c. 1, file 057/3557 (9) – Commercial and economic issues – Expositions – Trade fairs. MFA, no. 104.569/59. Issue: Spain – participation at the Trade Fairs in Barcelona 1959. Pro domo, n. d. (February 1959); AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955–1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/213 (7) – Financial issues, negotiations. Spain. MFA, no. 018.061/59. Issue: Španělsko – jednání československo-španělské smíšené komise v rámci mezibankovní dohody (Spain – negotiation of the Czechoslovak-Spanish Mixed Commission within the interbank treaty). Concept, 24.2.1959.

⁹⁸⁷ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/115 (3) – Spain. MFA, no. 015.217/57-ZEO/2. Issue: Čs.-španělské styky – konsultace (Czechoslovak-Spanish relations – Consultation). The MFA to the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Moscow. Issue: Czechoslovak-Spanish relations, consultation with the MID, 5.6.1957 (11.6.1957); NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 119. Carrillo to Novotný, 3.10.1957.

⁹⁸⁸ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/212 (8). MFA, no. 024180/69. Issue: Návrh na obchodně-politické jednání se Španělskem – vyjádření (Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain – opinion). Babáček to Trhлік, Annex: Návrh na obchodně-politické jednání se Španělskem v roce 1969 (Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain in 1969), 29.7.1969; AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/213 (7) – Financial issues, negotiations. Spain. MFT, no. 07.319/59. Issue: Zpráva o výsledku jednání smíšené komise v rámci mezibankovní dohody mezi Státní bankou československou a IEME, Madrid, ze dne 15. ledna 1958 (Report about the results of the negotiation of the Mixed Commission within the interbank treaty between the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and IEME, Madrid, on 15 of January 1958), 11.2 1959.

⁹⁸⁹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1955-1959, Spain, c. 205, file 057/213 (7) – Financial issues, negotiations. Spain. MFT, no. 07.319/59. Issue: Report about the results of the negotiation of the Mixed Commission within the interbank treaty between the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and IEME, Madrid, on 15 of January 1958, 11.2 1959.

and adopted the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, leading to the “Spanish economic miracle” of the 1960s⁹⁹⁰ – Spain’s GDP growth was at one point the second highest within the OECD, while Spanish exports to Czechoslovakia more than tripled from 1958 to 1960 alone.⁹⁹¹ In this sense, mutual economic relations fulfilled the motto of the Czechoslovak foreign policy in the spirit of the “Khrushchev Thaw” from the mid-1950s: “To trade with all the states of the world no matter their political systems, on the peer-to-peer basis.”⁹⁹²

Notwithstanding the quick increase in Czechoslovak-Spanish trade after the signing of the interbank agreement and the long-term intensification of commercial relations, by the end of 1961, the Prague MFT stated that this treaty was not being satisfactorily fulfilled. The reason being the difficulties caused by both the harsh competition on the Spanish market (a result of the cited liberalisation), as well as due to the qualitative defects of Czechoslovak products and the shortage of goods suitable for export to Spain, resulting in a passive balance of trade.⁹⁹³ In the same way, the low level of Czechoslovak exports and the consequent shortage of foreign currency was caused by the composition of Czechoslovak imports – it consisted of aluminium, mercury, oils and nuts, while the Czechoslovak contingent for products politically and commercially interesting to Spain, such as citrus fruits, was not effectively fulfilled. For 1962, therefore, within the planned commerce with Spain, Czechoslovak machinery and equipment accounted for 68,7% of export products and the planned Czechoslovak imports consisted mainly of foodstuffs – all of it with the aim of intensifying trade exchange.⁹⁹⁴ Still, in a report from the Spanish MFA from 1961 it was stated, that “even though through these (trade – M. T.) agreements the commercial relations intensified a lot, Spain means for Czechoslovakia a second-degree country from the commercial point of view”, while in the list of Czechoslovak trade partners it occupied the 31st position in 1959 and 36th in 1960.⁹⁹⁵

⁹⁹⁰ On the „Spanish economic miracle” see e.g., TOWNSON, “Spain”, pp. 135-158; or JULIÁ – GARCÍA DELGADO – JIMÉNEZ et al., *La España*, pp. 452-465.

⁹⁹¹ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 62, 67.

⁹⁹² AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file: 057/215 (13) – Výstavy, veletrhy (Expositions – Trade fairs). ČOK to the MFA, No. 31/575/60/Hn/S. Issue: Trade Fairs Barcelona 1960. Annex: Libreto čs. účasti na veletrhu v Barceloně 1960 (Libretto of the Czechoslovak participation at the Trade Fairs in Barcelona 1960), 13.1.1960.

⁹⁹³ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file 057/212. MFT, no. 07.171/61. Proposal for the initiation of negotiation about the change of Czechoslovak-Spanish commercial relations for the year 1962. Report to the proposal of the government decree about the change of list of goods between Czechoslovakia and Spain, 27.11.1961.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibidem.

⁹⁹⁵ AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/16307, l. R6549/26, Relaciones económicas checo-españolas (Czecho-Spanish economic relations). MAE, Nota informativa. Asunto: Comercio hispano-checoslovaco (MFA, Informational report. Issue: Spanish-Czechoslovak trade), 2.12.1961.

The crisis of the Czechoslovak economy in the early years of the 1960s, associated with the drop in the unit price of exports to Western countries and the decay of GDP,⁹⁹⁶ also negatively influenced the exchange of goods with Spain. The main reason for this Czechoslovak setback were the relaxation of its economic development as a consequence of the slow intensification of production, deficient investment and increasing imports of raw materials (whose price, covered in foreign currency, has risen).⁹⁹⁷ Another reason for the short-term decline in the mutual volume of trade (from 65 million CZK in 1960 to 34,4 million in 1962) was, in addition to the above-mentioned aspects, also the absence of a permanent Czechoslovak commercial representation in Spain, leading to a lack of information about the Spanish market – thus preventing the timely granting of Spanish import licenses for Czechoslovak products.⁹⁹⁸ Therefore, in order to accelerate the level of mutual exchange of products, the first efforts to open a Czechoslovak trade office in Madrid took place as early as 1960 – this initiative came from the Spanish side and was supported by the Czechoslovak MFT and ČOK, but it stalled at the Prague MFA on the issue of legal immunity for Czechoslovak representatives in Madrid, as well as on the question of reciprocal representation of Spain in Prague.⁹⁹⁹

It has been already mentioned that due to the departure of Spaniards to their homeland from the late 1950s, in the years that followed, a decline in the number of Spanish exiles living in the Czechoslovak Republic took place. This notwithstanding, Czechoslovakia took into account the interests of the PCE in formulating Prague's foreign policy towards Madrid also at the beginning of the 1960s.¹⁰⁰⁰ The Spanish party on the issue of the intensification of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the spring of 1963 declared that the PCE is not opposed to economic (and to some extent not even diplomatic) relations between the two countries, but it also warned the KSČ that Franco's recent efforts to develop relations with the Eastern Bloc

⁹⁹⁶ MAREK, "Československo", p. 138; MICHAL, "Czechoslovakia's", p. 220.

⁹⁹⁷ PRŮCHA et al., *Hospodářské*, pp. 312-314, 378-379.

⁹⁹⁸ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 189, a. j. 660, l. 77-78. Development of relations between the ČSSR and Spain, n. d. (1963).

⁹⁹⁹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file 057/212. MFA, no. 022.294/61. Issue: Španělské návrhy na zřízení obchodních misí (Spanish proposals for the establishment of trade missions), The MFT to the MFA. Issue: Španělsko – sondáž španělské strany ve věci zřízení čs. obch. zastupitelství v Madridu (Spain – probing of the Spanish side on the issue of the establishment of Czechoslovak commercial delegation in Madrid), February 1961; AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file 057/212. MFA, no. 022.294/61. Issue: Spanish proposals for the establishment of trade missions. K otázce zřízení obchodní mise v Madridu (Regarding the issue of the establishment of trade mission in Madrid), 6.3.1961.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Interesting in this aspect was the case of the shipments of coal to Spain during the Asturian miners' strike in 1962, when both Poland and Czechoslovakia provided Spain with much needed coal in exchange for hard currency. Nevertheless, the MOÚV KSČ claimed that their standpoint towards these shipments has always been negative and did not recommend continuing with these exports, in: NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 161-162. Záznam (Record), 6.11.1962; SANCHEZ-SIBONY, *Red globalization*, pp. 2-3.

were merely a manoeuvre to gain a better position in his negotiations with the USA¹⁰⁰¹ – socialist countries should therefore not react to these Francoist initiatives for intensification of mutual relations.¹⁰⁰² The build-up of a relational base on a long-term character was by that time not recommended by Moscow either;¹⁰⁰³ furthermore, another obstacle to the broadening of relations was the execution of the Spanish communist Julián Grimau in Madrid in April 1963. For these reasons, the leadership of the KSČ informed the PCE in the summer of 1963 that it had decided not to further expand Czechoslovak-Spanish trade, but to maintain it at the existing level; and, if a suitable substitute as a terminal market for Czechoslovak products could be found, mutual trade exchange was to be reduced.¹⁰⁰⁴ Like the USSR, also Czechoslovakia did not officially want to prevent commerce with Spain in the early 1960s (provided it was profitable), but in any case, the mutual economic relations (and their potential broadening) were not intended to lead to the recognition of Franco's regime nor the normalisation of relations.¹⁰⁰⁵ However, such a reserved attitude from Czechoslovakia had a negative resonance in Madrid – some representatives of the Spanish Ministry of Trade claimed that Czechoslovakia was the most difficult and the most self-restrained partner from among the socialist countries.¹⁰⁰⁶

Despite the Czechoslovak promises to the PCE not to expand commercial relations with Madrid, the economic interests started to prevail in Prague's foreign policy and as early as July 1964, the representation of the Czechoslovak PZO was established in Madrid, whose main task was to ensure the development and smoothness of mutual trade exchange.¹⁰⁰⁷ Surprisingly,

¹⁰⁰¹ In 1963, 10 years after the signing of *Pactos de Madrid*, the renewal of this agreement was planned and after the Spanish minimal success in renegotiating better conditions of the treaty in the economic sphere, eventually took place, in: MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, "Spain's", p. 54.

¹⁰⁰² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 177-178. Odpověď vedení KS Španělska – názor na obchodní a diplomatické styky se Španělskem (Answer from the leadership of the PCE – opinion about commercial and diplomatic relations with Spain), 20.3.1963. Santiago Carrillo in this respect even recommended Czechoslovak comrades not to send a delegation for commercial negotiations with Spain and in case Czechoslovakia would start official talks with Francoist commercial circles, the PCE would officially announce their disagreement with this step, in: NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 188, a. j. 656, l. 134-135. Záznam o rozhovoru s generálním tajemníkem KSŠ, s. S. Carrillem (Record about an interview with the Secretary General of the PCE, c. S. Carrillo), 15.5.1963.

¹⁰⁰³ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file 057/212. MFA, no. 023.679/63-4. Issue: Obchodní styky se Španělskem (Commercial relations with Spain). Pro domo, n. d. (April 1963).

¹⁰⁰⁴ NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 181. Record for c. Laštovička, 2.7.1963.

¹⁰⁰⁵ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1960-1964, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112. MFA, no. 031.685/63. Issue: Zájem Španělska o normalisaci styků se ZST (Interest of Spain in the normalisation of relations with the SCC). The MFA to the Embassy in Paris. Annex: Stručný přehled vztahů Španělska k ČSSR a ostatním ZST (Short overview of relations of Spain to ČSSR and other SCC), 2.1.1964.

¹⁰⁰⁶ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 021.336/68-5. Pro poradu kolegia ministra dne 7.3.1968 (For the Council of Collegium of Minister on 7 of March 1968). Issue: Zpráva o Španělsku se závěry pro další postup (Report about Spain with conclusions for further advancement), 29.2.1968.

¹⁰⁰⁷ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/211 (7). MFA, no. 021.958/69. Issue: Jednání na MZO – záznam – vydání dipl. pasu (Negotiations at the MFT – report – issuing of a diplomatic passport). Informace 5 TO k poznámce KO/2 (Info from 5 TO to the note from KO/2), 16.4.1969.

a concrete proposal from the Czechoslovak side for this step came after the agreement from the Prague government as early as 1962, but was continuously stalled by the negative stance of the Spanish MOI, due to the broadcast of *Radio Praga* from Czechoslovakia, as well as the intensification of anti-Francoist movement inside of Spain.¹⁰⁰⁸ After the opening of this semi-official representation of Czechoslovak commerce (similar representations of Poland and Romania were already established), whose counterpart was the Spanish commercial delegate in Warsaw, who was also in charge of the agenda for Czechoslovakia,¹⁰⁰⁹ on one hand, an immediate increase in the volume of trade – from 55,8 million CZK in 1964 to 113,2 million CZK in 1966 – took place.¹⁰¹⁰ On the other, Czechoslovak-Spanish commerce in 1965 still accounted for only 0,6% of total Czechoslovak exports and imports.¹⁰¹¹ Meanwhile, Czechoslovak exports to Spain at that time (as was the case before 1964) consisted of tractors, cars, machinery and industrial equipment, complemented by glassware, bijouterie, malt and hops; in contrast, imports included southern fruits, foodstuffs and metals, even though Czechoslovakia was also interested in importing leather, colophonium, mercury and agar.¹⁰¹²

Even though that by the mid-1960s, apart from the establishment of the representation of the Czechoslovak PZO in Madrid, full liberalisation was already guaranteed for Czechoslovak products in Spain to the same extent as for the OECD countries; Prague at that time did not react positively to Spanish initiatives to elevate contacts above and beyond the

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibidem; NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 192, a. j. 674, l. 165-167. The MFT to the ÚV KSČ. Annex: Návštěva španělského obchodního rady p. San Román v ČSSR (Visit of the Spanish Commercial Counsellor Mr. San Román in Czechoslovakia), 11.3.1963 (14.3.1963).

¹⁰⁰⁹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/111 (1) – Normalizace styků s ZST (Normalisation of relations with the SCC). MFA, no. 022.252/65. Issue: Styky ZST se Španělskem (Relations of the SCC with Spain). Informace pro I. náměstka ministra s. Gregora ke zvláštní zprávě ČTK ze 4.3.1965 (Info for the viceminister c. Gregor to the special report of ČTK from 4 of March 1965), 8.3.1965.

¹⁰¹⁰ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 021.047/67. Issue: Zpráva o Španělsku (Report about Spain). Klička to Babáček. Annex: Zpráva o Španělsku s návrhy na náš další postup (Report about Spain with proposals for our further steps), 20.2.1967.

¹⁰¹¹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/111 (1) – Normalisation of relations with the SCC. MFA, no. 022.252/65. Issue: Relations of the SCC with Spain. Info for the viceminister c. Gregor to the special report of ČTK from 4 of March 1965, 8.3.1965. Furthermore, the Head of the ČOK Horn claimed during an official visit of the Czechoslovak delegation in Madrid that the main reason why the mutual trade exchange did not reach the level it should have, was the fact that neither Czechoslovak nor Spanish companies were properly informed about the reciprocal necessities and possibilities, in: AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/19113, l. R7835/45, Relaciones económicas checo-españolas (Czecho-Spanish economic relations). Cámara oficial de Comercio de Madrid (Official Chamber of Commerce of Madrid) to the MFA. Informe de la estancia en Madrid de una misión comercial checoslovaca (Report about the stay in Madrid of the Czechoslovak commercial mission), 5.6.1965.

¹⁰¹² NA, f. MOÚV KSČ, sv. 189, a. j. 660, l. 77-78. Development of relations between the ČSSR and Spain, n. d. (1963); NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. Československo-španělské vztahy (Czechoslovak-Spanish relations), n. d. (1965).

interbank agreement, nor to sign an official commercial treaty.¹⁰¹³ In this respect, Czechoslovakia planned to wait for the actions of other socialist countries toward Madrid. The relational principle advocated by the MOÚV KSČ towards Spain was to be based not on the development of official relations, but on the building up of contacts at the level of institutions and organisations, while these steps and their appropriateness were to be regularly consulted with the CPSU and the PCE.¹⁰¹⁴ The Czechoslovak authorities (in accordance with the PCE) in this respect did not even agree with the broadening of cultural contacts between televisions by the mid-1960s, nor with the organisation of the reciprocal “Weeks of Spanish/Czechoslovak film”.¹⁰¹⁵ On the other hand, it must be stressed that despite the mentioned Spanish initiatives to broaden relations with Czechoslovakia in economic, cultural or scientific spheres,¹⁰¹⁶ the official standpoint of Francoist Spain towards socialist countries remained hostile.¹⁰¹⁷

Concerning the Spanish economy in the second half of the 1960s, it could be stated that in general, it was still enjoying the impacts of the Western European conjuncture of the 1960s, despite the inflation and short-term negative consequences after the devaluation of the peseta at the end of 1967. Even though the results of the First Development Plan (1964-1967) were inconsistent, leading also to a trade imbalance and expensive projects of poor international competitiveness; still, Spanish GDP, foreign investment, and trade were growing and foreign exchange reserves were increasing (mostly thanks to tourism and remittance inflows).¹⁰¹⁸ Furthermore, in 1967 negotiations between Madrid and the EEC about the trade preference arrangement began, after unsuccessful Spanish applications for association from 1962 and 1964.¹⁰¹⁹ Thus, in order to find new markets, as well as to improve its position in negotiations with the EEC, Spain started to formalise its relations with some Eastern Bloc countries from 1967, through the establishment of consular and commercial delegations (Romania – 1967;

¹⁰¹³ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. Czechoslovak-Spanish relations, n. d. (1965).

¹⁰¹⁴ NA, f. KSČ ÚV – Office of the First Secretary A. Novotný – foreign issues, c. 221 Spain, file: 3. Relations PCE – KSČ: Spain. Development of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. Standpoint of the MOÚV KSČ, n. d. (1965).

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁰¹⁶ In this respect it should be mentioned that Czechoslovakia has since 1956 attended regularly the San Sebastián International Film Festival (with multiple award-winning films); likewise, from the mid-1950s, Spanish films were also presented at the Festival in Karlovy Vary. From the second half of the 1950s, Czechoslovak delegates also visited various congresses in Spain (and vice versa).

¹⁰¹⁷ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/216 (9). MFA, no. 021.014/66. Issue: Commercially-political negotiations with Spain. Record (pro domo), n. d. (February 1966).

¹⁰¹⁸ FERNÁNDEZ NAVARRETE, “La política”, pp. 66, 71-72; Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ, *Twentieth-Century Spain. Politics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998*, London 1999, pp. 148-149, 204; CHALUPA, *Španělsko*, pp. 159-161.

¹⁰¹⁹ FERNÁNDEZ NAVARRETE, “La política”, pp. 71-75.

Poland – 1969).¹⁰²⁰ Even so, the Czechoslovak long-term condition for relations with Madrid, which would surpass the level of trade relations, was still the departure of Franco – Prague thus respected the interests of the PCE and the normalisation of relations with Madrid was therefore still out of the question at the beginning of 1967.¹⁰²¹

Notwithstanding this, a proposal for the establishment of consular relations with Czechoslovakia was officially presented in April 1967 to Oldřich Kaisr, General Secretary of Czechoslovak Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO, during his interview with the Spanish ambassador in Paris, Pedro Cortina Mauri.¹⁰²² Mauri's actions were stemming from the instructions from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando María Castiella, who had informed Mauri that the activity of Czechoslovak delegates in Havana and Paris (by UNESCO) was understood by the Spaniards as Czechoslovak interest in broadening contacts (based on the Romanian example). Mauri thus should, in case the Czechoslovak representative would approach him, show him the goodwill of Spain to investigate the possibilities of a new agreement between the countries.¹⁰²³ A proposal for a normalisation of relations with similar content was also presented to the Czechoslovak delegation headed by Vilém Nový at the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in April 1967 in Mallorca.¹⁰²⁴

However, Kaisr, nor Nový nor the Czechoslovak MFA answered these propositions, as the character of the Francoist regime had not changed in the last years and the basis of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Spain – evading any official relations until the departure of Franco, remained the same. Notwithstanding this, and taking into account the presence of forces within the Spanish state apparatus that distanced themselves from Franco, totally ignoring these proposals did not seem tactical and thus the Prague MFA proposed to insinuate to the Spaniards that Czechoslovakia wants to support those forces that want the development of relations on the principle of peaceful coexistence in the future; nonetheless, these forces did

¹⁰²⁰ EIROA, *Espanóles*, p. 98; MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA – PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, “Bajo la influencia”, pp. 45-46.

¹⁰²¹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 021.047/67. Issue: Report about Spain. Klička to Babáček. Annex: Report about Spain with proposals for our further steps, 20.2.1967.

¹⁰²² AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 023.600/67. Issue: Španělský návrh na normalizaci styků (Spanish proposal for normalisation of relations). Podkladový materiál pro poradu náměstků ministra (Basic material for the consultation of viceministers), 17.5.1967.

¹⁰²³ AGA, f. MAE, l. R10767/7, Checoeslovaquia – General (Czechoslovakia – General) 1967-1969. Castiella to Mauri, 28.1.1967.

¹⁰²⁴ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-69, Spain, c 1, file 057/112 Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 024.789/67. Issue: Normalisation of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. Record, 29.6.1967.

not control Spanish foreign policy yet.¹⁰²⁵ The Prague MFA on this occasion also elaborated a list of proposals within the broadening of relations, such as the establishment of the airline Prague-Madrid, sending a Czechoslovak correspondent to Madrid (and vice versa), the exchange of scholars and cooperation within UNESCO. Still, also in 1967 Czechoslovak authorities informed Moscow, as well as the PCE about these Spanish initiatives and acted towards Madrid in accordance with them and other socialist countries.¹⁰²⁶

Further proposals (not only from the Spanish side) for at least a partial officialisation of trade relations through a trade agreement or by turning the Czechoslovak representation of PZO in Madrid into a commercial mission continued to appear at the beginning of 1968. But now, with the arrival of the “Prague Spring”, they were being seriously reconsidered by the Prague MFA.¹⁰²⁷ In an internal report at the Czechoslovak MFA, on one hand, it was stated that relations with Spain should not be an example of a “new more active Czechoslovak foreign policy” as part of the Action Programme of KSČ. On the other, the Spanish regime was here compared with other states with the conclusion, that it was not very different from countries that Czechoslovakia already maintained diplomatic relations (USA, Greece) and in some issues (colonial and racial question, anti-communism, approach to Czechoslovakia) it was to be evaluated even more positively. Besides, it was also stated that even a partial normalisation of relations would be beneficial for the work of the illegal PCE (without any clarification how).¹⁰²⁸

During negotiations with a delegation from the Czechoslovak MFT in Madrid in April 1968, the Spanish representatives stated that they would not insist, within the normalisation of relations, on the same level of relations as Romania.¹⁰²⁹ Meanwhile, Bozzano (Director at the Spanish Ministry of Trade and future commercial attaché in Warsaw) at the end of April 1968 claimed that for the Spanish authorities the Romanian level of relations (consulate general) would be a precondition for further actions (his statement was considered by Prague as the standpoint of the Spanish MFA). In this situation, according to the Prague MFA, it was to be

¹⁰²⁵ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-69, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 023.600/67. Issue: Spanish proposal for normalisation of relations. Basic material for the consultation of viceministers, 17.5.1967.

¹⁰²⁶ Ibidem; AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 023.600/67. Issue: Spanish proposal for normalisation of relations. Klička to Pavlovský (Moscow), n. d. (June 1967).

¹⁰²⁷ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 021.336/68-5. For the Council of Collegium of Minister on 7 of March 1968. Issue: Report about Spain with conclusions for further advancement, 29.2.1968.

¹⁰²⁸ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 022.747/68. Issue: Pokyny pro s. Kaisra pro cestu do Španělska (Instructions for c. Kaisr for his journey to Spain). Pro domo, 7.5.1968.

¹⁰²⁹ Ibidem.

beneficial if Czechoslovak representatives in talks with the Spaniards about this issue would state that Prague is interested in the further development of relations, including normalisation, but to postpone this issue to be solved later.¹⁰³⁰ More precisely, the official prearranged answer for the Czechoslovak diplomats regarding the officialisation of relations was: “[w]e welcome all the currents that exist in Spain for the normalisation of relations with the ČSSR, but the Spanish side certainly understands that the process of normalisation will take some more time [...]”.¹⁰³¹

It should be noted, however, that the structure of the exchange of goods with Spain was favourable for Czechoslovakia during the second half of the 1960s – in 1966, 35% of its total export was comprised of machine industry products and three quarters of imports by foodstuffs.¹⁰³² This fact led not only to an increase in Czechoslovak exports but also in the volume of mutual exchange (116,3 million CZK in 1967 compared to 75 million in 1965), even though still accounting for only 0,25% of total Czechoslovak export and 0,07% of Spanish imports in February 1968.¹⁰³³ Moreover, the general thaw in mutual (economic) relations at the end of the 1960s could also be observed in other spheres – for example, in 1969 it was agreed to export 10,000 Mauser rifles from Spain to Czechoslovakia – they were to be adopted to sport arms.¹⁰³⁴ Also, in 1966 the purchase of two commercial sea ships (25,000 BRT and 8,000-10,000 BRT) for Czechoslovakia in Spain was being negotiated.¹⁰³⁵

5.4 The ground-breaking year 1968 and its aftermath

¹⁰³⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁰³¹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/216 (9). MFA, no. 026.410/68-5. Issue: Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. Pro domo: Stručná informace o Španělsku s návrhy na opatření k úpravě čs.-španělských styků (Short information about Spain with proposals for proceedings to change of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations), 9.12.1968.

¹⁰³² AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 021.047/67. Issue: Report about Spain. Klička to Babáček. Annex: Report about Spain with proposals for our further steps, 20.2.1967.

¹⁰³³ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/112 (2) – Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. MFA, no. 021.336/68-5. For the Council of Collegium of Minister on 7 of March 1968. Issue: Report about Spain with conclusions for further advancement, 29.2.1968.

¹⁰³⁴ AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/24285, l. R10553/1. Exportación e importación de armas y explosivos, Checoslovaquia. Ministerio del Ejército. (Export and import of arms and explosives, Czechoslovakia. Ministry of the Army). Subsecretaria – Servicio Comercial de las industrias militares to Director del Gabinete del Sr. Subsecretario de Política Exterior (MFA). Issue: Exportación de 10,000 mosquetones a Checoslovaquia (Export of 10,000 muskets to Czechoslovakia), 14.11.1969 (19.11.1969). Subsequently, between 1971-1972, 3,44 million cartridges and 505 rifles were imported from Czechoslovakia; in the other direction went (only in 1970) 15,000 Mauser rifles and 1,000 pistols, in: AGA, f. MAE, c. 82/24285, l. R10553/1. Export and import of arms and explosives, Czechoslovakia. Importación de armas de Checoslovaquia (Import of arms from Czechoslovakia); Exportación de armas a Checoslovaquia (Export of arms to Czechoslovakia), n. d.

¹⁰³⁵ AČNB, f. SBČS S VII/a – II- 182, c. 07-E-03, file: Cesty do zahraničí (Journeys abroad): 3/ Zprávy (Reports) ČSOB (1966-1970). Služební cesta do Francie a Španělska (Business journey to France and Spain), 11.-26.4.1966, (Dr. Jaroslav Koláček, ČSOB), 5.5.1966.

In May 1968, the Czechoslovak ambassador in Paris, Pithart, approached his Spanish counterpart with the proposal for the gradual normalisation of relations, with the ultimate, even though not immediate, effect of the establishment of consular missions. Nevertheless, the Spanish, in principle positive answer (even with some reservation caused by the presence of Spanish communists in Prague) could not be implemented,¹⁰³⁶ as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 affected also Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. Even though the reserved reaction of the Francoist government towards the invasion could be understood as a non-interference and “official silence [...] face-to-face Czechoslovak events” in order to avoid the interpretation that Spain supports “one or another side”,¹⁰³⁷ the occupation and the subsequent normalisation in Czechoslovakia had far-reaching consequences for relations between Czechoslovakia, the KSČ, the PCE and the Madrid government.

On one hand, still in 1967, in a report elaborated at the ÚV KSČ it was stated that the work of the PCE has in the last years improved – it was the main force within the “real, popular opposition” against the Francoist regime; however, according to the KSČ, also the work of Spanish communists in exile had some deficiencies, such as the lack of information about Spain, which could lead to the underestimation of some factors of the Spanish development.¹⁰³⁸ On the other hand, as has been already mentioned, after August 1968, the fraternal relations between the two parties were irreversibly damaged. The PCE openly criticised the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and under the leadership of Carrillo, the party embarked on the path of Eurocommunism, contrary to the foreign policy aims of the CPSU and the KSČ.¹⁰³⁹ At the same time, a further decline in the number of Spanish communists living in Czechoslovakia, as well as an internal schism within the PCE, took place. As a consequence, Prague definitely lost its position as one of the centres of Spanish communist exile – the primacy now belonged to Paris.

Still, in the summer of 1969, the PCE approached the ÚV KSČ on the issue of the establishment of consular and commercial representations between Spain and Poland – a step

¹⁰³⁶ AGA, f. MAE, l. R10767/7, Checoslovaquia – Relaciones Políticas (Czechoslovakia – Political relations), 1968. No. 727, Mauri to Castiella, 9.5.1968; AGA, f. MAE, l. R10767/7, Czechoslovakia – Political relations, 1968. Castiella to Mauri, 14.5.1968.

¹⁰³⁷ AGA, f. MAE, l. R 10767/7. Checoslovaquia – General (Czechoslovakia – General) 1967-1969, Castiella to Fraga, 2.10.1968. Subsequently, in November 1968, the Spanish MFA claimed it was interested at least in an agreement similar to Romania, even though, at this point, instead of making a proposal, they preferred to “wait and see” how the Czechoslovak situation will resolve, in: AGA, f. MAE, l. R10767/7, Czechoslovakia – Political relations, 1968. Sedó to Trelles, 18.11.1968.

¹⁰³⁸ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 29, a. j. 30, b. 7 k info. Informace o politickém vývoji ve Španělsku (Information about the political development in Spain), n. d. (1967).

¹⁰³⁹ FARALDO, “Entangled”, pp. 655-656.

criticised by the Spanish communists – while the reserved attitude of the KSČ towards Spain was praised by the PCE.¹⁰⁴⁰ However, given the cooling of relations between the Czechoslovak and Spanish party, this incident was rather exceptional – as will be shown in the following pages, in the late 1960s, the Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Madrid was already dominated by the economic interests of Prague, instead of those of the PCE. In this respect, after 1968 Czechoslovakia was in a way relieved of the financial demands of the PCE, which were, as proven above, often costly and contradictory to the economic interests of Prague.

At the same time when the PCE praised Czechoslovakia for their official restraint towards Madrid (July 1969), the Czechoslovak MFT proposed to the MFA to reconsider the possibility of opening a consular and commercial representation of the Czechoslovak Republic in Madrid. Although this step would necessarily have to be accompanied by the reciprocal establishment of a similar representation in Prague,¹⁰⁴¹ the MFA agreed with this proposal and with the reconsideration of this issue.¹⁰⁴² It should be noted that Czechoslovak-Spanish economic relations maintained, despite the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, a generally increasing trend and Czechoslovak trade with Spain continued to grow between 1968 and 1969. In addition to the mentioned positive Spanish economic development in the second half of the 1960s, the reason could be also found in the fact that after August 1968, Moscow on one hand pushed Prague to abandon economic and political reforms; while on the other, it loosened the pressure on Czechoslovak export and import to socialist countries. Also, the USSR supplied Prague with cheap fuels and raw materials in exchange for manufactured products and consumer goods (even of lower quality).¹⁰⁴³ All this enabled the Czechoslovak economy to continue trading with the West (Czechoslovak exports to the EEC more than tripled and imports more than quadrupled between 1958 and 1970),¹⁰⁴⁴ especially with its main export item for these markets – products of the machine industry. In this regard, the character of the Spanish

¹⁰⁴⁰ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file 057/111 (1) – Normalisation of relations with the SCC, no. 024.748-5/69. Issue: Styky PLR a RSR so Španielskom (Relations of the PPR and the RSR with Spain). EC PCE (Juan Gómez) to the ÚV KSČ, 30.7.1969.

¹⁰⁴¹ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file: 057/212 (8). MFA, no. 024180/69. Issue: Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain – opinion. Babáček to Trhlík. Annex: Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain in 1969, 29.7.1969.

¹⁰⁴² AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file: 057/212 (8). MFA, no. 024180/69. Issue: Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain – opinion. Trhlík to Babáček, 14.8.1969.

¹⁰⁴³ METCALF, “The impact”, pp. 1082-1083.

¹⁰⁴⁴ MAREK, “Československo”, pp. 139-140.

market, without high demands on the technical level and service of products, was understood by Prague as favourable.¹⁰⁴⁵

Still, in the second half of 1969, Czechoslovak participation in Spanish foreign trade amounted to only 0,34%. Yet, Spain was considered by Prague to be an interesting commercial partner and further increase in mutual trade was dependent on the commercial activity of Czechoslovak PZOs.¹⁰⁴⁶ The report elaborated at the Prague MFA further adds that considering that cultural relations were at that point at a low level, Czechoslovak authorities were planning to increase activity also in the cultural sphere (to influence Spanish people “in the spirit of socialism”) – thus, for 1970 various activities were planned (“Week of the Czech and Slovak culture” in Malaga, *Laterna Magica* and the Czechoslovak Philharmonic). However, the inexistent consular relations were considered an obstacle for the penetration of Czechoslovak culture and products into Spain. For these reasons, Czechoslovakia planned to elevate the representation of PZOs to an official commercial mission (with a consular agenda), according to the Polish example.¹⁰⁴⁷ This Czechoslovak position was also influenced by the fact that Spain had reached a certain level of normalisation of relations with Romania and Poland and did not want to continue under this *niveau* with Czechoslovakia. The potential Spanish proposal for the same level of relations as with Poland was to be, in case there would be no other way, accepted by Prague, as it would support Czechoslovak interests in Spain (without requiring diplomatic acknowledgement of Franco’s regime). In the conclusion of this report it was argued that the Spanish comrades, who ought to be informed about Czechoslovak intentions in relation to Spain, would hopefully understand the intentions of the Czechoslovak authorities and would explain to the Spanish people that the change of relations would not be in favour of the Francoist regime, but of the people of both countries.¹⁰⁴⁸ Nonetheless, this change in relational approach was in 1969 not “consulted” with Spanish communists anymore.

After the arrival of the new Spanish Foreign Minister, López-Bravo, in October 1969, Madrid’s efforts to deepen economic relations with the Eastern Bloc began to intensify even further. Behind this policy of openness towards the East was the Spanish desire for commercial

¹⁰⁴⁵ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1965-1969, Spain, c. 1, file: 057/212 (8). MFA, no. 024180/69. Issue: Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain – opinion. Babáček to Trhlík, Annex: Proposal for commercial-political negotiation with Spain in 1969, 29.7.1969.

¹⁰⁴⁶ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1970-74, Spain, Sweden, c. 1, file 057/112 (2). MFA, no. 025.046/69-5. Issue: Perspektívy rozvoja stykov ČSSR-Španělsko – informácia pre MOÚV KSČ (Perspectives of development of relations ČSSR-Spain. Info for the MOÚV KSČ). Trhlík to the ÚV KSČ. Annex: Stav a perspektívy rozvoja vzťahov medzi ČSSR a Španielskom (Situation and perspectives of development of relations between ČSSR and Spain), 17.10.1969.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibidem.

cooperation with the aim of accessing new markets (as Spain was still left outside of the EEC), the political realism and pro-European orientation of the Minister and the idea that economic relations should be the first step in developing further cooperation and eventually even diplomatic relations.¹⁰⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak MFA also noted that the situation in Spain at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s created favourable conditions for the economic and cultural penetration of socialist countries (and for the support of progressive forces).¹⁰⁵⁰ Thus, in November 1969, the Czechoslovak commercial mission enquired at the MFA in Madrid regarding the development of future mutual relations, especially whether the new Spanish government would include Czechoslovakia in its policy of openness towards the East, while being interested in the possibility of a commercial and payment agreement.¹⁰⁵¹ In their answer, the Spaniards confirmed the European line of their foreign policy with the intensification of relations with the East in the sense that Czechoslovakia could follow the example set by Romania or Poland. They also stated that the establishment of consular and commercial relations did not mean the final level of relations and if Czechoslovakia wished to make a proposal for opening negotiations, it would receive an answer in line with Spanish doctrine on mutual relations.¹⁰⁵² Finally, at the end of that year, the initiative to begin negotiations regarding the elevation of relations to the level of consular and commercial representations was undertaken, in parallel with the Spanish initiatives in Paris, by the Czechoslovak MFA itself.¹⁰⁵³

In an explanatory report to this step, the Prague MFA stated that the Spanish side had already indicated during the preliminary negotiations about the opening of air-line Prague-Madrid that this treaty was conditioned by a new agreement between the two countries – mutual relations should be, according to them, at least at the level of consulates. The MFA described Spain as being an interesting trade outlet for Czechoslovakia in terms of its industrial products, sale of licences and patents and the possibility of collaboration in production with Spanish

¹⁰⁴⁹ MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA – PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, “Bajo la influencia”, pp 44-49; EIROA, *Espanóles*, p. 99.

¹⁰⁵⁰ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 113, a. j. 186, b. 4. Úprava styků mezi ČSSR a Španělskem na úroveň konzulárně obchodních zastupitelství (Change of relations between ČSSR and Spain on the level of consular and commercial representations). Annex III: MFA, Důvodová zpráva (Explanatory report), 23.12.1969.

¹⁰⁵¹ AGA, f. MAE, l. R10767/7. Checoslovaquia – Relaciones comerciales (Commercial relations) 1965-69. Nota Informativa (Information Note). No. 73/69. Asunto (Issue): Visita (de) misión comercial checa a Director Europa Oriental (Visit of the Czech commercial mission to the Director for Eastern Europe), 7.11.1969.

¹⁰⁵² Ibidem.

¹⁰⁵³ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 68; NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 113, a. j. 186, b. 4. Change of relations between ČSSR and Spain on the level of consular and commercial representations. Annex III: MFA, Explanatory report, 23.12.1969.

companies for African and Latin American markets.¹⁰⁵⁴ Although the cultural relations were on a low level, as inexistent consular contacts were an obstacle to an efficient penetration of Czechoslovak culture into Spain, the elevation of relations would, according to the Prague MFA, enable Czechoslovakia to broaden not only economic and commercial ties but also cultural and scientific contacts and also to facilitate a more active and offensive foreign policy of Czechoslovakia in Spain. This would not entail any change in the Czechoslovak negative stance against Franco's regime; however, it would be a step toward the normalisation of relations. The MFA also claimed that other socialist states had already signed this kind of treaty and the PCE had already been informed about Czechoslovak intentions – the creation of consulates of socialist countries ought to enable the enforcement of their economic and cultural-political interests and help the Spanish labour movement, led by the PCE.¹⁰⁵⁵

Thus, in January 1970 the Presidium of the ÚV KSČ agreed with the proposal of the MFA regarding the elevation of relations between Spain and Czechoslovakia on the level of commercial and consular representations. The proposed treaty was described as mutually beneficial but also unusual, taking into account that a special form of representation would be established – consular and commercial representation, but with functions not different than those of normal consular offices and the immunity of its employees close to diplomatic privileges.¹⁰⁵⁶ After negotiations between the delegations of the MFA of both countries in Paris, the treaty was signed on 23 of July (entered in vigour in November 1970).¹⁰⁵⁷

¹⁰⁵⁴ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 113, a. j. 186, b. 4. Change of relations between ČSSR and Spain on the level of consular and commercial representations. Annex III: MFA, Explanatory report, 23.12.1969.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁵⁶ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1969-1974, Spain, c. 1, file 057/151 (2). MFA, no. 016.632/70-PO. Pro schůzi vlády (For the meeting of the government). Issue: Návrh na zahájení jednání mezi ČSSR a Španělskem o úpravě vzájemných styků na úrovni konzulárně-obchodních zastupitelství (Proposal for the initiation of negotiation between Czechoslovakia and Spain about the change of mutual relations at the level of consular-commercial representations). Annex: Návrh na sjednání dohody mezi ČSSR a Španělskem o zřízení konzulárního a obchodního zastoupení (Proposal for the closing of agreement between the ČSSR and Spain about the creation of a consular and commercial representation), 2.7.1970.

¹⁰⁵⁷ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 144, a. j. 222, b. 7. Dohoda o zřízení konzulárních a obchodních zastupitelství mezi ČSSR a Španělskem (Treaty about the creation of consular and commercial representations between Czechoslovakia and Spain). Annex III, 6.11.1970. Annexed to this treaty was also the letter from the Head of the Spanish delegation to the Head of the Czechoslovak one claiming that the broadcast of *Radio Praga* has already for some time abandoned engaging in topics, that could be understood as an intervention into internal affairs of Spain (a long-term obstacle in the development of mutual relations) and also that the RNE has since February, in its emission in Slovak, not broadcasted any political commentary related to Czechoslovakia, in: NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 144, a. j. 222, b. 7. Treaty about the creation of consular and commercial representations between Czechoslovakia and Spain. Annex IV to the Report. García Lahiguera to Illek, 23.7.1970.

One of the main tasks of the newly founded mission in Madrid was to follow the development in Spain and in case of positive changes and after consultations with Soviet and other “socialist friends”, to elaborate proposals for the change of mutual relations. Despite the signature of a consular and commercial treaty, in 1970 and 1971 Czechoslovak exports to Spain experienced a significant decrease in comparison to 1969, due to the stop of exports of meats and metallurgical material, leading to a short-term stagnation in mutual trade.¹⁰⁵⁸ The reason behind this can be found in the dismissal of the Czechoslovak economic reform of 1966 as “revisionist” by the new leadership of the KSČ in 1969 and the subsequent fight with the risk of inflation, decreasing foreign currency reserves and a passive balance of trade in Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁵⁹ However, these problems were quickly solved (thanks also to the support from the USSR) and positive changes within the structure of Czechoslovak exports took place, as in the first years of the 1970s the contribution of machines on the Czechoslovak foreign trade with Spain was almost 50%, while imports were dominated by citruses, dried fruits, wine and tires.¹⁰⁶⁰

Despite some minor obstacles in mutual relations,¹⁰⁶¹ in addition to the consular and commercial agreement, a long-term treaty about commercial relations was subsequently signed between the two countries in October 1971, creating the conditions for the further development of commercial relations and leading to an increase in mutual exchange and greater diversification of goods.¹⁰⁶² After the signing of this long-term treaty, the volume of trade increased rapidly from 140 million CZK (1971) to 204 million (1973),¹⁰⁶³ while this treaty gave

¹⁰⁵⁸ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1970-74, Spain, c. 1. file 057/112 (2). MFA, no. 023.349/72-5. Pro poradu kolegia ministra (For the consultation of the collegium of Minister). Issue: Zpráva o situaci ve Španělsku a v čs.-španělských vztazích s návrhy na další postup (Report about the situation in Spain and Czechoslovak-Spanish relations with proposals for further steps), 7.6.1972.

¹⁰⁵⁹ PRŮCHA et al., *Hospodářské*, pp. 325-327, 697.

¹⁰⁶⁰ AMZV, f. TO – T, 1970-74, Spain, c. 1. file 057/112 (2). MFA, no. 023.349/72-5. For the consultation of the collegium of Minister. Issue: Report about the situation in Spain and Czechoslovak-Spanish relations with proposals for further steps), 7.6.1972.

¹⁰⁶¹ In July 1971, the Spanish representation in Prague sent a verbal note with a protest against an article in *Rudé Právo* about the 35th celebration of the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Although the Head of the Spanish representation Triás de Bes apologised for the formulations in the note and justified them as an incorrect translation from the Czech translator, he also complained about the bad conditions of the Spanish representation in Prague, without administrative offices nor residence and working from a hotel. Triás threatened that if this situation would not be solved, then Spanish representation will have to move to some neighbouring country and a reciprocal approach will be carried out towards the Czechoslovak representation in Madrid, despite the Spanish interest in the development of relations, in: AMZV, f. TO – O, 1969-74, Spain, c. 1, file 057/161 (6). MFA, no. 112.859/71-5. Issue: Záznam o rozhovoru s. Jandíka z 5 TO s vedoucím španělského KOZ p. Triasem dne 5. t. m. (Report about an interview of c. Jandík from 5 TO with the Head of the Spanish KOZ Triás on 5th of this month), 5.8.1971.

¹⁰⁶² VURM, *Československo-španělské*, p. 69.

¹⁰⁶³ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1976-1981, sv. 24, a. j. 26, b. 9. Zahájení obchodně politického jednání o novou dlouhodobou smluvní úpravu hospodářských styků mezi ČSSR a Španělskem. (Initiation of the commercial-political negotiation about a new long-term contractual adjustment of economic

the Czechoslovak side the same principle of liberalisation on the Spanish market as other (GATT) countries had.¹⁰⁶⁴ Additionally, it changed the system of payments from clearing to freely convertible currency (desired by Czechoslovakia from the second half of the 1960s) – all these measures should have made the Spanish market more attractive for Czechoslovak exporters and improved Prague's balance of trade. Thus, at the beginning of the 1970s, the main relational line between socialist countries and Spain continued to be commercial relations.¹⁰⁶⁵ However, cultural relations were also slowly developing (on a commercial basis), although without any treaty and basically one-sided, with the export of Czechoslovak cultural actions and sporadic Spanish actions to Czechoslovakia, while the regular consultations between socialist countries and Spain on the level of the MFAs were taking place. Even though the Spanish side was interested in full normalisation of relations, their proposals were refused many times with the argument that this level of relations required certain conditions (departure of Franco), which had not been met in the first years of the 1970s.¹⁰⁶⁶

The year 1973 could be considered crucial not only in the internal development of Spain (Franco left the position of Prime Minister in June to Carrero Blanco, who was assassinated by ETA in December) but also for the changing international situation and its consequences for Madrid. In the spirit of *détente* and of Spanish openness to the East, Madrid's representatives attended the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (where they met with their Eastern European counterparts) and following the German *Ostpolitik*, in January 1973, Spain and the GDR successfully negotiated the establishment of diplomatic relations at the level of embassies, as the first socialist country.¹⁰⁶⁷ At the beginning of 1973, other countries (Poland) were also thinking about taking such a step, while the USSR was preparing the commercial representation in Madrid and the Spanish representation in Moscow, but was not willing to hasten the process of development of relations with Spain as, allegedly, there was no reason for this action. The Soviets claimed to also take into account the standpoint of the PCE within their approach to Spain, but they also stated that the leadership of the PCE was increasingly detached

relations between the ČSSR and Spain). Annex III: Zpráva k návrhu na zahájení obchodně politického jednání o novou dlouhodobou smluvní úpravu hospodářských styků mezi ČSSR a Španělskem (Report to the proposal for the initiation of the commercial-political negotiation about a new long-term contractual adjustment of economic relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Spain), 23.11.1976 (3.12.1976).

¹⁰⁶⁴ AMZV, f. TO-T, 1970-74, Spain, c. 1. file 057/112 (2). MFA, No. 023.349/72-5. For the consultation of the collegium of Minister. Issue: Report about the situation in Spain and Czechoslovak-Spanish relations with proposals for further steps, 7.6.1972.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁶⁷ MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA – PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, "Bajo la influencia", pp. 50, 52-56; FARALDO, "The Story", pp. 2-5.

from the reality in Spain and that it did not express international solidarity towards other parties, based on the PCE's negative statement regarding the "fraternal help" from 1968.¹⁰⁶⁸

In general, during the first years of the 1970s, Czechoslovak-Spanish relations were developing positively, without disturbing moments and mostly on the commercial level. According to the Prague MFA, Spain was trying to be a coequal partner of every European state and as such, in the near future, it needed to further develop economic contacts and eventually establish diplomatic relations with every socialist country. Also, the Head of the Spanish commercial representation in Prague, Trías de Bes, informed the Czechoslovak MFA that the level of relations between Spain and Czechoslovakia was lower than with Poland and Hungary, but that there were preconditions for further development.¹⁰⁶⁹ Nonetheless, the Prague MFA claimed that Czechoslovakia was still not thinking about the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Spain before the departure of Franco and due to the Czechoslovak role in the Spanish Civil War (*interbrigadistas*), it was considered as inconvenient to be among the first socialist states to establish diplomatic contacts. Instead, it was advised to carry out consultations with other socialist countries in the coordination of further steps toward Madrid. Similar to the Soviets, the Czechoslovaks were also considering the opinion of the PCE, which, headed by Carrillo, had a negative standpoint towards further development of relations of socialist countries with Spain at the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁰⁷⁰

However, this memo, elaborated at the Prague MFA, also mentioned the internationalist wing of the PCE, headed by García and Líster, who thought that contacts of socialist countries with Spain were useful, even though conflicts within this part of the PCE were also indicated.¹⁰⁷¹ At this point, it should be noted that Enrique Líster continued with his criticism of Carrillo and with his pleas to the KSČ while scheming against Carrillo and the delegation of the PCE in Prague at the beginning of the 1970s. Líster's false information that the majority of the Spanish party approved of the intervention of the Warsaw Pact and his requests for help from the KSČ – to not invite the delegation of the PCE to the XIV Congress of the KSČ, date even to May 1971. Meanwhile, the ÚV KSČ decided to support the "healthy forces" within the PCE, analyse the activities of the PCE in Prague, as well as to consult further actions towards

¹⁰⁶⁸ AMZV, f. TO-O, 1969-74, Spain, c. 1., file 057/41 (12). MFA, no. 102127/73-5. Issue: Záznam pro s. ministra o čs.-španělských stycích (Memo for c. Minister about Czechoslovak-Spanish relations). Annex: Memo for c. Minister, 30.1.1973 (2.2.1973).

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibidem.

the PCE with the CPSU.¹⁰⁷² Eventually, in May 1971, the EC PCE officially refused the invitation for its delegation to the XIV Congress of the KSČ, due to their different positions and opinions, which would eventually not lead to any positive results¹⁰⁷³ – thus confirming the split between the two parties. This notwithstanding, the delegation of Carrillo's PCE resided in Prague, as has been already mentioned, as late as 1973.

Another agreement between Czechoslovakia and Spain (about air transport) was signed in September 1973. Up until then, the Spanish economy was still experiencing a period of positive conjuncture, with growing GDP and industry, while being already considered by Prague as a part of the developed capitalist world.¹⁰⁷⁴ In the first half of 1973, Czechoslovak-Spanish trade, with a structure beneficial for Prague, grew by 22,2% year-on-year in terms of Czechoslovak imports and 19,8% in terms of exports – these were at that time growing also thanks to the Spanish economic conjuncture, while the share of machine industry products of total exports reached 60%.¹⁰⁷⁵ However, the Consular and Commercial Representation in Madrid claimed that the especially beneficial increase of Czechoslovak-Spanish commercial relations in the last two years stemmed in the first place from the fact that mutual relations were so far at an excessively low level – Czechoslovak participation in Spanish foreign trade was 0,2% (and vice versa). Still, they argued that the development of the Spanish economy gave preconditions for growth in commerce, as Spain was at that time still interested in broadening trade exchange with socialist countries hoping to increase the share of trade with socialist countries from 1,9% to 3,2% (the average of OECD countries).¹⁰⁷⁶ Furthermore, the Czechoslovak representation in Madrid in its report stated that there were also conditions for the development of technical-scientific and industrial cooperation which was potentially

¹⁰⁷² NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1966-1971, sv. 135, a. j. 213, b 15. Report on the developments in the PCE and interview between the Head of the dep. MP ÚV KSČ and the member of the EC PCE, c. E. Lister, on the current developments in the PCE, 22.8.1970; NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1971-76, sv. 1, a. j. 1, b. 1 k info. Záznam o setkání pracovníka oddělení mezinárodní politiky ÚV KSČ se s E. Listerem (Record about the meeting between an employee of the International Policy Section of the ÚV KSČ with c. Enrique Lister), 7.5.1971 (4.6.1971).

¹⁰⁷³ APCE, f. Mundo Obrero, 1971. *Mundo Obrero*, 15.6.1971, p. 9.

¹⁰⁷⁴ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1969-74, Spain, c. 1, file 057/3552 (8). MFA, no. 118.397/73-5. Issue: Zpráva o hosp. stycích se Španělskem (Report about the economic relations with Spain). Konzulární a obchodní zastupitelství ČSSR (Consular and Commercial Representation of ČSSR) in Madrid to the MFA. Issue: Report about the economic relations with Spain, 12.10.1973.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Ibidem; AMZV, f. TO – O, 1969-1974, Spain, c. 1, file 057/52 (14). MFA, no. 119.225/73-5. Issue: Jednání se Španělskem o zbožovém protokolu na rok 1974 (Negotiations with Spain on the Protocol on goods for 1974). Peter to Růžek. Annex: Návrh na zahájení obchodně politických jednání se Španělskem o Protokolu na rok 1974 (Proposal to open commercial-political negotiations with Spain on the Protocol for 1974), 2.11.1973.

¹⁰⁷⁶ AMZV, f. TO – O, 1969-74, Spain, c. 1, file 057/3552 (8). MFA, no. 118.397/73-5. Issue: Report about the economic relations with Spain. Consular and Commercial Representation of ČSSR in Madrid to the MFA. Issue: Report about the economic relations with Spain, 12.10.1973.

beneficial for Czechoslovakia. Also, with the objective of capitalising on the Spanish industrialisation process and the interest of foreign investors in Spain, it was advised to the MFA to broaden the network of Czechoslovak affiliations in Spain, while the signing of a treaty of scientific-technical cooperation and an agreement about road and naval transport ought to be put into consideration – this would get Czechoslovakia to the same relational level with Spain as other socialist countries. All these measures should, according to the Consular and Commercial Representation in Madrid, create a good economical and contractual basis for Prague in the post-Franco era and before the entry of Spain into the EEC.¹⁰⁷⁷

The oil crisis of 1973, which provoked a global recession, did not influence Spain immediately due to its vast monetary savings, undervaluation of the peseta and pre-negotiated energy contracts.¹⁰⁷⁸ On one hand, the increase in energy prices and imported products that had been hitting Spain since the turn of 1973 and 1974,¹⁰⁷⁹ was convenient for Czechoslovak exports, as in the mid-1970s Czechoslovakia exported to Spain mainly products that could not be sold on the markets of other developed Western countries. On the other, due to the economic crisis in Spain,¹⁰⁸⁰ Czechoslovak export growth came to an end after many years in 1975, thus ending an era of expanding Czechoslovak-Spanish trade (between 1970 and 1975), with an increase of about 140% (from 123,8 to 292 million CZK).¹⁰⁸¹ Generally, by the mid-1970s, the structure of trade with Spain was convenient for Czechoslovakia, as 40-50% of its exports continued to consist of machine industry products. At that time, the most important export items were textile machines, machine tools, tractors, ball bearings, ship diesel motors as well as chemical and pharmaceutical products, glass, textile products, bijouterie, rolled stock and malt. In the import dominated citrus, dry fruits, fish cans, wine, vegetables and phosphoric acid.¹⁰⁸²

In the negotiations for a renewal of the commercial agreement from 1971 in December 1976, the Czechoslovak side was prepared to ask for the inclusion of the most-favoured-nation clause in the new treaty. However, by 1976 the political climate changed, as with the death of Franco in November 1975, the biggest obstacle to the further development of relations had

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷⁸ JULIÁ – GARCÍA DELGADO – JIMÉNEZ et al., *La España*, pp. 480-484; UBIETO ARTETA et al., *Dějiny*, p. 750.

¹⁰⁷⁹ VELARDE FUERTES, *Cien*, pp. 260-261.

¹⁰⁸⁰ VURM, *Československo-španělské*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁰⁸¹ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1976-1981, sv. 24, a. j. 26, b. 9. Initiation of the commercial-political negotiation about a new long-term contractual adjustment of economic relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Spain. Annex III: Report to the proposal for the initiation of the commercial-political negotiation about a new long-term contractual adjustment of economic relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Spain, 23.11.1976, (3.12.1976).

¹⁰⁸² Ibidem.

disappeared. Thus, the Spanish side was interested in signing a new long-term commercial agreement on the level of ministries, as the relations with other socialist countries were carried out on a higher level than those with Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁸³ Considering that since WWII no Czechoslovak minister had visited Spain, the signing of a new commercial agreement by a minister was considered by Spaniards as an occasion to express higher Czechoslovak interest in economic contact with Spain. Taking into account that similar agreements were signed by the Polish and Hungarian ministers in the previous years and that promising political changes were happening in Spain, the Prague government decided to accept this proposal – even if the Spanish side wanted to use the visit of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade for political purposes.¹⁰⁸⁴ One month later, the ÚV KSČ approved the negotiation regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries, based on the example of the USSR, Bulgaria and Hungary and due to the positive internal situation in Spain. At this time, with the negotiations about the legalisation of the PCE in Spain in progress, Carrillo also stated that the normalisation of relations of socialist countries with Spain was in the interest of the Spanish Communist Party.¹⁰⁸⁵ Thus, in February 1977 diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain were restored at the level of embassies.¹⁰⁸⁶

Based on the above, it can be concluded that Czechoslovak foreign trade with Francoist Spain, despite recurring efforts to broaden it from the Spanish MFT, as well as from the ČOK and the Prague MFT (or even the PCE), repeatedly encountered obstacles, especially from the Czechoslovak MFA and the Spanish MOI, mainly for political and ideological reasons, stemming from the Cold War reality. Until 1968, when the split between the KSČ and the PCE took place; however, the foreign policy of state socialist Czechoslovakia towards Spain was more a result of manoeuvring between economic pragmatism (the needs of the Czechoslovak economy) and political imperative (the interests of the PCE and the Eastern Bloc), rather than a blind toeing of the line drawn by Moscow. Even so, “consultations” with the Soviets were taking place as late as the 1970s, although with the PCE, these “consultations” transformed into simple “information” after 1968. In relations with Franco’s Spain, Czechoslovakia was no “Eastern European pioneer” but a follower in the footsteps of Romania and Poland. Still, the

¹⁰⁸³ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁸⁵ NA, f. KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Prague – Presidium 1976-1981, sv. 29, a. j. 31, b. 3. MFA, no. 010.466/77-5. Pro schůzi předsednictva ÚV KSČ (For the meeting of the Presidium of the ÚV KSČ). Issue: Zahájení jednání o navázání diplomatických styků se Španělskem (Opening of negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Spain). Důvodová zpráva (Explanatory report), 21.1.1977.

¹⁰⁸⁶ NÁLEVKA, “Španělé”, p. 95.

gradual normalisation of relations in the 1970s must be understood in the context of the societal-political transformations in Spain and the change in the political climate and relations between the East and the West in the period of *détente*. On the other hand, the definitive split between the KSČ and the PCE at the end of the 1960s is demonstrated by the scarcity of, up till then, regular reports, lists and letters regarding both parties in consulted archives.

Prague's foreign policy towards Madrid was thus neither static nor averse to any form of contact with the Francoist regime – rather, it was pragmatic and gradually evolving in the context of the Cold War, shaped by political, social and economic changes and taking into account the internal developments in both countries, as well as the transforming relations between the respective communist parties (KSČ, PCE). Equally pragmatic was the approach of the KSČ towards the Spanish communists in Czechoslovakia – this altruism had its limits. It was the economic dimension of contacts between the two “fraternal” parties that was a frequent reason for mutual disputes and the economic problems of Czechoslovakia in the late 1950s and early 1960s influenced not only the formation of the Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Madrid but also the functioning of the Spanish communist emigration in Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the economic (as well as cultural or scientific) relations between Czechoslovakia and Francoist Spain in the studied period were limited – due to geographic distance, lack of traditional trade basis, absence of diplomatic relations and last but not least, the adherence to rival blocs.¹⁰⁸⁷ However, the example of economic relations between the two “secondary” players (Prague, Madrid) during the Cold War in many ways undermines the traditional understanding of Czechoslovakia as solely a Soviet satellite¹⁰⁸⁸ – Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Madrid was dynamically evolving in the context of the Cold War and was influenced by multiple, complementarily interconnected, but often contradicting actors.

¹⁰⁸⁷ EIROA, “Las relaciones de Checoslovaquia”, p. 318.

¹⁰⁸⁸ This current of thought is represented in the Czech historiography for example by Karel Kaplan, see e.g., Karel KAPLAN, *The Communist Party in power. A profile of party politics in Czechoslovakia*, New York, London 2019; Idem, *Československo v letech 1948-1953. 2. část, Zakladatelské období komunistického režimu*, Praha 1991.

6. Conclusion

As of December 2021, thirty years had passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet empire – a process which began with anti-communist revolutions in the Eastern Bloc in 1989, followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of that year and ended with the eventual disintegration of the USSR – the period known as the Cold War ended, as one of its main protagonists ceased to exist. Furthermore, the division of Europe into two antagonistic blocs (allegedly) ended as well. Even though there is a rather universal consensus about the date of its end (1991),¹⁰⁸⁹ historians still cannot agree on the origins of the Cold War – even though, for example, the US army marks as the beginning of this conflict the last day of WWII (2 September 1945).¹⁰⁹⁰ Even though it was the Revisionist school of the Cold War historiography (Walter LaFeber, Denna Frank Fleming) who first started to trace the origins of the Cold War back to 5 March 1946,¹⁰⁹¹ when Winston Churchill pronounced his famous “Iron Curtain Speech” at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri,¹⁰⁹² many contemporary social scientists also trace the beginning of this conflict back to this event.¹⁰⁹³ It was there in Fulton in March 1946, when the term “Iron Curtain”, the most representative symbol of the Cold War,¹⁰⁹⁴ was most famously used by the British statesman.

The present dissertation attempted to shed light on Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the 20th century, especially on topics (Spanish communist exile, relations between Prague and Madrid after WWII), which could be understood as under-researched up until now. With its focus on the connections and contacts, rather than conflicts and discrepancies, between the two countries even in the period when the two ruling regimes could be understood as hostile (1945-1977), this thesis necessarily clashes with the widely known perception of the Iron Curtain. The

¹⁰⁸⁹ See e.g., John Lewis GADDIS, *The Cold War: a new history*, New York 2005, p. 263; Jennifer M. HUDSON, *Iron Curtain Twitchers: Russo-American Cold War Relations*, Lanham, London 2019, pp. 249-250; ROMERO, “Cold War”, p. 685; Odd Arne WESTAD, “The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century”, in: LEFFLER – WESTAD (eds.), *The Cambridge*, p. 19; Karel DURMAN, *Popely Ještě Žhavé: Velká Politika 1938-1991. Díl II: Konce Dobrodružství*, Praha 2009, pp. 504, 513; Jan EICHLER – Jiří ŠEDIVÝ, “Hlavní rysy mezinárodní situace po skončení studené války”, *Mezinárodní vztahy* 2, 1995, p. 16.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Cold War Recognition Certificate Program Overview – HRC [on-line], [www.hrc.army.mil](https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Cold%20War%20Recognition%20Certificate%20Program%20Overview), <<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Cold%20War%20Recognition%20Certificate%20Program%20Overview>>, [accessed 19 March 2022].

¹⁰⁹¹ Fraser J. HARBUTT, *The Iron Curtain. Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War*, New York, Oxford 1988, p. 210.

¹⁰⁹² DURMAN, *Popely*, p. 176.

¹⁰⁹³ For example, Paul A RAHE, “The Beginning of the Cold War”, in: James W. Muller (ed.), *Churchill's “Iron Curtain” Speech Fifty Years Later*, Columbia, London 1999, p. 49; or Klaus LARRES, “Churchill's ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech in Context: The Attempt to Achieve a ‘Good Understanding on All Points’ with Stalin's Soviet Union”, *The International History Review* 1, 2018, p. 103.

¹⁰⁹⁴ ROMANO, “Concluding”, p. 191.

(im)mobility of Spanish communist and Czech and Slovak anti-communist exiles, as well as the transfer of products, ideas and capital between two small(er) countries from other sides of the Iron Curtain and through this allegedly impenetrable border, separating the West from the East, contests the nature of this Cold War divide.

6.1 The Myth of the impermeable Iron Curtain

Initially, the origins of the term “iron curtain” could be traced back to the eighteenth century, when an iron curtain was used in theatres to prevent the spread of fire¹⁰⁹⁵– its impermeableness was thus one of its most important qualities. Furthermore, at the end of WWII, this term was used between the years 1944-1945 by both British as well as Germans to describe the border, behind which Eastern Europe and Balkans were being “liberated” by the Red Army,¹⁰⁹⁶ probably most famously by Joseph Goebbels in February 1945.¹⁰⁹⁷ Still, it was Churchill’s use of this metaphor in Fulton, which, despite his Eurocentrism (seeing only Europe as divided by the conflict of us vs. them, democracy vs. dictatorship) popularised the term on a global scale.¹⁰⁹⁸

Churchill’s speech in Fulton was undoubtedly a breakthrough in the post-war relationship between the USSR and the West – the British statesmen warned the public about Soviet expansionism and peace-threatening policies and the communist menace, which ought to be resisted by an Anglo-American alliance, while the Iron Curtain served as a reference for his anti-communism.¹⁰⁹⁹ Still, even though it was Churchill who in March 1946 publicly and rhetorically called attention to this (at first abstract) boundary, behind which Eastern European communist parties were “seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control”¹¹⁰⁰ and thus introduced this *topos* into the Cold War lexicon, there can be no doubt that it was the Eastern European regimes which erected this barrier in material terms.¹¹⁰¹ Additionally, Churchill had already used the metaphor of the “Iron Curtain” in reference to Soviet power for the first time in May 1945 – in his telegram to President Truman, he expressed his concerns about Russians, “their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions” and their influence in the territories they occupied, meanwhile, he added that “[a]n iron curtain is drawn upon their front [and] [W]e do

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ignace FEUERLICHT, “A New Look at the Iron Curtain”, *American speech* 3, 1955, p. 186.

¹⁰⁹⁶ John RAMSDEN, “Mr. Churchill Goes to Fulton”, in: MULLER (ed.), *Churchill’s*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁹⁷ FEUERLICHT, “A New”, p. 187.

¹⁰⁹⁸ ROMANO, “Concluding”, pp. 190-191.

¹⁰⁹⁹ RAMSDEN, “Mr. Churchill”, pp. 16, 21-23; HARBUTT, *The Iron*, p. 185.

¹¹⁰⁰ Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech, “Sinews of Peace” [on-line], March 05, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP archives, <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116180>>, [accessed 18 June 2022].

¹¹⁰¹ BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK, “Crossing”, p. 3.

not know what is going on behind.”¹¹⁰² Interestingly, at that time, the line drawn by Churchill stretched from Lubeck through Trieste to Corfu and by adding the territory between Elbe and Eisenach, which Churchill defined as potentially occupied by Russians as soon as the US troops withdrew,¹¹⁰³ the territory behind Churchill’s “Iron Curtain of 1945” included, in contrast with the line sketched in March 1946, also almost exactly the area of the future GDR. On the other hand, based on his speech in Fulton in 1946, this line descended, “[F]rom Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic” and behind it “lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia [...] all [...] subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence, but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.”¹¹⁰⁴ For these reasons, this borderline sketched by Churchill, which separated the luminous “Christian civilisation”¹¹⁰⁵ from whatever was happening in the shadows behind this “barrier of quarantine”, served not only as a structural mental and geographical boundary during the Cold War but also as an excuse for a certain disinterest of the West in events in the countries of the Soviet sphere of influence.¹¹⁰⁶

Churchill’s Manichean depiction of a bipartite Europe was undeniably one of the steps toward the bipolar and global division between the East and the West – an interpretative and structural feature of the post-war reality for the next four decades – even though it should be reminded, that this speech included also an intent to call for a settlement and a “good understanding on all points with Russia”.¹¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the Fulton Speech alarmed Stalin and provoked his hostile reaction – in the Kremlin, they conceived it as the beginning of the Cold War,¹¹⁰⁸ as it, after Churchill’s juxtaposition of communism and fascism,¹¹⁰⁹ only confirmed and strengthened Stalin’s anti-Western standpoint, while the Soviet dictator

¹¹⁰² Copy of a telegram from Churchill to President Truman [on-line], May 12, 1945, www.churchillarchiveforschools.com, <<https://www.churchillarchiveforschools.com/themes/the-themes/key-events-and-developments-in-world-history/churchill-and-the-cold-war-why-did-churchill-make-his-famous-iron-curtain-speech-in-1946-/the-sources/source-3>>, [accessed 18 June 2022].

¹¹⁰³ Ibidem.

¹¹⁰⁴ Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech, “Sinews of Peace”, <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116180>>, [accessed 18 June 2022].

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibidem.

¹¹⁰⁶ Larry WOLFF, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 1994, pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁰⁷ Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech, “Sinews of Peace”, <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116180>>, [accessed 18 June 2022]. In this regard, we must remember also the title of the speech (“Sinews of Peace”), a clear purpose to prevent the escalation of a further conflict and a reminder of the basic condition for the global peace – a dialogue and compromise with the USSR, in: HARBUTT, *The Iron* pp. 191-192.

¹¹⁰⁸ LARRES, “Churchill’s ‘Iron’”, pp. 86-87.

¹¹⁰⁹ “I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and if some communist or neo-fascist State monopolised for the time being these dread agencies”, in: Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech, “Sinews of Peace”, <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116180>>, [accessed 18 June 2022].

subsequently publicly condemned Churchill in *Pravda* as a warmonger similar to Hitler.¹¹¹⁰ Probably the main reason, why Churchill's use of the Iron Curtain from Fulton became so popular, was that it encompassed and gave attention to (the crucial part of) the truth about the contemporary and future geopolitical situation – the USSR and the Eastern European territories under communist control were to be isolated, to some extent or another, from the rest of the Western world *ad infinitum*.¹¹¹¹ Besides, Churchill's Iron Curtain from 1946 – at first rather abstract, more of an “ideological divider” than a “physical border“, in the following years converted itself into a proper borderline, with barbed wire, mines, armed guards and eventually also a materialised (Berlin) wall.¹¹¹²

Still, it is precisely this division into the East and the West, linked with the above-mentioned isolation – both results of the erected Iron Curtain, that has been researched in the Cold War historiography since the popularisation of this metaphor by Churchill. Over the years, this curtain received many, more or less original adjectives, referring to its function as a dividing line and a form of protection, as well as a symbol of hostility, danger or otherness, such as “bamboo curtain”, “steel curtain”, “atomic curtain”, “uranium curtain” or “nylon curtain”.¹¹¹³ Surprisingly, it was only during the last two decades, when the first attempts to analyse not only the social and geopolitical consequences of the Iron Curtain but also its nature and the level of its permeability started to take place. This historiographic turn is linked with new approaches that have emerged in Cold War research that try to offer different perspectives on this conflict. One of them is the school of the New Cold War History, which differs from older historiography that portrayed the Cold War almost exclusively through the lens of the paradigm of the bipolar relationship between the US and the USSR. With its shift within the researched topics, innovative methodology, as well as by using archival documents from the former socialist countries, the New Cold War History also contributes to the research of “small countries/actors” and thus intends to reassess and reinterpret crucial aspects of the Cold War conflict.¹¹¹⁴

In accordance with this reorientation of historical research, some scholars have also begun to focus on the (dis)connections and contacts between the East and the West, leading to publications whose titles include the barrier separating the First and the Second World with a

¹¹¹⁰ HUDSON, *Iron Curtain*, p. 116.

¹¹¹¹ DAVID-FOX, “The Iron”, p. 15.

¹¹¹² BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK, “Crossing”, p. 4.

¹¹¹³ FEUERLICHT, “A New”, pp. 188-189.

¹¹¹⁴ REYNOLDS, “Bringing”, p. 9.

porous and permeable attribute,¹¹¹⁵ and often even rebranded. One of these attempts of renaming the “Iron Curtain” to the “Nylon Curtain” comes from György Péteri who claims, that this curtain “was not only transparent but it also yielded to strong osmotic tendencies that were globalizing knowledge across the systemic divide about culture, good and services.”¹¹¹⁶ Furthermore, Péteri posits that mentioned tendencies “were not only fueling consumer desires and expectations of living standards but they also promoted in both directions the spreading of visions of ‘good society’ of ‘humanism’, as well as of civil, political, and social citizenship”; thus, it was rather the permeable and transparent nylon (one of the symbols of modernity in the post-WWII era) than the hard and impervious iron, what separated the two blocs.¹¹¹⁷

Stemming from Péteri’s view, the already mentioned Michael David-Fox also questions the character of the Iron Curtain. Firstly, he points out the material of this curtain: “Although steel is harder and no less impenetrable [...] Churchill could hardly have called it a Steel Curtain”, mostly due to his intention of finding a settlement with Stalin, whose name comes from steel (*stal* in Russian – M. T.). Furthermore, Churchill revoked with the “iron” the barbaric and primitive Iron Age (a reference to the underdeveloped USSR), in opposition to the industrialised and modernised West.¹¹¹⁸ Secondly, David-Fox argues that the USSR during late Stalinism – an extremely isolationist regime – erected rather a semipermeable (or selectively permeable) membrane than an “Iron Curtain” – chosen people, products, information and capital were allowed to enter the Socialist Bloc (and vice versa) and the transfers through this membrane had a crucial impact on Soviet relations with the West, as well as on the relationship between the USSR and its Eastern European “satellites”.¹¹¹⁹

6.2 Aims and contributions of this dissertation

¹¹¹⁵ Romano mentions some of them: Frédéric BOZO – Marie-Pierre REY – Bernd ROTHER et al. (eds.), *Overcoming the Iron Curtain: Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990*, New York 2012; ENDERLE-BURCEL – FRANASZEK – STIEFEL et al. (eds.), *Gaps in the Iron Curtain: Economic Relations between Neutral and Socialist Countries in Cold War Europe*, Cracow 2009; Yale RICHMOND, *Cultural Exchanges and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*, University Park 2003; Poul VILLAUME – Odd Arne WESTAD (eds.), *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985*, Copenhagen 2010, in: ROMANO, “Concluding“, pp. 192-193, 201-202.

¹¹¹⁶ PÉTERI, “Nylon”, p. 115.

¹¹¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 114-115. In this aspect, Péteri refers to the imaginary report of David Riesman called “The Nylon War”, in which the US starts bombing the USSR with consumer products, thus satirizing the economy of shortage and a lack of consumer goods in the Eastern Bloc, whose citizens’ unfulfilled desires were pertinently characterised by their understanding of products such as nylon (a metaphor of the most desired Western products) to be a symbol of higher living standards, in: David RIESMAN, “The Nylon War”, *ETC: A Review of General Semantics* 3, 1951, pp. 163-170.

¹¹¹⁸ DAVID-FOX, “The Iron”, p. 16.

¹¹¹⁹ Ibidem, pp. 18-19.

Thus, and as has already been shortly cited in the second chapter, we agree with David-Fox on the issue of the true character of the Iron Curtain. The above-analysed contacts between the two geographically distanced countries (Czechoslovakia and Spain), which were also being separated by the (allegedly impermeable) Iron Curtain, as well as the existing networks transcending this divide (e.g., the Spanish and Slovak/Czech exile – both subjects of this dissertation), only confirm David-Fox’s thesis. Furthermore, we argue that the Iron Curtain was rather a dynamic, “mental (as well – M. T.) as a physical barrier”, which involved many different actors and activities,¹¹²⁰ and in fact as such included various loopholes or gaps in many levels, while its permeability varied according to different periods of time and countries involved in the circumventing of Cold War barriers.¹¹²¹ Despite the division of the post-WWII world between the East and the West, the exchange and transfer of people, ideas, products and influences took place (not only) in divided Europe on a regular basis also after 1946, considering that the dividing frontier was more porous than impermeable – as the case of the increasing economic relations and the exchange of products, information, ideas (patents and licenses) and even travellers between Prague and Madrid, especially from 1958 onwards, has shown. Notwithstanding the communist control over Czechoslovak foreign policy towards Madrid as early as 1946, followed by the communist coup d’état of February 1948, leading to the definitive incorporation of this country into the Socialist Bloc and the confirmation of the move of the Iron Curtain to the Czechoslovak western border, Czechoslovakia was in 1946 still a country designated by Churchill in Fulton as the only “true democracy”¹¹²² behind this curtain. Also, the Czechoslovak government in 1947 even simplified visa regulations in order to encourage foreign tourism.¹¹²³ Moreover, the reality of the Iron Curtain varied in the Eastern Bloc also on the socio-political status of those who wanted to penetrate it – as the cases of Spanish communist exiles have proven, the Iron Curtain was for some of them (mainly those politically heterodox emigrants) a hardly surpassable obstruction and the life in the West was often an unreachable dream; for others, for example, the leaders of the Spanish communist exile, the crossing of this divide was merely an administrative obstacle.

Furthermore, the Iron Curtain could be interpreted also as a symbolic barrier dividing two competing systems and world visions, which were; nevertheless, interconnected, depending

¹¹²⁰ BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK, “Crossing”, p. 3.

¹¹²¹ ENDERLE-BURCEL – FRANASZEK – STIEFEL et al., “Introduction”, in: Idem (eds.), *Gaps*, pp. 1-2.

¹¹²² Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech, “Sinews of Peace”,
<<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116180>>, [accessed 18 June 2022].

¹¹²³ Sune BECHMANN PEDERSEN, “Transnacionální rozměry cestování v éře studené války aneb Cestovní ruch ze západních zemí za tzv. Železnou oponu”, in: MÜCKE – KRÁTKÁ (eds.), *Turistická odysea*, pp. 23-24.

on each other and often serving as mutual referential points – socialist states, such as Czechoslovakia, measured their economic efficiency and status in comparison not with other socialist countries, but with the capitalist West.¹¹²⁴ Already during the years of the late 1940s, crossings through the Iron Curtain were numerous, while leading to familiarisation with Western material culture and influencing the Stalinist ideas of superiority of communist civilisation and the self-understanding of the socialist countries.¹¹²⁵ For these reasons, we agree that these multidimensional and multidirectional border crossings did not take place only after the “Khrushchev Thaw” from the mid-1950s, nor did the Iron Curtain become more porous only in the liberalised 1960s¹¹²⁶ – during these periods, the above-mentioned contacts and connections became only more intensive, as the objective of the Eastern European regimes, detached from the West by the Iron Curtain, was never to fully restrain the cross-border movement through this barrier and to totally separate themselves. Their main aim was to control and regulate these crossings, not only for security purposes but also for counterintelligence.¹¹²⁷ Lastly, Eastern European countries in these transborder contacts and transfers often acted not as passive members of the Eastern Bloc or Soviet satellite states, but also pursued their own interests and promoted ideas of their own, while pragmatism often ruled over ideology not only in the Third but also in the Second World.¹¹²⁸ The example of Czechoslovakia – a “small(er) state” or “junior actor” – and its foreign policy towards Spain, also contradicts the thesis of Prague as being exclusively a Soviet satellite.¹¹²⁹ Even though undeniably under Moscow’s influence, Prague carried out its foreign policy towards Spain based on many influences and actors (its economic needs, the PCE, other Eastern European countries), although in this respect, it never openly contradicted Soviet interests.

Interconnecting various topics within Czechoslovak-Spanish relations and utilising new methodological approaches, in this multidisciplinary and multitopic work we have clarified the mutual relations between the two distant countries, especially during the first three decades of the Cold War. Our investigation was based mainly on structural analysis with inductive reasoning and while combining both diachronic and synchronic approaches, we proceeded according to the progressive method of historical research. The reason why we decided to focus

¹¹²⁴ BREN, “Mirror”, p. 834.

¹¹²⁵ DAVID-FOX, “The Iron”, pp. 19, 26.

¹¹²⁶ BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK, “Crossing”, p. 3; DRAGOSTINOVA – FIDELIS, “Introduction”, p. 577.

¹¹²⁷ See e.g., FARALDO, “The Story”, pp. 1-18.

¹¹²⁸ DRAGOSTINOVA – FIDELIS, “Introduction”, pp. 577, 582.

¹¹²⁹ See for example KAPLAN, *The Communist*, pp. 119, 206.

our investigation on selected issues (Spanish exile in Czechoslovakia, Slovak and Czech exile in Spain, economic relations between state socialist Czechoslovakia and Francoist Spain), were the existing “gaps” in the research of relations between Prague and Madrid – it was the period of the Cold War, within which the highest number of unexploited perspectives for the research had existed before our dissertation. While trying to offer a different perspective on relations between Czechoslovakia and Spain, overreaching the traditional view of international relations and with a transdisciplinary methodology, we have offered a unique and innovative perspective and thus reinterpreted Czechoslovak-Spanish relations in the 20th century – these were full of contacts and transfers even after WWII, despite both countries belonging to rival Cold War blocs.

The main contribution of this thesis lies in its work with up until now un-researched archival sources (e.g., documents from the ABS or the SNA), as well as in its focus on the discrepancies between the respective exile collectives (e.g., Spanish groups living in Czechoslovakia) or the proper emigrants (leaders vs. politically heterodox exiles). With the application of new theoretical concepts and underlining the entanglement between mobility, resistance, power and space, we have filled some of the existing deficits in the research of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations. We argue that it is precisely these singularities – concrete topics within the relations between Prague and Madrid, that enable us to see the bigger picture of the Cold War differently. With a pluralist approach and through the lens of new tendencies and approaches in the Cold War historiography, we brought two smaller states into the centre of (our) Cold War research. Nevertheless, this dissertation also came to question the traditional understanding of Czechoslovakia as solely a Soviet satellite, as well as the notorious character of the East-West divide – the “Iron Curtain”.

6.3 Limits of the work and the perspectives for the future research

In the early years of the Cold War, Churchill’s notion of the Iron Curtain should have symbolised the official end of East-West cross-border interactions;¹¹³⁰ however, considering the above-stated arguments and taking into account the initial use of this collocation – in the theatres to stop the spread of fire,¹¹³¹ we argue that Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” was not a “brilliant metaphor,”¹¹³² but rather a misleading concept. The previous chapters of this dissertation have proven, through the example of Czechoslovak-Spanish relations, that in the

¹¹³⁰ DAVID-FOX, “The Iron”, pp. 15-16.

¹¹³¹ FEUERLICHT, “A New Look”, p. 186.

¹¹³² HARBUTT, *Iron*, p. 208.

three decades following the Fulton Speech, the Iron Curtain was neither static nor impervious, as the Cold War proved to be an era full of connections and exchanges through the East-West division and the barriers between Eastern Bloc countries and the West were permeable and changeable.¹¹³³

Thus, in our conclusions, we claim that a) in relation to Spain, the communist influence started to dominate Czechoslovak foreign policy by 1946, especially after the parliamentary elections of May 1946; b) (im)mobilities are (re)productive, as through fixities and (infra)structures, they could enable and/or lead to another (im)mobility (and vice versa); c) (im)mobility has a “by-product” – (everyday) resistance, which always affects dominant power structures; d) for Prague, the foreign trade with Western countries was a necessity, due to the lack of convertible currencies and there were more actors within the formation of Prague’s pragmatic foreign policy towards Spain – the USSR; the PCE (until 1968) and other Eastern European countries; and that e) the Iron Curtain was more of a semipermeable or selectively permeable membrane than an impenetrable border.

Still, the research of Czechoslovak-Spanish contacts and (dis)connections in the 20th century is impossible to be carried out in its entirety, due to the complexity of the issue, the quantity and availability of archival documents, as well as the time range of the topic. Our case was not an exception – in our research, we have faced many obstacles, which were the main limits of this dissertation. These included limited access to some archives, as well as a lack of materials dedicated to several questions; on the other hand, many topics within Czechoslovak-Spanish relations had already been thoroughly researched. Apart from the temporal and financial limitations experienced by every researcher, in our case, it was the multidisciplinary nature of the work, which served as a double-edged sword – it did not only methodologically benefit, but also limited our work due to the vast theoretical-methodological secondary literature.

This dissertation interconnected various, until now only separately analysed topics, such as the concepts of resistance or (im)mobility, or the influence of relations between communist parties on the formation of the foreign policy of state socialist countries. Future research could thus be directed for example toward other case studies of (not only) communist exiles in Eastern European or in other countries, or with a focus either on their resistance or (im)mobility. The present work aspired to contextualise Czechoslovak-Spanish contacts within the Cold War reality in order to serve as a referential point for a new perspective and approach to the

¹¹³³ BECHMANN PEDERSEN – NOACK, “Crossing”, pp. 3-4

investigation of the relations between the East and the West. With our pluralist, multipolar and multilateral approach to the Cold War histories, we proved that this conflict was not only about the bipolar confrontation between the US and the USSR, but it was full of connections and stories of “small(er) states/actors” on both sides of the curtain and their influence on the Cold War.¹¹³⁴

¹¹³⁴ CRUMP – ERLANDSSON, „Introduction“, p. 1; WESTAD, “Exploring“, pp. 56-58.

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