

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines how the decay of political power and other territorial characteristics affect al-Qaeda's chances of successfully building regional cells in weak and collapsed states. Its focal point is a comparison between a case study of the FATA region of Pakistan and Somalia. It aims to uncover factors that negatively affected the functioning of the actor in Somalia, but which did not negatively affect staying in FATA. As a result, we find that the factors mentioned are mainly related to the area of recruitment, the potential for forging new alliances, security risks associated with the absence of a central authority, and the toll of deteriorating infrastructure. This observation is interesting as the FATA region presents a similar socio-political environment to Somalia. In the literature, we encounter the view, demonstrated by the case of Somalia in particular, that failed states are not ideal for terrorist groups to operate. It is therefore interesting for us to identify the reasons why al-Qaeda turned out fundamentally differently in the two cases. The author interprets the results in such a way that it is not possible to over-generalize the aforementioned lesson, and further comparative studies are necessary for this reason