Abstract

This thesis aim is to investigate the propagation of the term 'Hybrid Warfare' in world politics, more specifically on NATO's discourses and official texts. Granted the argument that the term is unable to convey a concrete strategic doctrine or strategy due to its lack of conceptual fecundity, we argue that nonetheless, the usage of the term serves NATO as an Ontological Security exercise. The reasoning behind this argument is that Hybrid Threats (or war) have the capacity to make NATO ontologically (in)secure due to the latter's inability to respond efficiently. Thus, disrupting the alliance strategy of 'being' - that is a collective defense alliance in charge of security of all members via the Article V of the treaty - and at the same time its strategy of 'doing' which is the ability of the alliance to provide a peaceful and safe Euro-Atlantic region, inside and out. Following our attempted bridging on Hybrid War and NATO's Ontological Security, we then proceed to explicate policy changes influenced by the former. In order to do so, we chose to employ a three-layered model created by Jakub Eberle and Vladimir Handl which conceptualizes Ontological Security through narratives about the *self*, the *other*, and the overall international *system*. The argument is that when actors are threatened by a crisis, narratives are adjusted in a way that they express continuity in some levels, while enabling change in other levels. Given the argument that NATO's Ontological Security is based on its three core tasks of security, consultation, deterrence and defense, plus partnership and crisis management, we use the model to reconstruct NATO's response to the wars in Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014).