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**South Korea's challenge: Low fertility rate and Government's
policies to enhance fertility rate**

Master's thesis

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on

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References

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Abstract

Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, South Korea has undergone institutional changes in social welfare, especially in childcare and maternity protection policies (Chang, 1999; Seo, 2017). The changes were supposed to increase the birth rate (Song, 2003), but it is still in decline, and policies have not been effective (OECD, 2021). Birth rates in South Korea are among the lowest in OECD member countries, the population is aging, and economic and social consequences are expected (Stephen, 2012, p. 7). It is in the government's interest to provide various family policies to enable a manageable work-family balance and a healthy family life (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011). The aim of this work is to partially contribute to the elucidation of the phenomenon of low fertility rate in South Korea. The thesis focuses on the questions of whether targeted policies strengthen families, whether deep, developing social regime leads to social change, and whether Confucianism has a negative effect on fertility. This diploma thesis analyses the phenomenon of low birth rates from many perspectives: economic (Becker, 1960), familial (Leitner, 2003) and cultural (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Concerning the economic situation, an analysis of direct costs of South Korean families is performed, which focusses on expenditures on food, clothing, housing, and education, which are considered the main consumption costs burdening the household budget (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse et al., 2009, p. 20-21, 81). With the familial strand, an analysis of childcare centres and family policy tools (parental leave, maternity leave, and paternity leave) is performed. This then follows a classification of South Korea based on Leitner's (2003) typology of the 4 strong/weak concept of familialism-de-familialism. In cultural part, there is an analysis of KGSS Codebooks data from 2005, 2006, 2012 and cumulative data 2003-2018 and interpretation of results reflecting cultural aspects of Confucianism. The first two hypotheses were confirmed in this work: "Family policies tend to strengthen" and "a deeply developing social regime does not necessarily lead to social change, institutional change precedes social change." The hypothesis that "Confucianism has a negative effect on fertility" has not been refuted and neither unequivocally confirmed, because there are more factors involved and there is no clear line of argument to determine the answer.

Abstrakt

Od asijské finanční krize v roce 1997 prošla Jižní Korea institucionálními změnami sociální péče, zejména v politice péče o děti a ochraně mateřství (Chang, 1999; Seo, 2017). Změny měly zvýšit míru porodnosti (Song, 2003), ta však stále klesá a politiky nejsou účinné (OECD, 2021). Porodnost je nejnižší mezi členskými státy OECD, populace stárne a očekávají se ekonomické a sociální důsledky (Stephen, 2012, s. 7). V zájmu vlády je poskytovat různé rodinné politiky k zajištění pracovní-rodinného života a zdravého rodinného života (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011). Cílem práce je částečně přispět k objasnění fenoménu nízké porodnosti v Jižní Koreji. Práce se zaměřuje na otázky, zda mají rodinné politiky tendenci posilovat, zda hluboce se rozvíjející sociální režim nemusí nutně vést ke společenské změně a zda má konfucianismus negativní efekt na fertilitu. Tato diplomová práce analyzuje fenomén nízké porodnosti z mnoha perspektiv: ekonomické (Becker, 1960), familialistické (Leitner, 2003) a kulturní (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). V ekonomické části je provedena analýza přímých nákladů jihokorejských rodin se zaměřením na spotřební výdaje na jídlo, oblečení, bydlení a vzdělání, které jsou považovány za hlavní spotřební náklady zatěžující rozpočet domácností (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie- Thérèse a kol., 2009, s. 20-21, 81). V rodinné části je provedena analýza center péče o děti a rodinné politiky (rodičovská dovolená, mateřská dovolená a otcovská dovolená). Následuje klasifikace Jižní Koreje na základě Leitnerovy (2003) typologie 4 silného/slabého konceptu familialismu-defamilialismu. V kulturní části je analýza dat KGSS Codebooks z let 2005, 2006, 2012 a kumulativních dat 2003-2018 a interpretace výsledků odrážejících kulturní aspekty konfucianismu. V této práci se potvrdily první dvě hypotézy: „Rodinné politiky mají tendenci posilovat“ a „hluboce se rozvíjející sociální režim nemusí nutně vést ke společenské změně, institucionální změna předchází společenské změně“. Hypotézu, podle které „konfucianismus má negativní efekt na fertilitu“, se sice nepovedlo vyvrátit, ale ani jednoznačně potvrdit, protože zde působí více vlivů a není jasná linie argumentu, kterou by se odpověď dala určit.

Keywords

South Korea; fertility; TFR; family policy; Childcare centres; social welfare; direct costs; Confucianism.

Klíčová slova

Jižní Korea; porodnost; Míra celkové porodnosti; rodinná politika; jesle; sociální blahobyt; přímé náklady; konfucianismus.

Title

South Korea's challenge: Low fertility rate and Government's policies to enhance fertility rate

Název práce

Nízká porodnost a vládní politika k jejímu zvýšení jako výzva pro Jižní Koreu

2. Timothy 4: 7

„I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith.“

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Introduction

The presented thesis aims to give an interdisciplinary understanding of the fertility topic in South Korea. The low fertility phenomenon has become a problem in South Korea and many other OECD countries as the population ages and fertility rates decline (OECD, 2019; Van De Kaa, 1987). However, the South Korean fertility rate has long been estimated to be the lowest; therefore, the national government has sought to address tackle the low fertility as a major obstacle to the future of South Koreans. Especially after the Government introduced various pro-family policies and pro-natality plans, which have not been successful, it has become a puzzle for many scholars and experts trying to understand the phenomenon. Government policies were ineffective; instead, it has shown a somewhat decreasing trend and sometimes the Total Fertility Rate (hereafter referred to as TFR) fell to “very low”, “ultra-low” or “the lowest-low” fertility rate (Kim, 2005; Park, 2020; Yoo, Sobotka, 2018).

The South Korean fertility transition could be divided into two stages. The first fertility transition took place between 1960-1985, and the second began in 1985 and has continued to the present. In the first phase of the transition, the Korean government’s goal was to reduce fertility, explaining it by various factors: *socioeconomic changes, technological differences, migration, mortality decline, and family planning programs*. This phase could be sociologically termed “de-fertilization” (Kim, 2005, p.20).

The second fertility transition was the opposite, with the Korean government trying to increase the fertility rate. Compared to the first phase, South Koreans are aware of *socioeconomic changes, globalization, labour market insecurity, family formation, and gender equity*. This second fertility transition phase could be called “re-fertilization” (Kim, 2005, p.20).

Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea has been undergoing institutional changes in social welfare for 24 years (Chang, 1999; Sacchi, Roh, 2016). Since then, South Korea has experienced profound institutional changes to boost its fertility rate (Song, 2003). However, the South Korean government has not successfully enhanced the fertility rate because its policies are ineffective. In 2019, South Korea had the lowest-low fertility rate (the TFR fell below 1.3 and is often described as the “lowest-low” fertility) of 0.9 children per woman and had one of the lowest fertility rates among OECD member states

over the past 20 years or so (Yoo and Sobotka, 2018, p. 552). Therefore, the Korean Government raises concerns about the future of South Koreans (OECD, 2019).

Experts say that if the low fertility rate trend continues, the 51-million-strong population will shrink by a third over the next 50 years (Kim and Parish, 2020, p. 1). In addition to the low fertility, the South Korean population is also aging. Such trends are expected to have demographic, economic and social consequences (Stephen, 2012).

With such a challenge, it is in Government's interest to provide various pro-family oriented policies to secure and enhance work-and-family life, to build healthy family lives (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011). The fertility phenomenon constitutes a comprehensive problem that can be approached from multiple perspectives.

The diploma thesis relies on three major theories – the theory of Economic Analysis of Fertility by Nobel prize winner Gary S. Becker, who analysed the behaviour of households and families. He examined the West's post-war family behaviour and causality based on income and fertility. His socio-economic view on fertility and economic discrimination, and wage gap differences among families and society had additional value in studying Economics and fertility phenomena (Becker, 1960; Becker, 1957; Monk-Turner, Turner, 2004).

Although the fertility issue is predominantly a family matter, it is also a state's interest in boosting fertility. Nevertheless, the thesis addresses the gender perspective because it plays a significant role in how effective and successful the Government is raising the fertility rate. Therefore, the second relevant theory for this research will be Sigrid Leitner's theory of defamilialisation and the typology of varieties of familialism (Leitner, 2003). South Korea is a particular case that cannot be easily classified. Sigrid Leitner focused on welfare states mainly for European countries, just like her predecessor Gosta Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Later on, Sigrid Leitner extended her theory based on gender. Nevertheless, the author will seek to define South Korea against Sigrid Leitner's typology of familialisation and the concept of familialisation/de-familialisation (Leitner, 2003).

The last dominant theory applied in this research was determined by Pfau-Effinger, who linked culture and welfare state policies and established the concept of welfare culture (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). The theory facilitates understanding and explaining the Confucian cultural phenomenon (patriarchal and its familial aspects) and its implications on South Korean families' cultural and ethical values that shape and navigate the society's norms and behaviour (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, 2005). Moreover, the thesis

will also attempt to understand Confucianism from a familial and work culture perspective, essential for South Korean relational and inter-relational ethics (Kim and Kim, 2020).

South Korea is working on various social policies to address fertility issues. It primarily takes inspiration from Scandinavian countries on multiple ways to enhance fertility rates and build a gender-equal society and a sustainable work-family balance life (Park, 2021). The author's argumentation is based on cultural difference, which is hard to change. Although institutional changes for South Korean social welfare have been successful, the author of this thesis believes that the societal changes are lagging.

The present research represents a case study (Yin, 2018), i.e., an intensive study focusing on critical analysis and systematic investigation of South Korean case, examining in-depth secondary data concerning its topic from peer-reviewed journals and other online data relating to the low fertility rate.

To allow the author of this thesis to argue and explain the low low fertility phenomenon in South Korea, three major familialistic tools: *parental leaves*, *maternal leaves*, and *paternal leave*, shall be assessed from the three theoretical perspectives (economic, familialistic and cultural).

However, there is no simple solution to the low fertility phenomenon. This is a rather complex phenomenon, so this thesis will try to understand and interpret it from economic, familialistic and cultural perspectives. This topic could be treated from multiple perspectives. However, the author shall focus only on these three theories due to the complexity and our scope of analysis.

In conclusion, the present Diploma thesis will include a discussion of the problem of South Korea fertility considering the current political situation. In addition, the limitations of the research will also be examined, and recommendations will be made on how to analyse this phenomenon further.

1. Gary S. Becker: An economic approach on fertility

Gary S. Becker was a Nobel Prize-winning economist who focused his research on fertility seen from an economic perspective. He concentrated on human capital, the family, and family behaviour to observe and analyse the socio-economic causalities (Becker, 1993; Becker, 1960; Becker, 1976). In this respect, Becker's theory on fertility is substantial for the present Diploma thesis. This chapter attempts to explain the low fertility phenomenon in South Korea from a socio-economic perspective. Becker focused on post-war demographic changes in the West, particularly the US. Thus, his work does not necessarily fit Asian countries such as South Korea (Becker, 1960; Becker, 1993).

Nevertheless, the author will apply his theory and characteristics observed in the West on South Korea, since this land is considered a democracy, the tenth-largest economy, and many authors consider it an advanced welfare state (Estevez-Abe, Yang, Choi, 2016, p. 303; Kim, 2011; The Korea Herald, 2021).

Becker's economic theory on *human capital, family, and family behaviour* shall facilitate understanding the low fertility phenomenon in South Korea from an economic perspective. Families are essential as a whole unit because families are at the centre of deciding whether to have children, how many, and how much they will spend on them. However, Becker's concept is outdated and lacks a gender perspective; therefore, the author has decided to expand his theory from a gender-sensitive perspective by observing and analysing the disproportional utilization of family policy tools (parental leaves, maternal leave, paternal leave) by fathers and mothers. In particular, the amount and duration of these family subventions provided by the State and employers shall be assessed.

As said above, a family consensus is needed to decide who will be the caregiver and breadwinner-respectively, who will take the state subventions in the form of parental leaves.

Family is often seen as an essential foundation for the society for which the Government provides various social welfare policies. In this chapter, nevertheless, it will be assumed that families themselves play the most crucial role as an actor in increasing fertility, which is a current and future concern of South Korea (Schultz, 1990; Becker, 1993; Becker, 1960, p. 341).

Before Becker's theory on fertility and human capital, seen from the family perspective, the Malthusian and Neoclassical models perceive fertility as a dynamic growth process per capita income, arguing that with higher income, fertility also grows (Becker, 1992, p. 185). The Neoclassical model, which later replaced the Malthusian model, emphasised individual consumer choice describing the family as the central actor in societies that makes decisions and directs the behaviour in consumption, production, reproduction, and child-rearing decisions. According to Schultz, this model did not focus merely on consumption and production but also on reproduction, child-rearing, and women labour participation (Schultz, 1990).

On the other hand, from Becker's perspective, these theories neglect the economic way of looking at life from the family perspective (Becker, 1960; Becker, 1992; Becker 1993). The modern State has become more productive with *industrialization, focusing on human capital, education, training, and health*, which changed the way of perceiving economic growth. Furthermore, *technological advancements* have significantly changed the demand for workers in the market. As countries' productivity has increased, the cost of time and education for children has risen, reducing the demand for large families. Parents in industrialised economies also emphasise the quality that the number of children in demand, emphasizing human capital, education, training, and health (Becker 1992; Becker, 1993, p. 12).

According to Becker, human capital is the intangible capital produced by investing in them. Education and training are considered essential investments in human capital. There are varieties of education and training: *knowledge, skills, health, values*, etc., in which capital and non-capital values are invested (Becker, 1993, p. 16-17).

Becker synthesises both models (Malthusian and Neoclassical) and further elaborates the human capital phenomenon. He states that the link between investments in human capital and economic growth is strong. According to Becker, investments in human resources in spheres such as knowledge and skills are essential for economic development. Moreover, technological and scientific expertise goes hand in hand with economic growth and economic development. Becker argues that the rates of return on human capital investments pay off (Becker, 1993, p. 324-325). On the other hand, Becker also assumes that higher fertility discourages human and physical capital investments. According to Becker, with higher income and stock of capital, the demand for children decreases due to the higher costs incurred in childcare (Becker, 1993, p. 325).

An Analysis on Fertility is Becker's influential work, taken as an inspiration for understanding the phenomenon of fertility. To understand fertility, Becker defines children – economic terms – as “*special goods*” (Becker, 1960). To the parents, children are perceived as “*consumer durables*”, “*long-lived assets*” providing welfare and utility to the parents (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 17). Becker also defines children as “*a source of psychic income or satisfaction*” that makes parents actually want to have and invest in children, as they consider them as an investment in human capital that will eventually have a higher rate of return in the future.

Nevertheless, the family determines the size, the number of children, and the quality of children, demanded by the parents. Becker says that “higher quality” (not necessarily morally better) is the additional utility of parents, which they receive from additional expenditures spent on their children (Becker, 1960, p. 212; Becker, 1976, p. 173). However, in modern society with a low child mortality rate and the introduction of contraception, higher income no longer leads to higher fertility (Becker, 1960, p. 212-213; Becker, 1993, p. 99).

Becker argues that the larger the family size, the higher are the expenses (Becker, 1960, p. 210-213, p. 231). Becker's data have shown that income and fertility negatively correlate in developed countries. Per capita incomes and human and physical capital grow in such societies, but fertility declines. Also, married women extensively participate in the labour force (Becker, 1960, p. 215; Becker, 1992, p. 185).

Thus, wealthier parents generally tend to invest more in higher quality and higher qualities of other goods. However, higher expenditures can be associated with higher costs, explaining why wealthier families tend to have fewer children than poorer families in the society. “They simply choose high-quality children as well as higher quality of goods over a high quantity of children” (Becker, 1960, p. 214).

Becker's post-war survey on Indianapolis, USA, has shown that contraception knowledge converted the positive correlation between income and fertility. On the other hand, knowledge of contraception did not influence the relation between income and fertility in Sweden between 1917-1930 (Becker, 1960, p. 220).

Becker states, that fertility is also determined by factors other than *income* and *child costs*, such as child and adult *mortality*, *knowledge*, *uncertainty* (sex preference, intelligence,

height, demand for their consumption, etc.), and *tastes* (Becker, 1960, p. 231; Becker, 1992, p. 185).

In this case, “tastes” refer to the parent’s preferences, such as their desired number of children (Becker, 1960, p. 211). In addition, according to Becker, fertility and the desired number of children can also be determined by *religion, race, age*, and other factors.

Various factors are influencing the behaviour of parents to have a baby. From an economic perspective, we perceive parents as rational people – homo economicus - who want to have children by their free decision and calculus. It has been demonstrated that knowledge of contraceptives and their distribution in society may play a significant role in fertility control (Becker, 1960, p. 210-211).

Despite the complexity of fertility phenomenon, Becker links the correlation between fertility and income as a firm argument for understanding the fertility-related behaviour of families. He states that when income increases, the quantity and quality of children should increase; however, the quantity elasticity would be smaller than the quality elasticity (Becker, 1957, p. 174).

Such cases have been observed in many developed countries, in modern economies. While per capita incomes, human and physical capital continues to grow, the fertility rate declines. Women’s participation in the labour market has also highly influenced fertility growth in developed countries (Becker, 1992, p. 185).

Authors Wang and Sun take Becker’s fertility phenomenon further by emphasising the importance of political freedom. Wang and Sun conducted a cross-country analysis on how socio-political and economic factors influence the fertility decline (Wang, Sun, 2016). They compiled a list of countries where various variables were measured (“*total fertility rate, infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, urban population, GDP per capita, household expenditures, index of human capital per person, political freedom, contraceptive prevalence rate*”) (Wang, Sun, 2016, p. 366). The countries were divided on a scale of income, from *High income, Upper middle, Lower middle* to *Low income* (Wang, Sun, 2016, p. 366-367). Their research concluded that political freedom plays a significant role in how people perceive fertility. The deterioration of political independence had a worsening effect on fertility in Upper Middle-income countries. In contrast, it showed a positive impact on Lower middle and Low-income countries. In particular, investments in human capital appeared to play a crucial role in fertility declines across the list of countries

with different income categories. Low-income countries have appeared to invest more in human capital to reduce fertility rates and advance the development (Wang, Sun, 2016, p. 369).

Despite the complexity of the fertility phenomenon and the lack of gender sensitivity in Becker's theory, it has facilitated the author to comprehend South Korea's low fertility rate from an economic perspective. Becker's theory also enabled understanding family behaviours as homo economicus, rationally thinking people calculating the costs of having children. As part of modern society, South Korean families emphasize the importance of investments in human capital, as described by Becker. Especially in such a competitive market, like South Korea, high demand for education, prestige, honour to family resonates in the society. Therefore, families prefer fewer children for the sake of higher education and higher quality of life, contrary to having more children and constraining their budget.

Also, a career life constitutes an essential factor determining South Koreans' lives. On the one hand, the State relies on women's labour force to participation in the labour market. On the other hand, the State provides various social policies to address the low fertility rate as a potential demographic and socio-economic problem. Modern society has provided higher education opportunities for women. The women's labour force became an inseparable part to the State's economy. With growing capital and South Koreans becoming more prosperous, the cost of child-rearing and children's education rises. Moreover, the earning forgone by sacrificing career prospects for the sake of childbearing and child-rearing has also increased. To understand the costs and forgone costs connected to child-rearing, we need to understand "the costs" invested or sacrificed by the parents (career prospects) who decide to marry and have children. Also, we need to understand the so-called direct costs for *food, clothing, housing, and education* which are relevant for understanding the budget constraint of South Korean families.

1.1 Direct and Indirect costs

In the previous chapter, Gary S. Becker's theory was introduced. Becker pioneered a model of fertility decision-making based on income and preferences from a family perspective (Becker, 1957; Becker, 1960; Becker, 1992; Becker, 1993).

The 2009 EU report on the cost of children conducted an analysis for European Council and presented a methodological and theoretical framework to explain the low fertility phenomenon in the EU, which analysing how policies impact and influence the fertility rate (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009).

This report assumes that the cost per child represents an average of 20-30% of a childless couple (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 21). Bauer and Rettig (2002) compared the costs of children in urban areas of USA, comparing the estimates of the direct costs of children between two-parent and single-parent families (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 20). The authors argue that the costs vary depending on the family's economic situation and the age of children. Moreover, the costs of children increase with age of the children, especially during the transition to adulthood. However, in France, a decreasing pattern of expenses on childcare and education and clothing has been confirmed with the increasing age of a child (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 20). Nevertheless, *food* expenditure accounts for the most significant part of the consumption pie, with *childcare* and *education* expenditure second and *transportation* costs third (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 20-21).

Therefore, the author of the thesis believes that the costs of raising children, such as *food*, *clothing*, *education*, and *housing* play a significant role for families and parents who choose to have children, primarily because childbearing is associated with budget constraint. Couples are driven by rational economic decisions to have children. Therefore, a couple's decision to have a child is perceived as a utility maximisation process, a function of economic costs and benefits of children (Letablier and Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 81).

Child-rearing costs and measuring the costs of children can be divided into *direct* and *indirect costs* (Finch, Bradshaw, 2003; Finch, Bradshaw and Soo, 2005; Thévenon in:

Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009). The *direct costs* on children consist of expenditures on *food, clothing, childcare, education, housing, etc.* On the other hand, *indirect costs* represent the loss of income incurred because of having children and the opportunity costs of the mothers who decreased working hours or quit their jobs due to childcare. The indirect costs also include the loss of career prospects due to childcare (Finch, Bradshaw, 2003, p. 5; Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 17). In addition to these variables, representing both tangible and intangible costs, there are other costs, the so-called psychological costs, that need to be considered as well (Finch, Bradshaw, 2003, p. 6-7).

Finch and Bradshaw examined the trends of low fertility in Northern Europe to explore possible causalities influencing the low fertility phenomenon (Finch, Bradshaw, 2003). They refer to Castles (2002), who compared 21 advanced industrial countries on a cross-country basis. In tracing changes in fertility trajectories between 1960 and 1998, Castles analysed a variety of traditional cultural values (Catholic faith, Overall divorce rate) and non-traditional labour market structures (Service employment, Female employment, Female labour force, Female tertiary education, Female unemployment) that may affect fertility trends. The two different trends in 1980 and in 1998 has been deduced. In the first period, there was a negative correlation between female employment and total period fertility rates; in 1998, the trend was quite the opposite. A positive correlation was examined. Therefore, the authors argue that women's labour behaviour plays a decisive role in fertility change (Castles, 2002, p. 23-25).

Table 1: Patterns of association between period total fertility rates and variables measuring family and employment structure in 21 OECD countries in 1980 and 1998

	Correlation with period total fertility rates	
	1980	1998
Catholic adherence	.47*	-.43*
Total divorce rate	-.43*	.49*
Service employment	-.44*	.55*
Female employment	-.47*	.53*
Female labour force	-.47*	.50*
Female tertiary education	-.26	.53*
Female unemployment	.17	-.53*

Source: Castles, 2002, p. 25

Post-material values theory says that women have greater autonomy and wide-open opportunities, which could be contrasted with the traditional model of families where patriarchal behavioural patterns have prevailed. Factors such as “*female autonomy, self-realization, satisfaction of personal preferences, liberalism and freedom from traditional forces of authority (such as religion), the emancipation of women, the increased role for women in the paid labour market, the contraceptive revolution and the liberalization of divorce and abortion legislation have led to increased material independence for women and increased individual choice in relation to marriage and childbearing*” played the most decisive role in shifting from the traditional to the liberal fertility behaviour (Bradshaw, Finch and Soo, 2005, p. 1). These features meant more variety of choices for women, particularly giving them the possibility to decide how many children they wanted, even if they want to remain childless (Pearce et al., 1999).

Women’s perspective from the post-material values theory and the cost of children is further elaborated by the following theories: Gender equity theory, Rational choice theory and Risk Aversion theory (Bradshaw, Finch and Soo, 2005, p. 7-8; Finch, Bradshaw, 2003, p. 5-6).

McDonald (2000) suggests that the traditional patriarchal breadwinner model of family narrative must change to the gender-neutral narrative to raise fertility. Such change in the narrative must change not only in families but also in family-oriented institutions. Therefore, Gender equity theory does not determine the work of the family (income-earning, childcaring and housework) based on gender, but based on individual choice and mutual consensus (McDonald, 2000; Finch, Bradshaw, 2003, p. 5-6).

Rational choice theory explains that if the cost of having children outweighs each additional child’s marginal rate of return, the couples will not have more children. The diminishing rate of returns of having children explains that at some point, the cost of an additional child will be higher than beneficial due to their budget constraints. Thus, the high economic costs of childrearing may discourage couples from having children. Also, with each additional child, the psychological benefits diminish. Therefore, in societies where the psychological benefits of having children are low and where the economic costs

of children are high, fertility rates are low, and families with fewer children are preferred (Bradshaw, Finch and Soo, 2005, p. 8).

The Risk Aversion theory explains the risks of individuals linked with having a child. Especially, after the birth of a child, the direction and orientation of the individual change tremendously. Economic, social, and personal futures and benefits can become risky. To maintain risk-free life, people decide not to have a child to secure their living standards (Finch, Bradshaw, 2003, p. 6).

The present thesis also explores the topic from a gender perspective connected to men and women's indirect and psychological costs. Especially from a women's position, Gary S. Becker disregards in his studies. In his work - *The Economics of Discrimination* – he did not focus on the gender (in)equality and pay-gap (in)equality between men and women. He analysed the racial (White x Non-white), employer x employee discriminations in the market (Becker, 1957). Nevertheless, this thesis pays close attention to the indirect costs of sacrificing career prospects and forgone earnings, especially for women (mothers) for the sake of childbearing and childrearing, which are related to the scope of analysis – low fertility (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009; Castles, 2002; Finch, Bradshaw, 2003; Pearce et al., 1999).

1 Sigrid Leitner: A typology of familialisation and concept of familialisation/de-familialisation

Before introducing the concept of Sigrid Leitner, attention shall be paid to Gosta Esping Andersen's concept of decommodification and how its relation to the role of the family as seen from the sociological perspective. Both concepts, decommodification and familialisation/de-familialisation, are meant to explain the author's line of argumentation in this chapter as the reasoning why the State intervenes in family matters via family policies. Thus, both Esping-Andersen's and Sigrid Leitner's concepts will help the author study and understand the low fertility phenomenon in South Korea and draw implications therefrom.

Gosta Esping-Andersen is a pioneer who analysed welfare state regimes (mainly for European countries) and created a typology of three capitalistic welfare state regimes (Anglo-saxon, German and Scandinavian) by observing how they differ from character and decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Esping-Andersen developed a typology of three welfare capitalistic regimes in Europe: *a) liberal regimes b) conservative regimes* and *c) social regimes* (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 74-86).

Table 2: A summary overview of regime characteristics

	Liberal	Social democratic	Conservative
Role of:			
Family	Marginal	Marginal	Central
Market	Central	Marginal	Marginal
State	Marginal	Central	Subsidiary
Welfare state:			
Dominant mode of solidarity	Individual	Universal	Kinship Corporatism Etatism
Dominant locus of solidarity	Market	State	Family
Degree of decommodification	Minimal	Maximum	High (for bread-winner)
Modal Examples	USA	Sweden	Germany Italy

Source: Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 85

As a post-Marxist, Esping-Andersen came up with the concept of decommodification, which refers to defining the extent to which workers/employees in the post-industrial economies are independent of the market force (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen,

1999). Unlike liberals, he did not believe in the power of the market as an *invisible hand* solving social issues of equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 11). The concept of decommodification in capitalistic welfare regimes emphasises the role of the State as a protector ensuring the social rights of its people who are in need: *unemployed, disable, sick, old etc.* (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 47-49). The ultimate goal of the welfare state is to protect its people from any abusive or discriminatory forms based on social stratification or market forces. From an idealistic perspective, the welfare state should opt for equality, providing solidarity through social policies to diminish inequalities, poverty, unequal distribution of income etc. (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 3-4).

Furthermore, Esping-Andersen identified familialistic and de-familialising welfare regimes, according to the extent to which by the family plays a role in well-being of family members (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leitner, 2003, p. 354). The welfare regime can be defined as the combination and interdependence of the State, the market, and the family, producing and allocating welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 34-35). Often the role of the family is omitted. However, according to Esping-Andersen, the political economy lacks a sociological perspective when it neglects the family perspective, “a micro-foundation of society” (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 35).

Caregiving responsibilities can be divided between *State, Market, and Private households (families)*, the so-called *welfare triangle (welfare triad or welfare pillars)*, explaining which sector occupies the dominant caregiving role (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 35-36; Leitner, 2003, p. 356). The provision and method of welfare may differ for these actors: the State often takes the form of authoritative redistribution (not egalitarianism), the Market provides financial aid via cash nexus, the allocation method would be presumably via reciprocity (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 35-36).

In conservative societies, the family itself assumes the essential caregiving role. The State and Market provision of services largely absent in such conservative welfare regimes. On the other hand, de-familialisation can occur through public social services (state) or the market. Scandinavian countries are characterised by the more substantial role of public service, whereas in liberal countries, the market assumes a more decisive role (Leitner, 2003, p. 356-357).

Feminist scholars have criticised Esping-Andersen for neglecting the gender perspective in his analysis. Women became an inseparable part of the State’s labour force. Thus, the State’s concern is to motivate women to participate in the workforce and encourage childbearing with the help of childrearing (Leiner, 2003; Saraceno, 2016, p. 315).

De-familialisation policies, which are successful and strong in Scandinavian countries in tackling the fertility problems, help lower women’s dependency on family obligations (childrearing and childcaring), participate in the market’s labour force, and provide welfare (Park, 2021).

Sigrid Leitner and her major work “*Varieties of Familialism*” further develop and expand her predecessor with a gender-sensitive theory (Leitner, 2003).

Table 3: Gendered and de-gendered variations of familialism

	<i>Gendered familialism</i>	<i>Mixed cases</i>	<i>De-gendered familialism</i>
Optional familialism	France	Finland, Belgium	Denmark, Sweden
Explicit familialism	Germany, Italy, Luxembourg	Austria	

Source: Leitner, 2003, p. 371

She focuses on the role of the State or family in caring for children and the elderly. In her work, she conceptualises and develops a theoretical framework according to which she creates a typology of four ideal types: 1) *Optional familialism* – the family can decide whether to take on familialising or defamilialising family care; 2) *Explicit familialism* – the State wants the family to take responsibility, it also lacks alternative provision of family care; 3) *De-familialism* – the State or market takes responsibility and provides care services; and 4) *Implicit familialism* – the State does not offer any support nor alternatives, as the family is the primary caretaker. This matrix is combines strong/weak familialisation and strong/weak de-familialisation. Leitner’s typology of familialisation/de-familialisation is to identify real-world variations of familialism (Leitner, 2003, p. 358-359).

Table 4: Combinations of strong/weak familialisation and strong/weak de-familialisation

<i>Familialization</i>	<i>De-familialization</i>	
Strong	Strong	Weak
Weak	Optional familialism	Explicit familialism
	De-familialism	Implicit familialism

Source: Leitner, 2003, p. 358

According to Leitner, de-familialising care policies provide more options to the family caregivers, taking into account gender equality perspectives with more opportunities to manage childcare and participate in the labour market. Therefore, it weakens traditional breadwinner models where men participate in the labour force, and women stay home as caregivers (Leitner, 2003, p. 366). On the other hand, familialistic policies want to maintain and strengthen the traditional gender roles, especially the role of women as the primary caregiver of the family (Leitner, 2003, p. 366-371). However, the dichotomy of male breadwinners and female caregivers (homemakers) no longer correspond to the women's employment policies and the trend of dual-earner models (Leitner, 2003, p. 354-355; OECD, 2019).

Furthermore, this does not necessarily mean that de-familialisation is good and familialisation is wrong. The dichotomy of familialisation and de-familialisation should not be understood as black and white, right and wrong. Both familialistic and de-familialistic policies are to assist and help families and individuals. Moreover, the family should not be neglected as it is the fundamental unit assuming the most responsibility and playing a crucial role in choosing and using various social policies such as childcare and elderly care (Saraceno, 2016, p. 316).

However, since this research focuses on the phenomenon of fertility in South Korea, the author will focus on children and childcare policies, which are relevant to the topic. As described in Becker, children are very precious assets, providing us (families) with benefits (Becker, 1960; Becker, 1993). Chiara Saraceno, an Italian feminist scholar, focused on different variants of familialism across Europe (EU 27), i.e., who should take care of children, why should they care for children and how should they care for our children (Saraceno, Keck, 2010; Saraceno, 2011).

Saraceno and Keck write about the responsibility towards our children. In developed countries it is not perceived as only a family responsibility, but also the State, who takes part in child-rearing responsibility (Saraceno, 2011). It combines private (family) and public (state) responsibilities. The childcare support represents a combination of private and public provision via services and financial aid. These responsibilities vary across countries as the authors describe them as “*patterns of intergenerational obligations*” (Saraceno, Keck, 2010, p. 676; Saraceno, 2016). Based on observations of these “*patterns*” or “*different traits*”, embedded in history and culture, the authors cluster European countries into three or four different conceptualisations of familialism: 1) *familialism by default* – unsupported familialism; 2) *supported familialism* – both financial and care support provided; 3) *de-familialisation* – individual social rights or entitlement to reduce family responsibility and dependency; and 4) *between supported familialism and de-familialism* – as a scarce case (Estevez-Abe, Yang, Choi, 2016, p. 310; Saraceno, Keck, 2010).

After conducting a cross-country and inter-country comparative analysis of European countries (EU 27), Saraceno extended her scope of analysis further toward *cross-border* and *cross-area* comparative analysis, observing and analysing similarities and differences of four familialistic welfare regimes of southern Europe (Italy and Spain) and East Asia (South Korea and Japan) (Saraceno, 2016). In this work, she updated and elaborated her previous concept and typology of familialisation and defamilialisation continuum as into five ideal types:

1) *Familialism by default* (unsupported familialism) – the family has no or little support (financial or public service); 2) *Prescribed familialism* – legislation commands and prescribes the financial and care obligations; 3) *Supported familialism* – direct or indirect (taxation) family-oriented supports; 4) *Supported de-familialisation through the market* – the State provides monetary benefits, vouchers or tax deductions through the Market; and 5) *De-familialisation through public provision* – provision through public services (Saraceno, 2016, p. 315-323).

However, the familialisation/de-familialisation concept is not the only feature to determine the countries welfare regime and possible policies (Saraceno, 2011; Saraceno, 2016; Saraceno, Keck, 2010; Leitner, 2003; Estevez-Abe, Yang, Choi, 2016).

Estevez-Abe and Naldini focused on a cross-country analysis between some South European and some East Asian welfare states in their research. By comparing Spain, Italy, South Korea, and Japan, they identified a distinct factor that playing a decisive role in forming and implementing de-familialisation policies. For them, the “role of politics” in the de-familialisation policies was crucial (Estevez-Abe, Naldini, 2016). They argue that politics is essential in creating the design of de-familialisation policies. In their work, they argue that there are two ways, in which these emerge: 1) *election-oriented* – the role of electoral systems, as observed in Spain and South Korea; 2) *problem-oriented* – the role of government, as seen in Italy and Japan (Estevez-Abe, Naldini, 2016; p. 335).

Last but not least, one should not neglect the role of culture and values that shape and navigate the social behaviour, which plays the role of a *toolkit* or *repertoire* for new policies (Saraceno, 2016, p. 317). For the research, the thesis aims to define South Korea and its familialistic/de-familialistic policies as one of those clusters of varieties of familialism made by Leitner (2003), a more straightforward and universal typology and concept.

2 Pfau-Effinger: Culture and welfare state approach on fertility

In this chapter, the low fertility phenomenon in South Korea will be assessed from a cultural perspective. This chapter further elaborates Becker's theory, for he did emphasise the cultural aspect of fertility. Furthermore, the author argues that de-familialisation policies as benchmarked from the Scandinavian countries are inadequate for implementation in South Korea, because they do not consider the cultural aspect. On the other hand, the author perceives this aspect as the most significant and in the contrary to de-familialisation policies introduced by the West (Park, 2021).

This chapter aims to highlight the cultural determinants ("welfare culture") that are a cornerstone of the present thesis (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Its author argues that culture influences character, policy settings, and, most of all, it shapes and navigates the people's behaviour (Thomas in Thomas, Kinast, Schroll-Machl, 2010). Thus, cultural determinants have a significant impact on social phenomena such as fertility.

In her paper "*Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex Interrelation*", Pfau-Effinger provided a theoretical framework of how culture may influence and impact the development of welfare state policies (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

Before linking the relationship between culture and welfare state policies ("welfare culture"), the term "culture" needs to be determined (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

One definition describes culture as "*a system of collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality*" (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 4). Geert Hofstede defines culture as "*a collective pattern of thinking*", "*feeling*", and "*potential acting*" that has been learned throughout the lifetime or as "*a set of values and norms shared by the community*" (Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, 2005, p. 2-4).


The cultural standards (Thomas in Thomas, Kinast, Schroll-Machl, 2010, p. 21-27) and *cultural dimensions* (Hofstede, 2001, p. 24-34) may also conceptualise culture.

Alexander Thomas defined cultural standards as "*a system of orientation*" or as "*a set of norms and values*", which establish a frame of behaviour that is normal, typical, and

acceptable in the society (Thomas in Thomas, Kinast, Schroll-Machl, 2010, p. 21-22; Kinast, Schroll-machl in Thomas, Kinast, Schroll-Machl, 2010, p. 384).

In his seminal work “*Cultures and Organizations. Software of the mind. Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival.*”, Geert Hofstede evaluated the data of a survey among IBM corporate employees consisting of employees from more than 50 nations. By conducting the survey, he realised that all people from different countries (cultures) shared similar problems. He developed a concept of “*cultural dimensions*” to analyse the similarities and differences of their behaviour and cultural differences. The five dimensions are as follows: 1) *Power Distance* – measuring the degree of inequality; 2) *Uncertainty Avoidance* – the extent how the society feel threatened and ambiguous; 3) *Individualism vs Collectivism* – measuring the degree of individualism; 4) *Masculinity vs Femininity* – gender stereotype perceiving men and women; and 5) *Long-term vs Short-term Orientation* – people’s choice of focus for people’s efforts: present or future (Hofstede, 2001, p. 29; Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, 2005). Moreover, he linked the culture with IT (Informative technology) by defining culture as “*a software of the mind*”, or “*mental programming*”, which is considered as a collective phenomenon, learned not innate and challenging to change (Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, 2005).

Diagram 1: Three Levels of Human Mental Programming




Source: Hofstede, 2001, p. 3

Hofstede explains the manifestation of culture at different levels of depth, which is viewed in an “Onion Diagram”, which has many layers. The culture reproduces itself through

values, rituals, heroes, and symbols and passes it on to the next generations. Therefore, by practicing the cultural manifestation embedded in its values, the cultural heritage preserves, and cultural change is hard to achieve (Hofstede, 2001, p. 11).

Diagram 2: The “Onion Diagram”: Manifestation of Culture at Different Levels of Depth



Source: Hofstede, 2001, p. 11

In her work, Pfau-Effinger elaborates and interlinks culture with the welfare of the society and defines the “*welfare culture*” (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). She describes welfare culture as a complex of relevant ideas in a society, which are rooted in society and influence the welfare state (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 4). Moreover, she argues that welfare culture influences the welfare state policies related to the social actors and their values, ideas, and interests, who fight with other political actors in a political arena. Therefore, it is a complex interrelation of culture and welfare state policy in the societal context, wherein such political arena, various ideas, and interests collide, negotiate, and compromise (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 5-6). (For more information see the appendix no. 2 – Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 5)

Christianity and Christian democratic parties have influenced the design and formation of the European welfare states. Later, Neo-liberalism further developed the welfare state for more than 20 years (Oorschot, Opielka, Pfau-Effinger, 2008, p. 1). Also, the relationship between culture and the welfare state has been further analysed by presenting a more global perspective (Oorschot, Opielka, Pfau-Effinger, 2008).

However, cultural values and ideas resonate in society, restricting the spectrum of possible policies. The particular society with its specific social culture shapes and navigates state

welfare policies and social structures, preferences, and societal interests (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 4).

On the other hand, Ronald Inglehart - the theorist of Modernity - argues that each generation is confronted with its unique conditions of life to which it must adapt (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart, Welzel, 2007).

Kim Doo-Sub also speaks about the importance of the values and attitudes of society. He argues that they do not arise in a societal vacuum but rather as a result of socio-economic, political, and demographic factors (Kim, 2005, p. 11). Ronald Inglehart also supports this assertion by confirming the undisputed correlations between economic, cultural, and political developments. Therefore, the changes of one sphere are not independent but automatically determine and influence the changes in other spheres. This assumption has been confirmed in *World Values Surveys* conducted in more than 80 countries (Inglehart, Halman, Welzel in Vinken, Soeters, Ester, 2004, p. 6-20; Inglehart, Welzel, 2007, p. 15-47). Ronald Inglehart proposes the possibility of cultural change within its cultural values with socialization hypothesis, claiming that cultural changes happen through generational replacement. The younger generation modifies its value system, which it has adopted from parents, by adapting to its current conditions and problems. In this way, new value system brings new changes and developments to the society (Inglehart, 1990, p. 68; Inglehart, Halman, Welzel in Vinken, Soeters, Ester, 2004, p. 8; Inglehart, Welzel, 2007, p. 98).

3 Methodology

The present Diploma thesis aims to study South Korea from an interdisciplinary perspective: *economic, familialistic, and cultural (social)*, to explain the reality, i.e., the behaviour of South Korean families that would explain the low fertility phenomenon - why fertility rates do not increase despite growing government investments in family policies (political/institutional). The relationship between culture (Confucianism) and social welfare is the crucial line of argument (Park, Cho, 1995; Song, 2003; Kim, Kim, 2019).

Pfau-Effinger (2005) has expanded the social welfare theory regarding the relevance of cultural aspects to social welfare – *welfare culture*.

However, this thesis aims to explain and interpret the cultural and social welfare specifics in South Korea and its effects on fertility (Anderson and Kohler, 2013; Kim, 2017; Pfau-Effinger, 2005). It is essential to notice that the fertility phenomenon cannot be perceived only as black and white, i.e., the implication of cultural aspects in low fertility may not be the only factor within a complex set of factors. Thus, the author will try to determine certain cultural specifics linked to the social welfare and family policies of South Korea and observe some cultural traits connected to the low fertility phenomenon in that country.

The present thesis shall also describe the evolution and change of South Korean family policies in terms of Government policies how to address the low fertility between 1997 and 2017 (Seo, 2017). After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the South Korean welfare system experienced significant development (Chang, 1999; Sacchi, Roh, 2016). Moreover, 2017 meant a prominent Government change, as progressive president Moon Jae-In replaced conservative and corrupt former President Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of former authoritarian president Park Chung-Hee.

However, family policy tools, such as *parental leaves, maternal leaves, and paternity leaves* are perceived as an essential form of public subsidies to support families and raise fertility (Lee, 2020). The institutional perspective of de-familialism (Childcare centres) and supported familialism in the form of family policy tools will be analysed. According to these family policy tools, South Korea will be described as Leitner's ideal combination of strong/weak familialism and strong/weak defamilialism.

3.1 Definition and terminologies

The family is often described as a fundamental social group, usually consisting of one or two parents and their children. The term family is often misused and misunderstood, and its meaning may vary in time and place (Hansson, 2006, p. 4; Peters, 1999, p. 55). To study the behaviour of South Korean families regarding fertility, it is necessary to determine what does a “family” means. While the traditional family form is disappearing in developed countries, factors such as “decline in marriage”, “latter marriage”, “cohabitation which precedes marriage”, “divorce”, “remarriages”, etc., affect fertility rate (Hansson, 2006).

In the present thesis, its author utilises the traditional definition of the family, i.e., heterosexual married couples, to avoid any misunderstandings. Many authors perceive South Korean society as conservative because of its social norms dictating marriage to be a vital act before cohabiting and childbearing (Anderson, Kohler, 2013, p. 200). Therefore, the author applies the definition of family formulated by Murdock, who gave a heteronormative characterization (Murdock, 1949).

According to Murdock and Hansson a definition of family is “*a social group characterised by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults*” (Murdock, 1949, p. 1-2; Hansson, 2006, p. 6).

In addition, he argues that a family also carries a role to reproduce the *values* and *norms* of the culture and community to pass these values to the next generation (Hansson, 2006, p. 6).

According to theorist Thévenon (2011), the family polices in OECD countries are multidimensional and fulfil six goals:

- 1) *Poverty reduction and income maintenance,*
- 2) *Direct compensation for the economic cost of children,*
- 3) *Fostering employment especially for women,*
- 4) *Greater gender equality,*

- 5) *Support for early childhood development,*
- 6) *Raising birth rates* (Thévenon, 2011; Lee, Duvander, Zarit, 2016, p. 269).

Thus, the author has defined the following three family policy tools:

- A) Parental leave: *“employment-protected leave of absence for employed parents, which follows maternity leave”* (Lee, 2020, p. 2).
- B) Maternity leave: *“employment-protected leave of absence for employed women around the time of childbirth”* (Lee, 2020, p. 2).
- C) Paternity leave: *“is the same policy as Maternity leave but for employed fathers of newborn children to assist with childcare and strengthen the paternal bond during infancy”* (Lee, 2020, p. 2).

3.2 Source of data and methods for their analysis

The data sources derive predominately from secondary data and peer-reviewed journals. Moreover, the author of the present thesis supports his argumentation by using vital secondary statistical data (KOSIS – Korean Statistical Information Service, KOSTAT – Korea Statistics) and survey data (KGSS – Korean General Social Survey Codebooks from years 2005, 2006, 2012 and cumulative data 2003-2018) from both national and international resources (OECD, Statista).

The present thesis represents a case study, an intensive in-depth study of the particular case of South Korea.

3.3 Operationalisation

This research can be understood as a descriptive analysis with a solid theoretical framework relying on three theorists: Gary S. Becker (economic perspective), Sigrid Leitner (familialistic perspective), and Pfau-Effinger (cultural and welfare culture perspective) to analyse and interpret the low fertility phenomenon in South Korea.

The empirical part of the research will focus on South Koreans behaviour as seen from the *economic* (direct costs), tools of *familialistic* (politic/institutional) Government policies, and *cultural* (analysing survey data) perspectives.

In the Economic part, the author omits the indirect costs and analyses only the direct costs because they are more easily accessible and easier to measure. According to Thévenon, the cost of living such as *food, clothing, housing, and education* are considered as detrimental for childrearing (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 20-21, 81).

The direct costs of South Korean households will be observed and analysed through KOSIS data on consumer basket (2003-2020) and KOSTAT data survey on CPI (2010, 2015, 2017). These government data will help the author understand the South Korean household's consumption behaviour, preferences and changes in time.

Finally, the author had chosen the years mentioned in the previous sentence due to data availability. They were the most recent data before the 2018 COVID-19 pandemic, which likely impacted consumption behaviour and preferences.

The Familialistic part focuses on the institutional investigation of Childcare centres (Seo, 2017; Shin, 2018) and three family policy tools: *parental leave, maternal leave, and paternal leave* (Lee, 2020; Kim, 2020). After analysing both kinds of family policies tools (institutional and monetary, and service) the author shall try to fit South Korea into Sigrid Leitner's matrix of four ideal strong/weak familialism/de-familialism (Leitner, 2003).

The ICPSR-KGSS surveys (2005, 2006, 2012 and 2003-2018 cumulative data) will be analysed in the Cultural part. The author has chosen these survey data because other information was unavailable or did not have contain the author's data. Using this data, variables will be analysed to help the author interpret Korean society's Confucian values and norms. Variables referring to patriarchal traits of respect, authority and obedience, son preference, division of gender roles – men breadwinner and women caregiver, will be analysed. Also, who decided on their children's education and other societal questions on cohabitation, legitimacy and meaning of marriage will be investigated. These KGSS data will help the author interpret South Koreans' attitudes and opinions from a Confucian cultural perspective.

3.4 Research questions and Hypotheses

The view of welfare changes with time and with younger generations. Nevertheless, the author argues that the values change slowly compared to institutional changes. Therefore, the attention focuses on policies contrary to the traditional values of Confucianism, which is based on gender inequality. Confucianism favours men being dominant in both family and workplace as breadwinners, frontrunners of the labour force and the family head. With the democratic and economic development of South Korea, the State relies on women as both caregivers and the labour force. However, the present thesis argues that Confucianism and government policies are incoherent and ineffective in raising fertility rate.

This present thesis sets up three research questions and three hypotheses to provide a constructive and objective outcome.

1. “How the family policy tools (parental leave, maternal leave, paternal leave) help support the costs of having and raising children in South Korea, compared to other developed countries?”
2. “How do cultural, Confucian, values, such as Confucian relational ethics influence South Korean families and fertility rate in South Korea?”
3. “How these tools of family policies guide the South Korean welfare State towards fertilization/de-fertilization?”

The following three working hypotheses will the thesis navigate the research and analysis.

1. “South Korean family polices have a strengthening tendency.”
2. “Confucianism has a negative effect on fertility.”
3. “Profoundly developing welfare regime does not necessarily lead to social change; institutional change precedes social transformation.”

4 Confucianism in South Korea

Confucianism as philosophical thinking has been part of South Korea for more than two millennia (Park, Cho, 1995). At first, sages taught the Confucian virtues only to rulers to cultivate them for the moral good and become “good rulers”. However, later, the teachings of Confucian values were distributed to the whole society, cultivating them so that anyone could become a sage through learning and self-cultivation (Angle, 2009).

In Korea, the philosophical expansion of Confucian teaching to the broad society began during The Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) when Confucian teachings became an inseparable part of social civilization, often referred to as Neo-Confucianism (Park, Cho, 1995; Cho, 1988; Kim, Kim, 2019, p. 3). Confucianism became embedded in Korean society for more than two millennia, setting a value system and influencing the family and community’s behavioural pattern, structure, and order (Park, Cho, 1995, p. 118). Neo-Confucianism emphasizes the cosmic order, essential for society’s peace, stability, and harmony. Understanding one’s position in society and submitting to the system was considered virtuous. On the contrary, equality and egalitarian principles stood for chaos and disorder (Cho, 1988, p. 128).

Confucianism perceives family as the core of society (Park, Cho, 1995, Kim, 2017, p. 762). Family is understood as the foundation on which society builds. Moreover, Confucianism navigates the families and thus society by its behaviour patterns based on moral and ethical codes. Such values and norms influence the way of thinking by giving a social and economic narrative. Furthermore, it affects our *social and economic behaviour, decisions on production, consumption, socialization, and education* (Park, Cho, 1995).

Confucianism’s goal is the continuity of family lineage through sons (patrilineal bloodline) and sustaining the human community and the State (Park, Cho, 1995; Cheng, 2020). The continuation and sustainability are based on *hierarchical order*, i.e., the social order based on inequality and power difference (Park, Cho, 1995; Cho, 1988). In the past, the hierarchical order was evident in various power relationships such as *ruler versus subject, parent versus child, husband versus wife* (Park, Cho, 1995, p. 118, 124; Seo, 2017, p. 4).

In addition to power inequality and gender inequality, Confucianism is also based on the strong patrilineal institution (male lineage) and son preference (Park, Cho, 1995; Kim, 2017, p. 762). A woman had to be obedient to three men in the past: her father, husband and later to her son (Park, Cho, 1995, p. 124). A woman had no rights apart from her husband. The utmost goal of a women in ancient times was to produce sons. Especially in the noble aristocracy of the *Yangban* class, women were not allowed to socialize freely, participate in any social activities, or conversate with other men beyond kinship. Besides that, she had to get permission from her husband or the head of the family (Cho, 1988, p. 129). A husband had seven reasons to get divorced (*failing to produce a son, gossiping, stealing, jealousy, loose conduct, disease, or unfiliality toward her parents in law*) and a wife had only three (*a woman had no place to go, 3 years of mourning period for parents in law, improved her in law's household*) for remaining married (Cho, 1988, p. 129).

The so-called *Kaehwa-gi*, referred to as an enlightenment period (1876-1910) in Korea, had brought the momentum of introducing various Western philosophical, religious, and political thoughts (Cho, 1988). Christianity (both Protestantism and Catholicism) influenced the discourse of gender equality between men and women as equal subjects before God. Moreover, it played a significant role in involving women in various church activities and encouraging them to be more literate, participate in the land, and engage in the outside world more actively (Cho, 1988, p. 134-136). On the other hand, some cultural scholars argue that the Christianity doctrine on Trinity: The Father, The Son and The Holy Spirit, strengthened the father-son relationship and patrilineality in Korea (Cho, 1988, p.135).

The South Korean Constitution represents a synthesis of American presidential, British parliamentary systems and Confucian code of ethics. Nevertheless, according to the author, were synthesized and incorporated in the South Korean Constitution. Nevertheless, according to the author, both Article 10 (equality of all citizens regarding sex, religion, social status) and Article 34 (Family and marriage law), which formulate the spirit of South Korean constitution based on equality and dignity in both social, political, and family life contrast with the Confucian teachings, especially in the private life of Koreans (Cho, 1988, p. 126).

The Neo-Confucian values and norms were incorporated in the society, in the nuclear family, since the Chosun Dynasty and are reflected in *public education, political discourse* as *cultural heritage* (Chang, 1997, p. 25; Cheng, 2020, p. 107). Even now the family unity, the family-centred life, sacrifice of the individual rights for the sake of the family is being dominant, and thus fertility issue predominantly perceived as family duty, which are also reflected in Government policies (Chang, 1997, p. 25; Cheng, 2020, p. 30).

Nowadays, one can state that the traditional concept of family has changed dramatically compared to the past. Women, in particular, have experienced a different status in society due to modernisation, education, and labour force participation (Cho, 1998). Nevertheless, the author believes that the latent ethics and codes, stemming from Neo-Confucian values and norms and perception on the nuclear family as an ideological construct (conservative developmentalism) contrast with progressive welfarism and, therefore, negatively affect fertility (Park, Cho, 1995; Chang, 1997, p. 23-25; Cheng, 2020).

However, the low fertility phenomenon related to Confucianism is not the only specific to South Korea but also a concern in other East Asian countries with Confucian heritage (Cheng, 2020). For East Asian countries such as China, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea, the relevance of Confucianism, emphasising the importance of family, the hierarchical order between parent and children and husband and wife cannot be dismissed (Park, Cho, 1995, p. 118; Seo, 2017, p. 4). However, the low fertility phenomenon is not necessarily linked to Confucianism or Confucian traits; for example, in Europe and the Western world, many experts describe the low fertility as being caused by various factors: a) higher education, b) economic uncertainty, c) contraceptive technology and availability of abortion, d) gender revolution and increase of women's labour force participation, and e) changing character of family (Sobotka 2017; Park, 2020)

Also, "education" represents an important factor linked to Confucianism and should be addressed in this chapter as well. In particular, the phenomenon of *filial piety* is essential for characterizing the hierarchical order and family relationship between parents and their children (Cheng, 2020, p. 101). Moreover, East Asian family characteristics comprise phenomena such as *credentialism* (Cheng, 2020, p. 100), *arms race* (Jones, 2019), *education fever* (Anderson and Kohler, 2013) or *success-orientation* (Ogawa et al., 2015),

which are considered as “social ethos” (children give joy and glory to their parents through their success and achievements) that resonate in society and have an impact on fertility (Cheng, 2020, p. 100, 105-106).

Speaking about Confucianism, one cannot omit the patriarchal rules that strengthen the father-son relationship, based on respecting and honouring the traditional values and virtues (Wong, 2004). Also, fatherhood is based on discipline and guidance in children’s education rather than warmth or care (Oh, Yeon, Lee, Lee, Park, 2020, p. 6, Park, Cho, 1995, p. 129).

Confucianism and patriarchy have pervaded South Korean family systems and values for centuries. Despite the improvement in women’s socioeconomic status, with increasing individual and societal rights, the Confucian and patriarchal norms and values have become prevalent and embedded in society (Kim, Kim, 2019). Moreover, many elders and adults perceive housework as women’s task and breadwinner role as men’s obligation towards the family (Lee, 2018; Kim, Kim, 2019).

5 South Koreans and Government policies to enhance fertility rate

Park (2020) explains the evolution of Korean government policies to enhance fertility rate in the 2000's. The Basic Plans in 2006, 2010, 2016 were government-led planning programs to raise fertility. Except for a slightly increase in the TFR between 2005 (1.08), 2006 (1.13) and 2007 (1.26), the overall result of these policies was ineffective in increasing fertility (Park, 2020).

The success of such policies is intermingled with many other factors, and it is hard to measure them. Various incentives and measures for childbearing and childrearing have been put in place: *“support for childcare and pre-school costs; expansion of after-school programs; expansion of tax benefits and incentives for families with children; support for adoption; expansion of public and workplace childcare facilities; improving services in private childcare facilities; establishing a health and nutrition system for maternity and childhood; support for couples with infertility issues; support for post-partum and infant care,”* and other socio-cultural provisions such as *work-family balance, family-friendly enterprises* and other measures to provide gender equality did not help much to change the situation. Therefore, these measures, services, and incentives have failed to raise TFR to the replacement level 2.1 nor 1.5, which is considered a safety replacement level (Park, 2020). South Korean family policies between 1997 and 2017 focused mainly on protecting childcare and maternity (Seo, 2017). In addition to national provisions and incentives, the local government programmes provided various programs in the forms of financial subsidies and services: *2007 Ansan's policy of supporting tuition fees for households with multiple children, 2009 Daegu's policy of creating a women-friendly environment, 2010 Seoul's childcare center certification project, 2010 Jeju's project for group child-rearing* (Park, 2020). Nevertheless, such provisions and services can be considered situational, ineffective, and they are changing due to the agenda of a political party in power. Moreover, Park argues that local government programs and incentives were contrary to the central government policy and, thus, contra-productive (Park, 2020).

5.1 From State Welfarism to Welfare State

The Neo-liberal social welfare, as we know in the western European developed countries, did not exist in South Korea prior to 1997 (Chang, 1999; Song, 2003, p. 406). The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and IMF (International Monetary Fund) financial aid represented a turning point in South Korean policy change that went beyond familialism (Sacchi, Roh, 2016; Leitner, 2003; Saraceno, 2016). South Korea joined the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1996. At that time, South Korea was one of the lowest, if not the lowest, contributors to social welfare (Sacchi, Roh, 2016, p. 362). Nevertheless, by joining the OECD and following the IMF recovery package, South Korea underwent significant institutional changes based on Neo-liberal principles and civil rights (Sacchi, Roh, 2016, p. 363; Kim and Parish, 2020; Seo, 2017). However, the Government has failed to raise the fertility rate above two children per women since 1984. It is currently the country with the lowest fertility rate among OECD countries (OECD, 2021).

The South Korean fertility phenomenon could be delimited into two main stages: 1) 1960 – 1985 defined as “de-fertilization”, and 2) 1985 – the present, defined as “re-fertilization” (Kim, 2005). As in the first stage and even before (during the 1970s and 1980s), South Korea was an authoritarian regime. Its Government aimed to control the population, emphasising the quality of life rather quantity (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011, p. 54). In the second stage, the trend was reversed; it motivated young couples to have children. The TFR of South Korea is one of the lowest, if not the lowest (0.92 children per women in 2019), among OECD member states (OECD, 2021).

Having a total fertility rate of 2.1, which is a replacement level, forms part of the South Korean government agenda of Sustainable Development Goals, based on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, seeking to combat the low fertility phenomenon (Yi, Jung, Kim, Im, 2020).

When discussing fertility in South Korea, the country is very often described as having the “lowest-low” or “ultra-low” fertility (Park, 2020; Yoo, Sobotka, 2018; Kim, 2017; Cheng, 2020). The government aims to raise the TFR above replacement level, which is 2.1 children per woman (Park, 2020). However, before reaching the replacement level rate,

countries with low fertility rates first advocate for a TFR of 1.5, which is considered a safety replacement zone to secure the demographical challenges and implications (Yi, Jung, Kim, Im, 2020, p. 1).

Since 1980s, a rapid fertility decline postulated by the socioeconomic transformation that impacted the labour market, family formation, gender equity orientation. These factors resulted from the globalisation effect with the movement of capital and people (Kim, 2005, p. 11). Particular dynamics and trends were observed between socio-economic levels and fertility dynamics in Western countries that were generally valid for all developed countries. In particular, how the cubic relationship between socioeconomic level and fertility influences each other. It has been demonstrated that the low socioeconomic level positively affects fertility. But when the socioeconomic status rises, the relationship becomes negative. However, the relationship stays positive for the highest socioeconomic group (Kim, 2005, p. 12-13).

Theorist Chang defines South Korea as “compressed modernity”, which has very hazardous consequences in social, political, cultural, and economic life. With the modernisation of social welfare, i.e., westernization, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea accepted Neo-liberal welfare politics (Chang, 1999). According to Chang, this economy-centred social welfare approach takes its risk due to the short neo-liberal history. Compared to the social welfare of Europe, which is embedded in more than two hundred years of social welfare history, South Korea transited to social welfare politics too quickly (Song, 2003; Chang, 1999). It has been adopting and making institutional changes for several decades, but the fertility issue prevails puzzled (Chang, 1999, p. 45).

Song explains the birth and history of the South Korean welfare state quite exquisitely. He divides the historical phases into three periods: 1) Period of the developmental state (1961-1987), 2) Democratization and globalisation (1988-1997), and 3) The aftermath on financial crisis (1997-present) (Song, 2003).

According to Song, the combination of globalisation and democratisation had a decisive impact on the change of welfare state of South Korea. After the 1997 financial crisis and adopting the Western welfare state ideology, the country shifted and transformed itself into a guardian of public welfare (Song, 2003).

The authoritarian president Park Chung-Hee, who became famous for the so-called “Miracle on the river of Han”, is often referred with the rapid economic growth in the 1960s (Kim, 2011, p. 261; Song, 2003). South Korea’s economic rise was driven by the conglomerate family-centred businesses, the so-called “Chaebols”, with the aid of government subventions (Park, 2021). Although Park Chung-Hee is often described as a moderniser and developmentalist of South Korea, social inequality was evident. There was almost no social welfare concerning equality. There was only “*company welfarism*”, ensuring job security and increasing economic growth productivity (Song, 2003, p. 408). Under the Park regime, the public welfare service boosted economic growth rather than provided social welfare to its workers. Moreover, the company welfare service was not for everyone but the privileged few within the State and society. The state welfarism was also favouring the extremely poor, the disabled or elderly without family (Song, 2003, p. 409). Nevertheless, during 1970s and 1980s, the fertility rate was above replacement level. The TFR was 4.53 in 1970, then dropped gradually to 2.1. by 1983, and later plummeted to 1.65 in 1995, to 1.47 in 2000 and 1.08 (1.09) in 2005. The decreasing fertility rate was standard in East Asia; in 2005, the fertility rate in China was estimated 1.77, in Japan was 1.3, and in Taiwan 1.12. Yet, the fertility rate of South Korea was the lowest not only in East Asia but in the whole world (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011, p. 54; OECD, 2021). And even now, the fertility rate of South Korea is the lowest in the world, with 0.92 children per women in 2019 (OECD, 2021).

Kim Young Sam’s presidency is perceived as the beginning of new welfare (Chang, 1999). Kim Young Sam proclaimed productive welfare in 1995. His slogan was “globalization of the quality of life”, which aimed to increase the welfare of South Koreans on the level of developed countries (Chang, 1999, p. 45; Song, 2003, p. 406).

However, the newly introduced various social welfare policies and programmes were just a formal layout of Western welfare states. On the other hand, the Western type of social welfare was to blame, which was interpreted by the conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and journalist as contrary to the neo-Confucian family politics. According to them, the Western social welfare was contrary to the Confucian principles of the nuclear family; it was an attack on traditional familial solidarity to help many dependent and needy people by spreading individualism in the society (Chang, 1999, p. 46). Furthermore, they adored familialistic values and the work ethic of helping oneself through hard work (Park, 2020).

The phase following the 1997 Asian financial crisis has been a period of significant institutional changes in social welfare development. Sacchi and Roh, in their paper *Conditionality, austerity and welfare: Financial crisis and its impact on welfare in Italy and Korea*, conducted a comparative analysis of similar familialistic welfare states, whose reform on welfare states was anchored on economic conditionality. They observed how the economic conditionality: Financial crisis (1997 in South Korea and 2011 in Italy) affected the policy change and state's responsibility in taking risks and needs for the family (Sacchi, Roh, 2016).

In the period following the 1997 IMF bailout and after, i.e., even until now, the dynamics and political change of South Korea can be understood by political power change (Seo, 2017; Sacchi, Roh, 2016).

Especially between 1997 and 2007, when the progressives came to power, the political power alternation with the financial crisis made the public change the perception of general welfare and economic-centred society (Seo, 2017).

In such a challenging time, South Koreans have elected the progressive president, a Nobel peace prize laureate, often called “Nelson Mandela of the East” – Kim Dae Jung, representing the poor and the middle-class people. However, he has not been able to reverse the financial tragedy in South Korea. During the crisis, the IMF provided a loan of US\$21 billion to follow robust adjustment packages. Kim Dae Jung had to comply with conditions of deregulation and liberalisation of the Korean economy (Sacchi, Roh, 2016, p. 361). The situation was desperate, conglomerates laying off workers, and many also lost their jobs. In 1998, more than 20,000 firms went bankrupt, and people were hit by massive unemployment and poverty (Sacchi, Roh, 2016, p. 362; Chang, 1999, p. 46). The main reason for the pitfall was the political bankruptcy and national financial collapse during Kim Young Sam's presidency and his predecessors, who had focused only on economic growth and had not secured its workers (Chang, 1999, p. 46-47).

As his presidency lasted from 1998-2003, Kim Dae Jung was a labour-friendly president and spokesperson for the lower classes and industrial workers during his opposition (Song, 2003). Kim Dae Jung can be perceived as the father of modern welfare state, founder of Tripartite (representatives of big businesses, labour and of state) who wanted to correct the previous *state welfarism* to the Neo-liberal concept of *social welfare* or *welfare state*, as a universal right and protection (insuring), not only disabled and extremely poor, but also the

working poor and unemployed that lost their jobs as a consequence of financial crisis (Song, 2003, p. 426). Kim Dae Jung's presidency was a turning point to South Korea's social welfare due to welfare programmes' quality, amount, and speed, which shifted the direction of social policies towards more Western, Neo-liberal welfare state patterns (Song, 2003, p. 421).

From 2007 to 2016, the conservatives took power as winners of presidential elections; however, the family policy has risen regardless of political orientation (Seo, 2017, p. 1). From 2017 to the present, the current president Moon Jae-In is at office as a progressive liberal president who continues with agenda to raise fertility rate.

Moreover, during his mandate, he has introduced higher children allowance as a subsidy to Korean families (OECD, 2019 – Rejuvenating Korea: Policies for a Changing Society). Moon Jae-In's administration emphasized the agenda of “economic development with equality” (Chiang, 2019). In year 2018 the government expenditures have risen by 7% from previous year 2017. Expenditures on social welfare and health had the most dominant share of expenditures, accounting 34% of total expenses, followed by public administration (16%), education (15%) and national defence (10%) (Chiang, 2019, p. 117).

However, Seo asserts that endogenous and exogenous factors have negatively impacted social change leading to increased fertility. He reckons that South Korean welfare institutions are immature because of how Government policies address challenges through short-term and strong policies providing short-lived effects. The Korean welfare system lacks a solid institutional background (Seo, 2017, p. 2).

5.2 Family policies in South Korea

In Europe, we may observe the different policy change and development patterns among the advanced welfare states. The cross-national analysis has shown how differently the policy change and development have manifested. The manifestation and development of the welfare state have been shaped by civil forces, class struggles, political parties, or Christian religion, all having their roots in history and society (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Seo, 2017, p. 3; Oorschot, Opielka, Pfau-Effinger, 2008).

Esping Andersen called East Asian countries' welfare states "premature" systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, many scholars consider his statement inconsiderate given the cultural and economic conditionality specifics of East Asian countries and as being a divergent case against the Western typology of welfare states (Seo, 2017, p. 4; Sacchi, Roh, 2016).

The theorist McDonald considers the low fertility phenomenon in East Asia to be the result of the conflict of women's status improvement outside of the home, higher education access and labour participation, and high gender inequality at home (McDonald, 2000a; 2000b; Kim 2017). He argues that a typical East Asian trait is the exceptional fast economic growth, while the women's traditional gender roles have persisted; therefore, the socioeconomic advancement is lagging the economic growth (Kim, 2017, p. 744). Anderson and Kohler argue that South Korea needs to change its gender perception to boost the fertility rate (Kim, 2017; Anderson and Kohler, 2015). Other scholars state that the plausible reason for the low fertility anomaly is gender inequality, work-family imbalance (Kim, 2017, p. 744).


In his paper *Childcare and Maternity Protection policies*, Seo explained how the Korean Government had implemented family policies to overcome low fertility over the past 20 years (1997-2017) (Seo, 2017). He analyses and explains the process of policy-layering in childcare and maternity protection reforms as a reaction to low fertility (Seo, 2017). The State decided to take part of the responsibility; however, the predominant responsibility still lies with the families.

Also, he criticizes the unsuccessful (in)action of South Korean governments to address the low fertility trend over the past 30 years (Seo, 2017). Seo explores the institutional

development and transformation of Korean family policies over the past 20 years (1997-2017). The Government subvention of Korea’s family policies was mainly via *childcare* and *maternity protection* (Seo, 2017).

In Graph 1, the distribution of Childcare centres through different sectors can be seen. It can be seen that private sector dominates the number of facilities in the South Korean market (Seo, 2017, p. 7-8).

Graph 1: Childcare Statistics from KOSIS 2015 (the share of childcare facilities by types and in %)



Source: Seo, 2017, p. 8

Furthermore, the number of Childcare centres has increased from 2014 to 2020, especially the private sector remains dominant (See Table 5). The home-based (private) Child Care Centres became a new dynamic and the highest among other sectors (KOSIS, 2021 - Status of Establishment of Child Care Center by Year). As shown below, in 2020, the three most dominant sectors providing Child Care Centres were Home-based with approximately 44%, Private representing approx. 33% and Public reaching approx. 14%.


Table 5: Child Care Center Establishment (2014-2020)

Classification	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
Total	35,352	37,371	39,171	40,238	41,084	42,517	43,742
National- Public	4,958	4,324	3,602	3,157	2,859	2,629	2,489
Social Welfare Foundation	1,316	1,343	1,377	1,392	1,402	1,414	1,420
Corporation, Organization, Etc.	671	707	748	771	804	834	852
Private	11,510	12,568	13,518	14,045	14,316	14,626	14,822
Home	15,529	17,117	18,651	19,656	20,598	22,074	23,318
Cooperation	152	159	164	164	157	155	149
Workplace	1,216	1,153	1,111	1,053	948	785	692

Source: KOSIS, 2021 – Status of Establishment of Child Care Center by Year

Graph 2 shows how the expenditures on family sectors have increased tenfold from the end of 1990 to 2013, rising from 2% in 1990 to 7% in 2007 and then to 11.7 % in 2013 (Seo, 2017; OECD, 2021).


Graph 2: Social Welfare Expenditure in Korea from KOSIS 2015



Source: Seo, 2017, p. 2

Despite the growth in social welfare investments, South Korean governments' social and public expenditures are below the average of OECD member states (OECD, 2021). (Further information on public spending on families see the appendix no. 3 – OECD, 2021) Although the public spending since 1990 was remarkable, there is still much more to go. In 2019, the average OECD expenditure on public social affairs was 20% (% of GDP); South Korea was the fourth-lowest spender with Costa Rica, with 12.2 % (OECD, 2020).

Graph 3: Public social spending across the OECD (1960, 1990 and 2019)



Source: OECD, 2020 – OECD Social Expenditure database

Nevertheless, the Government worries about the low fertility rate and quickly ageing population, which go hand in hand as a concern with social welfare expenses (KOSIS, 2021 – Social Welfare Expenditure Ratio (vs GDP)).

In Table 5, we may see that the social expenditures on the elderly were consistently higher than social expenditures for families.

Table 6: Social Welfare Expenditure Ratio (vs GDP)

By Financial Resources and function(1)	By Financial Resources and function(2)	2017	2010	2006	2004	1999	1997
By financial resources	Sub Summary	10.9	8.4	7.2	6.1	6.2	3.5
	Public expenditure	10.1	7.9	6.7	5.5	5.6	3.4
	Legal private expenditure	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.1
By Function	Sub Summary	10.9	8.4	7.2	6.1	6.2	3.5
	Old-age	3.3	2.2	1.7	1.5	2.7	1.4
	Survivors	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
	Incapacity-related benefits	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3
	Health	4.2	3.6	3.0	2.6	2.0	1.7
	Family	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1
	Active labour market programmes	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.1
	Unemployment	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0
	Housing	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Other social policy areas	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.1

Source: KOSIS, 2021 – Social Welfare Expenditure Ratio (vs GDP)

Observing the statistical list from 1997-2019, the South Korean Government prioritized protecting the elderly beforehand to supporting new families. It is expected for South Korea to become one of the oldest populations in the world (OECD, 2019). (For more information, see the appendix no. 3 – OECD, 2021)

With such a trend, between 2019 and 2040, the Korean labour force capacity will shrink by 2,5 million workers, which will affect economic performance, sustainability, and public finances (OECD, 2019).

5.3 Korean family formation changing?

The current Korean population is considered as one of the youngest among OECD. Their perception on the traditional, patriarchal, Confucian values and norms is changing (OECD, 2019). Korean families are changing, in terms of values and attitudes towards marriage, the concept of family, and gender roles. The trend is that more single households are emerging as a new phenomenon. They do not perceive marriage as an obligation, being mandatory, but rather an option (Kim, 2005, p. 16; OECD, 2019).

The fertility decline has been a trend over the past two or three decades. Both men and women want to enter the labour market first and then start a family. Given the high demands of work and career-focused lives, couples are getting married later and later. Since the 1990s, the average age for women to give birth has increased by about five years. For men, the age at marriage increased from 27.8 to 33.2 in years from 1990 to 2018. For women, the average age of first marriage has been increased from 24.8 (1990) to 30.4 in 2018. Mothers have their first child at a higher age with higher age, preferring smaller families (OECD, 2019; Kim, 2005).

It is also important to mention that South Koreans have the lowest rate for non-marital births among OECD member states (OECD, 2020). In 2014, the percentage of non-marital births in South Korea was 1.9, followed by Japan (2.3%) and Turkey (2.8%). For South Korean society, but generally in East Asia, cohabitation of unmarried couples and having children out of wedlock is considered inappropriate and against traditional conservative values and attitudes (Lim, 2021, p. 945). It has been reported that childbirths estimated out of wedlock was less than 2% in South Korea in 2016. In contrast, the average of OECD reached over 40% (OECD, 2019). In 2020, the average percentage of births outside of marriage were also over 40% (41%); the highest rates were in Mexico (69%), Iceland (71%), and Chile (74). The lowest rates were estimated in Japan, Korea, and Turkey, around 2-3% (OECD, 2020).

In Europe, in contrast to East Asia, there has been a substantial increase in non-marital childbearing. The view on cohabitation has been tolerated due to the strong lobby of cohabiting unions for the past 30 years (Yoo, Sobotka, 2018, p. 552). In Europe and the US, non-marital cohabitation has been tolerated as and for unmarried couples to have children, which has been accepted by society as an individual right and decision. Nevertheless, in this sense, the cohabitation of couples in the West played a significant role in fertility, compensating the declining marriages but not resulting in low fertility (Chin, Lee, Lee, Song, Sung, 2011, p. 54).

For Koreans, the link between marriage and children resonates strongly in society. It seems that the phenomenon of “ultra-low” fertility appears likely to continue to prevail (OECD, 2019; Yoo, Sobotka, 2018).

Despite South Korea’s perception of unmarried cohabitation and the lowest nonmarital births connected to the fertility rate, we should not neglect the divorce rate, which also may impact fertility due to the strong association of marriage and children. Marriage in two East Asian countries – Japan and South Korea – is considered a very important, if not sacred social institution, which is more substantial as in other OECD countries (Adema, Clarke, Thévenon, 2020, p. 196; Kim, 2017, p. 748). Kim argues that the increasing divorce rate after 1990 has contributed to the fertility decline, while its impact was not as dominant (Kim, 2005, p. 16).

The South Korean Government perceived a very low fertility rate, high divorce rate, rapidly aging population, increased single households as a threat leading to demographic and family changes (Lee, 2018, p. 52). In 2019, one-third of all households consisted of single persons (Statista, 2021).

In the early-mid 2000s, the Korean Government led to a paradigm shift that focused on demographical issues of rapidly decreasing fertility, changes in marriage and divorce statistics, an increasing number of transnational marriages and multicultural families (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011, p. 54). Divorce in the pre-modern era was not allowed for women; divorce was rarely permitted, only men could petition for divorce. This was related to maintaining the family order (feudal family system) and male superiority (Park, Cho, 1995, p. 128). Nevertheless, shifting to the modern era, the CDR (Crude Divorce Rate – the number of divorces per 1000 people) after 1990 increased until it peaked in 2003

with 3.4, while the TFR showed a declining trend (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011, p. 54; KOSTAT, 2021).

The peak in CDR in 2003 also appeared to be due to an increase of transnational marriages. The Government policy encouraged the males residing in rural areas to intermarry with women from China of Korean descent and Southeast Asia to increase the total number of marriages. On the other hand, with the increasing number of transnational marriages, the divorce rate of transnational marriages increased as well, doubling from 1.2% to 2.4% between 2002 and 2004 (Chin, Lee, Lee, Son, Sung, 2011, p. 55).

With a sharp decline in the CMR after 1996 (9.4) and an increase in the CDR after 1997 (2.0), was South Korean CDR as of 2017 above 2, and considered above average in both the EU and OECD (OECD, 2019; KOSTAT, 2021).

The same was also the CMR of South Korea, which was above OECD average, which was above 4 and below 6 (OECD, 2019; KOSTAT, 2021).

South Korea's CDR showed a somewhat declining trend between 2009 and 2020, slightly fluctuating above 2, between 2.5 in 2009 and 2.1 in 2020. While the CMR was as high as double, estimated at 4.2 in 2020, the OECD average CMR in 2017 was estimated at 4.8 (KOSTAT, 2021; OECD, 2019).

Based on the foregoing, it can be inferred that South Koreans marry and want to have children. In most OECD countries, the traditional role of the male breadwinner is also changing. Instead, dual-earner families are becoming more prevalent and the new norm (OECD, 2019; Adema, Clarke, Thévenon, 2020). In South Korea, almost half of the married couple households were employed as double-earner households. Double-earner households in 2020 marked 45.4%, falling by 0.6% from the previous year 2019 (KOSTAT, 2021). However, it is important to distinguish between full-time dual-earning couples and part-time dual-earning couples, where one of the parents works full time.

The reason for dual-earner families is simple; they want to be financially stable and aligned with society's living standards and demands. The living costs such as food, clothing, housing, and childrearing education are simply a high burden for South Korean families. Single working parents may not afford to foot the bills with the costs connected with childrearing and the education standards.

6 Empirical analysis

6.1 Economic

Gary S. Becker analysed the fertility phenomenon from a family perspective (Becker, 1993). He studied the family behaviour from a socio-economic point of view (Becker, 1960). Becker perceived the family decision to have children as an investment in human capital (Becker, 1993).

According to Becker, the family is understood as the fundamental unit of society. Families make decisions on having children and the allocation of their consumption expenditures according to their budget constraint. Becker postulates that with higher income (I) and stock of capital (C), the demand for children reduces (Becker, 1993, p. 325). Also, the wealthier the family, the higher demand on for children's quality over quantity (Becker, 1960, p. 214).

Becker states that with the bigger size of the family (more children), the expenses of the family (consumption) also rise (Becker, 1960). According to Thévenon, the most significant costs linked with childrearing are *food, clothing, education, and housing* (Thévenon in: Letablier, Marie-Thérèse, et al, 2009, p. 20-21, 81).

The available KOSIS data on “Income and expenditure” from 2003-2020 show what consumption goods were dominant in South Korean households and how consumption has changed. Obviously, the highest share, approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ of total expenditures were estimated by Consumption expenditures. Food and soft drinks count the highest amount almost every year between 2003 and 2020.

Data from 2003-2016 shows that the second-highest share of the Consumption basket takes costs on “Restaurants and Hotels”. Many South Koreans eat at restaurants while they work. Eating culture is also a part of their daily socialization with other employees or superiors. Also, many households take retreats in hotels within the country, which offer various relaxing and leisure programs to spend their holiday with family.

The third most dominant place occupy costs on “Transportation” and finally fourth “Education”. The costs of education is important, as it was higher than the costs of housing during this period, along with energy (water, electricity, gas, and other fuels). It is important to emphasise that the costs on “Education” were higher than expenditures on

“Health” or “Clothing and footwear” between 2003 and 2016. (For more information, see the appendix no. 1 – KOSIS, 2020)

However, since 2017-2018, it is possible to observe a reverse trend in the consumption basket behaviour of South Korean families. In these years, the average households spent more on “Transportation” than on “Restaurants and Hotels”. In addition, “Housing” expenditures were higher than “Education” expenses.

In the year 2018, the education expenses were in eighth place, after “Health”, “Entertainment and culture” and “Other miscellaneous goods and services”. In both years 2017 and 2018, the expenses on “Education” were lower than “House and energy”. Though, in the year 2017, the education expenses were higher than health expenses; starting from 2018, the trend was reversed. This can be interpreted that the coronavirus pandemic beginning in 2018 could have influenced the consumption habit of households and their preferences. Therefore, South Korean households prioritised their health rather than education. (For more information, see the appendix no. 1 – KOSIS, 2021).

The consumer price index for years 2010, 2015 and 2017 was as follows:

According to the CPI, for the year 2010, the education cost count for the fourth most significant segment after Housing and energy, Food and beverages, Restaurants and hotels. In 2015, the education expenses dropped to fifth place after Housing and energy, Food and beverages, Transport, Restaurants and hotels.

In 2017, the education costs still retained fifth place after Housing and energy, Food and beverages, Restaurants and hotels and Transport. The clothing and footwear costs were not the dominant variable in the consumption basket for all three years. (For more information see the appendix no. 4 – KOSTAT, 2010, 2015, 2017)


According to Hultberg (2017), the education expenses in South Korea are incredibly high, putting much pressure on South Korean students and families. The Korean human capital investment in their children represents a tremendous financial burden and a significant risk to their health. The Korean phenomenon of *credentialism* (Cheng, 2020), *arms race* (Jones, 2019), *education fever* (Anderson and Kohler, 2013) or *success-orientation* (Ogawa et al., 2015) are in fact, firmly embedded in the Korean culture of Confucianism, emphasising the importance of education and perceiving the education as the only way to achieve high-income job, high status, and honour to the family (Hultber, 2017, p. 14).

According to Jones (2019), the “ultra-low” fertility phenomenon in South Korea, whereas in other East Asian countries like Japan and Taiwan, is due to “workplace culture”, slowly changing “gender norms” and pressures on “education of children” as well as a deficit of affordable apartments in big cities. Moreover, educating children is mainly considered a mother’s task, which involves much pressure on both parents and children (Jones, 2019, p. 8).

Anderson and Kohler (2013) determined that the Korean “education fever” became detrimental to Korean society, playing a significant role in fertility. The author state that South Korea has the highest participation rate in private education in the region and experienced the most considerable fertility decline over the past fifty years among OECD countries (Anderson and Kohler, 2013, p. 199). The respondents in the 2012 survey conducted by Health Ministry in Korea stated that the most burdensome expenses were the education costs, including private education fees. Also, they reported that balancing family and work was very difficult (Ji-Sook, 2012; Anderson and Kohler, 2013, p. 207).

According to the 2017 KOSTAT survey on private education expenditures of Korean households, the average monthly spending rose between 2013 and 2017. In Graph 4, it is possible to observe that the highest expenses were estimated by Middle school students (KOSTAT, 2018).

Graph 4: Average monthly private education expenditures per student and per student by school level



Source: KOSTAT, 2018 – Private Education Expenditures Survey

Cheng (2020) observed that in the early 2000s, the willingness of East Asian families to invest in their children’s education was high. Families in Korea, Taiwan and China paid about 50% to 70% of their private per capita educational costs for children and youths

under 24 (Ogawa et al, 2015; Cheng, 2020, p. 106). Cheng argues that public education in East Asia is not so expensive; however, the major human capital investments of the parent in the shadows of their children, the extracurricular activities (private education expenses) and private university tuition (if the child is not admitted to public university) refer children as a long-term financial burden for parents that must be inevitably factored into couples' calculations of whether to have children or not (Cheng, 2020, p. 106). In South Korea and other East Asian countries, the substantial quality-quantity trade-off in fertility behaviours among East Asian parents is evident due to increasing private transfers for children and youth (Cheng, 2020, p. 106). Education, job insecurity, living standards and other direct costs may influence fertility intentions even more.

6.2 Familialistic


In the previous chapter, the direct costs of South Korean households were analysed, and the enormous financial burden on families regarding expenses on education was explained. Becker's concept on human capital and socio-economic perspective on the family helped the author to understand families as homo economicus, rational beings calculating childrearing costs. Therefore, according to the analysis, education expenses play a significant role in the decision of young families to have children because the private education costs on children are enormously high.

This chapter stands on the institutional perspective of familialism. In chapter 6.2, the graph from KOSIS referred to the distribution of childcare centres in South Korea, where the private sector has become the dominant player (Seo, 2017, p. 7-8). The author believes that such availability of childcare centres provides services and care with childrearing is de-familialistic. On the other hand, policies such as Parental leave, Father's and Mother's leave encourage working parents to take leaves to take care of their children. Such policies are considered as familialistic because families are motivated by the State to take the responsibility as caregivers.

On average, 32% of OECD countries have enrolled their children aged 0-2 in childcare centres. The number of childcare centres has risen in South Korea since 1997. In 2001, the number of childcare facilities was 20,097, and in 2017, the number reached 39,171, which is 1.5 times the higher amount. In 2018, among 1,415,742 children, 45.6% of the

population used such facilities (Oh, Heo, Suk and Lee, 2021, p. 1). Graph 5 illustrates the rising utilisation and popularity of Childcare centres in South Korea (Shin, 2018).

Graph 5: Childcare facilities utilization rate for children aged 0-2



Source: Shin, 2018

The 2012-2020 KOSIS data show the amount of newly established childcare centres by year and the distribution by sectors (See Table 6). We may say that childcare provided at home became the new dominant to provide care and service for infants. However, the private sector, where home-based sector, remains prevalent in the South Korean market (KOSIS, 2021).

Table 7: Status of Establishment of Child Care Center by Year


Classification	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
Total	35,352	37,371	39,171	40,238	41,084	42,517	43,742	43,770	42,527
Home	15,529	17,117	18,651	19,656	20,598	22,074	23,318	23,632	22,935
Private	11,510	12,568	13,518	14,045	14,316	14,626	14,822	14,751	14,440
National: Public	4,958	4,324	3,602	3,157	2,859	2,629	2,489	2,332	2,203
Social Welfare Foundation	1,316	1,343	1,377	1,392	1,402	1,414	1,420	1,439	1,444
Workplace	1,216	1,153	1,111	1,053	948	785	692	619	523
Corporation, Organization, Etc.	671	707	748	771	804	834	852	868	869
Cooperation	152	159	164	164	157	155	149	129	113

Source: KOSIS, 2021- Status of Establishment of Child Care Center by Year

Family policy tools such as Parental leave, Maternity leave, and Paternal leave are perceived as basic supportive policies for parents securing their job and having an interlude for the care of young children (Lee, Duvander, Zarit, 2016, p. 277; Lee, 2020).

Parental leave was first introduced for women in 1988 without any financial subsidy. In 1995, parental leave was expanded to men if the spouse did not take it. In 2001, the employment insurance fund paid the forgone earning during leave periods (Lee, 2020, p. 2). In 2008, fathers were eligible to take paternity leave only for 3-5 days, while three days were paid and two days unpaid (Lee, Duvander, Zarit, 2016, p. 1). Currently, parental leave can be utilized by both parents, for the same length, up to 1 year (Lee, 2020, p. 2) (See the Graph 6).

Graph 6: Length of parental, maternity, and paternity leave



Source: OECD Family Database.

Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: Lee, 2020, p. 2 – Length of parental, maternity, and paternity leave

The employer provides parental leave. For the first three months, the employer must provide 80% of ordinary earning, with minimum of € 498,5 and maximum of € 1068.25 per month. For the remaining nine months, the employer provides 50% of ordinary earnings with a minimum € 498.52 and a maximum of € 854.60 (Kim, 2020, p. 367). When on part-time parental leave, the employee may split the leave into two separate periods for children up to eight years of age, reducing working hours from 1-5 hours and receiving a wage according to reduced hours (Kim, 2020, p. 367).


More than 120 countries worldwide provide maternity leave as a safeguard and protection policy for working women to secure their job and health during vulnerable times of mother's health and her newborn child (ILO, 1998; Lee, 2020, p. 2). The International Labour organization (ILO) mandates at least 14 weeks of leave to be financially compensated. In South Korea, maternity leave is obligatory and for 90 days. The first 45 days are taken after giving birth. While the employer pays 60 days, the remaining 30 days

are paid by the Employment Insurance Fund with an upper limit of € 1,424.34 for the last 30 days (Kim, 2020, p. 365-366).

The employer also pays paternity leave for ten days. The paternity leave must be taken within 90 days after the birth. The first five days are paid by calculating the maximum ordinary earnings of € 1,424.34 (Kim, 2020, p. 367).

The numbers of parental leave takers and the distribution between men and women is shown in the graph 7 below (Shin, 2018).

Graph 7: Number of parental leave takers (male and female) and % of parental leave takers in maternity leave takers



Source: Employment Insurance Statistics (for each year)

Source: Shin, 2018 – Number of parental leave takers and % of parental leave takers in maternity leave takers

The graph illustrates how the number of parental leave takers has increased. In particular, the number of parental leave takers among working female workers increased from 9,122 in 2004 to 82,467 in 2015. In 2004, the maternity allowance recipients took only 23.7% parental leave. Whereas in the year 2015, the takers jumped to 86.6%. However, the number of fathers taking the parental leave remains marginal, only 5% among all takers in 2015 (Shin, 2018).

Between 2010 and 2017, the percentage of fathers taking parental leave averaged only 1.6% (Kim, Kim, 2019, p. 2). However, recent data (2018-2019) on leaves show a rising trend of male employees taking parental leaves, rising from 13.4% (17,662) to 21.1% (22,297). Especially the popularity of “daddy months” has significantly increased, which allows husbands to take a three-month payment leave. Such a trend could be also perceived that the social attitude towards men taking parental leave has changed (Kim, 2020, p. 372).

Therefore, according to Leitner's concept of familialisation/de-familialisation, it is possible to interpret the childcare centres (facilities) as the State's motivation for de-familialisation. On the other hand, the provision of parental, mother's, and father's leave can be understood as familialistic because the State encourages the family to take significant responsibility for their children. With such respect, the author reckons that South Korea could have strong familialistic and strong defamilialistic characteristic, thus, being described as *optional familialism* according to Leitner (Leitner, 2003). The caring family is strengthened within the provision of supported familialism in the form of monetary subsidies and services. At the same time, there is also the option to be partly unburdened from caring responsibilities by childcare centres (facilities) as a form of defamilialism is given (Leitner, 2003, p. 359). Nevertheless, it is important to note that family policies of social welfare in South Korea are still on the path of development. Therefore, one can talk about pure *optional familialism* but aiming towards *optional familialism*.

6.3 Cultural

In the previous chapter, it has been concluded that from analysing the Childcare centres and leave policies in South Korea, the Government policies did not help raise fertility. Therefore, in this chapter, Korean society and families shall be evaluated from the cultural perspective, analysing their behaviour, attitudes, and values from a real-life perception, different to the previous institutional and political level.

This chapter will be a deep analysis and interpretation of KGSS Codebooks from years 2005, 2006, 2012 and cumulative data 2003-2018.

KGSS 2005 Codebook

The 2005 KGSS Codebook showed that most respondents agreed on the traditional role of family, i.e., the male breadwinner and female caregiver role. Furthermore, working mothers find it difficult to attend to pre-school children, and it is not good for the children if the mother works full-time. On the other hand, too much work conducted by men is also detrimental to the family's well-being. Staying late at work and not balancing work-family life is harmful to the family and children (Kim, 2005, p. 11).

KGSS 2006 Codebook

Analysing the 2006 KGSS Codebook resulted that a father's authority cannot be denied in South Korean society (Kim, 2006, p. 260). Also, children should honour parents as portrayed in the Confucian characteristics of *filial piety* (Cheng, 2020, p. 101). Moreover, society still "somewhat agrees" that the family must have a one son to keep the family line. Such patrilineal behaviour remains embedded in South Korean culture (Kim, 2006, p. 262). Other patriarchal aspect of social behaviour could be observed on a very close result, whether a husband's family should be prioritized before the wife's family. The overall distribution of answers tilted towards agreement rather than disagreement (Kim, 2006, p. 263).

The family, which is perceived as the core of society in Confucianism (Park, Cho, 1995; Kim, 2017, p. 762), stands on collectivistic values and teachings, reflected in respondents' answers. The emphasis and importance of family well-being have been regarded as more critical before the well-being of an individual. Such collectivistic behaviour could be understood as a Confucian value, which resonates in society, contrasting with Western individualism (Kim, 2006, p. 263-264).

According to this 2006 survey, the ideal number of children is 2. Having three or four was considered better than having one or none (Kim, 2006, p. 33-34). South Koreans regarded themselves as rather conservative than liberal concerning political ideology (Kim, 2006, p. 19).

The question on marriage and children showed a clear result that showed a clear position of South Koreans regarding marriage and children. For them, marriage was a precondition to have children (Kim, 2006, p. 255).

Also, generally, both men and women perceived married life happier than staying singles. On the other hand, men seemed to be more comfortable than women. Presumably, women must take the most responsibility for childcare and housework (Kim, 2006, p. 255-256).

Although, topics such as children's education and discipline, supporting parents, or purchasing high-cost items were considered mutual decision (Kim, 2006, p. 276-277).

Finally, the traditional dichotomy of male breadwinner and female caregiver role has been disregarded. Society showed an adverse acceptance of the conventional distribution of sex roles. Moreover, because most housework lies on wife's, respondents agreed that men should contribute more to housework (Kim, 2006, p. 259). Also, the respondents clearly showed that it is not ok to lay off women over men during the recession (Kim, 2006, p. 259).

Nevertheless, the favouritism of husband's careers over women's careers has been approved. Presumably of stigma in the society, that older conservative people are for male breadwinner and female caregiver distribution. Moreover, the wage gap in South Korea is high between men and women (Lee, Duvander, Zarit, 2016, p. 279-280). Also, the stigma in South Korea in utilising parental leaves by men showed an adverse acceptance in society, often perceived as selfish, especially among colleagues at the workplace (Kim, Kim, 2019, p.10, 12).

KGSS 2012 Codebook

The importance of family and dependence of South Koreans on the family could be observed via question where they last time sought help regarding problems on housework, childcare or elderly care. Most respondents answered that they turned to their co-residence family for help or sought help from other relatives, or sought no help (Kim, 2012, p. 263).

Considering the question of political ideology, the result remained the same as in KGSS 2006 – rather conservative than liberal (Kim, 2006). On the question of whether South Korea should increase or decrease social welfare, the most answered that it should “increase a little bit” (Kim, 2012, p. 21). However, the social welfare expenditures in term of the percentage of GDP of South Korea is below average OECD and needs to increase if the social welfare should increase (OECD, 2021).

South Korea also changed its son-preference to daughter-preference (Kim, 2012, p. 28). It is said that daughters take better care of their parents than sons who are more selfish and busier taking care of their family.

The job insecurity of job positions that comes hand in hand with economic uncertainty may also hinder healthy work-family life and fertility (Kim, 2012, p. 149). Opinions on working mothers may vary. Although respondents agreed that a working mother may have a warm relationship with a child as non-working mother, respondents agreed that it is better to stay at home with children, especially pre-school kids (Kim, 2012, p. 209-210). However, after the youngest child goes to school, the respondents favoured part-time work (Kim, 2012, p. 212). Women showed “strongly agreed” with the satisfaction of being a housewife (Kim, 2012, p. 210-211). However, respondents believed that both husband and wife should contribute to the household income (Kim, 2012, p. 211).

The traditional dichotomy: men should work, and women should stay at home was closely disagreed (Kim, 2012, p. 211-212). The view on marriage as a precondition to have

children remained the same as in the previous codebook (Kim, 2012, p. 213). The same negative position was regarding cohabitation without intention to get married (Kim, 2012, p. 214).

The ideal number of children stayed at two, then three, followed by one child and five children (Kim, 2012, p. 216-217). South Koreans perceive children as a financial burden; having children restrict career chances and employment, especially from the mother's perspective. Yet, most respondents agree that having children and allowing them to grow is the greatest joy (Kim, 2012, p. 217-218).

South Koreans consider paid leaves as a necessity. Furthermore, 12 months is the preferable duration of taking leaves. The primary funder should be the government, followed by the employer. The division of paid leave should be distributed this way: mothers should take the most; however, fathers should partly take as well (Kim, 2012, p. 220-222). On the other hand, the popularity of "daddy months" and fathers taking parental leave has increased, rising from 13.4% (17,662) in 2018 to 21.1% (22,297) in the year 2019 (Kim, 2020, p. 372).

The best distribution of work between mother and father is mother works part-time and father works full-time. Or mother stays at home and father works full-time. The worst option would be the father staying at home, and mother working full-time, or the mother and father working both full-time (Kim, 2012, p. 223).

The respondents indicated that the funding should be provided by the government and public funds (Kim, 2012, p. 224). However, the clear family responsibility of childrearing is evident, especially pre-school children. Although the burden of childcare goes predominantly to the parents and family members, they wish the government and public funds provide subsidies to childcare.


KGSS 2003-2018 Cumulative Codebook

This cumulative data survey shows cumulative data for the years 2003-2018 published later in 2019. The data were not provided or collected every year; therefore, the author utilised the data from the years that are at their disposal.

From analysing this Cumulative Codebook, the author has concluded that the traditional gender roles of male breadwinner and female caregiver are weakening. Nevertheless, the stigma concerning the "saving face" of husbands is apparent despite the rising utilisation of

parental leaves by men (Kim, Kim, 2019; Kim, 2020, p. 372). Overall authority, respect and obedience towards fathers is still valid. However, it is not the most important aspect to teach the children. The issue of low fertility is not being taken as serious in society. It seems that married women want to have children, ideally two, and preferably three than just one. The son preference has changed over time, and the son preference changed to daughter preference. Women perceive housework and child-rearing as being as enjoyable as if they were generally working. Nevertheless, men should participate more in the housework and spend less time at work. The perception of cohabitation and having children in non-marriage status is perceived negatively, compared to the Western world, where it is tolerated (Anderson, Kohler, 2013, p. 200; Lim, 2021, p. 945; Yoo, Sobotka, 2018, p. 552). In South Korea, conservative, traditional Confucian values and norms prevail. Such standards and values are still embedded in society, norms and values that deny certain behaviours such as cohabitation, which are considered “bad” (see Graph 8). Moreover, such standards and values shape and navigate the social welfare of the society (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, 2005).

Graph 8: Koreans are more likely to disapprove of unmarried couples living together than people in almost all other OECD countries



Source: OECD, 2019 – Rejuvenating Korea: Policies for a Changing Society

The transformation of a traditional nuclear family, where a man is a breadwinner, and a woman is a housekeeper and caregiver, has changed with the westernization of attitudes and modernisation of South Korea (Kim, 2005; Chang, 1999). Especially with the Westernisation of the attitudes in South Korea, the view on women’s role has changed and

loosened the traditional perception of the nuclear family. It has led to the transformation of family structure (Kim, 2005, p. 6).

Many micro-economists have described that the urban-industrial change has significantly altered the utility and costs of child-rearing in many ways. Especially the high costs of child-rearing have led to the low fertility; however, not just in the sense of statistical data, but in terms of people's low fertility-oriented norms, values, and attitudes (Kim, 2005).

South Korean family policies between 1997 and 2017 were mainly focused on the protections of childcare and maternity (Seo, 2017).

Fathers are perceived as frontrunners who earn money to support the family financially. As the family heads, they take complete responsibility to secure the family. Women, on the other hand, predominantly take care of children. Fathers must often stay long at the workplace and have less time for spending their time at home. This is also considered as the Confucian influence that shapes the relational duties, which are also reflected at Korean workplaces (a hierarchical order), working long hours (Kim, Kim, 2019). South Korea has one of the most prolonged working hours among OECD countries (OECD, 2019). (See the appendix no. 3 – OECD, 2016-2020)

Moreover, the low fertility could be related to women's low labour force participation in South Korea. Lee, Duvander and Zarit (2017) compared South Korea and Sweden regarding family policies, women's employment, and fertility. (For more information, see the appendix no. 3 – OECD, 2016-2020) They have determined that the gender inequality in South Korea was more extensive compared to Sweden. Especially the high gender wage gap in South Korea (which was 36% in 2016) and discrimination of temporary employees, being excluded in receiving leave benefits are some of the main reasons why working women may not be willing to have children in South Korea (Lee, Duvander, Zarit, 2016, p. 279-280).

An article on relational ethics in South Korea by Kim Yeon-Jin and Kim Suyoung (2019) shows South Korean patriarchal and conservative characteristics and why it is a taboo for Korean fathers to receive parental leave from a cultural perspective. With such, one may state that Confucian cultural traits are incorporated in the hierarchical, relational ethics at workplaces (Kim, Kim, 2019, p. 10). Such patriarchal, traditional, and conservative characteristics of Confucianism support the stereotype of male breadwinner and female caregiver roles, which resonate in the society. With such acceptance of social norm,

women are expected to sacrifice their career prospects or their job for the sake of staying home, raising children and saving the face of their husbands. On the other hand, the survey results show that women want to stay at home and encourage their husbands to be the breadwinners. However, the financial burden of childrearing and other consumption expenses (direct costs) shows that both family members should be working and participating in earning money. However, according to the 2012 KGSS Codebook, the father and mother as full-time working parents are considered unhealthy for the family and children. The wife should work partly rather than full-time.

According to Kim (2005), the values and attitudes change according to the context of the society, i.e., socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors. And such values and attitudes shape and operate Governmental policies in the community (Kim, 2005, p. 11). However, the western perspective on having children out of wedlock and cohabitation is perceived negatively. From the KGSS survey, the author may boldly state that South Korean society reckons marriage as an essential precondition before having children. Also, cohabitation before marriage remains still unaccepted in South Korea, compared to the western world. Such cultural traits of Confucian values and norms are strongly embodied in South Korean society, which may also be why the fertility rate may be lower compared to the West.

Theorist Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari have observed that fertility decline tends to reverse after countries become highly developed; however, according to their statement, South Korea is an exception in their study. Despite achieving high levels of development, South Korea has not yet experienced a rebound in fertility rates. According to the authors, there are two possible explanations: gender inequality and the difficulty of combining work and family (Kim, 2017, p. 744; Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari, 2009).

The study has shown that women react to formal and informal support within and outside their homes. It has been demonstrated that the fertility rates climb up if: a) husband contributes to domestic work, b) parents or parents in law help with childcare, c) if the childcare services are available and affordable (Kim, 2017, 744-745). In the KGSS surveys, one can observe that women and men admitted that men should participate more in the housework. Such change with less workload from the employers could encourage

more healthy families and balance family life better. (For more information, regarding KGSS Codebooks from years 2005, 2006, 2012 and 2003-2018, see the appendix no. 5)

7 Discussion

More factors are causing the problems of low fertility in South Korea. The low number of marriages and decreasing birth rates and factors such as high youth unemployment rate and housing issues affect the low fertility (Choi, 2017; Kim, Yoo, 2021). Young people in South Korea have the highest educational attainment in the OECD (OECD, 2019). In particular, young Korean women are among the best performers in PISA (OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment) that have the highest graduates in tertiary education (OECD, 2019). However, South Korea fights with a relatively high youth unemployment rate, which ascended since 2013 and fluctuated around 8% (Choi, 2017). According to the KOSTAT survey, the youth aged 15-29 count for 8.9% in 2019, which decreased by 0.6% from 2018 (KOSTAT, 2020). Kim and Yoo (2021) interviewed 20 single-person households with housing poverty issues. Most interviewees were college graduates (75%) aged 19-39, who could not find a proper job or even a part-time job. Many were surviving on their savings, also suffering health issues (Kim, Yoo, 2021, p. 9). For many youngsters, especially in Seoul, the capital city, it is hard to live in a rented apartment. On the other hand, many single households in poverty live in "Gosiwon" (formerly a temporary accommodation for students preparing for their university examinations), covering about 6.6 m² with a shared kitchen and bathroom (Kim, Yoo, 2021, p. 2). People living under the minimum housing standard rose from 54,000 in 2005 to 360,000 in 2015 (Kim, Yoo, 2021, p. 1). According to Becker, the complexity of fertility and fertility behaviour on quantity and quality of children is determined by the income level of parents (Becker, 1957). Nonetheless, when people face such financial difficulties and are on the verge of surviving, I reckon that marriage and having children is not the most urgent problem.

While the current president Moon Jae-In has introduced a government's program on youth employment support, the effects were relatively marginal (Choi, 2017, p. 1).

The share of a single-person household is rising. In the future, it is expected to replace the traditional couple households (OECD, 2019). The young generation of South Koreans is described as the „Sampo generation“ (삼포세대), referring to a generation that has given up on three things: *dating*, *marrying*, and *having children* (OECD, 2019). Such a phenomenon

also comes from other challenging factors such as huge workload and strict workplace ethics that prevent them from meeting in or through work more freely (OECD, 2019).

On the other hand, in the 2008 survey, the perception concerning “couples’ co-habitation” changed in 2018. In total, around 56% of asked said it’s ok (among them 70% were people in their 20s and 30s). Overall, it was up to 13% more than in 2008 (OECD, 2019). It seems that the younger generation is changing their perception of marriage and cohabitation. The younger generation does not consider marriage and having children as “a must”, but rather “a choice” (OECD, 2019).

However, the challenges for young people concerning housing and finding a proper job is a task that must be solved if the South Korean government wants to boost fertility levels. During COVID-19, the fertility rate in South Korea has not risen. It is presumably because of the lack of job openings and uncertainty connected with COVID pandemic. It is presumed that the fertility level will remain unchanged (Kim, Yoo, 2021, p. 9).

Japan is considered an East Asian country with the same Confucian tradition. Moreover, some scholars take Japan as a case study to improve South Korean social welfare policy transformation, broadening to factors associated with education, culture, and economics (Park, 2020). Also, Japan has promoted the Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace, which protects non-regular female workers who experienced disconnections with their careers after pregnancy and childbirth. However, instead, this is to help them with reemployment (Park, 2020). However, for South Korea, Sweden is considered as a benchmark in the field of social welfare. Also, the Scandinavian model is perceived as a role model in getting insight into their successful childcare policies (Shin, 2018; Park, 2021). However, it is questionable whether the Scandinavian model is applicable in South Korea when the Confucian and patriarchal norms and values still resonate in the community.

The methodology used in the present thesis could be strengthened with the Congruence method, which is mainly used in the field of International Relations. However, *a complementary theories approach* (Blatter, 2012, p. 11) described in Joachim Blatter’s strategy could strengthen the validity of theories used. Blatter says that the validity of more theories used for a case study doesn’t lead necessarily to confusion and chaos. However, it provides deeper explanation and comprehension to offer insights and answers, essential for

practical innovations. Therefore, he reckons that a good social science theory should align with a “three-cornered fight” involving practical information and at least two different approaches (Blatter, 2012, p. 12). The goal of using such a Congruence method is to argue that the author’s theories for the present analysis are plausible, convincing, powerful, and well-validated that fit the case (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 229).

South Korea was once one of the poorest countries in the world. South Korea grew to become a top 10 economy of the world and the nation’s rise to technological superpower status is viewed as a miracle considering that no other country has been able to achieve the same feat. Such significant changes could have been achieved because of the high focus on education, diligence, and determination of the society that has formed today’s South Korea as a dynamic country. President Moon Jae-In and his administration have only a few months left until the new presidential elections. However, during his four years of administration, he has promoted social-democratic agendas of “profitability” but in conjunction with “social values”, “innovative growth”, a “people-centred economy”, “fair economy” and “income-led growth” (Mickler, 2018). During his mandate, huge works on the field of social welfare has been done (Chiang, 2019). In foreign policy, he emphasised the topic of re-unification of the two Koreas through deeper economic cooperation (Mickler, 2018). With such a vision in mind, it would not only bring economic prosperity and peace to the Korean peninsula, but it is expected to help with future demographic issues as well. The low fertility phenomenon in South Korea could be solved by the unification because the fertility rate in North Korea was at level 1.91 in 2020 (Statista, 2021). On the other hand, Stephen (2012) presupposes that unification of Koreas would raise fertility level in the short-run but not in the long-run, as it was shown in the case of Germany (Stephen, 2012, p. 6). Nevertheless, Moon Jae-In’s government and presumably future progressive governments, will promote the same re-unification foreign policy that has the potential to develop new opportunities not only on terms of economic growth (Mickler, 2018), but also demographical issues such as low fertility.

8 Conclusion

The author concluded that the low fertility phenomenon cannot be easily answered in examining the South Korean fertility issue. Fertility issue is rather a complex phenomenon that is interlinked with many other factors. Nevertheless, from analysing fertility from the perspectives of three different theories: Gary S. Becker (1960) – Economic perspective, Sigrid Leitner (2003) – familialistic perspective and Pfau-Effinger (2005)– cultural welfare perspective, it has broadened the understanding of fertility issue in South Korea.

At the end, the author concluded that two out of my three hypotheses were confirmed, while one hypothesis cannot be confirmed nor refuted.

From an Economic perspective, the author determined that the education expenses are too high. The private expenditures on children and participation in private education are high. East Asian phenomena such as *Credentialism* (Cheng, 2020), *arms race* (Jones, 2019), *education fever* (Anderson and Kohler, 2013) or *success-orientation* (Ogawa et al.) influence the low fertility and encourages the substantial quality-quantity trade-off in fertility behaviours.

From the Familialistic perspective, the government provided both familialistic and de-familialistic policies on unburdening the families with childbearing and childrearing. Leave policies, and Childcare centres were to encourage raising fertility. Therefore, the provision of both familialistic (Leave policies) and de-familialistic (Childcare centres) policies could be characterised as *optional familialism* through Leiner's typology but not at its pure form (Leitner, 2003).

From the Cultural perspective, the author reckons that the cultural values and norms shape and navigate the social welfare of the society in terms of what is perceived as good and wrong. South Korean society disapproves the cohabitation and having children prior to marriage. Although it has changed its position from the rigidly patriarchal and patrilineal way of thinking, male breadwinner and female caregiver model, conservative and patriarchal characteristics of Confucianism resonates in the society.

South Korea has tried to boost the fertility rate from 1997-2017 via maternity and childcare protectionist means; however, it could not change the low fertility trend (Seo, 2017).

Family policies in South Korea tend to strengthen. South Korea's investments in social welfare have shown a dramatic change; however, it needs to invest much more because it still is below the average OECD (OECD, 2021).

Also, the low fertility in South Korea cannot be solely blamed on Confucianism and cultural factor. In the past, Confucianism had positive effect on fertility. However, in today's modern world, the Confucian values and norms have a tendency of weakening and moreover it is hard to confirm nor refute this hypothesis, because there are many more factors influencing fertility behaviours and thus clear line of argumentation cannot be determined.

Low fertility represents a global phenomenon, and women are capitalising the most usage of leave policies. However, the traditional patriarchal norms and behaviours do not encourage working women to leave their career prospects and single lives for the sake of staying home with their children. Also, the high wage gap clearly shows the inequality between men and women employees that works against government intention to encourage women to participate in the labour force and childbirth. To raise fertility, better policies to support the women's reemployment and safety nets must be provided if women are encouraged to participate in the labour force and have children.

Overall, South Koreans want to marry and have children. However, the challenges occurring in society, the uncertainty of getting a job when youth unemployment is high, the highly competitive market where people compete to get the best education and best jobs is detrimental to an individual's health and well-being.

Moreover, marrying and having children must be calculated with both direct and indirect costs. Children are perceived as financial burden that may affect their employment and career prospects. In addition, high costs of childrearing, especially combined with the excessive costs of education in South Korea and lack of housing subsidies and many more expenditures, influence South Korean couples' behaviour.

Although South Korea has introduced the so-called "daddy months" for fathers, which are becoming more and more popular, the predominant utilisation of parental leaves is on mothers.

South Korea's welfare isn't rooted in the long history as in Europe. Nevertheless, it has undergone a substantial institutional transformation. Despite the institutional change, the author still reckons that the societal change lacks behind.

In terms of family policies as a tool, it does help with childrearing in a short term, but not in the long term. The expenditures on the private education costs in South Korea and children's participation in private afterschool programs lead to high demand in the market and overinvestment of education in South Korea. So, concerning the education expenditures of parents, parental leaves are marginal support for childrearing.

As written in the cultural part of the present analysis, Confucianism's cultural values and norms are embedded in the society. It influences behaviour and thinking. Hierarchical order at the workplace and late working culture affect the family-work life and, therefore, fertility. Also, South Korea strictly relies on family members predominantly regarding childcare issues and problems.

Lastly, the family policies in South Korea don't seem to work for re-fertilization. The author believes that government policies and workplace policies protecting and strengthening female workers must be introduced to enhance the fertility. As in the case of Japan, the scope of policy responses regarding education, culture, and economics should be considered (Park, 2020).

Moreover, the rising single households argue that people do not want to marry or miss the opportunity to marry and have children. Moreover, young Koreans consider marriage and having children rather a choice than an obligation. Also, the perception of cohabitation with the younger generation will probably change over time. However, the strong disagreement of having children out of wedlock and marriage as a precondition to having children will likely dominate society. Therefore, the author believes that the low fertility phenomenon in South Korea remains puzzled and unsolved and will be a significant concern in the future turning South Korea into one of the oldest populations in the world.

For future elaboration of this topic, the author recommends expanding the scope of analysis by other theories or measuring the indirect costs.

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10 List of Appendices

10.1 Appendix no. 1: Tables

Table 8: 2003-2016 Average annual income and expenditure (real, whole exc. 1 person and farm)

By the item of monthly income & expenditure of household	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008
	All households	All households	All households	All households	All households	All households	All households	All households	All households
01. Food and soft drinks (Won)	341,528	354,023	356,977	355,021	359,042	362,770	366,370	366,143	394,733
02. Alcoholic beverages and cigarette (Won)	34,587	33,064	41,782	42,013	42,892	43,099	42,923	41,845	44,898
03. Clothing and footwear (Won)	155,171	161,900	171,617	178,649	179,957	178,135	171,440	159,086	166,873
04. Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (Won)	275,312	277,468	263,025	272,862	271,060	268,776	266,329	249,757	246,120
05. Household equipment and housekeeping services (Won)	107,575	105,183	107,428	103,973	97,776	97,128	96,536	86,098	86,244
06. Health (Won)	175,474	174,362	170,431	167,022	162,552	161,474	159,882	150,484	142,485
07. Transportation (Won)	314,605	321,587	307,778	278,875	272,130	274,335	270,124	277,761	264,087
08. Communication (Won)	143,872	147,725	150,062	152,405	151,776	138,698	132,387	125,332	126,556
09. Entertainment and culture (Won)	146,948	149,908	146,095	138,903	136,995	130,517	130,129	116,422	115,552
10. Education (Won)	277,572	283,331	289,487	292,557	301,313	312,155	319,750	319,297	306,176
11. Restaurants and hotels (Won)	335,927	339,457	342,684	332,032	328,476	319,120	323,646	318,233	339,041
12. Other miscellaneous goods and services (Won)	212,878	215,084	220,014	214,148	229,962	225,593	216,496	203,578	216,181

Source: KOSIS, 2020

By the item of monthly income & expenditure of household	2007	2006	2005	2004	2003
	All households	All households	All households	All households	All households
01. Food and soft drinks (Won)	385,683	392,463	391,250	399,365	406,747
02. Alcoholic beverages and cigarette (Won)	45,237	46,801	45,334	47,762	42,647
03. Clothing and footwear (Won)	167,042	164,678	163,138	156,844	156,753
04. Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (Won)	244,627	246,413	241,258	233,236	232,512
05. Household equipment and housekeeping services (Won)	92,071	85,438	84,429	78,233	75,282
06. Health (Won)	142,738	136,203	128,660	121,484	117,497
07. Transportation (Won)	274,220	276,966	267,835	260,570	256,313
08. Communication (Won)	125,007	120,590	118,271	116,006	109,235
09. Entertainment and culture (Won)	115,994	110,140	104,525	101,578	102,842
10. Education (Won)	286,618	280,631	280,296	278,862	272,580
11. Restaurants and hotels (Won)	336,388	328,089	332,517	336,209	319,598
12. Other miscellaneous goods and services (Won)	228,297	233,041	227,733	219,385	203,981

Source: KOSIS, 2020


Table 9: average annual expenditure (real, whole households)

By the item of monthly income & expenditure of household(1)	2018	By the item of monthly income & expenditure of household(1)	2017
	All households (average)		All households (average)
01.Food and soft drinks (WON)	337,263	07.Transportation (WON)	364,449
07.Transportation (WON)	336,233	01.Food and soft drinks (WON)	340,587
11.Restaurants and hotels (WON)	323,376	11.Restaurants and hotels (WON)	337,390
04.Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (WON)	281,021	04.Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (WON)	280,558
06.Health (WON)	187,685	12.Other miscellaneous goods and services (WON)	189,739
09.Entertainment and culture (WON)	187,295	10.Education (WON)	183,213
12.Other miscellaneous goods and services (WON)	179,787	06.Health (WON)	178,442
10.Education (WON)	166,368	09.Entertainment and culture (WON)	171,436
03.Clothing and footwear (WON)	146,295	03.Clothing and footwear (WON)	154,537
08.Communication (WON)	134,754	08.Communication (WON)	137,316
05.Household equipment and housekeeping services (WON)	111,549	05.Household equipment and housekeeping services (WON)	109,116
02.Alcoholic beverages and cigarette (WON)	34,184	02.Alcoholic beverages and cigarette (WON)	34,060

Source: KOSIS, 2021

10.2 Appendix no. 2: Diagrams


Diagram 3: Interrelations within the welfare arrangement



(Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 5)


10.3 Appendix no. 3: Graphs

Graph 9: Fertility rates among OECD countries




Source: OECD, 2021

Graph 10: average annual hours actually worked




Source: OECD, 2016-2020

Graph 11: labour force participation rate




Source: OECD, 2016-2020

Graph 12: Family benefits public spending




Source: OECD, 2021 – Family benefits public spending

Graph 13: Public spending on families in Korea in years 1980-2016



Source: OECD, 2019 – Rejuvenating Korea: Policies for a Changing Society

Graph 14: Elderly population 1997-2020 (total % of population)



Source: OECD, 2021 – Elderly population

10.4 Appendix no. 4: Consumer price index

Table 1: CPI – Consumer Price Index 2010 (2005=100%)

Expenditure category	Number of Items	Weights	December 2009			December 2010		
			Index	Percent changes from the preceding month	Percent changes from December 2008 to December 2009	Index	Percent changes from the preceding month	Percent changes from December 2009 to December 2010
All items	489	1000.0	113.8	0.4	2.8	117.8	0.6	3.5
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	131	140.4	115.8	1.5	2.8	128.1	0.9	10.6
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco	9	14.6	102.2	0.1	1.1	102.3	-0.1	0.1
Clothing and footwear	42	58.4	116.6	0.1	5.4	118.4	1.5	1.5
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels	19	170.4	112.1	0.3	1.6	114.8	0.4	2.4
Furnishings and household equipment	52	41.7	116.6	0.0	2.1	118.4	0.4	1.5
Health	28	51.6	108.2	-0.4	1.8	110.6	0.1	2.2
Transport	31	109.0	116.8	0.1	6.8	121.9	1.8	4.4
Communication	13	60.2	95.0	-0.1	-0.2	93.3	-1.0	-1.8
Recreation and culture	64	56.3	100.1	-0.1	-0.4	101.7	0.2	1.6
Education	23	110.9	120.8	0.1	2.2	123.4	0.1	2.2
Restaurants and hotels	43	132.7	114.2	0.3	2.8	116.6	0.2	2.1
Miscellaneous goods and services	34	53.8	130.3	0.5	4.7	137.3	0.9	5.4

Source: KOSTAT, 2010

Table 2: CPI – Consumer Price Index 2015 (2010=100%)

Expenditure category	Number of Items	Weights	December 2014			December 2015		
			Index	Percent changes from the preceding month	Percent changes from December 2013	Index	Percent changes from the preceding month	Percent changes from December 2014
All items	481	1000.0	108.82	0.0	0.8	110.21	0.3	1.3
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	134	139.0	113.47	0.6	2.0	115.62	1.4	1.9
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco	8	11.8	103.99	0.0	-0.1	156.33	0.2	50.3
Clothing and footwear	34	66.4	117.33	-0.1	2.2	118.91	0.4	1.3
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels	21	173.0	116.92	0.0	2.0	116.84	0.2	-0.1
Furnishings, household equipment & routine maintenance	49	38.2	110.18	0.2	2.5	113.22	0.4	2.8
Health	28	72.9	103.80	0.0	0.9	105.16	-0.1	1.3
Transport	32	111.4	103.55	-1.5	-5.1	98.22	-0.5	-5.1
Communication	8	59.1	95.59	-0.1	-0.1	95.46	0.0	-0.1
Recreation and culture	64	53.0	102.14	0.5	-0.3	102.72	0.4	0.6
Education	20	103.5	106.30	0.1	1.6	108.23	0.1	1.8
Restaurants and hotels	42	121.6	109.49	0.1	1.7	112.52	0.3	2.8
Miscellaneous goods and services	41	50.1	104.03	0.4	2.1	106.48	-0.2	2.4

Source: KOSTAT, 2015

Table 3: CPI – Consumer Price Index 2017 (2015=100%)

	Number of Items	Weights	December 2016			December 2017		
			Index	Percent changes from the preceding month	Percent changes year on year	Index	Percent changes from the preceding month	Percent changes year on year
All items	460	1,000.0	101.56	0.1	1.3	103.04	0.3	1.5
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	133	137.7	104.02	1.1	4.1	104.27	0.8	0.2
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco	7	15.5	100.85	0.0	0.5	102.29	0.0	1.4
Clothing and footwear	30	61.4	102.56	0.4	1.2	103.94	0.7	1.3
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels	16	170.2	99.41	-1.0	-1.3	100.91	0.2	1.5
Furnishings, household equipment & routine maintenance	49	41.7	101.54	0.1	0.8	103.34	0.1	1.8
Health	32	68.7	101.09	0.1	1.1	101.45	0.1	0.4
Transport	32	111.0	99.40	0.9	1.0	102.48	0.5	3.1
Communication	6	54.8	100.05	0.0	0.4	100.78	0.0	0.7
Recreation and culture	55	57.2	101.22	-0.2	1.4	100.61	0.1	-0.6
Education	20	97.0	102.01	0.0	1.6	103.01	0.0	1.0
Restaurants and hotels	44	129.4	103.27	0.2	2.2	106.06	0.3	2.7
Miscellaneous goods and services	36	55.4	103.10	-0.5	2.8	106.35	0.1	3.2

Source: KOSTAT, 2017

10.5 Appendix no. 5: 2005, 2006, 2012 and 2003-2018 KGSS Codebooks analysis

KGSS 2005 Codebook

In this 2005 codebook I will only analyse the gender aspects of variables (FEFAM, FEPRESCH and MEOVRWRK), because other variables weren't found to answer my cultural scope of view.

In total 833 respondents answered questions on gender roles, on scale of value level 1-4, strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree as follow (Kim, 2005, p. 11).

FEFAM with a question whether traditional role of division of a family is good, respondents answered agree (302 responds with 36.9%) as the most frequent answer, second was disagree (251 responds with 30.7%) and third was strongly agree (219 responds with 26.8%). Strongly disagreed only 46 respondents (5.6%) and 15 respondents said DK (Kim, 2005, p. 11).

FEPRESCH variable was whether working mothers give hard time to preschool kids. Whether preschool kids suffer under working mother. The most frequent answer was "agree" with 456 respondents (55.2%), the second place positioned disagreement with 199 respondents (24.1%), the third was strongly agree with 122 respondents (14.8%) (Kim, 2005, p. 11).

More than half of the respondents agreed that preschool kids suffer under working mothers and so that mothers taking care of preschool kids is better for children.

MEOVRWRK variable states that when men work too much, it causes family problems, referring to healthy family life. 45.2% (367 respondents) voted agree, 35.6% (289 respondents) disagreed, 7.4% (60 respondents) strongly agreed and lastly 11.8% (96 respondents) strongly disagreed. After we take in note that 21 answered DK, most respondents voted as men's too much concentration on work is harmful to the well-being of family (52.6%, 427 respondents among 833) (Kim, 2005, p. 11).

The KGSS 2005 showed that the majority of 833 respondents agreed on traditional role of family, i.e., male breadwinner and female caregiver role. Furthermore, working mothers give hard time to preschool children and it's not good for the kids. On the other hand, too much work of men is harmful to the well-being of the family as well.

KGSS 2006 Codebook

Variables PATRACH1-7 analyse the patriarchal norms and the perception of Korean families on patriarchal norms (Kim, 2006, p. 260-264). The values were from 1-7, from “Strongly agree”, “Fairly agree”, “Somewhat agree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Somewhat disagree”, “Fairly disagree” to “Strongly disagree”. And total respondents of 1,605 participated on this survey.

PATRACH1 question was regarding the father’s authority that should be respected whatsoever. From total amount of 1,605 respondents (100%), the first three values were the most dominant in the overall distribution: 31.3% (strongly agree), 29.0% (fairly agree) and 23.7% (Somewhat agree). The smallest amount of 14 respondents (0.9%) showed the last value – Strongly disagree. In this question we can’t deny the fathers authority in the South Korean society (Kim, 2006, p. 260).

PATRACH2 question was regarding if the children should bring honor to parents. From 1605 respondents, 9 of answered DK (don’t know). However, the highest value showed the value 3 – Somewhat agree (29.8%) and right after the value 2 – Fairly agree (25.0%). On the third place was the first value – Strongly agree with 19.4%. Deducing from this second variable the children are encouraged or supposed to give honor to their parents (Kim, 2006, p. 261).

Analysing PATRACH3 and PATRACH4 questions regarding who should inherit parents’ property, the results have shown that the oldest son wasn’t not in favor (Kim, 2006, p. 261-262). The result was rather neutral, not agree or disagree with the most 373 respondents (23.2%). On the other hand, from the results of the PATRACH4 the most property should be inherited by children who took the most care of parents. In this question the first 3 values took the most dominant positions (Strongly agree – 26.0%, Fairly agree – 28.0%, Somewhat agree – 27.5%).

PATRACH5 says “Must have at least one son to keep family line”. This question of patrilineal legacy resulted with the most dominant “Somewhat agree” with an estimate of 347 respondents (21.6%). The rest around 20% were distributed among agreement side as well (Kim, 2006, p. 262).

PATRACH6 says “Wife should help husband’s family before hers”. For this question the most respondents answered to “Neither agree nor disagree” with 455 respondents (28.3%).

And the distribution was rather equal, however while the overall distribution tilted towards agreement rather disagreement (Kim, 2006, p. 263).

PATRACH7 on whether we should put family well-being before our own resulted that the most respondents agree to the family well-being more important to the well-being of an individual. Among 1605 respondents, the most frequent answer was value 3 – Somewhat agree with 468 responds (29.2%), the second Fairly agree with 452 responds (28.2%) and third Strongly agree with 358 responds (22.3%). From this we may say that the collectivist perception and importance of a family is very important for South Koreans (Kim, 2006, p. 263-264).

Analysing the variables FAMDINN on frequency of supper with family and FAMLEIS on frequency of leisure activities with family I could answer how the family spend times together. These variables were measured on the scale of 1-7 with values: from “Daily”, “Several times a week”, “About once a week”, “About once a month”, “Several times a year”, “About once a year” to “Less than once a year”. For the first variable, the frequency of having supper together with family members among the total 1605 respondents answered “daily” with 38.6%. The second 397 responds with 24.7% several times a week and third 13.6% about once a week (Kim, 2006, p. 264). For the second variable regarding frequency of leisure activities with family, the frequency and distribution of answered were somewhat different to the previous question. The most respondents (348) answered that the family leisure activity they have about once a month, 21.7%. The second most frequent was about once a week with 327 respondents (20.4%) and on the third highest place was value 5 – Several times a year with 258 responds and 16.1%. Seeing results from these two variables, the South Korean families were frequently having a supper rather than having a family leisure time, which was rather once a month or once a week.

Variable IDLCHDN on ideal number of children for family, the respondents answered that having 2 children would be the best (748 respondents with 46.6%). The second was having 3 children with frequency of 505 respondents with 31.5%. The third most frequent answer was 4 children with 183 responds (11.4%), which was ahead of having 1 child with 86 responds (5.4%). And only 11 respondents (0.7%) among 1,605 answered that 0 children are the best (Kim, 2006, p. 33-34). Deducing from this variable, I may imply that the Korean society perceives having children as an important part linked to family. While the ideal number of children per family on average would be 2.

Variable on Political ideology (PARTYLR) with values 1-5 from Very liberal to Very conservative showed that the overall 1,605 showed rather tilted towards more conservative rather to liberal. However, the most frequent answer was Neither liberal nor conservative with 521 responds and 32.5%. The second most frequent answer was somewhat conservative, and the third place acquired somewhat liberal. The fourth place was “very conservative and the last place was “very liberal” (Kim, 2006, p. 19). Nevertheless. I reckon that South Korean society perceives itself as more conservative rather liberal considering the political ideology.

FAMVAL2 variables investigates about the perception of South Koreans on having children in marriage. From a scale of 1-7, from strongly agree to strongly disagree, the respondents showed clearly that marriage should be a precondition to have children (Kim, 2006, p. 255).

FAMVAL3 and FAMVAL4 show that both men and women in general are perceived as happier being married rather single. However, among men the most dominant value was fairly agree with 386 responds (24%), among women was rather neutral – neither agree nor disagree with 416 respondents with an estimate of 25.9%. Therefore, evaluating FAMVAL variables, the marriage is considered an obligation to have children. On the other hand, men are perceived to be happier than women. Presumably because women take the most responsibility on childrearing and housework (Kim, 2006, p. 255-256).

Variables CONJPWR1-3 show about who makes decisions on children’s education and discipline, supporting parents or purchasing high-cost items the couples decided equally on these matters (Kim, 2006, p. 276-277).

Variables SEXROLE1-4 show the perception of roles between men and women, how the breadwinner x caregiver dichotomy should be according to South Koreans. How the distribution of housework looks like and if male workers are more favorable to female workers while laid offs during recession (Kim, 2006, p. 258-260).

SEXROLE1 and question whether husband’s career should have priority over wife’s showed that the majority of 1,605 respondents answered to somewhat agree with 345 responds and 21.5%, however, the second most frequent answer was “somewhat disagree” with 311 responds with 19.4%. The third was fairly agree with 15.7%, fourth neither agree nor disagree with 13.8% and fifth strongly agree with 13.6% (Kim, 2006, p. 258).

SEXROLE2 variable the results on husband's role as breadwinner and wife as caregiver were as follow. The majority answered that "somewhat disagree" with 335 responds (20.9%). However, the second place was "somewhat agree" with 296 responds (18.4%) and third was neither agree nor disagree with 246 responds (15.3%). The fourth place was "fairly disagree" with 217 responds (13.5%), the fifth place was "fairly agree" with 199 responds (12.4%), sixth place was "strongly agree" with 180 responds (11.2%) and last seventh place was "strongly disagree" with 127 responds (7.9%). Also 5 people answered that they don't know. In sum, the majority showed rather a disagreement, but the disagreement was very close, 42,3 to 42, if we omit the neutral 15.3% and DK 0.3% (Kim, 2006, p. 259).

SEXROLE3 on men should do more housework than they do now, showed a clear majority of respondents showing that the most work in household lies on wife's and therefore men should contribute more on housework. The first place was "somewhat agree" (37%), second fairly agree (25%) and third was neither agree nor disagree (16.9%) (Kim, 2006, p. 259).

In variable SEXROLE4 on if it's alright to lay off women over men in recession showed a clear disagreement in this matter. The majority showed "strong disagree" with 411 responds (25.6%), second was 353 responds (22.0%) and third was 342 responds (21.3%) (Kim, 2006, p. 259).

Analysing the SEXROLE1-4 variables showed that the society is for favoring husband's career over wife's career. Presumably of stigma in the society, that older conservative people are for male breadwinner and female caregiver distribution. Also, the stigma in South Korea in utilizing parental leaves by men showed a negative acceptance in the society, often perceived as selfish, especially among colleagues at the workplace (Kim, Kim, 2019, p.10, 12). On the other hand, the dichotomy male breadwinner and women caregiver dichotomy and stereotype is not being accepted in the society. Also, men should contribute more on the housework and women being laid off during recession is not ok, more precisely is strongly disagreed in the society.

KGSS 2012 Codebook

Analysing this codebook, I found more information considering South Korean perception on their lives from social welfare, family life satisfaction, their opinion on paid leave, gender roles, such as division of work and family etc.

Variable HLPRT3 on finding help on problems on Housework, Childcare, or Elderly Care the most respondents among 1,396 answered that in the last time they asked Co-residence family with 847 respondents, 60.7%, the second highest were that they did not seek any help with 166 responds, 11.9% and third were finding help from other relatives with 86 responds, 6.2% (Kim, 2012, p. 263).

Question considering Political ideology, the respondents as well as in KGSS 2006 inclined to being more conservative on the scale of very liberal to very conservative. Although the most frequent answer was “neither liberal nor conservative” with 28.9%, summing up all the valid responds it inclined to being more conservative with 33% over 31.5% as liberal (Kim, 2012, p. 20).

Variable WELFSPD on whether South Korea needs to increase or decrease the social welfare spending, the respondents (1,396) answered in majority that the social welfare should be “increased a little bit” – 580 responds (41.5%) (Kim, 2012, p. 21).

Variable APPCCSXB was whether a boy or a girl was preferred if it would be the only child. The most responds (602) showed that girl (43.1%) is preferrable, while 21.3% had no preference (Kim, 2012, p. 28).

Variable WGSTAB shows how the respondents perceive their job post stable. The question was if they may keep their job for as long as they want. Among 1,396 responds 381 responded “yes”, however, 941 have not answered, which was 67.4% (Kim, 2012, p. 149). From this we may deduce that people feel rather uncertain about their work position. Although they wish their working position would be stable, the economic uncertainty and other factors may hinder to firmly say their working position is secure.

In variable MAWRKWRH the respondents showed that a working mother may have a warm relationship with a child (Kim, 2012, p. 208-209). However, in variables KIDSUFFR, FAMSUFFR the respondents agreed that pre-school kids and family suffer under working mothers (Kim, 2012, p. 209-210).

On the other hand, in the variable HOMEKID – if women’s preference is to stay at home with children, respondents showed rather close answers between agree (24.7%) and disagree (24.4%), but more agreed on this (Kim, 2012, p. 210). HOUSEWRK asked whether being a housewife is satisfying. Here, clearly majority answered, “strongly agree” (44.6%) and only little 1.6% strongly disagreed (1.6%) (Kim, 2012, p. 210-211).

Nevertheless, according to TWOINCS, the most respondents agreed on both husband and wife contributing to the household income with 580 responds (41.5%) (Kim, 2012, p. 211).

The traditional dichotomy: men should work, and women should stay at home was closely disagreed, with the most frequent answer “disagree” with 27.7% (Kim, 2012, p. 211-212). However, the view on marriage as an obligatory precondition to have children remains as in the previous surveys. The “strong agreement” with 652 responds among 1,396 responds almost consisting of 50% (46.7%) shows relatively strong position towards this topic. Moreover, the second highest was “agree” with 33.2% (Kim, 2012, p. 213). The same position was regarding cohabitation without intention to get married. Variable COHABOK shows that 30.8% were strongly disagreeing and 30.6% were disagreeing with this question (Kim, 2012, p. 214).

On question (FEMWK1) whether a mother should work with a pre-school child, the respondents answered that it is better to stay at home. However, this answer was very close to “work part-time”. To work full-time only agreed 9.4% (Kim, 2012, p. 212). On question whether a woman should work after her youngest child goes to school, the respondents were for part-time work (51.4%), the next was to work full-time (30.9%) and only 13.6% were for staying at home (Kim, 2012, p. 212).

According to respondents, the ideal number of children (IDLCHDN) stays traditionally to 2 children with 43.8%, just after the 3 children was considered as ideal with 35% and on the third place 1 child with 4.3%, and 3.9% of people were in favor to have 5 children (Kim, 2012, p. 216-217).

Variables KIDFINA and KIDCARR clearly show on the scale of 1-5 from strongly agree to strongly disagree, that the majority respondents “agree” on children being both financial burden (41.6%) and restricting the employment and career prospects (43.6%) (Kim, 2012, p. 218).

On the other hand, the KIDJOY variable clearly shows that the respondents “strongly agree” (45.9%) that watching children grow up is the greatest joy. Second most frequent answer was “agree” with 39.5% (Kim, 2012, p. 217). From these variables on children, I may conclude that children are considered as financial burden, also having children may restrict career chances and employment, especially from the mother’s side. Nevertheless, most respondents agree that having children and watching them grow is the greatest joy.

Variables on paid leave (PALEA, PALEATIM, PALEAWHO and PALEABAL) show that most respondents consider paid leave as a necessity. Furthermore, 12 month is the most preferable duration of taking leaves. The main funder of paid leaves should be government with an employer. The division of paid leave should be distributed this way:

mothers should take the most, however, fathers should partly take as well (Kim, 2012, p. 220-222).

Analysing FAMWOR1 and FAMWOR2 regarding the division of work between mother and father the best and the worst options were. The best option: closely “mother works part-time and father work full-time” (42.8%) with “mother stays at home and father works full-time” (42.2%) (Kim, 2012, p. 223). On the other hand, the worst option is “the father stays at home and mother works full-time” (52.5%) and “both mother and father work full-time” (33.0%) (Kim, 2012, p. 223). Observing these results, I may interpret that both full-time working parents is considered bad for the family life. On the other hand, the worst is considered full-time working mother and father staying at home. This may be linked with the stigma and negatively perceived stereotype and traditional division of gender roles where the husband should be the breadwinner and wife a caregiver.

Variables CHDWHO and CHDPAY were concerning the childcare and childcare funding. Especially who should be the most responsible for childcare and childcare funding. While more than 50% of respondents said that the family members do take the most responsibility of children under school age (56.6%), the second most frequent was government agencies (27.5%) (Kim, 2012, p. 224). However, the funding on childcare should be provided by the government and public funds according to the results. 55.9% of respondents were for the government/public funds, 38.3% were for the family and lastly, the employers for only 5.8% (Kim, 2012, p. 224).

Here, we may see clearly that respondents agree on the family responsibility of childrearing, especially of the pre-school children. The responsibility of childcare goes predominantly to the parents and family members. On the other hand, they wish the Government and public funds should provide subsidies to childcare.

KGSS 2003-2018 Cumulative Codebook

This cumulative data survey shows the 2003-2018 cumulative data, which were later in year 2019 published. Not every year the data were given or collected; therefore, I'll work with data from years I have. Via investigating this data I may see how the cultural perception of traditional gender roles, patriarchal values, regarding father's authority, obedience, respect, and honor to parents' changes. Also, the preference of a son will be analysed as well as the importance of marriage as a precondition to having children. Lastly,

the overall opinion on cohabitation will be analysed. At the end, I will give my interpretation.

SEXROLE1 variable on whether the wife should support husband’s career for the sake of her career. From values 1-7, from strongly agree to strongly disagree and distribution in years 2006, 2008, 2016 and 2018 show how the opinions have change in time. We may observe that in years 2006 and 2008 the husband’s career was in favor over wife’s career. However, starting from year 2016 and later in 2018 the opposite opinions prevail. See the table 1 below.

Table 1: SEXROLE1: “It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to pursue her own career?”

RESPONSE	PUNCH	03-05	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2018	TOTAL
Strongly agree	1	-	16.1	-	19.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.9	7.6	3.4
Fairly agree	2	-	18.0	-	20.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.2	10.5	3.9
Somewhat agree	3	-	24.9	-	25.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.5	15.0	5.5
Neither agree nor disagree	4	-	16.9	-	18.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.5	17.7	4.6
Somewhat disagree	5	-	22.5	-	14.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.0	20.8	4.9
Fairly disagree	6	-	0.5	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	15.7	1.0
Strongly disagree	7	-	0.7	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	12.7	0.9
DK	-8	-	0.4	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.0	0.1
IAP	-1	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	75.8
N		4240	1605	1431	1508	1599	1576	1535	1396	1294	1370	1051	1031	19636

* SHOW CARD

Source: Kim et al., 2019, p. 591

SEXROLE2 variable on the traditional gender role distribution of husband as money earner and wife as caregiver and home keeper resulted as follows. Compared to the KGSS 2006 data, the results in 2016 were distributed towards more for disagreement. Among 1,051 respondents the disagreement side became dominant (Kim et al., 2019, p. 592).

Table 2: SEXROLE2 “Opinions on gender roles: A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family”

RESPONSE	PUNCH	03-05	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2018	TOTAL
Strongly agree	1	-	11.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.3	-	1.3
Fairly agree	2	-	13.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.2	-	1.6
Somewhat agree	3	-	17.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.5	-	2.3
Neither agree nor disagree	4	-	15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.6	-	2.2
Somewhat disagree	5	-	21.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.5	-	2.9
Fairly disagree	6	-	13.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.6	-	1.9
Strongly disagree	7	-	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.2	-	1.4
DK	-8	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.0
IAP	-1	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	86.5
N		4240	1605	1431	1508	1599	1576	1535	1396	1294	1370	1051	1031	19636

* SHOW CARD
 *** KEYWORD: Job, Money, Family, Family Members

Source: Kim et al., 2019, p. 592

SEXROLE3 on men’s contribution in the housework showed no other data as in KGSS 2006. SEXROLE4 variable on women’s lay off in favor over men’s lay off during recession showed no change in the overall perception of the respondents. In overall

distribution the 30.1% among 1051 respondents were strongly against women being laid off prior to men (Kim et al., 2019, p. 592).

PATRACH1 variable on patriarchy shows rather a weakening trend of father’s authority as being respected in all circumstances. However, the table below shows still strong perception of South Koreans on the authority of father.

Table 3: PATRACH1 “Opinion on patriarchy: The authority of father in a family should be respected under any circumstances”

RESPONSE	PUNCH	03-05	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2018	TOTAL
Strongly agree	1	-	32.1	-	26.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.6	12.4	6.4
Fairly agree	2	-	28.6	-	25.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.5	19.7	6.7
Somewhat agree	3	-	23.2	-	27.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	32.8	26.7	7.2
Neither agree nor disagree	4	-	6.5	-	9.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.7	14.4	2.7
Somewhat disagree	5	-	6.8	-	7.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.4	14.4	2.2
Fairly disagree	6	-	1.6	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	7.6	0.8
Strongly disagree	7	-	0.9	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	4.9	0.5
DK	-8	-	0.3	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.0	0.1
IAP	-1	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	73.5
N		4240	1605	1431	1508	1599	1576	1535	1396	1294	1370	1051	1031	19636

* SHOW CARD
 *** KEYWORD: Family, Authority

Source: Kim et al., 2019, p. 592

Also, in the variable PATRACH2 and the opinion on the children, whether they should make efforts to bring honor to their parents showed that the agreement on this state is weakening, especially from year 2018. The reason why it has weakened in 2018 compared to 2016 is questionable. Nevertheless, in overall general result, the society still agrees that children should bring honor to parents (Kim et al., 2019, p. 593).

Variables PATRACH3 and PATRACH4 didn’t show new data since 2006 on children inheriting parent’s property. However, variable PATRACH5 on patrilineal continuation of family line showed that in years 2006 and 2016 the respondents mostly agreed on having son as an argument of family line continuation. On the other hand, in year 2018 it showed rather inverse opinions. Among 1,031 respondents the predominant answer was value 5 – somewhat disagree 20.6%, the second was neither agree nor disagree with 19.1% and third was fairly disagree with 18.9%. Nevertheless, in total sum-up of 19,636 respondents the agreement on having son as a family line continuation prevails, winning 8.1% over 6.6%, while 81.2% were “inapplicable” (IAP) (Kim et al., 2019, p. 593).

Variable AUTHORT5, whether teaching children on obeying and respecting authority is the most important virtue showed in 2016 data collection, that respondents mostly answered against it (Kim et al, 2019, p. 218).

Variable HAZA11 on Low birth rate as a life cycle risk will affect the respondent showed that it will likely have no effect on them in both available data from years 2013 and 2014.

In 2013 the majority of 1294 respondents answered neither or nor with 24.6%. In year 2014 with 26.5% (Kim et al., 2019, p. 315).

Variable concerning the preference of a child showed how the preference on son has been overtaken by the preference on a girl. While the years 2003-2008 showed rather dominant stance for son preference, the traditional son preference has changed since 2012 (Kim et al., 2019, p. 558). For more information see the table below.

Table 4: APPCCSXB “Preference for the gender of a child”

RESPONSE	PUNCH	03-05	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2018	TOTAL
A boy	1	11.3	42.4	-	43.2	-	-	-	30.3	28.7	27.6	-	-	15.2
A girl	2	9.6	34.0	-	39.9	-	-	-	46.9	47.4	45.1	-	-	17.5
No preference	3	9.5	23.5	-	16.3	-	-	-	22.8	23.3	27.3	-	-	10.3
DK	-8	0.6	0.2	-	0.6	-	-	-	0.0	0.5	0.0	-	-	0.2
IAP	-1	69.1	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	56.8
N		4240	1605	1431	1508	1599	1576	1535	1396	1294	1370	1051	1031	19636

** 2004 RESPONSE: A boy, A girl, DOESN'T MATTER

*** KEYWORD: Children

Source: Kim et al., 2019, p. 558

Variable IDLCHDN14 shows how the ideal number of children remained in 2014 same as in KGSS in year 2006, which was in favor of 2 children.

Variable THRGEN show rather desirability of respondents to live in a 3 generational house. In both years 2006 and 2008, the available data shows that 56.6% and 61% of respondents were in favor of living in 3 generational houses consisting of grandparents, their children, and grandchildren (Kim et al., 2019, p. 558).

HOUSEWRK variable on whether role as housewife is just fulfilling as working showed that the two most dominant answers – strongly agree and agree prevailed in all three data years: 2003-2005, 2012 and 2016 (Kim et al., 2019, p. 543).

MARLEGIT variable shows the people’s opinion on marriage, whether marriage should be a precondition to have children. The response was as follows: 2003-2005 the majority answered “Agree” 11.9%, 69% were inapplicable. In 2012 the most dominant answer was “Strongly agree” with 42.6% and second agree with 34.8% (Kim et al., 2019, p. 546).

Analysing the variable on cohabitation without intending to marry were perceived negatively by the respondents. In both years of data collection: 2003-2005 and 2012, the majority showed disagreement on this topic (Kim et al., 2019, p. 546). The question was also put differently (COHABFST), whether is all right if a couple who intend to get married live together first. The most respondents agreed with 9.2%, however among 4240 respondents in year 2003-2005, 69% were inapplicable. However, in general the

respondents were against it, as they take cohabitation as a for married couples (7.3 disagree, 6.8 strongly disagree).

Table 5: MARLEGIT “Opinions of marriage: People who want children ought to get married”

RESPONSE	PUNCH	03-05	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2018	TOTAL
Strongly agree	1	8.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	42.6	-	-	-	-	4.8
Agree	2	11.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.8	-	-	-	-	5.0
Neither agree nor disagree	3	4.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.3	-	-	-	-	2.1
Disagree	4	4.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.9	-	-	-	-	1.3
Strongly disagree	5	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.9	-	-	-	-	0.4
DK	-8	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.1
IAP	-1	69.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	86.2
N		4240	1605	1431	1508	1599	1576	1535	1396	1294	1370	1051	1031	19636

* SHOW CARD(12)

*** keyword: Children, Marriage

Source: Kim et al, 2019, p. 546